european perspective on the bri - ipe-berlin.org · −2049: strong, modern socialist country...
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BRI as part of China’s global ambitions
▪ Anniversary targets drive economic policies
− 2021: Moderately prosperous society
− 2049: Strong, modern socialist country
▪ Impressive “to-do” list:
1
Domestic- 2020 targets
- Middle-income trap
- Environment
- Poverty
- Quality growth
Global- Belt and Road
- OFDI
- Going global by
companies
Technology- Innovation
- Made in China 2025
- Digital economy
- Defense technology
Geopolitical- Restore global
leadership
- Rival US
- Defense interests
Vision and goals
(„Vision and Actions“ 2015, „Maritime Vision“ 2017, „Progress, Contributions and Prospects“ 2019)
4
▪ Singing of FTA and BITs
▪ Develope new markets
▪ Secure energy
▪ Re-arrange global supply chains
around China
▪ Explore new investment opportunities
▪ Export overcapacities
▪ Singning of bilarteral MoUs
▪ Statements endorsing BRI on (sub-)regional
forums (e.g. 17+1)
▪ International BRI summits
▪ UN resolutionen
Economic development Geopolitical development
Taking stock after 5 years
▪Consolidation, expansion and counter actions
Putting it in perspective: Domestic investment dwarfs BRI
5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
FAI in trillion CNY
Focus on Europe´s periphery via infrastructure
14
0
14
43
80 17
9
0 0
20
46
0 0 10
54
73
3
0 0
17
70
0 096
0
10
32 47
71
42
43
11
69
2
24
22
81
11
26
27
37
42
11
29
51
8
56
87
0
11
99
5
27
55
81
24
21
32
FUNDS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE IN CEEC (EUR MILLIONS)
China (bank loans) 2013-2018 EU, EIB, EBRD funds 2013-2020
Build up of Chinese debt
16
35
Munich Security Report 2019
Source: Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS)27
Infrastructure funds and loans to the
Western Balkans, 2013-18, EUR millions
Share of commited Chinese infrastructure loans in relation to other externally
held debt, 2018, percent*
Source: Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS)28
363614 574
787
796344
850
2,244
00
0
1,275
1,6620
2,858
1,809
1,184
1,849
796
2,512
Committed Chinese infrastructure loans
Announced Chinese infrastructure loans
Committed European infrastructure
funds and loans
14 2039
12
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Macedonia Montenegro
100%
Serbia
Source: Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS)29
MacedoniaAlbania Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Montenegro Serbia
Th in k tank s (M ac ed on ia): The CCP has promoted increasingly dense think tank exchanges between state-led Chinese institutions and partners from Macedonia as well as other Balkan countries, such as the China-CEEC Think Tank Network, and uses these exchanges to popularize Chinese core interests.
Ec on om y (M on teneg ro ): A EUR 809 m illion loan for the construction of the first stretch of a highway to Serbia has sent Montenegro ’s debt soaring to an unsustainable 80 percent of GDP, raising widespread concerns about Beijing subjecting Montenegro to “debt-trap diplomacy.”
M ed ia (Serb ia): The Communist Party of China (CCP) promotes “positive” China coverage through bolstering state media cooperation with Serbian media outlets, orchestrating, for example, joint symposiums on ‘sound journalism.’ Serbian media have also regularly published opinion pieces by Xi Jinping.
HOW DO THE EU AND
CHINA COMPARE ON
INFRASTRUCTURE
FUNDS AND LOANS IN
W ESTERN BALKAN
16+ 1 COUNTRIES?
HOW MUCH DO
W ESTERN BALKAN
16+ 1 COUNTRIES
OWE TO CHINA?
EXAMPLES OF CHINESE
INFLUENCE IN
W ESTERN BALKAN
16+ 1 COUNTRIES
* Most recent data from respective national banks: Bosnia and Herzegovina (2017), Macedonia (2018),
Montenegro (2017), Serbia (2018)
Source: Munich Security Report 2019, p 35 (based on MERICS research)