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Luxembourg in retrospect: a newEurope in prospectSir David Edward

Sir David Edward was a Judge of the European Court of First Instance from1989 to 1992 and of the European Court of Justice from 1992 to January 2004.This article is a revised version of his Valedictory Address delivered in the

Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 28 October 2003. He explains how theEuropean Courts work and gives an impression of what it was like to work as ajudge in that multilingual, multinational and multicultural environment. He setsthe work of the Courts in the wider context of developments since 1950 and looksahead to the challenges facing the new Europe of 25 member states.

Sir David Edward,lately of the

European Court ofJustice

When I went to Luxembourg as a judge inSeptember 1989, the Single European Act hadcome into force only two years before. The 1992programme was gathering pace but was far fromcomplete. We were still 'the EuropeanCommunity'. Maastricht and the European Union,EMU and the euro, Schengen, Amsterdam, Niceand Enlargement all lay in the future. Greece hadbeen a member state for less than ten years andSpain and Portugal for less than four. The BerlinWall was still standing and the GDR was stilloperational. The three Baltic states were anintegral part of the Soviet Union.

Address for correspondence: Professor Sir David Edward, 32Heriot Row, Edinburgh EH3 6ES.Email: david.edward@dileas.net

Then, two months later, the Berlin Wall fell.The Baltic states and many others regained theirindependence, though not without difficulty: in1991 Soviet tanks rolled into Vilnius and killed 14people at the TV tower. As events in Bosniashowed, Europe remained unstable and theeuphoria that provided the initial impetus forMaastricht turned very quickly to disillusionment.

Now we are passing through another period ofdisillusionment. But disillusionment with the

European project is not new. The whole history ofevents since 1950 is one of repeated mood swingsbetween euphoria and disillusionment.

The Schuman Declaration and the

'supranational' Coal and Steel Treaty in1950-1951 were followed almost immediately bythe failure of the European Defence and PoliticalCommunities. As a French participant in thenegotiations for the EEC Treaty has written:

The French delegation fought against theinstitutional system, seeking to reduce thesupranational character of the ECSC model, todelay majority voting and to limit the powers ofthe future European Commission.' In sum, theFrench administration was 'anti' . If one doesn'tknow that, one cannot understand theinstitutional crisis of 1965 in Brussels at the

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LUXEMBOURG IN RETROSPECT

time of General De Gaulle. (Deniau, 1977, p.60)

Nevertheless, the negotiations were successful, andthe period from 1959 to 1964 was one ofenthusiastic implementation of the EEC Treatyduring which the Court of Justice laid theconstitutional foundations of the Community withits judgments in Van Gend en Loos and Costa v

ENEL. But this was followed almost immediatelyby the institutional crisis of the 'empty chair' whenFrance refused to participate in meetings. TheLuxembourg Compromise which brought the crisisto an end admitted a general right of veto evenwhere the Treaty provided for majority voting. Inconsequence, the institutional system, which wassupposed to complete the common market by theend of 1969, ground to a slow crawl.

There have been many false dawns since then.But now the 1992 programme is nearly completeand the internal market is a substantial reality.Although not all EU members are part of them,Schengen is working and the euro is operational.The second and third pillars of Maastricht(Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and HomeAffairs) have led to a degree of close cooperationbetween the member states that was almost

unthinkable fifteen years ago.Above all, we have achieved enlargement.

Historic regions, cities and peoples (the geographyof War and Peace) have emerged from the shadowsof the twentieth century and in many cases haveachieved, for the first time ever, genuineindependence in a stable political environment.

So the fifteen years since I first went toLuxembourg has been a truly historic period. Howdid it appear at the time to a Judge of the EuropeanCourt (the ECJ)? What have been the successesand disappointments, the frustrations, theenthusiasms and failures?

Luxembourg in retrospect

For the most part, I had no sense of being at thecentre of things. It is true that the ECJ can nolonger be said to be 'tucked away in the fairylandGrand Duchy of Luxembourg, and blessed withbenign neglect by the powers that be and the massmedia' (a remark attributed to Professor Eric Steinof the University of Michigan). The fairyland hasbecome a post-modern jungle of banks and financehouses and, particularly in the mid-1990s, theCourt was far from neglected by the powers that be

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and the mass media. But Luxembourg remainsrelatively remote from the frenetic political villageof Brussels and, by and large, the Court has beenleft to get on with its work. The Court's judgmentssometimes cause a ripple on the surface of publicconsciousness and, very occasionally, a tidal wave.

Public, political and media reactions are quiteunpredictable. Judgments of the plenary court incases that were said to threaten the veryfoundations of the health care systems in themember states (e.g. Smits & Peerbooms) passedalmost without comment. But a judgment of achamber of five judges that seemed to follow well­established case law on the taxation of parent andsubsidiary companies (Bosal Holdings) led to anarticle in the Financial Times by CommissionerFrits Bolkestein entitled 'Company tax law mustnot be made in court'. The headline distorted theCommissioner's message: if the member states wantto control the agenda, they must be prepared tolegislate in the field of direct taxation. In a sense,that has always been the story. Litigants andtaxpayers do not wait for the legislator: they go tocourt to prove their point and the legislatorfollows.

The Court's judgments

sometimes cause a rippleon$;

the surface of public

consciousness and, veryoccasionally, a tidal vvave

The Court of First Instance

I went to Luxembourg in 1989 as the first Britishjudge of the Court of First Instance. This was anew institution with two limited and quiteunrelated categories of jurisdiction: staff cases,where the Court acts as an Employment AppealTribunal, and competition cases, where it acts as aCompetition Appeal Tribunal.

Some of the staff cases displayed an exaggeratedlegalism, perhaps inherited from the high-flownconception of la fonction publique on which theCommunity civil service had been based. But thestaff cases also showed up genuine injl,itices and,above all, the lack of a rational and transparentcareer structure for Community civil servants.Nationality is allowed to play too great a role inrecruitment and promotion. This is a fundamental

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flaw in the system for which the member states arelargely responsible and I do not believe it will besolved by the facile remedies of managementtechniques.

Nationality is allovve

and promotion

The competltlOn cases were concernedessentially with two areas - on the one hand,restraining the economic, and therefore the social,power of corporations and, on the other,'maintaining the constitutionality of bureaucracy'- a phrase coined by Professor John Mitchell, whotaught me constitutional law and whose Chair Iinherited at the University of Edinburgh. As hesaid, 'the disciplines of courts help governments tobe good, even more than they compel them to beso' (Mitchell, 1968). It is through judicial reviewof their acts that administrators learn that theyhave to comply with certain rules and observecertain standards.

What did I learn from my time at the Court ofFirst Instance? First, I learned (or tried to learn)the lessons that all British advocates have to learn

when they make the passage from the Bar (lawyer)to the Bench (judge): to keep quiet, and toappreciate that others may take a quite differentview of the same facts and circumstances,including the assessment of people and theirmotives. I also learned something I am sorry I didnot learn earlier - how much you can see (andhear) from the Bench of what is going on at theBar.

Second, I learned 'EC] method' - how to be ajudge in quite a different system. I will come backto that.

Third, I took part in establishing anddeveloping procedures that would enable the newCourt to perform effectively the role assigned to it- better fact-finding, or rather, better control offact-finding by the institutions, especially theCommission. In essence, our task was to ensure ahigher degree of 'quality control' in decision­making. On the whole, I think we were successful.

The Court of JusticeIn 1992, I passed from the Court of First Instanceto the Court of Justice. That was very different.Whereas the Court of First Instance worked almost

exclusively in chambers of three or five judges, the

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Court of Justice worked a good deal of the time inplenary. The number of Judges did not changesignificantly while I was there: there were thirteenwhen I joined in 1992 and fifteen when I left in2004. But the Court felt smaller in the early days,even in plenary, perhaps because we sat fairly closetogether round a table rather than, as becamenecessary later, in a horseshoe formation at oneend of a much larger table. Sometimes, if theargument became heated, as it occasionally did,one felt uncomfortably close.

There were strong personalities: FedericoMancini - tall, handsome and opinionated, apassionate and amusing Euro-enthusiast; ReneJoliet - learned, equally opinionated, almost Euro­sceptically dry, withdrawn but with a vulnerablecharm; Kostas Kakouris - deeply religious,passionate about human rights and distrustful ofreason as the solution to every problem('sometimes one must believe'); and FernandGrevisse - a man of infinite courtesy, thedistinction of whose career during World War IIwas only revealed at his funeral with full militaryhonours at Les Invalides.

The ECJ is different from any national court fora variety of reasons. It must work in all the officiallanguages - eleven when I left, now twenty. Itsjudgments must be written in one language(currently French) and then translated into all theothers. The Judges must try to understand themethods and concepts of quite different legalsystems - more than fifteen before I left, nownearly thirty. And one aspect at least of theprocedure is unique.

The system of 'preliminary references' underArticle 234 (formerly Article 177) of the Treatyempowers any court or tribunal of any memberstate to ask the ECJ to state what is the law to beapplied before the case is decided. When the casecomes to the ECJ, there will not necessarily havebeen any judgment of any national court dealingwith the point at issue. As Justice Ruth BaderGinsburg of the US Supreme Court remarkedwhen discussing it with us, 'I see that the EC] isnot a court of first instance, but it may often be thecourt of first look'.

The reference from the national court will be

written in one language and couched in theconcepts of one legal system. But the answer to begiven by the EC] must be capable of being appliedin any language by the judges of any legal system.The reference will often have been made by thenational judge without the help - and in somecases without the knowledge - of the parties. The

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parties and the member states may, but need not,intervene before the EC] to plead their point ofview, and the Court has no power to compel themto do so. The factual background may beincomplete or unexplained, and the legal contextin which the case arose before the national court

may be uncertain or obscure. The oral hearing mayor may not fill the gaps or contribute to one'sunderstanding of the case.

Although the purpose of the procedure is toenable the EC] to interpret the law to be applied,the Court is charged by the Treaty with the duty ofensuring that 'in the interpretation and application

of this Treaty the law is applied' (Article 220). Soit may be necessary, not only to interpret the lawbut to give some guidance to the national court asto how the law should be applied to thecircumstances of the particular case.

These special features of the EC] explain theimportance of the complementary roles of theJudges (especially the Judge Rapporteur) and theAdvocate General.

The role of the Advocate General is widelymisunderstood and widely misrepresented. It isoften said that 'in 80% of cases the Court followsthe Advocate General'. This is true in the sense

that, in a large proportion of cases, the Courtreaches the same result as the Advocate General.

This is not surprising because there will often bebroad agreement as to what the result should be ­indeed, it may be fairly obvious from thebeginning. But even where the result is obvious,there may be different reasons for arriving at it.

The function of the Advocate General is

neither to give a judgment nor, in spite of theEnglish text of the Treaty (Article 222 EC Treaty),to make 'submissions'. Although it is a 'judicial'function, the Advocate General is neither a judgenor an advocate. His or her function is to providethe Judges with an 'opinion', analysing the issuesand the strength of the conflicting arguments,setting out the options and making a proposal as tohow the case should be solved. Above all, theAdvocates General have the privilege of writing intheir own language and in their own individualstyle.

The function of the Judges is not to decidewhether the Advocate General was right or wrong,but to determine collectively (as a 'college') howthe case should be decided, what reasons should begiven and how they should be expressed. TheJudges come from different countries and differentlegal traditions using different languages. Theyhave to deliberate and write their judgment in a

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language which, for the majority, is not theirmother tongue.

The function of the Judge Rapporteur is toprepare the case for the other Judges, to identifythe important points and the potential pitfalls, towrite a draft judgment on the basis of which theJudges can deliberate and give effect to what theydecide.

Fernand Grevisse said that 'deliberation is theheart of our work'. Deliberation (le delibere) is theprocess by which the Judges, either in writing ormeeting together, debate how the case should besolved. It is not unique to the Court of Justice ­many continental courts work in that way - but itis particularly important for the working of the ECJand is probably the most fundamental point ofdifference between it and any court in thecommon law world.

When I produced my first draft judgment, oneof my colleagues said, 'That is a very good opinion,now we must make it a judgment. We must make itaseptic.' The scope for individuality lies, not in thepublic expression of one's own opinion, but in thedevelopment of personal relationships so as to beable to persuade others of one's point of view andto accommodate or reconcile divergent points ofview.

The purpose of deliberatio

judgment that all the

Judges can accept as leg,

defensible even if they

disagree vvith the result,

vvhich is very importaQt

judgment that vvillvvork"ilJ++'Q

all languages and all legalsystems

In common with the tradition in most member

states, no dissenting opinions are possible, but thisdoes not imply that there is no jinternaldisagreement between the Judges. On the contrary,there are often strong disagreements and the skillsof advocacy learned at the Bar can be useful inpersuading other Judges to one's point of view. Butthe purpose of deliberation is, in the end, to

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produce a judgment that all the Judges can accept aslegally defensible even if they disagree with theresult, and - which is very important - a judgmentthat will work in all languages and all legal systems.

There is therefore a strong incentive toconciliate. Of course, it is sometimes frustratingnot to be able to speak with one's own voice as anAdvocate General can do and it is sometimes

necessary to go along with a judgment thatrepresents the lowest common denominator ofconflicting opinions. But it is a system with whichI felt comfortable. The principle of collegiality isan incentive to judicial modesty, as it is intendedto be, and it is well adapted to the needs of a courtthat has to work in the multilingual, multinationaland multicultural environment of the EuropeanUnion. The individual Judges cannot be criticisedfor disloyalty to the interests of their own countrynor, correspondingly, can the member states findan excuse for not accepting the Court's judgmenton the ground that 'their' Judge did not vote for it.Above all, it ensures an absence of ideologicallobbies. In my experience, it was never possible topredict with certainty how any particular Judgewould react to a particular case.

The Court has often been criticised for

'activism' in promoting an integrationist agenda.Other commentators, taking the opposite point ofview, have referred to a bygone 'heroic period'during which the Court, in coalition with theCommission, was the 'motor of integration': now,they say, the Court shows greater deference to themember states and the coalition with theCommission has come to an end. Since boththeories are advanced on the basis of the same

evidence, neither is likely to be true. But even if,like all generalisations, they contain a grain oftruth, I do not see things that way.

Until Maastricht, integration was the agenda ofthe Treaty. The Maastricht, Amsterdam and NiceTreaties have changed the emphasis, givingsubsidiarity as great an importance as the 'ever­closer union'. So if (which I do not believe) theCourt has shown greater deference to the memberstates, this is because it is the duty of the Court tointerpret the treaties as they are, not ascommentators on either side would like them tobe. If there ever was a coalition between the Court

and the Commission, it is surely a sign ofinstitutional maturity that they can liveindependent lives.

The problems faced by the Court in the 1990swere different from those of the so-called heroic

period. Most (though not all) of the major

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constitutional decisions had already been taken.The Court had established the principles of theprimacy and direct effect of Community law (VanGend en Loos, Costa v ENEL and Factortame) andstate liability for loss caused by failure to complywith Community law (Francovich). But twoproblems remained - or rather one problem withtwo aspects. First, the basic principles had to beapplied to new situations which did not quite fitthe formulae by which the principles hadtraditionally been stated. Second, in order to do so,the principles had to be shown to be based on acoherent legal theory. This was done, essentially,by reliance on the conventional criteria of publicinternational law and, especially, that of obligation.

Treaties are international contracts creatingmutual obligations between states. The contractingparties cannot resile unilaterally from theobligations they have undertaken. That, inCommunity law, is the doctrine of primacy. Wherethe parties have no freedom of manoeuvre, theycannot avoid judicial enforcement of theirobligations - the doctrine of direct effect. Andparties must make good any damage caused byfailure to fulfil their obligations - the doctrine ofstate liability. Repeatedly, in the case law of theCourt during the past decade, emphasis is placedon the obligations of the member states and of theinstitutions, vis-a.-vis each other and also towardsthose who are affected by what they do(lnterenvironnement Wallonie, Portugal v Counciland Kobler).

Next, in at least three important respects, theCourt had to refine the criteria to be used in

applying the principles of Community law. First,the basis of state liability for breach of Communitylaw appeared to be different from that on whichthe Community institutions could be held liablefor the consequences of unlawful decisions on theirpart. This was illogical and a common basis ofliability had to be established (Brasserie du Pecheur,

Oillenkoffer and Bergaderm).

Second, while it had been accepted that themember states retain their autonomy in matters ofprocedure, it became necessary to define the limitsof that autonomy. This was done by introducingthe principles of equivalence and effectiveness: theremedies available for breach of Community lawmust at least be equivalent to those,available forbreach of national law and they must be effective(see, for example, Case C-78/98 Preston & Others).

Third, the Court refiri'€d the principle ofproportionality and generalised its application.Proportionality is the principle that defines the

wrote:

LUXEMBOURG IN RETROSPECT

circumstances in which administrative or legislativeaction can interfere with individual rights. Theremust be a legitimate and overriding objective ofpublic interest. The measure taken must benecessary to achieve that purpose, and it must beproportionate (in the narrow sense) in going nofurther than is necessary to achieve that purpose.

These criteria have been applied to theadministrative and legislative acts of theCommunity institutions and to measures taken bymember states whose effect is to limit or interfere

with the economic freedoms guaranteed by theTreaty (freedom of movement of goods, persons,services and capital; see, for example, Case 55/94Gebhard). This is essential if the internal market isreally to be 'an area without frontiers in whichfreedom of movement of goods, persons, servicesand capital is ensured' (Article 14(2) EC Treaty).

The internal market is not, and never was, apurely economic goal, still less is it simply a freetrade area. Taken together with Union citizenshipintroduced by the Maastricht Treaty (Articles 17­22 EC Treaty), its purpose is to ensure the legallyenforceable right of citizens to go where they wishand take their families with them, to live wherethey like and to trade and to work where they can.This is fundamental to the Community idea. Thetask of the Court - not always an easy one - hasbeen to hold the member states to their contractwith each other and with their citizens.

I accept that not every judgment of the Courtto which I signed my name is a model of clarity orlogic. That is hardly surprising since I signed morethan 1300 judgments and was Judge Rapporteur for300 of them. For all judges, there will always be atension between achieving impregnable legalreasoning and achieving a practical, workableresult, acceptable to common sense and justice,and doing so within a reasonable time. The best Ican claim for the Court of Justice during my time isthat it has become an accepted and respected part,not only of the Community legal system, but alsoof the national legal systems, including our own.

That is good, not only for lawyers, but for theindividual too. To quote John Mitchell again:

Governments and governmental bodies have asmany reasons for conniving amongstthemselves as they have for opposing eachother and it is important that, withinacceptable limits, individuals should be able toparticipate, through the neutral mechanism ofcourts, not merely in maintaining theframework of rules, but also in advancing its

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construction. The role of courts has - or shouldhave - something to do with the realities ofdemocracy since it is through them that theindividual can play a larger part in governmentwhile gaining a greater sense of security.(Mitchell, 1968)

Looking back, my chief regret is that the Court didnot succeed in putting an end to 'reversediscrimination' - the idea that, because we aredealing with international treaties, member statesare entitled to treat their own citizens less

favourably than they are required to treat thecitizens of the other member states.

A nevv Europe in prospect

In the declaration that started it all, RobertSchuman, the Foreign Minister of France, said:

Europe will not be conjured up at a stroke or bysome master plan. It will be attained throughconcrete achievements that lead to a practicalcommunity of interest.

For all that the sceptics may say, there have beenconcrete achievements that have led to a practicalcommunity of interest for the individual as well asfor governments: citizenship and non­discrimination, a vastly greater concern for humanrights, the achievement of the internal marketand, although not all members are part of them,Schengen and the euro.

Above all, there is an institutional frameworkwithin which, for the first time in history, thepeoples of Europe can work together for commonsocial, political and economic goals. Jean Monnetliked to quote the Swiss Henri Frederic Amiel:

Each man's experience starts again from thebeginning. Only institutions grow wiser; theyaccumulate collective experience; and from thisexperience and wisdom, men subject to thesame laws will gradually find, not that theirnatures change but that their behaviour does.(Duchene,1994,p.401)

Pursuing the same line of thought, Monnt;t himself/

Men who are placed in'l1ew practicalcircumstances, or subjected to a new set ofobligations, adapt their behaviour and become

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different. If the new context is better, theythemselves become better: that is the whole

rationale of the European Community, and theprocess of civilisation itself. The difficulties thatEuropeans still encounter every day in theirrelations with each other should not mislead us:

those difficulties are now internal problems,similar to those which we normally solve,within our countries, by discussion and freelyagreed decisions. Like all practical systems, theCommunity cannot prevent problems arising:but it offers a framework and a means for

solving them peacefully. That is a fundamentalchange by comparison with the past - the veryrecent past. (Monnet, 1978, pp. 389-90)

We are now facing a new challenge. The centre ofgravity of the European Union has shiftedeastwards and the dynamics of the system arebound to change. A Court of 25 judges cannotwork in the same way as the Court of fifteen judgesin which I worked. The same must be true of theother institutions. The 'ever-closer union' is bound

to be different from what was envisaged in the1950s. But we also need to consider whether, and ifso in what sense, the European Union can be a'union of sovereign nation states'.

Whatever vve call it,are necessarily disca constitution

Under public international law, all states areequal. Malta with 400000 inhabitants is as much astate as Germany with 90 million. Some statescannot be more equal than others and the power ofveto (if that be the badge of sovereignty) must bethe same for all. Yet the larger member states claim- with some reason - that power should bemodulated in proportion to population. Thelogical consequence must be a system of qualifiedmajority voting. If so, the legal consequence mustbe a departure from the traditional canons ofpublic international law and a movement towardsthose of constitutional law. Whatever we call it,we are necessarily discussing a constitution.

Constitutions - at least for entities as complexas the European Union - necessarily implycompromise. Population (statistical democracy)cannot be the sole determinant. New Hampshireand Bremen must, in some respects and for somepurposes, wield the same power as California or

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Bavaria. There must, as Madison saw more thantwo hundred years ago, be checks and balances.

It is useful to remember where this idea camefrom. It derived from the Calvinist view of man

taught to Madison by President Witherspoon, anexiled Scot, at Prince ton University. The depravityof man requires a distrust of everything he does,especially in politics. Political power affords thegreatest temptation for human weakness, whichrequires a system of government that pits ambitionagainst ambition (Sheldon, 2001).

This approach to constitution-building wasrefined by James Bryce, an Ulster Scot, who playeda major role in devising the constitution ofAustralia and elsewhere. In an essay entitled 'Theaction of centripetal and centrifugal forces onpolitical constitutions', he argued that the purposeof a good constitution should be to restrain theforces that divide (the centrifugal forces) such asethnic rivalry, religious differences and economicgrievances, and to promote the forces that unite(the centripetal forces), notably trade and freedomof movement (Bryce, 1901). To achieve this,power should be devolved as much as possible,central power should be restrained and, ifnecessary, special exceptions should be made todeal with special situations.

These are not new ideas and they remain goodcriteria for building a workable constitution. Inparticular, we should recognise that distrust ofpower is a healthy instinct. In an essay onEdinburgh, the novelist Muriel Spark wrote:

In my time, the society existing around [theCastle Rock] generally regarded thegovernment and bureaucracy of Whitehall asjust a bit ridiculous. The influence of a placevaries according to the individual. I imbibed,through no particular mentor, but just bybreathing the informed air of the place, itshaughty and remote anarchism. I can nevernow suffer from a shattered faith in politics andpoliticians, because I never had any. (Spark,1970, p. 153)

The importance of vvhyFor myself, I believe that our endless discussion ofHow has caused us to lose sight of Why. When Ifirst became involved in European affairs as adelegate to the Council of Bars and Law Societiesof the EC, the older members included one whohad lost a leg at Stalingrad; one who had endedthe War as the commander of a Hitler Youth

LUXEMBOURG IN RETROSPECT

Battalion and woke every night from thenightmare of hearing the boys' voices calling fortheir mothers; two who had been in concentrationcamps - one of them in Dachau; one who had beenin the Dutch Resistance; and a Belgian ofRomanian Jewish ancestry who spent six weeks in ahen house in the middle of a field waiting to guidethe paratroopers at Arnhem. If that generatiqnwere prepared to make the effort of reconciliationfor the sake of future generations - and it was agreat effort for some - why should not I?

The tension between the political andeCQnomic arguments for integration and respect fordiversity will always be there. In the City ofLuxembourg, on one side of the valley stands thehouse in which Robert Schuman, the father ofEuropean integration, was born. On the other side,on the wall of the old Fish Market, there is aninscription which has almost become the unofficialmotto of Luxembourg: Mir wolle bleiwe wat Mir sin(We want to remain what we are).

Making a success of enlargement will call forsacrifices and compromises, political andeconomic. We should remember that all Europeanpeoples have had 1000 years of history. The onlydifference is that some have been more fortunatethan others.

References

Bolkestein F (2003) Company tax law must not be made incourt. Financial Times, 21 October.

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Bryce JB (1901) The action of centripetal and centrifugalforces on political constitutions. In: Studies in History andJurisprudence, Essay no. IV. New York ,and Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

Deniau JF (1977) L'Europe Imerdite. Paris: Seuil.

Duchene F (1994) Jean Monnet, the First Statesman of

Interdependence. New York: Norton.Mitchell JDB (1968) Why European Institutions'. Inaugural

Lecture at the University of Edinburgh, 5 November 1968.

Monnet J (1978) Memoirs (translated by R Mayne). London:Collins.

Sheldon GW (2001) The Political Philosophy of James Madison,

p. 24. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Spark M (1970) What images remain. In: Miller K (ed.)

Memoirs of a Modem Scotland. London: Faber & Faber.

CasesCase C-352/98P Bergaderm [2000] ECR 529l.

Case C-168/01 Bosal Holdings, judgment of 18 September2003.

Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur &Factortame [1996] ECR 1-1029.

Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.

Joined Cases C-178/94 and others Dillenkoffer [1996] ECR 1-4845.

Case C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR 1-2433.Case C-6&9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR 1-5357.Case 55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR 1-4165.

Case C-129/96 Inter-Environnemem Wallonie [1997] ECR 1-741l.

Case 224/01 Kobler Judgment of 30 September 2003.Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR 1-8395.Case C-78/98 Preston & Others, [2000] ECR 1-3201.Case C-157/99 Smits & Peerbooms [2001] ECR 5473.Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1.