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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

1999 ««««

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2004

Session document

FINAL A5-0086/2000

PART 2

24 March 2000

REPORT

on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Committee on Constitutional Affairs

Rapporteur: Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos

Jo Leinen

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CONTENTS

Page

MINORITY OPINION............................................................................................................... 4 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY.................................................................. 5 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS ................................................................. 11 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY CONTROL........................................ 16 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CITIZENS' FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS ........................................................................................... 27 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS............ 31 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND THE INTERNAL MARKET............................................................................................................. 34 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, EXTERNAL TRADE, RESEARCH AND ENERGY......................................................................................................................... 44 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS .............. 56 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH AND CONSUMER POLICY................................................................................................... 60 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT...................................................................................................................... 63 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES................................................................ 67 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL POLICY, TRANSPORT AND TOURISM....................................................................................................................... 73 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE, YOUTH, EDUCATION, THE MEDIA AND SPORT....................................................................................................... 76 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND EQUAL

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OPPORTUNITIES.................................................................................................................... 82

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24 March 2000

MINORITY OPINION

by Georges BERTHU

on behalf of the Union for a Europe of Nations Group The shortcomings we condemned in the first Dimitrakopoulos-Leinen report are even more evident in the second report on preparations for the Intergovernmental Conference. The end effect of the numerous proposals for a super-State and full integration was to alarm the small countries - hence the qualified support secured by the report in committee - without really making a convincing case that these proposals would allow effective decision-making in an enlarged Union. In particular, making qualified majority voting the general rule, which entails imposing unwanted regulations on the minority, is a solution that is acceptable in a national democracy but it can only be a legal illusion in a heterogeneous international association. It seems to us that for a long time now the federalists have misinterpreted the Luxembourg compromise, which they see as a blocking right. It should, on the contrary, be regarded in a positive light as a safety net enabling each country to enter into negotiations with the others, and even to accept majority votes with fewer reservations, since they all know that in the final analysis they will always remain in control of their rights. In this sense, the Luxembourg compromise, far from impeding cooperation, actually facilitates it. This is why we are calling, with a view to enlargement, for this safeguard clause to be given official status for all parties to the Treaty, without small-minded restrictions or equivocation. It would demonstrate that the Union remains an association of States in which the national democracies hold the principal legitimacy and respect each other. It would thus enhance the democracy of the European system. It would also automatically regulate relations between the States, without the need for further amendment of the treaties, since it could be used to a greater or lesser extent, as the need arose. We regard full recognition of the Luxembourg compromise as the guarantee of a balanced Europe. On the other hand, where the situation varies from one country to another, it should, of course, be easy to make provision for differentiated, closer or more limited forms of cooperation. This is the thrust of our amendments.

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28 February 2000

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsman: Elmar Brok

PROCEDURE

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy appointed Elmar Brok draftsman at its meeting of 25 November 1999.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 10 January, 31 January and 24 February 2000.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions by 32 votes to 6, with 5 abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: Gary Titley, acting chairman; Bastiaan Belder, Andre Brie, Gunilla Carlsson, Carlos Carnero González (for Rosa M. Díez González), María Carrilho (for Mário Soares), Gérard Caudron (for Sami Naïr), John Walls Cushnahan, Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos (for Elmar Brok, draftsman), Juan Manuel Fabra Vallés, Giovanni Claudio Fava (for Claudio Martelli), Monica Frassoni (for Daniel Marc Cohn-Bendit), Michael Gahler, Per Gahrton, Vitalino Gemelli (for Jas Gawronski), Marietta Giannakou-Koutsikou, Alfred Gomolka, Klaus Hänsch, Magdalene Hoff, Giorgos Katiforis (for Petros Efthymiou), Efstratios Korakas, Jan Joost Lagendijk, Patricia McKenna (for Elisabeth Schroedter), Cecilia Malmström (for Haarder), Pedro Marset Campos, Emilio Menéndez del Valle, Philippe Morillon, Pasqualina Napoletano, Arie M. Oostlander, Hans-Gert Poettering, Jacques F. Poos, Luís Queiró, Lennart Sacrédeus (for Stenzel), Jannis Sakellariou, Jacques Santer, Pierre Schori, Mariotto Segni (for Muscardini), Ioannis Souladakis, Hannes Swoboda, Freddy Thielemans, Johan Van Hecke, Jan Marinus Wiersma and Matti Wuori.

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SHORT JUSTIFICATION

I. Preliminary remarks

This opinion for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs concerning proposals for revision of the treaties cannot give a comprehensive overview of a common European Foreign and Security Policy.

This is a matter for other reports by the Foreign Affairs Committee.

This opinion seeks rather to set out what treaty framework and what instruments are required to give a common foreign and security policy an independent European profile, if there is the political will to do so.

Revision of the treaties is necessary to ensure that the EU remains capable of action even after enlargement. It is worth noting that the enlargement of the EU to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will in itself provide greater stability in Europe in terms of security and that this is why it was speeded up further at Helsinki after the Balkan crisis.

Starting from the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam and their implementation and in the light of the most recent decisions of the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils to create the operational capability for a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), your draftsman will attempt to put forward a number of conclusions.

II. Positive outcomes of Amsterdam

The Amsterdam Treaty has brought a number of significant improvements in quality that have enhanced the effectiveness of the CFSP: • in the area of analysis capability:

- creation of a planning and early warning unit, now called the ‘policy unit’ reporting to the Secretary-General/High Representative of the Council;

• in the area of visibility and external representation:

- creation of the office of High Representative (Article 26), - creation of a new Troika composed of the Presidency, the High Representative and

the Commissioner for External Relations (Article 18);

• in the area of policy-making - creation of the new instrument of common strategies (Article 13);

• in the area of decision-making:

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- introduction of qualified majority decisions for matters relating to common strategies (Article 23(2)) which have no military or defence policy implications;

- introduction of the ‘constructive abstention’ to allow a coalition of Member States that are ‘willing and able’ to take action, provided that not more than one third have abstained (Article 23(1));

• in the area of security and defence policy:

- recourse to the WEU and incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the Treaty.

These innovations have introduced a number of fundamental Community elements into the intergovernmental procedures of the second pillar and laid the foundations for the gradual establishment of a common defence policy.

The provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty that offer the greatest potential for developing a genuine common foreign and defence policy are undoubtedly those relating to the High Representative, including the policy unit, common strategies, constructive abstention and the Petersberg tasks.

The negative outcomes of Amsterdam include:

• allowing Member States a veto for important reasons of national policy in qualified

majority votes, and referral to the European Council for decision by unanimity (Article 23(2) second paragraph),

• the failure to endow the Union with legal personality for its actions in international relations,

• the provisions on closer cooperation (flexibility clause – Article 43) are too complex, give an individual Member State the right of veto, and do not apply to the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

III. New constitutional reality as a result of implementation

With the appointment of Javier Solana as High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary-General of the WEU, the adoption of the first common strategy on Russia and the Ukraine and the preparation of further strategies for South-East Europe and Mediterranean policy, but above all with the decisions taken by the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils, which mark a decisive step forward in European security and defence policy, there is clear evidence of the political determination to strengthen the institutional, civil and military aspects of the CFSP in a lasting way. Above all with the decision to create the capability for autonomous military action, the debate on reform of the CFSP, which hitherto focused primarily on institutional matters, has

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for the first time acquired real substance, which strengthens the CFSP’s ability to act effectively in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management in and around Europe. By allowing the possibility of decision-making in accordance with the principle of constructive abstention pursuant to Article 23 for the implementation of Petersberg tasks, Helsinki has set clear guidelines for the implementation of a Common European Security and Defence Policy∗, with the creation of: (a) a military capability for Petersberg tasks, (b) a standing Political and Security Committee (PSC)∗

• a Military Committee (MC)∗ • a military staff

(c) a coordination mechanism for civilian crisis management.

The decisions taken in Helsinki leave open the question of whether and to what extent Treaty amendments are required to achieve a Common European Security and Defence Policy. The Portuguese Presidency was mandated to examine this matter.

A Council legal opinion of 26 November 1999 provisionally concluded that all decisions on security and defence policy, as they emerge from the Finnish Presidency’s progress report, could be covered by existing Treaty articles, in particular Article 18(2) and Article 26, under which the Presidency and the High Representative are responsible for implementing decisions taken by the Council pursuant to Article 13(3).

With regard to recourse by the EU to the WEU for framing and implementing Union decisions and actions with defence policy implications (Article 17(3)), the Council’s Legal Service argues that the wording of this provision makes such recourse optional and involves no obligation whatsoever on the Union, which is therefore perfectly able to take decisions with defence policy implications on its own authority.

CONCLUSIONS

In the light of the considerations above, your draftsman proposes to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, the following conclusions concerning possible Treaty amendments:

∗ Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) ∗ Political and Security Committee (PSC) ∗ Military Committee (MC)

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1. The main goal for the further development of the CFSP remains the creation of a

European Foreign Office with a common foreign representation within the framework of the structures of the EU Commission.

2. When developing operational capabilities for European crisis management within the framework of the Petersberg tasks, care should be taken, after the experience in the Balkans, to avoid a split between civilian and military crisis management and to ensure that a higher joint decision-making body is responsible for military and non-military crisis management, with appropriate Commission participation; the resulting dovetailing of military and non-military instruments and measures should not compromise the primary goal of civilian conflict prevention; Such a unified decision-making competence should lie with the standing Political and Security Committee, in which the Commission should be suitably involved.

3. As a matter of principle, Community competence, particularly in non-military crisis management, should be strengthened in a way that ensures the greatest possible coherence with a view to the integration of all 'pillars' in the Community structure. The Commission must be given a leading role in coordinating Community and national non-military instruments in international crisis management.

4. A Council of Defence Ministers should be instituted. 5. If the WEU’s functions in performing Petersberg tasks are transferred to the EU by

the end of 2000, a number of paragraphs of Article 17 will have to be revised (possibly removal of references to recourse to the WEU).

6. When the functions of the WEU for the execution of the Petersberg tasks are

transferred to the EU, there will be a need for a new provision for parliamentary involvement in second pillar affairs, for example in the form of a mixed assembly of national parliaments and the European Parliament.

7. Transferring the institutional structures and operational capacities of the WEU to the

EU would remove much of the substance of the WEU Treaty. One area in particular would require a Treaty amendment, namely to cater for the mutual assistance clause under Article V of the WEU Treaty. This could be added in the form of a protocol to the EU Treaty, which would leave the decision on whether to accede to each Member State alone.

8. The existing ‘Political Committee’ in Article 25 would have to be replaced by the

‘Standing Political and Security Committee’. A reference to the ‘Military Committee’ would have to be inserted where appropriate.

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The High Representative should head these bodies, whereas the Commissioner for External Relations should be responsible for coordinating arrangements for civilian crisis management.

9. The possibility of a veto in Article 23(2) in the case of qualified majority decisions

and referral to the European Council should be modified and brought into line with the normal Community procedure.

10. The single legal personality of the Union in its external representation must be written

into the Treaty.

11. The flexibility clause allowing closer cooperation between Member States should not be applied to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, except for military measures, provided the unity of the EU institutions and in particular the role of initiative of the Commission and the role of monitoring and democratic control of the EP are strengthened and guaranteed; the observatory for early warning of conflicts and comprehensive collection of data concerning the capacity for intervention and qualified personnel from the Member States are of key importance in this respect.

12. In Article 21 the provisions on informing and consulting the European Parliament

should be expanded by stipulating that Parliament should be kept regularly informed of the development of the Union’s foreign and security policy not only by the Presidency and the Commission, but also by the High Representative for the CFSP. This would firstly strengthen the position of the High Representative and secondly create a closer link between the European Parliament and the Council’s Secretariat. Further measures should be taken to ensure that the EP is associated in the most important decisions and has the possibility to contribute to the definition of the general guidelines of the EU foreign policy.

13. The appointment of the High Representative should be subject to a procedure similar to that for the appointment of Commissioners after a vote of approval in the European Parliament (Article 214(2), third paragraph).

14. In Article 28, which concerns the financing of operational expenditure in connection with Petersberg tasks, it must be made clear that although the costs of troops deployed in crisis management and their equipment are to be borne by participating Member States, the joint actions as a whole are funded from the Community budget. This would underline the political solidarity aspect.

15. The European Parliament considers that the European Development Fund (EDF)

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must in future be integrated into the budget of the European Union.

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OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Letter from the committee chairman to Giorgio Napolitano, chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

Brussels, 2 February 2000 Dear Mr Chairman, The Committee on Budgets considered the above subject at its meeting of 26 January 2000. At this meeting it adopted the following conclusions: By letter of 10 January 2000 you informed the chairman of the Committee on Budgets, Mr Wynn, that your committee intended to adopt a report on the proposals to be submitted by Parliament on treaty reform in view of the forthcoming IGC. The Committee on Budgets, in its previous opinion to your committee of 8 November 1999 on the method for revising the Treaties and the agenda for a possible IGC, signified certain budget-related issues which must, in its opinion, be addressed at the IGC and included in the revision of the Treaties. This Opinion attempts to take that initial list of topics and outline in a little more detail the content of possible reforms. 1. Reform of the budgetary procedure in order to make it simpler, more transparent, better

balanced and more efficient. This should contain the following elements.

(a) Updating the budgetary procedure on the basis of the experience acquired with the IIAs. A large corpus of ‘soft law’ now governs relations between the institutions in the budget field which has grown over the years since the first inter-institutional agreements of the 1980s and informal agreements from the 1970s which are still respected by the institutions (pragmatic timetable, gentlemens’ agreement). This corpus, although not “law” in the strictest sense nevertheless contains rules which are respected by each institution. Each institution can be confident that the others, in a spirit of trust and loyal co-operation, will not break these agreed rules. After over 25 years of practice, is it not time to give a more formal legal expression to these commitments and conventions ? Having the rules written into treaty articles would serve to increase the level of trust between the institutions and therefore the efficiency of the budget

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procedure. The over-whelming tendency of the procedural rules that have evolved is to encourage the institutions to dialogue with each other at each stage of the procedure in order as far as possible to find agreement and to avoid unnecessary conflict. The mechanisms of the budgetary trialogue and conciliation served the need to find ways of co-operating with each other not provided for in the treaties.

In fact reform of the treaties could take this process further. One could think of doing away with the first reading, which would become unnecessary if the institutions negotiate with each other on the basis of rules guaranteed by the treaty and founded on trust. If the object is reach agreement, and the budget cannot be adopted without the agreement of the two arms of the budget authority, then one could have a system where the Commission presents a draft budget, Parliament and Council each deliberate once on the Commission’s draft, and then they jointly adopt the budget after agreement reached in conciliation. This would considerably simplify the budget procedure and make it more transparent to the citizen.

(b) extending budgetary co-decision in order to put an end to the CE/NCE classification and to bring the EDF into the budget. As a complement to reforming the procedure, it would be highly desirable to abolish the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure – a long-standing demand of Parliament. This single reform, more than any other, would make it possible to have a more efficient procedure possibly limited to one reading only of the budget. If the Parliament would gain codecision over CE, then the Council could legitimately expect to have codecision over NCE. In such a “logic of codecision” the budget would become a genuine joint act which could not come into being without the positive agreement of both institutions.

In such a scenario, conflicts over classification would no longer have any substance. The procedure for fixing the maximum rate of increase would also become redundant and could be replaced by a system of medium-term financial planning (see below).

Having a more perfect codecision over the budget implies also the re-assertion of the principle of budgetary unity. If there were to be codecision over all the current budget, any residual logic in having separate areas of revenue and expenditure “off budget”, such as the EDF, would become untenable.

(c) incorporating the ‘peripheral’ institutions more satisfactorily into the Community system. Re-asserting the principle of budgetary unity would imply also that the question in particular of the decentralised agencies and their budgets should be addressed. If Parliament were to achieve codecision over the financial regulations governing these agencies (see below) that would go a long way to improving the anomolous situation. However, there would be little logic in having codecision over the regulations without having codecision over their budgets.

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The general principle could be enshrined in the treaty that any agency or body established under EC law, serving the objectives of the Union or carrying out public functions in its name, should be incorporated financially in the budget of the Union. The object would be to move towards a system where the Presidents of all such agencies would have to be approved by Parliament, the possibility of censure be allowed, their income and expenditure to be incorporated into the budget and greater transparency would be injected into their public accounts. Consideration should even be given as to how institutions as the EIB, the ECB and Europol could be brought under a similar system.

2. Consolidation of the financial perspective in the form of proper medium-term financial planning adopted by common agreement between the EU and its Member States. The practice of adopting medium-term financial plans, with advance limits on the amount of revenue to be raised, already exists in the form of the financial perspectives since 1988. Giving this practice a firm anchoring in the treaty would only serve to increase its efficiency and stability. It would also confirm the willingness that has been expressed by successive elected Parliaments to shoulder their share of the responsibility for justifying expenditure to the European tax-payers. Having already accepted the disciplines involved in having an agreed multi-annual financial framework, Parliament would have nothing to fear from making that framework legally binding. A condition for such a reform would of course be the inclusion of a sufficient element of flexibility in the system. One could imagine a formula similar to that of the current maximum rate of increase for NCE but applying to all the budget and giving the budgetary authority sufficient flexibility to vary the terms of the financial framework in any given year or to exceed its terms in certain defined circumstances. Again, having codecision in the treaty over financial perspectives would strengthen the Parliament’s argument that it should also have a more decisive say over how the necessary revenue is raised (see next point).

3. Reform of the own-resources system in order to provide the EU with financial autonomy and

efficacy and also to ensure financial transparency in the eyes of the general public, in particular by:

(a) introducing co-decision for the purposes of setting the overall level of the EU’s own resources and the arrangements for securing those resources. This would be the natural complement, on the revenue side, for having codecision on the expenditure side over medium-term financial planning. It would serve to increase the tendency for the Parliament to take responsibility for EU expenditure before the European tax-payer and to insist on the more efficient use of budget appropriations by the Commission and the Member states. It would also give the Parliament responsibility, for the first time, for finding a more equitable system for sharing the revenue burdens between Member states. Undoubtedly this would considerably increase the pressure for a more equitable system to be devised.

(b) enabling fiscal instruments which would be subject to co-decision and qualified- majority

voting to be established at European level. Consensus is already tantalisingly close on the need for progress on the fiscal front in relation to the with-holding tax on savings and a possible carbon tax. Doing away with the unanimity requirement would make the possibility of progress

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much more likely. The debate then on which fiscal instruments to use to generate revenue for the EU budget would be made easier.

(c) enabling the budgetary authority to intervene from year to year over the chosen combination of

the various categories of resources. The principle of annuality could also apply on the revenue side. The cost of the annual budget then would become more transparent for the tax-payer, while leaving the budgetary authority the flexibility to vary its sources of revenue according to annual needs and economic conditions. The long-term aim should be to make the annual budget decision a decision on both expenditure and revenue, within the framework of a medium-term financial perspective.

4. Extension of legislative co-decision and qualified-majority decision-making to:

(a) all financial regulations including decisions on budgetary discipline.

(b) all programmes and instruments without exception which involve Community expenditure (specific research programmes, the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund);

(c) all assent procedures relating to internal policies;

(d) all CAP regulations;

(e) any act establishing an executive agency and the modus operandi thereof.

Here there seem to be firmer grounds for thinking that something could be done in the next IGC to

reform the treaty. A sort of codecision already applies to many of the legislative instruments referred to above. Council knows that Parliament’s position on the legislative dossier needs to be taken into account otherwise Parliament will try to get its way through the budget, at least as far as non-compulsory expenditure is concerned. So certain sensitive legislative files are sometimes the object of negotiations as part of the budget procedure.

In particular for financial regulations, the Council continues to accept the application of the 1975-

style “concertation” procedure which gives Parliament a little bit more influence. Exceptionally, one sector of financial regulation, for the trans-European networks (Art.155 (1) in combination with Art.156, EC Treaty) is already subject to codecision. In the first half of 1999, COBU successfully negotiated with Council, under the German Presidency, an agreement on the TENs financial regulation as part of the AGENDA 2000 package (rapporteur: Mr KELLETT-BOWMAN). Agreement was achieved before Parliament’s second reading, thereby avoiding the need for the Conciliation Committee to be convened, and demonstrating the potential efficiencies to be gained by the application of codecision.

For these reasons, it should be easier for the Council to come round to formalising codecision as the

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normal procedure for all the above range of instruments. The quality of legislation with a financial impact can only improve by virtue of being adopted jointly by the two arms of the budgetary authority.

In conclusion, the Budgets Committee will do all it can to assist the Constitutional Affairs Committee in getting these issues raised within the IGC and formally placed on the agenda. To this end, it hopes that the Constitutional Affairs Committee will ensure that other committees are closely involved in its task of representing Parliament at the IGC and in formulating Parliament’s approach to the negotiations as they progress. For its part, the Budgets Committee intends to pursue the issues of treaty reform raised by this opinion, and which fall under its responsibility according to the Rules of Procedure, by different means such as hearings of experts, working documents and, possibly, by the formation of a “reflection group” in order draft potential treaty amendments which could be submitted to the IGC.

Yours sincerely,

Colom I Naval

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24 February 2000

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY CONTROL

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsman: Diemut R. Theato

PROCEDURE

The Committee on Budgetary Control appointed Diemut R. Theato draftsman at its meeting of 11 January 2000.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 25 January and 23 February 2000.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions by 14 votes to 2.

The following were present for the vote: Theato, chairman and draftsman, Bösch vice-chairman; Blak, vice-chairman; Bonde (for Holmes), Camre, Casaca (for van Hulten), Ferreira, Folias (for Costa), Jean-Pierre, Khanbai, Kuhne, Langenhagen, Morgan, Mulder (for Di Pietro), Pomés-Ruiz, Rühle (for Staes) and Stauner.

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SHORT JUSTIFICATION

Following the conclusion of the negotiations which culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Parliament and its budgetary control body consolidated the practices that had evolved in the area of the discharge procedure. In addition, further consideration was given to the question of criminal and judicial protection against acts harmful to the Community’s interests. Amendments therefore need to be made to the articles of the TEC which relate to the discharge and the protection of the Union’s financial interests. I. Discharge procedure The European Parliament refused to grant a discharge for the 1996 financial year1. Under the same resolution, Parliament closed the accounts for 1996. There was a specific logic in Parliament’s action, for which there was a precedent2: the discharge must not be an act which is confined to closing the accounts, as is the case in several of the Member States (France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg etc.), it must be an act which assesses the quality and the soundness of budgetary management; as a discretionary act, the discharge may be withheld. If the discharge is indeed withheld however, there is no reason to leave the budget implementation procedure open for the financial year concerned: the accounts need to be verified and closed so that the balance can be carried forward to the next financial year. The act of closing the accounts is the responsibility of the discharge authority. The discharge procedure must thus be concluded by two acts: the discharge, i.e. discretionary approval, and the closure of the accounts, an act which is necessary though discretionary in its content. In view of this fact, which has already been enshrined in Annex V of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (see in particular Articles 3 and 5), it is necessary to make an addition to the concise formulation in Article 276 of the Treaty (‘The European Parliament …shall give a discharge to the Commission …’). (See point A of the conclusions and the amendment proposed to Article 276(1) of the TEC in the annex to this document).

PPPPP The discharge act reflects Parliament’s power to make an evaluation; it thus amounts to an act of political assessment. Refusal to grant the discharge therefore entails a negative assessment of the Commission's actions. A decision refusing to grant the discharge is adopted by a simple majority;

1 see resolution of 4 May 1999 on the accounts of the EC for the 1996 financial year. 2 refusal to grant discharge for the 1982 financial year.

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however, if it were approved by a large majority it would signify a serious lack of confidence in the Commission on the part of Parliament. If the majority were the same as that required for a motion of censure, the Members of the Commission would have to draw the consequences and tender their resignations. (See point A of the conclusions and the amendment proposed to Article 276(1) of the TEC in the annex to this document).

PPPPP

Some 85% of the appropriations in the European budget are managed on a decentralised basis by the administrations of the Member States (in particular, the appropriations for the agricultural and structural policies). The national administrations also bear primary responsibility for supervising the management of those appropriations. Yet when Parliament and the Council carry out their assessments under the discharge procedure, they have dealings with the Commission alone, which is supposed to convey the arguments of the national management and supervisory authorities. This is detrimental to the clarity of the information given to the discharge authority, which ought to be able to obtain direct information from the national operators, both during the actual discharge procedure and during the procedure which follows the decision to grant, refuse or defer the discharge. Article 276, which regulates the discharge procedure, should accordingly be amended in respect of all the provisions which relate to the flow of information to the discharge authority. (See point B of the conclusions and the amendments proposed to Article 276(1), (2) and (3) in the annex to this document). II. Acts which are harmful to the Union’s interests: criminal proceedings Measures are currently in hand with a view to endowing the Union’s financial interests with criminal protection3, but which authorities would, in practical terms, be required to implement those protection measures and to prosecute those responsible for acts which harm the Union’s interests? To leave it entirely up to the national judicial systems to implement criminal law on the protection of the Union’s financial interests would result in those systems being encumbered with insurmountable problems. The most serious offences committed against the Community are mostly of a transnational nature (i.e. the nationality of the perpetrators and the place where the offence is committed or its effects are felt may bring several states into play, and not just Member States). This entails a variety of serious difficulties when it comes to prosecution, such as determining which state has the principal jurisdiction to prosecute and arranging satisfactory cooperation between the national judicial (or police) authorities concerned.

3 the convention on the protection of financial interests of July 1995 is at the ratification stage. A

legislative initiative has also been called for by the European Parliament.

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The creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s office with responsibility to take proceedings against anti-Community offences throughout the territory of the Union would sweep away all of these problems. On the initiative of the European Parliament and the Committee on Budgetary Control, a research group led by the Commission has proposed the creation of such a public prosecutor’s office and has defined the relevant statute, competence and structure. This study, known as the ‘Corpus Juris’, was followed up by a second study on comparative criminal law, which shows that the public prosecutor’s office would be applicable to the Member States, assuming that, in certain cases, difficulties of a legal or constitutional nature can be overcome. The committee of independent experts has also submitted a proposal along the same lines, but involving three stages: 1. the creation, through secondary legislation, of a Public Prosecutor’s office whose

responsibilities would be confined to offences committed within the Union; 2. the specialisation of national prosecutors’ offices; 3. the creation of a fully-fledged Public Prosecutor. Whereas a European Parliament legislative initiative is in progress on the first stage, the second and third stages could be implemented in the context of the new IGC. The features of the new Public Prosecutor’s office on which the IGC might reflect could include the following4: · competence: confined to the protection of the Union’s financial interests but covering

the whole of Community territory; · type of procedure: an adversarial procedure would reconcile the principles of

accusatorial and inquisitorial proceedings; · delegated European public prosecutors: these would act at national level, by

delegation from the central Public Prosecutor and could be established by specialised national prosecutors’ offices (the second stage proposed by the independent experts);

· supervision of the office and its acts: this would be the responsibility of a preliminary

4 However, for more detailed examination of the Public Prosecutor and the relevant judicial

system, and of the arguments in favour of setting up this body, the reader is referred to the following documents of the Committee on Budgetary Control: Theato report on introducing protection under criminal law of the Union’s financial interests (A5-0002/2000) and the working document on the efforts undertaken by the European Parliament and its Committee on Budgetary Control to establish standards against fraud and corruption against the finances of the European Union (PE 226.091).

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Chamber at the Court of Justice, acting as a court of freedoms and having the power to set aside decisions by the Public Prosecutor’s office and to decide on referrals;

· substantive criminal law: this would be the uniform body of law created by an instrument under the first or third pillar.

(See point C of the conclusions).

PPPPP Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the measures to counter fraud fall within the scope of Article 280 of the TEC. However, this article remains ambiguous and incomplete. It is ambiguous because paragraph 4 of that article, while providing for a codecision procedure for legislative measures to counter fraud, creates an exception for the application of national criminal law and the administration of justice in the Member States. This strange wording has given rise to a division of expert opinion as to the possibility of providing for criminal penalties (the Corpus Juris researchers, for example, are in favour, whilst others are against). The practical need to strengthen the legal instruments against fraud is an argument in favour of eliminating any ambiguity and making it clear that Article 280 provides a basis for criminal legislation limited to the protection of the Community’s interests. (See the amendment to Article 280(4) of the TEC proposed in the annex to this document). But Article 280 is incomplete too insofar as it appears to refer, in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, only to the fight against fraud, when it is also a matter of combating irregularities of an administrative nature, which do not come under the heading of criminal offences. To avoid ambiguity, it is therefore necessary to make an addition to the text. But Article 280 is also incomplete insofar as it refers to the financial interests of the Union, thereby excluding any behaviour which, though contrary to the rules, has no direct impact on the Community’s finances (for example, can fraud committed in organising a competition be punished under Article 280?). The scope of this article should therefore be widened to include all behaviour detrimental to the Union’s interests (whether financial, economic or moral). (See point D of the conclusions and the amendments to Article 280(1), (2), (3) and (4) proposed in the annex). III. Court of Auditors The Court of Auditors is made up of fifteen members, one from each of the Member States of the Union. Enlargement to include new States would result in a significant increase in members, which might lead to fragmentation of activities and have a negative impact on effective control. The composition of the Court of Auditors should in future be determined not by the number of Member States but on the basis of the operational needs of the institution. (See point F of the conclusions).

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CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Budgetary Control calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate in its opinion for the IGC the following draft amendments to the TEC: A. Discharge act (Article 276(1)). This act should comprise two components:

1. the discharge proper (act signifying approval and adopted on the basis of a political assessment of the Commission’s responsibility in budgetary management);

2. closure of the accounts (act of verification winding up the budgetary procedure for a given financial year).

B. Discharge and censure (Article 276(1)). The discharge and the refusal to grant the discharge are adopted by a simple majority; however, if the refusal to grant the discharge is adopted by the same majority and under the same conditions as required by Article 201 TEC for the adoption of a motion of censure on the Commission’s management (in particular, two-thirds majority of the votes cast representing a majority of the Members of the European Parliament), the Members of the Commission should resign as a body.

Amendments proposed to Article 276(1): see annex

C. Information sources for the discharge authority (Article 276(1), (2) and (3))

These should include all information supplied, orally or in writing, by the Member State or authorities responsible for administering Community funds as part of the discharge procedure and the follow-up to the decision closing it (granting, deferring or refusing the discharge).

Amendments proposed to Article 276(1), (2) and (3): see annex

D. Establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s office and a European system for the judicial protection of the Union’s financial interests

The European Parliament

a) welcomes and endorses the proposal by the Commission to establish a European Public Prosecutor with strong powers, which should be confined to the protection of the financial interests of the European Union;

b) observes that, with a view to this, the existing Treaty provisions must be supplemented with a legal basis

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• which not only protects the financial interests of the Community against fraud, corruption and other illegal acts but also protects the financial interests of third parties against such offences if and in so far as they are committed by officials or other servants of the Community in their official capacity,

• which makes it possible to define the powers of this European Public Prosecutor for financial matters in such way that he can conduct investigations throughout the territory of the Union and bring proceedings before the competent courts of the Member States,

• which makes it possible to adopt the procedural provisions required for this purpose.

Establishment of the system would necessitate, in particular, regulation of the following:

1. the principles underlying the system and in particular: European territoriality and the adversarial nature of proceedings;

2. the European Public Prosecutor’s office’s competences and powers of investigation, which would be strictly confined to offences against the European Union;

3. the structure of the European Public Prosecutor’s office, with the possibility of the peripheral structure being constituted by specialised national prosecutors’ offices;

4. means of redress: prior to the judgment stage, a ‘Preliminary Chamber’ at the Court of Justice of the European Communities would act as a ‘court of freedoms’; it would check that the acts of the Public Prosecutor’s office were sound and would decide on any referrals;

5. substantive criminal law applicable: Union law having entered into force in the meantime under the third or first pillar of the TEU, and subsidiarily: national law.

E. Article 280 of the TEC (measures to counter fraud)

The fourth paragraph of this article should be rid of the ambiguities which affect the application of the legal basis for legislative measures to counter fraud. The last sentence of this paragraph should in particular be amended in such a way as to emphasise, clearly and explicitly, the following two principles:

1. The European Community may adopt legislative measures in the sphere of criminal law in areas strictly confined to the protection of its interests;

2. Such measures, which are of a subsidiary nature, may not affect the administration of justice in the Member States, or the application of national criminal law where analogous measures have already been implemented by all of the Member States in another context

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(international treaty; convention under the third pillar of the TEU etc.).

Furthermore, adding the word 'irregularities' after the word 'fraud' should make it clear that Article 280 constitutes the basis for legislative and operational measures against all unlawful acts, not just in the criminal but also in the administrative sphere.

Amendment of Article 280: see annex

Court of Auditors

F. The European Parliament observes that even the present number of members, fifteen, has made the work of the Court of Auditors cumbersome and inefficient in many cases. The Parliament endorses the Commission's view that the number of Members of the Court of Auditors should be reduced, and that the six year term of office should be non-renewable. The composition of the Court of Auditors should be determined not on the basis of the number of Member States of the Union but in the light of the requirements of effective control.

***********

****

G. The European Parliament calls for

(a) only individuals who have already belonged, or belong, to external audit bodies to be selected,

(b) members of the Court of Auditors to be appointed by means of a procedure which provides for the assent of Parliament and not, as hitherto, merely for it to be consulted.

H. The European Parliament recalls Paragraph 37 of its resolution of 19 January 2000 on the

second report of the Committee of Independent Experts, in which it expressed the view that the application of the long-standing provisions in the Financial Regulation and the Staff Regulations concerning officials’ financial liability for the damage their actions cause should no longer to be left to internal Commission bodies, but that this task should be assigned to a chamber for budgetary discipline; calls for such a chamber to be set up at the Court of Auditors, with the Court of First Instance serving as an appeal court.

I. The Court of Auditors, should, at least once during each term of office of the Court, submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a performance audit undertaken by an

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external body.

J. The IGC should discuss and establish a more effective relationship between the national and

European bodies in the spending and auditing of EU funds. In particular a clear allocation of responsibilities and framework for cooperation needs to be established for: moving towards a ‘pyramid’ of auditing responsibilities in order to avoid duplication and clarify what information should be shared between the European Court of Auditors and State audit bodies; granting to the European Court of Auditors of full rights of access to information held by State audit bodies and public administrations concerning EU expenditure; and a commitment to moving towards harmonised accounting systems for public expenditure in Member States and the European Institutions.

K. The adoption of the Financial Regulation should become the subject of qualified majority voting in the Council.

L. Parliament believes that any derogation from the Financial Regulation in sectoral regulations

must refer to the Financial Regulation in order to be valid.

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ANNEX

Amendments proposed to the TEC5 Proposed new article after Article 248

(Budgetary discipline) (1) The Court of Auditors may impose disciplinary penalties and compel the parties concerned to pay compensation if authorising officers, financial controllers or accounting officers have violated their obligations.

(2) The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Court of Auditors, shall decide the nature and extent of the penalties and the procedure by which they are to be imposed.

Amendments proposed to Article 276(1), (2) and (3): 1. The European Parliament, acting on a recommendation from the Council which shall

act by a qualified majority, shall decide on the discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget and shall decide on the closure of the accounts for the financial year. To this end, the Council and the European Parliament in turn shall examine the accounts and the financial statement referred to in Article 275, the annual report by the Court of Auditors together with the replies of the institutions under audit to the observations of the Court of Auditors, the statement of assurance referred to in Article 248(1), second subparagraph and any relevant special reports by the Court of Auditors and the statements made by the management and supervisory authorities of the Member States; a refusal to grant the discharge adopted by the majority and under the conditions required by Article 201 for adoption of a motion of censure shall oblige the Members of the Commission to resign as a body.

2. Before giving a discharge to the Commission, or for any other purpose in connection

5 N.B.: see point D of the conclusions on the new articles relating to the establishment of

the European Public Prosecutor. For proposals on the future composition of the Court of Auditors, see conclusions, point F

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with the exercise of its powers over the implementation of the budget, the European Parliament may ask to hear the Commission and the management and supervisory authorities of the Member States give evidence with regard to the execution of expenditure or the operation of financial control systems. The Commission and the national authorities shall submit any necessary information to the European Parliament at the latter’s request.

3. The Commission shall take all appropriate steps to act on the observations in the

decisions giving discharge and on other observations by the European Parliament relating to the execution of expenditure, as well as on comments accompanying the recommendations on discharge adopted by the Council.

At the request of the European Parliament or the Council, the Commission shall report

on the measures taken by the Community and national authorities in the light of these observations and comments and in particular on the instructions given to the departments which are responsible for the implementation of the budget. These reports shall also be forwarded to the Court of Auditors.

Amendment to Article 280(4): ‘The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, after consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt the necessary measures in the fields of the prevention of fraud and irregularities affecting the financial interests of the Community and the fight against such illegal activities with a view to affording effective and equivalent protection in the Member States. These measures may concern the application of national criminal law or the national administration of justice only where analogous measures have not been implemented by all of the Member States in another legislative context.’ (N.B.: The word 'irregularities' should also be added to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 after the word 'fraud').

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29 February 2000

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CITIZENS' FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsman: Ana Palacio Vallelersundi

PROCEDURE

The Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs appointed Ana Palacio Vallelersundi draftsman at its meeting of 17 January 2000.

It considered the draft opinion at its meeting of 23 February 2000.

At the latter meeting it adopted the following conclusions unanimously.

The following were present for the vote: Graham R. Watson, chairman; Ana Palacio Vallelersundi, draftsman; Niall Andrews, Alima Boumediene-Thiery, Kathalijne Maria Buitenweg (for Patsy Sörensen ), Michael Cashman, Carmen Cerdeira Morterero (for Olivier Duhamel), Ozan Ceyhun, Carlos Coelho, Gérard M.J. Deprez, Giuseppe Di Lello Finuoli, Carlo Fatuzzo (for Marcello Dell'Utri pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Glyn Ford (for Robert J.E. Evans ), Pernille Frahm, Jas Gawronski (for Enrico Ferri pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Adeline Hazan (for Margot Keßler ), Jorge Salvador Hernández Mollar, Ewa Klamt, Alain Krivine (for Fodé Sylla ), Baroness Sarah Ludford, Luis Marinho (for Sérgio Sousa Pinto ), Elizabeth Montfort (for Roberta Angelilli pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Elena Ornella Paciotti, Hubert Pirker, José Ribeiro e Castro (for Mogens Camre pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Martine Roure (for Gerhard Schmid ), Ingo Schmitt (for Hartmut Nassauer), Martin Schulz, Francesco Enrico Speroni (for Marco Cappato pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Joke Swiebel, Anna Terrón i Cusí, Gianni Vattimo, Christian von Boetticher and Jan-Kees Wiebenga.

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SHORT JUSTIFICATION

At its meeting of 23 February 2000, the Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs examined the question of what Treaty reforms are desirable to ensure the development of the Union as ‘an area of freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ, Article 2, fourth paragraph, TEU). In the light of the resolutions adopted on this subject over the past two years and the conclusions of the European Council at its meetings in Vienna (December 1998), Cologne (April 1999) and Tampere (October 1999), it adopted four conclusions.

CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following conclusions in its motion for a resolution: Conclusion 1 (AFSJ: simplification of the regulatory and institutional framework) Notes that the development of the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) requires the regulatory and institutional framework to be simplified substantially by: (a) merging, within the Community framework, judicial and police cooperation in criminal

matters and judicial cooperation in civil matters and measures relating to the movement of persons,

(b) recognising, in application of the principle of the rule of law (Article 6, first paragraph, TEU),

that the Court of Justice has full jurisdiction over all measures relating to implementation of the AFSJ, the differentiation in legal protection in the third pillar being in breach of the principle of equality of European citizens before the law,

(c) abolishing the Treaty provisions imposing maximum time limits for Parliament's opinions

(Article 39 TEU, for example) or amendments (codecision Article 251 TEC, in particular) and replacing them with the possibility for the Council and Parliament to agree on such deadlines in genuinely urgent cases, after hearing the Commission,

(d) with a view to affording equal European citizens protection before the law, making

‘Schengen’ cooperation the general rule for the 15 Member States and renegotiating the special status of certain Member States so as to reduce to the strict minimum exceptions to the common regime,

(e) introduction of the codecision procedure and qualified majority voting for all measures

relating to establishment of the AFSJ, coresponsibility of the European Parliament at Union

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level being the corollary of the role played by the parliaments of the Member States in the areas of freedoms and criminal law.

Conclusion 2 (protection of fundamental rights)

Proposes, in order to prevent any one Member State blocking the implementation of a policy to protect fundamental rights (Articles 6 and 7 TEU) or combat discrimination (Article 13 TEC) and racism and xenophobia (Article 29 TEU), that future legislative measures should be adopted by Parliament and the Council under the codecision procedure;

Conclusion 3 (adjustments to the Union’s judicial system)

1. Calls for the introduction of rigorous judicial guarantees for all persons subject to the law of the Union, with a view to applying the principle of the rule of law fully within the Union (Article 6 TEU) and, consequently, for:

(a) recognition that any natural or legal person has the right of recourse to the Court of Justice in the event of measures taken by the institutions or bodies of the Union violating their fundamental rights;

(b) the implementation and adoption of appropriate measures to prevent conflicts of jurisdiction between the Court of Justice, the Court of Human Rights and the constitutional courts of the Member States;

(c) the establishment of appropriate judicial guarantees in relation to the activities of the future European Public Prosecutor’s Office authorised to bring proceedings in connection with the protection of the Community’s financial interests or in other cases laid down in the Treaties;

(d) the European Parliament to be given full power to bring actions for annulment, as is already the case for the Council and Commission;

(e) the authority provided for in Article 286 TEC, and the European Ombudsman, to have the right to apply to the Court within the framework of their competences.

2. Considers also that, following the widening of the powers of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance within the framework of implementing the AFSJ, there is no escaping effective reform:

(a) of their relations with the national courts, in order to ensure uniform application of Union law,

(b) of their organisation, composition and the allocation of responsibilities with a view to making judicial protection in the Community more effective.

Conclusion 4 (reform of Europol)

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Calls for Europol to be brought within the institutional framework of the Union as an operational structure and specialised agency for police cooperation (both within and outside the framework of Schengen cooperation). In this context, calls for the establishment, by means of a specific protocol to the Treaties, of :

(a) appropriate means of control by the European Parliament and judicial review by the Court of Justice, particularly over any activities carried out in the interests of the institutions of the Union;

(b) structural cooperation (EUROJUST) with the judicial and police authorities of those States which intend to make use thereof for national investigations not falling within the jurisdiction of the Union.

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29 February 2000

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsman: Karl von Wogau

PROCEDURE

The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs appointed Karl von Wogau draftsman at its meeting of 17 January 2000.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 22 February 2000 and 29 February 2000.

At the last meeting it adopted the amendments below by 17 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: Christa Randzio-Plath chairman; José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, vice-chairman; Thomas Mann (for Karl von Wogau, draftsman); Richard A. Balfe, Hans Blokland, Hans Udo Bullmann, Jonathan Evans, Carles-Alfred Gasòliba i Böhm, Robert Goebbels, Ian Stewart Hudghton (for Pierre Jonckheer), Christopher Huhne, Giorgos Katiforis, Piia-Noora Kauppi, Gorka Knörr Borràs, Werner Langen (for Christoph Werner Konrad), Astrid Lulling, Jules Maaten (for Karin Riis-Jørgensen), Ioannis Marinos, José Javier Pomés Ruiz, John Purvis (for Staffan Burenstam Linder), Alexander Radwan, Bernhard Rapkay, Olle Schmidt, Charles Tannock, Marianne L.P. Thyssen, Helena Torres Marques, Bruno Trentin, Ieke van den Burg (for Luis Berenguer Fuster), Theresa Villiers

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CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following points in its resolution: 1. Stresses the importance of the nature and meaning of the ‘social market economy’ and calls on

the forthcoming IGC to include it in the Treaty in an appropriate place. 2. Repeats its call, as expressed in its resolution of 19 November 1999 concerning the Amsterdam

Treaty, to extend the codecision procedure, where decisions are taken in the Council by a qualified majority, to legislative acts concerning competition policy (Articles 83 (ex Art. 87), Article 87 (3) (e) and 89 (ex. Art. 94), and approximations of laws (Art. 94 (ex Art. 100)).

3. Proposes that in the case of indirect taxation (turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of

indirection taxation), the codecision procedure should apply and unanimity in the Council should be replaced by qualified majority.

4. Calls for the cooperation procedure to be abolished, particularly in the provisions concerning EMU and, more specifically, in Article 99(5), arrangements for multilateral surveillance, Articles 102(2) and 103(2) concerning the financing of public institutions and bodies and Article 106(2) on the technical specifications of euro coins.

5. Calls for qualified majority voting to replace unanimity in the case of:

- the prudential supervision tasks conferred on the ECB (Article 105(6)), - the adoption of appropriate measures in the case of serious economic difficulties

(Articles 100(1) and 100(2)) so as not to cause gridlock in the decision-making mechanism in the even of a crisis,

- the conclusion of international agreements relating to the euro exchange regime because this type of decision should be similar to consensus decision-making and hence to qualified majority voting (Article 111),

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6. Considers it inconsistent and contrary to the declaration made by the European Council on reducing the democratic deficit by maintaining a provision allowing the Council unilaterally to impose sanctions on third countries in the field of capital movements (Art. 60 (ex Art. 73g)) without Parliament’s approval (Art. 301 (ex Art. 228a)).

7. Proposes that current procedures in the field of employment (Title VI A) and economic policy

(Title VII, Articles 103 and 104) be streamlined and consolidated as part of the planned Treaty reform; believes this to be essential notably in view of a better balance to be achieved between the economic and monetary dimensions within EMU before any further enlargement of the EU;

8. Deplores the fact that despite the legal possibility for the Council to adopt detailed rules for

multilateral surveillance (Art. 99 (ex Art. 103)) it has not yet done so; believes, however, that all matters concerning the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Community should foresee an enhanced participation of Parliament to offset the democratic deficit currently characterising EMU; in particular, demands that the broad economic guidelines are to be put forward by the Commission in the form of a proposal, rather than a recommendation, allowing for Parliament to be formally consulted in this process;

9. Calls, in general terms, for Parliament to be consulted systematically on acts involving a proposal

or recommendation from the ECB and/or the Commission in areas coming under Title VII (economic and monetary policy).

10. Believes, with regard to the widely increased role of the EIB as a key instrument at the disposal

of the EU in pursuing its policy objectives, both within and outside the Community, that a revision of the terms of its Protocol A annexed to the Treaty might be envisaged in order to ensure greater transparency in the activities of this institution;

11. Mindful of the repeated allegations of fraud and mismanagement within the European Investment

Bank (EIB) and the current lack of treaty powers for the European Court of Auditors to carry-out proper audit and financial oversight of the EIB, the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee calls upon the participants at the next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to make appropriate treaty changes to grant new statutory powers to the Court of Auditors with regard to the EIB.

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15 March 2000

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND THE INTERNAL MARKET

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsman: Willy C.E.H. De Clercq

PROCEDURE

The Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market appointed Mr Willy C.E.H. De Clercq draftsman at its meeting of 23 September 1999.

At its meeting of 27 October 1999 it adopted a first opinion for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs.

On 10 November 1999 a committee delegation paid a working visit to the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance in Luxembourg.

On 24 February 2000 five members of the committee met the President and Judges of the Federal German Constitutional Court for an exchange of views as part of a fact-finding mission.

The committee considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 31 January, 29 February and 14 March 2000.

At the last meeting it adopted the conclusions below by 13 votes to 0, with 8 abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: Ana Palacio Vallerlersundi, chairman; Willy De Clercq, draftsman; Maria Berger, Jean-Maurice Dehousse, Janelly Fourtou, Marie-Françoise Garaud, Evelyne Gebhardt, Malcolm Harbour, The Lord Inglewood, Kurt Lechner, Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Donald Neil MacCormick, Arlene McCarthy, Toine Manders, Manuel Medina Ortega, Bill Miller,

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Angelika Niebler, Feleknas Uca, Diana Paulette Wallis, Joachim Wuermerling, Stefano Zappalà and Jürgen Zimmerling.

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GENERAL REMARKS The reform of the Court of Justice will be on the agenda for the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference. In its report of 7 December 1999 on the Intergovernmental Conference drawn up on the basis of consultations with the Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission, the Finnish Presidency notes that broad support was expressed for the Treaty provisions concerning the Courts to be amended in order to make decision-making and procedures more flexible. The report refers to 'the organisation, the composition and the competencies of the Courts'6. Reforming the Community's judicial system is one of the most important requirements if justice is to be dispensed in future without unacceptable delay. There is no need to quote here the alarming statistics on the growing number of incoming cases. The situation was described in the discussion paper drawn up by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance on the future of the judicial system of the European Union7. The problem was explained8 in the committee's first opinion on the Intergovernmental Conference. We should note that it is possible to reform the Community judicial system by amending the Decision establishing a Court of First Instance9 or the Rules of Procedure of the two courts10. In particular, with the exception of questions referred for a preliminary ruling, powers may be transferred from the Court of Justice to the Court of First Instance without any need to amend the Treaty (Article 225(1) of the EC Treaty). In the conclusions contained in this opinion, we shall confine ourselves to amendments that concern the Treaty.

Composition of the Court: setting-up of two grand chambers A. To restrict the number of judges to a number less than that of the Member States does not

seem to us to be realistic in a Community composed of States. Nor is it appropriate from the legal point of view, since Community law should receive input from each national legal

6 Report of 7 December 1999, 13636/99. 7 Notice to members No 9/99. 8 Opinion of 27 October 1999, rapporteur Mr De Clercq, A5-0058/99. 9 Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 24 October 1988 establishing a Court of First

Instance of the European Communities, OJ No L 319, 25.11.1988, p.1 and L 241, 17.8.1989 (corrigenda), last amended by Council Decision 1999/291/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 26 April 1999, OJ No L 114, 1.5.1999, p. 52.

10 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 19 June 1991, OJ No L 176, 4.7.1991, p. 7, amended several times, consolidated version published in OJ No C 65, 6.3.1999; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance of 2 May 1991, OJ No L 136, 30.5.1991, (Corrigendum OJ No L 317, 19.11.1991, p. 34) last amended on 17.5. 1999 (OJ No L 135, 29.5.1999, p. 92).

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tradition. The Court must therefore be composed of an odd number of judges equal to or one more than the number of Member States.

B. The requirement that the Court must give judgement in a plenary session composed of all the

judges weighs down the internal procedure of the Court. This situation will worsen after the forthcoming enlargements11.

C. The majority of committee members did not, however, endorse the proposal that, in the light

of the experience of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) in Karlsruhe, two grand chambers should be set up, composed of the President of the Court, the President of the Grand Chamber and an odd number of judges12. The fact that the President would sit in both grand chambers would ensure uniformity of case law.

Procedure for the appointment of judges and advocates-general D. A nine-year non-renewable term for judges and advocates-general seems to be the most

appropriate13. It lends itself to partial renewal every three years, which ensures a degree of stability in the composition of the Court of Justice. In addition, a longer, non-renewable term of office is an additional guarantee of independence for the judges. This reform did not, however, have the support of a majority in the committee.

E. The appointment procedure should be amended to enable the European Parliament to take

part in it, by approving the nomination14. Parliament acts by an absolute majority of the votes cast15. A majority of the committee members felt that appointments should be left to the Council. A minority argued that it was inconceivable that the Council, being a Community institution, should appoint the members of another institution.

11 See to this effect the Interim Report of the Working Party on the future of the European Court of

Justice (known as the 'Due Group' after its Chairman), page 11: 'the new enlargements of the Union will lead to the repeal of the rule whereby the Court's sessions are generally attended by all its judges. The maintenance of proper standards in its case-law in fact make it crucial to keep a strict limit on the number of members convened in plenary session'.

12 This system enables the judges to be divided into two chambers regardless of the number of judges. It should be pointed out that the two Grand chambers are composed of an equal number of judges where the number of judges, leaving out the President, is divisible by four, and an unequal number when it is not so divisible.

13 See resolution of 16 September 1993, Conclusion 1(k), OJ No C 268, 4.10.1993, p. 156. 14 See by analogy the appointment of the Commission, Article 214 of the EC Treaty. 15 Article 198 of the EC Treaty.

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Statute of the Court, Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and of the Court of First Instance F. Pursuant to Articles 225 and 245 of the EC Treaty, any amendment to the Statute of the

Court or to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance requires the unanimous approval of the Council. With past and forthcoming enlargements, this requirement will become increasingly difficult to satisfy and blockages may occur.

G. Neither Titles III and IV of the Statute of the Court, nor the rules of procedure of the two

courts contain any rules of a constitutional nature. On the other hand, they do lay down the procedural rules applicable to the courts. For this reason, the Treaty must be amended so that the unanimous approval of the Council is replaced by approval by a qualified majority. In these circumstances, in order to ensure that the acts adopted have full democratic legitimacy, they must in addition be made subject to the assent of the European Parliament. In this unusual case of ‘organic’ legislation, the co-decision procedure seems inappropriate because it is difficult to imagine a conciliation procedure involving the participation of representatives of the Court of Justice.

As regards the provisions concerning the adoption or amendment of the Rules of Procedure

of the two Courts, the committee has gone a step further in its Conclusions 8 and 13 in that it calls for the deletion of the second sentence of the third paragraph of Article 245 and the second sentence of Article 225(4), which require the Council’s unanimous approval of the adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. The committee thus endorses the concern repeatedly expressed by the two Courts that their room for manoeuvre in shaping the procedure should be increased and that any amendments or adjustments needed should be facilitated.

In this context the draftsman believes that the two Courts should also consider the

introduction of specific rules on the granting of legal aid for proceedings before them. This might be done during the debate initiated by the Commission on the partial harmonisation of the Member States’ legislation on the granting of legal aid in cross-border disputes, since national rules and any rules created at Community level affecting proceedings before the Community Courts must, of course, complement each other.

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling H. This is a fundamental issue for the future of the Community judicial order since the procedure

for obtaining a preliminary ruling is the keystone of that system. We should draw attention to the following points:

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– The proposal which has sometimes been put forward that only the national courts of last

instance should have the power to appeal to the Court of Justice must be rejected. The right for the ordinary courts of law to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice must remain unrestricted. A measure of that kind would excessively weaken cooperation and dialogue between the Court of Justice and the national courts.

– At the same time, reservations can be expressed over the proposal put forward by the

‘Due Group’ to abolish the duty of national courts of last instance to request the court for a preliminary ruling (Article 234 of the EC Treaty). This would be risky in view of the objective of the uniform application of Community law.

I. The preceding two points do not affect the fact that the national courts, which must

themselves apply Community law, must become more aware of their responsibilities, and irrelevant, premature or poorly-prepared requests for preliminary rulings must be avoided.

J. It is necessary to amend the Treaty to address the latter point. The national courts can,

however, be made more aware of their responsibilities by means of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice:

– the introduction of a filter system enabling the Court of Justice to rule under a simplified

procedure by way of an order in straightforward cases which can be decided on the basis of existing case-law and do not raise any new issue16;

– a requirement for national courts to include in the questions referred for a preliminary

Ruling to the Court of Justice reasoned grounds for the answer which the national Court considers most appropriate. If the Court of Justice agrees with the national court's proposal, it could give a short statement of the grounds for its reply, referring to the reasons given by the national court.

K. Is it necessary to transfer to the Court of First Instance some of the powers of the Court of

Justice to give preliminary rulings ? The Court of Justice envisages this in its discussion paper17. The ‘Due Group’ suggests that certain categories of special cases before the Court

16 See the recent proposal of the Court of Justice along these lines the aim of which is to amend its

Rules of Procedure so as to establish an accelerated procedure for references for preliminary rulings of an especially urgent nature.

This proposal was put before the Council of Ministers of Justice by the President of the Court of Justice on 28 May 1999.

17 Discussion. paper, p. 37

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of Justice (proceedings for infringement of trade mark, regulations superseding the Rome and Brussels II Conventions and so forth)18 should be assigned to the Court of First Instance.

L. The present wording of Article 225 of the EC Treaty expressly provides that the Court of

First Instance cannot be assigned jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings. It would nevertheless be wise not to preclude totally a limited transfer of powers with regard to certain classes of action. This would enable the Court of Justice to be relieved of a certain number of cases and concentrate on its role as a constitutional court. In practice, it would be sufficient to delete the second sentence of Article 225(1) of the EC Treaty or to introduce an appropriate derogation in a new paragraph.

Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in fields coming within Title IV of the EC Treaty and Title VI of the EU Treaty

M. The Court of Justice’s jurisdiction must be extended to fields coming within Title IV of the

EC Treaty and Title VI of the EU Treaty where there are lacunae in the matter of legal protection.

N. With regard to Article 68 of the EC Treaty, we propose that the restriction to courts of last

instance be deleted so that the normal procedure for obtaining a preliminary ruling laid down in Article 234 of the EC Treaty applies to the provisions of this Title.

Statute for Members of the European Parliament O. A small majority in the committee believes that Parliament alone should be empowered to

adopt the Members’ statute. The draftsman’s proposal that the unanimous approval of the Council required in the Treaty should be changed to approval by a qualified majority was defeated in the voting.

Internal market P. In its first opinion, our committee took the view that the Intergovernmental Conference

should address the possibility of giving the European Parliament and the Council a right to submit proposals for the amendment of existing legal provisions. Your rapporteur believes that this important matter deserves an in-depth debate and that it would be premature to draw up specific proposals for amendment of the Treaty at this stage.

18 Interim report of the ‘Due Group, p. 7

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CONCLUSIONS The Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following conclusions in its report (the Treaty provisions are reproduced in bold type and the amendments are underlined): 1. Article 221, first paragraph, of the EC Treaty should be amended to Read as follows: ‘The Court of Justice shall consist of an odd number of judges equal to or one more

than the number of Member States. 2. Article 221, second paragraph, of the EC Treaty should be deleted. The remainder of Article

221 remains unchanged: The words “The Court of Justice shall sit in plenary session. It may, however, form

chambers, each consisting of three, five or seven Judges, either to undertake certain preparatory inquiries or to adjudicate on particular categories of cases in accordance with rules laid down for these purposes” are deleted.

The Court of Justice shall sit in plenary session when a Member State or a

Community institution that is a party to the proceedings so requests. Should the Court of Justice so request, the Council may, acting unanimously,

increase the number of Judges and make the necessary adjustments to the second and third paragraphs of this Article and to the second paragraph of Article 223.

3. Article 223, first paragraph, of the EC Treaty should be amended as follows: The Judges and Advocates-General, chosen from persons whose independence is

beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised competence, shall be appointed by the Council acting unanimously, after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament for a term of six years.

4. Article 223, second paragraph, of the EC Treaty should be amended as follows: Judges shall be replaced after each Judge’s term of office has expired or after a

Judge’s place falls vacant.

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5. After Article 225(1) of the EC Treaty the following new paragraph should be inserted: The Court of First Instance may also be competent to hear and determine questions

referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 in certain matters defined in accordance with the conditions laid down by the Statute. The decisions taken by the Court of First Instance on a preliminary basis may be the subject of re-examination by the Court of Justice, within the limits and conditions laid down by the Statute, if the Court deems it necessary in order to ensure the uniformity and consistency of Community law.

6. Article 225(2) of the EC Treaty should be amended as follows: ‘At the request of the Court of Justice and after obtaining the assent of the

European Parliament and consulting the Commission, the Council, acting unanimously, shall determine the classes of action … (remainder unchanged)’

7. After Article 225(2) of the EC Treaty the following new paragraph should be inserted: In accordance with the conditions laid down in paragraph 2, appeal chambers or

autonomous jurisdictional bodies may be established with the task of exercising jurisdictional powers at first instance, in certain specific areas.

8. The second sentence of Article 225(4) of the EC Treaty should be deleted: The Court of First Instance shall establish its Rules of Procedure in agreement with

the Court of Justice. The words ‘Those rules shall require the unanimous approval of the Council’ are

deleted. 9. Article 230, second paragraph, of the EC Treaty should be amended as follows:

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It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.

10. Article 230, third paragraph, should be amended as follows: The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions

brought by the Court of Auditors and by the ECB for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives.

(The words ‘by the European Parliament’ are deleted.) 11. Article 236 of the EC Treaty should be amended as follows: The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in (the word ‘any’ is deleted) disputes

between the Community and its servants within the limits and under the conditions laid down in the Staff Regulations or the Conditions of Employment.

12. Article 245, first and second paragraphs, of the EC Treaty should be amended as follows: The Statute of the Court of Justice is laid down in a separate Protocol. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority at the request of the Court of

Justice and after consulting the Commission and obtaining the assent of the European Parliament, amend the provisions of Title III of the Statute.

13. The second sentence of the third paragraph of Article 245 should be deleted: The Court of Justice shall adopt its Rules of Procedure. The words ‘These shall require the unanimous approval of the Council’ are deleted. 14. The following new third paragraph should be added to Article 226: In the case of failure to transpose directives within the prescribed time limits, the

Commission may directly have such a failure ascertained by a decision, subject to the right of application to the Court of Justice for annulment of the decision.

15. The following new first paragraph should be inserted in Article 234 of the EC Treaty: Subject to the provisions of this article as set out below, the courts of the Member

States shall rule on the questions of Community law that they encounter in the exercise of their national competences.

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16. Article 234, second paragraph, of the EC Treaty should be amended as follows: Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State,

that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. In assessing the desirability of consulting the Court of Justice, the court shall take particular account of the importance of the question to Community law and the presence of reasonable doubt as to the answer.

17. Article 300(6) should be amended as follows:

The Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of the Court of Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. The Court of Justice shall be competent to take a decision in accordance with the same conditions on a request by the European Parliament, when Parliament has been consulted on the envisaged agreement under the procedure laid down in paragraph 3, second subparagraph.

18. Article 68(1) of the EC Treaty should be amended as follows: Article 234 shall apply to this Title under the following circumstances and

conditions: where a question on the interpretation of this Title or on the validity or interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community based on this Title is raised in a case pending before a court or a tribunal of a Member State (11 words deleted), that court of tribunal shall, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.

19. Article 68(3) of the EC Treaty should be amended as follows: The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission or a Member State …

(remainder unchanged)'. 20. Article 190(5) of the EC Treaty should be amended as follows: The European Parliament shall (16 words deleted) lay down the regulations and

general conditions governing the performance of the duties of its Members.

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21. The Intergovernmental Conference must ask itself whether, in the context of the internal

market, it is appropriate to enable the European Parliament and the Council to submit proposals for the amendment of existing legislation.

22. The Intergovernmental Conference will also have to consider carefully the implications for the

Court’s case load and its manner of exercising jurisdiction in the event that the Convention on a Charter of Rights concludes that such a Charter should be justiciable before the Court of Justice.

23. The Intergovernmental Conference should make the procedure for amending the Treaties

more democratic by virtue of twofold legitimacy, and so make provision for the European Parliament to be involved in the decision-making procedure when revising the Treaties.

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29 February 2000

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, EXTERNAL TRADE, RESEARCH AND ENERGY

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsman: Elly Plooij-Van Gorsel

PROCEDURE

The Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy appointed Elly Plooij-Van Gorsel draftsman at its meeting of 14 October 1999.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 31 January 2000 and 24 February 2000.

At the last meeting it adopted the conclusions below by 46 votes to 3.

The following were present for the vote: Carlos Westendorp y Cabeza, chairman; Nuala Ahern, vice-chairman; Peter Michael Mombaur, vice-chairman; Elly Plooij-van Gorsel, draftsman; Konstantinos Alyssandrakis, Maria del Pilar Ayuso González (for Dominique Vlasto), Alexandros Baltas, Eduard Beysen (for Willy C.E.H. De Clercq), Guido Bodrato, Massimo Cacciari (for Colette Flesch), Giles Bryan Chichester, Nicholas Clegg, Claude J.-M.J. Desama, Harlem Désir, Concepció Ferrer, Christos Folias, Glyn Ford, Jacqueline Foster (for Marjo Matikainen-Kallström), Neena Gill (for Eryl Margaret McNally), Robert Goebbels (for Norbert Glante), Michel Hansenne, Malcolm Harbour, Alain Lamassoure, Werner Langen, Peter Liese (for Anders Wijkman), Rolf Linkohr, Linda McAvan, Nelly Maes, Erika Mann, Elizabeth Montfort, Angelika Niebler, Barbara O'Toole (for Mechtild Rothe), Reino Kalervo Paasilinna, Yves Piétrasanta, John Purvis, Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl, Alexander Radwan (for Paul Rübig), Daniela Raschhofer, Imelda Mary Read, Christian Foldberg Rovsing, Konrad K. Schwaiger, Esko Olavi Seppänen, Astrid Thors, Claude Turmes (for Ilka Schröder), Jaime Valdivielso de Cué, and W.G. van Velzen.

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SHORT JUSTIFICATION

The forthcoming revision of the Treaties and the IGC is of special importance for the committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy 1. In particular, with regard to external trade:

The need to reinforce the external role of the European Union has been, to a great extent, taken already into account by the first report of the Committee on constitutional affairs and it has been stressed in the final resolution of 11 November 1999. The basic considerations in this area are the following: - The Court of Justice opinion n. 1/94 on the conclusion of the WTO Uruguay Round

agreements has highlighted the necessity of setting a sounder base for the Community competence (and the Commission’s negotiating authority) on trade in all services, investment and intellectual property rights19, in particular in view of multilateral negotiations such as the WTO round;

- Parliament’s role should also be reinforced: this should apply both to unilateral measures in the context of the common trade policy, by introducing codecision, and to bilateral measures (in particular extension of assent to all external agreements, and a stronger role for Parliament in authorising and monitoring negotiations).

2. With regard to energy, the basic consideration to be made is the lack of a coherent Community

energy policy; while articles dealing with certain energy issues are contained in the ECSC and Euratom treaties, no clear disposition provides the institutional mechanisms for defining a common energy policy, or even a cooperation on securing energy supplies or dealing with environmental aspects of energy policy.

It is therefore the opinion of your draftsman that, in the context of the unification of the Treaties advocated by the draft report by the Committee on constitutional affairs, a new chapter on energy policy should be introduced in the Treaty, including the relevant parts of the ECSC and Euratom treaties. Furthermore, the European Parliament’s powers should be duly reinforced, including codecision in particular with regard to proposed legislation in the field of nuclear safety.

CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy calls on the Committee on

19 See also art. 133, par. 5, TEC

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Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following points in its draft resolution: A. With regard to external trade and economic policy, the relevant articles of the TEC should be

amended as follows:

Text TEC Amendments

(Amendment 1) Article 133

1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.

1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, investment and intellectual property, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.

2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common commercial policy.

2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council and to the European Parliament for implementing the common commercial policy.

3. Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need to be negotiated, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it.

The relevant provisions of Article 300 shall apply.

3. Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need to be negotiated, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which, after consulting the European Parliament, shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. The European Parliament shall be fully informed about these negotiations. The relevant provisions of Article 300 shall apply.

4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by 4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by

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this Article, the Council shall act by a qualified majority.

this Article, the Council shall act under the procedures referred to in Articles 251 and 300.

5. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may extend the application of paragraphs 1 to 4 to international negotiations and agreements on services and intellectual property insofar as they are not covered by these paragraphs.

Deleted

Or. en

Justification

Services, investment and intellectual property should be included in the common commercial policy. At the same time, Parliament must be consulted at all stages in the development of this policy. Furthermore, the codecision procedure should be extended to all aspects or important instruments of the commercial policy. We can therefore endorse the Commission's proposal to amend the treaties. The only useful addition to this proposal would be to add the words 'and to the European Parliament' in paragraph 2, as proposed by the draftsman.

(Amendment 2) Article 300, paragraph 1

1. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more States or international organisations, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with special committees appointed by the Council to assist it in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this paragraph, the Council shall act by a qualified majority, except in the cases where the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 provides that the Council shall act unanimously.

1. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more States or international organisations, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which, after consulting the European Parliament, shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with special committees appointed by the Council to assist it in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. The European Parliament is fully informed on these negotiations. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this paragraph, the Council shall act by a

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qualified majority, except in the cases where the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 provides that the Council shall act unanimously.

Justification

This amendment (in parallel to amendment 1 to article 133), reinforces the position of the European Parliament before and during negotiation of external agreements.

(Amendment 3)

Article 300, paragraphs 2 and 3

2. Subject to the powers vested in the Commission in this field, the signing, which may be accompanied by a decision on provisional application before entry into force, and the conclusion of the agreements shall be decided on by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. The Council shall act unanimously when the agreement covers a field for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules and for the agreements referred to in Article 310. By way of derogation from the rules laid down in paragraph 3, the same procedures shall apply for a decision to suspend the application of an agreement, and for the purpose of establishing the positions to be adopted on behalf of the Community in a body set up by an agreement based on Article 310, when that body is called upon to adopt decisions having legal effects, with the exception of decisions supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement. The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed on any decision under this paragraph concerning the provisional application or the suspension of agreements, or the establishment of the Community position in a body set up by an agreement based on Article

2. Subject to the powers vested in the Commission in this field, the signing, which may be accompanied by a decision on provisional application before entry into force, and the conclusion of the agreements shall be decided on by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. The Council shall act unanimously when the agreement covers a field for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules and for the agreements referred to in Article 310.

Deleted

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310. 3. The Council shall conclude agreements after consulting the European Parliament, except for the agreements referred to in Article 133(3), including cases where the agreement covers a field for which the procedure referred to in Article 251 or that referred to in Article 252 is required for the adoption of internal rules. The European Parliament shall deliver its opinion within a time-limit which the Council may lay down according to the urgency of the matter. In the absence of an opinion within that time limit, the Council may act. By way of derogation from the previous subparagraph, agreements referred to in Article 310, other agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation procedures, agreements having important budgetary implications for the Community and agreements entailing amendment of an act adopted under the procedure referred to in Article 251 shall be concluded after the assent of the European Parliament has been obtained. The Council and the European Parliament may, in an urgent situation, agree upon a time limit for the assent.

3. The Council shall conclude agreements after the assent of the European Parliament has been obtained. The Council and the European Parliament may, in an urgent situation, agree upon a time limit for the assent.

Justification

This amendment has a double objective: in paragraph 3, it introduces assent as the normal procedure for Parliament's participation in the conclusion of external agreements; in paragraph 2, it suppresses the derogations which would exclude Parliament's participation in decision on suspension of agreements and measures to be taken by Association Councils and other bodies created by external agreements.

The assent procedure therefore should be extended to all significant agreements covering areas in which the codecision or cooperation procedure is required (Article 251/252) and, consequently, the Commission's proposal should be amended to this effect.

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(Amendment 4) Article 300 , paragraph 6

6. The Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of the Court of Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union.

6. The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of the Court of Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union.

Justification

The reinforced role of the European Parliament justifies the possibility for it to take the initiative of asking the opinion of the Court of Justice on an external agreement being envisaged.

(Amendment 5) Article 301

Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted according to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or more third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent measures. The Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.

Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted according to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or more third countries, the Council shall take the necessary measures. The Council shall act under the procedure referred to in Article 251.

Justification

In parallel with the general principle to be implemented in the field of trade policy, codecision

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is applied in this case also.

B. With regard to energy and research policies: 1. Recalls the position of the European Parliament (as expressed, for example, in its resolution of

13 March 1996 on Parliament's priorities for the IGC), that in order to achieve sustainable development, it is essential to establish the competence of the European Union in the field of energy by creating a new chapter on energy on the Treaty, where the energy policy aspects of the ECSC and Euratom Treaties and other energy policy considerations should be integrated within a common energy policy framework, helping to ensure overall cooperation with regard to security of supply and environmental protection within the internal market framework;

2. Points yet again to the marginal position of the European Parliament with regard to decision-

making under Euratom provisions, and considers that the institutional balance should be adapted also in this sector. The codecision procedure should apply to the Euratom Treaty.

3. A New Chapter on Research should be created, including the possibility of creating a second

pillar to promote research outside the framework programme, for instance in the form of a Foundation based on the ECSC Treaty that is about to expire.

C. The relevant articles of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community should

be amended as follows:

Text Euratom Treaty Amendments

(Amendment 6)

Article 101 The Community may, within the limits of its powers and jurisdiction, enter into obligations by concluding agreements or contracts with a third State, an international organisation or a national of a third State.

The Community may, within the limits of its powers and jurisdiction, enter into obligations by concluding agreements or contracts with a third State, an international organisation or a national of a third State.

Such agreements or contracts shall be negotiated by the Commission in accordance with the directives of the Council: they shall be concluded by the Commission with the approval of the Council, which shall act by a qualified majority.

Such agreements or contracts shall be negotiated by the Commission in accordance with the directives of the Council: they shall be concluded by the Commission with the approval of the European Parliament and the Council, which shall act by a qualified majority.

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Agreements or contracts whose implementation does not require action by the Council and can be effected within the limits of the relevant budget shall, however, be negotiated and concluded solely by the Commission; the Commission shall keep the Council informed.

Agreements or contracts whose implementation does not require action by the Council and the European Parliament and can be effected within the limits of the relevant budget shall, however, be negotiated and concluded solely by the Commission; the Commission shall keep the European Parliament and the Council informed

Justification

This article was used to give the Commission a negotiating mandate for the International Thermonuclear Energy Reactor (ITER) Engineering Design Activities (EDA) agreement, and would also be used for the eventual decision to go ahead with the construction of ITER. There would be no requirement to consult Parliament on this agreement. In the USA, on the other hand, it would require the approval by both parts of Congress. Similarly the Euratom-USA agreement which does not require consultation or possible approval by the European Parliament, needs approval in both parts of the US Congress. Parliament's Rules of Procedure do provide for Parliamentary monitoring of international agreements - but such rules have no legal force, and the Council and the Commission could ignore them with respect to article 101. The proposed modifications of article 101 would remedy the lack of formal consultation of the Parliament.

(Amendment 7) Article 161 a (new)

1. Where reference is made in this Treaty to this

Article for the adoption of an act, the following procedure shall apply. 2. The Commission shall submit a proposal to the European Parliament and the Council. The Council, acting by qualified majority after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament, - if it approves all the amendments contained in

the European Parliament's opinion, may adopt the proposed act thus amended;

- if the European Parliament does not propose any amendments, may adopt the proposed

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act; - shall otherwise adopt a common position and

communicate it to the European Parliament. The Council shall inform the European Parliament fully of the reason which led it to adopt its common position. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament fully of its position.

If within three months of such communication, the European Parliament: (a) approves the common position or has not

taken a decision, the act in question shall be deemed to have been adopted in accordance with that common position;

(b) rejects, by an absolute majority of its component members, the common position, the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted;

(c) proposes amendments to the common position by an absolute majority of its component members, the amended text shall be forwarded to the Council and to the Commission, which shall deliver an opinion on those amendments.

3. If, within three months of the matter being referred to it, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, approves all the amendments of the European Parliament, the act in question shall be deemed to have been adopted in the form of the common position thus amended; however, the council shall act unanimously on the amendments on which the Commission has delivered a negative opinion. If the Council does not approve all the amendments, the President of the Council, in agreement with the President of the European Parliament, shall within six weeks convene a meeting of the Conciliation Committee. 4. The Conciliation Committee, which shall be

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composed of the members of the Council or their representatives and a equal number of representatives of the European Parliament, shall have the task of reaching agreement on a joint text, by a qualified majority of the members of the Council or their representatives and by a majority of the representatives of the European Parliament. The Commission shall take the necessary initiatives with a view to reconciling the positions of the European Parliament and the Council. In fulfilling this task, the Conciliation Committee shall address the common position on the basis of the amendments proposed by the European Parliament. 5. If, within six weeks of its being convened, the Conciliation Committee approves a joint text, the European Parliament, acting by an absolute majority of the votes cast and the Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall each have a period of six weeks from that approval in which to adopt the act in question in accordance with the joint text. If either of the two institutions fail to approve the proposed act within that period, it shall be deemed not to have been adopted. 6. Where the Conciliation Committee does not approve a joint text, the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted. 7. The periods of three months and six weeks referred to in this Article shall be extended by a maximum of one month and two weeks respectively at the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council.

Justification

There is a total lack of any requirement for the Council to formally consult the European Parliament on a whole range of issues relating to different articles of the Euratom Treaty, even though the Parliament is the co-budgetary authority for all expenditure invoked by this Treaty.

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Therefore an article establishing the co-decision, equivalent to article 251 EC, needs to be added to the Euratom Treaty.

(Amendment 8) New Chapter: Nuclear Reactor Safety, Article A

The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 161A, shall adopt the provisions necessary to ensure minimum standards for the safety of nuclear reactors in the Community, including minimum safety requirements in design, construction and operation.

Justification

This new article is necessary to remedy the 'lacuna' concerning nuclear reactor safety in the Euratom Treaty. While there is extensive talk of ‘international safety standards’ and ‘Western standards ’ in many EU documents dealing with nuclear safety issues, there is no Euratom Directive establishing the basic safety standards for the design, construction and operation of nuclear reactors in the EU. The 25 basic nuclear-safety principles published by the IAEA are still implemented in accordance with each Member State’s own technical standards and regulations, which has not facilitated the action the EU has been taking with regard to the safety authorities in the CEECs and the NIS." Thus it is up to each Member State to define its own nuclear reactor safety regulations, and regulatory structure, with some possible co-ordination via the IAEA. Given the more-or-less inevitably cross-border nature of any major nuclear accident, and given the aim of the Euratom Treaty of creating a Common Market for nuclear energy, the omission of any harmonization provisions for nuclear reactor safety does seem quite remarkable. A reactor safety Directive would be implemented via the existing national nuclear regulatory bodies, and would thus not require the creation of any European Inspectorate.

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4 February 2000 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsman: Bartho Pronk

PROCEDURE At its meeting of 14 October 1999 the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs appointed Bartho Pronk draftsman. It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 25 October, 30 November 1999, 24 January and 1 February 2000. At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions by 37 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions. The following took part in the vote: Michel Rocard, chairman; Winfried Menrad, Marie-Thérèse Hermange and José Ribeiro e Castro, vice-chairpersons; Bartho Pronk, draftsman; Sylviane H. Ainardi, Jan Andersson, María Antonia Avilés Perea, Philip Rodway Bushill-Matthews, Chantal Cauquil (for Ilda Figueiredo), Luigi Cocilovo, Elisa Maria Damião, Proinsias De Rossa, Den Dover (for James L.C. Provan), Harald Ettl, Jillian Evans, Carlo Fatuzzo, Hélène Flautre, Fiorella Ghilardotti, Marie-Hélène Gillig, Anne-Karin Glase, Koldo Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso, Roger Helmer (for David Sumberg), Ian Stewart Hudghton, Stephen Hughes, Anne Elisabet Jensen (for Daniel G.L.E.G. Ducarme), Karin Jöns, Ioannis Koukiadis, Arlette Laguiller, Jean Lambert, Giorgio Lisi (for Raffaele Lombardo), Elizabeth Lynne, Thomas Mann, Mario Mantovani, Manuel Medina Ortega (for Alejandro Cercas Alonso), Mauro Nobilia, Ria G.H.C. Oomen-Ruijten (for Guido Podestà), Neil Parish (for Ilkka Suominen), Manuel Perez Alvarez, Tokia Saïfi, Herman Schmid, Peter William Skinner, Miet Smet, Bruno Trentin (for Helle Thorning-Schmidt), Ieke van den Burg, Anne E.M. Van Lancker and Barbara Weiler.

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BACKGROUND/GENERAL COMMENTS There are a number of issues in the sphere of employment and social policy that the IGC should cover. In the Amsterdam Treaty there was no change in decision making power within the Council since unanimity was retained for all matters where the agreement on social policy so required: - implementing decisions relating to the European Social Fund - vocational training - provisions to facilitate the exercise of the right of citizens to move and reside freely within the

territory of the Member States - rules on social security for migrant workers from the Community - right of establishment. Even worse, the following matters remain subject to the simple consultation procedure: - social security and social protection of workers - protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated - representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers - conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Community territory - financial contributions for promotion of employment and job-creation, without prejudice to

the provisions relating to the Social Fund. Matters relating to pay, the right of association, the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs are still excluded from the provisions of Article 137 EC. The process of consulting management and labour, which, if the negotiations are successful, may lead to them acting in the place of the Community legislator, was written into Articles 138 and 139 EC. As a result, the Commission is using this procedure systematically. This is however something Parliament has warned against as when the social partners so request, it is up to the Council to decide whether the provisions of any agreement reached should enter into force in the Member States. Parliament is not even officially consulted. An institutional imbalance of this kind runs counter to the very spirit of the Treaty. There is an urgent need to remedy this attack on the European Parliament's prerogatives. Economic policy, employment policy and social protection must be treated as interdependent and equal parts of one and the same policy triangle. A European convergence strategy is needed for Europe. CONCLUSIONS

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The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following paragraphs in its report: Paragraph 1

Social policy recalls that progress has been blocked in key social policy areas due to the requirement for unanimity in the Council and calls therefore for the extension of majority voting to all areas of social policy, the deletion of the exceptions under Article 137(6) EC, using the principle of subsidiarity, firmly applied, as the determining factor, and calls for Parliament to be put on an equal footing with the Council in all areas covered by Articles 13, 42, 138 and 139 EC ; Paragraph 2 calls for recognition of social protection as a matter of Community interest in the Treaty; calls for recognition of fundamental social rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights; Paragraph 3 takes the view that the completion of the single market, the completion of EMU and enlargement will all have implications for social protection in the EU and will therefore require closer cooperation and coordination between the Member States in the field of social security;

Paragraph 4

calls for the full inclusion of Parliament in the macro-economic dialogue decided upon at the European Summit in Cologne;

Paragraph 5

calls for the inclusion of an article on the promotion of civil dialogue together with the establishment of a clear legal base for providing financial support to representative non-governmental organisations at the European level;

Paragraph 6

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calls for a more balanced and integrated approach in the Broad Economic Guidelines and Employment Guidelines in the spirit of the conclusions of the Cologne summit; calls for the integration into this procedure of a similar process to be started with respect to social protection;

Paragraph 7

calls for a clear reference in the Treaty (Art. 6 TEU), similar and in addition to that with respect to the ECHR, to the revised Social Charter of the Council of Europe, the core conventions of the ILO and the UN which are widely ratified by Member States and define the fundamental social rights acknowledged in the EU. Furthermore the IGC should open the door for incorporation in the Treaty of the new Charter of fundamental rights which is in the process of being drafted;

Paragraph 8 considers that equal treatment of men and women, as required by the principle of equal pay referred to in Article 141 of the EC Treaty, should be extended to all labour market matters and ultimately to all fields where unjustified discrimination arises; Paragraph 9

Taxation considers that coordination of fiscal policies within the EU is essential if potentially harmful effects on employment, social security and free movement of persons are to be avoided; calls on the European Council, therefore, in addition to Article 94 of the EC Treaty, to create a further legal basis to enable taxation coordination measures to be adopted in codecision with the European Parliament and by means of qualified-majority decisions in the Council; Paragraph 10 calls for the insertion in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union of a reference to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989; considers that a reference to reconciling family and occupational responsibilities, both for men and for women, should be inserted in Article 137(1) of the EC Treaty; Paragraph 11

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Non-Discrimination calls for the strengthening of Article 13 to bestow powers of direct effect to enable EU citizens to seek legal redress before European courts in cases of discrimination.

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28 February 2000

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH AND CONSUMER POLICY

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsman: Karl Erik Olsson

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 13 October 1999 the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy appointed Karl Erik Olsson draftsman.

At its meetings of 26 January, 15 and 23 February 2000, the committee considered the draft opinion.

At the latter meeting it adopted the amendments below by 37 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: Caroline F. Jackson, chairman; Carlos Lage, vice-chairman; Alexander de Roo, vice chairman; Ria G.H.C. Oomen-Ruijten, vice chairman; Karl Erik Olsson, draftsman; Per-Arne Arvidsson, Maria del Pilar Ayuso González, Hans Blokland, David Robert Bowe, John Bowis, Hiltrud Breyer, Philip Rodway Bushill-Matthews (for Marielle de Sarnez), Dorette Corbey, Chris Davies, Avril Doyle, Carlo Fatuzzo (for Marialiese Flemming), Karl-Heinz Florenz, Cristina García Orcoyen Tormo, Laura González Álvarez, Robert Goodwill, Françoise D. Grossetête, Cristina Gutiérrez Cortines, Roger Helmer, Anneli Hulthén, Marie Anne Isler Béguin, Christa Klaß, Eija-Riitta Anneli Korhola, Paul A.A.J.G. Lannoye (for Patricia McKenna), Marie-Noëlle Lienemann, Peter Liese, Torben Lund, Jules Maaten, Minerva Melpomeni Malliori, Emilia Franziska Müller, Rosemarie Müller, Riitta Myller, Mihail, Papayannakis, Béatrice Patrie, Marit Paulsen, Frédérique Ries, Dagmar Roth-Behrendt, Guido Sacconi, Karin Scheele, Horst Schnellhardt, Jonas Sjöstedt, María Sornosa Martínez, Bart Staes (for Inger Schörling), Robert William Sturdy (for Jorge Moreira Da Silva), Catherine Taylor, Marianne L.P. Thyssen (for Giuseppe Nisticò), Antonios Trakatellis, Roseline Vachetta, Kathleen van Brempt (for Bernd

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Lange), Phillip Whitehead.

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CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following points in its motion for a resolution: The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy 1. Calls for the next intergovernmental conference to broaden the scope for common economic

instruments in the environment sector; considers that fixing the levels of EU-wide green taxes and energy taxes should form part of that process;

2. Calls for the next intergovernmental conference to devise clearly defined economic

instruments designed to bring about a switch from nuclear energy and fossil fuels to renewable and environment-friendly energy sources in the Member States;

3. Considers that the intergovernmental conference should take initiatives to replace the

Euratom Treaty in the long term by a programme for the development of renewable energy sources and increased energy efficiency;

4. Welcomes the introduction of the principle of better protection and respect for animal

welfare in a separate protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty; notes, however, that many problems associated with the treatment of animals persist in several Member States; calls therefore for the next intergovernmental conference to introduce a separate article into the Treaty with a view to improving the protection and welfare of animals in the EU;

5. Considers that the EU should take progressive and preventive action to ensure food safety;

considers that the protection of public health in terms of food safety must be strengthened within the EU and that one way of achieving this is to extend the codecision procedure further in the food sector; calls therefore for matters relating to food production to be transferred from Article 37 to Article 95;

6. Considers that the food authority recently proposed by the Commission must be given

genuine power and that the intergovernmental conference should examine whatever amendments it may be necessary to make to the Treaty;

7. Considers that the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty aimed at strengthening the position of

consumers on the internal market should be used to greater effect; calls therefore on the next intergovernmental conference to discuss how consumer protection can best be strengthened in relation to e-commerce and other cross-border trade; considers that the Member States must be entitled to introduce more stringent national measures to protect consumers and

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public health; 8. Considers that the next intergovernmental conference should further strengthen Parliament's

power of codecision in the environment sector; considers that the codecision procedure should also be applied to the aspects of environment policy referred to in Article 175(2), such as fiscal instruments, management of water resources, land use and the choice of energy sources, and that "double simple majority" voting in the Council, that is a simple majority of member states representing a majority of the Union's total population, should also be extended to all environment, health and consumer protection issues;

9. Regrets the fact that the intergovernmental conference in Amsterdam deferred the debate on

numbers of votes and the composition of Parliament; considers therefore that the next conference must consider these matters and focus particularly on the scope for reforming decision-making in the area of EU environment, health and consumer protection; identifies the present voting system in the Council as an obstacle to the attainment of the EU’s objectives for sustainable development; considers that "double simple majority" voting, that is a simple majority of member states representing a majority of the Union's total population, and the codecision procedure should be extended to all policy areas relevant to the environment, health and consumer protection;

10. Agrees with the proposals made by the European Commission in its opinion on the calling of

the IGC20 on the necessity to modify the rules applying to closer cooperation21 in order to make it workable;

11. Considers that the Treaty should be modified in order to allow for proper access to justice to

citizens organisations; therefore suggests that article 230(3) be amended so that citizens organisations could bring legal actions to the Court of Justice to defend interest of a shared nature, such as the environment, against infringements by the Member States or EU Institutions;

12. Calls on the intergovernmental conference to discuss how the applicant countries can best

adapt to EU environmental standards and how those countries can be given financial assistance to meet the environmental criteria before the date of their accession.

20 COM(2000) 34. 21 Article 11 in the Treaty on the European Union.

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25 February 2000

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsman: Friedrich-Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf

PROCEDURE

The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development appointed Friedrich-Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf draftsman at its meeting of 11 October 1999.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 26 and 31 January 2000 and 23 February 2000.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions by 33 votes to none with 1 abstention.

The following were present for the vote: Friedrich-Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf, chairman and draftsman; Joseph Daul and Vincenzo Lavarra vice-chairmen; Gordon Adam, Danielle Auroi, Maria del Pilar Ayuso González (for Michl Ebner), Carlos Bautista Ojeda, Sergio Berlato, Pedro Marset Campos, Giorgio Celli, Arlindo Cunha, Avril Doyle (for Agnes Schierhuber), Anne Ferreira (for Bernard Poignant), Christel Fiebiger, Georges Garot, Lutz Goepel, Willi Görlach, María Izquierdo Rojo, Elisabeth Jeggle, Salvador Jové Peres, Hedwig Keppelhoff-Wiechert, Heinz Kindermann, Dimitrios Koulourianos, Albert Jan Maat, Xaver Mayer, James Nicholson (for Francesco Fiori), Neil Parish, Mikko Pesälä, Giovanni Procacci, Michel Raymond, María Rodríguez Ramos, Isidoro Sánchez García (for Niels Busk), Struan Stevenson and Robert William Sturdy.

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GENERAL COMMENTS

1. The importance of codecision for agricultural policy The Treaty of Amsterdam strengthened Parliament's powers, inter alia by extending the codecision procedure significantly. Codecision was also introduced for some aspects of agriculture policy, although only in areas directly relating to health protection (Article 152). The core area of the CAP remained outside the codecision procedure even after Amsterdam. There is no political justification for this state of affairs. For some time the common agricultural policy has been the policy area that has been communitarised to the greatest degree, and yet it still lies outside parliamentary control. Almost half the EU budget is spent within the framework of the CAP. Under the budgetary procedure, Parliament is jointly accountable and yet it is unable to exert any influence over the Council and Commission with regard to the orientation of the CAP, which determines spending policy. Even after adoption of the Agenda 2000 package, the common agricultural policy is still in need of reform, as demonstrated by food scandals and continuing fraud involving subsidies. To ensure that the necessary political and institutional reforms are introduced, Parliament must step up the pressure for reform and play a full part in ensuring the necessary integration of Community health and environment policy. 2. Need for integration of environmental and consumer protection The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties called for environmental protection and consumer protection to be integrated into other Community policies. In the past, however, preventive legislation and measures were not systematically implemented in the organisation of agricultural production. One exception is the promotion of voluntary measures by farmers to introduce extensive and ecologically sound production. The linkage of EU support measures to verifiable criteria in terms of quality production and preventive consumer protection has been left to the discretion of the Member States under the 'horizontal' measures (Regulation EC 1259/99). These measures do not provide a sufficient incentive to ensure that environment policy and consumer policy are effectively integrated into the CAP. Parliament should draw the attention of the Commission and the Council to this situation and call on them to take the initiative, at the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference, to introduce a binding list of measures integrating preventive environmental and consumer protection measures into the CAP. A timetable for the phased implementation of these measures should be agreed (revision of Article 33(1) of the EC Treaty). 3. Enlargement of the European Union

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The challenge of enlargement of the Union to Central and Eastern Europe makes institutional and political reforms inescapable, particularly in the area of agricultural policy. In view of the rising productivity in the agricultural sector and falling demand for mass products, the objectives of agricultural policy must be reviewed. Government support measures must be geared to quality production and quality products, rural infrastructure and employment and diversification of incomes and must give priority to regional markets. These reforms must be tackled if possible before, or at least during, the transitional period leading up to actual enlargement to make sure that the Union does not give the wrong signals with regard to the organisation of production and rural structural change and to prevent the depopulation of the countryside, without alternative jobs being created in urban areas. The Intergovernmental Conference should in no event slow down the process of enlargement but should ease the applicant countries' way into the Union by forward-looking reforms in rural structural policy, environmental policy and consumer protection. This requires a great deal of political and financial support for civil society, local actors and non-governmental organisations, which will have a major role to play in making the modernisation and sustainable development of rural areas a success. With a view to the WTO negotiations in the agricultural sector, the Intergovernmental Conference must ensure that the Treaty objectives reinforce the multi-functional model of agriculture and Community preference. 4. The fight against fraud As far as combating fraud in the agricultural sector is concerned, the Intergovernmental Conference must bring about an improvement in the enforcement of Community law in the Member States. The Member States have an important responsibility in combating fraud involving subsidies because they are responsible for allocating and auditing resources at local level and are accountable to the EU. Often what are lacking are effective control methods, staff and systematic reporting of suspicious cases to the relevant EU authorities, who can in any case only carry out spot checks. Support structures must be simplified and the granting of support tied more closely to the type of production and employment.

CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following points in its draft report: 1. Calls for Parliament to have full power of codecision in all areas of the common agricultural

policy; in this context, considers it essential for there to be a precise clarification of the respective competence of the Commission and Parliament with regard to policy orientation, budgetary decisions and parliamentary control on the one hand and administrative implementing provisions on the other;

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2. Expects the Intergovernmental Conference to draw up a new version of Articles 32 to 38 of

the Amsterdam Treaty in order to update the objectives of the common agricultural policy, in particular by sanctioning the principle of multifunctionality, which underlies European farming. Farming's contribution to preserving the environment and landscape, to employment and spatial planning and to safeguarding the quality and safety of food must be clearly stated as an integral part of the European Union's policy for agriculture and the countryside. In addition to farming's productive role, which must continue to be efficient and competitive, the focus should shift to promoting quality and the marketing of quality products and emphasis should be placed on its contribution to the sustainable development of agriculture and rural areas;

3. Hopes that the accession negotiations will be completed speedily on the basis of further

reforms of the CAP, which will emphasise and define more clearly the multi-functional role of agriculture; calls for reliable criteria and conditions for promoting the production of quality products and services in the environmental sphere for rural areas in both East and West and in the Mediterranean region; stresses the importance of active involvement of civil society to ensure the success of these reform proposals, particularly in the applicant countries;

4. Calls on the Member States at the Intergovernmental Conference to support more effective

measures at local level to combat fraud involving subsidies and to improve significantly the exchange of information between themselves and with the control bodies of the Union.

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27 January 2000 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsman: Mrs Brigitte Langenhagen PROCEDURE At its meeting of 23 September 1999 the Committee on Fisheries appointed Mrs Langenhagen draftsman. It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 29 November and 7 December 1999 and 26 January 2000. At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions unanimously. The following were present for the vote: Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, chairman; Rosa Miguélez Ramos, vice-chairman; Brigitte Langenhagen, draftsman; Elspeth Attwooll, Niels Busk, Arlindo Cunha, Carmen Fraga Estévez, Pat the Cope Gallagher, Ian Stewart Hudghton, Salvador Jové Peres (for Mihail Papayannakis), Heinz Kindermann, Lisi (for David W. Martin), Nello Musumeci and James Nicholson. INTRODUCTION The Committee on Fisheries delivered two opinions on the Intergovernmental Conference which produced the Treaty of Amsterdam. Its ideas were reflected in both the European Parliament’s resolution of 17 May 1995 on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, the ‘Bourlanges/Martin report’22, and the resolution of 13 March 1996 embodying Parliament’s opinion on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference and an evaluation of the work of the Reflection Group and definition of the political priorities of the European Parliament

22 OJ C 151, 19.6.1995, p. 56.

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with a view to the Intergovernmental Conference, the ‘Maij-Weggen/Dury report’23. The position of the European Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries concerning the changes which should be made to the fisheries policy could be summarised as follows: 1. fisheries and agriculture should be treated separately in the Treaty and a specific title for

fisheries should be created;

2. the codecision procedure should be applied to directives and basic regulations; 3. the assent procedure should be applied to all international fisheries agreements. The changes made by the Amsterdam Treaty to existing legislation are extremely limited as regards the common fisheries policy (CFP). Article 299(2) states, inter alia, that fisheries policy shall be taken into account when measures are adopted to set the conditions for the application of the Treaty in the outermost regions. In fact, certain specific aid measures to these regions (i.e. the French Overseas Departments, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands) have already been adopted in accordance with Declaration No 26 of the Maastricht Treaty. Furthermore, Article 300(2) envisages a specific legal basis, which as yet does not exist, for the provisional application of recently initialled agreements, pending Parliament’s opinion and the definitive conclusion of such agreements.

FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES TO BE TACKLED AT THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL

CONFERENCE

A. Specific reference in the Treaties It would be appropriate for one of the few existing Community sectoral policies to be dealt with

more specifically in the Treaties, since although fisheries could originally be considered as an extension of agriculture, it is now a sectoral policy in its own right, which has developed substantially, and hence in the new Treaty there should be a specific title on fisheries, dealing with the aims of the common fisheries policy and the legislative procedures which must be applied for its implementation.

B. Decision-making procedures Since fisheries policy is one of the few truly Community economic sectors in which the main

decisions are taken by the Union institutions, the European Parliament, as the highest representative of the citizens and in the context of its monitoring of the Community executive, be it the Council or the Commission, in the specific Community institutional system, considers that its role in the defining of the main issues affecting this policy must go beyond mere consultation,

23 OJ C 96, 1.4.1996, p. 77.

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which is what it is confined to at present. The Committee on Fisheries considers that, as a general rule, in the areas affecting the major

spheres of action of the common fisheries policy and the basic regulations governing the various sectors - organisation of markets, the principles of conserving and managing resources, the system of control, technical conservation measures and structural policy instruments - the codecision procedure, or a similar procedure emerging from the future reform of the Treaties, must apply, guaranteeing Parliament a proper role in taking decisions regarding legislative acts of fundamental importance.

C. International fisheries agreements At the beginning of the last legislature, Parliament used to be presented with a fait accompli. It

would be consulted about a text, generally a protocol renewing a previous agreement, negotiated unilaterally by the Commission in accordance with the Council’s instructions, which was often already provisionally in force when the text of the protocol was forwarded to Parliament. Its consultation was hence a mere formality.

On 12 December 1996 Parliament, the Commission and the Council signed a joint statement on

improving the provision of information to the budgetary authority on fisheries agreements24. This document establishes, in particular, that the Commission is to ‘keep the European Parliament regularly informed through its parliamentary committees regarding the preparation and conduct of the negotiations, including the budgetary implications’ and that ‘every quarter the Commission will present detailed information to the budgetary authority concerning the execution of ongoing agreements and the financial forecasts for the remaining part of the year’.

The adoption of the statement was followed by a definite improvement in the supply of

information to Parliament. Our committee now receives information on the budgetary aspects of the agreements referred to in the statement, as well as on the exploitation of the fishing rights granted. Furthermore, the texts of the most recent protocols were forwarded promptly to the committee - at least the text agreed on in the negotiations - and the period of time between the initialling of the protocols and the first payment of financial compensation to the third countries concerned was long enough to enable Parliament to analyse it and deliver a prior opinion on the subject. Unfortunately, recent delays in the adoption of legislative proposals proposed by the Commission are reversing this improvement.

Considerable progress has been made towards a more rational application of the current provisions and procedures laid down in the Treaty, but Parliament still has very little opportunity of actually influencing the content of new agreements.

24 OJ C 20, 20.1.1997, p. 109.

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The European Parliament has been carrying out intensive work in the legal and political spheres aimed at making its assent compulsory for the adoption of international fishery agreements, as a suitable mechanism for ensuring that it has a proper share in decision-making when such agreements are concluded. Hitherto, except in the case of the fisheries agreement with Greenland - a complex international agreement which is not purely a fisheries agreement - and the fisheries agreement with Morocco, the Council has always considered that Parliament only required to be consulted about the conclusion of agreements. The recent judgement of the Court of Justice of 8 July 1999 concerning the proceedings for annulment of the relevant legislative act, Council Regulation 408/97 of 24 February 199725 on the fisheries agreement between the European Union and Mauritania, which sets a precedent regarding the definition of ‘important budgetary implications’ as the reason for requesting Parliament’s assent, could not be more frustrating for Parliament. The judgement flatly rejects its arguments and rules out judicial proceedings as a way of establishing a balance between the institutions in decisions regarding international fishery agreements.

Already aware of the difficulties involved, Parliament had tried, during the previous legislature, to reach agreement with the Council on a balanced interpretation which would support its claims. It must be recognised that the outcome of the meetings between the Presidents of the three Institutions, known as ‘trialogues’, did not produce any tangible result. The subject therefore calls for redoubled efforts and particular attention should be devoted to it in the run-up to the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference.

D. International organisations

Another issue connected with external activities in the fisheries sphere in which Parliament finds itself in an unsatisfactory situation is its involvement in international organisations of a regional nature, such as the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean (GFCM), the North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO/OPANO) and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), which are becoming increasingly active in the conservation and rational exploitation of fish resources worldwide. During the 1994-1999 parliamentary term the European Parliament reached an agreement with the Commission, set out in the Code of Conduct of 15 May 1995, which has resulted in more information being supplied on the deliberations and decisions of these important fora, which in many cases must be incorporated in Community law and have a bearing on the common fisheries policy.

Despite having made progress as regards the transparency and swift transmission of information, Parliament has not been as successful as regards its request for Members of

25 OJ L 62, 4.3.1997, p. 1.

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Parliament to take part in the meetings of the bodies administering these organisations. At the very best, in cases such as the annual meeting of NAFO, a Member of Parliament attending with observer status as a member of the Commission delegation was allowed to take part in the work of the plenary sessions, but not directly in the meetings leading up to negotiations, which is where decisions are actually negotiated.

E. Monitoring of the acts adopted in the context of commitology

Owing to the complexity of the administrative work of public authorities in modern society, in all our legal systems legislative work is increasingly carried out by bodies which, according to Montesquieu’s classic division of powers, can be considered as belonging to the executive. This development is unstoppable, owing to the technical complexity of certain provisions and the physical impossibility for parliaments to have a monopoly in the legislative work required in today’s world.

In the Community context this phenomenon leads to more powers being taken over by consultative, regulatory and management committees, which adopt provisions of enormous importance which may invalidate the Community legislation in force and are extremely difficult for Parliament to monitor.

This phenomenon, which also affects fisheries, but whose implications go far beyond, needs to be dealt with in depth at the new Intergovernmental Conference, with the aim of finding a balance which, without hindering its operation, will facilitate parliamentary control over the exercise of these powers. The relevant parliamentary committees should have access to reliable information about the activities of these committees.

CONCLUSIONS The Committee on Fisheries calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to take the following issues into account in the preparations for the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference for the amendment of the Treaties: 1. The European Parliament regrets that no specific chapter was devoted to fisheries in the

Amsterdam Treaty, in accordance with the importance and development of one of the Union’s few common policies; this chapter should state its objectives and underlying principles and specify which legal procedures regulate it;

2. A reform of the Treaties in the near future should re-establish a balance between the roles of

the various institutions of the Union in taking decisions in the fisheries sphere, giving Parliament real power to decide on the fundamental aspects of shaping the common policy;

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3. The achievement of this objective requires changes to the present situation, in which Parliament’s role, except in exceptional cases, is that of a mere bystander when regulations are being drawn up and is confined to assessing the work of the other two large institutions directly involved in the decision-making process - the Commission, as the body which submits Community initiatives and the Council, the important and almost sovereign authority involved in the adoption of the relevant decisions;

4. Turning Parliament from an observer into a real active force requires changes to the existing

procedures, altering the general rule whereby Parliament’s involvement in this sphere is based on the consultation procedure; a different procedure is needed to allow Parliament to influence fundamental decisions, which will require the adoption of procedures like the current codecision procedure;

5. In the sphere of international fisheries policy, Parliament’s role must be strengthened by

making its assent compulsory for the conclusion of all international fisheries agreements; similarly, it would be appropriate to consider, together with the Commission, what channels are needed to ensure that Members of Parliament are involved in the work of the decision-making bodies within the international organisations responsible for fisheries at regional level and in the negotiation of the Union’s international fishery agreements;

6. The democratic control of the work of public authorities requires an improvement in the

provisions governing commitology, giving Parliament access to reliable information about the deliberations of committees, so that it can exercise effective control over the decisions adopted by them.

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3 February 2000 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL POLICY, TRANSPORT AND TOURISM for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsman: Isidoro Sánchez García PROCEDURE At its meeting of 13 October 1999 the Committee on Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism appointed Isidoro Sánchez García draftsman. It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 13 December 1999 and 26 January 2000. At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions by 41 votes to 1, with 9 abstentions. The following were present for the vote: Konstantinos Hatzidakis, chairman; Helmuth Markov, Emmanouil Mastorakis and Rijk van Dam, vice-chairmen; Isidoro Sánchez García, draftsman; Sir Robert Atkins, Elspeth Attwooll, Emmanouil Bakopoulos, Theodorus J.J. Bouwman, Philip Charles Bradbourn (for Rolf Berend),Carmen Cerdeira Morterero, Luigi Cocilovo (for Martin Callanan)Paolo Costa, Danielle Darras, Alain Esclopé, Giovanni Claudio Fava, Markus Ferber (for Raffaele Fitto), Mathieu J.H. Grosch, Juan de Dios Izquierdo Collado, Georg Jarzembowski, Elisabeth Jeggle (for Francesco Musotto), Dieter-Lebrecht Koch, Brigitte Langenhagen (for Reinhard Rack) Arlene McCarthy, Erik Meijer, Reinhold Messner, Rosa Miguélez Ramos, Pasqualina Napoletano (for Günter Lüttge), Camilo Nogueira Román, Juan Ojeda Sanz, Josu Ortuondo Larrea, Karla M.H. Peijs, Wilhelm Ernst Piecyk, Samuli Pohjamo, Adriana Poli Bortone, Marieke Sanders-ten Holte (for Dirk Sterckx), Gilles Savary, Dana Rosemary Scallon, Brian Simpson, Renate Sommer, Per Stenmarck (for Ari Vatanen), Ulrich Stockmann, The Earl of Stockton, Helena Torres Marques, Francesco Turchi (for Gerard Collins), Maurizio Turco, Joaquim Vairinhos, Guido Viceconte and Jan Marinus Wiersma (for Mark Francis Watts). The Committee on Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism requests the Constitutional Affairs Committee to include the following conclusions in its report to the IGC:

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CONCLUSIONS 1. Considers that the assent procedure is not an appropriate procedure for involving the European

Parliament in decisions regarding the future definition of tasks, objectives and organisation of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. Considers, therefore, that article 161 of the Treaty must be modified to replace the assent procedure with codecision and unanimity with Qualified Majority Vote.

2. Considers, that the next IGC must underline the importance of territorial cohesion by introducing a

clearer reference, under the Title of economic and social cohesion, to the concept of spatial planning at a European level, defining the parameters for partnership and coordination. Development of this concept may be a valuable way of dealing with the task of taking a decision on the European geographical area.

3. Believes that the credibility of European integration can only be maintained if the principle of

subsidiarity is reinforced and developed to include decisions taken at the lowest level commensurate with efficiency, including that of the regional and local authorities.

4. Takes the view that ministers from regions with legislative competences should participate more

regularly and systematically in the national delegations to Council meetings when their competences are affected by the items under discussion and that national governments should actively facilitate this participation.

5. Similarly, considers that regions enjoying devolved legislative competence should also have access to

the Court of Justice, as indeed should all Community institutions and organs listed in Part 5 of the Treaty, including the Committee of the Regions.

6. Suggests that the forthcoming IGC should take advantage of a general renumbering to delete

unnecessary and obsolete articles, particularly in the transport sphere (Title V), such as Article 71(2), whereby principles of the transport system are laid down by the Council acting unanimously, after merely consulting Parliament; Article 78, which is still a special provision for the division of Germany; and Article 80 which excludes sea and air transport from the common transport policy, unless the Council decides otherwise.

7. Proposes that the common transport policy be clearly stated and defined as an objective of the

Treaty under an expanded Article 70 along the lines agreed in the Final Declaration to the Third Pan-European Transport Conference in Helsinki in June 1997.

8. Draws attention to paragraph 44 in its resolution of 18 November 1999 on the IGC, calling for the

Treaty of Amsterdam to incorporate provisions for the establishment of a single European air traffic control agency.

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9. Stresses the importance of tourism both to the economy and to jobs. Takes the view that the Community can play an important role in bringing together the many elements that affect the tourist industry. Insists that when the Treaty is revised at the Conference of Representatives of the Member States it must include a legal basis to enable the Community to act in this area, with due respect to the principle of subsidiarity.

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31 January 2000 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE, YOUTH, EDUCATION, THE MEDIA AND SPORT for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsman: Ole Andreasen PROCEDURE At its meeting of 12 October the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport appointed Mr Andreasen draftsman. It considered the draft opinion at its meeting(s) of 24 November 1999, 6 December 1999, 11 and 27 January 2000. At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions unanimously. The following were present for the vote: Giuseppe Gargani, chairman; Vasco Graça Moura and Ulpu Iivari vice-chairmen; Ole Andreasen, draftsman; Alexandros Alavanos, Per-Arne Arvidsson, Pedro Aparicio Sànchez, Raina A. Mercedes Echerer, Alain Esclopé (for Jens Dyhr Okking), Janelly Fourtou, Lissy Gröner, Cristina Gutiérrez-Cortines (for Theresa Zabell Lucas), Christopher Heaton-Harris, Ruth Hieronymi, Karin Junker (for Valter Veltroni), Thierry Brac de La Perrière, Lucio Manisco, Maria Martens, Mario Mauro, Barbara O'Toole, Doris Pack, Roy Perry, Christa Prets, Mónica Ridruejo, Willi Rothley (pursuant to Rule 153(2)) Martine Roure, Maria Johanna Sanders-Ten Holte, Catherine Taylor, Kathleen Van Brempt, Luckas Vander Taelen, Christine de Veyrac, Eurig Wyn and Sabine Zissener. Introduction With a view to the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference on the review of the treaties of the European Union, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs has asked Parliament’s committees for their opinions. In the light of the forthcoming enlargement of the EU, your draftsman notes that increased variety, heterogeneity and cultural and linguistic diversity in the EU will impose further demands for the promotion

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of and respect for individual linguistic and cultural identity, the common heritage of shared cultural values and the common European identity. Ambitious and dynamic development should be based on human rights, prohibiting any discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language, age, religion, political views, ethnic origin etc. and respecting minorities in an open and tolerant democracy. Your draftsman will below submit his ideas for institutional reform of the Union, followed by thoughts on reform within the policy areas covered by the committee.

Institutional reform The European Union faces substantial institutional reform. The Treaty of Amsterdam did not properly prepare the Union for enlargement and, if this great project is to be successful, the reforms need to be tackled now. However, the restricted IGC procedure, discussing the weighting of votes in the Council, the number of commissioners and the use of qualified majority alone, will not be enough. A more radical reform will be required. Your draftsman refers to Parliament’s resolution of 18 November 1999 on the basis of the Dimitrakopoulos and Leinen report26 and would like to see the Treaty divided into two parts. The first, the constitutional part, would contain the preamble, general principles and objectives, constituent articles, decision-making procedures, membership rules and citizens’ rights. This part of the Treaty could be amended only by unanimity among the Member States with the support of the European Parliament. The second part of the Treaty could contain chapters implementing policies, e.g. economic and monetary policy, agriculture etc. This part of the Treaty could be amended by a less strict procedure involving the EU’s institutions. Your draftsman believes that this more constitutional approach to reform of the Treaty would settle the problem of sovereignty and thus meet the dissatisfaction expressed by sections of the public. At the same time, this treaty format would make the formulation of Union policies more political and hence increase public interest. Your draftsman hopes that the overarching institutional changes will respect the wish for efficiency, simplification, transparency, democratisation and accountability in the affairs of Europe.

26 A5-0058/99

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The committee’s policy areas

In general The Treaty of Amsterdam, as we have seen, did not bring the institutional reform needed if an enlarged EU is to operate appropriately and effectively. The institutional reforms will be the most important part of the intergovernmental conference, but in addition there will have to be negotiations on amendments and additions to those provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam falling within the sphere of the Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, the Media and Sport. Reference may be made to the Commission communication of 11 November 199927 which emphasised the need with enlargement to alter the voting rules in Council in cases where conciliation procedure co-existed with unanimity, and expressly pointed out that Article 151 on culture should be amended to introduce qualified majority in that area. The committee concluded in its opinion for the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the draft Treaty of Amsterdam on 24 September 199728 that it was regrettable that qualified majority voting had not been introduced in the sphere of culture and that unanimity in the Council would stand in the way of the introduction of measures in this field. The correctness of this forecast has been proved by the difficulties in negotiating and adopting the Culture 2000 programme. Your draftsman would emphasise that the subsidiarity principle which requires decisions in the EU to be taken as close as possible to the citizen, in Articles 149, 150 and 151, must be respected. If a Union whose membership is continually increasing is not to be politically and institutionally paralysed, we need to consider whether the subsidiarity principle should not be developed and refined. In the longer term, the objective must be for a Treaty to lay down spheres of responsibility at central and regional levels. Amendments to the Treaty in the areas relating to culture, youth, education, the media and sport must not entail any form of harmonisation of the Member States’ rules and administrative provisions.

Specifically

Information Taking a lesson from the generally unsatisfactory turnout in the June 1999 European Parliament elections,

27 “Adapting the Institutions to make a success of Enlargement”, Contribution by the European

Commission to preparation for the Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional Issues. 28 Resolution of 19 November 1997, OJ C371/97 – A4-0347/1997.

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we may repeat the words of the committee’s opinion of 22 February 199629 that there is a compelling need to set up a genuine information policy concerning the intergovernmental conference, in which the European Parliament should play a part. The turnout showed the continuing gap between the European public and the European Community institutions and your draftsman believes that the lack of debate makes public attitudes towards the Communities sceptical and pessimistic rather than positive. An information and communications policy which will effectively and directly inform the public of all aspects of European affairs and which follows the principle of pluralism and diversity is needed, not only in respect of the Intergovernmental Conference but also as part of everyday life in Europe.

Culture Few places in the world rival Europe in the multiplicity of languages, cultures and traditions it combines in such a limited geographical area. This variety is a constant source of cultural vigour and wealth, which must never be hampered by excessive red tape and bureaucratic jargon. In the global arena it is Europe’s strength that it reflects diversity and your draftsman believes that cultural diversity and tolerance are strengthened by European integration as it fosters intercultural exchanges of experience. The protection of the Community’s cultural minorities, who are entitled to their own languages, schools and media, will become even more important after enlargement. Article 151 therefore needs to be amended to contain a clear legal basis for the protection of cultural minorities. As already mentioned, Article 151(5) should be amended to require Council decisions by qualified majority.

Education Young people represent the future and continuity of any society and the Community must continue to make its contribution to developing a high level of education by supporting and encouraging cooperation between the Member States in this area. It may do this by stepping up the exchange programmes for young people which will benefit cultural and linguistic understanding between citizens. The Member States must encourage the learning of European foreign languages by children and young people at as early a stage as possible and the teaching of European history.

29 A4-0068/96, annex.

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The EU must ensure the mutual recognition of qualifications and courses in the Union and urge the Member States to recognise time spent abroad as part of the pupils’ education.

The Media In the information society the media, and in particular the audiovisual media, play an important role in the comprehension of Community policies. A European media policy is vital, not simply from a cultural but also from economic and social viewpoints. That part of the Community’s media policy falling within the articles in the Treaty concerning industry, e.g. Media 2 – Development and Distribution, is therefore adopted after consultation of the European Parliament and by unanimity in the Council. Co-decision and qualified majority in the Council need to be introduced in this field. Consideration needs to be given to whether the Treaty of Amsterdam Protocol30 on the system of public broadcasting in the Member States should become an article in the new Treaty, as public broadcasting is highly important to democratic and cultural development in the Member States.

Sport The various aspects of sport, cultural, social and economic, are increasingly important in European society. With the Treaty of Amsterdam, a political declaration of intent was adopted on sport31 concerning the need for dialogue with sports associations and for special consideration to be given to amateur sport. Consideration needs to be given to the desirability of introducing a legal basis for sport in the new Treaty, as proposed by the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport in its report of 21 May 199732 In view of recent developments concerning drug-taking in amateur and professional sport, there needs to be discussion at all levels within the Community on the rules of conduct that might be adopted among the Member States.

CONCLUSIONS 30 Protocol No 32, appended to the Treaty establishing the European Community. 31 Declaration 29 to the Treaty of Amsterdam (annex). 32 A4-0197/97 adopted by Parliament on 13 June 1997 (OJ C 200/97, p. 252).

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The Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs to include in its report the following points:

1. Points out that the forthcoming enlargement of the EU will mean increased variety, multiplicity

and cultural and linguistic diversity in the EU, which will be reflected to a much greater extent in European cooperation and the European Treaties; takes the view, in this regard, that a European information and communications policy based on the principles of pluralism, openness and diversity would enhance public awareness of European cooperation; takes the view, further, that boosting cooperation between the European Union and applicant countries in the field of information policy would strengthen European cultural cohesion with a view to enlargement;

2. Calls for the future reform of the Treaties to include sufficient legal basis for the development of

common policies on cultural matters, and for an increase in Community competencies with regard to education;

3. Calls for the use of the subsidiarity principle to be strengthened and developed in line with the

principle of openness and democratic accountability at all levels of the legislative process; 4. Calls for the introduction of qualified majority voting in those areas in which the conciliation

procedure currently exists alongside unanimity in the Council, especially Article 151 on cultural policy, where the existence of unanimity significantly hinders the adoption of decisions and thus legislative progress in that highly important area;

5. Calls for the necessary basis to be provided for the creation of a European dimension of

education with a view to enabling the European Community's objectives in this area to be fully achieved, particularly those laid down in Article 149 of the EC Treaty;

6. Takes the view that consideration should be given to the introduction of a legal basis for

sport in the new Treaty, as proposed by the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport in its report of 21 May 1997, in view both of developments in amateur, professional and popular sport (e.g. drug-taking) and of the economic impact of sport (e.g. betting);

7. Asks that, during the Intergovernmental Conference, Parliament should be able actively to

follow the Conference and should have the opportunity to express its opinion throughout the deliberations, and that a procedure be established to enable each parliamentary committee to contribute to the drawing-up of such an opinion within its terms of reference.

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25 February 2000

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (14094/1999 – C5-0341/1999 – 1999/0825(CNS))

Draftsperson: Anna Karamanou

PROCEDURE

The Committee on Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities appointed Anna Karamanou draftsperson at its meeting of 21 September 1999.

It considered the draft opinion at its meeting of 24 November 1999, 26 January 2000 and 23 February 2000.

At the last meeting it adopted the amendments below by 14 votes to 0, with 4 abstention.

The following were present for the vote: Theorin, chairperson; Van Lancker, vice-chairperson; Karamanou, draftsperson; Auroi (for Hautala), Avilés Perea, Dybkjær, Ghilardotti, Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso, Gröner, Izquierdo Rojo (for Paciotti), Lulling, Martens, Prets, Sanders-Ten Holte, Schmidt (for van der Laan), Smet, Swiebel and Torres Marques.

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SHORT JUSTIFICATION

INTRODUCTION Background The Intergovernmental Conference 1. The conclusions of the Cologne European Council (June 1999) and of the Helsinki European

Council (December 1999) set the framework for the Intergovernmental Conference to be convened in February 2000 in order to resolve the institutional issues left open in Amsterdam that need to be settled before enlargement.

2. According to the Cologne conclusions, the brief of the IGC would cover three main topics:

size and composition of the Commission; weighting of votes in the Council; possible extension of qualified majority voting in the Council.33

3. The agenda for the IGC adopted by the Helsinki European Council has not substantially

enlarged this brief. In its resolution of 16 December 199934, Parliament expressed its disappointment and deplored the lack of political vision by the European Council, which had restricted institutional reform at the IGC to the three issues left over at Amsterdam. The EP considers that this reform is inadequate to ensure that an enlarged Europe can function effectively.

4. Your draftsperson shares these views and calls on the Portuguese Presidency to make use,

according to the mandate given by Helsinki, of the possibility of adding further items to the agenda. The EU should fully exploit this opportunity not only to reform its institutions - from our committee's point of view, the aim is to ensure representation and political participation of women in EU decision-making processes - but also to complete the policy reforms started with the Amsterdam Treaty, in particular the policy to promote the equality of women and men (Articles 2 and 3).

5. The Amsterdam Treaty represented a step forward for women. In its opinion35, this committee

gave an overall positive view. Equality for women and men has become both a principle and a task of the Community and the combined reading of Articles 2 and 3 provides a basis for a

33 'Other necessary amendments to the treaties arising as regards the European institutions in connection

with the above issues and in implementing the treaty of Amsterdam could also be discussed'.

34 Minutes of 16.12.1999, part II, point 5.

35 AD/337741/PE 223.233/fin.; draftsperson: Helena Torres Marques.

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pro-active strategy of the Community in this area. Articles 137(1) and 141(3) and (4) also represent some progress.

6. This committee also pointed to some gaps and stated priorities for the next Treaty revision:

• broadening of Article 141 to ensure a legal basis for equality between women and men going clearly beyond the employment field;

• a rewriting of Art. 13 to give the prohibition on discrimination based on sex direct effect; • legal clarification of the implications of equality for women and men being included in

Articles 2 and 3. 7. Against this background, your draftsperson wishes to focus on the following issues:

• gender-balance in the composition of EU institutions and bodies, • a clear legal basis for equality in the Treaty, • non-discrimination on the basis of gender, • positive actions.

The first topic would be line with the current, quite limited brief of the IGC, the others are the

logical consequence of the policy changes introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty and should be added to the agenda.

a) Gender-balance in the composition of EU institutions and bodies 8. In its resolution of 18 November 1999, based on the Dimitrakopoulos and Leinen report (A5-

0058/1999)36, the EP expressed its views on the method and the agenda of the IGC. Strengthening the institutions and making them more efficient, transparent and democratic - by changing their composition, tasks and cooperation and organisation - should be the main objectives. As to the substance of the reform, Parliament recommended the constitutionalisation of the Union and bringing Europe closer to citizens, which is in turn linked to the issue of the EU Charter of fundamental rights.

9. Making institutions more democratic also means ensuring gender-balance in their composition.

There is a substantial body of international conventions and instruments concerning equality of access for women and full participation in power structures and decision-making, to which the EU Member States are committed. We will mention in particular: • the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

(CEDAW); • the Declaration and Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women

(Beijing, 1995); • the Council recommendation of 2 December 1996 on the balanced participation of

36 Minutes of 18.11.1999, part II, point 4.

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women and men in the decision-making process37 which called, inter alia, on the Institutions, subsidiary and decentralised bodies of the European Communities to design a strategy for achieving balanced participation by women and men in the decision-making process38;

• the 1988 declaration of the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe; • the Declaration adopted by the Member States at the European Conference 'Women and

Men in Power', Paris, 17 April 199939. 10. Equality is an integral part of human rights and the eradication of gender discrimination is a

prerequisite of democracy. A democracy where women - over half of the population - are under-represented in decision-making in the political, economic and social areas cannot be a true democracy. Your draftsperson supports the concept of 'parity democracy', as developed by the Council of Europe, as a way to enrich democracy through the equal contribution of women and men and to ensure a fuller realisation of justice and equity within society40. The integration of 'equality of women and men' in all Community policies will only become a reality if women participate in the drawing up and follow-up of these policies at all levels. This depends in turn on representation on decision-making bodies and requires presence in posts of responsibility and decision-taking positions41.

11. Women are still under-represented in decision-making bodies at all levels and in all EU

institutions. Your draftsperson would recommend a revision of the relevant Treaty articles, in order to ensure a balanced participation of women and men in the composition of the following EU institutions and bodies: Commission; Court of Justice; Court of First Instance; Court of Auditors; Economic and Social Committee; Committee of the Regions.

12. As for Parliament, this objective can be achieved by ensuring balanced representation of

women and men in winnable positions on electoral lists, in order to overcome political obstacles posed by the selection of candidates within political parties and the electoral

37 OJ L 319, 10.12.1996. 38 It recommends that the Member States: 'I.4 (b) raise the awareness of those involved of the importance of

taking initiatives to achieve balanced participation of women and men in public positions at all levels, paying particular attention to the promotion of a balanced composition in committees, commissions and working parties at national as well as Community level'.

39 It states that European institutions, governments and the political parties should take the necessary measures including binding and or encouraging measures, both in the electoral field and in the appointment of members of advisory bodies involved in public decision-making, with the aim of ensuring a balanced participation by women and men.

40 See also Council recommendation of 2.12.1996, recital 10: 'Whereas the under-representation of women in decision-making posts constitutes a loss for society as a whole and may prevent the interests and needs of the entire population from being catered for in full.'

41 Council recommendation of 2.12.1996, recital 6.

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system42. Your draftsperson would recommend a revision of Articles 190(1) and 191 (European political parties).

b) A legal basis for equality 13. The Amsterdam Treaty marked a step forward for women. Articles 2 and 3, combined,

provide a basis for a pro-active policy, but no article in Part III of the Treaty lays down explicit measures for bringing about and implementing equality in all policy areas, beyond employment and occupation (Art. 141). The request for a specific chapter on equality in the Treaty was not taken on board by the previous IGC. In order to take the existing provisions of Articles 2 and 3 a stage further, your draftsperson would recommend introducing into the Treaty a single coherent legal basis for equality for men and women in all policy areas.

c) Non-discrimination on the basis of gender 14. As stated in the Torres Marques opinion, Article 13 on non-discrimination is unsatisfactory

both from a political and from a legal point of view. Women are not a minority; they represent over the half of the population. Discrimination on the basis of gender is structural and horizontal and cannot be grouped alongside other forms of discrimination. Rather, it exacerbates other kinds of discrimination. Moreover, Article 13 is purely an enabling clause, with no direct effect, unlike Article 12 (non-discrimination on grounds of nationality). Finally, it allows for appropriate action to combat discrimination under a procedure requiring unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of Parliament. Your draftsperson proposes a separate provision in the Treaty, ensuring that non-discrimination on ground of gender has the same legal status as non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and direct effect.

d) Positive actions 15. Your draftsperson refers to the views expressed in the opinion from the Committee on

Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities on the Charter of fundamental rights43. The gender-neutral formulation of Art. 141(4)44 will have to be reconsidered, in line with the political will to advance the position of women expressed in the EU policy to promote the equality of women

42 See also the Recommendation 1413(1999) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on equal

representation in political life. 43 PE 232.347/fin. 44 'With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life, the principle of

equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.'

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and men (Articles 2 and 3 of the TEC).

CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following points in its report: 1. Calls for a more ambitious agenda for the IGC and asks the Portuguese Presidency, in

accordance with the mandate given to it by the Helsinki European Council to make proposals for further items, to enter the issue of an equality policy for women and men on the IGC agenda;

2. Affirms that balanced participation of women and men in decision-making at all levels is a

prerequisite of democracy and social justice and calls for amendment of the relevant articles of the Treaty in order to include the principle of balanced participation of women and men in the composition of the Commission, Court of Justice, Court of First Instance, Court of Auditors, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions;

3. Calls for a single coherent legal basis for equality for women and men in all policy areas to be

introduced into the Treaty; 4. Stresses that discrimination on the basis of gender is structural and horizontal and cannot be

grouped alongside other forms of discrimination; asks for a separate provision in the Treaty with a view to ensuring that non-discrimination on grounds of gender has the same legal status as non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and direct effect;

5. Stresses the need for a close linkage between the IGC and the process of drawing up the

Charter of fundamental rights; in the framework of the constitutionalisation of the Union, calls for the fundamental right to equality of women and men to be written into Community law.

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ANNEX Examples of possible amendments to the Treaty A number of examples of possible amendments to the Treaty are listed below. The rapporteur believes that these could form a working basis for a revision of the Treaty aimed at strengthening the policy of equal opportunities for both genders. These examples reflect the rapporteur's viewpoint.

Article 3, point (h)a (new)

(h)a a common policy of equality for women and men

Article 3, paragraph 2 2. In all the activities referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities and give men and women equal status.

Article 12(a) (new) Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of gender shall be prohibited. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, may adopt rules designed to prohibit such discrimination. Article 17, second paragraph a (new)

In accordance with the fundamental values of democracy, European citizenship requires balanced participation and representation of women and men in decision-making bodies and forums at Community level.

Article 190, paragraph 1

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1. The representatives in the European Parliament of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community shall be elected by direct universal suffrage and respecting the principle of balanced representation of women and men in winnable positions on electoral lists. Article 191 Political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union, and to achieving parity democracy.

Article 213, paragraph 1 Commission

The Commission shall consist of 20 Members, who shall be chosen on the grounds of their general competence and whose independence is beyond doubt, respecting the principle of balanced representation of women and men.

Article 223, first paragraph Court of Justice The Judges and Advocates-General shall be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised competence; they shall be appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States for a term of six years, respecting the principle of balanced representation of women and men.

Article 225, paragraph 3 Court of First Instance The members of the Court of First Instance shall be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment to judicial office; they shall be appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States for a term of six years, respecting the principle of balanced representation of women and men. The membership shall be partially renewed every three years. Retiring members shall be eligible for reappointment.

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Article 247, paragraph 2 Court of Auditors 2. The Members of the Court of Auditors shall be chosen from among persons who belong or have belonged in their respective countries to external audit bodies or who are especially qualified for this office, respecting the principle of balanced representation of women and men. Their independence must be beyond doubt.

Article 258, second paragraph Economic and Social Committee

The members of the Committee shall be appointed by the Council, acting unanimously, for four years, respecting the principle of balanced representation of women and men. Their appointments shall be renewable. Article 263, third paragraph Committee of the Regions The members of the Committee and an equal number of alternate members shall be appointed for four years by the Council acting unanimously on proposals from the respective Member States, respecting the principle of balanced representation of women and men. Their term of office shall be renewable. No member of the Committee shall at the same time be a Member of the European Parliament.