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1 Abstract: The nadir of the study of civil-military relations is how diplomats negotiate to control the equipment type and quantity of other countries armed forces. After the borders and the free movement of people. Civil-military relations is no longer control has become a facet of public administration. This paper will detail the CFSP/ESDP separate to the agreements reached by individual member states. This contrasts the 'national role conception' but highlights the significance of human Introduction The theme of this 20 IPSA World Congress is “Is Democracy Working?” Many things. This includes the formal and informal imposition of different political these known as democracy is a subjective political ideology, philosophy and practice. European Arms Control Regime Glen M. Segell Cold War the European Union has experienced enlargement and deepening with open national, nor is it paramount to the defence of sovereign territorial boundaries. Arms emergence of a European Union arms control regime linked to the evolving decision-makers. Keywords: European Union, civil-military relations, arms control, CFSP/ESDP th parts of the world may blame centuries of European political meanderings for many ideologies, philosophies and practices within Europe and across the globe. One of

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Abstract: The nadir of the study of civil-military relations is how diplomats negotiate

to control the equipment type and quantity of other countries armed forces. After the

borders and the free movement of people. Civil-military relations is no longer

control has become a facet of public administration. This paper will detail the

CFSP/ESDP separate to the agreements reached by individual member states. This

contrasts the 'national role conception' but highlights the significance of human

Introduction

The theme of this 20 IPSA World Congress is “Is Democracy Working?” Many

things. This includes the formal and informal imposition of different political

these known as democracy is a subjective political ideology, philosophy and practice.

European Arms Control Regime

Glen M. Segell

Cold War the European Union has experienced enlargement and deepening with open

national, nor is it paramount to the defence of sovereign territorial boundaries. Arms

emergence of a European Union arms control regime linked to the evolving

decision-makers.

Keywords: European Union, civil-military relations, arms control, CFSP/ESDP

th

parts of the world may blame centuries of European political meanderings for many

ideologies, philosophies and practices within Europe and across the globe. One of

There is no singular definition. Like all political ideologies, philosophies and

These values can form norms for daily interactions and practices. Norms can be

agreements, institutions and regimes. Taking this further this paper commences with

democracies have ever entered into armed conflict with each other. This can in part be

(negotiation). This paper will continue along such lines of consideration using The

working with regards to a “European Arms Control Regime.” The paper will discuss

and the EU stance on WMD non-proliferation.

2

practices democracy arises out of the values of society as a collection of individuals.

codified into legislation and form the basis for national and international treaties,

the hypothesis that democracy is working in the case of arms control, predominately

amongst and between democratic states. There are very few if any instances where

attributed to the democratic practises (norm) of resolving disputes through diplomacy

European Union (EU) as the case study of democracy showing that democracy is

the various treaties and how they were reached, the implementation of the treaties

within Europe and with other states, the European code of conduct on arms exports,

is the only prerequisite for wider world peace and harmony with universal consensus.

Numerous other criteria and factors could be contemplated and debated. It could also

disputes without the use of armed force are solely confined to the practise of

between sovereign states that are not democratic. However the historical precedence

part due to the creation of the European Union and a European Arms Control Regime.

In evaluating such a case there is no doubt that it could be questionable if democracy

be questionable if issues of arms control, disarmament and the determination of

democracy. Indeed there are many cases of successful diplomacy and arms control

of thousands of years of conflict and war have been brought to an end in Europe, in

All member states of the European Union being democratic as it is a prerequisite for

where, when and why democracy is working, for example in the European Union.

3

membership. It follows that arms control is a significant starting point to note how,

states is the nadir of democratic civil-military relations. Diplomats aim to curtail

another states military capability offering to likewise limit their own. The result is

peace dividend and/or gain an eventual comparative or absolute advantage of one side

military of the respective parties to the agreement will limit or reduce their weaponry

sovereign state who control the military is an important characteristic of democracy.

Such practises of elected civilian authorities enacting arms control has abolished

development and procurement in the armed forces of EU member states. Today the

and peace-roles across the globe. The security and defence of the EU is maintained by

police and para-military forces co-operating in patrolling the open internal borders

states engaged in diplomacy. In the 19 and 20 Centuries the most prevalent of arms

the predominate states and the most frequent at war. This was often as multi-lateral

In doing so it should be noted that the diplomacy of arms control between sovereign

sometimes multi-faceted and not always symmetrical. Agreements may achieve a

of the other. When diplomats reach agreement internationally it is expected that the

and forces. This is per se civilian control of the military. Elected civilians in a

conscription and reduced the manpower and devastating escalation of weapon

armed forces of EU states are predominately used to project humanitarian missions

between and amongst EU member states and the free internal movement of citizens.

Historically arms control agreements in Europe have not been confined to democratic

th th

control treaties were negotiated by the Great Powers of Europe, mostly monarchies as

agreements after the cessation of hostilities such as the Peace of Versailles after

control agreements between the United States and Soviet Union. The Soviet Union

had civilian control of the military. NATO countries had predominately

4

World War I. During the Cold War, European states were proxy to bi-lateral arms

was not a democratic state though the majority of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries

democratically elected civilian governments while the Warsaw Pact had

predominately autocratic civilian control of the military.

In both historical periods the characteristic of such agreements was the construction of

norms originated from the values of domestic politics. State leaders were signatories

democratic sovereign states these elected state leaders were required to refer the treaty

to domestic legislature for ratification. It was understood that the process of

There was confidence in continuity in following treaties signed and ratified by

was no such legislative ratification. This frequently gave cause for apprehension that

subsequent leaders would not adhere to their predecessor's agreement. In this

reached through diplomatic efforts. This longevity was apparent after the end of the

international authority to enforce the treaty. This was especially since not all parties to

international norms codified into legal documents in state-to-state agreements. Such

to these treaties often after protracted diplomatic processes. In the Western European

ratification in democratic states by their legislature was in a binding notion of trust.

previous governments. In the Eastern European non-democratic sovereign states there

democracy gave confidence to the longevity of arms control agreements that had been

Cold War for example the INF Treaty.

The inherent limitation of any arms control process is the lack of any form of

such treaties were democratic sovereign states. However, it was understood that so

that they would reach agreement and/or comprise not to descend to war. The hope

fields that could bring antagonistic entities towards peaceful co-existence. There were

reflection of arms control during the Cold War. Indeed the diplomatic process and

important as the domestic ratification and deposition of the treaties in the newly

5

long as antagonistic states were negotiating and engaged in diplomacy there was hope

was that arms control treaties would be the platform for further co-operation in other

also clauses in most agreements for monitoring and verification process though these

were also difficult to confirm. By and large and in retrospect this was an accurate

debate in retention of the Cold War agreements after the Cold War was seen as just as

democratic European states as morally if not legally binding.

The arms control environment has progressively changed since the end of the Cold

War. Instead of a rigid bi-polar world dominated by two Superpowers there are now

that cannot participate (weak/failed states) in the diplomatic processes. Such non-

weaponry as well as dissent on the basis of existing treaties resting on the domestic

values of the dominant / hegemonic state that is not universally accepted as

espoused by the USA is complicated by the increased number of sovereign states due

diplomatic process between less than 30 Kingdoms or between two Super-Powers.

General Assembly or its 15 member Security Council to reach consensus.

non-state entities (terrorists), states that are not willing to participate (rogue) and those

participation in arms control discussions has been aggravated by the proliferation of

representative of all nations. This dissent over democracy, capitalism, and secularity

to the end of colonial rule and the rise of nationalism. Arms control is no longer a

Effective arms control and disarmament now requires 192 states in the United Nations

Complicating issues is the decision by President Bush to take uni-lateral pre-emptive

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military action against those opposing the democratic values of the United States.

On a positive and unique note the 25 member states of the European Union (EU) are

disarmament as part and parcel of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP) with a sub-ordinate European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The idea

European integration process itself. But the Union has made less progress in forging a

and a single currency. The geopolitical changes following the collapse of

EU members to redouble their efforts to speak and act as one. The deep divisions

among EU member states in spring 2003 illustrate just how difficult this can be over

Nor is it a purely intergovernmental organisation like the United Nations. It is, in fact,

a unique experiment in democracy that is working. Its member countries remain

through the pooling of state sovereignty - and thus gain much greater collective

the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission. For example, a

functioning civil-service, an elected parliament and agreements on social, culture and

progressively and democratically adopting a common approach to arms control and

that the European Union should speak with one voice in world affairs is as old as the

common foreign and security policy over the years than in creating a single market

communism, and the outbreak of regional crises in the Balkans and beyond, have led

whether the UN Security Council should authorise the American-led war on Iraq.

The European Union (EU) is not a federal State like the United States of America.

independent sovereign nations, but their citizens attain greater democratic rights

strength and influence. Joint decisions are taken through shared institutions such as

single currency, a judiciary as the highest court of appeal to citizens of the EU, a

health issues are just a few benefits to all citizens, to name just a few. Although many

integration to abrogate nationalism that was the cause of 350 years of European

amongst its 25 member states is being enacted as public administration rather than

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may contest what the EU is all about most would concur that it's two objectives are

conflict and strife and to promote democracy. The practise of democracy between and

international diplomacy.

that the EU is an additional entity involved in international arms control and

cannot be a signatory to international agreements and whose actions do not require

governmental organisations or indeed United Nations agencies such as UNIDR that

strive to further arms control and disarmament. Hence CFSP/ESDP is not the same as

not have a 'national role conception' in its foreign, defence and security policy. The

'external action' as it is called in Part III of the Draft Constitutional Treaty of the

Convention encompasses the so called 'first pillar' policies such as development co-

well as rapid reaction forces for humanitarian intervention.

The rules for decision-making and the role of the Commission and of the Council are

Council by QMV on the basis of a Commission initiative and under the control of the

Integral to understanding the formulation and implementation of these EU policies is

disarmament that is wielding power in the name of itself and its members but that

domestic ratification. In a sense this is similar but also different from the various non-

a sovereign states foreign policy nor is it the same as external relations. The EU does

EU is thus a democracy but without nationalism. In EU jargon, external relations, or

operation and technical assistance, trade, environmental, visa and asylum policy as

unique for CFSP. Whereas in the first pillar most decisions can be taken in the

European Parliament, all CFSP decisions require the unanimous consent of 25

substantial budget of some 100 billion EURO annually. The second pillar only

crisis management operations in the Balkans. Decision-making and implementation in

effective way - commonly referred to as coherence - implies a seamless and

these are managed in the Commission by debates between the Commissioners who

upon the human element of the actual decision maker. This differs from national

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Member States, but no EP involvement. Also, first pillar policies are underpinned by a

disposes of an annual budget of 40 million EURO most of which is currently spent on

the EU federal attitude is typified of the option of either consensus (commonality) or

unanimity (singularity). However, the implementation of external relations in the most

coordinated use of the CFSP and of all other external relations instruments. Most of

often negotiate from personal views. Such decision making is very much dependant

assemblies / parliaments where there is often the input of political parties, public

opinion, and the need to attain coherency with colleagues.

This is also a consequence of the nature of the European Union where civil-military

territorial boundaries. On the tactical (operational) and strategic (structural) levels

throughout the EU there has progressively been a restructuring of armed forces, new

armed forces are no longer required for territorial defence nor for border patrols given

focussing on the state apparatus for human security by such EU organisations as

laundering and trafficking etc. The armed forces as a defence industrial base are

relations is no longer national, nor is it paramount to the defence of sovereign

focus on equipment procurement and human resource recruitment and training. The

the open borders with the legalised free movement of people and goods. The EU is

EUROPOL against terrorism, organized crime, drug and human trafficking, money

retained as insurance and are being restructured to operate as combined-joint-task-

forces have a dual-hat role with and by NATO's Response Force (NRF).

9

forces (CJTF) for humanitarian and peace-operations on a global basis. Many of these

states are progressively adopting consensual attitudes towards regional and global

issues on the policy (political options) and doctrinal (specific political

assisting Russia to dismantle obsolete nuclear weapons, the threat of biological and

nuclear program. It is also clear that many of the Cold War arms control agreements

doubt receive the attention of both the EU and OSCE. Indicative of any new

agreements is the uniqueness that EU agencies such as EURATOM and not the IAEA

the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) must be preserved by all means. This is recalled

December 2003. The Commission is contributing, in close cooperation with the

Council, to the implementation of the Strategy.

Given such events and realities it is the purpose of this paper to continue by focussing

Union's CFSP/ESDP. The goal is to detail the emergence of a unique European Union

democratic public administration separate but in tandem with individual member

Given such practicalities it is of no surprise that the European Union and its member

implementation) levels. These include thematic and regional issues that include

chemical weapons and in taking an active role in negotiations with Iran over its

such as CFE are no longer relevant to the union of 25 EU member states and will no

monitor the EU member states. An example of common policy is the insistence that

in the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMDs adopted by the Council in

on certain specifics of arms control and disarmament that pertain to the European

arms control regime that is co-ordinated with the evolving CFSP/ESDP through

states sovereign diplomacy and democratically formed policies. The emerging form of

regulations; illicit trafficking; a code of conduct; joint action on small arms; a

and disarmament.

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this EU arms control regime is in: dual use regulation; conventional export

common military list; non-proliferation of WMD; and non-proliferation assistance

It is more than likely that the real impact on armed forces and society of the EU

construction of a European military force. This is not surprising given that the

better than French President Jacques Chirac (2001) who succinctly stated ‘The

its task’. The current peace between and amongst EU member states shows just how

democracy is working compared to other ideologies and political systems that have

socialism, and fascism.

This debate has already attracted some attention in academia, in the writings of

Dunnay (2002), Feakes (2002), Grand (2000), Saferworld (2004) and Wulf (2003)

Notable in the debate are the relations between the United States and the European

international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance. Anthony (2004) has

prominent cases of Iran and China since neither are really pertinent to the unique

CFSP/ESDP will be through arms control and disarmament rather than the

rationale of the very existence of the European Union could not have been defined

Purpose of the European Union is to establish lasting peace on our continent. This is

failed in the European region for example monarchies, communism, national

where a list of relevant documentation has been made available by SIPRI (2005).

Union since both espouse democracy. This article will not detail the role of the EU in

already been written on this topic. Further this article will not delve into two

European Union Institutions but are more inclined to relations between the United

11

States and separate sovereign states on a bi-lateral level.

Specifically the Iranian dialogue is the initiative of France, Germany and the United

individual or specific institutions of the European Union. These three European union

member states have different diplomatic, political, economic and cultural relations

on the basis of and as a follow-up to the 'Paris Agreement.' This agreement

against terrorism, middle east peace process, weapons of mass destruction, on the one

negotiation but other EU states have remained passively inactive.

European Union on the suggestion of the lifting of European Union’s arms embargo

report that details these relations (Grimmett and Papademetriou 2005). Further to their

report it has also been argued that should the embargo be lifted that it would not result

understood that the European Union’s Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, while not

safeguard against worrisome arms exports by EU states to the Chinese in the future.

for example the transfer of technology. The United States does not have a Code of

Kingdom through the IAEA and the United Nations and does not actively involve the

with Iran but have agreed to co-ordinate their efforts to engage Iran on arms control

encompasses crucial political issues such as the promotion of human rights, the fight

hand, trade and cooperation on the other hand. The United States has supported this

Similarly this article will not consider the relations between the United States and the

on China imposed by the Council of the EU on 27 June 1989. There is an excellent

in either a quantitative or qualitative increase in EU arms exports to China. It is

legally binding on EU members, with some enhancements, would provide a solid

To be sure the Code of Conduct is more comprehensive than the embargo covering

Conduct on Arms Exports.

12

is really the stance of the United States on whether the European Union or indeed

States. Supporting this is the fact that 6.7% of all China's military imports come from

the United States compared to 2.7% from the EU. Further the United States frequently

at the United Nations. Alleged human rights abuses were the cause for the imposition

Ambassador of France to the United Kingdom (2005), noted such as 1) Australia is an

criticised; 2) there was no opposition to the Olympic Games in Beijing and 3) France

received remonstration for having recognised China in 1964 as a sovereign state but

recognition.

The Treaties

debated in Larsen (2002). The different national perspectives of EU member states

does not have a single definition or application. The European Union covers an

external neighbours. For example the Mediterranean area has to take into

It is also understood that arms control is a diversionary issue where the main question

other states should have foreign policy stances independent of that of the United

supports China on many issues including vetoing resolutions of human rights abuses

of the arms embargo. There are further examples that Monsieur Errera, the

ally of the United States that does not have an arms embargo on China but is not

this was followed shortly afterwards by President Nixon's visit to China and state

There is no panacea to counter the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons well

show that there is 'no one-size-fits-all' policy that can be applied. As noted democracy

extensive geographical area each with specific needs dependent upon local needs and

consideration the Middle East peace process and states for concern such as Syria and

Kaliningrad enclave while the Balkans remain on a precarious cliff-edge of ethic and

their own special considerations, as do the neutral states of Ireland and Austria.

sovereign member states have been entrusted to meet regularly to discuss the

basis of consensus that the goal is to establish norms and regimes for arms control and

13

Libya. The Baltic area has to consider residual Russian weaponry and issue of the

clan strife. The nuclear power states of Europe, France and the United Kingdom, have

Despite this sub-regional focus the overall EU goal is to promote peace and

democracy across the continent and globally where diplomats of each of the 25

formality of agreements and treaties to counter the spread of weapons. This forms the

disarmament.

The norms and regimes follow such treaties as reached in agreement between the two

super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, exampled by the Treaty on the

(CTBT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin

European states, be they members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, followed the super-

powers in these agreements. Pessimists could claim that the debate was more

evidence of effective inspection and verification regimes, such as those of

the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), whose intrusive inspections have

concealment and deception programmes; limited the development of WMD; and –

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Weapons Convention (BTWC). During the Cold War both Western and Eastern

important than treaty given that they could be torn up at any stage. Optimists provide

EURATOM, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organisation for

helped force the proliferating or violating country concerned into complex and costly

ultimately - helped reveal covert WMD programmes. This optimism persisted after

European members continued to adhere to the treaty agreements even though they

14

the end of the Cold War where former Warsaw Pact European states as well as NATO

were no longer being imposed upon through the bi-polar Cold War alliance system.

Indeed mitigating the pessimism, and seeking an alternative to lengthy diplomatic

efforts in treaty negotiation and furthering the optimism, the EU as the world's largest

utilise its economic might to arms control advantages. Its member states agreed to

This has turned the European Union into a major initiator of international arms

objective given that from the Treaty of Rome (1957) until 1970 agreements with third

party states focussed exclusively on common market issues, mainly economic, where

October 1970 that Member States endeavoured to consult one another on major

context of 'European Political Cooperation'. In 1986, the Single European Act

formalised this intergovernmental cooperation without changing its nature or methods

came when the Maastricht Treaty entered force on 1 November 1993 announcing the

utilise the common EU institutions to make their combined voice heard on the

trading block reached internal agreement through negotiation in December 2003 to

include a model non-proliferation clause in all mixed agreements with third countries.

control and disarmament. This was a unique intra-EU agreement and extra-EU

the expression 'common foreign policy' found no place in the Treaties. It was only in

international policy problems. However, this was at intergovernmental level in the

of operation.

An added momentous impetus to the intra-EU agreement and extra-EU objective

concept 'common foreign policy'. Since then the EU member states have strived to

international stage in addition to the actions of their own diplomats. This has been in

subject linked to the fundamental principles and common values which form the basis

Convention on Human Rights.

15

expressing common EU positions on armed conflicts, human rights and any other

of the European Union to which it is committed to defend exampled by the European

The provisions on the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty which entered

specifically to the CFSP. An important decision in terms of improving the

Representative for the CFSP (an innovation of the Treaty of Amsterdam). The former

October 1999. The new Treaty of Nice entered into force on 1 February 2003 contains

new CFSP provisions. The proposed Constitutional Treaty would grant further powers

Affairs who will be responsible for the representation of the Union on the

The Implementation

The progression of these Treaties reflects the attitudes and intent of EU member states

becoming increasingly complex and multi-faceted in the areas of: 1) export controls

operative threat reduction initiatives. For example, during the 1990s EU members

into force in 1999. Articles 11 to 28 of the Treaty on European Union are devoted

effectiveness and profile of the EU foreign policy was the appointment of a High

NATO Secretary-General Mr Javier Solana Madariaga, took up the post on 18

towards foreign policy through the creation of the post of Union Minister for Foreign

international scene.

to grant the EU institutions a role in armaments, security and defence. This is

of both dual-use items and conventional arms; 2) non-proliferation policies; and 3) co-

developed an export control system that includes a common legal basis for dual-use

an iterative process the institutions and agencies of EU have also exercised a

Member States.

16

export control and strengthened cooperation in conventional arms export control. In

progressively larger influence over the conventional arms export systems of its

In this fashion the EU has taken on a strong and coherent role in fighting the

Council adopted a WMD Strategy and a WMD Action Plan. Enlargement of the EU

additional new member states, who once were members of the Warsaw Pact, and who

information sharing in arms control treaty implementation. One of the prerequisites

for states to join the European Union in enlargement is that they have demonstrated

Central and East Europe. In the process of enlargement and democratisation arms

Europe.

Control System'. Individual decisions about whether or not to approve an application

their national governments. This is passed to the European Union dual-use export

national obligations with regard to non-proliferation in the context of the EU single

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For example, in 2003, the

in 2004 has extended these processes and the standards contained therein to the new

have now gained access to the common EU mechanisms for consultation and

that they are democratic. In the process of enlargement, democracy has extended in

control, disarmament and a peace dividend has replaced the Iron Curtain of Cold War

Such processes and standards can be viewed in the 'European Union Dual-Use Export

to export controlled items are taken at the national level by authorities responsible to

control system which is then used by the members of the EU to help implement their

market. The main principle that underpins the dual-use export system is that civilian

commitment to non-proliferation within a single market that aims at free movement of

without first considering the implications of the export for: 1) commitments under

4) the intended end-use and risk of diversion.

17

trade shall not undermine the essential security interests of the member states or their

goods and services. Accordingly, products subject to control will not be exported

international agreements on non-proliferation; 2) obligations under sanctions imposed

by the United Nations Security Council; 3) national foreign and security policy; and

the internal market for goods and services established under the 1987 Single European

established the dual-use export control system were developed between 1991 and

1994 to clarify EU legislation [Article 296 (EC)] that makes it clear that member

296 (at that time known as Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome) was not changed in the

Rome (1957) clarifies that arms production and trade are exempted from any common

European regulations. No subsequent EU agreement has changed this status. Hence

trade competence of the European Union, all other manufactured goods are subject to

applications. In this EU member states recognized that they have a strong national

proliferation of certain types of weapons. As a result, it was necessary to develop a

The objective of this EU dual-use export control system is intended to help complete

Act while safeguarding the non-proliferation principle. The regulations that

states may exempt arms production and arms trade from EU common rules. Article

Treaty revisions at Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice. Article 223 of the Treaty of

while items identified in an annex to Article 296 (EC) are explicitly excluded from the

community law. This includes civilian goods which have potential military

security interest as well as national and international commitments to prevent the

system which allowed this non-proliferation commitment to be maintained in the

18

framework of EU community law.

In March 1995 the system entered into force. The original system was based on two

Community Regime for the control of exports of dual-use goods; and 2) EU Council

Decision 94/942/CFSP of 19 December 1994 on the joint action adopted by the

control of exports of dual-use goods. On 22 June 2000 the European Union Member

Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology.

1334/2000 applies. This includes a Joint Action to introduce export controls covering

technical assistance (including transfers of technology) controlled by the international

missiles and for conventional military goods exported to countries subject to arms

The decisions about whether to approve or deny a given transfer are taken by the

which are then required to provide enforcement and penalty power. Member states

the greatest awareness of potential proliferation risks. Member states have agreed to

territory. In cases where aspects of a specific transfer are unclear or in dispute the

documents: 1) EU Council Regulation 3381/94 of 19 December 1994 setting up a

Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the

States introduced a new Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a

Subsequent amendments have updated the control list to which Regulation (EC) No

export control regimes, bodies and treaties for weapons of mass destruction and

embargoes. The regulation is directly applicable in all Member States.

member states through their national authorities that are democratically elected and

exchange information about license denials to ensure that each licensing authority has

respect export licenses issued by EU partners at the point where goods leave EU

responsible national authorities in the country from which the goods are to be

license was issued. Alternatively, the EU Commission can act as a clearinghouse to

dual-use exports according to agreed criteria to make the process of dispute resolution

19

exported can contact the responsible national authorities in the country where the

assist in resolving the case. States are obliged to keep information and records about

easier and to assist in making exchanges of information more useful in analysis.

in which commonality functions in the European Union based upon ethos, norms and

inconsistent with: 1) the international obligations of member states and their

commitments to enforce UN, OSCE, EU agreements; 2) the international obligations

Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention; 3) their

Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement; 4)

their commitment not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine; and 5) the

example, to-date the total EU support to the fight against landmines for the period

of the worldwide financial assistance to mine action in that period.

The European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports has the status of a political

The Code of Conduct

A Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (EU 1998) has emerged inherent to the manner

values. It states that an export licence should be refused if approval would be

of member states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and

commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology

respect of human rights in the country of final destination. In perspective of one

1997-2004 has exceeded the figure of 1 billion Euro. This represents more than half

commitment in the framework of the CFSP serving as the major political document of

commitment to ensure that their national legislation enabled them to conduct their

that coherence is desirable in implementing agreed measures, including arms

this Code of Conduct into their national arms export legislation, and to publish annual

recognize the industrial and technological base required to maintain a defence

detailed in EU documentation (EU 1997) provides ample forum for discussion to

export licences for items subject to the Code of Conduct.

20

the EU arms export regime. Upon signing, the member states' made a political

arms exports in the fashion outlined in the agreement. Such commonality recognises

embargoes, and establishing procedures to facilitate gradual harmonization towards

singularity. In generating EU singularity EU Member States are aiming to incorporate

reports on the Code's implementation. The Code of Conduct has integral elements that

industry able to deliver equipment of the latest generation. The EU framework

elaborate a programme to combat illicit arms trafficking and to enhance information

sharing, including the circulation of information about national decisions to deny

policy has also increased over the years. Similar to national parliaments, the European

Parliament is divided into Committees dealing with specific issues. The ‘Committee

deals with arms transfer matters. There are also two major working groups under the

that plays the central role in the discussion on arms transfer issues within the EU and

most of the information is shared and COARM produces an annual report under

In furthering the Code of Conduct the European Parliament's role in arms export

on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy’ normally

Council of Ministers in which member states discuss these matters. Firstly COARM

in dealing with most issues covered by the Code of Conduct. In this working group

provision 8 of the Code of Conduct. The 'Programme for Preventing and Combating

programme provides a coherent framework for tackling illicit weapons trafficking

disarmament measures.

21

Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms', was adopted by COARM in 1997. The

called for in UNGA resolution 51/45 F (10 December 1996), to take practical

The second group is POLARM that has examined whether the trade in military

multilateral arrangements that exchange technology and multinational defence

impact of simplified procedures for internal trade in military equipment on economic,

programmes that only involve EU member states could the process of exchanging

articles and technologies between members of an industrial project team be made

procedures for internal trade in military equipment: 1) the impact on economic policy;

In 1998 the Council also adopted a Joint Action on the basis of Article J.3 of the

accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons (EU 1998a). The Joint

national laws and procedures. The Joint Action therefore permits the EU to provide

of small arms and light weapons. The EU has taken actions as regards technical,

equipment between member states could be simplified. A central issue here are

industrial projects among EU members. Discussions in POLARM have examined the

export and procurement policy. For example, in the framework of cooperative

more straightforward? This discussion has examined three aspects of simplified

2) on export policy; and 3) on procurement policy.

Treaty on European Union on the EU's contribution to combating the destabilizing the

Action is legally binding on the member states, though it is implemented through

financial and technical assistance to solve problems caused by existing accumulations

financial and other assistance given to projects conducted by the UN, the Red Cross,

other states. Projects have been conducted in Albania, Cambodia, Georgia and

for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Lima. In July 2002, the Council

22

other international organisations and regional arrangements, and NGOs, as well as to

Mozambique. In addition, the EU has sponsored the United Nations Regional Centre

modified the Joint Action to include ammunition in the small arms definition.

practices have been added to an increasing list of joint EU efforts. A council

European Union code of conduct on arms exports. Like the code of conduct, the

The member states made a political commitment to ensure that their national

legislation enables them to control the export of all the goods on the list. The common

than directly replacing them.

The European Union and WMD Non-proliferation

levels detailed in the EU document on the issue (EU 2003). In brief these are: 1)

EU standpoint, first discussed and agreed upon between the Member States, is

into account. The safeguards systems implemented within the EU, the commitments

Since the introduction of the Code, a number of other policy instruments and agreed

declaration of June 2000 adopted a common list of military equipment covered by the

common list has the status of a political commitment within the framework of CFSP.

list therefore acts as a reference point for Member States’ national military lists, rather

The European Union handles WMD non-proliferation and disarmament on three

During political dialogue with third countries, the issue is frequently raised and the

recalled and explained; 2) At Community level the proliferation risks are duly taken

of the Member states in the different international non-proliferation regimes

Wassenaar, Zangger), and specific regulations, like the Council regulation setting up a

important contributions to the global non-proliferation regime; and 3) Assistance

the realisation of disarmament projects. These programmes are financed from

23

(Australia group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Supplier’s Group,

Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology, are

programmes are designed and implemented, in particular with Russia and other

Newly Independent States and North Korea, to reinforce non-proliferation or support

different Community Budget sources and managed by the Commission.

Hence the European Union (including the Member States, The Parliament, the

international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance. The creation of the Global

Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction by the G8 group of

of international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance as a security building

effectiveness of non-proliferation systems. The Community and its member States

support a strengthening of the regime of nuclear non-proliferation and call for all

weapons of mass destruction developed by the EU Political and Security Committee

individual Member States as well as collectively. EU assistance is financed using a

Council and the Commission) has become a progressively more important player in

industrialized states was the catalyst for additional thinking by the EU about the value

measure. The recent Gulf War showed the absolute necessity of further enhancing the

States to become parties to the NPT.

Measures of this kind feature prominently in the Action Plan against proliferation of

at a meeting on 10 June 2003. Programmes and projects are developed nationally by

variety of different national and collective mechanisms. Some projects are managed

include: 1) Community support to Russia: EU Joint Action on Non-Proliferation and

Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation (MNEPR); 3) the

Science and Technology Centre, Ukraine (STCU) in Kyiv.

24

by the authorities of Member States and others are managed by the Commission that

Disarmament in Russia Nuclear Environmental Programmes; 2) The Multilateral

Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) Scientific cooperation; 4)

The International Science and Technology Center, (ISTC) in Moscow; and 5) the

CFSP Javier Solana presented a paper entitled ‘A secure Europe in a better world’ to

that the EU would have to address as a matter of highest priority: 1) terrorism; 2) the

proliferation of WMD; and 3) the nexus between failed states and organized crime.

Notably that a secure Europe relied on member states of the European Union

In this context, in November 2003, the EU adopted a policy regarding the

countries. Language for a ‘non-proliferation clause’ was agreed and was to be

commitment to join, ratify, implement and comply with relevant international legal

establish an effective system of national export controls that apply to both the export

Furthering these objectives, on 20 June 2003, the EU High Representative for the

the Council of the European Union. In the paper Solana identified three new threats

The Council accepted Solana’s analysis and provisionally endorsed his strategy.

continuing to adhere to democratic values and practises.

management of non-proliferation in the context of its relationships with third

included in future agreements with third countries. The agreed language included a

instruments that seek to counter the proliferation of WMD as well as a commitment to

and the transit of WMD-related goods. In November 2003, the Council also adopted a

agreements in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and

25

Common Position on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral

means of delivery.

Largely building on these, on 12 December 2003, the EU Strategy Against

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was agreed at the Council in Brussels.

operational elements such as the establishment of a monitoring centre to collect

review of implementation by the General Affairs Council. In this document the

security’.

categories: 1) measures for immediate action; and 2) measures to be implemented

each the Action Plan included a time frame, the specific actions to be taken and

projected costs. The seven measures were: 1) a detailed plan of diplomatic action; 2)

the EU’s programme on disarmament and non-proliferation in the Russian Federation;

member states and acceding countries; 5) a budget increase for the IAEA to allow it to

framework of the CWC; and 7) making the EU a leading cooperative player in the

The process involved protracted diplomatic negotiations. The strategy included

information and intelligence relevant to the strategy’s implementation and a biannual

proliferation of WMD was described as ‘potentially the greatest threat to EU

The ensuing Action Plan grouped measures to be undertaken by the EU into two

over a longer period. Seven measures were identified for immediate action and for

firm engagement to promote universalization and reinforcement of 3) prolongation of

4) rapid ratification and implementation of IAEA Additional Protocols by all EU

implement safeguards tasks; 6) the promotion of challenge inspections in the

export control regimes.

26

“Is Democracy Working?” As a case to show that democracy is working this paper

took the instance of the European Union. It was note that a prerequisite for

was note that there are few if any known instances where democratic states have

European Arms Control Regime to show how borders are being opened amongst and

regime are functioning as a public administration institution reducing nationalistic

tendencies that have been the cause of centuries of conflict and war.

This EU arms control regime is part of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

regime being separate but in tandem with individual EU member states sovereign

diplomacy and policies. This EU regime probably being the single most important

amongst the 25 EU member states. It was also noted that two main rationales for the

centuries of war and to promote democracy through the rights of individuals. Such a

Conclusion

This article commenced by highlighting the theme of this 20th IPSA World Congress -

membership of the European Union is the adherence and practise of democracy. It

entered into armed conflict with each. The paper detailed the development of a

between EU member states who are also disarming. Democracy and indeed this EU

(CFSP) and sub-ordinate European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This EU

contribution to a common foreign, security and defence dimension between and

establishment and continuance of the European Union are to reduce conflict after

democratic Europe is more peaceful than ever before in its history.

The success of the European Union is not confined to the European continent or

international recognition and acceptance as the worlds single largest trading bloc. In

the rights of individuals, the European Union stresses the means it used to achieve

states, and of corporate and of GO endeavour's. The EU arms control regime is used

conventional export regulations; preventing illicit trafficking; a code of conduct; joint

proliferation assistance and disarmament. Specific thematic and regional efforts are

Iranian nuclear program, the lifting of the arms embargo to China and opinions on

27

region. The European Union wields power and attains respect globally through

setting an example based on its achievements politically, financially, legally, and for

these ends. The European Union promotes democracy as a means better than any

other to achieve peacefully the aspirations and needs of individuals in society, of

to project such values and norms of democracy globally in: dual use regulation;

action on small arms; a common military list; non-proliferation of WMD; and non-

engaged such as EU efforts in assisting Russia in dismantling obsolete nuclear

weapons and concerns on biological and chemical weapons. The dialogue on the

North Korean were also mentioned by this paper as specific projects.

Further the EU Commission plays a role in the various multi-lateral global non-

proliferation regimes to reduce conflict amongst non-democratic states. These are the

and effectiveness of non proliferation export control measures: 1) the Australia Group

Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention); 2) the Zangger

Non Proliferation Treaty); 3) the Missile Technology Control Regime; and 4) the

four international regimes providing co-ordination fora to reinforce the consistency

looking at the bio and chemical sectors (linked with the Chemical Weapons

Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (linked with the ultimate objectives of

Wassenaar Arrangement for the broader arms non proliferation aspects.

28

current stance of consensus (commonality akin to a collective alliance) to unanimity

Constitution for Europe, unveiled in June 2003. This Constitution, the height of any

democratic practise, would grant the European Union a legal personality to enter into

post of EU foreign minister entrusted with formulating EU-wide foreign policy. The

Treaty explicitly creates a federal national security structure superior to that of any

questions relating to the Union's security.’ Member states, according to Article 15(2),

must ‘actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security

effectiveness’; and ‘uphold the Union's position’ in international organizations,

25 member states.

announcement to the world on the promotion and furtherance of democracy. This

through codification into treaties and the establishment of national and international

EU Constitution. Ingrained in this Constitution is the agreement amongst 25 states

The overriding conclusion on the potential for the European Union to move from its

(singularity or a federal union) is exampled in the 263-page Treaty Establishing a

bi-lateral arms control processes with other sovereign states. The Treaty creates the

structure also envisages a European Chiefs of Staff. Specifically Article 15(1) of this

member state, with EU competence ‘cover[ing] all areas of foreign policy and all

policy’; ‘refrain from action contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its

including the UN Security Council. The Treaty is currently under ratification by the

If and when the Constitution enters force it is likely to signify a dramatic

given that arms control policy is based upon a set of values and norms furthered

regimes. These values and norms arise from domestic politics and society such as the

across an entire continent to further a unified stance on the promotion of democracy

international community for arms control to be established based upon the European

there are few that could argue on the need for an agreement for peaceful coexistence

informal agreements, treaties and regimes. The process towards this is already in

democratic states and where it is working it is reducing local, regional and global

29

and arms control. This would enhance and strengthen the case for an enforceable

Union example of the value of non-proliferation and counter-proliferation. Clearly

even though the precise means of attaining these may still be debatable. Nevertheless

a starting point for such an arms control community could be the existing formal and

progress and hence it can be said that the democracy is working between and amongst

tensions that would otherwise lead to armed conflict.

30

Disarmament Assistance, GCSP Occasional Paper Series, No 44, Stockholm,

Jacques Chirac, (2001) The Common Foreign and Security policy of the European

trimestere

P. Dunay, (2002) 'A Lasting Decline or a Dead End in European Arms Control?',

Errera, Gerrard, French Ambassador to the United Kingdom, (2005) Lecture to the

conventional arms. www.nisat.org/EU/European_Armament_Cooperation.htm

www.nisat.org/EU/European_Armament_Cooperation.htm

EU (1998a), Joint Action on Small Arms,

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Biographical note

Glen Segell, PHD, is the Director of the Institute of Security Policy, Editor of the

London Security Policy Study, and Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society.