european aviation safety agency notice of proposed ... 2012-12.pdf · including airworthiness codes...

European Aviation Safety Agency 29 Aug 2012

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NOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT (NPA) 2012-12

DRAFT OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY

amending Commission Regulation (EU) No 20xx/xx of xx Month xx establishing

the Implementing Rules for air operations

and

DRAFT DECISION OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY

amending Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material

to Part-CAT and Part-ORO

‘Transfer of JAA cabin safety tasks’

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The NPA 2012-12 includes tasks which were transferred to the Agency from the Joint

Aviation Authorities. The proposal addresses the following:

1. Incapacitation and replacement of Senior cabin crew member:

The aim is to clarify the intent of the paragraph ORO.CC.200(e), transferred from

EU-OPS 1.1000(d), requiring the operator to establish procedures on replacement

of Senior cabin crew member in case the nominated individual becomes unable to

operate. The NPA 2012-12 proposes a modified text of the regulatory requirement,

further new AMC on who can replace an incapacitated or unavailable Senior cabin

crew member and GM explaining the concept of incapacitation and unavailability,

and providing some guidance on assigning a prompt replacement.

2. Communication between a person on board the aircraft and aerodrome services

during ground operations with passengers on board and in the absence of flight

crew members:

The aim is to develop a regulatory requirement requiring a qualified person on

board the aircraft during ground operations with passengers embarking, on board

or disembarking in the absence of flight crew members who will establish and

coordinate communication with aerodrome services in case of urgent need or

emergency.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. EXPLANATORY NOTE ........................................................................................... 4

I. GENERAL ........................................................................................................ 4

II. CONSULTATION ................................................................................................. 4

III. COMMENT-RESPONSE DOCUMENT ........................................................................... 5

IV. CONTENT OF THE DRAFT OPINION/DECISION .............................................................. 5

V. REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT ....................................................................... 10

1 PROCESS AND CONSULTATION ...................................................................... 10

2 ISSUE ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT .......................................................... 10

3 OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................... 16

4 IDENTIFICATION OF OPTIONS ....................................................................... 17

5 ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS ............................................................................... 18

5.1 SAFETY IMPACT ............................................................................... 18

5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT .................................................................... 19

5.3 SOCIAL IMPACT ............................................................................... 20

5.4 ECONOMIC IMPACT ........................................................................... 20

5.5 PROPORTIONALITY ISSUES .................................................................. 21

5.6 IMPACT ON REGULATORY COORDINATION AND HARMONISATION ....................... 21

6 CONCLUSION AND PREFERRED OPTION ............................................................ 21

B. DRAFT OPINION AND DECISION ....................................................................... 23

I. INCAPACITATION AND REPLACEMENT OF SENIOR CABIN CREW MEMBER ............................... 23

II. COMMUNICATION BETWEEN A PERSON ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT AND AERODROME SERVICES DURING

GROUND OPERATIONS WITH PASSENGERS ON BOARD AND IN THE ABSENCE OF FLIGHT CREW

MEMBERS ...................................................................................................... 27

C. APPENDICES ..................................................................................................... 31

D. ATTACHMENTS .................................................................................................. 32

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A. Explanatory Note

I. General

1. The purpose of this Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) is to amend the future

Commission Regulation1 establishing the Implementing Rules for air operations and the

related Decision of the Executive Director of the European Aviation Safety Agency on

Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Part-CAT2 and

Part-ORO3. The scope of this rulemaking activity is outlined in Terms of Reference (ToR)

RMT.0327/0328 (OPS.058(a)-OPS.058(b)) and it is described in more details below.

2. The European Aviation Safety Agency (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Agency’) is directly

involved in the rule-shaping process. It assists the Commission in its executive tasks by

preparing draft Regulations, and amendments thereof, for the implementation of

Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Basic Regulation’)4 which

are adopted as ‘Opinions’ (Article 19(1)). It also adopts Certification Specifications,

including Airworthiness Codes and Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance

Material to be used in the certification process (Article 19(2)).

3. When developing rules, the Agency is bound to follow a structured process as required by

Article 52(1) of the Basic Regulation. Such process has been adopted by the Agency’s

Management Board and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’5.

4. This rulemaking activity is included in the Agency’s Rulemaking Programme for 2013-

2016. It implements the rulemaking task RMT.0327/0328 (OPS.058(a)-OPS.058(b)).

5. The text of this NPA has been developed by the Agency. It is submitted for consultation

of all interested parties in accordance with Article 52 of the Basic Regulation and Articles

5(3) and 6 of the Rulemaking Procedure.

The proposed rule has taken into account the development of the European Union and

international law (ICAO), and the harmonisation with the rules of other authorities of the

European Union’s main partners as set out in the objectives of Article 2 of the Basic

Regulation. The proposed rule takes into account developments of relevant European

Union law and addresses implementation problems that have already been identified by

the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA).

II. Consultation

6. To achieve optimal consultation, the Agency is publishing the draft Decision of the

Executive Director on its Internet site. Comments should be provided within 3 months in

accordance with Article 6(4) of the Rulemaking Procedure.

Please submit your comments using the automated Comment-Response Tool (CRT)

available at http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/6.

The deadline for the submission of comments is 29 November 2012.

1 The rules were published in the EASA Opinion 04/2011 ‘Air Operations – OPS’ and are currently undergoing a

process at the Commission level. Publication is expected in 2012. 2 Annex IV to the EASA Opinion 04/2011 ‘Air Operations – OPS’. 3 Annex III to the EASA Opinion 04/2011 ‘Air Operations – OPS’. 4 Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common

rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.03.2008, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by Regulation 1108/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 (OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 51).

5 Management Board Decision concerning the procedure to be applied by the Agency for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (Rulemaking Procedure), EASA MB 01-2012, 13.3.2012.

6 In case the use of the Comment-Response Tool is prevented by technical problems, please report them to the CRT webmaster ([email protected]).

http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/

mailto:[email protected]

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III. Comment-Response Document

7. All comments received in time will be responded to and incorporated in a Comment-

Response Document (CRD). The CRD will be available on the Agency’s website and in the

Comment-Response Tool.

IV. Content of the draft Opinion/Decision

8. This NPA includes a proposal to amend the future Commission Regulation establishing the

Implementing Rules for air operations and the related Decision of the Executive Director

of the European Aviation Safety Agency (hereinafter referred to as the “Decision”)

containing AMC and GM to Part-CAT and Part-ORO on the issues explained below.

9. This NPA includes two subtasks. Both subtasks originate from the Joint Aviation

Authorities (JAA). When the JAA ended its activity in 2009, both tasks were transferred

to the Agency and were included in the Agency’s rulemaking programme as one merged

task titled ‘Transfer of JAA cabin safety tasks’ under the number RMT.0327/0328

(OPS.058(a)-OPS.058(b)).

10. Taking into account the progress of the tasks under the JAA, this rulemaking task was

completed as an Agency task not requiring the involvement of a Rulemaking Group. The

proposals included in this NPA were drafted, consulted and reviewed by experts within

the Agency.

11. The part D. ‘Attachments’ of this NPA contains Attachment 1 ‘EASA safety analysis report

for RMT.0327/0328 based on data retrieved from EASA copy of ICAO ADREP data base’.

The report is attached to this NPA for reader’s information only to complement the

Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) of this NPA. The report is not included in CRT for

comments.

12. This NPA contains two different tasks. For easy reference the Agency would like to

request the commentator, when entering comments in CRT, to also include the

referenced paragraph number. .

Background

Incapacitation and replacement of Senior cabin crew member

13. In 2005, the Central Joint Aviation Authorities (CJAA) received an enquiry referring to

then applicable JAR-OPS 1.1000(d) Senior cabin crew members7. The enquiry addressed

the lack of clarity of the paragraph resulting in various interpretations by European

operators and leading to operational misapplications. The CJAA concluded that proper

understanding of the requirement could only be achieved by referring to several other

paragraphs of JAR-OPS and could therefore lead to different interpretations and possible

non-compliance. Further details of the enquiry are explained in the Regulatory Impact

Assessment (RIA) to this NPA.

14. The referenced text of JAR-OPS 1.1000(d) was transposed into the Commission

Regulation (EC) No 859/20088 (hereinafter referred to as ‘EU-OPS’) in OPS 1.1000(d)9

7 JAR-OPS 1.1000 Senior cabin crew members

…

(d) An operator shall establish procedures to select the next most suitably qualified cabin crew member to operate as senior cabin crew member in the event of the nominated senior cabin crew member becoming unable to operate. Such procedures must be acceptable to the Authority and take account of a cabin crew member’s operational experience.

8 Commission Regulation (EC) No 859/2008 of 20 August 2008 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 as regards common technical requirements and administrative procedures applicable to commercial transportation by aeroplane

http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:254:0001:0238:EN:PDF. 9 OPS 1.1000 Senior cabin crew members

…

http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:254:0001:0238:EN:PDF

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which came into effect in 2008. During the development of the EASA Opinion 04/2011

‘Air Operations – OPS’10, the purpose of which was to assist the European Commission in

establishing the Implementing Rules for air operations (hereinafter referred to as the

‘Opinion 04/2011’), the Agency transposed the text of OPS 1.1000(d) into the Annex III

– Part-ORO, Subpart-CC, ORO.CC.260(d)11. In view of the upcoming rulemaking task

RMT.0327/0328, no modifications were made to the concerned paragraph. Similarly to

JAR-OPS, in the case of both EU-OPS and the new regulatory requirements included in

the Opinion 04/2011, a reference to several other paragraphs of the regulatory

requirements is essential to achieve a proper understanding of the rule. More details are

provided in the RIA to this NPA.

15. The order of the paragraphs in the Agency’s proposed Opinion 04/2011, Annex III,

Subpart-CC has been changed during the comitology process and the text, that

represents the subject of this subtask of this NPA, is now included in ORO.CC.200(e).

Therefore, both the proposed amendment and the RIA refer to the new paragraph

number.

16. This NPA addresses the following main issues:

A) The difference between the Senior cabin crew member’s inability to continue

flight duty due to an occurrence happening during a flight duty period or at a

stopover (layover) destination and the individual’s inability to report for any flight

duty due to substantiated absence from work due to e.g. sick leave, medical

leave, pregnancy, maternity/paternity leave, parental leave, etc.; the latter

would not result in the Senior cabin crew member being considered incapacitated

or unavailable:

- incapacitation in this NPA refers to an occurrence happening during a flight

duty period that precludes the Senior cabin crew member from performing

his/her duties;

– unavailability in this NPA refers to an occurrence happening at a stopover

(layover) destination that prevents the Senior cabin crew member from reporting

for the continuation of the duty (the remainder of the series of flights).

B) Clarification on who is the replacement of the nominated Senior cabin crew

member who became incapacitated or unavailable, and of the Senior cabin crew

member who did not report for or could not commence the assigned flight

originating from his/her assigned crew base;

C) Clarification on a prompt replacement of the nominated Senior cabin crew

member who became incapacitated/unavailable or does not report for or cannot

commence the assigned flight originating from his/her assigned crew base.

Explanation is provided in the points 2.2.1 and 2.3.1 of the RIA to this NPA.

17. The text of the Opinion 04/2011 reflects the term “senior cabin crew member” with

lowercase letter “s”. This NPA does not use the full term; instead, it introduces an

abbreviation of this term - “SCCM”. Modifications have also been made in those

(d) An operator shall establish procedures to select the next most suitably qualified cabin crew member to operate as senior cabin crew member in the event of the nominated senior cabin crew member becoming unable to operate. Such procedures must be acceptable to the Authority and take account of a cabin crew member’s operational experience.

10 Opinion 04/2011 of the European Aviation safety Agency of 1 June 2011 for a Commission Regulation establishing the Implementing Rules for air operations ‘Air Operations – OPS’ http://easa.europa.eu/agency-measures/opinions.php.

11 ORO.CC.260 Senior cabin crew member

…

(d) The operator shall establish procedures to select the most appropriately qualified cabin crew member to act as senior cabin crew member if the nominated senior cabin crew member becomes unable to operate. Changes to these procedures shall be notified to the competent authority.

http://easa.europa.eu/agency-measures/opinions.php


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paragraphs of the Opinion 04/2011 and of the related Decision where the term “senior

cabin crew member” is used with lowercase letter “s”. This is to ensure a correct

interpretation of the term as referring to the cabin crew member “in charge”.

18. The resulting draft Amendment proposal is included in the part B. I of this NPA.

Communication between a person on board the aircraft and aerodrome services


crew members

19. This NPA proposal refers to a requirement of a qualified person on board the aircraft

during ground operations (other than refuelling/defueling) with passengers embarking,

on board or disembarking when flight crew members are absent. This qualified person

would be able to establish and coordinate communication with aerodrome services in

case of urgent need or emergency on board the aircraft.

20. This task was initiated by the JAA Operations Procedures Steering Group (OPSG) as a

proactive safety initiative, as a result of identification of a safety need to prevent

incidents/accidents that may occur in the future. The issue is discussed in further details

in the RIA to this NPA. The initiation of this task by OPSG originated from the fact that

the operational requirements (JAR-OPS and EU-OPS) addressed the need for a qualified

person to be present on board the aircraft during ground operations with passengers

embarking, on board or disembarking during the instances of refuelling/defueling only.

Furthermore, the operational requirements required at least one member of flight crew to

be in the flight crew compartment during ground operations with passengers on board

when the number of cabin crew has been reduced below the minimum required.

21. These provisions have been transferred into the Opinion 04/2011 in its Annex IV,

Part-CAT, CAT.OP.MPA.19512 and the Decision containing AMC and GM to Part-CAT - in

AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.19513 - as well as into the Annex III, Part-ORO, Subpart-CC,

ORO.CC.20514 and the Decision containing AMC and GM to Part-ORO, AMC1

ORO.CC.205(c)(1)15.

22. This NPA proposes a new requirement addressing ground operations with passengers

embarking, on board or disembarking when flight crew members are absent. In order not

to disrupt the structure and the paragraphs numbering of the Opinion 04/2011, the NPA

proposes to merge the text of paragraphs CAT.OP.MPA.195 Refuelling/defueling with

passengers embarking, on board or disembarking and CAT.OP.MPA.200

Refuelling/defueling with wide-cut fuel into one paragraph CAT.OP.MPA.200 titled

“Refuelling/defueling”. The available paragraph CAT.OP.MPA.195 will be dedicated to the

newly proposed requirement: CAT.OP.MPA.195 titled “Ground operations with passengers

in the absence of flight crew”. The Decision containing AMC and GM to Annex IV, Part-

CAT would be amended accordingly.

23. The resulting proposal is included in the point B. II of this NPA.

24. The EASA Opinion 04/2011 is currently undergoing the scrutiny process by the European

Parliament and the Council; therefore, it may still be subject to changes. Should this

happen, the proposed text in this NPA may need to be amended.

25. Furthermore, the Decisions have not been adopted yet and, therefore, may still be

subject to changes. Should this happen, the proposed text in this NPA may need to be

amended.

12 CAT.OP.MPA.195 Refuelling/defuelling with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking. 13 AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.195 Refuelling/defuelling. 14 ORO.CC.205 Normal ground operations and unforeseen circumstances. 15 AMC1 ORO.CC.205(c)(1) Reduction of the minimum number of cabin crew during ground operations and in

unforeseen circumstances. PROCEDURES WITH REDUCED NUMBER OF CABIN CREW.

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The envisaged changes to the Commission Regulation establishing

Implementing Rules for air operations:

26. In Annex III, Part-ORO, Subpart-CC:

1. ORO.CC.200 Senior cabin crew member – the abbreviation “SCCM” replaced the

term “senior cabin crew member” throughout the entire paragraph.

2. ORO.CC.200 Senior cabin crew member, point (e) – a new text.

3. ORO.CC.205(c)(2) – the abbreviation “SCCM” replaced the term “senior cabin crew

member”.

27. In Annex IV, Part-CAT:

1. CAT.OP.MPA.195 – a new title “Ground operations with passengers in the absence

of flight crew” followed by a new text.

2. CAT.OP.MPA.200 – the paragraph title has been changed to “Refuelling/defueling”.

The paragraph contains all requirements regarding refuelling/defueling with wide-

cut fuel, Avgas fuel, mixture of these types of fuel and any other types of fuel, and

requirements when passengers are embarking, on board or disembarking.

The envisaged changes to the Decisions containing AMC and GM to Part-ORO

and Part-CAT:

28. In Part-ORO:

1. New AMC containing two separate subparagraphs followed by a new text:

AMC1 ORO.CC.200(e) Senior cabin crew member

REPLACEMENT OF THE INCAPACITATED OR UNAVAILABLE SCCM

A separate paragraph titled: BY ANOTHER SCCM

A separate paragraph titled: BY MOST APPROPRIATELY QUALIFIED CABIN CREW

MEMBER

2. AMC1 ORO.CC.200(e)(iii) Senior cabin crew member

REPLACEMENT OF SCCM BY THE MOST APPROPRIATELY QUALIFIED CABIN CREW

MEMBER

3. New GM followed by a new text:

GM1 ORO.CC.200(e) Senior cabin crew member

REPLACEMENT OF INCAPACITATED OR UNAVAILABLE SCCM BY ANOTHER SCCM

4. New GM followed by a new text:


INCAPACITATION AND UNAVAILABILITY

5. The abbreviation “SCCM” replaced the term “senior cabin crew member” -

introduced with a lower case letter “s” - in the text of the following paragraphs:

AMC1 ORO.GEN.110(f)(h) Operator responsibilities – subparagraph (b)(1)

AMC3 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual – general – subparagraph 4.1(g)

AMC1 ORO.CC.115(e) Conduct of training courses and associated checking -

subparagraphs (b)(1) and (b)(3) and (b)(3)(i)(ii)

GM1 ORO.CC.115(e) Conduct of training courses and associated checking –

subparagraph (b)(2)

AMC1 ORO.CC.135 Familiarisation – subparagraph (b)(2)(i)

AMC1 ORO.CC.200(c) Senior cabin crew member – the introductory sentence

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AMC1 ORO.CC.200(d) Senior cabin crew member – the introductory sentence

AMC1 ORO.CC.205(c)(1) Reduction of the number of cabin crew during ground

operations and in unforeseen circumstances – subparagraphs (a)(2) and (a)(5)

29. In Part-CAT:

1. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.195 – the paragraph number has been changed to “AMC1

CAT.OP.MPA.200(b)”. A new subtitle has been added REFUELLING/DEFUELLING

WITH PASSENGERS EMBARKING, ON BOARD OR DISEMBARKING. The content of

this AMC1 remains unchanged.

2. No AMC has been drafted for CAT.OP.MPA.195 Ground operations with passengers

in the absence of flight crew; therefore, AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.195 does not exist now.

3. GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.200 – the title of the paragraph has been amended to “GM1

CAT.OP.MPA.200(a)”. The subtitle of the GM has been amended and now reflects

PROCEDURES FOR REFUELLING/DEFUELLING WITH WIDE-CUT FUEL.

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V. Regulatory Impact Assessment

1 Process and consultation

The scope of this rulemaking activity is outlined in the Terms of Reference (ToR) for

rulemaking task RMT.0327/0328 (OPS.058(a)-OPS.058(b)) issued on 26 September 201116.

The ToR describe two subtasks of this rulemaking task: Incapacitation and replacement of

Senior cabin crew member and Communication between a person on board the aeroplane and

aerodrome emergency services during ground operations with passengers on board and in the

absence of flight crew members.

The initiative to start tasks on both subjects originates from the Joint Aviation Authorities

(JAA). The subject Incapacitation and replacement of Senior cabin crew member was to clarify

the applicable paragraph of the operational requirement hence avoiding misinterpretations and

possible non-compliance by European operators. The subject Communication between a

person on board the aeroplane and aerodrome emergency services during ground operations

with passengers on board and in the absence of flight crew members was initiated as a

proactive safety initiative to avoid possible incidents/accidents in the future since the issue is

not covered by the applicable operational requirements.

When JAA ceased its activity in 2009, both tasks were transferred to the Agency and were

included in the Rulemaking programme as one merged task RMT.0327/0328 (OPS.058(a)-

OPS.058(b)) titled ‘Transfer of JAA cabin safety tasks’. The result of these tasks represents a

draft proposal to amend the future Commission Regulation establishing the Implementing

Rules for air operations and the related Decisions of the Executive Director of the European

Aviation Safety Agency containing Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material.

The Agency selected a single-handed process for this task – the working method ‘Agency’. .The

proposals included in this NPA and RIA were consulted and reviewed by experts within the

Agency.

The following documents represented the base for developing the NPA 2012-12:


JAA NPA-OPS 62.

Communication between a person on board the aircraft and aerodrome services during ground

operations with passengers on board and in the absence of flight crew members

Rulemaking proposal form prepared by JAA Operations Procedures Steering Group (OPSG)

dated 4 May 2007.

Note: Pre-RIA for this task has not been developed by the Agency as the task was included in

the Agency’s Rulemaking programme as an item transferred from the JAA.

2 Issue analysis and risk assessment

2.1 What is the issue and the current regulatory framework?

2.1.1 Incapacitation and replacement of Senior cabin crew member

In 2005 an enquiry was received by Central JAA about then applicable paragraph of JAR-OPS

1.1000(d) Senior cabin crew members (SCCM):

(d) an operator shall establish procedures to select the next most suitably qualified cabin crew member to operate as senior cabin crew member in the event of the nominated senior cabin crew member becoming unable to operate. Such procedures must be acceptable to the Authority and take account of a cabin crew member’s operational experience.

16 http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/terms-of-reference-and-group-composition.php.

http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/terms-of-reference-and-group-composition.php

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The same text of the paragraph (d) was transposed by the European Commission into the

Regulation (EC) 859/200817, commonly referred to as EU-OPS, in OPS 1.1000(d) currently still

applicable. In view of the Agency’s upcoming rulemaking task RMT.0327/0328, the same text

of the referenced paragraph (d) was also transposed into the paragraph ORO.CC.200(e) of the

EASA Opinion 04/2011 ‘Air Operations – OPS’18, purpose of which was to assist the European

Commission in establishing the Implementing Rules for air operations (‘Opinion 04/2011’):

The enquiry sent to JAA addressed the lack of clarity of the referenced paragraph and

conflicting interpretations by European operators. The following questions were to be

answered:

1. ‘in the event of the nominated senior cabin crew member becoming unable to operate' –

does ‘becoming unable’ refer to incapacitation occurring in flight, or a few hours, or days

before?

2. ‘select the next most suitably qualified cabin crew member to operate as senior cabin

crew member’ – how long is this substitution allowed, e.g. single sector, or round trip, or

all rostered flights for the month?

3. Does JAR-OPS 1.1000 disallow any flights to depart from base with an SCCM substitute,

i.e. if a cabin crew member replaces a SCCM, must he/she be replaced by a SCCM once

he/she has a stopover at base?

The proper understanding of this paragraph can only be achieved by referring to several other

paragraphs of regulatory requirements19. This could lead to a possible non-compliance, such as

replacing a SCCM for the duration of sick leave, pregnancy and/or maternity/paternity or

parental leave by a cabin crew member not appropriately qualified to carry out the duties of a

SCCM.

This task was initiated by the JAA and resulted in the draft proposal JAA NPA-OPS 62. The aim

of this rulemaking activity is to clarify the Implementing Rules and to amend the associated

AMC/GM to ensure the clear understanding and the correct application of this requirement by

EU operators.

2.1.2 Communication between a person on board the aircraft and aerodrome services

during ground operations with passengers on board and in the absence of flight crew

members

The Directive 2003/42/EC20 in its Article 9 enables Member States to establish a system of

voluntary reporting ‘to collect and analyse information on observed deficiencies in aviation

which are not required to be reported under the system of mandatory reporting, but which are

perceived by the reporter as an actual potential hazard’.

The proposal to initiate this task was presented to JAA by the JAA’s Operations Procedures

Steering Group (OPSG) in 2007. The proposal represented a proactive safety initiative as a

result of the identification of a safety need to prevent accidents/incidents that may occur in the

future.

Currently, the operational requirement OPS 1.305 and its Appendix 1 to OPS 1.305 specify

that an aircraft must be manned by a qualified person during fuelling operations with

passengers embarking, on board or disembarking. The requirements further state that ‘This

17 Commission Regulation (EC) No 859/2008 of 20 August 2008 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No3922/91 as

regards common technical requirements and administrative procedures applicable to commercial transportation by aeroplane http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:254:0001:0238:EN:PDF.

18 Opinion 04/2011 of the European Aviation safety Agency of 1 June 2011 for a Commission Regulation establishing the Implementing Rules for air operations ‘Air Operations – OPS’ http://easa.europa.eu/agency-measures/opinions.php.

19 OPS 1.175(g)(1); OPS 1.175(n); Appendix 2 to OPS 1.175(c)(1).

ORO.AOC.100(c)(3); ORO.GEN.110(d) and (e); ORO.AOC.135(b). 20 Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2003 on occurrence reporting in

civil aviation.

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:254:0001:0238:EN:PDF



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qualified person must be capable of handling emergency procedures concerning fire protection

and fire-fighting, handling communications and initiating and directing an evacuation’.

The operational requirement OPS 1.311 requires the minimum required number of cabin crew

to be on board during ground operations whenever any passengers are on board. When the

aircraft is at a parking place, the number of cabin crew may be reduced below the minimum

required; the Appendix 1 to OPS 1.311(2.) states that ‘a means of initiating an evacuation is

available to the senior cabin crew member, or at least one member of the flight crew is on the

flight deck’.

These requirements were also transposed into the Opinion 04/2011 in paragraphs ORO.CC.205

and AMC1 ORO.CC.205(c)(1).

There are, however, situations during ground operations other than those mentioned above –

instances not involving fuelling operations with passengers embarking, on board or

disembarking or reduction of minimum required cabin crew, such as flight crew members’ prior

approval to commence passenger boarding and their own later arrival/return in/to the aircraft.

If flight crew members are present, the necessary communication with the aerodrome

services, whenever required, will be initiated by them. However, flight crew members may be

absent and such situations pose a question of who and how can advise the aerodrome services

about the urgent need or an emergency happening on board. The current and the future

regulatory requirements address the need for the minimum required number of cabin crew

during ground operations whenever any passengers are on board. The regulatory

requirements, however, neither address the need of flight crew members to be on board

(except for the case of reduction of the minimum number of cabin crew), nor do they address

the requirement of a qualified person to be on board when flight crew members are absent in

order to handle the communication with aerodrome services. The aim of this rulemaking

activity is to cover these instances.

The rulemaking proposal form submitted by JAA’s OPSG referred to the subject’s title as

“communication between an aircraft and aerodrome emergency services”; however, the

analysis of the proposal made by OPSG reflected the requirement to alert the services in the

event of emergency or urgent need. In order not to limit the intention of the rule to emergency

situations only, such as fire, smoke, bomb threat, evacuation, etc. but to also cover

circumstances that are not classified as emergencies, however, require the necessary attention

and rapid action to prevent them from turning into an emergency, such as the airport medical

practitioner to attend to a passenger who is not feeling well and hesitates whether to

commence/continue the flight, etc. Therefore, the term “aerodrome emergency services” was

modified to reflect the need of a qualified person on board an aircraft to alert ‘aerodrome

services’.

2.2 Who is affected?

2.2.1 Incapacitation and replacement of Senior cabin crew member

Operators, cabin crew members and Senior cabin crew members.

The operator needs to ensure that a sufficient number of appropriately qualified personnel is

on standby (e.g. at home or at the airport) and that appropriate measures are taken to ensure

that the SCCM who does not report for or cannot commence the assigned flight originating

from his/her assigned crew base is replaced so that the flight does not depart without a SCCM.

Furthermore, the operator has to take appropriate measures to ensure that the SCCM who

became unavailable at the stopover (layover) destination or became incapacitated during a

flight can be replaced without undue delay in outstation(s) and/or when the aircraft passes

operator’s base (during e.g. the same-day flight-pairing on which an incapacitation happened).

The operator also needs to establish procedures on replacing SCCM who became incapacitated

during a flight. Operators may have more than one SCCM on the same flight: the leading

SCCM and a SCCM responsible for a particular cabin section, such as Business or Economy

class. If another SCCM is not available on the same flight, the incapacitated SCCM has to be

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replaced with another appropriately qualified cabin crew member who will be capable of

handling the duties and responsibilities of SCCM until the aircraft passes the next operator’s

base where another SCCM has been made available by the operator to take over. The

operational experience, aircraft types/variants qualifications and training of a suitable cabin

crew member need to be taken into account. The following examples can be used for a clearer

illustration:

Example 1:

A330 crew team is scheduled to operate a 1-day duty consisting of two sectors; the flight is

originating from the operator’s base CDG: CDG-PRG-CDG. The SCCM (S1) becomes

incapacitated before landing into PRG. If there is another SCCM on the same flight (e.g.

responsible for Economy cabin – S2), the S2 will take over the duties and responsibilities of

the incapacitated S1. If there is no other SCCM on the same flight, the cabin crew member

most appropriately qualified and suitable to manage the duties and responsibilities of a SCCM

will be assigned (acting SCCM - A/S) to take over for the sector PRG-CDG.

If, for example, the scheduled duty is a four-sector duty: CDG-PRG-CDG-TXL-CDG, another

SCCM (e.g. from standby) will join the crew when the aircraft passes the operator’s base (in

this case CDG) for the sectors CDG-TXL-CDG.

If, for example, the scheduled duty is a three-sector duty: CDG-PRG-TXL-CDG and the

operator has bases in CDG and TXL (not in PRG), another SCCM (e.g. from standby) can be

made available in TXL.

Example 2:

B777 cabin crew team is scheduled on a duty that involves a stopover (layover) point; it can

be a two-sector flight (e.g. FRA-BKK-FRA) or a several-day duty consisting of several sectors

(e.g. FRA-BKK-CGK-BKK-FRA). Destinations to which the operator operates at higher

frequencies and/or destinations with a crew change represent aerodromes where another

SCCM is available or can be made available. The layover period provides the operator with

sufficient time and flexibility to make another SCCM available as a replacement of the

incapacitated/unavailable SCCM for the remainder of the series of flights. The operator can

utilise SCCM from another crew team staying in the same layover point, or can position

another SCCM to the concerned layover point (e.g. SCCM who is staying in another close-by

layover point, e.g. in SIN, or from the operator’s base).



members

Operators, as they will be required to establish the relevant procedures. At the discretion of

the operator, the qualified person could be e.g cabin crew members, maintenance personnel,

aerodrome ground handling personnel, etc.

2.3 What are the safety risks?

2.3.1 Incapacitation and replacement of SCCM

2.3.1.1 Senior cabin crew member

Senior cabin crew member is the leading cabin crew member whose responsibility is to

manage flight operation related to cabin, i.e. collection of information related to the particular

flight; cabin crew pre-flight briefing or de-briefing; management of cabin crew members

assigned for the flight (leadership; time/workload/stress management; human factors and

multicultural/multinational awareness; crew members’ quality performance and assessment;

coordination and monitoring of performance of safety duties; awareness and prevention of

emergency situations; correct actions and instructions in situations related to safety, security

and medical aspects; flight time limitations and rest requirements); decision-making;

coordination on cabin-related matters with ground handling personnel/medical staff/security or

police/engineers/catering/cleaning; coordination with flight crew members on cabin events and

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progress; management of passengers including acceptance and correct seat allocation of

special categories of passengers; coordination with flight crew members on the required seat

distribution of passengers in the cabin according to the applicable weight and balance; correct

application of operator’s standard operating procedures; handling and distribution of

documents related to the flight; incidents/accidents reporting and coordination with the

operator on any disruptions when away from base; etc.

The regulatory requirements specify requirements for single cabin crew member operations21.

It is essential that in multi-cabin crew operations there is one cabin crew member who

undertakes the scope of the duties and responsibilities; the role requires operational

experience as well as personal skills. Due to the need of one cabin crew member being in

charge of coordinating all cabin-related matters with flight crew, cabin crew and any ground

personnel involved in dispatching the aircraft, the regulatory requirements also specify

requirements for SCCM22; the rules require the operator to nominate a SCCM when more than

one cabin crew member is assigned to operate the flight. The SCCM has the responsibility to

the commander for coordination of normal and emergency procedures specified in the

operations manual. The requirements further include the conditions for nominating a cabin

crew member to the position of a SCCM and the content of the required training.

2.3.1.2 Incapacitation and unavailability

Just as any human being or any aircraft occupant is prone to incapacitation,

incidents/accidents also happen to SCCM whether on duty or during time off between

scheduled flight duties. Time off between scheduled flight duties concerns days off or the rest

period between flights scheduled on separate days and originating from the assigned crew

base and the rest period at a stopover (layover) destination whilst conducting a series of

flights.

In case circumstances result in the SCCM’s substantiated absence from work due to e.g. sick

leave, medical leave, pregnancy, maternity/paternity or parental leave, etc., the operator

substitutes the employee with another employee with the same qualification in order to ensure

smooth operation to comply with the applicable regulatory requirements.

If unpredictable circumstances that prevent the SCCM from reporting for the continuation of

duty happen at a stopover (layover) destination, e.g. health problems, death, traffic-related

accidents, law-related problems, etc., for the purpose of this NPA, the SCCM becomes

unavailable for the scheduled duty.

Incidents/accidents also happen during a flight. They may be caused by various factors, such

as medical-related, e.g. unpredictable body allergic reactions, injuries sustained during abrupt

aircraft movement, when carrying out safety-related duties (e.g. securing passengers or galley

during turbulence or taxiing, etc.), consequences of emergency situations (e.g. asphyxia,

hypoxia, burns, injuries, etc.), sudden psychological/psychiatric deterioration, death, etc. For

the purpose of this NPA, these are categorised as incapacitation of the SCCM during a flight

duty period.

Death can occur during a flight or at a stopover (layover) destination; therefore “death” is

included in both texts above - incapacitation and unavailability. Death would result in an

unavailability of the SCCM. For the purpose of this task and distinguishing incapacitation

referring to flight duty period and unavailability referring to unpredictable circumstances at

stopover (layover) destination, both occasions example “death”; however, the terminology

referring to two different occasions remains unchanged.

The operator is responsible for establishing procedures on replacement of SCCM who did not

report for or cannot commence the assigned flight or series of flights originating from the

assigned crew base and for establishing procedures on replacement of the incapacitated or

unavailable SCCM.

21 OPS 1.1002; ORO.CC.255. 22 OPS 1.1000; ORO.CC.200.

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2.3.1.3 EASA copy of ICAO ADREP data on incapacitation of SCCM

Directive 2003/42/EC23 states that ‘…Each Member State should set up mandatory reporting

systems…Safety information should be available to entities entrusted with regulating civil

aviation safety or investigating accidents and incidents within the Community and, as

appropriate, to the people who may learn from them and take or initiate the necessary action

to improve safety.’ The Directive in its Annex 1, A. Aircraft Flight Operations, (iii) Crew

incapacitation (b) mandates Member States to report ‘incapacitation of any member of the

cabin crew which renders them unable to perform essential emergency duties’.

EASA Safety Analysis and Research department conducted a research on the available data

concerning incapacitation of SCCMs. The data retrieved from the EASA copy of ICAO ADREP

database shows 19 occurrences from which it can be clearly identified that the reported

incapacitation concerns a SCCM. There is no relation of the incidents to an aircraft type; the

retrieved incidents occurred on both narrow-bodied and wide-bodied aircraft in multi-cabin

crew operations, as well as in single cabin crew operations. Four of the reported events

occurred on ground whilst the aircraft was parked at the gate or taxiing, one event occurred

during climb, twelve events happened during cruise, one event during initial descent and one

event happened during approach. The causes of the incapacitations vary and include injuries,

unidentified medical reasons, injury followed by unconsciousness, food poisoning, dizziness

resulting in hospitalisation, psychiatric disorder, diabetes-related insulin reaction, hypoxia

caused by decompression, unconsciousness caused by prioritising the Commander and helping

him to put his oxygen mask on during decompression. Five of the reported occurrences

happened in the United States, thirteen in Canada and one in Europe. None of the retrieved

data contains information on the follow-up – whether the incapacitated SCCM was replaced by

another suitably qualified cabin crew member or the operator used any other solution. The

ICAO ADREP database reflects information of the reported occurrences; however, there may

be occurrences that have not been reported and, therefore, these cannot be found in the data

base, such as an incident of an unidentified airline involving the need to use handcuffs and

restrain a mentally disturbed passenger who posed a risk to the aircraft occupants. The SCCM

was physically attacked by the passenger during cruise and also suffered a vocal cords

impairment leading to a complete loss of voice. This disabled the SCCM to continue the

responsibility to the commander and the cabin crew for the conduct and coordination of normal

and emergency procedures, i.e. inability to communicate by speaking, only by whispering.

SCCM required an on-going medical treatment at the stopover destination and was replaced by

another SCCM for the return flight scheduled several days later.

Even though crew members are aware of possible risks and operators make efforts to take

necessary precautions to prevent some events, some incidents/accidents happen suddenly

with no previous warning and the affected individual has no influence to stop them. Such

occurrences will continue to happen.

Regulatory requirements require the operator to employ a sufficient number of properly

trained personnel for ground and flight operations24 and to ensure that the aircraft is equipped

and its crew are qualified as required25.



members

The regulatory requirements do not require cabin crew, including single cabin crew operations

and SCCM, to be trained on establishing communication with aerodrome services via radio

frequencies using the installed aircraft flight crew compartment instruments or by using

23 Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2003 on occurrence reporting in

civil aviation. 24 Appendix 2 to OPS 1.175(c)(1); ORO.AOC.135(b). 25 OPS 1.175(n); ORO.GEN.110(d) and (e).

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walkie-talkies. Urgent needs and emergencies happening on board require a rapid action and

coordination with necessary entities. Some examples below are to illustrate the safety risks:

There is usually a limited number of medical practitioners available at the airports and,

taking into account the area the medical practitioner is supposed to cover, it may take

some time for the doctor to arrive at the aircraft after the request has been made from

the concerned aircraft. The medical condition of a passenger who is initially ‘not feeling

well’ may deteriorate and if there are restricted means of establishing the necessary

communication, the medical condition may turn into an emergency with serious

consequences.

In case of various failures of aircraft systems, harmful or hazardous vapour

concentration, fumes, smoke, noxious gases other than natural moisture released by air

conditioning system may rise in the aircraft cabin during passenger boarding. These can

cause short-term incapacitation of cabin crew members or passengers. Cabin crew are

trained on how to act in case of various aircraft systems malfunctions and how to deal

with smoke in the cabin, and the situation must be reported immediately. The situation

may lead to an evacuation. The situation requires a qualified person (e.g. maintenance or

flight crew) to attend to the matter which can be an urgent technical need (such as

smoke resulting from the examples above coming out from the aircraft air conditioning

system) or an emergency of hidden fire. If there are restricted means to establish the

necessary communication requiring assistance, the situation may have serious

consequences.

3 Objectives

The overall objectives of the Agency are defined in Article 2 of the Basic Regulation. This

proposal will contribute to the overall objectives by addressing the issues outlined in Section 2.

The specific objective of this proposal is therefore:

3.1 Incapacitation and replacement of SCCM

The objective is to ensure that the intention of the regulatory requirement - coordination of

cabin safety and of all cabin-related matters with flight crew and all ground personnel involved

in dispatching the aircraft for a flight by the appropriately qualified cabin crew member - is

maintained. This will be achieved by clarifying the applicable regulatory requirement to ensure

that it is clearly expressed and cannot be misunderstood and/or interpreted in multiple ways

by operators.

3.2 Communication between a person on board the aircraft and aerodrome services


members

The objective is to ensure that communication can always be established between an aircraft

and aerodrome services when passengers are embarking, on board or disembarking, hence

preventing potentially serious consequences due to non-presence of a qualified person on

board who can alert the aerodrome services in case of urgent need or emergency on board.

This will be achieved by developing regulatory requirements requiring a qualified person on

board the aircraft in the absence of flight crew members during ground operations with

passengers embarking, on board or disembarking who will establish and coordinate

communication with aerodrome services in case of urgent need or emergency.

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4 Identification of options

4.1 Incapacitation and replacement of SCCM

Table 1

Option No Description

0 Baseline option. Do nothing.

No clarification of the rule; the text of ORO.CC.200(e) remains as transposed

from EU-OPS:

‘an operator shall establish procedures to select the next most suitably qualified

cabin crew member to operate as senior cabin crew member in the event of the

nominated senior cabin crew member becoming unable to operate. Such

procedures must be acceptable to the Authority and take account of a cabin

crew member’s operational experience.’

Understanding of the requirement can only be achieved by referring to several

other paragraphs of the regulatory requirements:

ORO.AOC.100(c)(3); ORO.GEN.110(d) and (e); ORO.AOC.135(b)

1 Clarification of the paragraph ORO.CC.200(e): any cabin crew member can be

considered a suitably qualified cabin crew member to replace the SCCM who did

not report for or cannot commence the assigned flight or series of flights

originating from his/her assigned crew base or who became

incapacitated/unavailable.

The replacement can happen for an unlimited period of time.

Provide explanation on what incapacitation and unavailability refer to.

2 Clarification of the paragraph ORO.CC.200(e): another SCCM is assigned to

replace the SCCM who did not report for or cannot commence the assigned

flight or series of flights originating from his/her assigned crew base; the flight

does not depart without another SCCM.

In case of incapacitation/unavailability, another SCCM replaces the

incapacitated/unavailable SCCM; if there is no other SCCM who can be

assigned, the cabin crew member most appropriately qualified is assigned as a

replacement; the operational experience and qualification of that cabin crew

member are taken into account.

The replacement will happen without undue delay and only for the remainder of

the flight or series of flights for which the SCCM, who became

incapacitated/unavailable, signed in to operate when leaving his/her assigned

crew base.

Provide explanation on what incapacitation and unavailability refer to.

4.2 Communication between a person on board the aircraft and aerodrome services


crew members

Table 2

Option No Description

0 Baseline option. Do nothing.

No change of the regulatory requirements. A qualified person to be required on

board during ground operations with passengers embarking, on board or

disembarking only in cases of aircraft refuelling/defuelling or at least one

member of the flight crew to be required in flight crew compartment only when

the number of cabin crew has been reduced below the minimum required:

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CAT.OP.MPA.195(b); AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.195(c)(1) and (c)(2), ORO.CC.205;

AMC1 ORO.CC.205(c)(1).

1 Develop a new regulatory requirement requiring a qualified person to be on

board during ground operations with passengers embarking, on board or

disembarking in the absence of flight crew members. The qualified person will

establish and coordinate communication with aerodrome services in case of

urgent need or emergency on board.

5 Analysis of impacts

5.1 Safety impact


The role of SCCM is described in 2.3.1.1 above.

Option 0

The approach as outlined in Option 0 continues to provide space for misapplication of the

paragraph ORO.CC.200(e), therefore a non-compliance with the associated paragraph

ORO.CC.200(a)26 and with the regulatory requirements referenced in the point 4.1, Option 0.

Option 1

The approach as outlined in Option 1, similarly to Option 0, continues to provide space for

misapplication of the paragraph ORO.CC.200(e), therefore a non-compliance with the

associated paragraph ORO.CC.200(b)27 and the regulatory requirements referenced in the

point 4.1, Option 0.

All cabin crew members undergo the qualification-required training and from the aspect of

managing their own safety duties and responsibilities, there is hardly any impact, as cabin

crew members are trained to manage any normal/abnormal/emergency situation.

In addition to the qualification training all cabin crew members must undergo, SCCM requires

to further undergo training in accordance with ORO.CC.200(c)28 covering all duties and

responsibilities of a SCCM. Absence of a SCCM and replacement by any cabin crew member

who lacks the required training, knowledge, experience and skills may result in ineffective CRM


(a) When more than one cabin crew member is required, the composition of the cabin crew shall include a senior cabin crew member nominated by the operator.


(b) The operator shall nominate cabin crew members to the position of senior cabin crew member only if they:

(1) have at least 1 year of experience as operating cabin crew member; and

(2) have successfully completed a senior cabin crew training course and the associated check. 28 ORO.CC.200 Senior cabin crew member

(c) The senior cabin crew training course shall cover all duties and responsibilities of senior cabin crew members and shall include at least the following elements:

(1) pre-flight briefing;

(2) cooperation with the crew;

(3) review of operator requirements and legal requirements;

(4) accident and incident reporting;

(5) human factors and crew resource management (CRM); and

(6) flight and duty time limitations and rest requirements.

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within the operating crew team and ground personnel (due to reasons mentioned in 5.3.1

below), incorrect decisions on coordination of cabin safety-related matters or incorrect actions.

Option 2

The training the SCCM requires to undergo in accordance with ORO.CC.200(c) covers

additional aspects that will fall under the sole responsibility of the SCCM, such as

communication with flight crew before take-off/landing on cabin status or entry into the flight

crew compartment during phases of flight determined by the pilot-in-command or commander

as safety-critical activity, etc. Option 2 ensures that the intention of the regulatory

requirement - the competence required for coordination of cabin safety and of cabin-related

matters with flight crew and all ground personnel involved in dispatching the aircraft for a

flight - is maintained.



members

Option 0

Cabin crew members are trained on situational awareness, prevention of emergency situations,

efficient and effective decision-making, how to deal with situations requiring immediate

attention and/or emergencies, initiating and directing evacuation, etc. However, the rules do

not require cabin crew to be trained on the operation of aircraft flight crew compartment

installed communication system or walkie-talkies in order to establish communication with

aerodrome services using radio frequencies.

The regulatory requirements concerning ground operations with passengers on board mandate

the minimum required number of cabin crew to be on board. The regulatory requirements,

however, do not require flight crew members to be on board (except for the case when the

number of cabin crew has been reduced below the minimum required, at least one member of

flight crew is required to be in the flight crew compartment).

In case of refuelling/defueling, a qualified person is required to man the aircraft in order to

handle fire-related emergency procedures, communication and to initiate and direct an

evacuation.

Other than the instances of refuelling/defueling and reduction of the minimum required cabin

crew, a qualified person is not required to be on board during ground operations when

passengers are embarking, on board or disembarking and flight crew members are absent.

There may be cases of urgent needs such as the ones exampled in 2.3.2 above happening on

board the aircraft which would require an attention of specifically qualified personnel. Ground

handling personnel may not be around and cabin crew members are isolated on board with

passengers with limited means of making the necessary contact, e.g. using a mobile phone to

contact the operator’s offices. The time is progressing and the urgent needs may turn into

emergencies. Restricted means of contacting the aerodrome services for the particular

assistance immediately when required may have an impact on safety of the aircraft occupants.

Option 1

Option 1 ensures that safety of aircraft occupants is not jeopardised by none or limited means

of communicating the need for help on board the aircraft to aerodrome services when flight

crew members are absent. Option 1 ensures that a qualified person will always be present on

board and will have the adequate means to establish the necessary communication with

aerodrome services in case of urgent need or emergency on board, hence preventing possible

serious consequences.

5.2 Environmental impact

No environmental impact has been identified.

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5.3 Social impact


Option 0 and Option 1

Option 0 and Option 1 conclude the same social impact.

If the regulatory requirement is not interpreted correctly by the operator and any cabin crew

member is assigned to replace the SCCM who cannot report for flight duty originating from

his/her assigned crew base or who became incapacitated/unavailable, the social consequences

of non-compliance or misapplication may result in an increased stress of the cabin crew

member who is assigned to take over the role of SCCM. The stress may be caused by lack of

self-confidence due to insufficient training, knowledge, experience, lack of required

qualification, etc. This may reflect on working atmosphere, human factors and performance of

cabin crew members who work with the insufficiently qualified cabin crew member who was

assigned by the operator to replace the SCCM. It may reflect on flight crew and ground

personnel nervous/irritated approach and attitude when dealing with a cabin crew member “in

charge” who is not fully aware and trained on the scope of the SCCM’s duties and

responsibilities.

Furthermore, the operators who currently interpret the regulatory requirement correctly may

be tempted to interpret the requirement in such a way that could lead to non-compliance,

which would result in a negative social impact.

Option 2

Option 2 ensures that the social impact identified in Option 0 and Option 1 is prevented.



members

Not relevant.

5.4 Economic impact


Option 0 and Option 1 and Option 2

Regulatory requirements mandate the operator to employ a sufficient number of properly

trained personnel for ground and flight operations29. No economic impact is expected as a

result of clarifying the text of the applicable regulatory requirement to prevent misapplication

and non-compliance for those operators who interpret the regulatory requirement correctly.

Limited economic impact related to training costs is expected for those operators who interpret

the regulatory requirement in such a way that leads to non-compliance.



members

Option 0

No change compared to the current situation.

Option 1

The qualified person could be e.g. cabin crew members or SCCMs, maintenance personnel,

ground operations aerodrome personnel, etc. The person would require e.g. training in the use

29 Appendix 2 to OPS 1.175(c)(1); ORO.CC.135(b).

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of installed flight crew compartment communication system or walkie-talkies in order to initiate

a communication with aerodrome services via radio frequencies.

In the case of cabin crew members or SCCMs, such training would be included in the required

operator conversion/differences training, familiarisation or, in the case of SCCM, in the SCCM

training. A practical training on the communication with aerodrome services via radio

frequencies using the flight crew compartment installed communication system or walkie-

talkies has non-significant economic impact.

In the case of maintenance personnel: the aircraft type training for maintenance personnel

includes the operation of flight crew compartment installed communication system; the aircraft

type rating is endorsed in the individual’s licence. No economic impact is expected with regard

to aircraft type-rated maintenance personnel.

The specific task-trained maintenance personnel who do not hold the particular aircraft type

rating would require such training with non-significant economic impact.

In the case of aerodrome ground operations personnel, the use of walkie-talkies is common;

the training on the installed flight crew compartment communication system via radio

frequencies would be required, with no significant economic impact.

No economic impact is expected in the case of utilising the qualified personnel, other than the

flight crew members, required to man the aircraft in case of refuelling/defuelling when

passengers are embarking, on board or disembarking.

The choice of a qualified person is sufficiently flexible and the regulatory requirement can be

estimated cost-efficient.

5.5 Proportionality issues


No difference identified. SCCM is required when more than one cabin crew member is assigned

by the operator to operate the flight.

5.5.2 Communication between a person on board the aircraft and aerodrome

services during ground operations with passengers on board and in the absence of

flight crew members.

Not relevant.

5.6 Impact on regulatory coordination and harmonisation

Not relevant.

6 Conclusion and preferred option

After comparison of the possible options and their impacts, the following has been concluded:


Option 2 has been chosen to ensure a clear understanding and correct application of the

paragraph ORO.CC.200(e) by EU operators.

SCCM who does not report for or cannot commence the assigned flight or series of flights

originating from his/her assigned crew base is replaced by another SCCM, thus the flight does

not depart without a SCCM.

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SCCM who became incapacitated/unavailable will be replaced by another SCCM; if there is no

other SCCM who can be assigned, the cabin crew member most appropriately qualified will be

assigned. Operational experience and aircraft types/variants qualifications will be taken into

account for selection of such cabin crew member. The replacement will happen without undue

delay and will be effective for a limited period as clarified in the draft rules ORO.CC.200(e).

Option 2 ensures that the intention of the regulatory requirement is maintained and the

coordination of cabin safety and of cabin-related matters with flight crew and all ground

personnel involved in dispatching the aircraft for a flight is conducted by the competent cabin

crew member.

Communication between a person on board the aircraft and aerodrome services during ground

operations with passengers on board and in the absence of flight crew members

Option 1 has been chosen to amend the EU rules and to develop a regulatory requirement to

require a qualified person on board during ground operations with passengers embarking, on

board or disembarking in the absence of flight crew members. This is to ensure that safety of

the aircraft occupants is maintained by having a qualified person on board the aircraft who can

utilise means to communicate and can coordinate with aerodrome services in case of any

urgent need or emergency happening on board the aircraft when flight crew members are

absent.

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B. Draft Opinion and Decision

I. Incapacitation and replacement of Senior cabin crew member

Amendment to Annex III, Part-ORO, Subpart-CC of the Commission Regulation

establishing Implementing Rules for air operations:

ORO.CC.200 Senior cabin crew member

(a) When more than one cabin crew member is required, the composition of the cabin crew

shall include a senior cabin crew member (SCCM) nominated by the operator.

(b) The operator shall nominate cabin crew members to the position of senior cabin crew

member SCCM only if they:

(1) have at least 1 year of experience as operating cabin crew member; and

(2) have successfully completed a senior cabin crew training course and the associated

check.

(c) The senior cabin crew training course shall cover all duties and responsibilities of senior

cabin crew members SCCM and shall include at least the following elements:

(1) pre-flight briefing;

(2) cooperation with the crew;

(3) review of operator requirements and legal requirements;

(4) accident and incident reporting;

(5) human factors and crew resource management (CRM); and

(6) flight and duty time limitations and rest requirements.

(d) The senior cabin crew member SCCM shall be responsible to the commander for the

conduct and coordination of normal and emergency procedures specified in the

operations manual, including for discontinuing non safety-related duties for safety or

security purposes.

(e) The operator shall establish procedures to select the most appropriately qualified cabin

crew member to act as senior cabin crew member if the nominated senior cabin crew

member becomes unable to operate. Changes to these procedures shall be notified to the

competent authority.

(e) The operator shall:

(1) establish procedures to ensure replacement of the nominated SCCM by another

SCCM when:

(i) the nominated SCCM does not report for, or cannot commence the assigned

flight or series of flights originating from his/her assigned crew base. In this

case the concerned flight shall not depart unless another SCCM has been

assigned;

(ii) the nominated SCCM becomes incapacitated or unavailable. The replacement

shall be assigned without undue delay for the remainder of the flight or series

of flights;

(iii) for the purpose of (ii), if there is no other SCCM who can be assigned, the

operator shall assign the cabin crew member most appropriately qualified to

act as SCCM.

(2) notify the competent authority of any change to these procedures.

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Amendment to the Decision containing AMC and GM to Part-ORO:

AMC1 ORO.CC.200(e) Senior cabin crew member

REPLACEMENT OF THE INCAPACITATED OR UNAVAILABLE SCCM

BY ANOTHER SCCM

Another SCCM assigned to replace the nominated SCCM needs to comply with the

requirements of ORO.CC.200(b)(1) and (c).

BY MOST APPROPRIATELY QUALIFIED CABIN CREW MEMBER

The procedures to select the most appropriately qualified cabin crew member to replace the

nominated SCCM should take into account the cabin crew member’s operational experience

and aircraft types/variants qualification.

AMC1 ORO.CC.200(e)(iii) Senior cabin crew member

REPLACEMENT OF SCCM BY THE MOST APPROPRIATELY QUALIFIED CABIN CREW MEMBER

Incapacitated SCCM can be replaced by the most appropriately qualified cabin crew member

for the remainder of the flight if there is no other SCCM on the same flight. Another SCCM

should be made available when the aircraft passes the next operator’s base.

In case of unavailable SCCM, the operator should take into account the available time and

resources at the stopover (layover) point to ensure the unavailable SCCM can be replaced with

another SCCM for the remainder of the series of flights.


REPLACEMENT OF INCAPACITATED OR UNAVAILABLE SCCM BY ANOTHER SCCM

To ensure that another SCCM is assigned without undue delay and that a flight or series of

flights do not depart from an aerodrome where a SCCM is available or can be made available,

the operator should take appropriate measures. These include, but are not limited to the

following:

(1) Utilising a SCCM assigned to another flight and available at the concerned base or

stopover (layover) point if the reporting time for that flight provides sufficient time to

find a replacement; or

(2) Utilising a SCCM on standby to operate the flight or to position to the destination where

the nominated SCCM has become incapacitated or unavailable to operate.


INCAPACITATION OR UNAVAILABILITY

Incapacitation means a sudden degradation of medical fitness that occurs during flight duty

period and precludes the SCCM from performing his/her duties.

Unavailability means unforeseen circumstances at a stopover (layover) destination that

preclude the SCCM from reporting for the remainder of the series of flights, such as traffic

jams that prevent the SCCM from presenting himself/herself at the crew pick-up point in time,

difficulties with local authorities, health problems, death, etc. Unavailability does not refer to

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absence from work due to pregnancy, maternity/paternity leave, parental leave, medical leave

or sick leave.

ORO.CC.205 Reduction of the number of cabin crew during ground operations and

in unforeseen circumstances

…

(c) Conditions:

…

(2) the reduced cabin crew includes a senior cabin crew member as specified in ORO.CC.

200;

AMC1 ORO.GEN.110(f)(h) Operator responsibilities

ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURES

…

(b) When establishing procedures and a checklist system for cabin crew with respect to the

aircraft cabin, the operator should take into account at least the following duties:

Duties Pre-take

off In-flight

Pre-landing

Post-landing

(1) Briefing of cabin crew by the senior

cabin crew member SCCM prior to

commencement of a flight or series

of flights

x

AMC3 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual – general

CONTENTS – COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

1 The OM should contain at least the following information, where applicable, as relevant

for the area and type of operation:

A GENERAL/BASIC

…

4 CREW COMPOSITION

4.1 Crew composition. An explanation of the method for determining crew compositions,

taking account of the following:

…..

(g) the designation of the senior cabin crew member SCCM and, if necessitated

by the duration of the flight, the procedures for the relief of the senior cabin

crew member SCCM and any other member of the cabin crew.

AMC1 ORO.CC.115(e) Conduct of training courses and associated checking

CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT– CRM INSTRUCTORS AND TRAINING PROGRAMMES

…

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(b) CRM training programmes

(1) There should be an effective liaison between flight crew and cabin crew training

departments. Provision should be made to allow, whenever practicable, flight and cabin

crew instructors to observe and comment on each other’s training. Consideration should

be given to creating films of flight deck scenarios for playback to all cabin crew during

recurrent training, and to providing the opportunity for cabin crew members, particularly

senior cabin crew members SCCM, to participate in flight crew line oriented flying training

(LOFT) exercises.

…

(3) CRM training for senior cabin crew member SCCM

(i) CRM training for senior cabin crew members SCCM should be the application

of knowledge gained in previous CRM training and operational experience

relevant to the specific duties and responsibilities of a senior cabin crew

member SCCM.

(ii) The senior cabin crew member SCCM should demonstrate the ability to

manage the operation and take appropriate leadership/management

decisions.

GM1 ORO.CC.115(e) Conduct of training courses and associated checking

CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CRM)

…

(b) General principles for CRM training for cabin crew

…

(2) Whenever practicable, combined training should be provided to flight crew and cabin crew, particularly senior cabin crew members SCCM. This should include feedback.

AMC1 ORO.CC.135 Familiarisation

FAMILIARISATION FLIGHTS AND AIRCRAFT FAMILIARISATION VISITS

…

(b) Familiarisation flights

…

(2) Familiarisation flights should be:

(i) conducted under the supervision of the senior cabin crew member SCCM;

AMC1 ORO.CC.200(c) Senior cabin crew member

TRAINING PROGRAMME

The senior cabin crew member SCCM training course should at least cover the following elements:

AMC1 ORO.CC.200(d) Senior cabin crew member

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RESPONSIBILITY TO THE COMMANDER

When the level of turbulence so requires, and in the absence of any instructions from the flight

crew, the senior cabin crew member SCCM should be entitled to discontinue non-safety related

duties and advise the flight crew of the level of turbulence being experienced and the need for

the fasten seat belt signs to be switched on. This should be followed by the cabin crew

securing the passenger cabin and other relevant areas.

AMC1 ORO.CC.205(c)(1) Reduction of the number of cabin crew during ground

operations and in unforeseen circumstances

PROCEDURES with REDUCED NUMBER OF CABIN CREW

(a) During ground operations, if reducing the applicable minimum required number of cabin crew, the operator should ensure that the procedures required by ORO.CC.205 (c)(1) specify that:

…

(2) a means of initiating an evacuation is available to the senior cabin crew member SCCM or

at least one member of the flight crew is in the flight crew compartment;

…

(5) the senior cabin crew member SCCM should have performed the pre-boarding safety

briefing to the cabin crew; and

II. Communication between a person on board the aircraft and aerodrome services


crew members

Amendment to Annex IV, Part-CAT of the Commission Regulation establishing

Implementing Rules for air operations:

CAT.OP.MPA.195 Refuelling/defuelling with passengers embarking, on board or

disembarking Ground operations with passengers in the absence of flight crew

(a) An aircraft shall not be refuelled/defuelled with Avgas (aviation gasoline) or wide-cut type

fuel or a mixture of these types of fuel, when passengers are embarking, on board or

disembarking.

(b) For all other types of fuel, necessary precautions shall be taken and the aircraft shall be

properly manned by qualified personnel ready to initiate and direct an evacuation of the

aircraft by the most practical and expeditious means available.

For ground operations whenever passengers are embarking, on board or disembarking in the

absence of flight crew members, the operator shall:

(a) establish procedures to alert the aerodrome services in the event of ground emergency

or urgent need; and

(b) ensure that at least one person on board the aircraft is qualified to apply these

procedures and ensure proper coordination between the aircraft and the aerodrome

services.

CAT.OP.MPA.200 Refuelling/defuelling with wide-cut fuel

(a) Refuelling/defuelling with wide-cut fuel shall only be conducted if the operator has

established appropriate procedures taking into account the high risk of using wide-cut

fuel types.

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(b) When passengers are embarking, on board or disembarking:

(1) an aircraft shall not be refuelled/defuelled with Avgas (aviation gasoline) or wide-

cut type fuel or a mixture of these types of fuel; and

(2) for all other types of fuel, necessary precautions shall be taken and the aircraft

shall be properly manned by qualified personnel ready to initiate and direct an

evacuation of the aircraft by the most practical and expeditious means available.

Amendment to the Decision containing AMC and GM to Part-CAT:

AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.195 200(b) Refuelling/defuelling with passengers embarking,

on board or disembarking

REFUELLING/DEFUELLING WITH PASSENGERS EMBARKING, ON BOARD OR DISEMBARKING

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES - GENERAL

(a) When refuelling/defuelling with passengers on board, ground servicing activities and work

inside the aircraft, such as catering and cleaning, should be conducted in such a manner

that they do not create a hazard and allow emergency evacuation to take place through

those aisles and exits intended for emergency evacuation.

(b) The deployment of integral aircraft stairs or the opening of emergency exits as a

prerequisite to refuelling is not necessarily required.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES - AEROPLANES

(c) Operational procedures should specify that at least the following precautions are taken:

(1) one qualified person should remain at a specified location during fuelling operations

with passengers on board. This qualified person should be capable of handling

emergency procedures concerning fire protection and fire-fighting, handling

communications and initiating and directing an evacuation;

(2) two-way communication should be established and should remain available by the

aeroplane's inter-communication system or other suitable means between the

ground crew supervising the refuelling and the qualified personnel on board the

aeroplane; the involved personnel should remain within easy reach of the system of

communication;

(3) crew, personnel and passengers should be warned that re/defuelling will take place;

(4) ‘Fasten Seat Belts’ signs should be off;

(5) ‘NO SMOKING’ signs should be on, together with interior lighting to enable

emergency exits to be identified;

(6) passengers should be instructed to unfasten their seat belts and refrain from

smoking;

(7) the minimum required number of cabin crew should be on board and be prepared

for an immediate emergency evacuation;

(8) if the presence of fuel vapour is detected inside the aeroplane, or any other hazard

arises during re/defuelling, fuelling should be stopped immediately;

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(9) the ground area beneath the exits intended for emergency evacuation and slide

deployment areas should be kept clear at doors where stairs are not in position for

use in the event of evacuation; and

(10) provision is made for a safe and rapid evacuation.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES - HELICOPTERS

(d) Operational procedures should specify that at least the following precautions are taken:

(1) door(s) on the refuelling side of the helicopter remain closed;

(2) door(s) on the non-refuelling side of the helicopter remain open, weather

permitting;

(3) fire-fighting facilities of the appropriate scale be positioned so as to be immediately

available in the event of a fire;

(4) sufficient personnel be immediately available to move passengers clear of the

helicopter in the event of a fire;

(5) sufficient qualified personnel be on board and be prepared for an immediate

emergency evacuation;

(6) if the presence of fuel vapour is detected inside the helicopter, or any other hazard

arises during refuelling/defuelling, fuelling be stopped immediately;

(7) the ground area beneath the exits intended for emergency evacuation and slide

deployment areas be kept clear; and

(8) provision is made for a safe and rapid evacuation.

GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.200(a) Refuelling/defuelling with wide-cut fuel

PROCEDURES FOR REFUELLING/DEFUELLING WITH WIDE-CUT FUEL

(a) ‘Wide cut fuel’ (designated JET B, JP-4 or AVTAG) is an aviation turbine fuel that falls

between gasoline and kerosene in the distillation range and consequently, compared to

kerosene (JET A or JET A1), it has the properties of higher volatility (vapour pressure),

lower flash point and lower freezing point.

(b) Wherever possible, the operator should avoid the use of wide-cut fuel types. If a

situation arises such that only wide-cut fuels are available for refuelling/defuelling,

operators should be aware that mixtures of wide-cut fuels and kerosene turbine fuels can

result in the air/fuel mixture in the tank being in the combustible range at ambient

temperatures. The extra precautions set out below are advisable to avoid arcing in the

tank due to electrostatic discharge. The risk of this type of arcing can be minimised by

the use of a static dissipation additive in the fuel. When this additive is present in the

proportions stated in the fuel specification, the normal fuelling precautions set out below

are considered adequate.

(c) Wide-cut fuel is considered to be ‘involved’ when it is being supplied or when it is already

present in aircraft fuel tanks.

(d) When wide-cut fuel has been used, this should be recorded in the technical log. The next

two uplifts of fuel should be treated as though they too involved the use of wide-cut fuel.

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(e) When refuelling/defuelling with turbine fuels not containing a static dissipator, and where

wide-cut fuels are involved, a substantial reduction on fuelling flow rate is advisable.

Reduced flow rate, as recommended by fuel suppliers and/or aeroplane manufacturers,

has the following benefits:

(1) it allows more time for any static charge build-up in the fuelling equipment to

dissipate before the fuel enters the tank;

(2) it reduces any charge which may build up due to splashing; and

(3) until the fuel inlet point is immersed, it reduces misting in the tank and

consequently the extension of the flammable range of the fuel.

(f) The flow rate reduction necessary is dependent upon the fuelling equipment in use and

the type of filtration employed on the aeroplane fuelling distribution system. It is difficult,

therefore, to quote precise flow rates. Reduction in flow rate is advisable whether

pressure fuelling or over-wing fuelling is employed.

(g) With over-wing fuelling, splashing should be avoided by making sure that the delivery

nozzle extends as far as practicable into the tank. Caution should be exercised to avoid

damaging bag tanks with the nozzle.

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C. Appendices

Appendix A: Acronyms and definitions

ADREP Accident/incident data reporting system data base

AMC Acceptable Means of Compliance

CJAA Central Joint Aviation Authorities

CRM Crew resource management

EASA European Aviation Safety Agency

EC European Commission

EU European Union

EU-OPS Commission Regulation (EC) No 859/2008 of 20 August 2008 amending Council

Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 as regards common technical requirements and

administrative procedures applicable to commercial transportation by aeroplane

GM Guidance Material

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation

JAA Joint Aviation Authorities

JAR-OPS Joint Aviation Requirements for operation of commercial air transport

NPA Notice of Proposed Amendment

OPSG Operations Procedures Steering Group

Part-CAT Annex IV to the Regulation on Air Operations

Part-ORO Annex III to the Regulation on Air Operations

RIA Regulatory Impact Assessment

RMT Rulemaking task

SCCM Senior cabin crew member

ToR Terms of Reference

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D. Attachments

Attachment 1: EASA safety analysis report for RMT.0327/0328 based on data retrieved from

EASA copy of ICAO ADREP data base

european aviation safety agency notice of proposed ... 2012-12.pdf · including airworthiness codes...

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