european and regional studies vol. 1, no. 1, 2010

Acta Universitatis SapientiaeThe scientific journal of Sapientia University publishes original papers and surveys

in several areas of sciences written in English.Information about each series can be found at

http://www.acta.sapientia.ro.

Editor-in-ChiefBEGE Antal

[email protected]

Main Editorial Board

BIRO A. Zoltan KASA Zoltan KELEMEN AndrasPETHO Agnes VERESS Emod

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae

European and Regional Studies

Executive EditorBODO Barna (Sapientia University, Romania)

[email protected]

Editorial BoardGabriel ANDREESCU (National School of Political and Administrative Studies

Bucharest, Romania)BAYER Jozsef (Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary)BAKK Miklos (Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania)

BERENYI Zoltan (University of Debrecen, Hungary)Vasile DOCEA (West University, Timisoara, Romania)

GERGELY A. Andras (Institute of Political Science, Budapest, Hungary)LUPESCU Radu (Sapientia University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania)

MARACZ Laszlo (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands)Christoph PAN (Sudtiroler Volksgruppen-Institut, Bozen, Italy)SZALAYNE SANDOR Erzsebet (University of Pecs, Hungary)SZILAGYI Istvan (University of Pannonia, Veszprem, Hungary)TONK Marton (Sapientia University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania)

Sapientia University Scientia Publishing House

ISSN 2066-639Xhttp://www.acta.sapientia.ro


European and RegionalStudies

Volume 1, Number 1, 2010

Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania

Scientia Publishing House

Contents

KANTOR ZoltanScience or Politics? Reflections on the Concept of Nation . . . . . . . 5

BAKK Miklos, SZASZ Alpar ZoltanConflict and Convergence: Regionalisation Plans and AutonomyMovements in Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

TORO TiborCompatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines ofCommunism and Nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

BODO BarnaInternal Diaspora – Assimilation – Formation of the InternalDiaspora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Vasile DOCEAHistory, Ideology and Collective Memory. Reconstructing theIdentities of Timisoara by Means of Monographies and StreetNames during the Communist Regime (1947-1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

TONK Marton, NAGY-MEHESZ Tunde, Alexandru Virgil VOICU“Autonomy” of Sport Policy and Sport Activities in the EuropeanUnion: Connections between Human Rights and Sports . . . . . . . 103

Book Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Academy Affairs (News, Events) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

3


European and Regional Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (2010) 5�18

Science or Politics? Re�ections on the

Concept of Nation

KÁNTOR ZoltánPolitical Science Department

Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapestemail: [email protected]

Abstract. There is no single state in Europe that is not based � ina way or another � on the principle of nationality. In di�erent places,in di�erent historical periods nationalism was, and is, present is variousforms. I try to demonstrate that the term `nation' hinders much moresocial analysis, as it helps. The adjectives � political, ethnic, cultural,civic, eastern, western, etc. � do not clarify anything, even more theymislead theoretical thinking and empirical analysis. The issue of de�ni-tion of the nation is not only a scienti�c issue, but a political one too.The real question of social sciences targets the way societies transformand institutionalize. Even the most sophisticated de�nition of the nation(if possible), the most perfect typology does not help us in understandingthe ongoing social processes (globalization, EU enlargement, etc.). Themain reason is that the nation is a static term, imagined as somethingreally existing.

Keywords: nation, nationalism, science

Questions regarding the de�nition of nation have a very long history. The�rst attempts to de�ne the nation can be dated to the middle of the 19th

century. Even if the term was employed earlier, no de�nition with scienti�cintent can be recorded.After the breakdown of the communist regimes in East-Central Europe, a

new debate has arisen. Social scientists focused foremost on explaining post-communist nationalism. Later, at the end of the millennium, kin-state activitybrought into the light again debates on the de�nition of nation. Is the na-tion political or cultural, which would be the de�nition states should adopt,

6 Kántor Zoltán

and � not least � who, and based on which criteria, belongs or does not belongto a nation.Ever since the signing of the peace treaties that put an end to World War I,

minority rights and the settlement of minority questions have been a constantproblem on the international agenda. Looking at the issue in retrospect, itmight sound quite surprising that the concept of nation, especially the dilemmaof a clear-cut de�nition, only raised public attention in the late 20th century.This process was launched by a debate that evolved around the international-ization of the Hungarian status law. The legal and public debate in Hungarytouched upon the de�nition of the Hungarian nation itself. The con�ict withneighboring countries such as Romania and Slovakia put the question of nationinto the limelight. The last attempt to de�ne nation on European level wasmade by a report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.1

If we analyze the problem deeper, we have to see that both science and pol-itics are engaged in the game of de�ning nation. The issue of the de�nitionof nation is not only a scienti�c issue, but a political one, too. Moreover, itseems that science has misplaced the emphasis: for a century or more socialscientists attempted to de�ne the nation, however � at least this is my point �the de�nition of nation is not a crucial social scienti�c question! The real ques-tion of social sciences target how societies transform and institutionalize. Ourmain interest is how we can describe and interpret social change. For this weneed concepts, and one of these concepts is the nation. Nation is regarded asa central concept, what � in my view � is at least problematic. I consider thatthe central concept should be nationalism, and we should interpret national-ism as a neutral concept that describes the institutionalization of societies onnational basis, recalling the nation as a central value.It is worth reconsidering what has been written on the concept of nation since

the �rst attempts to de�ne and typologize it. One must not forget that thearticle of Ernest Renan is an answer to the German historians who legitimizedthe conquest of Alsace-Loraine, invoking the objective elements that may de�nea nation. Renan's answer is built on the subjective element of a de�nition, butone has not to forget that his main goal was to delegitimize the conquest. Wemay say that one of the �rst debates on the de�nition of nation was not ofscienti�c but of political interest.Nationalism, as a perpetual project, institutionalizes the polity invoking

the nation and involves a permanent de�nition and rede�nition of boundaries.

1Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: The concept of �nation� Recommen-dation 1735 (2006). Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 January 2006 (7th Sitting).

Science or Politics? Re�ections on the Concept of Nation 7

Since modernity, societies are institutionalized on a national basis, which isvalid for both majorities and minorities. In Europe arguably everyone is na-tionalized. In Ernest Gellner's words: modern man is nationalist, and he/sheis nationalist because he/she has to be. Nationalism is more than discourse orideology, it is also institutionalization: a de�nition with consequences for theorganization of society.The modern state is the protagonist of nationalism, and minorities answer

with the same means. We hardly can encounter any group in Europe that doesnot de�ne itself in national terms.Tom Nairn's remark shows how central nationalism is in the contemporary

world: �[Gellner] demonstrated how industrialization produced modern politi-cal nationalities; yet did not go on to suggest that the true subject of modernphilosophy might be, not industrialization as such, but its immensely complexand variegated aftershock - nationalism.� (Naim 1997: 1)Nationalism, according to most scholars, came into being in the 18-19th

centuries. Since then societies have been organized based on the principleof nationality. The invocation of �nation� is perhaps the main legitimizingprinciple. Nationalism is inherently related to culture. Nationalism comesinto being when culture replaces structure (Gellner 1983). George Schöp�instates: �All cultures are collective; they include and exclude; they give us aparticular set of identities; they allow us to make sense of the world; theyo�er us collective regulation and collective forms of knowledge; and they arebounded. These boundaries may shift but they will not vanish. They protectthe culture in question and act as a �lter through which new ideas are receivedand integrated. In addition, all cultures rely on broadly similar mechanismsto keep themselves in being. If threatened, they will redouble their e�orts toprotect cultural reproduction.� (Schöp�in 2006)Nationalism emerged �rst in Western Europe as a consequence of major

transformations, explained di�erently by the major authors. Gellner considersthat nationalism is the outcome of the transition from agrarian society to in-dustrial society, (Gellner 1983) while Benedict Anderson detects the emergenceof national consciousness � the nation as an imagined community � as a resultof the �convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversityof human language�. (Anderson 1983) In all these cases a new legitimation ofthe state occurred by institutionalizing nationalism as a principle of organizingsociety. Since nationalism emerged, the organization of societies is (also) basedon the principle of nationality. In this respect, we may consider every Euro-pean society as being nationalist. In the age of modernization, states tendedto homogenize ethnically their societies, doing this in various ways. Eugene

8 Kántor Zoltán

Weber, in his famous book, describes the way France linguistically (and na-tionally) homogenized the inhabitants of the country. Similar processes can beobserved in other parts of Europe.States, societies and culture became increasingly institutionalized. The stan-

dardization of language, the creation of high culture, the introduction of com-pulsory education and the nationalization of culture served the titular nation.Non-dominant ethnic groups intended to create their own nation, with leadersfrom that particular nation, and intended to have their own state. The na-tionalists' programs and projects of nation-building/nationalizing usually wereformulated and made in opposition to dominant groups/nations and other na-tionalizing processes. That is the reason why one can speak about ancienthatreds, old and lasting con�icts. The change of state authority, of borders,created newer and newer frameworks, the former masters became servants andusually experienced similar treatment to what they had been responsible forwhen they had been the masters. The breakdown of empires, the division ofstates, and transitions recon�gured political power and o�ered new frameworksfor nationalist politics.According to Walker Connor, in Europe there are only two ethnically ho-

mogeneous states: Ireland and Portugal. (Connor 1994) All the other statesinclude national minorities or ethnic groups. The majority of the Europeanstates have co-nationals living in other states. This is due to the peculiarity ofEuropean history. Those states that have co-nationals (kin-minorities) in otherstates have adopted a policy that supports � �nancially, culturally, or even po-litically � their kin-minorities. The support of kin-minorities is based on theidea of the nation as an ethno-cultural entity, not on the political conceptionof it. It is assumed that the co-nationals have, or should have a special relationwith the kin-state. The historical process of nation-formation can easily ex-plain this, from the 18th century on. Nations have been formed and have beeninstitutionalized. A sense of national identity emerged within the populationusually due to the (often painful and aggressive) process of nation-building.Forging the nation, (Colley, 1992) nationalizing culture (Löfgren 1989) andfabricating heritage (Lowenthal 1998) are the concepts scholars use to describethe process of national/ethnic homogenization. The French process of mak-ing Frenchmen from peasants, (Weber 1979) the Scandinavian culture-builders(Frykman-Löfgren 1987) and the politics of the Polish nationalizing state allre�ect the state-driven nationalizing processes. In the 19th and 20th centuriessuch politics created the modern European nation-states. A strong sense ofnational identity developed within the national groups in this way. Standard-ization of the language, o�cial culture, mass-education and ethnic cleansing


led to further homogenization and strengthened the signi�cance of nationalidentity.The history of nationalism in East-Central Europe can be best understood

if we analyze the di�erent � i.e., of the majority and of the minority � nation-building, or nationalizing processes. An important role in the nationalizingprocess of the national minority is played by the external national homeland.As the borders of states have often changed, di�erent groups have experiencedat di�erent times the assimilationist or dissimilationist politics of the titularnation. In other words, they were the su�ering subjects of nation-building pro-cesses, frequently with disastrous outcomes. A description of such policies ispresented by Michael Mann, and a theoretical account (Mann 1999: 18-45) de-scribing the mechanisms is o�ered by John McGarry � the settlement of major-ity groups in peripheral regions inhabited by minorities, relocation of minoritygroups within the state and expulsion of minorities from the state. (McGarry1998: 613-638) Basically, every national minority which was once a componentof the majority nation, or expressed nation-building goals within the new state,or at least showed a danger regarding the nation-building/nationalizing of themajority, experienced one or several of the processes described.One possible approach to national con�icts in Eastern Europe is to stress the

parallel and often con�icting processes of nation-building. Once the ideal ofnation becomes important, there does not seem to be any sign that it will loseits signi�cance. Nationalism may be transformed, but it remains an importantorganizational principle in our world. Nationalist politics is oriented partiallyon the strengthening of boundaries of the titular/majority nation, and by moreor less hostile politics against national minorities.As we see, for most scholars of nationalism, the crucial question is how

and when nationalism emerged. We rarely �nd de�nitions on nation in theworks of the major scholars. This suggests � at least in my opinion � that onemay analyze the social processes without de�ning nation. We have to startscholarly encounters with understanding the social processes and not the otherway around: with the de�nition of the nation. Gellner and Hobsbawm bothconsider that nationalism created the nation. In this way, the nation is theresult of nationalization, basically the outcome of the institutionalization ofthe society on national basis, or � in other words � the result of socializationon national basis. From this perspective it is indi�erent whether a particularnation is cultural or political. It depends on the way how the state or thepolitical elite shaped its politics.However, we have to go further. In my essay, I am going to ask the inevitable

question whether the concept of nation has ever been a scienti�c issue or it

10 Kántor Zoltán

emerged as a political one since the �rst de�nition of nation appeared. Theproblem remains in what theoretical framework and with which scienti�c meansquestions related to the nation could be analyzed, especially those with respectto status law and the referendum on dual citizenship. First of all, one has toemphasize that we analyze not a scienti�c question but a political process inwhich the de�nition of nation has been given a central role. Our researchquestion could refer to what a nation really is, how it could be de�ned andhow a typology of nations could be constructed. I use the conditional heresince in my opinion, as opposed to numerous experts, the de�nition of nationhas never been a question of (social) science. We can also add that a precisescienti�c de�nition of nation or a precise typology would not get us closer toa better understanding of social and political processes, either.The de�nition of a certain nation has political consequences as a given state

institutionalizes its society and de�nes its relations to minorities living withinits borders and fellow nationals living beyond its borders based on a conceptthat the state itself accepts. This has far-reaching political consequences. Theattitude of a state to its own national question has di�erent outcomes basedon whether the concept of political or cultural nation is used as a startingpoint. According to the cultural identity/de�nition, a nation involves thoseliving outside the borders of a given state as well, taking them to belong tothe majoritarian/titular nation, but this also implies that minorities that liveon the territories of this state are not part of that particular nation. Thepolitical de�nition regards people living in one state as the members of thenation, namely all citizens living on state territory, independent from ethnicor national origin. Those living beyond the borders of the majoritarian/titularnation are, however, not part of this particular nation. Based on the criteria ofscienti�c thinking, the concept of nation of a given state should be coherent.Law also demands a similar coherence as harmony should prevail amongst lawsof a state, as a matter of principle. Political practice o�ers a di�erent picture.We can notice that the relation of states towards minorities living on stateterritories and fellow nationals de�es any scienti�c criteria or legal coherence.Those who claim that nationalism appeared again after the regime changes

in the region are fundamentally wrong. Nationalism has always been presentin Western Europe as much as in Central-Eastern Europe. Politicians of theregime changes did not use nation-based state reuni�cation as a political slo-gan, one can only �nd some references to the overall respect of the rights ofnational and ethnic minorities. In the light of the above, it might have seemedsurprising that a nationalist rhetoric overwhelmed the public sphere only fewmonths after the regime changes. The birth of democratic institutions have


fuelled intense debates in some states, while others shared a common under-standing towards the national self-identi�cation of states and rights to be givento or taken away from minorities.It is obvious that post-communist societies, Western European politicians

and opinion-maker (elites) were shocked by the emergence of nationalist rhetoricin the public sphere, and the wars in Yugoslavia and con�icts following thebreakup of the Soviet Union were often labelled `ethnic'. These were all partof the transition process. Every social transition and revolution, may it be vel-vet or bloody, is accompanied by a political restructuring along national lines.It was not only the democratic institutions, market economy etc. that had tobe created, an answer regarding the national characteristics of a state had to beconstructed as well. The re-de�nition of a state does not only mean that, fromtoday on, the former communist/socialist state will be a market economy andthe former one-party system will be a multi-party system etc. The state, pre-viously calling itself socialist, that managed to solve the minority question hadto face the fact that national minorities became more engaged on its territoryand it had to accept that a decisive part of the political elite belonging to themajority (sometimes its de�ning majority) wished to continue nation-buildingthat was de�ned as �un�nished�.2 Regardless whether this process involvedalterations to the old constitutions or constitutional national assemblies thatedited a new constitution, the political elite had to provide a political answerconcerning the rights to be given to national identities, what its stance towardsfellow nationals living beyond its borders was and, last but not least, what thenational self-determination would look like. The vast majority of states in theregion opted for a �nation-state� identity and politics. (Culic 2003: 38-58)One can hardly �nd a state in Europe where the problem of national minoritydoes not �gure at least occasionally on the political agenda. The protection ofnational minorities and the de�nition of national/ethnic minorities have notuntil recently been linked to the issue of the de�nition of motherland and ofnation itself. From the viewpoint of a researcher, this is a clear misunderstand-ing of the problem, from a political standpoint, however, the linkages are easyto construct. Social sciences investigate the evolution of nationalism and theorganization of (majoritarian and minoritarian) societies on a national basis,

2These are exactly the reasons why Central-Eastern European left-wing parties face issuesrelated to nation, since antinationalist politics (or political rhetorics) was deeply embeddedin successor parties as well. It lasts until recent days despite the fact that a part of today'sleft-wing political elite does not claim any continuity with the socialist party. The otherreason why the left-wing has a hard time conceptualising its nation concept is that it wasmainly `pre-reserved' by the left-wing.

12 Kántor Zoltán

while politics seeks solutions to given questions. Politics on minority protec-tion in the EU that are based on governmental considerations do not approachminority rights from the standpoint of minorities but look at stability �rst.(Kymlicka 2004; Majtényi 2004)

For about one or two centuries, literature on the concept of nation has beentrying to de�ne what a nation really is, but the attempt has constantly raninto some methodological obstacles. The way Daniele Conversi puts it is veryprecise: `Nationalism is both a process of border maintenance and creation.Hence, it is a process of de�nition. One of the problems stemming from thelack of a universally acceptable de�nition of the nation and of nationalismderives precisely from the fact that the nation is itself a tool of de�nition'.(Conversi 1977: 77) Scholarly questions, on the other hand, refer to the de-scription of processes and �nding the most appropriate theoretical frameworkfor their analysis: in my view, this framework is best called nationalism andnation-building. We can only agree with Rogers Brubaker, who draws ourattention to the fact that �We should not ask 'what is a nation' but rather:how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized withinand among states? How does nation work as practical category, as classi�-catory scheme, as cognitive frame? What makes the use of that category byor against states more or less resonant or e�ective? What makes the nation-evoking, nation-invoking e�orts of political entrepreneurs more or less likely tosucceed?� (Brubaker 1996: 16) If we accept therefore that our questions donot refer to the nation but to social processes, national typology becomes asecondary question. Brubaker mainly states, and we have all reasons to agree,that social processes can be understood even without the real de�nition of na-tion. Nation is only interesting regarding the nation concept based on whichthe given state institutionalizes its society and regulates relations between fel-low nationals within and beyond the borders. In this respect, we can alreadytalk about politics resting on a political and/or cultural concept of the nationand about politics institutionalized according to these. In order to �nd outwhich national concept a state prefers, one has to look at the constitution, thelaw on citizenship and the laws applied to fellow nationals.3

The history and political practice of nationalism is the politics of acceptanceand discrimination. The de�nition of nation is the result of and not the rea-son for this process. Nationalism, as a value-neutral and process-descriptivescienti�c concept, can also be de�ned as a political �ght for the o�cial deter-mination of what the nation is (and the political practice stemming from this

3Party laws and laws for education and culture can serve as further reference.


�ght). The concept of nation and the settlement of the relation between nationand state changes depending on the way a certain political party/side/ideologyde�nes those who belong to the nation and those to be discriminated. Thisintention can be traced in the constitution, the citizenship law, the minoritylaw, the `status law' and laws related to education, culture etc. The nationconcept of a certain state can basically be excellently derived from these lawsand regulations.

Until the middle of the twentieth century, social sciences regarded the de�ni-tion of nation as a central problem. The theory of Ernest Gellner has pointedout that the central concept of social sciences is nationalism, not nation. Thatis when emphasis was transferred from the de�nition of the �real essence� ofnation and nation typologies to the analysis of social institutionalization. Theproblematic nature of any de�nition of the nation had already revealed itselfin the nineteenth century, leading many scholars to try to specify the con-cept by linking nation and nationalism with a given characteristic. That ishow classical typologies that still have not lost their political power were born.Concerning typologies, the debate is mainly about whether objective or sub-jective features are decisive in delineating a nation. Approaches in favor ofthe de�nitive nature of objective factors list culture, language or religion asnational characteristics. They further suppose, however, that the mere ex-istence of these objective criteria does not alone generate a certain nationalidentity. Subjective approaches, not denying the importance of certain ob-jective characteristics, look at belonging to a nation as the most importantthing: one can only talk about a nation when the ones belonging to it claimand feel that they are part of that. It is without a doubt necessary to havesome kind of objective features, but we do not �nd any that would satisfy theneeds of a theoretical de�nition. The debate between these two preconcep-tions is the centerpiece of Ernest Renan's classical study. (Renan 1995) Thisessay is regarded as the �rst formulation of the objective and the subjectivede�nition of nation. Although the terminology changed, the debate still ragedon amongst various representatives of sciences. Renan was contributing to theFranco-German historical debate following the annexation of Alsace-Lorraineand argued that the occupied territories belonged to France4. In the debate,

4See more details: Finkielkraut, Alain: A gondolkodás veresége. [The Defeat of the Mind]Budapest: Osiris, 1996. 39-47. Pokol, Béla: A nemzet fogalmának átértelmezése? [Reinter-preting the concept of nation?] In Médiahatalom. Budapest: Windsor, 1995. Ádám, Péter:Renan nemzetfelfogása: Elzász-Lotharingiától a nemzeti önrendelkezésig, [The nation con-cept of Renan: From Alsace-Lorraine to national self-determination] In Mi a nemzet? Bu-dapest: Akadémiai, 1998. Smith, Anthony D.: Nationalism and the Historians. International

14 Kántor Zoltán

all arguments are listed that are also typical of later interpretations and de�-nition attempts. It is therefore important to note that the �rst debate on thereal nature of nation is not a scienti�c but a political one about a provincechanging hands! Friedrich Meinecke, (Meinecke 1970,10) Hans Kohn, (Kohn1994: 162-165) John Plamenatz (Plamenatz 1973: 23-36) all o�er di�erenttypologies that are actually based on the same thought. They di�erentiate be-tween political and cultural, Western and Eastern and civil and ethnic nations.We also have to see that their arguments rest on strong normative presump-tions. The �good� and �right� political nation is opposed to the �inappropriate�and �bad� cultural nation and nationalism. All these typologies were createdwhen there was no theory available to explain the evolution of nationalism5.Alain Dieckho� de�nes civil and cultural nation preconceptions as follows: the�civic, contractual, elective nation is the basis of the French idea of the nation,conceptualized by the philosophers of the Enlightenment and realized by theGreat Revolution. In contrast, the second type is seen as the concretization ofa historical community, the expression of an identity feeling, the re�ection of anatural order. This cultural, organic, ascriptive nation is the basis of the Ger-man idea of the nation, nurtured by romanticism and embodied by the Secondand the Third Reich.� (Dieckho� 2005) The latter approach de�nes nationalong ethnocultural lines, puts the emphasis on common language and culture,while the previous one regards those living in the same country belonging tothe nation. These typologies listed above merely try to clear up the conceptof nation that is hard to grasp as a category of social science. Constructingtypologies does not bring us closer to the essence of the problem. We mightsay that these typologies cause more trouble than actually help in interpretingthe question. On the one hand they con�rm that the nation is a central cat-egory, an actual identity, on the other hand they create a simplistic categorythat obstructs scienti�c considerations on the question6. No matter how manysocial phenomenons are used to clarify the two concepts, it does not bring uscloser to the understanding of the political process itself.It is by all means more productive to analyze nationalism and nationalisms,

namely the processes of institutionalization since social transformation andvarious governmental, minority, home land politics become more understand-

Journal for Comparative Sociology, XXXIII, No. 1-2, 1992. 58-80.5I do not mean that we have a coherent nationalism theory approved by social sciences,

only that those who created the typology, especially according to the recent stance of science,did not understand essential questions concerning nation and the evolution of nationalism.

6Naturally, contemporary literature questions the use of the cultural vs. political di-chotomy, but oddly, this theory has not yet spread in Western social scienti�c mindset.


able7. Instead of using various typologies as a scheme, it would be more fruitfulto investigate the evolution of a certain nationalism, a concept of nation thatexplains why the state prefers this or the other approach. It is almost obviouswhy a nationalism that is a result of a social transformation rather approachesthe political model and why a nation-building that is initiated from above andputs its own language and culture to the central place stands closer to thecultural model.Although nation is often the subject of social scienti�c analysis, in my view,

purely concentrating on nation does not bring us closer to the analysis of socialtransformation and political processes. It is almost nonsense to describe a givennation as a political or a cultural one, but nationalism as an institutionalizationprocess can be examined with the help of these categories. This can be doneby examining which concept of nation political actors refer to, more precisely,based on which concept of nation they wish to institutionalize society. Wecan get closer to the understanding of the national policy of a given state byexamining law, political statements, and political activity, and, if we wish to,we can then decide whether a certain policy is closer to the cultural or rather tothe political ideal type. Hungarian domestic debates can be analyzed very wellin this framework. We have no reason to assume that the international debateis not political and that it is not about the European de�nition of nation andnationality.

Conclusions

In this paper I attempted to show that it is not only contemporary de-bates on the concept of nation that are political in nature, but in fact, eversince the beginning of such enterprises, de�ning the nation has been a politicalquestion. I tried to demonstrate that this is not a question of social sciencebut a political debate underpinned by arguments from social science. Sincea given de�nition of nationhood has political consequences, it is not neutralfor politics which concept of the nation is used to institutionalize society and

7It has to be detected behind the public debate of status law (and later `dual citizenship')that it is about the national self-determination of the Hungarian state. Which one shouldbe the legitimiate nation concept along which the Hungarian state should relate towards allminorities, including those in Hungary and those beyond the borders? The central questionconcerns on what (national) principles the Hungarian state should de�ne itself and Hun-garians in neighbouring countires and in other parts of the world. We can understand thisprocess in the theoretical framework of nationalism, and those approaches that put nationas the central issue of analysis are essentially wrong.

16 Kántor Zoltán

how the question of who belongs and does not belong to a certain nation isanswered. A certain concept of the nation legitimizes or delegitimizes certainpolitical acts. Social sciences can de�ne nations, they can set up typologies,but they serve as insu�cient sources for the understanding of social processesand social transformation. Political debates evolving around the de�nitions ofnationhood and institutionalization are, as a direct consequence of the above,nothing more than the determination of what a given state accepts and whatit discriminates against in terms of the identity choices of citizens. This is nota question for science, but one for politics.

References

Ádám Péter 1998 Renan nemzetfelfogása: Elzász-Lotharingiától a nemzeti ön-rendelkezésig, In Mi a nemzet? Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.

Anderson, Benedict 1983 Imagined Communities: Re�ections on the Originand Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.

Brubaker, Rogers 1996 Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the NationalQuestion in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press.

Colley, Linda 1992 Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837. New Haven: YaleUniversity Press.

Connor, Walker 1994 Ethnonationalism: the quest for understanding. Prince-ton University Press.

Conversi, Daniele 1995 Reassessing theories of nationalism. Nationalism asboundary maintenance and creation. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.1, Nr. 1, Spring.

Culic, Irina 2003 State Building and Constitution Writing in Central and East-ern Europe after 1989. Regio, 38-58.

Dieckho�, Alain 2005 Beyond Conventional Wisdom: Cultural and PoliticalNationalism Revisited. In Alain Diecko� and Christophe Ja�relot (eds.), Re-visiting Nationalism, Theories and Processes (CERI Series in ComparativePolitics and International Studies) London.

Finkielkraut, Alain 1996 A gondolkodás veresége. Budapest: Osiris.


Frykman, Jonas -Löfgren, Orvar 1987 Culture Builders: a historical anthro-pology of middle-class life. New Brunswick and London: Rutgers UniversityPress.

Gellner, Ernest 1983 Nations and Nationalism. Oxford UK & Cambridge USA:Blackwell.

Halász Iván 2004 A nemzetfogalom nyelvi-kulturális elemei a modern kelet-és közép-európai demokratikus alkotmányokban. In Halász Iván, MajtényiBalázs, Szarka László (szerk.): Ami összeköt? Státustörvények közel és távol,Bp., Gondolat Kiadó.

Kohn, Hans 1994 Western and Eastern Nationalism. In Hutchinson, John andSmith, Anthony D. (Eds.): Nationalism. Oxford University Press. 162-165.

Kymlicka, Will 2004 Justice and Security in the Accommodation of MinorityNationalism. Dieckho�, Alain (ed.): The Politics of Belonging: Nationalism,Liberalism and Pluralism. New York: Lexington 127-154.

Lowenthal, David 1998 Fabricating Heritage. History & Memory, Vol. 10,No. 1.

Löfgren, Orvar 1989 The nationalisation of culture. Ethnologia Europaea, XIX,5-23.

Majtényi Balázs 2004 Utilitarianism in Minority Protection? Status Laws andInternational Organisations. Central European Political Science Review, Vol.5, Nr. 16.

Mann, Michael 1999 The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition ofEthnic and Political Cleansing. New Left Review, Nr. 235, May-June. 18-45.

McGarry, John 1998 `Demographic engineering': the state-directed movementof ethnic groups as a technique of con�ict regulation. Ethnic and RacialStudies, Vol. 21, No. 4. 613-638.

Meinecke, Friedrich 1970 Cosmopolitanism and the National State. PrincetonUniversity Press.

Nairn, Tom 1997 Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited. London & New York:Verso.

18 Kántor Zoltán

Plamenatz, John 1973 Two Types of Nationalism. In Kamenka, Eugene (Ed.):Nationalism: the nature and evolution of an idea. London: Edward Arnold,23-36.

Pokol Béla 1995 A nemzet fogalmának átértelmezése? In Médiahatalom. Bu-dapest: Windsor.

Renan, Ernest 1995 What is a Nation? In O. Dahbour and M. R. Ishay (eds.):The Nationalism Reader. New Jersey: Humanities Press.

Schöp�in, George 2009 Nationhood, Modernity, Democracy. Regio, Budapest.

Smith, Anthony D. 1992 Nationalism and the Historians. International Journalfor Comparative Sociology, XXXIII, No. 1-2. 58-80.

Weber, Eugene 1979 Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernisation of RuralFrance, 1870-1914. London: Chatto and Windus.

xxx Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: The concept of �nation�Recommendation 1735 (2006). Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 January2006.



Con�ict and Convergence: Regionalisation

Plans and Autonomy Movements in Romania

BAKK MiklósPolitical Science Department

Babe³-Bolyai University Cluj-Napocaemail: [email protected]

SZÁSZ Alpár ZoltánPolitical Science Department


Abstract. This paper examines the possibilities for regionalisationin Romania, a project that requires a break with Romania's presentconstitutional heritage. Regions can be constructed by creating theirterritorial, symbolic and institutional forms combined with the �nal es-tablishment of the entire regional system. For more than one-hundredyears, Romania's historical regions have been subjected to a unifyingprocess of Jacobin state-building. Even if this process resulted in serioushindrances to regionalisation, it could not do away neither with regionalidentities, nor with certain symbolic and institutional aspects of the re-gions. In the last few years, several plans for regionalisation have beendevised. Arguably, the Hungarian community in Romania would bene-�t most from asymmetrical regionalisation, but in order to be successfulthe Szekler autonomy movement should formulate its goals using thelanguage and concepts of regionalisation without reference to minorityrights or cultural autonomy.

Keywords: regionalism, regional identity, culturally `thin' and `thick'regions, regionalisation (symmetrical and asymmetrical), internal self-determination, administrative structure, decentralisation, state-building,(regional) autonomy, federalism, development regions, Romania

It is commonplace that the development of the Romanian state from the `OldKingdom' (i.e., Romania before the First World War) to interbellum GreaterRomania meant not only territorial completion and achievement of nation-stateunity, but entailed also a choice regarding the kind of political modernization tobe accomplished, speci�cally, the choice to continue with the Jacobin tradition

20 Bakk Miklós, Szász Alpár Zoltán

adopted by the Romanian political elite in the 19th century. Moreover, inspite � or perhaps because � of the Communist constitutionalism (that is, theperiod between 1948 and 1989 in�uenced by Stalin's constitution from 1936),this tradition was resuscitated by the 1991 Constitution (Stanomir 2005: 228-229). The present paper examines the possibilities and ways for regionalisationon the basis of this constitutional heritage.

Regional identities and state-building: introductory

considerations

The idea of regional identity has been present for a long while in traditionalgeographical approaches to regionalism. Regional identity was often seen as theprimordial nature of regions, researchers belonging to this school of thoughtstressing the internal `harmony' of regions, which meant for them unity be-tween the regions and their inhabitants (see Paasi 2003: 475-479). But themanner how this nature, this unity is constructed, albeit an old question, stillelicits interest and is periodically revisited by geographers, anthropologists andpolitical scientists alike. Generally, we may consider that regions preceded therise of nation-states, but were later e�ectively omitted or exploited � dependingon context � by the emerging states while organising governance and controlover their territories. Many strong modern states assimilated former regionsand areas, transforming them in frames or parts of territorial governance �linked, however, to a certain extent to historical and cultural contexts. Insome states, regions became instruments of state power being de�ned more orless `from above', and because of their administrative importance, remainedculturally `thin' (Paasi 2001: 15). In this case, regional identity did not emergeas a separate and competing focus of political loyalties in contrast to the na-tional identity constructed by the modern state. In other cases, regions weredeeply rooted historical and cultural (`thick') entities, their existence becom-ing manifest not only through and in their identity, but also through varioussocial and cultural institutions (Paasi 2001: 15). Consequently, such regionsbecame powerful competitors in the struggle for capturing the political loyaltyof a territorial community and challenged the loyalty pattern constructed andprescribed by the state. Regions wield such power in Spain, Italy and Belgium,and � more recently � in Great Britain, where the positions of Scotland andWales have been signi�cantly strengthened during the last ten years1.

1The question of political competition for the loyalty of territorial communities is relatedto the recent debate on multicultural citizenship. (See Kymlicka�Straehle 1999, Fowler 2004.)

Con�ict and Convergence: Regionalisation Plans and Autonomy ... 21

These two ways of assimilating regions into the structures of governmen-tal power distribution can be interpreted as two types of state construction.Hechter (2000) made a clear distinction between primary states and secondarystates. Primary states are all the large states which existed before the 19th

century and adopted indirect rule because of technical limits to central control.Their political structure was based on indirect rule relying on �the existenceof groups mediating between individuals and the state� (Hechter 2000: 40).This type of rule allowed primary states to arise and function as growing andculturally diverse political units. Furthermore, Hechter called secondary statesall the states that introduced direct rule with modern state-bureaucracy. How-ever, the functioning of such states required legitimation by nationalism and,hence, forced these states to strive for cultural homogeneity.It is clear that a state administration based on institutionalised regions ex-

hibiting strong identities (i.e., `thick' cultural entities) inherited many of itsfeatures from a primary state. However, if regionalisation occurs as a politicalprogramme, every part of a centralist state may be regionalised (even if someparts were not considered `regions' previously). Yet, a sense of regional iden-tity and cohesion as well as regionalist movements will emerge only if these canrely on a long-standing regional tradition, a common history and experience,or a distinct language2.A region's construction � may it be strong and `thick' or weak and `thin'

� �is part of the perpetual transformation of the spatial system in which re-gions emerge, exist for some time and may then disappear. This process maybe labelled the institutionalisation of regions� and, analytically, presents foursimultaneous aspects, which in practice are always di�erent sides of the sameprocess: 1) the creation of the territorial, 2) symbolic and 3) institutional formsof a region, as well as 4) its establishment as an entity in the regional systemand the social consciousness of the society concerned. It is a process throughwhich a territorial unit becomes an established entity in the spatial structureand is afterwards identi�ed in institutionalised political, economic, cultural andadministrative practices and social consciousness alike, while being continuallyreproduced in all these practices (Paasi 2001: 16).In conclusion, Romania's regional perspectives should be analysed accord-

ing to the above two ways of (creating and) embedding regions and the foursimultaneous aspects of their institutionalisation.

2See Hans-Jürgen Puhle Regions, Regionalism and Regionalization in 20th-Century Eu-

rope. [http://www.oslo2000.uio.no/program/papers/s9/s9-puhle.pdf], downloaded on 2 Au-gust 2009.


Romanian parties: symmetrical regionalisation `from

above'

In what regards the �rst aspect mentioned by Paasi � that is, territorialshaping � Romania can be divided into so-called historical provinces: Transyl-vania, Banat, Partium (referred to in Romanian as �ara Cri³urilor or Cri³ana),Maramure³, Moldavia, Oltenia and Muntenia (composing together Wallachiaor �ara Româneasc , in Romanian) as well as Dobruja. The said provincesre�ect diverging historical-political evolutions, which left their mark on per-ceptions of spatial di�erences as this can be gleaned both from local mentalityand everyday discourse. Moreover, many daily practices contribute to the re-producing of the cultural di�erences between these regions. Notwithstandingthese di�erences, the modernization of the Romanian state in the 19th centuryand later, in the third decade of the 20th century as well as under Communistrule, was based on a rather arti�cial administrative-territorial division. Thisdivision generated new social practices (mainly during the Communist period),which altered the mentioned spatial di�erences, however, only moderately andwithout being able to cancel them out. According to Sandu (2002), the di�er-ences between various cultural areas interpreted as subdivisions of historicalregions in Romania should be interpreted as sociability variables combined inspeci�c patterns. (More precisely, the main regional types of sociability inRomania are combinations of closeness or openness, context-conformity in re-lations with institutions and poverty or richness in network capital.) Bearingin mind that Paasi de�ned the regions' boundaries not as �xed, but saw themas resulting from processes in which territories and their contested meaningsare socially and culturally constructed (Paasi 2001: 16), these cultural areascould be used for the formation of territorial units in a wider sense.Turning to the second aspect, it should be noted that numerous symbolic

elements of the cultural areas and historical regions making up Romania arepresent in the public sphere3, but the centralist ethos of the dominant Roma-nian parties constitutes a serious hindrance to their political usage. However,the political usage of regional symbols is an open question. Until now, onlythe Szeklerland's symbols gained political signi�cance, thanks to an ethnore-gional(ist) movement which emerged apparently in the last �ve years. Onemay rightly hypothesise that if a regional(ist) party had obtained seats in the

3The coat of arms of Romania contains the blazons of the most important his-torical regions; but the new coats of arms of counties and municipalities were cre-ated in a rather haphazard and arbitrary manner after 1990 (Cf. Heraldica_României,[http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heraldica_României], downloaded on 20 August 2009).


parliament or in important county councils, it would have used regional sym-bols and watchwords, and would have pushed for the enactment of regionalpolicies. But the Party of Moldavians (Partidul Moldovenilor), founded inlate 1997, was rather short-lived since its leadership accepted the merger ofthis organisation into the Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat,hereinafter PSD) in 20024. Another initiative aimed at the creation of theTransylvanians' Party (Partidul Ardelenilor) ended in failure because of thevery restrictive registration criteria stipulated by the Romanian law on politi-cal parties and the arbitrary judicial practice which characterised the 2001-2004parliamentary cycle.The third aspect, institutional forms of regions, exists only in the cultural

realm: important museums, universities and publishers bear names referringto historical regions or serve a manifestly regional function. The most obviousexamples are Muzeul Banatului (Banat Museum), Muzeul Naµional de Isto-rie a Transilvaniei (National Museum of Transylvanian History) and SzékelyNemzeti Múzeum (Székely National Museum). However, these institutional el-ements may represent a good starting point for the development of the regions'social capital once the required political bodies and administrative structureshave been established for these regions � the fourth aspect mentioned by Paasi.For various reasons to be found in Romanian political traditions5 and be-

cause of the speci�city of the Romanian party system and political régime �described as �administrative consensualism and patronage� (Preda-Soare 2008:50-57) �, the larger parliamentary parties have no interest in launching a radicalregional reform targeting the Romanian administrative system. Their ultimategoal in this respect is a controlled symmetrical regionalisation6.Between 2000 and 2004, two conceptions regarding regionalisation have been

formulated. According to the views of the National Liberal Party (PartidulNaµional Liberal), the Romanian parliament should have passed an organiclaw introducing symmetrical regionalisation with regions enjoying equal sta-tus. The Liberals' proposal took into account the existing cultural and tra-ditional boundaries of the regions, but remained very cautious in what concerns

4See `Partidul Moldovenilor s-a înscris la Tribunal.' Ziarul de Ia³i (25 August 1998).[http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/national-extern/partidul-moldovenilor-s-a-inscris-la-tribunal-nig8s] (downloaded on 20 August 2009) and Bakk 2003: 426.

5On the traditions of Romanian political thinking see Barbu 2005: 11-24.6However, in recent years, several civic organisations raised the question of federalism or

asymmetrical regionalism (e.g., the Pro Europa League/Liga Pro Europa/ and the Provinciagroup).


the degree of the decentralization. However, the Liberals organised no publicdebate on their proposal (Szokoly 2005b: 10).Another conception was put forward by the PSD, even though the politicians

belonging to this party could not agree on the precise form of regionalisation.On the one hand Ioan Rus, the Transylvanian ideologist of the party, suggesteda regional reform based on local autonomy and traditional-cultural delimita-tions, (Szokoly 2005b: 9-10) while on the other hand, Octav Cozmânc , theMinister of Administration, envisaged symmetrical regions created throughmerging two or three counties.After 2004, only the idea of transforming the extant statistical and develop-

ment regions into administrative regions (governed by elected political bodies)was present in political discourse. Needless to say, this is another method ofachieving symmetrical decentralization.

The Hungarian minority's autonomy: pushing for an

asymmetrical regional reform?

After the fall of Communism in December 1989, the Democratic Alliance ofHungarians in Romania (Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, hereinafterRMDSZ) was established as an ethnic party representing Hungarians in Ro-mania. The RMDSZ, a party which for the last two decades has obtained thelarge majority of votes cast by ethnic Hungarians, raised the question of (re-gional) autonomy. However, no concrete guidelines for attaining this goal havebeen formulated initially. The clari�cation of the party's conception occurredonly later, after lengthy debate and controversy. In search for a workable anddefensible conception, four types of proposals have been taken into account:a) the autonomy proposals put forward between the two World Wars; b) theRomanian Statute of Nationalities adopted in 1945; c) various internationalinstruments and documents on human and minority rights, which attractedmuch attention recently because � in the process of European integration �the stipulations contained in these documents were regarded as requirementsof European accession; d) examples of functioning autonomies in several mem-ber states of the European Union that have been regarded as good practices.The �rst proposals made by Hungarians, such as the concept of `internal

self-determination' or the társnemzet7 idea, mirrored an expectation regarding

7This term, which translates approximately as `partner nation', suggests that a certainstate, in our case Romania, is formed and inhabited by two (or more) national communi-ties � here the Romanian and the Hungarian national communities � which are and behave


a possible rapid and fundamental change of the Romanian state structure ina manner which would have allowed the attainment of a collective legal statusby Hungarians. But in the early nineties, post-Communist Romanian partiesand elites followed a nationalistic political course to legitimate their leadingrole. This state of facts put to the fore the Jacobin way of state organisationstipulated in Article 1 of the Constitution, de�ning Romania as a �unitary andindivisible national state�. The consolidation of the Romanian moderate right� including the RMDSZ � in the second half of the nineties did not result inanother de�nition of the state and of the political community.After the adoption of this new Constitution (in 1991) the RMDSZ, enjoy-

ing strong support from ethnic Hungarian voters, submitted to the Romanianparliament a bill on national minorities and autonomous communities in 1993.It was the draft of a framework law de�ning three possible forms of autonomy:personal autonomy, regional autonomy and special status for local govern-ments. As interpreted by the RMDSZ, the law did not contradict the Con-stitution, and was meant to be only a regulatory frame on a conceptual level,while stipulating no concrete institutional solutions. The bill was based onthe idea that autonomy represented a sustainable project both in the domesticand the international political arena. The reasons why Hungarian politiciansin Romania reasoned in this manner were the following: �rst, in those years,the Council of Europe apparently preferred policies aiming to augment specialminority rights through autonomy-based institutional solutions8; second, theRMDSZ was not `trapped' yet by the cooperation with center-right Romanianparties, a situation in which the ethnic Hungarian party was o�ered coalitionmembership in 1996 provided it shelved its plans for achieving some form ofautonomy.After the rejection of the bill on autonomous communities, the topic became

a marginal one within the RMDSZ, too; although the idea of autonomy hasnot been deleted from the political programme of the party. In fact, autonomyis still viewed in symbolic terms as a central identity trait of Hungarians inRomania, but ceased to be a source of political initiatives. Nonetheless, in 1995,a group elaborated a draft statute on Szeklerland's autonomy, but this hasnot been submitted to Parliament and remained a solitary initiative for many

like partners while enjoying equal constitutional status. (Put di�erently, the társnemzet-conception is aimed at avoiding the political situation in which members of a national mi-nority are treated as second-rate citizens.)

8Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly on an additional protocolon the rights of national minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights can rightlybe interpreted in this way.


years. All in all, shelving the idea of autonomy meant that the politicians whobetween 1990 and 1995 argued for drafting and submitting various autonomyconceptions were gradually marginalised inside the RMDSZ.From 1996 onwards, the course of action taken by the RMDSZ was strongly

in�uenced by its (perceived) chances to participate in coalition governments.This attitude towards government participation seems to be shared by mostethnic parties in Central and Eastern Europe, and appears to be a direct conse-quence of the European integration process and the basic treaties signed by thecountries in question. A kind of `consociational strategy' replaced the barrenautonomy strategy, and this orientation was supported by the process of Eu-ropean integration. The reason is that the European Union, in the absence ofan acquis stipulating minority rights, was guided by a security-based approachwhich preferred the consensual settlement of disputes over the enforcement ofuniversalistic norms (see Brusis 2003).In the meantime, the short time-span before EU-accession o�ered possibili-

ties for �nding a way towards an internal autonomy arrangement or, at least,of creating a framework for a later arrangement of this kind. (In this respect,reference was made to the Copenhagen criteria.) In the case of Hungariansin Transylvania, these opportunities presented themselves roughly at the samemoment when new political organisations claiming to represent political alter-natives to the RMDSZ have been founded.In 2003, a splinter group that left the RMDSZ established the Hungarian

National Council of Transylvania (Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács, hereinafterEMNT). The goal of this (legally unregistered) organisation was to revivethe autonomy conceptions, which were shelved and neglected by the RMDSZ.Somewhat later the Szekler National Council (Székely Nemzeti Tanács, herein-after SZNT) was also created, born out of the desire to push for the territorialautonomy of the Szeklerland. At the beginning of 2008, a new Hungarianparty � reuniting �rst and foremost mayors and local councillors from theSzeklerland � has been registered. This organisation, called Hungarian CivicParty (Magyar Polgári Párt, hereinafter MPP), focuses on Szekler territorialautonomy, too.In the context of EU-accession and under the circumstances of �erce com-

petition between the four political organisations representing Hungarians inTransylvania, three strategic conceptions regarding the territorial autonomyof the Szeklerland have been formulated:


1) Considering the history of the proposals, one must mention �rst the au-tonomy statute adopted by the SZNT since its original version has beenelaborated in 1995, prior to the establishment of the organisation thateventually embraced it. This proposal is based on the concept of in-ternal self-determination. The leading body of the SZNT broughtsome amendments to the initial draft stemming from 1995 and adoptedit as an o�cial document. Finally, the bill was submitted to the Ro-manian Parliament in February 2004. In fact, the SZNT, which initiallywas another unregistered civic organisation, could not introduce the bill.Hence, the draft law was submitted to Parliament by a group of MPs be-longing to the RMDSZ but maintaining informal political ties with theSZNT. Needless to say, their action attracted criticism from the RMDSZleadership, but no severe crisis developed within the ranks of the partysince, in March 2004, the Parliament rejected the bill.

2) During the Party Congress held by the RMDSZ in 2003, another strate-gic conception was outlined. This was based on the idea of territo-rial precedent. The advocates of this idea set out from the possi-bility of transforming the extant regions of development into political-administrative regions or units. The present development regions � cre-ated in 1998 without taking into account historical-cultural traditionswithin Romania � do not have administrative competencies and corre-spond to NUTS II level divisions in EU member states. Consequently,the RMDSZ aims, as a �rst step, to create the Szeklerland Develop-ment Region by reuniting three counties (Harghita, Covasna and Mure³).However, the SZNT criticises this idea because the three counties do notcoincide with the historical territory of Szeklerland.

3) The third conception has been elaborated as part of the package dealo�ered by the EMNT to the RMDSZ. This package contains three pro-posals: the draft of a framework law on regions (without specifying theirgeographical boundaries), a bill on the creation of the Szeklerland devel-opment region, which would enjoy special status and the draft statuteof the Szeklerland region. This whole package is rooted in a vision ofasymmetrical regionalism being in the meantime based on the as-sumption that the prospective Romanian regionalisation will be similarto the Spanish or the Italian one. Hence, the idea of Szeklerland's territo-rial autonomy should be included in a larger scheme regarding Romania'sregionalisation, and should be put forward using the language and ter-minology of regionalism (not the language and terminology of `internal


self-determination'). This conception includes another presupposition aswell, namely, the idea that such a conception will attract more supportfrom ethnic Romanian political actors as opposed to other plans, whichfocus exclusively on the Szeklerland.

These proposals have not been submitted as bills to the Romanian parlia-ment yet, but it should be noted that the expert commission on constitutionalreform nominated by the head of state, President Traian B sescu, in the au-tumn of 2008 (the so called Stanomir Commission) drafted a lengthy and de-tailed report delineating a possible way for administrative reform and towardsasymmetrical regionalism.Apart from these proposals on territorial autonomy, two conceptions tackling

the idea of cultural autonomy for Hungarians living outside the Szeklerlandhave been elaborated. First, in June 2004, the EMNT submitted to Parliamenta draft framework law on personal cultural autonomy. If enacted, this bill couldhave served as the basis for the establishment and operation of autonomouscultural institutions in case of 15 autochthonous national minorities living inRomania. In what concerns Hungarians, the draft law did not specify clearlyhow Szeklerland's territorial autonomy shall be correlated with the culturalautonomy enjoyed by ethnic Hungarians who live outside the Szekler region.The bill, lacking even the support of the RMDSZ, was eventually rejected byParliament.Nevertheless, the RMDSZ introduced later, as member of the coalition gov-

ernment formed in December 2004, another, similar bill. This bill did not passeither, because the coalition partners of the RMDSZ did not support it.

Conclusions and perspectives

The society made up by ethnic Hungarians in Romania, due to its diverseethno-demographic situation, regional-territorial fragmentation and intricatesocial structure, needs a combined autonomy arrangement based on the po-litical consent of its members. Such a conception can be constructed only intime.The relatively large number of autonomy conceptions elaborated by ethnic

Hungarian political organisations mentioned in the present paper shows thatno agreement � necessary for putting forward and eventually enacting a certainarrangement � has been reached, neither in what regards the required institu-tional framework nor in what regards the subsequent strategies. Although allpolitical actors representing ethnic Hungarians accept this diagnosis, little ef-


fort has been spent in the last twenty years in order to reach at least a minimalconsensus.Romania's accession to the EU represented an important turning point be-

cause this period o�ered some possibilities for political arm-twisting and forlaunching a negotiation process on autonomy arrangements. However, the po-litical actors involved in the process seemed to be unable to practice consensus-oriented politics and imagine creative policies. This statement holds true bothfor political parties in Hungary, the kin-state, and for the political groups whichassumed the task of representing the Hungarian minority in Romania.Now that Romania became a full member of the European Union, Szekler-

land's regional autonomy can emerge as a successful political project only iftreated as a completely separate matter, without connecting it to the topic ofminority rights construed as individual rights or to the idea of cultural auton-omy seen as a legal solution for the entire Hungarian national community livingin Romania9. More precisely, success may be achieved only if the movementfor Szekler autonomy will follow the models and the path taken by Westernethnoregional(ist) movements, which interpreted territorial autonomy as partof a larger regionalising process consonant with various national and EU-levelpolicies. In this respect, the achievement of territorial autonomy by a speci�clinguistic or cultural group is the result of mutual accommodation between twoprocesses: one that is directed `from above' (like a reform of the state struc-ture or of the administrative system) and another one which is coming `frombelow' (like a grassroots level communitarian movement). This mutual ac-commodation means that regional movements and parties must accommodateand rede�ne their goals while the processes themselves are underway (Schri-jver 2006). The manner how these processes evolve depends on the measure ofdecentralisation, on the available instruments of direct democracy (local ini-tiatives and referenda etc.), on the community's identity as well as its internalsolidarity. All in all, it is a lengthy process involving various con�icts, butseeking convergence.However, another set of questions also arises. Can the failure of autonomy

conceptions be attributed to an inherent structural trait of our region? Is itsomehow encoded in a speci�c part of Central and Eastern Europe or, put dif-ferently, does it require a certain level or degree of democratic consolidation?It is rather di�cult to explain why in countries that until the early 1990s wereparts of the former Soviet Union previously established territorial autonomiesstill operate and new ones were also created (Kolstø 2001), and in Western Eu-

9It should be mentioned that the strategy of the RMDSZ combines these two ideas.


rope various autonomies contribute signi�cantly to democratic consolidation,while in our region10, which is more developed and shares more features withWestern European countries as compared to non-Baltic republics of the formerSoviet Union, plans for territorial autonomy usually fail.An unfavourable ratio between the two powers of the state, the despotic and

the infrastructural one11, seems to o�er a possible explanation. In the `moreOriental' region of Central and Eastern Europe, where the despotic powerof the state is greater, the state itself seems to be based on an agreementbetween territorial-oligarchical elite groups. Here autonomy does not needdemocratic legitimacy since it is well established and entrenched by this eliteconsensus. However, in Western Europe, autonomist movements targeted theterritorial reorganisation of the state (structure), which in fact allowed themdemocratic access to a (proportional) share of infrastructural power. Moreimportantly, as Western examples show, such arrangements eventually serve(d)the public weal.Finally, in the `more Occidental' area of Central and Eastern Europe, democ-

racy and democratic legitimacy weakened the despotic power of the state tosuch an extent that territorial-oligarchic elite groups cannot entirely controlthe state and restrain public (democratic) will. Nonetheless, this democraticconsolidation occurring within the civil societal arena of democracy (cf. Linz�Stepan 1996: 7-15) does not mean that the state is able to construct somekind of inter-group democratic legitimacy, embodied perhaps by a contractualpower-sharing arrangement among several communities. Regionalisation basedon territorial communities characterised by strong regional identities could be,however, a possible path towards instituting such a contractual power-sharingarrangement.

10Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia (the Russian community in Narva and Sillamäe), Sub-carpathia or Subcarpathian Ukraine (the Ruthenian and the Hungarian minorities), Slovakia(the Hungarian minority) and Romania (Hungarians in Transylvania) can be ranged in thiscategory.

11The despotic power of the state elite refers to the range of non-routinised actions thatthe elite is authorised to undertake, while the infrastructural power to the state's capacityto penetrate civil society and logistically implement political decisions on the whole territoryof the country. (See Mann 1984: 185-201.)


References

Bakk Miklós 2003. `A regionalizmus kronológiája Romániában.' [The Chronol-ogy of Romanian Regionalism.] In Bodó Barna (ed.) Romániai MagyarÉvkönyv 2003. [Yearbook of the Hungarian Community in Romania: 2003.]Temesvár: Szórvány Alapítvány - Marineasa Könyvkiadó. pp. 415-428.

Barbu, Daniel 2005. Politica pentru barbari. [Politics for Barbarians.] Bucure³ti:Editura Nemira.

Brusis, Martin 2003. The European Union and Interethnic Power-sharing Ar-rangements in Accession Countries. Journal of Ethnopolitics and MinorityIssues in Europe, vol 3, no. 1. [www.ecmi.de/jemie], downloaded on 31 July2006.

Fowler, Brigid 2004. Fuzzing Citizenship, Nationalising Political Space: AFramework for Interpreting the Hungarian `Status Law' as a New Formof Kin-state Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. In Kántor Zoltán et al.(eds.) The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protec-tion. Sapporo: Hokkaido University, Slavic Research Center.

Hechter, Michael 2000. Containing Nationalism. Oxford � New York, OxfordUniversity Press.

Kolstø, Pål 2001. Territorial Autonomy as a Minority Rights Regime in Post-Communist Societies. In Will Kymlicka (ed.) Can Cultural Pluralism be Ex-ported? Oxford � New York, Oxford University Press.

Kymlicka, Will � Straehle, Christine 2001. Kozmopolitanizmus, nemzetál-lamok, kisebbségi nacionalizmus: a legújabb irodalom kritikai áttekintése.[Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States and Minority Nationalism: A Critical Re-view of Recent Literature.] Kellék. [Accessories.] no. 21, pp. 27-56.

Linz, Juan J[osé] � Stepan, Alfred 1996. Problems of Democratic Transitionand Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-CommunistEurope. Baltimore - London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mann, Michael 1984. The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mecha-nisms and Results. Archives Européennes de sociologie, vol. 25, pp. 185-213.

Paasi, Anssi 2001. Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerationsof Place, Boundaries and Identity. European Urban and Regional Studies,vol. 8, no. 1, pp 7-28.


Paasi, Anssi 2003. Region and Place: Regional Identity in Question. Progressin Human Geography, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 475-485.

Preda, Cristian � Soare, Sorina 2008. Regimul, partidele ³i sistemul politic dinRomânia. [The Romanian Political Regime, Parties and Political System.]Bucure³ti: Editura Nemira.

Sandu, Dumitru 2002. Ariile culturale ca matrice de sociabilitate. [Cultural Ar-eas as Sociability Matrices.] Sociologie Româneasc . [Romanian Sociology.]no. 3-4, pp. 77-92.

Schrijver, Frans 2006. Regionalism after Regionalisation: Spain, France andthe United Kingdom. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Stanomir, Ioan 2005. Libertate, lege ³i drept. O istorie a constituµionalismuluiromânesc. [Liberty, Legislation and Law. A History of Romanian Constitu-tionalism.] Ia³i: Editura Polirom.

Szokoly Elek 2005a. Regionalizmus és regionalizáció Romániában I. [Regional-ism and Regionalisation in Romania. Part One.] Comitatus. ÖnkormányzatiSzemle. [Comitatus: Local Government Review.] vol. XV., no. 6, pp.7-19.

Szokoly Elek 2005b. Regionalizmus és regionalizáció Romániában II. [Regional-ism and Regionalisation in Romania. Part Two.] Comitatus. ÖnkormányzatiSzemle. [Comitatus: Local Government Review.] vol. XV., no. 7, pp. 7-20.

Yash Ghai (2002): Autonomy and Ethnicity. Negotiating Competing Claims inMulti-ethnic States, Cambridge.



Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the

Political Doctrines of Communism and

Nationalism

TORÓ TiborDepartment of European Studies,Sapientia University Cluj-Napocaemail: [email protected]

Abstract. Some would say communism and nationalism are the most

in�uential political doctrines and ideologies of the 20th century, chang-

ing not only history itself, but the institutional, political, cultural and

social framework of the Central and Eastern European states. Many of

the scholars, taking in consideration only the early incompatibility of the

two, argue that their simultaneous appearance, such as in the case of

Romania of the 1970s and 1980s is an interesting anomaly, a particular

deviation from the pattern, which needs to be studied separately from

the whole. This paper argues that the relationship between communism

and nationalism evolved gradually from a palpable incompatibility in the

19th century to a perceptible compatibility at the end of the 20th. More-

over, the concurrent appearance of the two doctrines does not represent

a particular case, but it is rather the result of an organic ideological

development which was triggered by the problems met by Marxism in

deconstructing nationalism.

Keywords: communism, nationalism, national question, political the-

ory, Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Romania

Introduction

Some would say communism and nationalism are the most in�uential politi-cal doctrines and ideologies of the 20th century, changing not only history itself,but the institutional, political, cultural and social framework of the Central

34 Toró Tibor

and Eastern European states. Beyond this, Marxism � the theoretical basis ofthe socialist doctrine � has become one of the leading analytical schools andmethodologies in current social sciences and philosophy.Many scholars, taking in consideration only the early incompatibility of the

two, argue that their simultaneous appearance, such as in the case of Roma-nia of the 1970s and 1980s, is an interesting anomaly, a particular deviationfrom the pattern, which needs to be studied separately from the whole. Evenmore, several social scientists who study Central and Eastern European na-tionalisms of the 1990s, explain this revitalization as a result of the communistrepression of national feelings, making the disappearance of the regime themain trigger for the observed processes. This paper tries to argue against theabove-mentioned hypothesis, showing that the relationship between commu-nism and nationalism evolved gradually from a palpable incompatibility in the19th century to a perceptible compatibility at the end of the 20th. Moreover,the concurrent appearance of the two doctrines does not represent a particularcase, but it is rather the result of an organic ideological development, whichwas triggered by the problems met by Marxism in deconstructing nationalism.The study has the following structure. In the �rst part I brie�y introduce

the most important works that deal with the studied topic. The second partpresents the two doctrines separately, underlining their particularities alongthree theoretical aspects. The third part analyzes how early Marxist literaturetries to incorporate nationalism, by examining the most important works ofMarx, Engels, Otto Bauer and the Austro-Marxists, Lenin, Stalin, some textsfrom and about Brezhnev and the Romanian or Polish communists, showingthe possible organic changes occurred in their perceptions of the movement.The fourth part of the study synthesizes its �ndings not losing sight of themain hypothesis.

Communism and nationalism � a rather understudied

topic

Although there are several scienti�c works that study the relationship be-tween communism and nationalism, many of them have a strong ideologicalcharge as they were written in the 50s or the 60s, in the middle of the ColdWar. However, in the 80s and after, when the scienti�c world oversteppedthese di�culties, several wider studies appeared. Many of these works studythe relationship of the two doctrines from theoretical perspectives, from philo-sophical point of view, (Szporluk 1988; Nimni 1991) some of them concentrate

Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines ... 35

on one country or period (Connor 1985; Verdery 1991; Mevius 2005 and others)and only a few try to develop a comprehensive theory incorporating in theirinquiry political theory and history as well (Zwick 1983; Kemp 1999).As the goals of this paper are similar to the ones formulated by the authors

in this last category, in this chapter I will present only these two works, focus-ing on their main arguments and conclusions. National Communism, a bookwritten by Peter Zwick in 1983, was probably inspired by the puzzle of theevents occurred in Poland in 1981, which topped a long line of anti-Soviet ac-tivities in communist countries. The author argues that there was �no inherentcontradiction between national and communist sentiment�, nationalism beingthe one that kept communism alive. Moreover, he believes that the only formof communism capable of surviving is national communism (Zwick 1983: 2).In order to prove this, he reaches for historical facts, presenting documenta-tion on the nationalization of the Peoples' Parties of the di�erent Central andEastern European States, and examines political theory as well. Zwick arguesthat even Marx, Lenin or Stalin had nationalist arguments. They believed thatthe best way to reach communism is through nationalism, thus communismhas a di�erent path in every state and it is linked to the speci�cities of thenation (Zwick 1983: 3-11). An important �aw of Zwick's theory was shownby history. In a few years, most of the communist states vanished, showinglack of viability of the communist state. Many consider that it left its placeto nationalism. Therefore, national communism can be considered as a periodof communism, but does not prove to be a general theory of the relationshipbetween the two doctrines.Another important work that tries to explain the relationship between na-

tionalism and communism is Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe

and the Soviet Union: A Basic Contradiction, a book written by Walter Kempin 1999. The puzzle that the author tries to decipher is how the fall of com-munism can be explained and what its relationship to nationalism is? Kempargues that the relationship between the two can be explained as recurrent.Communism tried to widen its legitimacy by supporting the self-determinationmovements of di�erent nations. After getting popular support, they central-ized the state, repressing and neutralizing national movements. The negativeapproach had as result an increasing pro-national sentiment, which caused thestrengthening of nationalism and left communist parties with decreasing sup-port. The lack of legitimacy compels communists to try a new reconciliationwith nationalism (Kemp 1999: 83). One of the main traits of this reconcil-iation is the separation of the cultural and political aspects of nationalism.Communism kept cultural nationalism � language, literature, cultural recon-

36 Toró Tibor

struction, identity �, but oppressed its political characteristics, shaping thislatter to its own views (Kemp 1999: 39). This, in Kemp's opinion, was the keyof their failure because the two aspects of nationalism cannot be separated,the existence of one side strengthens the other. Beyond this, the need for rec-onciliation acted as a centrifugal power, distancing them from each other untilcommunism was outfaced by nationalism. As Kemp puts it, the widening gapbetween the two, �which manifested itself in a cyclical pattern of action andreaction (. . . ) pulled the regimes ever farther from legitimacy,� breaking themin the end (Kemp 1999: 173).

Communism, nationalism � birth, development and

particularities

In the following chapter I synthesize the main characteristics of the twodoctrines by focusing on three important theoretical aspects: 1) historicityof the two, 2) their relationship with power, and 3) their in�uence on theindividual social actors.

1. Theoretical aspects of nationalism

Most of the scholars who study the phenomenon of nationalism agree that itsbirth is related exclusively to modernity. However, some authors think that itreaches back to pre-modern social structures and cultural myths1. Despite thefact that these critics have their own part of truth, in this paper I focus on themodernist paradigm as the referential time in which nationalism � similarlyto communism � started to incorporate the masses as a direct result of thetechnical and social changes generated by industrialization.A central point of national development is its relationship to power. From

this point of view, one can distinguish two important strategies which focus onthe state and its authority. In the �rst case, the representatives of the nationalproject already have state control, which they use to �create the nation� byuniting the people of the controlled territory. This was an important step fromtheir perspective: linguistic and cultural homogenization legitimized power,cultural similarities consolidated the political ties, creating a sentiment of soli-darity. Moreover, this cultural and linguistic homogenization was an important

1More on this conception can be found at the so called ethno-symbolists and perenialists,who argue that the essence of nations has been formed in the Middle Ages, modernism gavethis essence a structural context (see Anthony D. Smith 1999).


condition for economic and technological development. As Gellner points out,the division of labor and its technical complexity stimulated the standardiza-tion of education and the reduction of social distance between di�erent layersof the society (Gellner 1998: 25-29).2

In the second case, the elites do not control the state, only the means ofcultural production and group solidarity. In other words, the group whichthey lead identi�es itself as a nation. The political objectives in this case arerelated to the creation of an own sovereign state. This can manifest itselfin several strategies: secession, the seizure of power, or uni�cation (Breully1993: 9)3. Although these strategies are much diversi�ed, they have severalcommon points. First, group ascription is not related to territoriality but tocollective culture, therefore it has a stronger cohesive force than the territorialcase, and second, the creative power of the elites is not focused on nationcreation, but on the justi�cation of their claims of being state founders. Theyfocus on the �invention of such traditions�4 that would legitimize their claimsby connecting the group to the territory. Similar �ndings are underlined byRonald Grigor Suny, who by studying historiography argues that the mainideological tool for inventing traditions was the connection of the group to theterritory by particularizing historical narratives from a national perspective.These narratives not only present the crystallization of national histories, butthey legitimize the nation's claims as well (Suny 2001: 337; 345-348).Even though the two situations can be related to di�erent processes or strate-

gies, one important similarity can be observed: the political agenda of nation-alism develops in its relationship to state � or state-like territorial � powerwithout the need of universalization.A last theoretical aspect which needs to be clari�ed is the relationship be-

tween nationalism and the individual. Nationalism changed individual rela-tions; by its integrated perception of group solidarity it created a strong col-lective identity, which slowly replaced or overwrote the traditional identities.Moreover, it changed the old social relations of the Middle Ages � the rigidimpenetrable social classes �, and introduced horizontal social relations andequality between all members of the society (Bakk 2008).Another aspect of individual relations is the capacity of people to imag-

2The study on the process of nation-building can be found in the work of Anderson (1991),Hobsbawm & Rangers (1992) or Weber (1976) as well.

3Although Breully mentions three cases, one could talk about other national projectswhich do not have state-formation as their �nal objective. In these particular cases they wantto control only a territorial part of a country, such as territorial autonomies or federalisms.

4More on the invention of tradition see Hobsbawm and Rangers (1992).

38 Toró Tibor

ine the boundaries of the nation not only from a spatial but from a culturalperspective as well (see Anderson 1991). Although this border-constructioncan be found mostly in Frederik Barth's anthropological theory on ethnicity(see Barth 1969 and 1994), I will use the similar theory developed by MiklósBakk, who introduces a new concept in border construction: the concept ofdual boundary, which signi�es the productive tension between di�erent typesof national boundary constructions, such as political-administrational or cul-tural. Although these categories appear in several theories on nationalism, thenovelty introduced by Bakk is that he considers the two types present at thesame time and in continuous interaction, modelling the future projects andhorizon of the �nation� (Bakk 2008: 166-177). This interaction is shaped bythe di�erent discourses and political interactions of the society.

2. Theoretical aspects of communism

Before analyzing the communist doctrine according to the above-mentionedthree theoretical categories, one must clear some probable misunderstandings.From an analytical point of view, there is a di�erence between communism asa doctrine � in the classical sense, developed by Marx � and Communism as apolitical system with the ideology constructed to support it. This separationis important on the one hand because this latter one is a practical usage, adevelopment of the former, and on the other, because some parts of the originaldoctrine were modi�ed by the institutional framework constructed on it.Like nationalism, communism in its modern usage was formed in modernity,

in the 17th-19th centuries, as a response to the massive social changes gener-ated by industrialization5. A large mass of people found itself with no politicalrights, with neither social nor economical instruments. Social idealism wasborn as a reaction to these changes �as a huge petition for justice, as a revoltagainst exploitation, as a hope that progress can be achieved rapidly, for every-body� (Z pârµan 1994: 345). Marx considered that the only possible remedyis the instauration of communism. In his conception communism would have�ful�lled human liberation� by introducing a �society without classes, with noprivate property whatsoever, [where] the means of production would belong tothe community� (White�eld 2001: 84-85). This liberation can be achieved onlythrough revolution, the revolt of the exploited, who reached the consciousness

5Although similar socio-political ideas can be found in the Middle Ages � Liviu Z pârµanis talking about almost one hundred utopist writings in the 16th-18th centuries (1994, 347)� , none of these can be compared with the theoretical bases and complexity of the onedeveloped by Marx.


of their own power. In Marx's perspective this class consciousness is a naturaldevelopment of capitalism6.Compared to nationalism, communism uses a di�erent concept of power.

While the political agenda of nationalism focused on state power, communismsees state authority as a tool which would help to achieve its universal objec-tives. In other words, reaching for power in one state would attract � as indomino theory � the other states into the class struggle between bourgeoiseand the proletariat. The premises of Marx and Engels' theory at this point arevery important. In their perspective, the capitalist economic development hasalready reached globalization � through world market and other similar insti-tutions � and the civilized countries are tied to each other (Engels 1847: 197).Therefore, the extension of the revolution would be natural process, leavingthe nations to �dissolve themselves, just as the various estate and class distinc-tions must disappear through the abolition of their basis, private property�(Engels 1847: 22).Another example of the relationship between state and communism in the

Marxian thought is given by David McLellan in the Blackwell Encyclopaediaof Political Thought. Examining the ideas of Marx in The Critics of Gotha

Project, one can conclude that the author did not excel in presenting the insidesof a working communist society. However, one thing is sure, the �need for thepolitical will disappear from its organization� (McLellan 2006: 485). Theseideas appear later, in the Soviet version of communism as well. Trotsky in ThePermanent Revolution a�rms that the �proletarian democracy� as a resultof the �socialist revolution begins on the national arena, it unfolds on theinternational arena, and is completed on the world arena� (Trotsky 1931: 10).The premise of the communist revolution, therefore, was an extreme polar-

ization of the society between those who controlled the means of productionand those who were propertyless and were obligated to sell their labor to the�rst category (Engels 1847: 4). The two are in a continuous tension, the orga-nization and activation � in other words class consciousness � of the workingclass will lead to the socialist revolution and the instauration of communism.The communist individual was formed to identify itself against the Other;

this resulted in polarized identity structures called by Koselleck asymmetrical

6This idea appears most strikingly in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, wherehe uses a deterministic approach to the development of human history and considers thatcapitalism will have similar fate to Feudalism, which was abolished by the bourgeoise, whoreached for power (Marx and Engels 2008: 6-22).

7In the case of online sources references are made to the chapter where the original textscan be found.

40 Toró Tibor

counter-concepts (Koselleck 1997: 7-9). In his conception, the existence ofthe Other is not only needed for the self-identi�cation, but it is a generalizingterm for everybody who is not included in Our group, �lled with contradictoryand negative meanings. Thus, the Other is not only an important elementof our identifying and value system, but is vital in this identi�cation. Theidea of the socialist revolution from this perspective becomes ambiguous, onthe one hand it forms a Koselleckian identity-pair, but on the other hand itis destroying itself by an auto-induced crisis in its objectives: the abolishmentof social classes. Another close related problem is the fact that the practicalimplication of the classless system dreamed by Marx and his epigons was neverexplained in totality (Singer 2001: 78). These two �aws led to the developmentof the theory of permanent revolution, which kept the state � already led bycommunist elite � in an arti�cial state of revolution, where newer and newer�enemies� would be localized.This ideology of class struggle shaped individual relations as well, although

one must di�erentiate the normative and empirical implications of this relation-ship. From a normative point of view, Liviu Z pârµan observes correctly thatmost of the known socialist utopias have a rigorous organization of power, �let-ting the state use it for the perfection of the new social organization� (Z pârµan1994: 348). Likewise, in the Marxian conception, communism would changethe ethical bases of society, would abolish private property, and greed, egoismor envy would disappear (Singer 2001: 81).From an empirical point of view, the two normative postulates have become

possible through the technical-scienti�c developments of the 20th century. Thecommunist power used these �ndings to closely control its subjects, Stalinism �the extreme form of communism � had chosen a maximal implication, not onlydegrading interpersonal relationships, but introducing a permanent relativityin the conception of the future. The communist individual needed to trustnobody � everybody could have been an agent of the secret service, everybodycould have become the �enemy of the state�. This uncertainty generated astate of alienation (Thom 1996: 160), an even bigger one than described byMarx in the case of the capitalist system. Moreover, communism wanted tocreate a new type of man, one without individuality and controlled totally bythe system (Boia 1999: 122-123).

* * *

Before analyzing the relationship and interaction of the two doctrines, aconclusion of the �ndings is needed. Taking into account the three theoretical


aspects, one could say that communism and nationalism are incompatible fromseveral perspectives.First, from the point of view of their relationship to state power. Nationalism

has state formation as its objective or the conservation of state power, it is notinterested in expanding its in�uence over other territories or states until thesedo not interfere with its political agenda. On the contrary, communism usesstate power as an instrument in order to spread its doctrine worldwide. In theirconception, the globalization of economy tied states together in such a way thatcommunism from one capitalist state would expand to others in a very shorttime. Second, considering the relationship between the two doctrines and theindividual, one can conclude that both doctrines wanted to reshape mankind.However, while nationalism had a clear agenda on how to reformulate socialcon�guration � creating horizontal social structures, equality and strong groupcohesion �, early communism did not develop clear strategies, the main focalpoint of the doctrine remained class consciousness of the proletariat and socialrevolution with its self-destructive and ambiguous objective.Last, taking into account the historicity of the two, although both doctrines

were structured mainly in the 18th-19th centuries, the mass-support of nation-alism rooted earlier in the states and societies of Europe, leaving communismjust a marginal role for a large period of time.

Marxism, communism and the national question

This chapter studies the attempts of Marxist authors to incorporate or ex-plain the national question. I analyzed some selected works of Marx and En-gels, Otto Bauer and the Austro-Marxists, Lenin and Stalin, Brezhnev and,last but not least, the Romanian and Polish communists, focusing on the com-patibility and progression within their writings.

1. Marx and the national question

The great scholar of nationalism, Walker Connor in his study on the rela-tionship between communism and nationalism argues that from a philosophicalperspective the two are incompatible because their world views are in contradic-tion. While nationalism imagines the world in vertical segments � the nationsof the world divided by boundaries �, communism � with the classes in con�ict� constructs it from horizontal ones (Connor 1985: 5). It is clear, however,that their development in the 19th century could not have happened isolated,without re�ecting to each other. Examining Marx's work from this perspective,

42 Toró Tibor

Connor divides it into three main periods: classical Marxism � before the year1848, strategic Marxism � takes into account the national question, support-ing the self-determination of some nations which would sustain the communistcause, and national Marxism � where nations are seen as the principle actorsof history (Connor 1985: 20).Although in time Marx recognized the importance of nations, it has to be

mentioned that he remained anti-national and anti-nationalist. This is statedalready in the Manifesto of the Communist party, where he names the na-tional character a bourgeois concept constructed to attract the masses to �ghtagainst the hegemony of the aristocracy. However, as a result of the constantextension of the means of production and capital, a new class was born, themodern working class, �who live only so long as they �nd work, and who �ndwork only so long as their labor increases capital� (Marx and Engels 2005: 8).Moreover, in Marx's conception, this new class, the proletariat will becomeconscious of its power and will organize itself politically. In this posture it willneed no national framework because it will unite to �nd the common oppressorand to achieve universal political supremacy. Only the communists can leadthe proletariat because they can see the �common interests of the entire pro-letariat, independently of all nationality� and they �represent the interest ofthe movement as a whole� (Marx and Engels 2005: 13). This universalism canbe reached at a certain point of capitalism, thus, because not all nations areat the same level of development, they need to be approached with di�erentstrategies.Despite these ideas, Marx underestimated the power of nationalism and the

nations. In his early period he considered them just byproducts of capitalism,an ephemeral evolutionary stage toward a higher stage of development. Inthe second period he looked at them just as at strategic means of reaching thedesired evolutionary stage. He supported some of the national movements, butonly those of the historical nations8 (Nimni 1991: 17). Thus, he consideredthat the national self-determination of bigger and stronger nations would befavorable for the proletariat's goals as well.In his last period Marx recognized the historical importance of the nation

state, but still did not reframe his ideology according to it (Szporluk 1988:177). He recognized the role of nationalism and its connections to power orits border-constructing capacity, but saw this phenomenon inferior to the ones

8In Marx and Engel's perception historical nations are those who managed to form orare close to form their nation-state, while nationalities or non-historical nations are thosenationalist movements that did not manage to form their states until a certain period oftime. These, in Marx's idea, will never be able to do so (Nimni 1991: 23-27).


generated by communism9. As Kemp points out, the problem was that Marxand Engels saw nationalism as �something that was not really worth comingto term with� (Kemp 1999: 22). In their opinion, nations and states wouldgradually disappear as the proletariat and communism installs in power.Anderson, however, has a di�erent point of view. He considers that the

problem is not related to the fact that Marx ignored the importance of na-tionalism, but to the fact that in Marxist theory �nationalism has proved anuncomfortable anomaly and has (. . . ) been largely elided, rather than con-fronted� (Anderson in Szporluk 1988: 67).Marx failed to give a feasible explanation to nations and nationalism despite

the fact that he believed that communist doctrine would be a stronger socialorganizer. However, the proven viability of nationalism and the lack of guide-line developed for the practical usage of communism left no choice for Marxistwriters but to �face� the nation.

2. Otto Bauer and the Austro-Marxists

One of the most interesting Marxist approaches to the national question wasdeveloped by the Austro-Marxists as a resolution of the increasing tensionscreated by the national movements in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Theseconcretized in the 19th century, and have become the central problem of theempire as a result of the increasing political activity � struggle for nationalself-determination and political rights � of di�erent national elites.Otto Bauer, one of the most important representatives of the Austro-Marxists,

considered nationalism � similarly to Marx � a bourgeois weapon: national cul-ture was produced by modern capitalism for the people as a whole in orderto mobilize the masses in combating feudalism (Bauer 2000: 85). Later, bystressing the national speci�city of the state and by dividing the proletariatinto di�erent nations, the bourgeoise tried to protect the existing social order(Bauer 2000: 131).Despite these ideas, there is a novelty in Otto Bauer's work. He recognized

the importance and the power of the nation and nationalism, and stated thatif social-democrats took out the nationalist wind of the sails of the bourgeoiseby resolving the question of national self-determination, there would be noobstacle in front of the proletariat to follow their objectives (Bauer 2000: 249).

9A rather peculiar fact related to these beliefs is the fact that he never developed apractical usage for his theory, nor images about the world and society after the revolution,except maybe some general ethical ideas related to the behavior of the social actors (Singer2001: 78-81).

44 Toró Tibor

The exact strategy would be to grant national-cultural autonomy for everynationality, in which �each nation, wherever its members resided, would forma body that independently administrated its own a�airs� (Bauer 2000: 281).This autonomy concept is closely related to Bauer's own de�nition of the

nation, which likewise lacks territoriality: the nation �is a community of char-acter that has grown (. . . ) out of a community of fate� (Bauer 2000: 101). AsNimni interprets it, �nation [is] a process, rather than a �xed one-dimensionalrelation of causality� (Nimni 1991: 165). Therefore, national development hasto be seen as a dynamic process � not a static fact �, which acts as a greatintegrating force on the social actors.The Austro-Marxists recognized the power of nationalism and its dynamics

compared to socialism, and, as Kemp puts it, they did not try to destroythe nation as Marx did, they tried to enhance it (Kemp 1999: 35). In otherwords, they recognized that national aspirations were higher forces than the onegenerated by class struggle. They thought that the resolution of the di�erentproblems of national self-determination would clear the way in front of theproletariat, leaving them to focus on the universal problem of the socialistrevolution. Moreover, they believed that this would occur faster in a strongstate. Therefore, by defending the unity of the empire, socialism would beeasier to approach (Kemp 1999: 38). Some authors use this argument to pointout the national a�liations of the Austro-Marxists. This, however, is only halftrue. One could argue that Bauer and Renner believed that the only way toreach socialism is through the political nationalism of a strong Habsburg state,which needs to be kept together at any price.

3. Lenin and Stalin about the national problem

Another interpretation of the national problem is the one given by Leninand Stalin in the case of the Soviet Union. Being in a di�erent situation thanMarx or the Austro-Marxists, Lenin found himself leading a strong communistmovement which not only challenged but overturned the tsarist leadership inRussia. Two important questions were needed to be solved: the problem of thenationalities, which could decisively help the communists in their cause, andthe seizure of power in the state; this last aspect was not taken in considerationby Marx when writing the Manifesto. When it was written, the worker move-ments were very weak or non-existent, they could not challenge state power(Kemp 1999: 23).Therefore, Lenin had to rethink the communist theory by incorporating both

of these puzzles in one coherent ideology, what made him � if we remain at the


typology introduced by Walker Connor � a strategic Marxist. In Lenin's pointof view, self-determination of nations is important because the nation state isthe best formation that can foster societies to pass from an early capitalist stageinto the period of �bourgeois-democratic society and state� and fully formedcapitalism, which is essential for the cleavage and class struggle between thebourgeois and the proletariat (Lenin 1914: 2). Thus, the proletariat mustsupport the national bourgeoise only insofar as they �ght the oppressor (Lenin1914: 4). Moreover, Lenin believed that a number of small countries couldbe easily drowned into an integrating communist movement. Therefore, self-determination in his conception is the possible secession of cultural or ethnicgroups from a multi-ethnic state, and it needs to be supported in every case.Small nation-states can be helped to reach the revolutionary stage a lot fasterthan strong capitalist empires. This new strategy had an immediate e�ectwithin the Russian Empire, the Bolsheviks �raised their prestige higher thanthe `white' generals� (Kemp 1999: 57).Following this new logic, Lenin criticized Bauer and his cultural autonomy

in several accounts. First he believed that communism needed to be reachedby revolution, not by reformation or reconciliation as the Austro-Marxiststried. In his conception, cultural autonomy was reconciliation with nation-alism, which is not compatible with the universal objectives of communism,internationalism and �the amalgamation of all nations in the higher unity�(Lenin 1913: 4). In other words, he considered Bauer's conception a stabi-lization of the Empire, which is not compatible with Marxism. Although hecriticized Bauer, Lenin saw the functional usages of the nation. His conceptionof internationalist culture is not non-national � the nation with its commonlanguage and relation-system is needed to spread this culture, and in everynational culture there is a �democratic and socialist element�, which can beintegrated (Lenin 1913: 2).Similarly, Lenin did not reject autonomy altogether. The state, although

strongly centralized as regards general economic and political decisions, needsregional autonomy in purely local, regional questions. National-territorial au-tonomy seemed to be the best solution but only from the point of view of aneconomic reasoning: �unitary national population is (. . . ) one of the most re-liable factors for free commercial intercourse� (Lenin 1913: 6). In other words,national-territorial autonomies would legitimate the communist movement. Bystating the right to self-determination and granting territorial autonomy, hebelieved that the di�erent nationalities could be kept in the empire, and theywould not �ght for their freedom in the Bolshevik regime (Kemp 1999: 51).

46 Toró Tibor

This, however, was not the case. Many of the nationalities opted for indepen-dence, giving a hard time to the Soviet Union to reincorporate them.Although Stalin's conception is similar to the Leninist ideas presented above,

there is an important aspect that needs to be underlined. After stabilizingthe Soviet Union, the communist doctrine needed further adjustments in or-der to be usable in institutionalized form. Neither Marx nor Lenin thoughtabout what a communist state should look like. Although the idea of self-determination o�ered some insight, it created a long line of problems with thedi�erent nationalities living within the borders of the Russian Empire. In orderto deal with the new dilemma, Stalin pushed communism even further towardnationalism by re-evaluating the question of national self-determination. AsNimni correctly observes, the Stalinist conception of self-determination �is farless rigid� than the Leninist version (Nimni 1991: 93). The principle wouldapply to those nationalities that would prefer to remain in the bond of a multi-national state. For these cases Stalin proposes the regional autonomy, similarto the one described by Lenin (Stalin 1913: 7). Moreover, as Kemp pointsout, he parries the exit option of the nationalities by pronouncing the rightof the proletariat to consolidate its power, and subordinates the right of self-determination to this former one (Kemp 1999: 72-73), not only stabilizingstate power but legitimating the later evolution of the Soviet Union. In otherwords, Stalin did not abolish the `exit option' of the nations, but introduced a`keep in' option for every national group.Therefore, Stalin developed the �socialism in one country� paradigm, which

tried to use the social structures created by nationalism to resolve the practicalproblems occurred when using the pure theoretical conceptions of Marx, whodid not formulate any real solution for these cases. The solution deliveredby the Soviet Union was �nationalist in form, socialist in content� (Lenin inConnor 1985: 37) and had three basic strategic principles (Connor 1985: 38):

1) support the right of national self-determination of all national groupswith wide-ranging territorial autonomy for those who want to remain;

2) after securing power, end the `exit-possibility', begin assimilation withthe help of the created territorial autonomies;

3) �keep the party centralized and free of all nationalist proclivities�.

Although this strategy could be one of a nation-state as well, there is oneimportant aspect which one cannot leave out of consideration: the elites ofthe Soviet socialist party � even those of the regional leadership � could notidentify themselves through their national identity, but in the prism of their


political one formed under a communist ideology. However, as Connor andNimni observed, in reality this was very hard, almost impossible to realize10.Some scholars have chosen to analyze how communism stabilized in the di�er-ent countries, and what the communist elite's relationship was to nationalism.Many of these argue that the �socialism in one country� policy and the new-born people's democracies kept a portion of national identity, some kind of�socialist patriotism� which was used by them as legitimizing power. Eachand every communist party integrated itself in the national history creating anideological patriotism, which would strengthen their power (Mevius 2005: 2).However, these patriotic discourses were rather communist than nationalist.The only analogy between the two is the fact that the communist system usedthe social and economical organizational structure of nationalism to keep statepower. This argument is supported by the observations made by Kemp on therelationship between the di�erent people's parties and Moscow (Kemp 1999:123). In his opinion there is a basic contradiction and paradox in these rela-tions. On the one hand the parties needed some sort of national commitmentin order to legitimize their power, on the other hand they needed to keep theirgood relationship with the Soviet Union. Strengthening one of these policiesjeopardized the other, leaving the party leaderships to control the usages ofnationalism and their discourse to Moscow as well.Therefore, the attitudinal change toward nationalism is more evident in the

Stalinist and Leninist conception, they recognized and integrated the socialand economic organizational power of nationalism, but rejected its culturaland ideological components. In other words, the ideological charge of the sys-tem is a universalist one, the national organization is used in order to integrateinto the system the ethnic groups as a whole, not directly the individuals. Thisis an evident departure from the ideas presented by Marx, because in his con-ception nationalism as a bourgeois structure would disappear altogether, theindividuals would be the ones who would connect themselves to the communistsystem.

10Nimni shows nationalist rhetoric even in Stalin's position on national-territorial auton-omy question: he talks about the solving of the national question by bringing the nationsand nationalities under one common high culture, in this case the Russian one. One couldargue, however, that this culture is a socialist internationalist one.

48 Toró Tibor

4. Beyond Leninism and Stalinism � de-Stalinization and the

Brezhnev-doctrine

A further adjustment of communism to the national question � and a clear�aw of the Leninist-Stalinist theory � comes from the period of Khrushchevand Brezhnev. After the death of Stalin, a new reformulation was needed,not only of the two doctrines but of communist state-building as well. Thepolitical struggles within the Soviet nomenclature left Khrushchev, who justrose to power, with two strategic options: 1) to continue the Stalinist legacyby close centralization and control over the other communist countries, or 2)to delimit himself from Stalin and his coercive politics, formulating a newcommunist doctrine.One of Khrushchev's �rst actions was the normalization of the Soviet-Yugo-

slav relations. Tito, when creating the post-World War II Yugoslavia, didnot want to be in�uenced by Stalin and his imperialist politics, and found adi�erent road slightly changing the doctrine: he did not touch nationalism onregional level, but created a strong federal Yugoslav identity based on social,political, and cultural aspects. This new loyalty was catching mostly for theyoung people, who already socialized in the Titoist era (Shoup 1968: 263). Inother words, Tito introduced a trans-national federal Yugoslav identity, whichwould have gradually abolished the national ones, in the end forming �thenational identity of the country�. Stalin did not accept Yugoslav communism,leaving the two countries in an almost one decade con�ict. Therefore, in orderto `bring back Yugoslavia' Khrushchev needed to recognize their ways. In apact called the Belgrade Declaration, signed in 1955, the Soviet Union accepted�the right of each party to follow an independent path�, however, within theMarxist-Leninist doctrine (Zwick 1983: 94). The declaration recognized thefact that there is not only one road for reaching Communism, each countryneeds to �nd its own ways.As a direct result of the Belgrade Declaration, many communist parties

chose a more nationalistic approach. The Soviet Union interfered only whenthis reconciliation reached a certain level, as Zwick calls it, when a party failedto develop its own form of socialism (Zwick 1983: 104). This was the case ofHungary and partly Poland in 1956.When the Soviet leaders have seen the strengthening of nationalism against

communism � as a probable result of the Belgrade Declaration �, they tried toremedy the situation in 1959 with the Moscow Declaration. As Zwick pointsout, this document laid down the basic principles of communism that all coun-tries should accept (Zwick 1983: 105). This strategy had only one goal: to


limit the options of the di�erent communist parties in their relationship withnationalism.Another change came with the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia. Brezh-

nev, in a discourse delivered for reasoning this action11, stated the following.By referring to the Leninist principle of �ghting against �small-nation narrow-mindedness, seclusion and isolation,� he introduces several new lines in theMarxist-Leninist doctrine. First and foremost, he restates that �[e]ach Com-munist party is free to apply the basic principles of Marxism Leninism andof socialism in its country, but it cannot depart from these principles� (myitalics). This is a clear shift from the classical Leninist interpretation of thenation because it allows a certain degree of freedom for the di�erent nationalcommunist parties. Second, the phrasing itself is di�erent from the classicalvision, which usually referred to a single movement. In contrast with this dis-course, the Brezhnev-doctrine lets the national factions choose their actionswithin their states as long as they act by Marxist-Leninist principles.Zwick, in an interpretation delivered on this document, argues that the

Brezhnev-doctrine not only limits national communism, but introduces a kindof collective responsibility, which orders all communist states � members of theWarsaw Treaty � to verify the politics of each other. In other words, the SovietUnion did not interfere in the policies adopted by one single state until it didnot try to deviate from socialism. Therefore, party policy was not an issueuntil the country remained socialist in form and it declared and sustained �itsadherence to the movement� (Zwick 1983: 114-115).This conception is an evident withdrawal in the relationship between commu-

nism and nationalism. Brezhnev did not consider nationalism as an instrumentof communism in order to achieve its universal objective, he rather acknowl-edged the fact that the doctrine of communism is not universally applicable,that it has become more an internal matter of every state. In other words,there is no universal communist movement, but several communist movementswhich coalesce in a single bloc and match their foreign policies. This shift isimportant because it is the �rst time when communism or communists reallyrecognized and used the capacity of vertical boundary creation of nationalism.

11The whole transcript of the speech can be found online in the Mod-ern History Sourcebook, under the title 'The Brezhnev Doctrine' on the pagehttp://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1968brezhnev.html. The quotes in this section arefrom this text.

50 Toró Tibor

5. Combining communism with nationalism � the birth of

nationalist-communism

This last chapter presents the consequences of the Brezhnev-doctrine in twocases: Romania and the actions of the Romanian Communist Party and Polandand the workers' movement. Although the events in the two countries di�er,there is an important similarity: in both cases nationalism manages to dom-inate the communist doctrine, leaving the two countries communist in form,but national in content.A large number of scholars who focus on the research of Romania between

1945 and 1990 (Verdery 1991, King 1980, Gilberg 1990) agree that the shift ofRomanian communism from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine to a slightly nation-alist one had begun in the year 1964, and became more evident in 196812. Kingargues that this shift has three possible causes: 1) the Romanian CommunistParty was looking for public support and legitimization, 2) the nationalist dis-course of the Romanian political elites was used as a strategy to break awayfrom the Soviet Union, and 3) strategically seemed appropriate to stimulateeconomic progress (King 1980: 125).Katherine Verdery, in a book published on Romanian communism from an

anthropological perspective, argues that the Party engaged three strategies oflegitimation: remunerative, coercive, and �symbolic-ideological� (Verdery 1991:83-87). This latter one � the most important from our perspective � involvesthe saturation of consciousness �with certain symbols and ideological premises�,which serve as foundation for the legitimacy of the system. These symbols andideological premises, however, can take various shapes from classical Marxistclass consciousness, through the importance of personal connections, even tothe emphasizing of patriotism and sacri�ce for the Nation (Verdery 1991: 86).In her point of view, these symbolic-ideological strategies have become pro-nouncedly nationalist after 1968, when di�erent aspects of the Nation invadedthe public discourse (Verdery 1991: 86).Beyond this, Verdery presents the basis of this strategy: the usage of

economic principles such as monopolization or maximization in culturalproduction. In the �rst step, the Party, by controling the educational system,produced more intellectuals than its labormarket could take up. The surplus

12These dates are contested by Tism neanu and Boia, who argue that nationalism set-tled in already in 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev declared the rupture of the Soviet Unionwith its Stalinist past. As a result of this �de-Stalinization�, Gheorghiu Dej �cleared� theCommunist Party from all non-Romanian elements, consolidating its power at the sametime (Tism neanu 2002: 31). This period, however, is an earlier one, the period of nationalcommunism or social patriotism mentioned by Mevius or Zwick.


forced the intellectuals to collaborate with the party, as a single chance ofsurvival. Moreover, the limited space pressed them into a cutthroat competi-tion, which assured the consumption of possible `dissident' producers (Verdery1991: 91-92).A �rst step in the nationalization of the Party was the rede�nition of its

own past. Ceau³escu rehabilitated several purged communists of the end ofthe 1940s, who were charged with rightist behavior (Tism neanu 2003: 199),denounced the party's interwar and 1940s politics, which was considered aresult of the coercive power of the Comintern and the in�uence of foreignerson party strategies (King 1980: 123).Parallel to these events, the party ideologists were trying to demonstrate the

continuity of national history and party history. First, the role of the nationwas recognized �in achieving progress and civilization in the world�, and it wasa�rmed that only communism can help it to reach to the highest levels, notthe bourgeois social order. This new approach not only reconciled communismwith nationalism, but surrendered it to this latter one. Second, the role of theCommunist Party was rede�ned by stressing its national and not its universalrole (King 1980: 125). From this perspective, Ceau³escu's decision to openlyconfront the Soviet Union in 1968 on the issue of the Czechoslovak interventionwas more an internal message than an international one.The rewriting of the national history continued in order to combine the com-

munist present with a nationalistic past. The reevaluation of the Daco-Romantheory, of the actions of some emblematic �gures of Romanian history � �tefancel Mare, Mihai Viteazul, Vlad �epe³ �, or the accentuation of some smallerevents that could be interpreted as similar to the communist history, such aspeasant-uprisings like the one of Horea, Clo³ca and Cri³an (1784), or the Up-rising from Bobâlna (1437-1438) were all part of the national contextualizationof the Communist Party (Gilberg 1990: 175 or Verdery 1991: 224-240).The third part of the nationalistic symbolic-ideological strategy was a strong

assimilationist policy against national minorities and the di�erent regionalgroups. The declaration of the unitary national state principle and the sep-aration of the concepts of nation and nationality all demonstrate this strat-egy. In the o�cial ideology, the Romanian socialist nation incorporates all in-habitants of the country, while nationality represented ethnicity (Sha�r 1985:164). In the promotion of this classi�cation even some of the minority in-telligentsia was involved. In a highly propagandistic book about the Hun-garians of Romania edited in 1981, one of the ethnic Hungarian party mem-bers, Sándor Koppándi, demonstrates this stategy on the Hungarian minority.

52 Toró Tibor

By making the shift from minority to nationality he demonstrates the nation-ally unitary character of Romania in the following way:

[After presenting the demographic data on the Hungarians from Ro-

mania he writes] �The above data show that Romania is a unitary

national state, in which along the Romanians � the compelling ma-

jority � live other nationalities as well. Thus, in the case of our

country, we cannot talk about a multinational state� [own transla-

tion] (Koppandi & L®rincz 1981: 10 ).

However, this `integrating policy' was just a façade. The repression of theminorities continued (and in some cases accentuated) with strong assimilationand forced emigration. This could be best exempli�ed on educational andcultural level. The state limited minority language education: in the 1970srestricted the Hungarian higher education in applied sciences and appointednew Hungarian academic stu� to the Babe³-Bolyai University in a much lowerrate. Similarly, in 1973, the new educational law discriminated minority edu-cation by setting a minimal number of 25 children for class organization, whileRomanian language classes were organized regardless the number of pupils(Schöp�in 1978: 10-11). Furthermore, the state started the Romanianizationof Transylvanian history. This policy had a strong impact on the existing re-gional identities as well. The Romanian regional di�erences were abolished,the publication of regional studies was banned and the usage of the originalnames of the provinces was forbidden as well (Boia 1997: 162).The repression of the minorities culminated in the second part of the 1980s.

As Gilberg correctly puts it, the economic de�ciencies radicalized the nationaldiscourse of the Party, pulling it to extreme chauvinism (Gilberg 1990: 179-180). In 1986, the proportion of Hungarian pupils studying in Hungariandropped to 23% (from 60% in 1980) and Ceau³escu, with a `systematization'policy, planned to destroy a large number of villages � mostly Hungarian ones� in favor of `agro-industrial towns' (Schöp�in&Poulton 1990: 17-18).In conclusion, after 1968, the whole party ideology was rewritten, national-

ism becoming the main legitimizing force mostly as a result of the boundary-constructing capacity of nationalism. It corrected the ambiguities of the auto-destructive strategy of the communist revolution, leaving the communist eliteto embrace nationalism.Another important example for the nationalization of communism comes

from Poland. In 1980, as a result of the economic problems encountered bythe state, the Solidarity movement was born, a civil workers' movement, which


openly protested against the policies of the communist party. However, Soli-darity was not simply a social movement, but also a national one. As DavidMason cites the movement's program, it is clear that beyond the material ben-e�ts, Solidarity fought for �democracy, truth, legality, human dignity and therepair of the republic� (Mason 1989: 52), all goals that can be associated withnationalism as well.The activity of the movement created an awkward situation for the Polish

party leaders. According to the Brezhnev-doctrine the Soviet Union wouldnot interfere in Polish home a�airs as long as they stick to communism andto the Eastern Bloc. However, by �ghting for democracy the Solidarity move-ment would have jeopardized this as well. Therefore, the government interferedonly when the movement reached the critical point of possible democratization(Zwick 1983: 126-135). The introduction of martial law weakened the move-ment, but did not break it. As history shows, several strikes, undergroundactivities were organized, which had an increasing nationalist character. An-alyzing the underground stamps issued by the Solidarity movement, KristiEvans argues that most of its iconography was articulated around events con-cerning Polish resistance and Polish culture, in opposition to the o�cial historypromoted by the government, which � as the images argue � was not Polish(Evans 1992: 749-750). Furthermore, many stamps included the emblem ofthe movement, which can clearly be linked with the one of the prewar Polishstate. Evans considers that this imagery legitimizes Solidarity as the �heir ofthe sovereign Poland� (Evans 1992: 760).In both cases nationalism managed to dominate the political sphere nearly

a decade before the democratization of the country. This, in my opinion, wasa direct result of the Brezhnev-doctrine, the last major adjustment made bycommunists to integrate nationalism.

Conclusions

The case studies show that communism and nationalism are not incompat-ible, they can be present at the same time in one country or can even bereconciled. This is a result of the de�ciencies caused by the practical usagesof the Marxist theory and of the need of doctrinal renewal imposed by thecontinuous socio-political development of the Central and Eastern Europeancommunist states. As the study tried to prove, this settlement was an out-come of a long and organic transformation as di�erent Marxist authors � OttoBauer, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, Khruschev or Brezhnev � in di�erent phases of

54 Toró Tibor

development of the socialist doctrine tried to face the national question. The�rst communist theories considered nationalism an ephemeral phase in humanhistory that will be dissolved by the class struggle and communism. Later, itwas seen as a tool in the hand of communist leaders, which could help themto achieve their universalistic goals. In the following phase, when the doctrineneeded to be implemented on state level, the communists recognized the socialorganizational and centripetal power of nationalism, and used it to legitimizetheir own leadership. However, in order to combine the two they needed toreevaluate the universalistic approach, nationalizing the movement itself; everycommunist party had the liberty to create its own Marxist-Leninist principles.This construction was nationalist in form but socialist in content. In the lastphase also this settlement changed. In order to keep the unity of the commu-nist bloc at any price, Brezhnev readjusted the doctrine, allowing it to becomecommunist in form but nationalist in essence.In my opinion, this linear shift from an evident incompatibility through an

ideological compatibility to the domination of nationalism is rooted on theone hand in the incapacity of Marxism to explain the national phenomenon �neither Marx nor his followers could set up a working analytical framework�, and on the other hand in the di�erent renewal capacity of the two doc-trines. While communism is a rigid dogmatic construction, nationalism, withits horizontal social organization and dynamic development is capable of end-less renewal. In other words, communism surrendered �rst the organizationalpower to nationalism and then the ideological control as well, dissolving com-pletely in the end.

References

Anderson, Benedict (1991): Imagined Communities (revised edition). London- New York: Verso.

Bakk, Miklós (2008): Politikai közösség és identitás [Political Community andIdentity]. Cluj Napoca: Korunk Komp-Press.

Barth, Frederik (1969): Introduction. In: Frederik Barth (ed.): Ethnic Groupsand Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Di�erence. Boston: Lit-tle, Brown and Company, 9-39.

Barth, Frederik (1994): Enduring and Emerging Issues in the Analysis of Eth-nicity. IN: Hans Vermeluen and Cora Govers (ed.): The Anthropology of


Ethnicity. Beyond Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Amsterdam: Het Spin-huis, 11-34.

Bauer, Otto (2000): The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy. Min-neapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press.

Boia, Lucian (1997): Istorie ³i mit în con³tiinµa româneasc [History and Mythin the Romanian Consciousness] Bucure³ti: Humanitas.

Boia, Lucian (1999): Mitologia ³tiinµi�c a comunismului [Scienti�c Mythologyof Communism]. Bucure³ti: Humanitas.

Brezhnev, Leonid (1968): The Brezhnev Doctrine. [Online - visited on31.01.2009] http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1968brezhnev.html.

Breully, John (1993): Nationalism and the State. Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press.

Connor, Walker (1985): The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory

and Strategy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Engels, Friedrich (1847): The Principles of Communism. [Online - visited on27.01.2009]http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/11/prin-com.htm.

Evans, Kristi S. (1992): The Argument of Images: Historical Representationin Solidarity Underground Postage, 1981-1987. American Ethnologist, 19 (4)749-767.

Gellner, Ernest (1997): Nationalism. London: Phoenix.

Gilberg, Trond (1990): Nationalism and Communism in Romania. The Rise

and Fall of Ceau³escu's Personal Dictatorship. Boulder, San Francisco &Oxford: Westview Press.

Hobsbawm, Eric and Rangers, Terrence (ed.) (1992): The Invention of Tradi-

tion. Cambridge University Press.

Kemp, Walter A. (1999): Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and

the Soviet Union: A Basic Contradiction. New York: St. Martin's Press.

King, Robert R. (1980): History of the Romanian Communist Party. Stanford:Hoover University Press.

56 Toró Tibor

Koppándi Sándor and L®rincz László (1981): Coordonate ale rezolv rii prob-lemei naµionale [Coordinates of the Resolution of the National Question] In:Koppándi Sándor (ed.): Naµionalitatea maghiar din România. [The Hun-garian Nationality from Romania] Bucure³ti: Kriterion.

Koppándi Sándor (ed.) (1981): Naµionalitatea maghiar din România [TheHungarian Nationality from Romania]. Bucure³ti: Kriterion.

Koselleck, Reinhart (1997): Az aszimmetrikus ellenfogalmak történeti-politikai

szemantikája [The Historical-political Semantics of the Asymmetric CounterConcepts]. Budapest: Jószöveg M¶hely.

Lenin, Vladimir Ilici (1913): Critical Remarks on the National Question. [On-line - visited on 28.01.2009.]http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/crnq/index.htm.

Lenin, Vladimir Ilici (1914): The Right of Nations to Self-determination. [On-line - visited on 28.01.2009.]http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/index.htm.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels (2005): Manifesto of the Communist Party.Marxists Internet Archive (marxists.org).

Mason, David S. (1989): Solidarity as a New Social Movement. Political Sci-ence Quarterly 104 (1) 41-58.

McLean, Ian (ed.) (2001): Oxford Dicµionar de Politic [Oxford Political Dic-tionary]. Bucure³ti: Univers Enciclopedic.

McLellan, David (2006): Karl Marx. In: David Miller (ed.): Enciclopedia

Blackwell a Gândirii Politice [Blackwell Enciclopaedia of Political Thought].Bucure³ti: Humanitas, 483-485.

Mevius, Martin (2005): Agents of Moscow. The Hungarian Communist Party

and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism 1941-1953. Oxford: Oxford Univer-sity Press.

Miller, David (ed.) (2006): Enciclopedia Blackwell a Gândirii Politice [Black-well Enciclopaedia of Political Thought]. Bucure³ti: Humanitas.

Motyl, Alexander J. (ed.) (2001): Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New York:Academic Press, Vol. I.


Nimni, Ephraim (1991): Marxism and Nationalism. Theoretical Origins of Po-

litical Crisis. London: Pluto Press.

Schöp�in, George (1978): The Hungarians of Romania. Minority Rights Group

Report No. 37.

Schöp�in, George and Hugh Poulton (1990): Romania's Ethnic Hungarians.Minority Rights Group Report No. 37 (New 1990 edition).

Sha�r, Michael (1985): Romania. Politics, Economics, and Society. London:Pinter Publishers.

Shoup, Paul (1968): Communism and Nationalism in the Yugoslav Question.New York: Columbia University Press.

Singer, Peter (2001): Marx. A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford Uni-versity Press.

Smith, Anthony D. (1999): Myth and Memories of the Nation. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovici (1913): Marxism and the National Question. [Online- visited on 28.01.2009.]http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm.

Suny, Ronald Grigor (2001): History. IN: Alexander J. Motyl (ed.): Encyclo-pedia of Nationalism. New York: Academic Press, Vol. I, 335-358.

Szporluk, Roman (1988): Communism and Nationalism. Karl Marx versus

Fredrich List. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thom, Francoise (1996): Sfâr³iturile comunismului [The End of Communism].Bucure³ti: Polirom.

Tism neanu, Vladimir (2002): Gheorgiu Dej and the Romanian Workers'

Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism.Woodrow Wilson Center: Cold War International History Project, WorkingPaper 37.

Tism neanu, Vladimir (2003): Stalinism for All Seasons. A Political History

of Romanian Communism. Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: UniversityCalifornia Press.

58 Toró Tibor

Tortsky, Leon (1931): The Permanent Revolution. [Online - visited on 27.01.2009.] http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1931/tpr/pr10.htm.

Verdery, Katherine (1991): National Ideology Under Socialism. Identity and

Cultural Politics in Ceau³escu's Romania. Berkeley, Los Angeles & London:University California Press.

Weber, Eugen (1976): Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural

France, 1870-1914. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

White�eld, Stephen (2001): Comunism [Communism]. In: Ian McLean (ed.):Oxford Dicµionar de Politic [Oxford Political Dictionary]. Bucure³ti: Uni-vers Enciclopedic, 84-87.

Z pârµan, Liviu Petru (1994): Doctrine politice [Political Doctrines]. Ia³i: Edi-tura Chemarea.

Zwick, Peter (1983): National Communism. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,1983.



Internal Diaspora � Assimilation �

Formation of the Internal Diaspora

BODÓ BarnaDepartment of European StudiesSapientia University Cluj-Napoca

email: [email protected]

Abstract. The expression ìnternal diaspora' is a current term of ourdays for Hungarian minorities living in Central-Eastern Europe. Thereis no exact de�nition for the term. The de�nitions there exist contain aseries of �exible (i.e., imprecise) elements. It is easy also because com-mon people have experiences related to the internal diaspora and alsointerpretations of it. Some are not �rst hand experiences, but literaryones, e.g., reports on the linguistic extremities (the Csangos, for exam-ple). Usually the term is associated with a certain situation characterizedby several disadvantages, and it is used with comments on social equityand morality in an associative or demanding tone, but always with anintention for �improvement�. The present study is an attempt to com-pare assimilation in diasporas and internal diasporas and to describe thesocial psychology of the formation of internal diasporas.

Keywords: diaspora, internal diaspora, identity, assimilation, assimila-tional situation, melting pot

The expression ìnternal diaspora'1 is a highly fashionable term of our days.We use and abuse it. And it is easy to do so since there is no exact de�nition forthe term. The de�nitions there exist contain a series of �exible (i.e., imprecise)elements. It is easy also because common people have experiences related tothe internal diaspora and also interpretations of it. Some are not �rst handexperiences, but literary ones, e.g., reports on the linguistic extremities (theCsangos, for example). Usually the term is associated with a certain situation

1The terms `local diaspora` and èthnic diaspora' are used by some researchers to describethe same phenomenon. We opt for the variant ìnternal diaspora`.

60 Bodó Barna

characterized by several disadvantages, and it is used with comments on socialequity and morality in an associative or demanding tone, but always with anintention for �improvement�.And yet, there is no scienti�c standpoint even regarding the basic terms re-

lated to this phenomenon; specialized scienti�c texts hardly use it. Diasporais di�erent � that is a point of interest with sociologists, politologists, anthro-pologists and psychologists at the same time. But the diaspora, the existenceand essence of integrated, migrating ethnic groups formed as a consequence ofthe movement of people from a nation or group away from their own coun-try, is something di�erent. Internal diaspora (`szórvány' as Hungarians call it)is (was) formed as a consequence of historical processes (new circumstancescaused by cataclysms, borders that have been moved). In the case of themembers of internal diasporas events that caused their minority status justhappen(ed), while being member of a diaspora is a matter of personal choiceeven in cases when there was a political pressure that caused it. Internal di-aspora is the phenomenon of living in the same place despite of a changedpolitical and ethnical medium. Internal diaspora means undertaking continu-ity. The question is: for how long? For how long can people undertake to livein an internal diaspora? How long will (can) an internal diaspora hold on? Onwhat terms can an internal diaspora continue, be kept alive?Those who think this is an unimportant issue on the table of national politics,

being a matter that regards only (small) communities living at the linguisticextremities, are utterly mistaken. Internal diasporas made up of members ofa nation are the boundaries of that nation. And since the phenomenon ofinternal diaspora is a non-static one and the formation of internal diasporas isa process, the conclusions are quite obvious: the linguistic and national bor-ders are constantly moving along with the movement of the internal diasporasbelonging to that nation. The question arises: is there any nation without in-ternal diasporas? It is a question that ought to be asked despite the fact thatno other European nation except Hungarians has a term for that phenomenon.For one hundred years now, since American writer Israel Zangwill formu-

lated (in 1908) the concept and metaphor of the melting pot, the diaspora hasbeen a leading topic of social sciences. It took half a century to become obviousthat no matter how good natured the discourse on that concept was it was stilla social dead end. Ever since, assimilation is an important topic not only ofsocial psychology, but also of political philosophy. The topic has several pointsof interest: what kind of changes do worldwide migrations induce within thehost society, how long can newly comes identify themselves as foreigners � what

Internal Diaspora � Assimilation � Formation of the Internal Diaspora 61

kind of relational strategies and social systems result from the state of �beingan outsider within�?If some of the European nations � mainly the Germans � did not �nd it nec-

essary to present a speci�c life situation and a political issue to public discourseand to the sciences by dealing with the term of internal diaspora, that doesnot mean the topic should be a menial one for Hungarian social scientists aswell. Still, this is the case. For contemporary discourse on the topic of internaldiasporas can be called everything � moral, social, political � but scienti�c.Although Milton Gordon's classical theory on assimilation was followed by aseries of new and highly regarded theories, there is no general theory of theformation of internal diasporas � i.e., of the assimilation in internal diasporas� until this very day.Therefore the present study is an attempt to compare assimilation in di-

asporas and internal diasporas and to describe the social psychology of theformation of internal diasporas.

Diaspora and internal diaspora

Rogers Brubaker, an American sociologist familiar also with the situationof the internal diasporas in the countries neighbouring Hungary, has recentlywritten an important roundup article on diasporas (Brubaker 2005). The arti-cle shows that even the greatest minds of nationalism theory, social psychologyand anthropology (A. Cohen, J. Cli�ord, B. Anderson, G. Baumann, W. Con-nor, St. Hall) tackled this subject, which thus gains a more and more complexmeaning and interpretation. That is not surprising at all given the fact thatwe live in a world of increasing migration, where it is important to �nd outwhether the state of diaspora will come to an end, whether there is such athing as �perfect� integration.It is more and more di�cult to answer the basic question due to the fact

that the concept gains ever new meanings. Referring back to the literatureof the �eld, Brubaker mentions besides the classical ethnic diasporas also theYankee, white and liberal diasporas. The author quotes a relatively new anal-ysis, according to the �ndings of which the concept of diaspora has 45 di�erentmeanings in the discourse of the various humanities and social sciences. The in-terpretations of the term have come up with diasporic consciousness, diasporicidentity, diasporic nationalism, diasporic networks, diasporic culture, diasporic

62 Bodó Barna

religion � and so on2. This is hardly surprising if we take into considerationwhat the movements and networks of our globalized world are. And this kindof examples will take us directly to the question: if every kind of di�erenceconstitutes a diaspora, what is diaspora in fact? Seeing the various situationsthat correlate with this term, one could expect also what Brubaker is warningagainst, i.e., although the example of the Jewish people is basic to analyzingthe term of diaspora, this model is quite limited and un�t for the interpretationof a series of new situations.Since the 1960s a prestigious international professional journal has been

dedicated to the topic: Diaspora � a Journal of Transnational Studies. Itwould be well worth reviewing some of the articles presented here as a proofof the variety of the contemporary literature on diaspora. But I will refrainfrom that for now and I will only mention a comment regarding the existenceof the journal: the mobilization potential of the diasporas is growing into atimely topic of today's politics. Social movements of the present day show thatmigrants �nd it more important to represent and maintain the elements thatdi�erentiate them from the host society than to be accepted and to integrateinto the host society as fully as possible. B. Anderson opines even that in manycases diaspora can be interpreted as �long term� nationalism (Anderson 1998)� which, once accepted, will take us into a new dimension.In his article Brubaker asks: how can we de�ne diaspora, what are its de�n-

ing elements? He names three of them: territorial dispersion, an orientationtowards the native country and preservation of boundaries. I will not discussterritorial dispersion � that is quite obvious. As for the orientation to the nativecountry, it can imply the actual, physically existing country or an imaginaryand idealized entity. The goal is to cherish and protect the collective memoryof the native country, regardless of whether this also means a living culturalrelationship or not. The third element shows that members of the diasporawish to preserve and maintain their original identity, which is di�erent fromthat of the host society, they wish to resist assimilation by the host society.Most assumptions and dilemmas regard the modalities in which the variouscommunities interpret the limits that protect their separate identity and the

2Here is a quotation enumerating the concepts: �There is the adjective `diasporist', des-ignating a stance or position in a �eld of debate or struggle. And there are the adjectives`diasporic' and `diasporan', which designate an attribute or modality � as in diasporic citi-zenship, diasporic consciousness, diasporic identity, diasporic imagination, diasporic nation-alism, diasporic networks, diasporic culture, diasporic religion, or even the diasporic self (toenumerate only some of the most common conceptual pairings found in recent academicarticles).�


elements these limits are made up of. And yet we have to ask also what thefeatures that turn these walls into porous, permeable entities are? How longcan this state last? What will be the result of such an attitude considering theworld-wide migration processes going on today?Due to the discourse on the topic of diaspora, the term gained multiple

meanings. Theoretical writings use the concept with various meanings in var-ious contexts. It can refer to an actual community, in an abstract sense to astate of being, it can also name a process (diasporization, dediasporization)and a specialization (diasporology � diaspora research).Brubaker refers in his article also to the situation of the Hungarians, bringing

it as an example, a particular case when diaspora was created not by themigration of the (members of the) community, but by the rede�nition of theborders3. This takes us to what I have mentioned before: although Brubakerwas a professor at the Central European University in Budapest and thus hadthe chance to gain a personal experience on the di�erence in meaning betweendiaspora and internal diaspora, he does not consider it important to mention inthe English context he communicates in that the two situations di�er in morethan their initial cause and that there are further di�erences between the twolife situations, which also de�ne the di�erent characteristics of the situations.I will continue now by reviewing the interpretations of the Hungarian authors

regarding the concept of internal diaspora. Naturally, these authors do notcompare diaspora and internal diaspora, for them the di�erence is so obviousthat they do not even make any references to the diaspora. Let us see someof the classical de�nitions. The �rst one who ought to be quoted on thissubject is Ödön Nagy. �Internal diaspora is the smaller or larger communityor settlement of our brothers and sisters belonging to the same nation whichcame into being in the midst of people belonging to other nations or outsidethe centers of the compact Hungarian communities living in Romania, or whichwas preserved in territories that in some historical time used to be Hungarianterritories. One of the de�ning elements in the meaning of internal diasporais the idea of dispersion both territorially and at the level of community lifeand another, stronger de�ning element is that communities de�ned as internal

diasporas do not function as organic parts of the Hungarian community because

of their reduced number and lack of organization�. (Nagy 1938)

3�Diasporas have been seen to result from the migration of borders over people, and notsimply from that of people over borders. Hungarians, Russians and other ethno-nationalcommunities separated by a political frontier from their putative national homelands havebeen conceptualized as diasporas in this manner.�

64 Bodó Barna

Of course, Ödön Nagy analyzes the issue as a Transylvanian, and even if hedoes not explain it, it is quite obvious that he considers the state of internaldiaspora a particular case of minority life. He assumes there is a compact massof Hungarians (he uses a di�erent expression) and regards internal diasporaas an opposite of that, something that di�ers from the compact mass. Animportant element in his de�nition is the reference to the lack of organization,which is probably meant to refer to the institutional background, or rather tothe lack of such a background. He then continues to de�ne internal diaspora indetail and goes on as follows: �Members of internal diasporas do not positionthemselves according to the focus of the main ethnic group, as iron powder�nding the magnetic �eld lines, but function outside of the main lines of themain ethnic group and thus take no part in the nation-building process of thislatter. They are nothing but a virtual number, a disorganized mass within thebody of the ethnic community, which constitutes a burden to the nation; theydo not have any consequent relationship with the body of the nation and itsculture, and they can be regarded as a channel letting thousands of membersof the ethnic group leak out from the body of the nation into the powerfulstream of another nation every year.�My own de�nition of the internal diaspora is: �The essence of the internal

diaspora can be rendered properly by a politological interpretation, i.e., thatthe internal diaspora is a state of daily decisions (Bodó 2005). This situationis present also when the member of an internal diaspora does not think of it,does not care for it, since it functions in each of their conscious and involuntarydecisions from the language they use to the life partner they choose, from thefriends they make to the workplaces they select. The background and contextof each decision is the fact that members of internal diasporas cannot live ascompletely free social beings for they do not bene�t from the natural feeling ofbeing among those of their own kind, for they are being surrounded by mem-bers of another ethnic group living there in a compact mass � they are underconstant pressure. And that is the reason why the internal diaspora becomesa medium which favours assimilation. And also this is the context where theprocess of formation of local communities ending in taking up the languageof the majority as main language, in leaving behind their own culture or evenin ethnic adaptation becomes important. One cannot eliminate this constanturge for alignment from the lives of people. And these are circumstances whichought to be taken into consideration also by researchers of the �eld and internaldiaspora attendants.� (Bodó 2007)So if we want to make progresses in describing internal diasporas, we need

to study assimilation. How can assimilation processes of internal diasporas be


described (or formation of internal diasporas, if we want to use a more friendlyterm), do they have any particular features and if so, what are these?

Assimilation

The Cambridge Dictionary gives three synonyms for the term to assimilate:to take in; to �t into and to become similar. These three terms are a clear signthat in the English world-view there is no di�erence between the active andpassive nuances of the process of assimilation. The English term contains alsothe Latin and German approaches. Or, to put it more precisely, English appliedthe conclusions of German philosophical tradition to the descriptive meaningof the Latin term. But despite of all appearances the situation is far frombeing so unambiguous, there is a great deal of confusion in what assimilationmeans, which shows also in the usage of the term in modern social sciences.Assimilation is a contradictory term: we think we know what assimilation

means and yet its theoretical frame changes over time. There are an increasingnumber of signs that the classic interpretation of the term is in need of arevision. A general interpretation of assimilation would usually be that it isan ability of an ethnic majority to take in and to form into its own imageanother community of di�erent culture (and language) living in the same areaand having a minority status. There are also cases when the minority formsthe majority into its own image � as it happened in some of the formerly SaxonTransylvanian villages when the Gipsies constituting the majority took overmany of the features of the traditional Saxon culture of the minority, (Biczó2004: 19) but these are usually the exception.According to the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (Marshall 1998) assimi-

lation can be conventionally interpreted as a subordinate community takingover the values of the dominant community and thus integrating into the lat-ter. More recent interpretations (Yinger 1994; Alba and Lee 1997) state thatintegration does not necessarily mean disappearance of the ethnic di�erencesand boundaries, but besides taking over the general values of the host culturethe minority community can maintain its particular, di�erentiating values.Assimilation is a particular process of socialization and individualization, a

type of identi�cation when the individual does not interiorize (build into hisown personality) simply an attitude, a value, a behavioral culture etc., butalso the emotional, intellectual, volitional, cultural, political etc. values of an-other nation. This means he parallelly draws away from his former nationalidentity, which is already built into his personality and constituted his former

66 Bodó Barna

self (Gordon 1964, Horowitz 1975). He draws away, not breaks up with ev-erything speci�c to his former national identity. Human personality is not aboard which can be simply wiped clean of all the signs and formulas formerlywritten onto it so that these could be replaced with new interests, evaluationsand values speci�c to the conscience, emotional and voluntary patterns of an-other nation. Despite of this fact we need to speak of the highly controversialterm of assimilation of the national features so di�cult to describe in scienti�cterms, but still unquestionably present. The parallel process of dissimilation,i.e., �taking o�� the former national identity and assimilation, i.e., taking overthe new values is a great intellectual, voluntary and emotional performance,some even call it a second birth.One of the classic �gures of assimilation research, Milton Gordon expresses

that this process can be described with three terms with very similar meaning:assimilation, acculturation and incorporation. All three describe the processwhen persons with various cultural backgrounds come into contact and duringthis contact form a context for a common cultural life (Gordon 1964). Sociol-ogists prefer to call the process assimilation, while anthropologists rather usethe term acculturation.Assimilation as a state and consequence takes place in the case when a mem-

ber/members of a �foreign� or minority culture take over the language, customsand values of the host culture. In this context acculturation means cultural as-similation and de�nes the opportunities gained by the assimilated person as aconsequence of the assimilation as social (structural) integration. Describingacculturation as a solely cultural process can lead to misinterpretations sincesuch a description would suggest that cultural integration can take place alsoas a process independent of the social network.Assimilation integrates, it contains all the social and cultural changes char-

acterized by accommodation, adaptation to and acceptance of the dominantculture. Acculturation is both a social and cultural event for the concept ofculture implies the society which legitimizes it and confers it its meaning. So-ciocultural changes de�ned by the terms assimilation and acculturation havean independent relationship. If we want to interpret them we could say accul-turation is a special aspect of assimilation.Recently, Brubaker has written a study on the problem of assimilation. Ac-

cording to this, the primary meaning of assimilation viewed from a general andabstract perspective is increasing resemblance and correspondence. Not same-ness, but resemblance. To assimilate (as an intransitive verb) means to become

alike, which leaves us with assimilation as a process of becoming alike, formingto be alike and treating alike. From an organic point of view, to assimilate


means �to turn something into an entity having the same pattern as the agent'sown nature, [. . . ] to incorporate into a system, to integrate� (Oxford English

Dictionary). In this respect assimilation means complete incorporation. Inthe case of the general and abstract meaning the process was more importantthan the result and that allowed degrees of assimilation. Assimilation in thatrespect meant a direction for the change taking place and not a certain degree

of similarity. The �forming to be alike� meaning of the verb �to assimilate�refers to the state policy and programs of forced assimilation, to political goalsand programs which set as a target to assimilate people against their own will4.For a long time now one of the key concepts of public speech and current

politics is di�erentialism, the need for di�erences as opposed to universalism.This aspect, which marks the beginning of an era, was formulated by twowell-known researchers of ethnicity, Nathan Glazer and Patrick Moynihan. In1963 they put on paper a sentence that was going to become a classic in the�eld: �The main characteristic of a melting pot is its non-existence.� (Glazer-Moynihan 1963) Immigrants of the 1970s, 1980s and of the beginning of the1990s were faced with a new, liberal policy which admitted cultural di�erences(the policy of di�erentiation). Today pluralism has become a conventionalconcept. The situation turned so much in favour of di�erentialism that Glazerthought it was time to ask: �Is Assimilation Dead?� (Glazer 1993) But it seemsthat the liberal policy of di�erentialism, which was too keen on emphasizingdi�erences, according to some, became outworn by the end of the 1990s and thedemand for assimilation was in favour again. In Brubaker's opinion the causefor such a return was that the political attitude concentrating on pluralismbecame so strong that it threatened the existence of the host society, taking itto the edge of total disintegration. That is the reason for his statement thattoday we are witnessing �the return of assimilation�5.In a broad sense (becoming alike, imitation, acceptance, realization: quasi-

assimilation (Biczó 2004)) assimilation and the history of its e�ects show thehigh complexity of the matter, due to which the problem of assimilation isnot only a phenomenological question, but concerns also hermeneutics andthe ethics of values and ought to be analyzed from those perspectives as well.However, I will refrain from that.In conclusion, we could say that for the individual or the group living in a

foreign culture �ve strategies are possible, all of which will result in an identity

4See: Brubaker, Rogers: The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigra-tion and its sequels in France, Germany and the United States. Ethnic and Racial Studies,24. vol. 2001. July. (Hungarian translation: Az asszimiláció visszatérése? In Regio 2002 no.1)

5See: Brubaker, op.cit.

68 Bodó Barna

of di�erent components. In the case of assimilation the individual or thegroup will lose his original cultural features and will identify himself only bythe features of the majority. In case of double bonds the individual or groupwill keep his original culture and will take over the culture of the host society aswell, having in his identity elements from both the majority and the minorityculture, one completing the other. As opposing assimilation the dissociative

strategy can appear as well, in which case the individual or group will mainlyde�ne himself by the features of the minority culture. The essence of themarginal strategy is that the individual or group does not de�ne himself eitherby the majority or the minority features, instead he will select a category ofdi�erent type (i.e., his profession) to de�ne himself. These four strategies canin fact be de�ned as positive identities for they are based on the de�nition ofwhat one is. The �fth strategy can be de�ned also as a negative identity, inthis case the individual is unable to identify himself with any dimension andgoes through a � long-lasting identity crisis� (Er®s 1998). The background forsuch instances is usually that the elements composing an individual's identityare not compatible and result in cognitive dissonance. If the dissonance canbe solved, the individual will choose one of the positive strategies mentionedabove. If not, the result is a long-lasting disharmony.

The assimilational situation � in general and in the

internal diasporas

Before analyzing the assimilational situation I want to re�ect to a gener-ally valid issue. In the former subchapter I have mentioned Brubaker's muchquoted article which talks about the return, i.e., the approval of assimilation.The reason for that is a fear in the host societies that plurality would lead tosegmentation. And in this line takes there place also the rehabilitation of theconcept of assimilation as we can well observe, its �rst component being thatassimilation is raised to the status of an operation, it is its instrumentalitythat is emphasized. This is an attempt to counterweight the former concept ofassimilation referring to those who see assimilation as an ideology. However, itis important to note that instrumentality presupposes a goal: actions lead bycertain interests. Assimilation is an instrument of the majority society in itsattempt to achieve its (secret) goal (hardly ever mentioned in the social dis-course): i.e., stability. The minority society has a di�erent view on this. In thecase of the minority the goal � i.e., assimilational integration conferring stabil-ity � is related to the evaluation of a situation, i.e., in what circumstances do


courses of mobilization become accessible. Assimilation in the internal diaspo-ras is therefore a reaction, an answer to a certain political and social situationimplying both majority and minority components and both an individual anda group level. The fact that opportunities of social success are preconditionedby belonging to a certain group of people (identity) � for accepting assimila-tion means just that � opposes the ideals of both freedom and equality. Thus,rehabilitation of assimilation contrasts the basic values of our era.According to Husserl, the relationship between the self and its environment

can be described by the term �lifeworld� (Husserl 1984). Self-de�nition andpersonal decisions of the self are conditioned in this lifeworld. The lifeworldhas various levels � cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic dimensions, inother words �, all of which can become the subject of the (sub)process ofassimilation. The assimilant does not intend to take over another culture, buthe simply acknowledges that in certain social situations taking over that otherculture gives access to new courses in society.The assimilant has an a�rmative response to the situation for the response

is formed under the in�uence of a certain community and political program,even if the existence and the characteristics of this program are partly hiddenby sociocultural and political factors. Assimilation � just as the lifeworld �is an intersubjective issue, the process is triggered in both cases by environ-mental changes. The individual reacts to the contradiction between the initialfeatures of his lifeworld regarded as natural and the � usually obscure andunclari�ed � perspectives of the future, de�ning his future actions by giving aseries of iterative answers. Although his decision is made individually, it is notindependent of the community. The basis for the community features of indi-vidual responses is that people realize that the same situation is applicable toothers as well (Heller 1997). The points of reference here are the �I� (�us�) and�you� (�you�- pl.), still the opposition is not between the assimilator and theassimilant, but the lifeworld de�ning the initial identity of the assimilant andthe interpretation of the new (changed) situation in terms of the individual.A de�ning element of the assimilational situation is the foreigner who �ar-

rived yesterday and will stay for long� as Simmel's classic de�nition puts it(Simmel 1908). However, the question arises: Who is the foreigner in the caseof internal diasporas? But this is not the place to discuss this aspect.Classical tracts view assimilation as a negative phenomenon, as a process

during which an initial value is lost. This is so only if the outcome of theprocess can be described as: A + B + C = A, i.e., if the dominant group (A)integrates minorities so that they leave behind their own values and behavioral

70 Bodó Barna

patterns and take over those of the majority (Schae�er 1989)6. Specialized lit-erature de�nes two methods of assimilation: forced assimilation and voluntaryassimilation7. I am inclined to argue with that.There is a question that cannot be avoided: can taking over of values be

voluntary? What does it mean �by their own free will� in sentences like minoritygroups take over values of the majority by their own free will? I cannot regardthis as a voluntary action. Voluntarity implies an unrestricted decision. Iwould call it voluntarity that I become part of a peer group as a teenager orthat I choose something to spend my spare time on � all variants are equivalent,so the choice made by the individual shows a preference. I cannot apply thissituation to assimilation. For example, when a youth living in the countrysidehas to enroll in the local school, which teaches members of the majority inthe language of the majority, because his family does not have enough moneyto have him enrolled in the minority school in the town or at a considerabledistance from his home, this is a decision made under the pressure of social

structures and it initiates a process. This is also a kind of constraint, a kind offorced assimilation for the decision is not voluntary but forced in this directionby circumstances. In the program the individual sets for his life there is no suchstep as interim reprogramming of identity elements � and if this still happens,it means there is a circumstance that triggered it.In the case of an internal diaspora there are no voluntary decisions regarding

the course of one's life for structures of the local society, the institutionalframe of the minority and the less wide opportunities, which never reach thelevel of the opportunities o�ered by the majority society, will always limit thepossibilities for decisions8.In general we can speak of Boas' cultural relativism, we can accept that no

culture has an absolute set of criteria that could be the basis for qualifyingthe actions of another culture as �bene�cial� or �harmful�. The members ofevery culture can judge their actions by the system of values of their own

6Research on assimilation de�nes four basic types according to viewpoints like whether theassimilator or the assimilant community has the numerical majority, or who is the assimilator,the local community or the foreign one. In the case of the internal diaspora only the typediscussed in the paper is valid. Even if it is more numerous, internal diaspora can only bean isolated community, and viewed from a higher level, that of microregion, this isolation nolonger constitutes an opprotunity for social success.

7See G. Coltescu (ed.) Szótár plurális társadalmaknak (The Dictionary for PluralisticSocieties), headword: assimilation, http://tarstudszotar. adatbank.transindex.ro/?szo=106,downloaded on 7 February 2009.

8The restricted circle of opportunities for the minority is not a politically planned stateof facts � it simply derives from the situation.


culture for members of each culture are both agents and observants in thatculture. At the same time equivalence of cultures at a theoretical level does notautomatically lead to a social equivalence between a dominant and subordinateculture. Compared to the minority, the majority has very di�erent possibilitiesto live according to its own culture and preserve the values of its culture, tohave a heritage. Assimilation is mainly the matter of this lack of balance andsometimes this is not a political matter, but an issue related rather to theinstitutional structure of a given society.The subjectivity and free will of the individual is a basic feature and a

precondition for assimilation to take place. For the individual �the other�is present on the problem horizon. In the course of communication variouselements �t together, various elements are in contact and thus overlap occurs.It cannot be in any di�erent way for willingness to cooperate is a preconditionfor having a social life. Di�erences have to be acknowledged and accepted.The ideal of society as sociocultural community lies within the di�erences(Dilthey 1974). Viewed as such, society can be understood as the intentionalcommunity of individuals who cooperate led by the experience of having incommon some of their goals, plans and opportunities. Free will refers to thetheoretical possibility of accepting di�erences � and yet individual decisionsare not made �by free will�. It is never incidental whose goals are the sameand whose di�er. This is always rooted in some action of the self-appreciationconditioning applied to �the other�.

Assimilation theories

The �rst theoretical approaches to assimilation corresponded to the theoret-ical frame shaped by the metaphor of the melting pot, created by the interna-tionalist Israel Zangwill (in his drama of 1908), and the ideology based on it.One of the �rst theoreticians of the �eld was Robert E. Park, who gave up jour-nalism to become a sociologist. He created his �marginal man� theory in orderto interpret the situation of people living at the border of two cultures. Thetheory studies the innovative patterns the foreigner who has just become partof a community uses to solve his con�icts with the host community (Stichweh1993). The assimilation model created by him was for a long time a paradigmin the study of immigrant adaptation. Park stated that contact between peopleof various cultures leads to adaptation through competition and con�ict, andresults in assimilation. Assimilation means losing the former ethnic and cul-tural identity and thus fully integrating into the host society. This approach

72 Bodó Barna

states that assimilation supposes also a so-called process of acculturation inthe course of which the immigrants change culture, i.e., they integrate into thehost culture, and that is the price of adaptation. Park viewed assimilation as alinear process and considered it an inevitable consequence of the immigrationof groups of various ethnic background � although in di�erent cases it wouldhappen in di�erent rhythms and with di�erent di�culty (Park 1928).Park's theory of marginality was further developed by Robert K. Merton,

who published in 1938 a hypothesis studying what happens when culturalcon�ict of groups and individuals becomes permanent due to the fact that thedominant culture refuses to integrate certain groups or persons. According toMerton's �ndings, �frozen marginality� is rooted in the discrepancy betweencultural o�ers and the structural impossibility of accomplishing these, whichresults in anomia and deviance (Merton 1980).While Merton draws the attention upon dangers, for the leading members of

the famous Chicago school �the successful adaptation of immigrant groups tothe host society� is a basic issue. I quoted the statement of A. W. Lloyd Warnerand Leo Srole because in this context �successful� can be applied both to theindividual/the group and the American society. This bipolarity based on anideology is very interesting and it made a theory out of the opinion of those whostated that the future of American ethnic groups is limited since immigrantsare integrated by the Anglo-Saxon Protestant cultural ethos9. We need toobserve the complexity of this model for the idea and view of Americanizationdoes not propose merely integration into the host society, but it is an optionfor a social model which proved successful all over the world10. In Americantextbooks the American lifestyle is presented as �the right to life, freedom andthe pursuit of happiness�11.Milton M. Gordon has written his classic book, Assimilation in American

Life (1964), under the in�uence of this view. According to Gordon, bothindividual and group assimilation has certain phases and these are as follows:

- acculturation- structural assimilation- marital assimilation

9See: Warner, W. Lloyd & Srole, Leo (1945): The Social Systems of American Ethnic

Groups, Yale University Press.10In our days the interpretation of the phenomenon of Americanization underwent serious

changes in the context and under the in�uence of globalization studies.11See: Tóth Tamás (1996): Vulgármodernizmus és posztmodernizmus végletei között (Be-

tween Two Extremes: Vulgar Modernism and Post-modernism), In: Lukács és a modernitás,edited by Szabó Tibor, Szeged: A Szegedi Lukács Kör Kiadása, pp. 27-62.


- identi�cation assimilation- attitude reception assimilation- behavior reception assimilation- civic assimilation.

The Gordon model is one of the most frequently quoted assimilation modelsup to this day. It is a basis for comparison for nearly every later theoreticalapproach. The question arises whether this is a valid statement in view ofthe fact that the basic idea of this model has been controversial from the verybeginning. I have mentioned earlier that Glazer and Moynihan questioned thevalidity of the melting pot theory already in 1963, one year before Gordonpresented his theory, while three decades later Glazer was the one who wroteabout assimilation that it was dead.The key concept of the Gordon theory is acculturation. Several scientists

attempted to de�ne acculturation. I consider Kim's interpretation to be oneof the most important de�nitions for he broadens the concept allowing socialelements to become part of the process beside the cultural ones, an innovationthat changes the division to stages of the process. According to Kim, theprocess of acculturation begins with the identi�cation of the de�ning symbolsof the host society. Then the immigrant familiarizes with these and projectsthem upon the values of his initial culture during the process of reception.So the process of acculturation is based on communication and it implies acontinuous contact and interaction between the immigrant and his social andcultural environment (Kim 1985: 378).At the end of the 1980s Gibson suggests using integration instead of assim-

ilation (Gibson 1988) since, according to him, in the course of the majority-minority relationship accommodation settles in after the stages of contact andcompetition, and the process never reaches the phase of assimilation. This im-plies an additive bicultural strategy in the course of which the minority groupparticipates to the (political) life of the majority society by also maintainingthe values, the linguistic, religious and cultural traditions of his own group.Hutnik (1991) deals with assimilation viewing it within the relationship of

the majority and minority. He introduces the concept of dissociative strategy asa counterpoint to Gibson's term. Dissociative strategy means that the minorityfully maintains its own culture totally disregarding the majority culture. Inthe process of acculturation the identity of the individual is made up equallyof elements speci�c to the minority and majority culture. If neither culturalelement dominates and the individual describes himself using none of thesedimensions, we call it marginal strategy.

74 Bodó Barna

Gordon's one-dimensional model is more and more criticized for there isan increasing number of researchers who warn that an individual can becomepart of several cultures parallelly. Others criticize the concept of assimilationbecause it indirectly implies that the assimilant had a problem with the culturehe was born into. The latest researches show that individuals are capableof joining in the cultural life of the dominant society and maintaining theirown values at the same time and yet do not become marginalized (Berry,1992; LaFromboise et al, 1993). What means that acculturation should bedistinguished in its professional and casual meaning as well from assimilation,which is frequently its result, and also from dissimilation, which is the oppositeof assimilation. In the process of acculturation the initial cultures are oftenpreserved (sometimes as subcultures).The concept of �middleman minority� is a minority/migrant strategy

proposed by Blalock (1967: 79-84) and Bonacich (1972). Merton's theory of

social exchange can be viewed as its precedent (�rst issue: 1949). Accordingto this theory, individuals have contacts, transactions that are pro�table tothem. In this light members of a minority are considered to strive to lessenthe disadvantages of their ethnic identity. Another precedent to this theoryis the interpretation of Alfred Schütz (Stichweh 1993). He considers everyculture as an impenetrable universe and as such suggests that the problemof minority/foreigner marginality is not rooted in the cultural con�ict, but inthe incomparability of the two cultures. According to Schütz, the orientationcrisis of the foreigner is caused by some kind of structural and situational con-straint, and by analyzing this situation he came up with the term �middlemanminorities�.The concept of �middleman minorities� denominates migrants who, based

on cross boundary ethnical networks, build up institutionalized positions incertain well-de�ned areas of the economy between the higher and lower socialstrata and stay out of the hierarchy due to their foreigner status. In thesecases the orientation of the minority, i.e., their constant and strong connectionto their native country and its economic life, is of the utmost importance.The 1990s is a period of revival for assimilation research. In this period

important questions and several categories of Gordon's model were analyzed.The theory of segmented assimilation o�ered a theoretical answer to the

migration waves of the 1970s. In that period immigrants were coming from(mainly Asian) countries and societies so di�erent from the American societythat they did not integrate into it despite of the considerable in�uence ofthe WASP (white � Anglo-Saxon � Protestant) society. These immigrantsare the fastest growing segment of the population, they have considerably


changed the social composition, culture and policy of several great Americancities. At present in the USA there live over 30 million people who wereborn in another country. Only in the period between the last two censuses(1990 � 2000) there arrived 11,2 million grown ups and their children whichis 70% of the population growth. According to the latest estimates, there areover 60 million people of foreign origin (from the �rst and second generation)in the USA, which is 24% of the entire population (U.S. Bureau of the Census,2003). And what is more important: the immigration tendency continues toremain high.A. Portes and M. Zhou (1993) identi�ed three � segmented � adaptation pat-

terns: straight-line, upward and downward spiral adaptation. Downward spiraladaptation means cultural dissonance and con�ict, the immigrant marginalizesand creates a subculture. Other authors call the patterns di�erently, but in-terpret them in the same way (Wight 2005). Thus the three models are: 1)transition to the WASP main stream, the WASP society, 2) selective accul-turation � individuals connect to majority culture, but continue to value theirinitial ethnic community and 3) dissonant acculturation � transition to a na-tive minority �lower class�. The �rst model is the �straight-line� assimilation,which is considered to have a high level human capital. I have already men-tioned the advantages of the second model. In the case of the third model itis often signalled that the Gordon model does not work at all. The danger ofthis is the reason why many authors put down their vote for the second model.They see it as the only way tensions and con�icts entailing acculturation canbe avoided (Portes, Rumbaut 2001: 313). In their opinion, it is mutually ben-e�cial if minorities belong to strong cohesion communities and are still opento the culture of the majority.Adherence to the native culture and the wish to preserve the initial cul-

ture in the case of second generation immigrants lead to the rethinking of theformer theories. Acculturation is viewed more and more as a bidimensionalconstruction. Some people consider it possible also to have multidimensionaladherence. At the same time, the term acculturation is increasingly associatedwith that of enculturation (Rogler, Cortes & Malgady 1994). Enculturationmeans that the individual takes over and interiorizes the culture surroundinghim through its objects, customs, models of action, behavioral patterns, stylesof communication, the lexical aspect of the language, information, value andinterest relations of the environment, through the medium of his immediateenvironment, his activities and actions in the course of socialization processes.During this process of enculturation the individual grows into a mature per-sonality. In this respect enculturation is a kind of �growing into� the culture,

76 Bodó Barna

becoming a man of culture, it is the most comprehensive learning process,which helps people acquire basic abilities which are absolutely necessary forevery individual in every society. It is a more general term than socialization,it renders individuals �t to integrate into the current society.Special attention is needed for the interpretation of R. Alba and V. Nee,

who propose a new theoretical frame and undertake to reformulate the entireassimilation theory (Alba, Nee 1997). They sustain that Gordon's theory hadits merits, but it still has to be revised from the above mentioned points ofview and several others. They build their analysis on the ethnic strati�cationtheory of Shibutani and Kwan. The ethnic competition of the various groupsgoes on at di�erent levels and channels, this is the basis for strati�cation.Communication has several strata as well, an individual and a group level, andin this latter case there is also strati�cation within and outside the group �which in�uences in every case the integration process. The main conclusion tobe formulated based on this model is that even ethnic groups who were veryhostile at the beginning learnt how to cohabit (Shibutani, Kwan 1965)12. Themain thesis of Alba and Nee is that assimilation implies the disappearance ofthe ethnic di�erences and ethnicity, while these di�erences continue to exist.In the model they propose the various minority groups enter the majority insti-tutions taking with them their former links and the culture of their community.At the same time, according to the Alba�Nee theory, the process of inclu-sion is incremental, i.e., the process gets stronger and quicker as it proceeds(Alba, Nee 2003).Last but not least, I will quote the theory of Milton Yinger. According to

his interpretation, the measure of assimilation in a certain environment canbe de�ned by the intensity of four connected subprocesses (Yinger 1994). Thefour subprocesses are (cultural) acculturation, (psychological) identi�cation,(structural) integration and (biological) interbreeding.Acculturation is a process that appears when two or more groups come into

contact and leads to an increased cultural similarity. The process a�ects to agreater degree the smaller and weaker groups or the immigrants, but it has ane�ect on all the interacting groups.During the process of psychological identi�cation individuals originating

from di�erent groups may think they are part of the same society, a newsociety that has grown out of the intermingling of the initial societies of theindividuals participating in the process. These various processes have a cause-

12I did not mention further elements of the theory of Shibutani and Kwan, e.g., thatassimilation has a social and settlement dimension.


e�ect relationship with acculturation, integration and interbreeding, but theyare separated from these from an analytical point of view. Changes in iden-ti�cation are not going only one way, they are not part of a one-way processheaded toward a greater and increasingly integrating group. Both for the selfand the other it is very important to distinguish between the levels of theconscious and the involuntary identi�cation. It may so happen that the twolevels do not correspond to each other, and this will become obvious preciselythrough the changes in circumstances.Yinger means by integration the process of structural assimilation, during

which people coming from two or more formerly distinguished lower level so-cial units arrive to the level of common interactions. These interactions canbe quite varied depending on concrete situations, e.g., from relatively imper-sonal relationships in the economic and political institutions to very personalrelationships like good neighbours, friends or spouses. During these changesintegration can occur at various times.

The formation of internal diasporas and assimilation

The overview of the specialized literature shows that the issue of internaldiaspora is a speci�cally Hungarian issue. Despite this fact it is still surprisingthat in other Central and Eastern-European languages no speci�c term hasformed to distinguish internal diaspora from diaspora. Especially that there isno nation in this area which does not have internal diasporas. In the case ofRomanians there are nearly nothing but internal diasporas: in Hungary, Serbia,Bulgaria and the Ukraine at least. Of course, the Moldavian Republic, whichis an independent state, is another issue. So if a culture does not producea speci�c concept to name a certain phenomenon, the reason for that lieswithin the world-view of that culture: it means the members of that culturedo not regard that situation as a speci�c one (i.e., di�erent from the diaspora,in this case) or that the entire situation is unimportant as far as they areconcerned. It is demonstrated that the Hungarian, Romanian and Germanpolicy for minorities views the same problem very di�erently, emphasizingdi�erent matters (Bodó 2004: 178-186).The subject of internal diaspora has been continually present in the Hun-

garian specialized literature of the past �fteen years. The issue was discussedat numerous conferences, at professional forums organized by universities andacademic research institutions, by NGO institutions and sometimes even bypolitical parties. In the past several years a number of volumes have been

78 Bodó Barna

published in the �eld; several publications of the Research Institute of Ethnicand National Minorities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences appeared in aseparate series dedicated to the problem of internal diasporas.I needed to mention these �rst because it is not clear to this very day whether

the professional world wishes to distinguish between internal diaspora anddiaspora or not. I want to quote two authors in this respect.Györgyi Bindor�er is one of the well-known identity researchers of Hungary.

I would draw attention upon her volumes on the Germans of Hungary, espe-cially the one entitled Kett®s identitás (Double identity) (2001). This volumecontains the results of a research conducted on the ethnic identity compo-nents of the German community living in a small settlement (Dunabogdány,of approx. 3000 inhabitants, three quarters of which are Swabians) and thetheoretical part on which the research was based. This volume is one of thoseI use frequently in my work for it is a good basis for comparison and a profes-sionally reliable source of information. Despite this fact � or maybe preciselybecause of it � a question keeps arising in my mind: why does the author useas a theoretical basis for her work Gordon's assimilation model? Does thismean that Györgyi Bindor�er does not think it necessary to distinguish be-tween internal diaspora and diaspora? Does she think integration at the levelof internal diasporas and of diasporas are processes that can be dealt withusing the same theoretical frame?Gábor Biczó has published important studies on the research of both the in-

ternal diaspora and the diaspora (Biczó 2004, 2007). The practical and researchpart of his study in the �eld of assimilation research examines a Transylvanianinternal diaspora. Half of the research report published in one volume is theoryon the subject and I think it is one of the best summaries of the Hungarianassimilation literature. However this author does not think it necessary todistinguish between the assimilation in the diaspora and the theoretical frameof the internal diasporas either.My opinion di�ers from that of these two excellent researchers, an attitude

I have preserved during my entire study. I am compelled to state also that thetheory of internal diasporas has not been born up to this day. I consider thisa serious theoretical challenge and, as a continuation of the present study, Iintend to create a model in order to trace the theory of the process of formationof internal diasporas.


References

Alba, R., Nee, V. 1997: Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era ofImmigration, International Migration Review, 31 (4), Winter, pp. 826-874.

Alba Richard, Nee, Victor 2003: Remaking the American Mainstream: Assim-

ilation and Contemporary Immigration, Harvard University Press.

Anderson, Benedict 1998: The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast

Asia, and the World, London: Verso.

Benvenuto, Sergio 2000: Az igazság angolul beszél. Globalizációs tendenciákés a különböz®ség vágya (Truth Speaks English. Globalization Tendenciesand the Desire to Di�er). Translated by Karádi Éva. Magyar Lettre Inter-

nationale 37. 19-23.

Berry, John W. 1992: Acculturation and Adaptation in a New Society. Inter-national Migration, 30, 69-85.

Biczó Gábor 2004: Asszimilációkutatás � elmélet és gyakorlat (AssimilationResearch � Theory and Practice), Budapest: MTA Politikai TudományokIntézete, Etnoregionális Kutatóközpont.

Biczó Gábor 2007: A nemzetközi diaszpóra-kutatás eredményeinek gyakor-lati jelent®sége a magyar szórványkutatásban (Practical Importance of theResults of the International Diaspora Research in the Internal Diaspora Re-search of the Hungarians), In: Balogh B.- Bodó B.- Ilyés Z. (szerk.): Re-

gionális identitás, közösségépítés, szórványgondozás, Budapest: Lucidus �Kisebbségkutatás Könyvek, pp.15-28.

Bindor�er Györgyi 2001: Kett®s identitás (Double Identity), Budapest: ÚjMandátum � MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet.

Blalock, Hubert M. 1967: Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations, JohnWiley & Sons.

Bodó Barna 2004: Az identitás egyetemessége (Universality of Identity),Kolozsvár: Polis.

Bodó Barna 2005: Szórványnarratívák (Narratives on the Internal Diaspora),In: Ilyés Zoltán - Papp Richárd (ed.): Tanulmányok a szórványról, Budapest:Gondolat-MTAKI.

80 Bodó Barna

Bodó Barna 2007: A szórványtól a nemzetig � és vissza (From the Concept ofInternal Diaspora to that of the Nation � and Back), Pro Minoritate, Nr. 1(Spring).

Bonacich, Edna 1972: A Theory of Middleman Minorities, American Sociolog-

ical Review 37: 583-594.

Brubaker, Rogers 2005: The �diaspora� diaspora, In: Ethnic and Racial Stud-

ies, Vol. 28. nr. 1. pp. 1-19.

Dilthey, Wilhelm 1974: Bevezetés a szellemtudományokba (Introduction tothe Human Sciences). In Ludassy Mária (ed.) A történelmi világ felépítése a

szellemtudományokban. Budapest: Gondolat.

Er®s Ferenc (ed.) 1998: Megismerés, el®ítélet, identitás (Familiarization, Prej-udice, Identity). Budapest: Új Mandátum Kiadó.

Gibson, Margaret 1988: Accommodation without Assimilation: Punjabi Sikh

Immigrants in an American High School. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress.

Glazer, N., Moynihan, P. 1963: Beyond the Melting Pot. The Negroes, Puerto

Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City, Cambridge, MA: MITPress.

Glazer, Nathan. 1993. Is Assimilation Dead? Annals of the American Academy

of Political and Social Science 530:122-36.

Gordon, Milton 1964: Assimilation in American Life: the Role of Race, Reli-

gion, and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press.

Heller Ágnes 1997: Idegen (Foreigner). Budapest: Múlt és Jöv® Könyvkiadó.

Horowitz, D.L. 1975: Ethnic Identity. In Glazer, N.- Moynihan, D.P. (eds.)Ethnicity: Theory and Experience. London: Harvard Press, 35-45.

Husserl, Edmund 1984: A tiszta fenomenológia és fenomenológiai �lozó�aeszméi (Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenologi-cal Philosophy). In A fenomenológia a társadalomtudományokban. Budapest:Gondolat.

Hutnik, N. 1991: Ethnic Minority Identity. A Social Psychological Perspective.Oxford: Clarendon Press.


Iordachi, Constantin 2001: �The California of the Romanians�: The Integrationof Northern Dobrodgea into Romania, 1878-1913, In: Nation-Building and

Contested Identities. Romanian & Hungarian Case Studies, Ia³i: Polirom,Budapest: Regio Books, pp.121-153.

Kim, Y.Y. 1985: Communication and Acculturation, In Intercultural Commu-

nication: A Reader, Larry A. Samovar and Richard E. Porter, eds., Belmont,California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 379-386.

Korzenny, Felipe, Abravanel, Rebecca 1998: Acculturation: Conceptualizationand meauserement. In Quirk's Marketing Research Review, Vol. XII. No. 4.pp. 32-37.

LaFromboise, T., Coleman, H., & Gerton, J. 1993: Psychological impact ofbiculturalism: Evidence and theory. Psychological Bulletin, 114(3), pp. 395-412.

Marshall, G. (ed.). 1998: A Dictionary of Sociology (2nd ed.). New York:Oxford University Press.

Merton, Robert King, 1980: Társadalomelmélet és társadalmi struktúra. Bu-dapest: Gondolat (English version � original: Social Theory and Social

Structure, New York: The Free Press, 1968).

Nagy Ödön 1938: Szórvány és beolvadás (Internal Diasporas and Assimilation),Hitel No. 4.

Niederhauser Emil 2000: Utószó Pukánszky Béla könyvének új kiadásához(Epilogue to the New Issue of the Volume Written by Béla Pukánszky), In:Pukánszky Béla: Német polgárság magyar földön. Budapest: Lucidus. (Firstedition: Budapest, 1940).

Park, R. 1928: Human Migration and the Marginal Man. American Journal

of Sociology 33: 881-893.

Park R. E., Burgess, E. W. (1961): Introduction to the Science of Sociology.Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Portes, A., Rumbaut, R.G. 2001: Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second

Generation. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Portes, A., Zhou, M. 1993: The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimila-tion and its Variants. The ANNALS of the Academy of Political and Social

Science 530 (November): 74-96.

82 Bodó Barna

Rogler, L. H., Cortes, D. E., Malgady, R. G. 1991: Acculturation and Men-tal Health Status among Hispanics. Convergence and New Directions forResearch. American Psychologist, 46(6), 585-597.

Schae�er, R.T. 1989: Sociology. (3. ed.) New York: McGraw-Hill.

Shibutani, T., Kwan, K.M. 1965: Ethnic Strati�cation: A Comparative Ap-

proach, New York.

Simmel, Georg 1908: Exkurs über die Fremden In: Simmel, Georg Soziologie,Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.

Rudolf Stichweh 1993: Az idegen (The Foreigner), Regio volume no. 4. issueno. 4.

Turner, J. H. � Bonacich, E. 2001: A közvetít® kisebbségek összefoglalóelmélete felé (Toward a Composite Theory of Middleman Minorities). In:A migráció szociológiája (ed. Sík E.), Budapest: Szociális és CsaládügyiMinisztérium.

van den Berghe, Pierre, 1981: Assimilation. In The Ethnic Phenomenon. NewYork: Elsevier. Pp. 214-36.

Wight, Ellen 2005: Segmented Assimilation? Explaining Ethnic Disparitiesin the School Achievement of Second Generation Students. Paper pre-

sented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association,

Philadelphia, PA, Aug 12, 2005. Lásd: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p19514_index.html downloaded on 05.02.2009.

Yinger, J. Milton. 1994. Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Con�ict?

Albany, NY: State University Press of New York.

Zhou, M. 1997: Segmented Assimilation: Issues, Controversies, and RecentResearch on the New Second Generation. International Migration Review.Vol. 31 No. 4 : 975-1008.



History, Ideology and Collective Memory

Reconstructing the Identities of Timi³oara by Means of

Monographies and Street Names during the Communist Regime

(1947-1989)

Vasile DOCEAPolitical Science DepartmentWest University Timi³oara

email: [email protected]

Abstract. The �rst theme of this paper is the relationship between

collective memory and the construction of identity. Starting from the

case study of street names in Timi³oara, I looked at how urban identity

is constructed by means of collective memory, and how collective memory

is an expression of identity.

The second theme envisaged is ideological control. Starting from the

successive changes in the streets' name, I investigated the manner in

which the construction of identity is in�uenced by ideology. The street

names of Timi³oara were changed in several waves: �rstly, after 1918,

when the Banat was included in the Romanian state, when Hungarian or

German street names were turned into Romanian ones; secondly, upon

the installation of the communist regime, when the ideological in�uence

became a form of direct control, with streets being given names from

the communist �mythology�; thirdly, in the 1970s and the 1980s, during

national-communism, when native names were preferred. Finally, the

collapse of the communist regime in 1989 brought about a new wave of

street names, when every reminder of the communist period was removed.

Keywords: identity, collective memory, ideological control, urban place

names

Prologue

No one can argue that journalists have become a permanent presence inour lives. They do in�uential things, they initiate and conclude, analyse and

84 Vasile Docea

develop, predict and prescribe. They hold the ultimate truth, absolute justiceand many more. They are omnipresent. Paraphrasing a Romanian proverbwhich says that one can hardly get rid of a disease or a marriage, we can arguethat one can never get rid of journalists.Like many everyday details, this study is also inspired by an incident involv-

ing journalists. A few months ago two local columnists carried out a surveyabout the name of a street in Timi³oara, well known to everybody as �Fil-ipescu Street�. Though not an important avenue or meeting point, the streetis placed in the central area and works as a secondary connection between twobusy boulevards. It is, thus, well known at least to motorists. The two journal-ists had found two di�erent address tags on the No. 10 building. The formerread �Nicu Filipescu Street�, while the latter read �Leonte Filipescu Street�.Two names for the same street � two mysteries to decipher.The journalists called two persons and asked them what they knew about

the names on the two tags. The criteria for choosing the two subjects werequite obscure. They didn't contact the experts in the �eld, but rather localVIPs. It happened that I was picked as one of the subjects, the other beinga colleague from the Faculty of Economics, both of us working for the WestUniversity. The question took me by surprise. I was able to identify, on thetelephone, only one of the names, that of Nicu Filipescu, who, to the bestof my knowledge, was a Romanian politician at the end of the 19th century,one of the leaders of the Conservatory Party and, a few years later, mayor ofBucharest. I couldn't pinpoint the other character. However, my colleaguefrom the Faculty of Economics was able to inform the journalists that LeonteFilipescu �was a member of the Romanian socialist movement�, while beingcompletely ignorant of Nicu Filipescu's biography. Our selective individualmemory has preserved the information the other has forgotten (or has neverbeen aware of). �Filipescu Street� in Timi³oara meant one thing to me and acompletely di�erent one to my colleague.I was thus prompted to investigate how the name of the street had changed

in time. In the interwar period the street was called �Louis Barthou�. Thisname appears on the 1936 city map1. The street was named in honour of theformer French foreign secretary, Jean-Louis Barthou, assassinated in Marseilletwo years earlier, together with King Alexander I of Yugoslavia. The nameescaped the Stalinist 1950s but was helpless under the nationalistic siege ofthe 1970s, when it became �Leonte Filipescu Street�2.

1Planul ora³ului Timi³oara. 1936. Cu datele o�ciale ale Serviciului tehnic al ora³ului,design by D. Dumitrache, lithography by Kheil & Baumstark, Timi³oara.

2Ora³ul Timi³oara. Ghidul str zilor. 1980, Institutul Poligra�c Banat, Timi³oara.

History, Ideology and Collective Memory 85

This historical �gure has as much in common with the city of Timi³oara as J.-L. Barthou. Leonte Filipescu (1895-1922) was born in Bârlad, Moldova. At theend of World War I he became a prominent representative of the Bolshevik wingof the Romanian socialist movement. Accused of espionage, he was arrestedand died in prison. Consequently, he turned into a martyr in the communists'pantheon. Being a local hero, unlike most of the communist activists in theinterwar period, he was rediscovered by Ceau³escu's propaganda system duringthe years of national communism. Thus, the name of a minor Bolshevik agentbecame an encyclopedic entry3 and a street name in many Romanian towns.After the fall of communism, the new authorities gave up the street name

that was too suggestive of totalitarian practices. But, in order to spare thecitizens of Timi³oara � who had already got accustomed to the abbreviated�Filipescu Street�� from a radical transformation, the local administration pre-served the surname and changed only the �rst name, picking that of the Conser-vatory leader Nicu Filipescu. This is how the former �Leonte Filipescu Street�became �Nicu Filipescu Street�. The owners of the No. 10 building put up anaddress tag with the new name without giving up the old one. I am sure theymeant to capitalize on how choosy collective memory is.

The Theme

The present study is the result of interdisciplinary research at the crossroadsof history, theory of history and cultural anthropology. My aim is to study acertain segment of collective memory, related to the space of Timi³oara. Thesegments envisaged are those represented by the city's historical monographiesand the successive names given to streets and other public places.The historical monographies are one of the ways in which collective memory

becomes manifest. In this particular case they correspond to the �explanations�a city receives, explanations which, for the communist period, are under strictideological control. I am basically interested in the way in which the ideological�lter resizes each and every time the nature of the information and explanationscontained by monographies and the manner in which the same �lter reshapesthe public space, giving certain names to streets.In what concerns the streets, I will, on the one hand, look at how place

names change from one period to another and why. On the other hand, I willendeavour to explain why certain streets or public places preserve their old

3For example, Mic dicµionar enciclopedic, the 3rd revised edition, Editura ³tiinµi�c ³ienciclopedic , Bucure³ti, 1986, p. 453.

86 Vasile Docea

names in the collective memory, even if o�cially (in terms of administrationmeasures) they have been replaced.Therefore, the theme of this study is the construction and reconstruction of

the identity of Timi³oara by means of collective memory, which is expressed inhistorical monographies and street names.

Exploring the Histories of the City

1. Insights into the past and the construction of multiple

identities

The analysis of the historiographical component of the identity discourse ofTimi³oara implies a survey of the studies that aim at reconstructing � partiallyor totally � the past of the city. I refer to those authors who adopt a certaintype of discourse � the historical jargon � which entails using certain researchmethods and speci�c explanatory strategies. Although it belongs in its turn tothe imaginary, like literature and �ne arts, the historical work is di�erent fromthem in the sense that it seeks to reconstruct �reality� � a past, consumedreality. In this it is similar to memoirs � yet another expression of identity�, but on the other hand it di�ers from those by striving to make a morerigorous reconstruction based on methods deemed by historians as �scienti�c�,i.e. secure, and on the other hand, it goes deeper into the past, where individualmemory has no access.What a historian can say about Timi³oara is, for example, the fact that it has

always had a tolerant past, that there were no major con�icts between variousethnic and religious communities. To make himself credible, the historian willextract from the past those instances which can prove the harmony of the area,will talk about the fairly good economic evolution, the e�cient institutions andthe cultural life of the city. But the same historian can argue that the citydidn't have a tolerant past, which he will prove by selecting past con�ictsand capitalizing on various kinds of persecution. Which of the two images isaccurate? Neither, of course, as there is no such thing as a true historicalimage. Then, which of the two is more credible? Both, as each of them can besupported by a su�cient number of historical arguments.The various ethnic and religious communities of Timi³oara made up their

own images of the past. Each of them had their own historians, who imaginedthe past so as to come up with arguments supporting the image the groupwanted to have at a given moment. Resorting to the past is, thus, a way to


account for present aims. The legitimized content of historical discourse isgiven by its very circumstantial nature.

2. The ideological con�scation of the past: Romanian histori-

ography during the communist regime

The monographies prior to the communist period also have an overt ide-ological component. The freedom of ideological choice was absolute beforethe installation of communism: some historians embraced conservative values,others were liberal. The situation changed dramatically after 1947.For the communist historians, the ideological pressure was immense. It man-

ifested itself directly and brutally all over the country. During the entire period(1947-1989), a complete propaganda apparatus made up of party �academies�,�schools� and �boards� of hierarchical structures of secretaries and executivestook pains to annul the autonomy of research. Historians were forced to be-come mere propaganda instruments of the regime.The mechanisms of this subjection varied from the publication of ideological

texts in �scienti�c� journals to the imprisonment of those who were reluctantto the model. In his analysis of Politics and History, Vlad Georgescu mentionsamong other examples the publication � in the major historical journal of the1950s, �Studies� � of texts that explained in detail the ideas emitted by thecommunist party (then called the Romanian Workers' Party) for the consump-tion of the �historians' front�. In 1952, for example, following a congress ofthe Romanian Workers' Party, the role of the historian and of his disciplinewas explained in radical terms: �the historical science is part of the ideologicalbattle front of party�. (Georgescu 1991: 19) The historians' mission was thatof narrating the past according to a simple framework and the political aimsof the day. (Boia 1999: 82-101)The 1950s were the years of �Russolatry� (Georgescu 1991: 31), a worship-

ping attitude towards Russia, especially its Soviet counterpart. The o�cialpropaganda considered the Soviet Union Romania's greatest friend and, some-times, protector. Russolatry was obviously present among historians, too.One of the ideological historians of the period, General Zaharia wrote in 1955about the Romanian people having been �liberated� by the Soviet Union,labelling the Eastern neighbour with a term common to all workers' assemblies� �a rampart of peace and socialism�, whose mission was that of protecting theentire world from the �cannibalistic plans of the aggressive imperialistic statesand their accomplices�. (Georgescu 1991: 41) The entire history was reinter-

88 Vasile Docea

preted then so as to comply with the communist, internationalist, pro-Sovietideological notions.The 1960s, conversely, with their more relaxed ideology, stood, in the view

of the same Vlad Georgescu, for a reinterpretation of the newly reinterpretedhistorical truth! (Georgescu 1991:51) It envisaged the issue of the Russian-Romanian relations, but more timidly, the comment focusing almost exclu-sively on the moves of the communist party. The public debate was avoided,what can also be noticed in the manner in which Karl Marx's comments onthe Romanians were edited and published in 1964. The anti-Russian opinions,so common in Marx's writings, were not mentioned at all by the historianswho signed the introductory study. (Marx 1964) They felt protected by theauthority of the founder of the received ideology, the only thinker who wasallowed to state that at a given moment in the past the Russians had been theRomanians' enemies.But soon a new reinterpretation of the past occurred. The 1970s and the

1980s witnessed an intensi�cation of the nationalistic character of the o�cialRomanian ideology. The internationalist communism had proved to be an eco-nomic failure and a social aberration. Something had to be made up to savethe totalitarian regime and to re-legitimize Nicolae Ceau³escu's dictatorship.Thus, the national communist formula was adopted, which had already beenapplied elsewhere, not just in the Soviet Union, but also in Albania, China andNorth Korea. (Boia 1999: 90-101) In fact, the latest variant of Ceau³escu'snationalistic discourse was not invented. Katherine Verdery points out thatit had been there forever, moreover, that it had been competing permanentlywith other types of discourse speci�c to totalitarianism. What happened inthe 1970s and the 1980s was an enforcement of the nationalistic discourse,which started to dominate all the others, including the Marxist one. (Verdery1994: 102-115)In the nationalistic atmosphere of the 1970s and the 1980s several authors

were �rediscovered�, whose texts, written and published mostly in the interwarperiod, had been marginalized or even banned. This measure should not besurprising. It was frequently employed by the communist party leadership.Not only at that time, but also during other stages of the communist regimethe leadership of the only party would stipulate which were the accepted worksand which were the forbidden ones, just as they decided when an author shouldpass from one category to the other. (Mihalache 2003: 78) Full volumes arepublished in this period by Gheorghe Br tianu (who, as a matter of fact, diedin a communist prison), Nicolae Iorga, Vasile Pârvan, A. D. Xenopol, etc.Their works, varied in terms of theme, point of view and method, share only


the nationalist devotion characteristic of the authors' age. It is this devotionthat brings them back to life and is expected to legitimize the new formula ofnational-communism.

3. Rewriting the history of the city: themes and �gures

The installation of the communist regime causes a gap in the historiog-raphy of Timi³oara. The authors of monographies and historical studies ofthe interwar period � some of them still active in the early 1940s � are si-lenced. There are various reasons for this, all having to do, though, withthe mutations in the social and political context. Nicolae Ilie³iu, for in-stance, the author of the above-mentioned monography, who announced hisintention to continue research and publish a monography of the entire Ba-nat region, was prohibited. He ran a series of local political newspapers inthe 1930s and the 1940s, which for the communist regime after 1947 wasan unpardonable guilt. He was unable to publish again until his death in1963. Nicolae Ivan, the author of a monography published in 1936 (Ivan 1936)also stopped publishing. The same happened to Traian Liviu Bir escu, au-thor of a series of volumes on the history of Timi³oara and the Banat in theMiddle Ages4. Other authors, active historiographers before 1946, chose toleave Romania. Aurel Bugariu, who published a very useful bibliography in1943, (Bugariu 1943) was a POW on the Western front and chose to remainin Germany (where he wrote and translated literature under the pen nameNicolae Novac). The German and Hungarian interwar authors disappearedas a result of the war and the persecutions that followed. In short, the his-toriographic gap was caused by the death of some and the silencing of theothers. The ground was prepared thus for the rewriting of the history and forthe birth of a new generation, more willing to make ideological amends, moreobedient to the newly installed communist regime.Nevertheless, rewriting history was not a sudden phenomenon. In the 1950s

there were no historical or monographic studies about Timi³oara which isolatedthe local historiography from that of Bucharest, Cluj or Ia³i. The reasons forthis absence are numerous. I shall mention only two of them, which I con-sider to be the most important. Firstly, during the interwar period Timi³oaradidn't have its own historiography school at an academic level. Consequently,

4Traian Bir escu, Banatul sub turci. Timi³oara, 1934; idem, �Timi³oara. Urbanismul ³ihigiena neamului�, in Dacia, Timi³oara, 1939, No. 65; idem, �Timi³oara de ieri ³i de azi�, inRevista Institutului Social Banat-Cri³ana, Timi³oara, 1942, No. 1 (January-February) andothers.

90 Vasile Docea

it wasn't imperative to replace one academic tradition with a new historicalinterpretation, as it happened in the other great academic centres. On theother hand, at the beginning of the communist period there was no Univer-sity in Timi³oara with its own history department. That was founded onlyin the 1960s.It was, thus, during the 1960s that the rewriting of the city's history began,

in the communist regime's attempt to resize the collective memory. Out ofthe 66 historical studies and monographies published until 1989, 25 (37.8%)have a strong ideological component and focus on themes speci�c to commu-nist historiography: the installation of the communist regime, the history ofthe working class and of the communist movement, the industrialization, thecollectivization of agriculture, etc. Nothing new is o�ered, the motifs are thesame in all the historiography of the time, as recommended by the communistpropaganda apparatus.One of the most popular historiographic themes with the communist pro-

paganda revolves around an event that took place at the end of World WarII, in September 1944, shortly after Romania turned against Germany andstarted to �ght on the side of the Soviet Union, when several military unitsaround Timi³oara were defending the city against the German troops whichwere moving back westwards. The coup and the military uprising in Au-gust 1944 were transformed by the communist propaganda into archetypalfounding gestures of the new regime. The communist historiography consid-ered August 1944 the beginning of the installation of communism in Romania.The communists' involvement in the coup was exaggerated by the propagandain order to legitimize the new regime. The historiography of Timi³oara triedto connect the past of the city to these events and hence, associate it withthe very installation of the communist regime in Romania. With this in mind,many studies were published5 in which the military event of September 1944was overrated, the communists being presented as the leaders of the soldierswho defended the city.Another theme �encouraged� by the entire Romanian historiography was

that of the tradition of the working class movement. The communist party

5Alexandru Galgoczy, �Timi³oara, pe locurile unde s-a desf ³urat insurecµia armat , au-gust 1944�, in Analele Institutului de istorie a Partidului de pe lâng C.C. al P.C.R., Bu-cure³ti, vol. 10, 1964, No. 4, p. 158-163; Dumitru Popescu, La porµile Timi³oarei. Septem-brie 1944. Bucure³ti, Editura Militar , 1968; Sorin Berghian, �Un moment însemnat dinistoria poporului român � ap rarea Timi³oarei, septembrie 1944�, in Studii de istorie a Ba-natului, Timi³oara, vol. 11, 1985, p. 195-200; Oancea, Maria, �Participarea oamenilor munciial turi de armata român la ap rarea Timi³oarei � septembrie 1944�, in Studii de istorie aBanatului, Timi³oara, vol. 11, 1985, p. 191-194.


needed more legitimacy and one way to achieve it was by promoting the no-tion that the entire party or at least some of its prominent members took partin the most prominent events or made the most fortunate, patriotic and ad-vanced decisions. This tendency is present in the local historiography as well,latent during the entire communist period, more conspicuous in several pseudo-scienti�c articles6. Another strategy was that of con�scating the history of allsocial movements, as well as the history of various professions and social strata(especially the poor ones). The life of 18th century craftsmen in Timi³oara isstudied so as to justify their revolt against the urban patricians (Bardos 1961).The strikes of the printers or of the railroad workers are recurrent subjects forthe communist historians7.The texts about the industrial tradition of Timi³oara belong to the same

politically ordained ideological historiography. Communism was � theoretically� the ideology of the �working class�, itself a product of industrialization. Inother words, if there were no industry, there would be no �working class�, thisso-called avant-garde of the communism. And it would be quite hard to talkabout communism without a working class. That is why, also in the caseof the historiography of Timi³oara, historians were urged to write about thedevelopment of various industrial institutions in the city8.Among the measures taken to consolidate the totalitarian regime was the

so-called �nationalization of the main industrial sectors�, which was, in fact,the seizure of all factories and of most properties in the agricultural sector,as well as of a great number of residences. This happened in June 1948.At �rst, the communist regime didn't need the historians to legitimize the

6Traian Bunescu, �Activitatea comitetelor cet µene³ti din Timi³oara, decembrie 1944-mai1945�, in Studii de istorie a Banatului, Timi³oara, vol. 4, 1976, p. 121 134; Wiliam Marin,�Aspecte ale activit µii revoluµionare desf ³urate de organizaµiile U.T.C. din Timi³oara înanii 1922-1944�, in Studii de istorie a Banatului, Timi³oara, vol. 4, 1976, p.74-91.

7Traian Bunescu, and Gheorghe Radulovici, �Din lupta muncitorilor tipogra� din Tim-i³oara împotriva exploat rii capitaliste, 1851-1947�, in Tibiscus, Timi³oara, vol. 2, 1972,p. 131-139; Gheorghe Radulovici, �Cu privire la organizarea ³i lupta muncitorilor tipogra�din Timi³oara în perioada 1851-1918�, in Studii de �loso�e ³i socialism ³tiinµi�c, Timi³oara,vol. 2, 1975, p. 361-374; Gheorghe Oancea, �Greva muncitorilor feroviari din Timi³oara dinaprilie 1904�", in Studii de istorie a Banatului, Timi³oara, vol. 4, 1976, p. 58-73; GheorgheRuja, �Cadre didactice ³i studenµi timi³oreni în lupta antifascist din România 1933-1940�,in Studii de istorie a Banatului, Timi³oara, vol. 11, 1985, p. 135-160.

8(no author) Fabrica de µigarete Timi³oara. Monogra�e. 1848-1973, Timi³oara, 1973;Vasile Zaberca, Gheorghe Ruja, �Premiere ale industriei b n µene în a doua jum tate asecolului al XIX-lea�, în Anuarul Muzeului tehnic prof. dr. ing. A. Leonida, Bucure³ti,1975, p. 173-180; (no author), Scurt monogra�e a întreprinderii �Tehnometal� Timi³oara,1879-1979, Timi³oara, 1982.

92 Vasile Docea

seizure. Later on, when the industrial production of these nationalized facto-ries dropped constantly, reaching the verge of bankruptcy, in the context ofa collapsed economy, the communist regime felt the need to justify the 1948�nationalization� by propagandistic means. The more disastrous the economicsituation grew, the more enthusiastic were the apparatchiks about the processof nationalization, which had actually caused the failure. In Timi³oara the his-torians of the regime celebrated various anniversaries related to the large-scaleseizure, trying to prove it had had the �people's support�9.The monographies of Timi³oara or of the Banat published during the com-

munist period are pervaded by the obsession to capitalize on the di�erencesbetween the past and the present10. Almost everything in the past had beenbad, poor, ugly, harmful, or, at best, mediocre. The present, in exchange,was the sum of all qualities. The myth of progress appears in these monogra-phies to justify the totalitarian regime, which is responsible for all the positivechanges, and of course, to hide the real nature of the regime.

The Street Names

1. The successive waves of street name changes

The researcher interested in the evolution of the city of Timi³oara, in itsstreets and � in this case � in the street names must resort to the city maps.Such maps are still available: the oldest ones, prior to World War I, at theState Archives in Timi³oara and in the Banat Museum, the newer ones in thecity libraries, in the archives of the City Council and in private collections11.

9Vasile Duda³, �Adeziunea clasei muncitoare din Timi³oara la înf ptuirea actului istorical naµionaliz rii principalelor mijloace de producµie�, in vol. Actul naµionaliz rii în Banat,Re³iµa, 1978, p. 53-58; Gheorghe Ruja, �Aspecte ale naµionaliz rii principalelor mijloace deproducµie în judeµul Timi³�, in vol. Actul naµionaliz rii în Banat, Re³iµa, 1978, p. 45-52.

10(no author), Regiunea Banat în dou decenii de m reµe înf ptuiri 1944-1964, Timi³oara,1964; N. Oprean, Timi³oara contemporan , Timi³oara, 1969; �tefan Pascu et al., Timi³oara700. Pagini din trecut ³i de azi, Timi³oara, 1969; Al. Z nescu, I. Martin, Timi³oara ieri ³iazi, Timi³oara, 1969.

11Without o�ering an exhaustive enumeration of the city maps, I will mention here onlythose I used directly in this research project:Timi³oara. Planul ora³ului cu numirile noi ale str zilor. Made by Major Thoma Darabas

after the city's techical department plan. Design and lithography by I. Pregler, Timi³oara(1923); Planul municipiului Timi³oara. 1936. Conform datelor o�ciale ale Serviciului TehnicMunicipal, design by D. Dumitrache, lithography by Kheil & Baumstark, Timi³oara; Mu-nicipiul Timi³oara. Ghidul str zilor. 1980, Intreprinderea Poligra�c Banat, Timi³oara;Îndrum torul prin Timi³oara, cu noua denumire a str zilor, pieµelor, podurilor ³i parcurilor,


There is little systematic research on street names. Some studies, though,are worth mentioning, such as those by Irina St nculescu about the streetnames in Bucharest12. Though no reference is made to Timi³oara, they canprovide a good comparative perspective, thus broadening the horizon. For thestreet names in Timi³oara the necessary data are provided by two comparativecharts. One of them was published by Octavian Le³cu in 200113. But it onlycomprises the successive names, up to the present moment, of streets extant inthe year 1900. The other one was made by the City Council of Timi³oara andposted on its website14. It contains all current streets, but the identi�cationof the streets' previous names goes back in time only to 1936.The change of street names in Timi³oara occurred in several waves. When

I use the term wave, I do not have in mind, of course, attributing or changingnames accidentally or occasionally. The waves are in direct connection withthe socio-political contexts and their alteration. In the 20th century the �rstwave of changes took place immediately after 1919, when the city receivedRomanian administration. The second wave occurred in the late 1940s, afterthe installation of the communist totalitarian system. The third wave followedin the 1970s, when the o�cial ideology became that of national-communism.Last but not least, the fourth wave took place in the mid 1990s, after thecollapse of the communist system.

2. The Romanian transformation

Between 1867 and 1918 � the period of the Austro-Hungarian dualism � thestreets of Timi³oara had German and Hungarian names. Many were the namesof great personalities in the history of Hungary or Transylvania15. The streetsin this period are a public procession of kings and noblemen (Attila utca,

1949; Ghidul ora³ului Timi³oara ³i planul ora³ului, 1959; Ghidul ora³ului Timi³oara, cu indi-catorul alfabetic al str zilor, 1966; Municipiul Timi³oara. Ghidul str zilor, 1980; Timi³oara.Ghidul str zilor, 1991; Hegedus Abel, Timi³oara, Cartographia, The Collection of Romaniancity maps, Budapest (2001).

12Irina St nculescu, �Schimbarea reperelor memoriei colective. Bucure³ti, secolul XX�, inBuletinul Laboratorului �Psihologia câmpului social�, Universitatea �Al. I. Cuza� Ia³i, No.4/1999, Editura Polirom, p. 55-73; idem, �Apariµia ³i evoluµia denumirilor de str zi dinBucure³ti�, in Bucure³ti. Materiale de istorie ³i muzeogra�e, vol. XIV, Muzeul municipiuluiBucure³ti, 2000, p. 137-185.

13Octavian Le³cu, Ghidul ora³ului Timi³oara de-a lungul timpului 1900-2000, Timi³oara,2001, p. 20-63

14At: www.primariatm.ro15The information about street names presented in what follows resulted from the com-

parative analysis of the data found in the sources quoted in footnotes 61-64.

94 Vasile Docea

Árpád utca, Báthory utca, Hunyady tér, Korvin Mátyás utca, Széchényi utca,Zápolya utca, Rákóczy utca, Losonczy tér), of ministers (Andrássy utca, Telekyutca, Deák utca), of Hungarian leaders and generals of the 1848 Revolution(Kossuth Lajos tér, Klapka sor, Bem utca), of cultural and literary �gures(Pet®� utca, Jókai Mór utca). Even the leader of a Transylvanian uprisingof about 1514, Dózsa György, who had been executed in Timi³oara, lent hisname to a street and a square in the city. Many other streets � not as manyas the Hungarian ones � had names evoking the city's Austrian past: namesof Habsburg emperors and royalties (Elisabeth Gasse, Franz Josef Gasse, JosefPlatz, Karl Gasse, Maria Theresia Gasse, Rudolf Gasse), names of Austriangenerals and governors of the city of Timi³oara (Prinz Eugen Plaz, MercyGasse, Koronini Platz), or city mayors (Preyer Gasse) and cultural �gures(Lenau Gasse).At the end of World War I, after the abolition of the dual monarchy, the Ba-

nat was occupied by the Serbian army. The peace treaties of Paris-Versailles,though, decided that the Eastern part of the Banat, Timi³oara included, shouldbelong to Romania. In August 1919, the Romanian troops marched into Tim-i³oara, followed by the new administration. Romania joined the war in 1916against Austria-Hungary and Germany. When the war was over, the o�cial at-titude of the Romanian state towards the former enemies was far from friendly.This was also perceived in Timi³oara, where the new local government soondid away with all the o�cial street names and public places which remindedof the old times.Until 1921, all the streets in Timi³oara were given Romanian names. The

new names were chosen from �elds of Romanian history and culture, oftennames of personalities or heroes who had nothing to do with the city's ownhistory. The central area of the city (which contained the largest number ofHabsburg emperors' names), came to host World War I generals or �ghters inthe older Romanian-Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878: General PraporgescuStreet (former Báthory utca), General Dragalina Street (former Deák utca),General Grigorescu Street (former Franz Josef Gasse), General I. OdobescuStreet (former Maria Theresia Gasse), General Traian Doda Street (formerPrajkói utca), etc. The locations of World War I battle�elds where the Roma-nian army had been victorious, also became popular: M r ³e³ti Street (formerElisabeth Gasse), M r ³ti Square (former Josef Platz), Oituz Square (formerNádor tér), etc. Streets were named also after the members of the royal family.The former Park Strasse is named Queen Mary Boulevard after the very popu-lar wife of King Ferdinand I. Another street, the former Hunyady ut, becomesCarol I Boulevard.


The streets or public places with neutral names are not spared either. Theformer Rekascher Strasse (the street that connected Timi³oara with the set-tlement Reca³, a famous local wining town about 25 km away from the city)became Calea Dorobanµilor in 1921. �Dorobanµi� was the name of the Roma-nian infantry in the second half of the 19th century. Dorobanµi units madehistory during the Independence War of 1877-1878, but none of these thingshad much to do with the past of Timi³oara.Some streets receive the names of Moldavian or Wallachian medieval princes:

�tefan cel Mare Street (former Bad Gasse), Petru Rare³ Street (former KleinPlatz), D. Cantemir Street (former Karl Gasse), �epe³ Vod Square (formerLenau Platz), Mihai Viteazul Boulevard (former Bischof Gasse). It is worthmentioning here that none of these �gures had anything to do with the his-tory of the city. Many other streets are given the names of Romanian cultural�gures: George Co³buc Street (former Pet®� utca), Gheorghe Laz r Street(former Serben Gasse), Coriolan Brediceanu Street (former Széchényi utca),Eminescu Street (former Siebenburger Gasse), Ion Creang Street (formerNussblater Gasse), Barbu Delavrancea Street (former Tauben Gasse), MoiseNicoar Street (former Bad Gasse), Caragiale Street (former Jókai Mór utca),Eliade R dulescu Street (former Emmaus Gasse).Some names remained unchanged: Griselini Street, Huniade Square (at a

certain moment named Iancu de Hunedoara Square), Paul Chinezul Street(Kinizsi Gasse in the Austro-Hungarian period), Matei Corvin Street. Butthis is very little in contrast with everything that is changed. Keeping in mindthat many of the new names had no connection with the history of the city,I may conclude that the gap between street names and the collective memorywas huge.

3. The Stalinist transformation

A new gap, no less dramatic, was about to occur at the end of World WarII. Hardly had three decades elapsed since the Romanian administration's �na-tionalization� of street names and public places when another change tookplace. The time was too short for the population to get familiar with thegreat amount of names which, for many, were totally irrelevant. But this timethe change was not national, but ideological. The communist administrationwould cleanse all the names which were unsuitable to the new ideology, thecommunist, Soviet-Stalinist one.The classics of Marxism could not be omitted from the new list of street

names. Starting from 1947 such street names as Karl Marx Street (former

96 Vasile Docea

Fortress Street) and Friedrich Engels Street (former Mercy Street) appeared.The two names were, in fact, omnipresent all around Romania, being employedfor streets in the central areas of the cities. This observation is also valid forall the other East and Central European countries in the communist bloc.The late 1940s were characterized by a massive Russianization of street

names. The sources of these names were varied. They belonged to Russian cul-tural and scienti�c �gures (writers, philosophers, biologists, musicians, etc.),who were, of course, leftist: Lermontov Square (former �epe³ Vod Square),Modest Musorgski Street (former Titu Maiorescu Street), Visarion BelinskiStreet (former �aguna Street), Tchernyshevski Square (former Mitropolite �u-luµiu Square), Turgheniev Street (former Rev. Dragomir Street), Maxim GorkiStreet (former Nistru Street), Pushkin Street (former General Mo³oiu Street),Timireazev Street (new street).Dates from the history of the USSR are added to this massive phenomenon:

7 November Street (former Bonaaz Street), 12 April 1961 Street16 (former3 August Street), The Stalingrad Heroes' Boulevard (former Tache IonescuBoulevard), Stalingrad Street (former Martyr Ioan Ciorda³ Street). The nameof several Soviet political and military personalities complete the process: Mali-novski Street (former Dimitrie Sturdza Street), Marshall F. I. Tolbuhin Square(former General Dragalina Square), Kalinin Street (former Alsacia Street),Vyshinski Street (new street).The paradigm of renaming the streets by the new communist authorities

includes the names of several leaders of the communist and socialist move-ment. Some are foreign, and thus new street names are created: GeorgyiDimitrov Street (former Eugeniu de Savoya Street) and Marshall Tito Square(former Alexandru Lahovary Square). The name of the Yugoslavian leaderwas started to be used in 1948, but lasted only for a year because of thedeterioration of the Romanian-Yugoslav relations. Thus, in 1949, MarshallTito Square became Nicolae B lcescu Square. The new patron of the streetwas a 19th century politician and radical ideologist, an important member ofthe European Masonry. Although the Stalinist communists condemned andpersecuted masonry ever since they reached power positions, they were, in acurious way, still willing to rehabilitate a few such members from the past,appropriating them.Other communist leaders who lent their names to streets were of Romanian

origin. A few died in the interwar period or during the war and were consideredheroes of the new political regime. Including them in the list of street names,

16The date of the �rst human cosmic �ight, performed by I. Gagarin.


the regime was trying to make an inventory of communist martyrs. The list,which acquired almost mythical implications, included: Vasile Roait Square(former St. George, then for a while I. C. Br tianu Square), Bela Brainer Street(former Rev. Tr il Street), �tefan Pl v µ Boulevard (former Regent BuzduganStreet), �tefan Stânc -Street (former Chevalier Martini Street), Ocsko TereziaStreet (former Homer Street).High communist o�cials also gave their names to streets: Iosif Rangheµ

Street (former Preyer Street), Alexandru Dr ghici Street (new street in 1946),which would then become Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol Street (1956).Finally, several street names refer to important dates in the history of

the communist party and regime: 23 August Boulevard (former Queen MaryBoulevard), 1 May Street (former St. John Street), 6 March Boulevard (formerCarol I Boulevard), Griviµa Ro³ie Street (former Domniµa B la³a Street), etc.

4. The native transformation under the pressure of national

communism

Less than two decades later, a new political change took place. The 1960switnessed a reconsideration of communist Romania's attitude towards Moscow.The transformation was gradual, from a discreet attempt to nationalize po-litical decisions in the early 1960s (Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's last years ofleadership) to an open declaration of de�ance towards Moscow, with commu-nist leader Ceau³escu criticizing the military invasion of Czechoslovakia by thetroops of the Warsaw Treaty states in 1968.The political shift can also be observed in the new street names. Those of

foreign communist leaders are given up: Georgyi Dimitrov Street, for exam-ple, becomes Ceahl u Street in the early 1960s. Similarly, the names of Rus-sian or Soviet cultural �gures disappear: Lermontov Square becomes Doice³tiSquare, also in the early 1960s. Tchernyshevski Square becomes Vârful cu DorSquare in 1966, Maxim Gorki Street becomes Tu³nad Street, Pushkin Streetbecomes Pescarilor (Fishermen's) Street, Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol Street be-comes Galaµi Street. On this occasion, the names of some personalities arenot replaced by their Romanian counterparts. Despite the relative autonomyfrom Moscow, the Romanian communists didn't dare defy the Soviet Union byreplacing their heroes. In Timi³oara the Russian names are thus replaced bynames of mountains, towns, or professions.Dates and events from the history of Russia and the USSR are also given

up: Stalingrad Street becomes Garibaldi Street already in the late 1950stogether with Malinovski Street, which becomes Gheorghe Crosnev Street

98 Vasile Docea

(then, from 1964 on, Mangalia Street), The Stalingrad Heroes' Boulevardbecomes Tipogra�lor (Printers') Street in 1964 (Leontin S l jan Boulevardin 1966), Kalinin Street regains its former name, Alsacia Street, Pavel KisselefStreet becomes Cocorilor (Cranes') Street, Vyshinski Street becomes Cerbului(Stag's) Street.The communist nationalism also manifested itself in erasing the names of old

Romanian communist activists of foreign origin (Jewish or Hungarian). Beingmartyrs didn't save their place among street names. Bela Breiner and TeresiaOcsko Streets are baptized, in the mid 1960s, with names of �owers: Lalelelor(Tulips') and Narciselor (Da�odils') respectively. National communism wishednew green grass to grow onto the old internationalist mythology.

Conclusions

The fall of the communist regime brings a new change to the social-political,economic and cultural context. This novel age witnesses a series of muta-tions both at the level of the historiography of Timi³oara and in the streetnames. The local university opens a history department, which expands thearea of study and trains new researchers. A theme that becomes very popularwith the historians of Timi³oara is that of the Revolution of December 1989,research supported by the publication of documents, reconstructions and inter-pretations17. Older preoccupations are renewed in connection with the historyof the city in a traditional positivistic-descriptive manner18, but new studies,

17(no editor), Timi³oara 16 � 22 decembrie. Timi³oara, Editura Facla, 1990; Miodrag Milin(ed.), Timi³oara 1 � 21 decembrie '89, Timi³oara, 1990; idem (ed.), Timi³oara în revoluµie³i dup , Timi³oara, Editura Marineasa, 1997; idem (ed.), Timi³oara în arhivele �EuropeiLibere�, 17-20 decembrie 1989, Bucure³ti, Fundaµia Academia Civic , 1999; Marius Mioc,Revoluµia din Timi³oara a³a cum a fost ³i falsi�catorii istoriei revoluµiei: m rturiile r niµilor,arestaµilor, rudelor ³i prietenilor celor decedaµi în revoluµie; încerc rile de falsi�care a istorieirevoluµiei de c tre Ion Iliescu, Ion Cristoiu, Sergiu Nicolaescu..., Timi³oara, Sidonia, 1999;M. Milin (ed.), Procesul de la Timi³oara, vol. I-VI, Bucure³ti, Fundaµia Academia Civic ,2004-2008. From 2007 on, a periodical entitled �Memorial 1989. Buletin ³tiinµi�c ³i deinformare� appears, edited by the Timi³oara Revolution Memorial.

18For example: Costin Fene³an, �Domeniul Cet µii Timi³oara pân în 1552�, in Revistaistoric , Bucure³ti, New Series, 1997, no. 7-8; Marica V. Guy, �Timi³oara în secolul alXVIII-lea�, in Analele Banatului. Art , Timi³oara, New Series, vol. 3, 1998; Jancsó Arpád,Istoricul podurilor din Timi³oara, Timi³oara, Editura Mirton, 2001; Ioan Munteanu, �Presadin Timi³oara, 1771-1918�, in Studii de istorie a Banatului, Timi³oara, New Series, vol. 9(23), 2001; Ioan Munteanu, Rodica Munteanu, Timi³oara. Monogra�e. Timi³oara: EdituraMirton, 2002, etc.


based on oral history19, are also promoted. Another �eld of scrutiny is that ofthe history of anti-communist underground groups20. Apart from the cognitive,historical motivation, this perspective also has a recovering purpose, which issometimes explicitly stated, sometimes only implied: the communist histori-ography overrated the working class' movements and completely ignored thecommunists' opposition, so it was high time the historians revealed the lattercategory's contribution. The researchers are no longer limited by the politicalestablishment. They have gained the freedom to deal with themes and topicswhich are interesting for the community. Thus, the relationship between thehistorian and the collective memory starts to be regulated.The same thing happened to street names. Between 1990 and 1993 almost all

names reminding somehow of the communist regime disappeared. The city'sstreets were given back their former kings and members of the royal family,the �gures who had contributed to its history (Eugene of Savoy, Florimondde Mercy, Johann Nepomuk Preyer, etc.). Romanian as well as internationalwriters and artists are also revived. The names of a few dozens of victims ofthe Revolution of December 1989 have joined the prestigious gallery of names,and so have various events related to this historic moment, which shows thatthe Revolution is already deeply rooted in the collective memory.To conclude with, one may argue that, when it comes to the city of Timi³oara

at least, the connection between the collective memory, the local historiogra-phy and the street names is far from simple. It cannot be explained onlyby means of identity or linear, mechanical conditioning. The three categoriesoverlap, sometimes more deeply, sometimes more super�cially, according tothe social-political context. In some such cases both the local historiographyand the street names can be regarded as explicit forms of collective memory:the historians write about subjects which are relevant to the community, whilethe streets and the public places bear the names of �gures, events, or locationsstored in the collective memory. This applies to the period before 1918 andto that after 1989, and only partially to the interwar period. On other occa-

19Smaranda Vultur, Antonia Komlosi, Memorie ³i diversitate cultural , Timi³oara 1900 -1945/Mémoire et diversité culturelle, Timi³oara 1900-1945, Ia³i, Polirom, 2001; SmarandaVultur (ed.), Germanii din Banat prin povestirile lor, Bucure³ti, Paideia, 2000; idem (ed.),Memoria salvat . Evreii din Banat, ieri ³i azi, Ia³i, Polirom, 2002; Mihaela Sitariu, Oaza delibertate. Timi³oara, 30 octombrie 1956, Ia³i, Polirom, 2004 etc.

20Mihaela Sitariu, Rezistenµa anticomunist . Timi³oara 1956, Bucure³ti, Editura So�a,1998; C. Muµiu et al., �Mi³c rile studenµe³ti anticomuniste din octombrie 1956 din Tim-i³oara�, in Analele Sighet, Bucure³ti, vol. 8, 2000; Ioan Munteanu, �Manifestaµia anticomu-nist a studenµilor de la Timi³oara din octombrie 1956. Semni�caµia politic naµional �, inAnalele Sighet, Bucure³ti, vol. 8, 2000, p. 635-655.

100 Vasile Docea

sions there may be a total schism between the collective memory, on the onehand, and the local historiography and the street names, on the other, as ithappened in the communist period. A partial schism was witnessed during theinterwar period.

(Translated by Dana Percec)

References

Boia, Lucian, 1999: Mitologia ³tiinµi�c a comunismului, Translated fromFrench, revised and adapted by the author, Bucure³ti: Humanitas.

Bugariu, Aurel, 1943: Bibliogra�a Banatului 1918-1943, in Revista InstitutuluiSocial Banat-Cri³ana, Timi³oara.

Duda³, Vasile, 1978: Adeziunea clasei muncitoare din Timi³oara la înf ptuireaactului istoric al naµionaliz rii principalelor mijloace de producµie, în Actulnaµionaliz rii în Banat, Re³iµa, p. 53-58.

Georgescu, Vlad, 1991: Politic ³i istorie. Cazul comuni³tilor români 1944-1977, Bucure³ti: Humanitas.

Ivan, Nicolae, 1936: Timi³oara. Mic istorie a ora³ului. Timi³oara.

Le³cu, Octavian, 2001: Ghidul ora³ului Timi³oara de-a lungul timpului 1900-2000, Timi³oara.

Marx, Karl, 1964: Însemn ri despre români (Manuscrise inedite), publishedby A. Oµetea and S. Schwann, Introduction by A. Oµetea and Gh. Zane,Bucure³ti: Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Române.

Mihalache, Andi, 2003: Istorie ³i practici discursive în România �democrat-popular �, Bucure³ti: Albatros.

Milin, Miodrag (ed.) 1990: Timi³oara 1-21 decembrie '89, Timi³oara.

Milin, Miodrag (ed.) 1997: Timi³oara în revoluµie ³i dup , Timi³oara,Marineasa.

Milin, Miodrag (ed.) 1999: Timi³oara în arhivele �Europei Libere�, 17-20 de-cembrie 1989, Bucure³ti, Fundaµia Academia Civic .

Milin, Miodrag (ed.) 2004-2008: Procesul de la Timi³oara, vol. I-VI, Bucure³ti,Fundaµia Academia Civic .


Mioc, Marius, 1999: Revoluµia din Timi³oara a³a cum a fost ³i falsi�catoriiistoriei revoluµiei : m rturiile r niµilor, arestaµilor, rudelor ³i prietenilor celordecedaµi în revoluµie; încerc rile de falsi�care a istoriei revoluµiei de c tre IonIliescu, Ion Cristoiu, Sergiu Nicolaescu..., Timi³oara, Sidonia.

Munteanu, Ioan � Munteanu, Rodica, 2002: Timi³oara. Monogra�e. Timi³oara:Mirton.

Oprean, N. 1969: Timi³oara contemporan , Timi³oara.

Pascu, �tefan et al., 1969: Timi³oara 700. Pagini din trecut ³i de azi, Timi-³oara.

Popescu, Dumitru, 1968: La porµile Timi³oarei. Septembrie 1944. Bucure³ti:Editura Militar .

Ruja, Gheorghe, 1978: Aspecte ale naµionaliz rii principalelor mijloace de pro-ducµie în judeµul Timi³, în Actul naµionaliz rii în Banat, Re³iµa, p. 45-52.

St nculescu, Irina, 1999: Schimbarea reperelor memoriei colective. Bucure³ti,secolul XX, in Buletinul Laboratorului �Psihologia câmpului social�, Univer-sitatea �Al. I. Cuza� Ia³i, No. 4/1999.

Sitariu, Mihaela, 1998: Rezistenµa anticomunist . Timi³oara 1956, Bucure³ti,So�a.

Sitariu, Mihaela, 2004: Oaza de libertate. Timi³oara, 30 octombrie 1956, Ia³i,Polirom.

Verdery, Katherine, 1994: Compromis ³i rezistenµ . Cultura român subCeau³escu, translated into Romanian by Mona Antohi and Sorin Antohi,Bucure³ti: Humanitas.

Vultur, Smaranda � Komlosi, Antonia, 2001: Memorie ³i diversitate cultural ,Timi³oara 1900 � 1945/Mémoire et diversité culturelle, Timi³oara 1900-1945,Ia³i, Polirom.

Vultur, Smaranda (ed.) 2000: Germanii din Banat prin povestirile lor, Bu-cure³ti, Paideia.

Vultur, Smaranda (ed.), 2002: Memoria salvat . Evreii din Banat, ieri ³i azi,Ia³i, Polirom.

Z nescu, Al. and Martin, I., 1969: Timi³oara ieri ³i azi, Timi³oara.

102 Vasile Docea

(xxx) 1964: Regiunea Banat în dou decenii de m reµe înf ptuiri 1944-1964,Timi³oara.

(xxx) 1973: Fabrica de µigarete Timi³oara. Monogra�e. 1848-1973, Timi³oara.

(xxx) 1982: Scurt monogra�e a întreprinderii �Tehnometal� Timi³oara, 1879-1979, Timi³oara.



�Autonomy� of Sport Policy and Sport

Activities in the European Union:

Connections between Human Rights and

Sports∗

TONK MártonDepartment of European StudiesSapientia University Cluj-Napocaemail: [email protected]

NAGY-MÉHÉSZ TündeDepartment of European StudiesSapientia University Cluj-Napocaemail: [email protected]

Alexandru Virgil VOICUDepartment of Individual Sports


Abstract. With the increasing social role of sports, respectively itsever more decisive economic role the matter of sports takes an increas-ingly distinguished rank in EU politics. In close connection with that,the organisations dealing with sports claim a special status for sportactivities, one that is di�erent from the general judicial practice of theEuropean Union, one which represents an exception in many respects.This phenomenon will the present study call �the autonomy of sport ac-tivities�. The special, �autonomous� nature of sport appears most of allperhaps in the legal con�icts on the agenda of European Union leveljustice institutions; therefore the study lays a special emphasis on theanalysis of these legal cases (e.g. �Bosman Case�, �Abdelmajid OulmersCase�, �6+5 Rule�). At the same time, we seek answers to the question ofwhat further types of directives are necessary within the sport policies ofthe European Union, from the point of view of the social and economicrole of sport activities.

Keywords: human rights and sport, sport policy in the EU, autonomyof sport activities

∗The present manuscript was closed on 28 October 2009.

104 Tonk Márton, Nagy-Méhész Tünde, Alexandru Virgil Voicu

The broadcast of the Super Bowl, the championship game of the premier as-sociation of professional American football � the American National FootballLeague (NFL) � is an annual most-watched event in world television broadcast-ing. Yet one must not go very far for an even handier example: football gamesof European and world championships, or even the competitions of the OlympicGames also make millions of viewers sit in front of televisions every time. Asuggestive piece of information about the popularity of sport events is that theopening ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing was watched by twobillion people, even according to the most pessimistic estimates. In additionto the popularity of proper sport activities and events, the taking of steroids,hooliganism, or the issues of selling/buying players are also permanent topicsof sport media. The legal aspects of these issues can at the same time also befound in legal or European Union discourse. Simultaneously with the increas-ing social role of sport, respectively its ever more decisive economic role (inthe case of certain sport branches the invested amounts of money resulted inreal �superpowers�)1, the matter of sports takes an increasingly distinguishedrank in EU politics. In close connection with that, the organisations and insti-tutions dealing with sports, and sports clubs themselves not the least, claim aspecial status for sport activities, one that is di�erent from the general judicialpractice of the European Union, one which represents an exception in manyrespects. This phenomenon will the present study call �the autonomy of sportactivities�, and at the same time the investigation of the matter will also bethe main purpose of our analyses below2. The special, �autonomous� natureof sport, pointing beyond the legal and other type regulation framework of theEuropean Community, appears most of all perhaps in the legal con�icts on theagenda of European Union level justice institutions; therefore we lay a specialemphasis in our paper on the analysis of these legal cases (e.g. �Bosman Case�,�Abdelmajid Oulmers Case�, �6+5 Rule�). At the same time, we seek answersto the question of what further types of directives, regulations are necessary

1Sport as an economic activity produces circa 4% of the annual total output of the Euro-pean Union, while in addition, it provides 15 million jobs on the level of the Member States.

2The adequacy of the expression �autonomy of sport activities� is proven to an even largerdegree by a most recent development of sports diplomacy: the international sports diplo-macy conference organised on 21 October 2009 in the building of the Hungarian Parliament� attended by leading �gures of international sports � was given the title of �InternationalConference on the Speci�city and Autonomy of Sport in the European Union� by its organ-isers. Later in the present paper we will discuss more about the Budapest Declaration � theclosing declaration of this conference.

�Autonomy� of Sport Policy and Sport Activities in the European Union 105

within the sport policies of the European Union from the point of view of thesocial and economic role of sport activities.

Sports in community treaties and documents

On a European Community level the EU Constitution, by now o� the agendain its original form, would have been the �rst treaty to deal with sports issues- but because it has not been rati�ed, the article on sports has not come intooperation either. Yet, the failure of the coming into force of the Constitu-tional Treaty does not mean that the leading bodies of the European Uniondid nothing to remedy the challenges faced by sports. The events of the recentyears, the increasing number of sport-related legal cases ending up in frontof the European Court of Justice prove that sport policy and regulations be-come more and more a necessity in order to ensure the healthy and vigorousdevelopment of sports (Weatherill 2007: 34). The uncertain legal frameworkimposes increasing problems for commercialising and steadily and irreversiblydeveloping sports. On the other hand, the enlargement of the EU also con-tributes to the necessity of further regulations, as the Member States adheringin 2004, and later in 2007 have all di�erent cultures of sports organisation.In 2005, during the British Presidency of the European Union, a decision hasbeen taken to prepare an independent report on the speci�c nature of sport,respectively � based on European football � to analyse the situation of sportand its problematic issues.Sports related questions are not something new in the European Union.

Although the Founding Treaties do not include articles referring to sports,sport policy has increasingly gained ground in EU law, simultaneously withthe recognition of the signi�cance of the matter. Sport at the same time is alsoconnected to many EU policies; moreover, if it appears as an economic activity,it becomes subject of EU legislation with the applicable rules of competitionand of the internal market. Thus, the classi�cation of professional sport asan economic activity for instance means that the economic regulations of thecommunity apply to it and it must operate in accordance with those principles(Arnaut 2006.). The activities that can be quali�ed as amateur or leisure timesports however, remain in the competence of the Member States, just as cul-ture and education. Until the eighties sport was only de�ned as an economicactivity; yet in the early nineties this way of looking to it was extended, andthe outstanding social signi�cance of sports was recognised. As a result of therecognition of its social functions, the European Olympic Committee (EOC)


established the European Sports Forum, which functions as an advisory body.The main task of this institution is to organise an annual meeting among theMember States, the civil sphere and the European Union, to create a forumfor dialogue and consultations. The annual fora are commonly attended besidenational delegations by representatives of the Member States' sports organi-sations and of international institutions; yet the representatives of EuropeanUnion institutions (European Council, the Commission and the Parliament),and some delegations of non-member countries and of other concerning sectors(e.g. media, universities, sports requisites manufacturers) also partake. Sportmade its way into the acquis for the �rst time in 1997, when a Declarationon Sport3 was attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam. The importance of theDeclaration itself resides in the fact that it recognises the social signi�canceof sport, and calls the attention of political leaders that when decisions insport-related matters are taken, they should listen to sports associations.The next important station of community sport policy is a Consultation

Document issued in 1998 by the Commission, entitled �The European Modelof Sport�4. The document is in fact a situation assessment, which presentsthe organisation model of European sport, its characteristic features and theemerging problems. In the document released in 1998 the Commission declaresthat in spite of the large diversity, it does not wish to make sport structuresin the Member States become more uniform, but would like to maintain theexisting di�erences � thus making the keynote based on which the relative �au-tonomy� of sport activities can later be claimed. Even if the Union did notset up a uniform model of sport organisation for the Member States, theseorganisations show great resemblance throughout the states of Europe. In itsreport issued during the summit in 1999 in Helsinki5 the European Commissionreinforces once again the acceptance of sport organisation models functioningin the Member States, yet in addition to that it further enlarges the sports-related thematic palette of EU policies. The document lays a special emphasison the increased economic dimension of sport, which is especially due to tele-vision broadcasts. Beside the increased economic role, the report also rendersan account about the negative tendencies a�ecting sports. It highlights thespreading of violence in stadiums, hooliganism, corruption and doping prac-tices, as well as the frequent exploitation of young sportsmen and -women, andit also indicates concrete sports policy objectives: the development of sportsand physical education at school, the promotion of the subsequent switch to

3Declaration on Sport. Amsterdam, 1997.4The European Model of Sport. European Commission, 1998.5The Helsinki Report on Sport. COM (1999) 644 �nal.


other employment and future integration onto the labour market of sports-men and -women, respectively the promotion of the convergence between thetraining systems for sports workers in each Member State. Still, the most im-portant objective set is the better and more detailed clari�cation of the legalenvironment of sport within the framework of the European Union.The Nice Declaration6 has also meant a step forward in the history of the

EU from the point of view of sport activities: it recognised the speci�c par-ticularities and outstanding social functions of sports, which therefore wouldhave to be taken into account when implementing community policies. Thedeclaration is extremely important on the level of principles as it formulatesthat the Community must, in its action under the various Treaty provisions,take account of the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport(Nice Declaration 2000, Article 1). Sporting activity should be accessible toevery man and woman, with especial regard to the physically or mentally dis-abled, as it provides a particularly favourable opening for rehabilitation and �not incidentally � social integration (Nice Declaration 2000, Article 5). Besidethese, in the declaration the European Union encourages voluntary or socialwork in sport, and supports the independence of sport organisations and theirright to organise themselves. Another important matter was touched upon bythe declaration, namely the issue of ownership of sport clubs. The attentionwas called upon the fact that single ownership or �nancial control of morethan one sport club entering the same competition in the same sport mayjeopardise fair competition. In order to clear up the question, the Councilproposes that the sport federations may introduce arrangements for oversee-ing the management of clubs. Based on this recommendation for instance theUEFA initiated a rule that two clubs with the same owner cannot compete inthe same competition within European championships. The Nice Declarationincludes a reaction with reference to one of the most important problems ofEuropean sports - also from the point of view of our present paper: in mattersrelated to player transfers the Council expressed its support for a permanentdialogue between EU institutions and organisations representing professionalsportsmen and -women. The latter recommendation was practically on parwith the increased role of the European Sports Forum.Part III, Chapter V, Section 5 of the draft Constitutional Treaty of the

European Union deals with education, vocational training, youth and sport.According to the document the European Union can adopt co-ordinating, com-plementary or supporting regulations in the named areas with the aims � nar-

6Nice Declaration, 2000.


rowed down to our subject � of developing a European dimension of sport,by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and coopera-tion between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical andmoral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially children and youngsportsmen and sportswomen. In the draft Constitution the Union turns awayfrom the possibility of changing the existing European sports model, there-fore this continues to remain within the sphere of authority of the MemberStates. The Treaty of Lisbon, �growing out� of the Constitutional Treaty,presently being in stage of rati�cation (and possibly soon to be adopted) onthe other hand can easily become the �rst treaty in the history of the EU whichwill make a concrete mention of sport, and within it the special character ofsport activities7.The evolution, development of the sport policy of the European Union basi-

cally re�ects the recognition of the fact that sport is not merely an economicactivity, but by its social signi�cance it is also part of European cultural her-itage and an important educational tool. The latter feature of sport activities isimportant from the perspective of a uni�ed European spirituality because theresults of the educating function are social cohesion on a community level, anddeepening and strengthening social integration. (As a result of this new out-look, year 2004 was declared the European Year of Education through Sport,and in 2007 a White Paper on Sport was published.) The tendency takingshape shows a developing European Union sport policy, while furthermore, aseries of legal questions related to sports have been answered over the lastdecades. In spite of that, the obstacles still present in European sports createfurther challenges for the European Union and the sports organisations. TheWhite Paper raises issues such as the licensing systems for clubs, ownershipissues and �nancial management of clubs, or the system of player transfers(White Paper 2007).

7Article 124 of the Treaty of Lisbon establishes the following in connection with sports:a) �The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while tak-ing account of the speci�c nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity andits social and educational function.�; b) �Union action shall be aimed at developing theEuropean dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competi-tions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physicaland moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen andsportswomen.�


The special character of sports: the �autonomy� of

sport activities

One of the main features of European sport is that its governing bodiesenjoy legitimate autonomy. This independence does not mean that sports arebeyond law but that in certain areas of sport a regulating autonomy must betaken into account and respected. There are cases when general law can beapplied in sports, but even in these situations the concrete characteristics mustbe acknowledged. This aspect of sports has also been recognised by the NiceDeclaration. In other words, when we speak of the economic dimension ofsport, it is not sure that it should be treated as a business from a legal point ofview. The speci�cities of sports have also been recognised in the Declarationby European heads of state and government, consequently the debate from nowis not about questioning whether or not sports have a special character. Theessential task is to �nd those practical measures by which European legislationcan take into account the speci�c aspects of sport (Arnaut 2006: 10). Inthe legal disputes ending up in front of the European Court of Justice andthe European Commission, this principle has already been applied, althougherratically and on a case-by-case basis; yet no transparent legal environmenthas been built up in connection with the issue. The lack of an adequateregulation on the other hand resulted in situations when certain �autonomous�sport activities con�icted with the uni�ed European law and order � or createda borderline case at best. A good example for that � and later on we will discussit more in detail because of its topicality � is the issue of �release� of under-contract players to play for national teams8. The aim of the internationalbodies in order to attract as many spectators as possible is to have the bestteams participate in the most important competitions. In football for instancethe aim is to have the best composition of national teams participate in worldand European championships. The measure of releasing the players defendsthe aims and e�ectiveness of such championships, as well as the interests ofsmaller and poorer countries and public (Arnaut 2006: 12), yet it may hurt theinterest of club teams, which can also be considered economic undertakings.The same contradiction, but from an opposite direction is supported by a

phenomenon not unfamiliar at all in the area of sport activities, i.e. thatthe results of the competition are solely determined by money. Although as

8The regulation is speci�cally European, as similar rules do not exist for instance inthe case of American professional leagues. Simultaneously with the ice hockey world cham-pionships for example, current NHL seasons are in full speed and foreign players do notparticipate in the world competitions.


economic activities, sports events could also make reference to the theory ofthe "Invisible Hand" (i.e. the self-regulating mechanism of market forces); theFIFA has presented a draft regulation on domestic players, which will also befurther discussed in the present paper due to its topicality and importance.The proposal is the idea of the leaders of the international association, yetthe issue is relevant mostly in European championships, as one can hardlytalk of the employment of so many �foreign players� in the championshipsof other countries. The proposal known as the �6+5 Rule� stimulates thetraining of players, and to a certain degree it restricts the �trade� with them.The regulation of costs is also an issue connected to the proposal on domesticplayers. The aim in this case is to prevent that the competitors with mostmoney, being able to buy the best players, rule the competitions. This is not inthe interest of sport and the spectators, but it is important to mention that theaim is not to set restrictions regarding the upper limit of players' payments. Aconcrete solution for the extremely complex problem has not yet been found,one possible alternative would be that the general level of expenditure of aclub should be proportionate with its turnover. Another alternative for costregulation could be the strict payment ceiling applied in professional Americanleagues (NBA, NHL, NFL).From all these it consequently becomes clear that on a Union level the special

character of sport requires an application of law that is di�erent from theone generally applied. When applying the regulations one must observe the�autonomy� and self-reliance of sport-governing bodies and sport activities,respectively the speci�cities of sport.

Relationship between the fundamental human rights

and sports

When attempting to analyse the relationship between sports and fundamen-tal human rights, the researcher has to confront the question whether andto what degree can sport be considered a human right. The answer to thequestion may even seem simple as none of the human rights declarations oragreements include articles on the performance of sport activities or on theaccessibility of sports. In that light one can conclude that practising sports isnot classi�ed into the category of fundamental human rights. Sport, however,as a social activity can constitute a very important element of the fundamentalhuman right of equal access to education and culture.


The right to education is included in Article 26 of the Universal Declara-tion of Human Rights: �Education shall be directed to the full development ofthe human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rightsand fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance andfriendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further theactivities [. . . ] for the maintenance of peace.� (Universal Declaration of Hu-man Rights, 2nd paragraph). By its basic characteristics, sport develops theself-respect of people, creates an opportunity for self-ful�lment, and on a sociallevel it promotes cohesion. The spirit of fair play in sport teaches respect forwork and performance, and also respect for the opponent or the other party.The social solidarity e�ect of sport can be witnessed every day, when sports-men and -women and spectators with various cultural, religious backgrounds,speaking di�erent languages rise above these di�erences, helping to overcomesocial stereotypes, discrimination, intolerance. The fact that women can per-form such �typical male sport activities� as football or weight-lifting can alsogive an impulse to combat discrimination against them (Voicu 1999).Fundamental human rights can be enforced by sport, yet these can also be

harmed by it. The most frequent cases of the infringement of fundamentalhuman rights in sports are related to doping (Nádori 2007: 147). The use ofarti�cial performance-enhancing drugs endangers human health, and in addi-tion to that they are in contradiction with the spirit of sports. Human dignityand the private sphere are harmed when sportsmen and sportswomen are sub-mitted to examinations in order to check drug use. Knowing about the possiblerisks of achieving outstanding performances belongs to the basic rights, andin that context fundamental rights can also be harmed. The processes go-ing on today in sports often provide opportunities for some of the sponsorsto exploit sportsmen and sportswomen, or in certain cases for the parents tomake use of their children's talent, without paying attention to the e�ects ofsport activities on their physical and mental development. In recurrent casestalented young people are either physically or mentally worn down by theirdaily training and the burdens of responsibility during the competitions. Theinfringement of other types of human rights can result from the assertion bybribery of commercial or other interests on the race grounds.Recent events have also proven that sports, politics and fundamental human

rights are in close connection with one another. The International OlympicCommittee was strongly criticised when it awarded the right of organising the2008 Olympic Games to Beijing as it was common knowledge that the People'sRepublic of China had often failed to respect human rights. Yet the Olympiadwas organised and after the event it can be concluded that the Chinese Olympic


Games at least provided an opportunity for basic human rights related issuesto be debated at important fora. It is also the �merit� of the event that theChinese State made an attempt to prove to the world the opposite of theallegations, therefore paying better attention to critical remarks. As JacquesRogge formulated on the occasion of the closing ceremony: �The world learnedmore about China, and China learned more about the world�9.One of the most frequent human rights element that keeps coming up in

connection with sport activities is one of the four freedoms of the EuropeanUnion, the free movement of persons. The freedom guaranteed in the Commu-nity Treaty is a prerequisite of the operation of the common market, thereforeArticle 2 of the Treaty rules on the elimination of all restrictions regarding thefree movement of persons (Szalayné 2008: 29). The principle of free move-ment of persons includes the free movement of workers, the freedom to pursueemployment freely and the freedom to establish companies. Of the freedomslisted, it is primarily the free movement of workers that bears special relevancefrom the point of view of sport activities. Although the concept of a workeris not made clear by legal documents, the accepted de�nition is that workersare those who carry out activities based on instructions, for being compen-sated/remunerated. According to the de�nition, employment can be linkedto many di�erent types of activities, sport being one among these, providedthat it results in economic consequences. As a result, the professional sports-men and sportswomen, who carry out their activity by occupation, for com-pensation, are workers.An important element of the free movement of workers is the interdiction

of discrimination, be it even a positive discrimination for the bene�t of owncitizens. Based on the legal practice of the European Court of Justice inthe past years, we can assert that on the grounds of the free movement ofworkers not only discrimination is prohibited, but all forms of obstructions andrestrictions of the freedom. The Bosman case (1995) had the most signi�cantcontribution to the extension of these principles, as not the issue of employmentwas the most important aspect in this case, but the obstructive attitude of theclub that had formerly employed the football player. The Bosman case didnot only alter the basic principles of the Union, but also induced enormouschanges in European sport (Szalayné 2008). Jean-Marc Bosman had been theprofessional player of the Belgian team Liège RC until 1990. Following theexpiration of his contract he refused the o�er of a contract of employmentproposed by the association, as it was disadvantageous to him. The club

924 August 2008


accordingly placed him on the list of players to be sold, and determined atransfer fee of 11,743,000 Belgian francs. This meant that the club that wouldemploy him in the future would be obliged to pay that amount of money inorder to employ him. The regulations regarding this huge amount of money,respectively those restricting the number of foreign players10 made Bosman'ssituation impossible, therefore he was not hired by any of the clubs. In thecase ending up in front of the European Court of Justice a judgment waspassed on 15 December 1995, and beginning with that day a new chapterhas started in the history of team games, but also in that of the �autonomy�of sport activities. During the legal proceedings Bosman argued that as hiscontract had expired in Liège, the club had no right to ask for a transfer fee,moreover, his Belgian employers had violated the article of the free movementof working force from the Treaty of Rome. In his decision, the European Courtof Justice ruled in favour of the free movement of sportsmen and -women. Onthe one hand this meant that the clubs cannot request a transfer fee for thefootball players and sportsmen and sportswomen whose contracts had expired,while on the other hand it also meant that the restriction on the number of�foreign players� was against EU principles. The ruling in the Bosman case,the later Bosman rule in fact, declares that professional players from a legalpoint of view are not di�erent at all from other employees, and the samerules must be applied in their case as in the case of any other citizens of theUnion, performing any other profession. This second bearing of the rule wasextended in 2003 to those countries for which bilateral agreements with theEU pronounce that citizenship cannot constitute a discriminative aspect withregard to employment (this was achieved by a Slovak handball player, MarosKolpak at the end of a similar case at the European Court of Justice in 2003)11.The Bosman case is a copybook example of the tensions among the regula-

tions on sport activities, the �relative autonomy� of sport, and community law(acquis communautaire) � and in its decision the European Court of Justice

10According to the rules of the UEFA at that time, the maximum number of �foreignplayers� on the playing �eld within one team at a time was limited to three players.

11One of the �rst �victims� of the regulations introduced as a consequence of the Bosmancase was the Dutch team Ajax Amsterdam. The winner association of the Champions'League Trophy in 1995 lost most of its best players within less than three years. ClarenceSeedorf signed abroad before the Bosman case but by January 1998 the following playersleft Ajax: Edgar Davids, Michael Reiziger, Finidi George, Nwankwo Kanu, Patrick Kluivert,Marc Overmars, Winston Bogarde, Ronald and Frank de Boer. Three of them left the Dutchteam without a transfer fee, after the expiration of their contracts. The departure of theother players was indirectly related to the e�ects of the Bosman rule, i.e. to the fact thatthe wages of �free� football players reached astronomical amounts.


maintained the unconditional application in the area of sports of the freedomof movement, the free movement of workforce and the freedom of employment.Yet the decision raised further legal questions related to the special status ofsport activities, of which the most representative and in its e�ects the mostimportant one was a type of a second Bosman case, the case that became fa-mous under the name of �Abdelmajid Oulmers�. The latter legal case is stillon the agenda of the European Court of Justice, and a decision in that mattermay become a new milestone in the history of the status of sport activities inthe European Union.On 17 November 2004 the national football team of Morocco hosted the

team of Burkina Faso at an exhibition game. The match ended with a scoreof 4:0, and the Moroccan Abdelmajid Oulmers playing in the Belgian team ofCharleroi was injured. The injury, which seemed to be an easy one, turned outto be serious resulting in a forced rest of a minimum of eight months for theplayer. Oulmers had signed a contract with the Belgian club about a year ear-lier and played well during the whole season, therefore the club considered thatit had su�ered a provable loss as a result of the injury of its employee - so it suedthe FIFA. The competent leaders of the International Federation of Associa-tion Football thought there was no connection between the injury of the playerand the successfulness of the team, consequently they were not willing to paywhat the Charleroi claimed. In the case that was submitted to the EuropeanCourt of Justice the Belgian club argues following a simple logic, which makesthe point that the international association by the conditions set forth clearlyin its regulations on the employment and transfer of players, forces the clubs toallow their players to play at international matches in the competition agenda.Yet the subsequent parts of the rules do not dispose that compensation shouldbe paid in the event of an injury to the player during the match resulting inan in�uence on the player's performance at the club team. The question hereis not that the club continues to pay a wage to the player during the periodof his/her injury, respectively provides rehabilitation expenses, but that theability of the player to generate an income is reduced. It is important to stressthat as sport increasingly ful�ls a commercial role, the ability of a player togenerate income is not only limited any more to his/her performance on theground, but it also includes sponsorship, advertising, publicity-related com-mercial activities (Dénes 2006.). During the legal dispute the Belgian club hasbeen endorsed by the G-1412 group � compressing 14 European leading clubs

12Members of the G14 group were: Ajax Amsterdam, FC Barcelona, Bayern München,Borussia Dortmund, PSV Eindhoven, Internazionale Milan, Juventus, Liverpool, Manch-ester United, AC Milan, Olimpique Marseille, Paris Saint-Germain, FC Porto, Real Madrid.


� that has since then disbanded. At the proposal of the G-14 group, Charleroidetermined the amount of the compensation requested to be 860 million Euros.The interest of the club teams is unequivocal, on the other hand similar is theinterest of the International Federation of Association Football, as the latterhad consciously turned world and European championships, where nationalteams participate, (as well as the respective qualifying rounds) into commer-cial products. The most important positive feature of such sport events is thatthey require minimal �nancial investment from the FIFA, as players are paidby the clubs, the infrastructure is given, and although there are certain rentingand organising expenses, the revenues � especially resulting from the royaltiesof television broadcasts � are enormous. The European Court of Justice hasnot yet ruled in connection with the mentioned case, yet it is estimated thatthe sport clubs will win the case.It is important nonetheless to draw as a conclusion that in connection with

the Abdelmajid-Oulmers case the autonomy of sport activities (in this par-ticular case the regulating monopoly of the FIFA and the continental sportsassociations) is questioned once again in comparison with Union legislation, orin other words an autonomy is questioned which can create rules and adoptregulations without taking national laws and international treaties into con-sideration.Although the Oulmers case is still on the agenda of the European Court

of Justice, together with the Bosman case it has got important in�uence andbears signi�cant consequences in another direction of sport legislation as well.At the end of May 2008, at its congress held in Sydney the representatives ofFIFA member states adopted the so-called �6+5 Rule�, which is in contradictionwith the basic principles of the Union, � or to say the least, with the decisiontaken in the Bosman legal case discussed earlier. The initiative has not beenput into practice ever since, exactly because of the series of disputes connectedto it. Leaders of the FIFA think that the rule is reconcilable with Unionlaw, yet the standpoint of the European Union is that the rule would harmcommunity law, particularly the principle of the free �ow of working force. ThePresident of the most important football association proposes that the numberof �foreign players� sent on the playing ground at the same time should againbe restricted, namely in the sense that starting with the 2012-2013 season,each club must �eld at least six players eligible to play for the national teamof the country of the club, of the eleven players at the beginning of the match.To avoid misinterpretations, it is important to emphasise right from the very

Further four teams joined in 2002: Arsenal, Bayer Leverkusen, Olympique Lyon, Valencia.


beginning that the proposal as such cannot be considered as discriminative ongrounds of nationality, as it rules about the national teams of the countries,where the eligibility to play for the national team is conditioned by citizenship,and not by belonging to one national group or another. It can happen that aplayer with a Spanish national background, but with a British passport, canplay in the national team of Great Britain. In order to make the �6+5 Rule�be accepted, the FIFA requested a fully independent expert team to studywhether the stipulation was in harmony with European law. Five legal expertsof the Institute for European A�airs (INEA) declared after the examinationof the matter that the rule was compatible with the system of regulations ofthe European Union. Namely, according to the report said to be independentthe 6+5 restriction could at most constitute indirect discrimination becauseit is not directly based on the nationality of professional football players, butconsiders entitlement to play for the national team concerned, even if in thegreat majority of the cases these two mean the same thing.Yet the situation is presently in stagnation, one could even say that we

witness a real stalemate: both parties insist on their own interests, and itis hard to imagine they would be willing to alter their standpoints. This issupported by the latest developments connected to the �6+5 Rule�, as theparties reinforced once more their previous standpoints at the conference onsport diplomacy in Budapest mentioned earlier, organised on 21 October 2009.As Joseph Blatter representing FIFA put it, in case the introduction of the ruleis widely supported by sport leaders, then the e�ective provisions of law (i.e.the aquis of the European Community) should be changed, whereas the headof the Sport Unit of the Education and Culture Directorate General of theEU, Michal Krejza declared that the Union will continue not to restrict thefree �ow of workforce. The closing document adopted by the conference (TheBudapest Declaration) for that matter newly points out the tensions betweenthe autonomy of sport activities and the provisions of law and the policies onthe level of the EU, and the signatories ask the European institutions and theMember States of the European Union to have the political will to supportdecisions strengthening the speci�city and the autonomy of sport13.

13Articles 4-6 of the declaration include the following: �4. We commit ourselves to mobilizeour connections and our e�orts to preserve the autonomy of sport respecting the principle ofsubsidiarity, the competences of the Member States as well as the pyramid of internationalsport.; 5. We urge the decision-makers in Europe to recognize, realize and support thespeci�city and the autonomy of sport in the light of the Article 165 of the Lisbon Treaty

as we need to safeguard these principles, the fairness and the openness of the competitions,the training of young players, youth development at club level and the national teams in


The experts of the �eld on the other hand consider that the introductionof the rule would not change the present balance of power in football, as therichest clubs will continue to buy the best football players � at the very mostsome of them will also have to receive citizenship. A major di�erence wouldnonetheless be that the price of football players within one country would in-crease. Yet the issue is a signi�cant one indeed from the point of view ofprofessional sport, it is enough to say here that the degree of workforce mi-gration among professional football players exceeds 45% at present. Accordingto the report published on the o�cial site of the Union of European FootballAssociations (UEFA) the migration of labour force (i.e. proportion of �foreignplayers�) is the largest in England, but almost all European championshipsshow an increasing tendency (see Table 1).

Proportion Average Number

Country of Foreign of Foreign

Players Players per Club

1. England 59.1 % 162. Portugal 53.7 % 133. Belgium 51.9 % 124. Germany 51.7 % 135. Greece 51.2 % 136. Russia 50.2 % 137. Switzerland 47.7 % 128. Scotland 42.4 % 109. Italy 40.6 % 1010. Turkey 40.6 % 10

Romania 36.1 % 10.8Hungary 24.0 % 6.5

Table 1. The proportion of foreign players playing in Europeanchampionships14

all sports, in the spirit of the Nice Declaration adopted in 2000, of the document presentedin September 2008 by the Olympic and Sport Movement, of the Declaration adopted inBiarritz in November 2008 and of the action developed by the Swedish Presidency of the EUto promote these principles.; 6. We call upon the European Institutions and all of the EUMember States, in particular Spain, Belgium and Hungary, which will preside the EuropeanUnion in 2010 and in the �rst semester of 2011, to have the political will to support decisionsstrengthening the speci�city and the autonomy of sport in the interest of future developmentfor generations to come.�

14The proportion of foreign players playing in European championships


It is clear from the table that the statistics is led by the English champi-onship, which continues to be the strongest and at the same time the one mostwatched, in which most front rank teams employ only one or two domestic play-ers. In the 2005 season for instance, the historic occurrence came about whenno English (not even British) players appeared in the Arsenal team (neitheramong the beginning 11, nor on the substitutes' bench). The table released byUEFA was complemented with data referring to the Romanian and Hungarianchampionships; in these cases we used the respective statistics to calculate theproportion of foreign players playing in front rank teams. It can be concludedin the latter cases that while the Hungarian championship is below the Eu-ropean average (also) in this respect, the proportion of foreign players in theRomanian forefront is relatively high, and even extreme examples similar tothe English Arsenal can be found: among the 29 players entered for the teamof CFR from Cluj for the 2008/2009 championship season there were 22 foreignplayers. In the case of Romania, the accession to the European Union was alsoan outstanding moment in the growth of the number of foreign players em-ployed by Romanian club teams: starting with the 2006/2007 championshipseason the number of foreign players increased drastically.The European and world level tendencies shown by the above examples and

statistics adequately re�ect the importance and well-founded character of thedebates around the �6+5 Rule�, but also the ambitions of European sportsorganisations to claim a special, autonomous status for their sport activities,which tries to �nd a way out from under the uniform legal regulation of theEuropean Union, by making reference to the social, cultural, educational roleof sports.

Conclusions

A very important conclusion of our study may be formulated by the state-ment that community level regulations concerning sport activities, and gener-ally the domain of sports are not in par with their signi�cance and economicpower. The speci�c features of sports, the legal instruments and case studiespresented above prove without exception that there is a real need for coopera-tion between EU institutions and sports organisations, and also for the creationof o�cial structures that can form the basis of such cooperation. Because ofthe uncertain legal environment, only in the last �ve years series of corruptionand cross case scandals connected to sports pools or to the agencies managingplayer employments have occurred in Europe - Belgium, Finland, Germany,


Italy and Portugal are the most important examples. In Italy for instance,even the elite clubs with the best traditions were involved in these practices,and the Juventus team was for example placed among the B Series for a season.The referee bribery scandal in volleyball could a�ect even the decisive matchof the most prestigious European championship series, but criminal o�encesare permanent also in tennis and cycling. Another consequence of the legaluncertainty is that many clubs and associations ended up in di�cult �nancialsituations and have to deal with de�cits of several millions.The institutions of the European Union and the organs governing sports

must cooperate in every respect in order to protect the speci�c nature of sportactivities and to safeguard legal security. It is the task of the highest Europeangoverning organs of sport branches to initiate a dialogue with the EuropeanCommission. In football, the task of the UEFA is to maintain a dialoguewith the institutions of the EU, to elaborate the legal framework necessaryfor the security of football � while respecting community law. The statementof sport lawyers that an o�cial agreement is in any case necessary betweenthe European Union and UEFA, in which the nature of the relationship be-tween the parties is de�ned is quite pertinent, and should be extended to otherbranches of sports. Such contracts would make clear which in the di�erentsports branches are the organisations that are the negotiating partners of theUnion, respectively these agreements should also include which institution iscompetent in which issue and what are the methods of cooperation. The Eu-ropean Union has already taken decisions with regard to cycling, basketball,volleyball, swimming, or judo, but the areas that should be regulated must beextended to all branches of sports, for the sake of uniformity and transparency.At the same time, the sport model building from bottom up, in which all couldparticipate, played an important part in the increasing social and economic roleof sport. In the process of shaping legal security therefore one must be carefulto protect the several decades old European sport model, so that its apprecia-tion and esteem is further strengthened. Perhaps even by paying the price ofthe �autonomy� of sport activities.

References

Arnaut, José Luis 2006 Independent European Sport Review (Report). Execu-tive Summary, October. Report by José Luis Arnaut. p. 41

Dénes Ferenc 2006 Lábától szaglik. Az Abdelmajid Oulmers-eset (The Abdel-majid-Oulmers Case). Magyar Narancs XVIII. 21. (25 May 2005).


Nádori László � Bátonyi Viola 2003 Az Európai Unió és a sport (The EuropeanUnion and Sport). Budapest � Pécs, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, p. 215.

Szalayné Sándor Erzsébet 2008 Az egyén jogi helyzete az Európai Unióban

(Tansegédlet) (The Legal Status of the Individual in the European Union

� University Course). Manuscript. Pécsi Tudományegyetem, Állam- és Jog-tudományi Kar, p. 160.

Voicu, Alexandru Virgil 1999 R spunderea civil delictual cu privire la activi-

tatea sportiv (Delinquent Civil Responsibility with Regard to Sport Activity).Bucure³ti, Editura Lumina Lex, p. 480.

Weatherill, Stephen 2007 European Sports Law. The International Sports LawJournal 1-2. 33-37.

xxx 1948 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations Orga-nization.

xxx 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam � Declaration on Sport. Publications O�ce ofthe European Union, O�cial Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0136.

xxx 1998 The European Model of Sport. European Commission � ConsultationDocument of DG X (Information, Communication, Culture, AudiovisualMedia. Audiovisual policy, culture and sport), p. 28.

xxx 1999 Report from the Commission to the European Council, with a view

to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function

of sport within the Community framework. The Helsinki Report on Sport.European Commission, COM(1999) 644 �nal.

xxx 2000 Declaration on the Speci�c Characteristics of Sport and its Social

Function in Europe, of Which Account Should be Taken in Implementing

Common Policies. Presidency Conclusions, Nice European Council Meeting,7-9. December.

xxx 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Publications O�ce ofthe European Union, O�cial Journal, C310/01.

xxx 2007 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the

Treaty establishing the European Community. Publications O�ce of the Eu-ropean Union, O�cial Journal C 306/01.

xxx 2007 Fehér Könyv a Sportról (White Paper on Sport). Európai Bizottság,Európai Közösségek Hivatalos Kiadványainak Hivatala, Luxembourg, p. 40.



Book Reviews

Interdisciplinary Scienti�c Discourse and the Issue

of Minorities

A Review of the VolumeNations and National Minorities in the European Union.

Ed. by Barna Bodó and Márton Tonk.Cluj-Napoca: Scientia Publishing House, 2009.

SZÁSZ Alpár ZoltánBabe³-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca

This volume comprising most of the papers presented at one of the �rstinternational conferences organised by the Department of European Studies ofthe Sapientia University Faculty of Sciences and Arts Cluj will most probablymake a peculiar �rst impression to many readers because they might considerit rather eclectic. However, this eclecticism should not be construed as invitingcriticism, but rather as a reason for praise. The organisers of the conference,who are by the way the editors of the book, may be commended since theybore in mind that the multitude of topics to be addressed when dealing withthe issue of nations and national minorities leaves no viable alternative tothe interdisciplinary approach, which pervades the pages of this publication.Anthropologists, philosophers, experts in minority law, economists, linguists,political scientists and sociologists contributed to the volume. This resultedin multifariousness and richness of ideas both in terms of the topics dealtwith by the authors and the approaches they deemed adequate for discussingtheir subjects.The book is divided into three larger parts. The �rst part addresses the wide

area of issues related to the presence of national minorities in the member statesof the European Union; the second seems to ask the question whether Europe

122 Book Reviews

is made up by languages and identities or, simply, languages and identities aremerely present in Europe; while the last is a set of re�ections on how currentpolitical practice is trying to �nd solutions that observe the general normativerequirement(s) of democracy to the plethora of 'problems' stemming from theco-existence of nation-states and national minorities.Probably one way to adequately summarise the entire content and message

of the volume is to quote the �rst sentence of its introductory study: `Presently,Europe is made up of 47 states, in which one may �nd 353 ethnic groups, ormore precisely national or ethnic minorities, i.e., autochthonous populationgroups speaking a native language which is, in general, di�erent from theo�cial language of the respective state.' This situation may well be perceivedas one generating enormous resources or unimaginable cultural richness forEurope, nonetheless, it may be interpreted as a problem, too, a threat tostability and security in the European Union and its 27 member states, or asecurity dilemma confronting the European Union itself. This is the contextin which Christoph Pan chooses to place minorities and minority policy seenboth as a foreign policy priority for the EU and as a challenge regarding theinternal a�airs of the EU. Bearing in mind that professor Pan's study was thekeynote speech of the conference, these thoughts set the tone of debate and,in consequence, of the whole volume as well.In their paper, Attila Demeter and Márton Tonk continue one of the ideas

set forth in the previous writing, namely the statement that the problem ofnational minorities is not part of � and, may I add, cannot be part of � theso-called acquis communautaire. Therefore, they turn their attention to inter-national legal instruments adopted by the Council of Europe and the Organi-sation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the legal standards therein.They regretfully observe that the policies adopted by international organisa-tions with regard to issues or con�icts related to national minorities are quiteoften dictated by speci�c security policy considerations entailed by concretesituations that have to be dealt with rather urgently. This state of a�airs leadsto an ambivalent treatment of minority issues, or � although the authors preferto avoid such a sharp formulation � to imposing a double standard. That is,international organisations seem to simultaneously stimulate and sti�e ethnicactivism and mobilisation; to present successful Western European models ofethnic autonomy as examples to be followed, while warning other countries oftheir implementation as if such a measure will necessarily lead to ethnic seces-sion, and �nally, uphold or dismiss 'the legitimacy of special minority rights'according to their momentary interests and considerations.

Book Reviews 123

The last two papers included in this initial part of the volume discuss na-tional and/or regional minority movements and parties, and the idea of post-national minorities, respectively. We learn from Balázs Vízi that the above in-ternational organisations, in spite of the subtle criticism levelled against themin the previous paper, are increasingly becoming fora where minority organisa-tions and parties may represent themselves. In the meantime, ethnoregionalistmovements seem to have given up, at least partly, their separatist claims andstart focusing on the idea of shared sovereignty � an opportunity that presentsitself as a result of deepening European integration.Notwithstanding the previous author's interest for changes in formal polit-

ical organisations, András A. Gergely investigates modi�cations in informalpolitical and communicational structures. His main contention is that in theabsence of these changes, the national framework of political existence wouldstill rule supreme and unchallenged making it di�cult and risky for other formsof political existence and organisation (e.g., minority or local) to emerge while(`nationalising') identity policies are implemented by most nation-states. Butthis is not the case. We live in an increasingly globalised world in which anAsian bird disease or a computer virus devoid of national identity may a�ectus all in many respects, and in a Europe characterised by integration on thenational and regional levels and increasing disintegration on the level of localcommunities. Under these circumstances, local or minority identities still havea hard time in �nding opportunities for self-expression, but not because na-tional identities are strong. Au contraire, because they have been graduallyeroded and weakened! If we live indeed in an era characterised by the disin-tegration of various communities, one cannot overstate the importance of theEuro-Atlantic integration bridging the gap between West and East. Still, inA. Gergely's opinion, it is very di�cult and also inappropriate to formulateother � general and perhaps premature � conclusions. Instead, we should con-tent ourselves with asking a puzzling and crucial scienti�c question, namelywhether being a (post-national) minority is simply a state or an opportunityfor integration, `or a [value-]choice born [out] of necessity or insight'.The part trying to disentangle the relationships between identities and Eu-

rope comprises, on the one hand, papers discussing the question of mono-, bi-and multilingualism as well as the resulting challenges for a Europe undergo-ing various transformations, and on the other hand, writings on ethnic identityand identi�cation. In what concerns the �rst three papers of this section, thecontribution written by Krisztina-Mária Sárosi-Márdirosz is unique of its kind.An interesting fact is that the author, apart from being both a linguist anda political scientist, is also a practicing translator and interpreter. Thus, it

124 Book Reviews

comes as no surprise that she writes about various aspects regarding the legallanguage and o�cial (legal) translations involving the language pair made upby the Romanian and Hungarian languages. In her paper, she stresses thecultural-institutional and linguistic aspects generating di�culties for transla-tors when trying to �nd o�cially acceptable equivalents for various terms andnames of institutions.The striking fact regarding the two papers tackling the �eld of socio-linguistics

is the sharp contrast between the two versions or sides of reality seen and pre-sented by their authors. Both linguists, Orsolya Nádor and László Marácz,agree that nation-states are characterised by linguistic disparities in what con-cerns the o�cial, majority language and the languages of national minorities.They are in agreement even with regard to their labelling of language poli-cies as hegemonic. However, Orsolya Nádor is interested in singling out themotivations behind individuals' decisions to learn languages. She points outthat persons belonging to the titular nation in a certain country learn foreignlanguages primarily if their native language is not a world language, such asEnglish, French, German or Spanish. Hence, by learning at least one of the lat-ter, they will augment their communication skills and possibilities. In contrast,members of national minorities (in Central and Eastern Europe) are forced bylaw and circumstances to acquire the o�cial majority language �rst and thenproceed to studying other, widely used, languages. Finally, Nádor adds thatno matter how bene�cial this may be for mutual understanding, persons be-longing to the titular nation of a state rarely learn a minority language. Nev-ertheless, László Marácz, considering the experiences of Hungarian-Hungarianrelationships, positive examples of cross-border co-operation as well as various(statistical) data, asserts that `the Hungarian language has a good chance ofbecoming a lingua franca in the Carpathian Basin'.In what concerns ethnic identity and identi�cation, the paper written in Ger-

man language by Vasile Docea � a Romanian historian � investigates the linkbetween ethnic identi�cation and the mental-symbolic image constructed byvarious ethnic groups of his city of residence: Temeswar/Timi³oara/Temesvár.More precisely, Docea � marshalling historiographical sources stemming fromthe ethnic communities inhabiting the city � studies the interplay between thenarrative reconstruction of the past and the discourse on ethnic identity witha special focus on the interpretation of ethnically divisive historical events likethe Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence from 1848-1849, which,with some notable exceptions, pitted Hungarians against Germans.In another paper targeting this topic, Mátyás Binder describes the three

identity layers of the Boyash Gypsies in Hungary. His most interesting remark

Book Reviews 125

concerns the situational-relational character of identity layers. The Boyashview themselves as Boyash, a respectable Gypsy group speaking an archaicdialect of the Romanian language, when they wish to di�erentiate themselvesfrom other ethno-social or occupational Gypsy groups of lower status and/orprestige. They see themselves as Gypsies when the relationship of state insti-tutions to the whole Romani population in Hungary is the issue at hand, and�nally, they identify themselves as Hungarians in case of o�cial celebrationsand sporting events involving Hungarians as a political nation.The last part of the book discusses, on the one hand, elements as well as

solutions present in current political practice regarding minorities and, on theother hand, addresses various aspects of minority life. Rather interestingly, itis introduced by a paper on the theoretical, philosophical and legal groundingof future solutions to the wide area of questions, which may arise from minor-ity communal existence. In this rather optimistic study, Péter Egyed marshalspolitical declarations and legal instruments adopted in the last two decades.These seem to embody a novel and more general conception of (positive) lib-erty equated with autonomy and self-determination, and summarised best bythe phrase `[f]reedom means diversity' or Isaiah Berlin's assertion that `pater-nalism is the greatest tyranny conceivable'. Nevertheless, as the author pointsout, some of these documents overstate and overgeneralise the `benevolence'of nation-states and their ethnic majorities and are also overcon�dent in whatregards the existence of immediate solutions. He argues that instead of �ndingsolutions parties should try to initiate processes which may possibly lead inthe long run to solutions. As for processes, he concludes that `the pressure ofcircumstances' � most notably Kosovo's situation and the impetuous drive forincreased autonomy in Catalunya � will eventually force even EU legislatorsto seriously consider the idea of collective rights.In the next paper, Thomas Benedikter examines the performance of auton-

omy solutions in 36 regions and territories belonging to 11 European countries.According to him, autonomies perform well if they contribute to the estab-lishment of harmonious relationships between ethnic groups sharing a certainterritory and increase respect for minority rights while securing political stabil-ity and economic development. The author operationalises these four criteriathrough a set of indicators, termed by him `functions', and examines how thesefunctions are ful�lled by various autonomies. He concludes that three of theterritories included in his analysis (the Åland and Farøe Islands as well asGreenland) have achieved quasi-statehood, while South Tyrol and the histori-cal autonomous communities in Spain (Catalunya; Euskadi, i. e., the BasqueCountry and Galicia) enjoy very advanced forms of autonomy. A similar situa-

126 Book Reviews

tion can be observed in the only two non-EU territories, Crimea and Gagauzia.In an important �nal remark, Benedikter deems European autonomies successstories. The fact that cutting back the functions of autonomous regions hasnot been considered as a serious political and legal option in any of theseeleven countries, rather conversely, the existing autonomy system has been`continuously improved and deepened' is a su�cient proof for his statement.Nevertheless, misgivings still exist and territorial autonomy solutions mustbe devised after careful consideration and taking account of the eleven lessonsdrawn from European experiences, which are enumerated at the very endof the article.Apart from autonomy, the right of minorities to education in native language

is another important concern. Barna Bodó deals with an interesting aspect ofthis issue in connection with the Hungarian community in Romania, an ethnicgroup which has had its own university for more than a decade even during theCommunist regime that eventually abolished it in 1959. Four decades later,the reestablishment of this state-�nanced university was perhaps the mostclearly formulated aspiration of the respective community, which supported theenvisaged measure unanimously. However, as compared to this � in hindsight �rather ambitious political goal, two decades of political struggle yielded modestresults. Moreover, under these circumstances, the political elite apparentlydropped the project, ethnic Hungarian academics `are waiting in confusion'and the community itself shows no reaction whatsoever. This state of a�airs isa puzzle for any analyst, Bodó being no exception. Hence, he decomposes thedilemma into three questions: (1) was the initial goal setting a mistake; (2) werethe means or the manner employed to achieve the goal inadequately chosen andcan somebody be held, politically or personally, accountable for mishandlingthe issue; (3) how e�ective is the Hungarian minority public sphere in Romania,inasmuch as a matter of this salience can be shelved with relative ease. In tryingto answer these questions, the author carefully examines the socio-historicalcontext and two decades of political developments � particularly in the �eldof education policy � in post-Communist Romania. Terming, most probablyjustly, the Romanian political system institution-centred, he assigns the blamealmost exclusively to the DAHR (RMDSZ).The last three writings in the volume are dedicated to a socio-political phe-

nomenon which is gradually �lled with new content: cross-border relations.The respective papers address various aspects of the questions, that is, linguis-tic, cultural, anthropological, economic and political-administrative. Alongthese lines, the encompassing aim of the study written by Szilvia Szoták is todelineate what changes did the Austrian and Hungarian accession to the Euro-

Book Reviews 127

pean Union entail with regard to the life and social network of local linguisticcommunities: the Hungarian, the Croatian and the Romani. Considering theinterplay of various special circumstances � the inexistence of a Romani ex-ternal national homeland, the laggardness of Croatia in European integrationas well as the strength of Hungarian traditions in Burgenland � her paper isinescapably one sided. It is no wonder that positive changes can be observedexclusively in the case of Hungarians. For instance, the prestige of their lan-guage increased and their cultural life became livelier especially after 2004,although the intensi�cation of cross-border cultural contacts started imme-diately after the fall of the Iron Curtain. All this seems to underscore theauthor's impression that Burgenland Hungarians di�er (markedly) form otherHungarians in the Carpathian Basin and from Austrians, too. As opposed tothe previous paper, Zoltán Simon's anthropological writing focuses on bordersand on Transylvania-Hungary and/or Hungary-Transylvania discourses. Hismain contention is that the word and concept `Transylvanian(ism)' seems tobe a stigma in the perception of Hungarians living in Hungary since it is of-ten equated with Romanian, backward, poor, needy and arbitrary. His hope,however � using a metaphor inspired by Georg Simmel � is that, in the future,people will gradually cease to interpret borders as doors, which divide us, andsee them as bridges, which connect and unite.The �nal study of the volume discusses the relationship between cross-border

cooperation and minority policy. In the rather polarised arena of Hungariandomestic politics, cross-border cooperation has been perceived either as a re-placement for traditional minority policy or as a somewhat ine�cient instru-ment diverting energies and resources form `genuine' minority protection. InDániel Heged¶s's opinion, neither of the above interpretations is entirely accu-rate. He thinks that, if adequately implemented, cross-border cooperation andminority policy can complement each other. The rather intricate argumentpresented by the author is based on new European legal instruments regard-ing territorial cooperation, which may be used even for supporting autonomye�orts of border regions and minorities.The variety of the approaches, the richness of ideas and the merits of the

arguments presented by most authors can impress any reader or reviewer. Ido not wish to assert that while reading this book, one will hold a perfect�nished product in her/his hands, but collecting and publishing these studieswas certainly a worthwhile exercise. All in all, the editors' hope that thisvolume may represent a valuable contribution to minority studies and becomea useful tool for anyone interested in the �eld seems justi�ed.

128 Book Reviews

Dilemmas, Thoughts about Diaspora and Life in

Diaspora

A Review of the VolumeBodó Barna: Szórvány és nyelvhatár (Internal Diaspora andLanguage Border). Kisebbségkutatási Könyvek (Books on

Minority Research), Lucidus Publishing House,Budapest, 2009.

FAZAKAS EmeseBabe³-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca

�Perhaps the most serious problem of the Hungarian communities in neigh-bouring countries is the continuous diasporization because it leads to assimi-lation in the absence of positive discrimination. The author of the book, theTransylvanian professor Barna Bodó is perhaps the best expert of the diasporaresearch. In this work, he brings us new ideas in the theoretical grounding ofthe diaspora problem as well as in practical research and university education�� these sentences are written on the back of Barna Bodó's latest volume: BarnaBodó, although born in an area where the Hungarian population is in majority,left his home town early and settled in the Bánság (Banat), a diaspora regionfor Hungarians. This de�ned and is de�ning his career, his public activities,scienti�c interests, perhaps even his teaching habits. The chairman of the Di-aspora Foundation has more than 10 separate volumes, more than 80 studiesand he is editor of more than 10 volumes. Among these works there are hardlyany which do not in any way discuss the issues of diaspora, diasporization.The author publishes in this volume 14 revised studies that were originally

presented at conferences, symposiums during the last 15 years. Each study istreating diaspora issues, problems of the diaspora situation: the di�culties, theattitude, the economic status, the education, the culture of the people livingin diaspora. One of the most important issues, which over the years arose notonly in Barna Bodó's studies, is: what is diaspora? In several places the authorstates that one has to make a distinction between the terms szórvány (ethnic orinternal diaspora) and diaszpóra (migration diaspora). The �rst community,

Book Reviews 129

the ethnic/internal diaspora, is an ethnic community that has not changedits habitation, and the diasporization process is in�uenced by historical-socialcircumstances. The second community, the migration diaspora, comes intobeing as a consequence of immigration (mostly to overseas lands) and is madeup by economic immigrants. It is very important to clarify the usage andmeaning of these terms especially for non-Hungarian speakers. In this volume,whenever the term szórvány is used, it refers to the ethnic/internal diaspora.The most important recurrent question has been left unanswered for long.

The de�nition of internal diaspora is still pending despite the fact that thescholars who study the question of diaspora do know what they are dealingwith, what and how they are researching and how the internal diaspora situ-ation emerges. Recently, several typologies of the diaspora were created (seeNándor Bárdi's typology, which the author repeatedly refers to). However,Barna Bodó deservedly raises the question more than once: �Where does theborder lie, when and on what basis can we talk about internal diaspora?�He states that �One has to make a distinction between diaspora and dias-porization. If the cultural and political boundaries coincide, internal diasporasdo not come into being. As long as language borders do not coincide withfrontiers, internal diasporas will exist. If by fate political borders vary signif-icantly in time, diasporization occurs. Perhaps it is not necessary to mentionconcrete examples to illustrate how the ethnic boundaries were 'enforced' inmany places by introduction, relocation and shift of the population, by forcedimmigration. In the case of diasporization, the individual tends to disregardthe relevancy of the existing connection, the possibilities and relations thatdetermine self-identity, but he/she builds into his/her value judgement andself-evaluation a future-image based on the emerging process. Diasporization�lls in the situation with direct political content, the individual does not re-spond to the current status, but he/she is driven by the occurring events, thusthe process in�uences him/her, moreover, it de�nes his/her life. (...) Internaldiaspora is the medium (...) where the indicated process of language- andcultural shift may seem natural, but never is. A comprehensive investigationabout the diasporization process with respect to settlement type, settlementsize and local institutionalization, about the extent to which these factors in-�uence the evolving situation has not been carried out concerning Hungariansin Transylvania. Due to some local research one has partial results, but theseare incidental� (p. 148-9.).Barna Bodó cannot conduct alone a research to map all internal diaspora

regions in Transylvania or Romania, so he is exploring the situation in the Ba-nat. In his study entitled Azonosulás, elitek, peremlét (Identi�cation, Elites,

130 Book Reviews

Existence along the Borderline) the author presents a wide survey conductedin 1996-1997. The research examines the settlements in the Banat with re-gard to demographic regression, economic potential, system of public utilities,education, culture. Let's see here the key conclusions. �Demographically thevillage in general is losing ground, however, the restructuring of the industrialsystem forced a relatively large population to return to their home village.This movement was not able to halt the demographic regression in villages,which is anyway part of the general decrease of population. (...) Educationis on decline, school is losing its attractiveness as part of the general changein value orientation. (...) The position of public cultural institutions is deter-mined by, one could say, a general tendency to turn away from culture� (p.48.). These �ndings may apply not only to the internal diaspora. However, ifwe read all the conclusions regarding the self-identity, we immediately see thebiggest problems of the internal diaspora (in respect of the economic, demo-graphic and other indicators), which lead to diasporization, then to the lossof ethnic awareness. �Narrowing the �eld in which they can use their mothertongue. (...) Loosening ties to the native community. (...) Driving back thenative culture. (...) The lack of leader �gures is even more signi�cant amongHungarians than among the majority Romanians. (...) The importance of thechurch should be mentioned along the school, but one-third of the analysedsettlements has no local priests, and in two places the Catholic priest does notconsider his task to support distinctively the Hungarian culture� (p. 50-1.).The study entitled Elitek, modellek szerepek (Elites, Models, Roles) presents

the results of a larger research. Besides the usual questions of a survey (age,sex, marital status, education) the researchers try to obtain answers regardingthe following issues: the language of education, languages spoken within thefamily, knowledge of language, leisure activities, culture, inter-ethnic relations,vision of their future, community involvement. The researchers wanted to getsome knowledge about the status of the Hungarian elite. The survey resultswere interesting: �Although the notes suggest that it is di�cult to assess theanswers regarding the evaluation of the current situation according to a com-mon standard, it is obvious that the local minority elite perceives the situationas positive and incorporates this perception into their life strategy� (p. 73),and �There is no consistency in role-formation as regards the behaviour inspiredinternal values and the tasks really undertaken� (p. 84).Within the pages of the essay Szórványok kutatása (Researching Internal

Diasporas), the author uses the work of Pál Péter Tóth written in the 1940sunder the title In the Diaspora to re�ect on the theoretical issues. The studyJöv®tervezés és b¶nbánat (Future-planning and Remorse) is closely linked to

Book Reviews 131

the previous one. Here the author tries to formulate solutions. In particular,he talks about the importance of maintaining education in mother tongue andthe possibilities of the practical realization of this, as well as about how tokeep the Hungarian-speaking children in Hungarian classes instead of forcingthem to enrol into Romanian ones.The study Szórvány és dinamika (Internal Diaspora and Dynamics) tackles

mostly theoretical issues, focusing especially on the terminology traps, whichhinder or may in future hinder the dialogue between the majority and theminority. There can also be found a brief but meaningful overview of act-ing ethnopolitical approach in Romania, of the role, the involvement or non-involvement of the DAHR. Other aspects of theoretical issues are discussed inthe study entitled Szórványdiskurzus és tudomány (Internal Diaspora-discourseand Science). Besides the recurrent theoretical issues (what is an internal dias-pora, the process of diasporization, the relationship of individual and commu-nity, status and law), the author points to the three nation-models which aredominant in terms of minorities in Romania. The German model of nation-building that encourages the immigration of all members of the German na-tion who can be identi�ed on the basis of their family ties and the Romanianmodel of nation-building that � at least � implicitly envisages the uni�cationof all geographical areas inhabited by Romanians are very close to each other,while the Romanian and the identity-based Hungarian model (of ethnoterri-torial nation-building focusing on the preservation of the ethnic identity of allHungarians coupled with their continuity in their current, historically deter-mined settlement areas) are mutually exclusive. In these circumstances thereis constant confusion; situations occur in which both parties feel o�ended, inspite of the goodwill there are misunderstandings and communication fails. Inthe study entitled Szórványnarratívák (Narratives on the Internal Diaspora),Barna Bodó continues the line of the previous theoretical studies. In partic-ular, he analyses the diaspora-typology of Zoltán Illyés and claims that thistypology would be the most acceptable in terms of further research. The au-thor returns to the issue of internal diaspora and diasporization, including thetypes of assimilation. The presentation of structural assimilation is followed bythe conclusion: �The pressure of the structural assimilation is one of the essen-tial elements of diasporization. In addition, it is strengthened or weakened bythe majority-minority discourse, which in respect of internal diaspora can benamed diaspora-discourse. If Timi³ (Temes) county or Timi³oara (Temesvár)is taken as an example, we can speak about a permissive discourse since themajority acknowledges the existence of a minority � and that's it. (...) The mi-nority's response can be labelled as a discourse of good manners : they accept

132 Book Reviews

the situation, they accept their status as a group of second-rate citizens, andperhaps they are happy for not being hurt, for not being threatened in theirminority status � as far as there are examples of such a behaviour� (p. 140-1.). Within the pages of the study entitled A szórvány és a Makkai-dilemma(Internal Diaspora and the Makkai-dilemma) the author analyses the issuesconcerning the minority status emerged after the First World War. Startingfrom these problems he tackles the re-emerging issues which determine thecurrent minority status, the ethnopolitical situation.In the following essay, Értékek, nyelvhasználat � szórvány (Values, Language

Usage � Internal Diaspora), Barna Bodó focuses on identity research. Whilelargely using the results of a survey carried out in September 2004 by theMax Weber Center for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies, Bodó places theemphasis on language usage as the usage or non-usage of one's mother tonguein di�erent areas is what determines the self-identity of an individual livingin internal diaspora. The individual is facing a decision: if he/she choosesto belong to a community (that is already given to him/her), he/she cannotbe part of another (external, culturally di�erent but strong) community (seep. 163.). The individual has to choose between a community determined byhis/her family, mother tongue, historical heritage and a community with whomhe/she has no such connections. The language of education is decisive in thisdilemma situation, and so is the extent to which the individual appreciateshis/her mother tongue, the way he/she regards the language of the majority,if he/she is ashamed or proud to be born Hungarian.�We live in a world of strategies ..., however, there is no strategy for internal

diaspora in Transylvania� � states Barna Bodó in the study entitled Szórvány,stratégia � nemzet (Internal Diaspora, Strategy � Nation). In order to developa strategy or some strategies, there are two questions to be answered: �Who orwhat institution is or would be responsible for preparing such a programmaticdocument? To whom should be made such a document; the political elite orwhat social institutions would be responsible for the diaspora issue?� (p. 192).The author tries to answer these questions, and urges the researchers to studyin detail the internal diaspora problem.Barna Bodó is forced to another return to the theoretical issues in his study

entitled A szórványtól a nemzetig � és vissza (From Internal Diaspora to Nation� and Back) written in 2006. His goal is to give, �nally, a de�nition of internaldiaspora, and in addition, the diaspora policy and the strategy outlined aboveare further elaborated here. The essay Szórvány, identitás, civil társadalom(Internal Diaspora, Identity, Civil Society) outlines the role of the civil society,the responsibilities to be taken by it; and in the last study, Szórvány � asszim-

Book Reviews 133

iláció � szórványosodás (Internal Diaspora � Assimilation � Diasporization),the author provides us with new theoretical aspects, the latest research resultsin order to rethink and study in detail the situation of internal diasporas, andperhaps to �nd solutions.Barna Bodó's book gives us a comprehensive picture of the �rst tentative

theories and of what has been or has not been achieved at both theoretical andpractical level.



Academy A�airs (News, Events)

Inter-institutional Agreement on Cooperationbetween the Sapientia Hungarian University ofTransylvania and the Hungarian Institute of

International A�airs(Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, May 4, 2009)

On May 4, 2009 an inter-institutional agreement on cooperation was signedin Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár between the Sapientia Hungarian University of Tran-sylvania (Faculty of Sciences and Arts, Department of European Studies) andthe Hungarian Institute of International A�airs.The signing of the agreement represents a further level in the joint activi-

ties carried out by these parties. It is su�cient to mention in this respect thejoint lectures held on November 5, 2008 at the Hungarian Institute of Interna-tional A�airs by Zoltán Kántor, Research Fellow on behalf of the HungarianInstitute of International A�airs and Barna Bodó, Coordinator of Studies onbehalf of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, discussing theRomanian legislative elections held in 2008 (the latter presented the positionof the Hungarian minority towards the elections, focusing on the relationshipbetween minorities and foreign policy).The two parties entering joint activities in the �eld of teaching, research, and

science were represented by János Terényi, PhD, Director of the Hungarian In-stitute of International A�airs, László Kiss J., Dr. habil., Research Directorand Zoltán Kántor, Research Fellow; Márton Tonk, PhD, Dean of the Fac-ulty of Sciences and Arts, Cluj-Napoca, Sapientia University, Radu Lupescu,PhD, Head of the Department of European Studies, and Barna Bodó, PhD,Coordinator of Studies.The agreement comprises joint activities in teaching and research: respect-

ing the curricula of the two institutions, academics from the Hungarian Insti-

Academy A�airs (News, Events) 135

tute of International A�airs have been o�ered the opportunity to hold lec-tures in the �eld of international a�airs and diplomacy. The sta� of theInstitute is also invited to participate in round-table discussions organized forthe academic community of Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár. Likewise, the teachingsta� of the Sapientia University is invited to present lectures and reports atthe Institute.Joint research activities have a key role in the agreement: the parties agreed

upon conducting joint researches, participating together in research grants andprojects, inviting each other to conferences and workshops organized by thepartner institutions, informing each other about the ongoing researches andthe latest results, as well as facilitating individual researches conducted by theacademics of the partner institutions in each other's home country.The agreement refers also to joint editorial activity: members of the partner

institutions are invited to publish in each other's scienti�c journals.Exchange of publications will also be carried out via the libraries of the partnerinstitutions.Facilitating the work of students is also a very important issue in the agree-

ment: students are o�ered assistance with their research activity conductedin one of the partner institutions as well as use of the library and facilities,and students from Romania who have outstanding results may also opt for aninternship at the Hungarian Institute of International A�airs.As a �rst example of joint activities in the �eld of education, both János

Terényi and László Kiss J. presented lectures after the signing of the agreement:János Terényi discussed the key issues of Hungary's international a�airs inthe last 20 years (o�ering a brief survey on the main strategies, directivesand events between 1989-2009), while the lecture � From the Old to the New

Diplomacy. The Complex and Dual Character of Foreign A�airs � by LászlóKiss J. addressed problems such as the theory and history of foreign a�airs andinternational relations, Hungary's position in the �eld of international policyafter the fall of the old regime.

KOKOLY ZsoltDepartment of European Studies, Sapientia University Cluj-Napoca

136 Academy A�airs (News, Events)

European and Regional StudiesThe ECPR Standing Group on Federalism andRegionalism and Minority Rights Research

The Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) is an independent, schol-arly association, established in 1970. It supports and encourages the training,research and cross-national co-operation of political scientists throughout Eu-rope and beyond. The ECPR currently has nearly 350 European institutionalmembers and associate members in over 40 countries, from as far a�eld asNew Zealand and Japan. These members together form a network of thou-sands of individual political scientists, international relations and Europeanstudies specialists. This fall I visited the 5th General Conference on 10-12September 2009 that was held in Potsdam, Germany. I presented my paperon 'European tools of Con�ict Management in Central European States withHungarian Minorities' in the panel entitled 'Governing Divided Societies: Ter-ritorial and non-Territorial Tools of Con�ict Management'. The abstract readsas follows:

Due to twentieth century peace treaties extensive Hungarian minorities live

in the Central-European states Slovakia (600.000), Serbia (400.000), Roma-

nia (1.5 million) and Ukraine (300.000). These states are deeply divided along

ethnic-linguistic, religious and cultural lines between the Hungarian versus non-

Hungarian, i.e., Slovak, Serb, Romanian and Ukrainian majority communities.

The situation of the Hungarian minorities and the relations of the Hungari-

ans and the majority populations have not improved structurally after the fall

of communism and the expansion of the European Union to Eastern Europe.

This state of a�airs negatively a�ects the relations between the states with Hun-

garian minorities and neighbouring kin state Hungary, jeopardizing cohesion in

the European Union and risking safety and security in Central Europe and the

Balkans. This paper presents an empirical investigation of the state of a�airs

in the territories inhabited by the Hungarian minorities, discussing the root,

character and scope of the con�icts. Emphasis will be put on the proposals for

a solution put forward by the legitimate Hungarian representatives introducing

all sort of concepts of �territorial� politics, like ethnic autonomy and minor-

ity rights. Secondly, the paper will analyse the architectural and legal options

the EU o�ers for governing these con�icts, both territorial and non-territorial

tools, including the spill-over e�ects of independent statehood in the case of


Kosovo and other �frozen� con�icts. From the empirical data and the theoret-

ical analysis a set of tools will be formulated �tting the nature of the societies

involved, contributing to the management of con�icts in the Central European

states with Hungarian minorities.

3 key words: territorial politics, Hungarian minorities in Central Europe;

European tools

The panel was chaired by Wilfried Swenden (University of Edinburgh) andKlaus Detterbeck (University of Magdeburg). Further papers in this panelincluded among other: Organizing for Stability: Strategic Choices and Dilem-mas for State-wide Parties in Divided Societies by Wilfried Swenden (Univer-sity of Edinburgh) and Klaus Detterbeck (University of Magdeburg); Why isTerritorial Autonomy not Enough? By Kris Deschouwer (Free University ofBrussel); Ethnic Federalism, Political Allegiance and the Right to Secede byIan O'Flynn (University of Newcastle); The Politics of Territory in EthnicallyPolarized Cities: Looking for a Comparative Framework by Marco Allegra(University of Torino); and the Perils of Post-Ethnic Political Mobilization: aCase Study of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Peter Vermeersch and Heleen Touquet(Catholic University Louvain).One of the Standing Groups operating within the ECPR framework is the

Standing Group on Federalism and Regionalism boarded by Wilfried Swenden,Klaus Detterbeck and Eve Hepburn. In the general meeting of this StandingGroup at the end of the Potsdam conference my proposal to set up a ResearchGroup on Central and East European National and Ethnic Minorities wasaccepted by the general meeting. In the September Newsletter of the SG (nr.29) my Call to form a Research Group was published:

Call to form a Research Group on Minorities � Amsterdam

Dear friends, my name is Laszlo Maracz and I am a lecturer in East Euro-pean Studies at the University of Amsterdam. I would like to invite researchers,scholars and other interested specialists to participate in a research group on'Central and Eastern European national and ethnic minorities' (CEENEM-RG). The CEENEM-RG will operate under the �agship of the ECPR SG onFederalism and Regionalism. CEENEM-RG research issues will include thebroadest dimensions of national and ethnic minorities in Central and East Eu-rope (CEE), such as security and stability, the legal framework for minorityrights' protection in the Union and related international European organiza-tions (the Council of Europe, OCSE, etc.); case studies including social, polit-


ical, linguistic, educational and religious aspects; stereotypes and images; andcomparative analyses with West European national and ethnic minorities andfederalization frameworks. Hence, analysts from all sorts of scienti�c disci-plines covering social and political sciences, history, linguistics, law, economyand area studies are welcome to participate. The goal of CEENEM-RG is topursue fundamental theoretical research in this �eld. International collabora-tion in this �eld creates possibilities for organizing workshops and panels infuture ECPR meetings and preparing joint publications. CEENEM-RG willbe able to apply for research grants in the framework of the ESF, the EU'sKP8 and local, national research foundations. If you are interested in joiningCEENEM-RG please send an email (with your name, a�liation and a shortCV) to me at: [email protected].

MARÁCZ LászlóEuropean Studies, University of Amsterdam

Culture, Science and Nation in the CarpathianRegion � International Conference in Veszprém,

Hungary (May 8, 2009)

New opportunities for inter-institutional cooperation between the Facultyof Sciences and Arts, Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, Cluj/Kolozsvár and the Faculty of Modern Philology and Social Sciences, Universityof Pannonia, Veszprém have been constantly looked for ever since the signingof the agreement on cooperation. Following a joint council meeting betweenthe representatives of the two institutions (in September 2008), an invitationwas extended to the teaching sta� of the Sapientia University to take partin the international conference Culture, science and nation in the Carpathian

region that was to be held in Veszprém on May 8, 2009.The international conference represented a novelty in the traditional celebra-

tion of the Gizella Napok (Gizella Days), one of the most important and com-plex events in Veszprém. The series of events is dedicated to Queen Gizella,wife to Saint Stephen, the �rst Christian King of Hungary, as the city ofVeszprém was o�ered to her as a royal wedding gift. The festivities tradition-ally include high mass and procession, art events (concerts, exhibitions, theatregalas etc), fairs and salons.


In 2009 Veszprém (as well as Veszprém County) celebrated 1000 years of ex-istence and commemorated 950 years since the death of Queen Gizella. Thus,the organizers included in this year's program an international conference ded-icated to questions in the �eld of Hungarology, entitled Culture, science and

nation in the Carpathian region, and their intention is to have it organizedbiannually. The conference seeks to facilitate, implement and consolidate thecultural and scienti�c cooperation of Hungarian scholars, researchers, as wellas of scienti�c institutions. It aims at shaping the role of Hungarian identityand self-consciousness in an era of globalized European cultures, as well asat presenting alternatives to the growing phenomenon of Americanization andtechnical isolation.Organized under the auspices of the Veszprém Academic Committee (one

of the seven regional committees of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) andthe City Hall of Veszprém, the conference brought together at its �rst edi-tion an impressive number of 60 presentations, sustained by academics andresearchers from Hungary and its neighboring countries (Romania, Ukraine,Slovakia, Croatia).The Sapientia University was represented at this international event by pro-

fessor Zoltán Kása, assoc. professor Márton Tonk, dean of the Faculty ofSciences and Arts, assoc. professor Barna Bodó, univ. lecturer Radu Lupescu,head of the Department of European Studies, as well as János Kristóf Murádinand Zsolt Kokoly, assistant lecturers at the Department of European Studies.Given the high number of participants, the conference was organized in

three panels comprising the following thematic groups: National identity in the

era of globalization, Culture, values and memory, Language, language policies

and Hungarians, Literature, minorities and theatre, Institutions and destinies,

Ethnology, cult, cultural heritage, Archives and Hungarica research, Hungarian

philosophy (this last one was chaired by Márton Tonk).The presentations sustained by Zoltán Kása, János Kristóf Murádin and

Zsolt Kokoly were included into the thematic group Institutions and destinies.Zoltán Kása presented a synthesis of scienti�c researches conducted at theSapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, pointing out the results ob-tained, the particularities of the research activity within the university, aswell as future plans and perspectives for scienti�c cooperation. János KristófMurádin and Zsolt Kokoly presented fragments of Transylvanian institutionalhistory (history of Hungarian theatres in Transylvania between 1944 and 1948,respectively the history of Law studies in Cluj/Kolozsvár from 1581 to thepresent day).


Barna Bodó presented a paper entitled Diaspora and the borderlines of a na-

tion. This presentation took part in the �rst thematic group, National identityin the era of globalization, and was in dialogue with the other presentations,which were dealing with problems of national identity, cultural diplomacy inthe 21st century, paradigm shifts in the Carpathian region or political repre-sentation of Hungarian interests in Brussels. Similarly, an exciting dialoguebetween the presentations was to be observed in the thematic group Language,

language policies and Hungarians: both the theoretical (language as a determi-nant factor of the acquisition of culture, language-promoting strategies in theEU) as well as the practical aspects of language policies (teaching Hungarianas a foreign language, di�culties of Hungarian-language higher education inUkraine, language as a career of nation-wide accepted and acclaimed values)were discussed.In the further thematic groups iconic topics of the Hungarian self-conscious-

ness were being discussed and presented in new perspectives, topics like: theHungarian identity in the works of the philosopher Sándor Karácsony, Hun-garian ethos in the medieval chronicles (in the Gesta Hungarorum and theIllustrated Chronicle), the means of projecting and shaping the cult of Hun-gary's great king � Matthias Corvinus (this latter being detailed in the pre-sentation of our colleague, Radu Lupescu), The tragedy of man, the landmarkdrama by Imre Madách, and why not, the rise and fall of the once famousHungarian football.The participants of the conference also had the opportunity to get acquainted

with workshops and scienti�c institutions of the Carpathian Region as detailedpresentations on the �athenaeum� in Szatmár county, the public sphere in Ser-bia, the higher education network in Ukraine or the Transylvanian institutionsof philosophy were o�ered to the audience.It is without any doubt that the exchange of information, the discussion of

common problems and best practices, the debates that had place, the sugges-tions and recommendations that were made during the conference have creatednew possibilities of cooperation and of joint research, as well as reinforced andcompleted the existing ones.

KOKOLY ZsoltDepartment of European Studies, Sapientia University Cluj-Napoca


Chronology of Political and Regional Science Eventsin Transylvania � Romania

January-December 2009

May 4-5, 2009 � A formerly existing cooperation agreement between theHungarian Institute of International A�airs (Budapest, Hungary)and the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania Faculty

of Sciences and Arts, Cluj-Napoca (Romania) was reinforced andextended to the year 2009. The extended agreement was signed by JánosTerényi, Director of the Hungarian Institute of International A�airs andMárton Tonk, Dean of the Faculty of Sciences and Arts, Cluj-Napoca,Sapientia University. The event was followed by public lectures on theTwenty years of Hungarian foreign policy by János Terényi andThe complexity and dual nature of foreign policy by László J.

Kiss at the Sapientia University.

May 14, 2009 � Specialists and researchers from the Department of Politi-cal Science Babe³-Bolyai University presented their volume of studies

(Reprezentarea diasporei ³i votul românilor din str in tate) on vote col-lection methods elaborated for Romanians abroad. The edition of thevolume was initiated and supported by the Soros Foundation Romania.

May 26, 2009 � Public lecture on Democracy in Europe by Philippe C.Schmitter at the Department of Political Science, Babe³-Bolyai Uni-versity. The debate of the topic was moderated by Kinga-Koretta Sata,assistant lecturer of political science at the Babe³-Bolyai University.

June 10, 2009 � A regional monography of Southern Transylvania and Ba-nat was presented by its editor, Gyula Horváth, at the Hungarian Uni-versity Federation of Cluj/Kolozsvár. The monography is part of theseries A Kárpát-medence régiói (Regions of Carpathian Basin) pub-lished by the Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academyof Sciences. Co-authors of this volume are mostly scholars from Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, researchers in regional science, sociology and politicalscience.

June 18-20, 2009 � The conference entitled Nyelv, identitás, többnyelv¶

lét és oktatás-politikák (Language, Identity, Multilingualism and Edu-cational Policies) was held in Miercurea-Ciuc/Csíkszereda. Organizers:


the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities from Cluj-Napoca and the Sapientia University Miercurea-Ciuc Department of Ro-manian Language and Literature � English Language and Literature.

June 19, 2009 � An international conference was held to evoke the ac-tivity of the former Bolyai University. The event included the presen-tation of the book �Fehér könyv az erdélyi magyar fels®oktatáskálváriájáról � (White Book of the Hungarian Language Higher Educa-tion in Transylvania).

July 16, 2009 � The Romániai Magyar Évkönyv 2007-2008 (Hun-garian Yearbook from Romania 2007-2008) was presented by its editor,Barna Bodó and co-authors at the Summer University and Student Campin Tu³nad/Tusnád.

September 29, 2009 � The international conferenceMinorities and Tra-ditional Communities in Transition was organized by the Roma-nian Institute for Research on National Minorities and the Kriza JánosEthnographical Society. The conference focused mainly on the questionof `double identity' and the case of the Csango, Aromanian, Armenianand Jewish Communities. Lecturers were: István Horváth, Lehel Peti,Corina Iosif, Attila Gidó, Ilka Veress, Vilmos Tánczos, Veronika Lajos,Chris Davis, C lin Cotoi, Ferenc Pozsony.

October 15, 2009 � Within the framework of the series World Politics in

the 20th Century organized by the Sapientia University Department ofEuropean Studies a public lecture was held on Hungarian-RomanianRelations in the Past 20 Years by Mátyás Szilágyi, Consul Generalof Hungary in Cluj-Napoca.

October 22, 2009 � Within the framework of the series World Politics

in the 20th Century a public debate was held on the topic Struggleand Construction. Remembering the 1989 Revolution with theparticipation of László T®kés, European MP. Moderators were MiklósBakk and Árpád Gazda.

November, 2009 � The Department of European Studies, Faculty of Sci-ences and Arts, Cluj Napoca, Sapientia Hungarian University of Tran-sylvania became member of the European Consortium for Political

Research. This association based at the University of Essex (UK) wasestablished in 1970 and supports and encourages trainings, researches


and cross-national co-operation of political scientists throughout Europeand beyond. In 2009 it numbered 352 member institutions from 47 dif-ferent countries. The Department of European Studies of the SapientiaUniversity is the second institution with membership from Romania.

November 20-21, 2009 � The Transylvanian Museum Society organizedThe Day of Hungarian Science in Transylvania. On the secondday of this anniversary conference (the Museum Society celebrated 150years of its existence), several lectures were given on political and regionalsciences by Alpár Zoltán Szász, Timea Csetnek, Daniel Pop, Miklós Bakk,Timea Draveczky, Barna Bodó and Tünde Székely in the panel Social andPolitical Science.

December 3-4, 2009 � An international conference was held on the topicEuropean Union and the Challenges of Contemporary Societyorganized by the Sapientia University Department of European Studies.The following books were presented at the conference: Bodó Barna �Tonk Márton (Eds): Nations and National Minorities in EU, Sci-entia, Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, 2009; Cseke Péter (Ed.): Kistérségek� nagy remények? (Microregions � Great Expectations?), Komp-Press, Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, 2009 and Szilágyi István: Európa és amediterrán világ (Europe and the Mediterranean World), Aron, Bu-dapest, 2009.

December 15, 2009 � The international conference Struggle and Con-struction � the Twentieth Anniversary of the Regime-changeorganized by the Diaspora Foundation was held in Temesvár/Timi³oara.Lecturers were: Imre Pozsgay (Szent László Academy, Hungary), MarkusMeckel (StiftungWissenschaft und Politik, Germany), Gabriel Andreescu(SNSPA, Bucure³ti), Miklós Bakk (Babe³-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár). Moderator: Barna Bodó (Sapientia University Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár).

December, 2009 � The ECPR Standing Group on Federalism and Region-alism together with the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylva-nia and the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities(ISPMN) announced an international conference on Minority Politicswithin the Europe of Regions, which will take place on June 17-20,2010 in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár.

Information for authors

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies publishesoriginal papers and surveys concerning the historical development, the economic, so-cietal, political and philosophical dimensions of the European integration project.The European and Regional Studies provides an independent forum for informed de-bate and discussion of European affairs. All papers are peer-reviewed.

Papers published in current and previous volumes can be found in Portable DocumentFormat (pdf) form at the address: http://www.acta.sapientia.ro.

The submitted papers should not be considered for publication by other journals. Thecorresponding author is responsible for obtaining the permission of coauthors and ofthe authorities of institutes, if needed, for publication, the Editorial Board disclaimsany responsibility.

The paper should be submitted both in Word.doc and pdf format. The submittedpdf document will be used as reference. The camera ready journal will be preparedin pdf format by the editors. An accurate formatting is required in order to reducesubsequent changes of aspect to a minimum. The paper should be prepared on A4paper (210 x 297 mm) and it must contain an abstract not exceeding 100 words.

Only papers written in English will be published in the journal (please use Englishspell-check).

Use the template file at http://www.acta.sapientia.ro/acta-euro/euro-main.htm fordetails.

Submission must be made by e-mail ([email protected]) only.

One issue is offered each author free of charge. No reprints will be available.

Contact address and subscription:Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies

RO 400112 Cluj-Napoca, RomaniaStr. Matei Corvin nr. 4.

E-mail: [email protected]

Publication supported by

european and regional studies vol. 1, no. 1, 2010

Documents

adjectives political

scientic issue

o agnes veress em

sport activities

areas of sciences

dierent places

ina way

empirical analysis