EVALUATION OF

FINLAND’S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Ms. Birgitta Berggren, SIPU

Mr. Anders Olin, SIPU Inter

International

national

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 4 2. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................ 9

2.1 The aim of the evaluation ........................................................................................ 9 2.2 Scope and approach.................................................................................................. 9

3. THE FINNISH CONTEXT .......................................................................................... 12 3.1 The Bosnian programme ....................................................................................... 14

4. THE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA CONTEXT..................................................... 18 5. FINDINGS...................................................................................................................... 23

5.1 Social sector.............................................................................................................. 23 5.1.1 Women’s projects in Mostar ......................................................................... 23

5.2 Economic infrastructure ........................................................................................ 31 5.2.1 District Heating Project in Sarajevo ............................................................ 31 5.2.2 Donation of a railway tracklayer machine .................................................. 37

5.3 Reconstruction and Return.................................................................................... 40 5.3.1 The return process.......................................................................................... 40 5.3.2 Fida International in the Doboj area ........................................................... 41 5.3.3 FinnChurchAid/Lutheran World Federation in Ostra Luka/Orasje .... 44 5.3.4 The Finnish CIMIC work ............................................................................. 47

5.4 The judiciary............................................................................................................. 55 5.4.1 Independent Judicial Commission............................................................... 56

5.5 Other already evaluated projects........................................................................... 59 5.5.1 The Social Sector Support Project ............................................................... 59 5.5.2 The Gender Equity and Equality Project ................................................... 62 5.5.3 The Teacher Education and Professional Development Project ........... 65 5.5.4 The ERNO News Exchange ........................................................................ 68

6. CONCLUSIONS ON THE COUNTRY LEVEL .......................................................... 71 6.1 The instruments....................................................................................................... 71 6.2 Relevance .................................................................................................................. 72 6.3 Effectiveness ............................................................................................................ 73 6.4 Efficiency.................................................................................................................. 73 6.5 Sustainability............................................................................................................. 74 6.6 Project management ............................................................................................... 75 6.7 Other administrative considerations .................................................................... 75 6.8 Coordination and cooperation.............................................................................. 77 6.9 Post-conflict issues.................................................................................................. 78

7. THE FUTURE/RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................... 81 7.1 The need for continued international assistance................................................ 81 7.2 The future direction of finnish assistance ........................................................... 81

ANNEXES

1. Terms of Reference

2. List of Informants (provisional)

3. List of References (provisional)

4. IPSA technical assessments

5. Other donors’ programmes

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AOR - Area of Responsibility

BAM – Bosnia and Hercegovina Mark (currency)

BHRPC – Bosnia and Herzegovina Railway Public Corporation

BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina

CARDS - Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation

CCM – Civilian Crisis Management

CEDAW - The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women

CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation

CRPC - Commission for Real Property Claims

CTA – Chief Technical Adviser

CWBIH - Connecting women in BiH

DAC – Development Cooperation Directorate of OECD

DFID – Department for International Development, UK

DH – District Heating

EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EBU - European Broadcasting Union

EE – Ekono Energy

EIB – European Investment Bank

ERNO – South Eastern European Regional Network of public Broadcasters

EUPM - EU Police Mission

EUPM - European Union Police Mission

EVN – Eurovision Network

FBiH – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

FCA - FinnChurchAid

FRC - Finnish Refugee Council

FTV Federation of BiH TV

GEEP – Gender Equity and Equality Project

GFP - Gender Focal Points

GTZ - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit

GTZ – The German official aid agency

HDZ – Nationalist Bosnian Croat party

HJPC - High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils

IBHI – Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues

ICTY - International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

ICVA – International Council of Voluntary Agencies

IDA – International Development Association

IDEJA - local NGO in Mostar

IDPs – Internally Displaced Persons

IFOR – Implementation Force, 1st Peace keeping mission in BiH

IJC – Independent Judicial Commission

IMG - International Management Group

IPSA – a engineering consultancy in Sarajevo

IPTF - UN International Police Task Force

ISO - International Organization for Standardization

JSAP - Judicial Structure Assessment Programme

LWF – Lutheran World Federation

MFA – Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

MHRR - Ministry for Human Rights and Refugee Return of BiH

NATO – Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation

ODA – Official Development Assistance

OHCHR - The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OHR - Office of the High Representative

PBS – Public Broadcasting Service of BiH

PIC - Peace Implementation Council

PIU – Project Implementation Unit

PSO - Peace Support Operations Branch

RRTF – Reconstruction and Return Task Force.

RS – Republika Srpska

RTRS – Radio and Television of RS

SAp - Stabilization and Association process

SDA – Nationalist Bosniac party

SFOR – Stabilisation Force, 2nd Peace keeping mission in BiH

SSSP – Social Sector Support Project

TAER - Technical Assistance for Educational Reform (supported by EC)

TEPD – Teachers’ Education and Professional Development Project

UNDP – United National Development Programme

UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

WB – World Bank

CURRENCY

In all conversions Finnish Marks to EUR the following rate has been used: 1 Finnish Markka = 0.16819 Euro; 1 Euro (EUR) = 5.94573 Finnish Markka (FIM); 4,5 Finnish Markka=1 USD. The official rate of the Bosnia Hercegovina Mark (BAM) is 0,5 Euro.

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SIPU International carried out the present evaluation between September 2003 and March 2004. Around 115 persons have been interviewed during missions in Finland and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The report begins with an overview of the Finnish policy environment and the administrative structure in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It is observed that since 1996, several policy documents have been produced regarding international development cooperation to update its foundations and principles in accordance with Finland’s new foreign policy outlook. Harmonisation with EU and coherence of all foreign policy instruments is emphasised.

While several administrative reforms have been carried out there is not enough capacity at the MFA to manage high quality development programmes, as has been observed in several other evaluations.

The target for Finnish assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the peace process, has been slow and dramatic at times. The Dayton agreement, far from perfect, has been difficult to implement, due to nationalist divisive politics and the ethnic divisions which have still to be fully reconciled. There has been dramatic progress on several fronts however, e.g. on the economic front, with low inflation and stable (albeit minimal) state finances, and considering the return of a million refugees and internally displaced.

A sample of nine projects and groups of projects were studied to form a base for country level conclusions. They were the following:

NGO projects

1. Reconstruction of two Kindergartens in Mostar, 1995-1996

2. Establishment of a Consulting Centre in Mostar, 1999-2002

3. Women’s projects in Mostar, 1998-2002

4. Return and reconstruction in Doboj, 2000-2002

5. Return and reconstruction in Ostra Luka, 1998

Bilateral projects

6. District Heating in Sarajevo, 1996-2000

7. Donation of a Railway tracklayer, 1998-1999

Other

8. Small scale reconstruction by the Finnish CIMIC Company, 2002-2003

9. Support to the Independent judicial commission, 2001-2002

In addition, recent evaluations of four other projects have been taken into consideration to broaden the basis for country level conclusions. These projects are:

• Teacher Education and Professional Development Project (TEPD)

• Social Sector Support Project (SSSP)

• Gender Equity and Equality Project (GEEP)

• The ERNO News Exchange

Summary of evaluation results

• The programme has several strengths. Despite the lack of strategic guidance and genuine coherence it has a degree of internal consistency. It is generally relevant in terms of the needs assessments of BiH and WB, and the Dayton agreement implementation. It has also been adjusted continuously to stay relevant. Its relevance in relation to Finnish development policy goals is acceptable, with a clear emphasis on human rights and democratic governance.

• Finnish aid instruments have largely served well in BiH. NGOs and consultants have for the most part been efficient and professional. A novelty within development cooperation, the Finnish CIMIC company, has been found to be a very efficient and powerful instrument, and it can well be used for implementing small scale reconstruction and humanitarian projects in the right circumstances. It needs, however, to be guided by civilian agencies with a mandate to set priorities and coordinate the work.

• Goal fulfilment seems in general quite high, and there is no major problem related to overall efficiency of the programme. However, efficiency can be improved. A field presence could increase efficiency by yielding more and better information, improving monitoring, solving problems at source, and promoting synergies between projects.

• The programme has had the largest impact in the promotion of return as well as in some of the infrastructure projects. In the social and education sector a platform has been built and national level impact is within reach.

• The main weakness of the programme is sustainability. Projects are not designed with the long term effects sufficiently in focus. However, ownership seems rather good and getting stronger.

• The project management structure of the bilateral projects has been both effective and inclusive, and is one example of how Finland’s earlier development cooperation experience has come to use in BiH.

• The evaluation results confirm earlier evaluations’ observations regarding the weak administrative capacity of MFA. The ministry’s administrative structures are not suitable for development cooperation, and a chronic shortage of manpower compounds the problems, especially regarding monitoring and follow-up. Progress has been made in terms of organisation and procedures, but there is a need for a change of attitudes before development cooperation can be administered professionally.

• A positive characteristic is the responsiveness of the MFA which has been observed. Such responsiveness is important, especially in post-conflict situations and will hopefully be preserved in the continued integration of foreign policy instruments.

• Finland has not been widely noticed in BiH, and its programme is not known to many other donors. What is more, strategic and operational coordination has been weak, leading to inadequate knowledge of the development on the ground. This is particularly serious in some sectors where good coordination could make the difference between success and failure.

• The Finnish programme has been largely relevant also from a post conflict perspective. It has been well balanced between the Entities. It has however not fully utilised opportunities to play a more positive role in the peace-building process in project design and implementation.

• At present, Finland is looked upon as a credible actor in a few key sectors. The sectors, and the reforms of the same, are of central importance for the Stabilisation and Association process with the EU. The recommendations of this report include i a to concentrate the future programme on such key sectors, thereby intensifying the cooperation and improving the impact.

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SELECTED EVALUATION RESULTS IN BRIEF

Key Findings Conclusions Lessons learned Recommendations

The programme is not based on a country strategy.

Country programming evolves “organically”, but basing each new step on the experience of the previous

Lack of country strategy inhibits country evaluation since results cannot be measured against any original expression of will or intention.

1. Develop the new draft strategy together with BiH into a useful guiding tool with measurable goals.

Many different combinations of funding modalities and implementers have been used in BiH.

Finnish implementers in general have been effective and professional.

Consultants have no help or guidance from local embassy and often have to represent Finland

CIMIC has been a very effective instrument, albeit with a high real overhead.

Finnish implementers in countries with no representation are relatively vulnerable.

CIMIC can well be used for small scale projects, but needs guidance from civilian agencies

2. Take measures to increase political awareness of implementing partners.

3. Issue instruction on how to monitor and handle risks

4. Continue to develop CIMIC as a Finnish speciality but raise awareness on the user side on strengths and weaknesses.

Local NGO partners often have complicated management structures, poor administrative routines and poor reporting.

Short NGO tradition in BiH civil society. Inadequate capacity building among local partners of Finnish NGOs.

5. Improve capacity building components in the cooperation between Finnish and local NGOs.

The choice of sectors has been relevant in terms of expressed needs of BiH.

The relevance with regard to Finnish policy aims limited to human rights and good governance.

Overall the programme is found to be relevant.

Goal fulfilment and impact on project level ranges from satisfactory to good

On country level there has been limited but important impact in infrastructure and return

National potential within education and

The effectiveness of the programme is found to be good

CIMIC funding model possibly replicable to NGOs

6. New creative procedures for NGOs are encouraged possibly modelled from CIMIC.

social sector

Flexible funding of CIMIC very effective

No wastefulness has been observed

Implementers are professional and effective

The programme is generally quite efficient.

A field presence could increase efficiency by yielding more and better information, improving monitoring, solving problems at source, and promoting synergies between projects.

7. Establish a liaison office in BiH.

Most projects have weaknesses in terms of sustainability

Problems of sustainability not always noted by MFA

Lack of sustainability and proper follow-up is a general weakness of the programme

8. Take measures to improve sustainability, especially in reconstruction for return projects

9. Take measures to improve capacity of follow-up and evaluation.

Project management structure of bilateral projects has been both effective and inclusive

Limitations are shortage of human resources at MFA and lack of field presence

Some NGOs have been funded directly from Unit for WB

Project management model from developing countries well working in BiH.

Direct contact with NGOs improved project content, monitoring, and management

10. When working in a sensitive environment NGOs should have closer contact with the policy making unit.

MFA staff have an unrealistic workload

MFA’s documentation and filing of project documents is not conducive to evaluation

The new organisation appears innovative and functional in theory, but much remains before it is consolidated.

Strategic planning weak

A ministry for foreign affairs is not a “natural” organisation for handling development cooperation.

The culture of MFA needs to be further adapted to the needs of long-term development cooperation

Coherence of foreign policy is difficult to achieve

11. Carry the reorganisation out fully, as originally planned

12. Improve routines for documentation in order to facilitate evaluation and follow up

13. See no. 1.

Finland has had very limited visibility in BiH

At times, MFA has had inadequate knowledge of current affairs in BiH.

14. See no. 7.

15. Plan for, and carry out improved

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A low level of participation in the international coordination mechanisms

In one project, Finland has no contact with two other very active donors in the same sector.

The MFA apparently underestimates the experience of other donors and the value of coordination

coordination, for example by instructing implementers to share information and to inform about projects

The balance of the assistance between the entities has been kept, but many opportunities for supporting inter-entity relations have been lost.

The ethnic tensions have been approached in a rather shallow way. Not enough efforts have been made which genuinely promote ethnic coexistence.

The reorganisation could make MFA sharper at crisis management.

The post-conflict context is a dimension which requires more innovative approaches than ordinary development cooperation.

16. Increase resources for advisory functions regarding post-conflict and peace building

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2. INTRODUCTION In September 2003, SIPU International was awarded the contract to evaluate Finland’s development cooperation with BiH during the period 1996 – 2003. The evaluation team consisted of: Ms. Birgitta Berggren has an extensive professional experience of administration and management of international development cooperation in government service (Sida) and as Secretary General of the Swedish NGO Foundation for Human Rights. Geographically, her consultancy work has focussed on Southern Africa, Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans. She was in charge of the Swedish reconstruction and rehabilitation support to Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Embassy of Sweden in Sarajevo (1997 – 1999). Mr. Anders Olin is a SIPU consultant since 2002 with a background at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and development cooperation in various capacities. Between 1996 and 1999 he spent most of his time in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Tuzla, he ran a field office for the international NGO umbrella ICVA (International Council of Voluntary Agencies). In the capacity of Senior Democratisation Officer, he was in charge of implementing the OSCE Democratisation programme in the cross-entity north-western region of BiH. In addition, the local consultancy IPSA Institute was contracted for technical assessments of two infrastructure related projects. The assessments were carried out by Mr Enes Covrk and Mr Momir Majusevic. The evaluation was carried out during the period Sept 2003 to March 2004 with two fact-finding missions, one week in Helsinki in October and two weeks in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the beginning of November 2003.

2.1 THE AIM OF THE EVALUATION According to the Terms of Reference (hereinafter ToR), the purpose of the evaluation is to provide the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with lessons learned from the Bosnian programme, as well as recommendations for the orientation of future Finnish cooperation. Of particular interest is how issues and problems emanating from the unique post-conflict and economic-political transition context of BiH have been addressed by Finland. The evaluation results are meant to guide the operationalisation of an upcoming strategy for the region including BiH , as well as programming in future post-conflict situations.

2.2 SCOPE AND APPROACH The programme has been evaluated in its entirety during the time period 1996 to 2003. Not all activities have been studied at first hand, however. In accordance with the ToR, nine different interventions have been scrutinised closely in the course of this investigation. They represent the whole range of modalities, sectors, geography, and time periods of the Finnish involvement in BiH. On the basis of the findings from the project level, conclusions on the country level have been reached. A number of other recently produced evaluations have also been taken into account in order to broaden the base for analysis and cross-check findings.

In addition, in order to find something out about the origin and motives behind the programme, it has been necessary to study the policy environment and the administrative structures of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (hereinafter MFA) in Finland (Chapter 3). Furthermore, the unique and quickly changing Bosnian context during the period has been researched and outlined in order to serve as a background of the analysis of the programme’s relevance (Chapter 4). The projects have been evaluated according to the parameters prescribed in the ToR. Firstly, against the background context of the sector and the country, the project’s relevance is assessed, from the viewpoints of

(i) The realisation of the Dayton agreement. In this context best practices for assistance to peace building in post-conflict situations have also been considered;

(ii) the stated needs and priorities of BiH, as formulated in various documents such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (hereinafter PRSP);

(iii) the needs and aspirations of the beneficiaries, and; (iv) the policy aims of Finnish development cooperation.

Secondly the project’s effectiveness is assessed, which is basically about defining goal fulfilment, and the degree to which the project actually contributed to goal fulfilment. The challenge here has been to identify the goals of the projects. Thirdly, efficiency is assessed. No quantitative measurements have been possible, instead possible alternative approaches and their pros and cons have been discussed. Fourthly, sustainability is assessed. While a few of the projects evaluated are so recent that a discussion of sustainability is difficult, most of them are sufficiently old for a useful discussion of this aspect. As a fifth parameter, the consistency of the interventions as part of a programme has been assessed. As additional parameters, the administration of the programme has been examined, i a project management and monitoring as well as the level and quality of coordination and cooperation with other donors. Also, gender and environmental aspects have been brought to bear on the assessment of each project. The evaluation is concluded with a discussion of the future. For the sake of comparison, several donors have also been interviewed (see Annex 5). Time limitations have prevented any in-depth study of their programmes, but the facts uncovered should be helpful. Different methods and means have been used to carry out the investigation, including: desk study; field visits; interviews with representatives of implementing organisations, target groups and stakeholders; email survey of all relevant MFA staff; sub-contracted studies by local experts specialised in the subject matter. The scope of this evaluation is wide and it aims high. Readers of the present report should, however, keep its limitations in mind. While more than 100 people have been interviewed, there is still information which has not been possible to corroborate or cross check due to difficulties of finding informants and/or time limits. An email survey was sent out to 12 people but only 3 persons were

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able to answer it. Consequently, there could well be factual errors and misunderstandings in the report. Another important limitation has been the non-access to certain key documents. It has been difficult and in several cases impossible to find basic project documents. One reason has been the language barrier. Documents in English or Swedish have been somewhat rare. A few essential documents have been translated from Finnish to English. As the focus of the evaluation was the country level, the individual project evaluations has been kept limited. In terms of efficiency and project management, time has not allowed for any detailed study of budgets and accounting. We have assumed that any mismanagement in this regard will be detected by the yearly audits.

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3. THE FINNISH CONTEXT

Finland has been involved in international development cooperation since the beginning of the 1960s. During the 1970s, it grew in terms of both cooperation partners and budget. In the 1980s, Finland reached the UN target of devoting 0,7 per cent of its GNP to development assistance. Like most donor countries, Finland’s development cooperation was directed towards countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. The need and the opportunities for cooperation and assistance in central and eastern European countries became apparent only after the Cold War had ended in the beginning of the 1990s. This coincided, however, with a Finnish economic recession, which forced the government to drastically cut back on all development assistance, from more than EUR 630m in 1991 to about EUR 250m in 1994. Since then the ODA (Official Development Assistance) has slowly increased to its present level at close to 500m. The end of the Cold War, increased globalisation, and Finland’s full-scale integration into the political and economic structure of Western Europe has radically changed the foreign policy outlook. Since 1996, several policy documents have been produced regarding international development cooperation to update its foundation and principles. While the Nordic countries originally constituted the reference group for Finnish development cooperation, they were replaced in the 1990s by the EU. The Decision-in-Principle on Finland's Development Cooperation from 1996 emphasised the coherence of all foreign policy objectives as a guiding principle. The primary development objectives are stated to be the reduction of poverty, sustainable development, and human rights and democratic governance. The government also resolved to draw up a more comprehensive strategy for development policy, and this was done two years later in the Policy on the Relations with Developing Countries. In this document, poverty reduction was replaced by promotion of global security as the primary policy aim, and promotion of economic interaction was added to the list. It outlined the different types of potential partners and how the modes of cooperation should vary in accordance. This classification was further elaborated in the third policy paper Operationalisation of Development Policy Goals in Finland's International Development Co-operation from 2001. In the latter, a distinction is made between “Long-term partnerships”, and “other partnerships”, which has relevance for the assistance to BiH. For practical purposes, this document was the first Finnish attempt at explicitly devising a model/approach for working with countries for other purposes than traditional development cooperation, e g post-conflict situations or in cases of severe environmental problems. While the long-term partnerships will be sustained, the other partnerships’ time span are clearly time- limited and determined case by case. The sectors and issues for cooperation are chosen with an eye to specific needs, rather than based on the overriding objective of poverty reduction. The choice of modalities and channels are also more dependent on the actual situation than in the case of long- term partnerships, where government programmes dominate. Finland does not even need to have a diplomatic mission in the country. De facto representation could be obtained through multilateral and EU organisations, Finnish non-governmental organisations, etc. Examples of other partnerships are the Republic of South Africa, the Palestinian Autonomous Territories, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and East Timor. Cooperation

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expanded with these partners after 1996, “justified by the importance of prevention and mitigation of conflicts and support for national reconciliation” according to the 2001 policy. As regards long-term partnerships, these will decrease and the remaining partnerships will be intensified with fewer and larger programmes. In line with the policy of greater coherence, a major reorganisation of MFA was carried out in 2000. Until then the Department for Development Cooperation had been responsible for aid management globally, while other foreign policy instruments were handled by the regional departments. The reform aimed at integrating all foreign policy instruments (aid, trade and diplomacy) at the point of the regional department. Only advisory and coordination functions are retained in the new Department for Development policy. For the same purpose, the present government has created a combined post of Minister of external trade and development cooperation. Due to the reorganisation, BiH has been handled by several units since 1996. The first was the Unit for Latin America, Asia and the Mediterranean within the Department for Development. Political relations were at the same time handled by the Central and Southern Europe Unit within the Division for Europe. In May 2000, the Unit for West Balkans was created. While always consulting with the “expert” departments such as the Political Department and others, it has now the last say on all policy -related issues regarding Western Balkans. It also took over the full responsibility for the assistance programme. In recent years, several reviews of the development cooperation have been carried out. One is the Synthesis study of seven country programme evaluations from 2002. Two other reports, which will be referred to here, are the DAC (Development Cooperation Directorate of OECD) Peer Review from 2003, and the report from a government commission led by Harri Holkeri from the spring of 2003. Criticism regarding content has centred on the small volume per partner country, and on scattered targeting on too many sectors. The result has been disintegrated programmes and little impact, especially in terms of the main objective of poverty reduction. The main weakness found, however, is the MFA administrative capacity, which is deemed inadequate to manage high quality development cooperation programmes. This is a serious problem both in Helsinki and in the relevant embassies, which all need to be strengthened, according to the reports. The shortage of staff has led to weaknesses in approaches and in project management generally. Baseline planning, monitoring and evaluation have all been found lacking in terms of thoroughness and effectiveness in all partner country programmes. DAC questions the appropriateness of the system of reporting, evaluation and learning at MFA, which it views as unnecessarily closed and ineffective. The synthesis report recommends more untied aid, in the form of budget support, and a concentration on key sectors or geographic areas, designed and implemented in line with partner development policy. The recommendation to have fewer partner countries is also made by DAC and the Holkeri committee. DAC also recommends introducing country strategies to enhance accountability, transparency and monitoring. One of the recommendations of the Holkeri commission was to increase the development cooperation budget to 0,7 % of GNP. An important proviso, however, was to strengthen the administrative capacity at the same pace as the budget.

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Against the background of the various review results and above all based on the Holkeri report, the government will submit a proposal for a new development programme before parliament in January 2004.

3.1 THE BOSNIAN PROGRAMME After the Dayton Peace Accord, all European countries showed strong commitment to support the peace process, and Finland was no exception. The political pressure on the unit assigned to start up the assistance to BiH was intense. The unit did its best to assess the needs, by going on field trips to the country and donor conferences, but there was little time for thorough or strategic planning of the interventions. The basic approach was to try to make BiH’s priorities and Finnish expertise match. Low maintenance was also a criterion, i e the projects must not be difficult to administer since there was a shortage of personnel in Helsinki and no representation in the field. Partnerships were sought, since this would help Finland to get more “bang for the buck”. It would also lessen the burden on BiH by having fewer individual donors to coordinate. Before Bosnia, Finland had limited experience of providing assistance to a country ravaged by a brutal civil war. There had been some post-conflict work done in Mozambique, in particular in cooperation with the World Bank. Following the Dayton Agreement, it was also the World Bank which provided Finland with the first opportunity to contribute to the recovery and reconstruction of BiH. Finland does not use country strategies in the sense of a document which outlines priorities and modalities in any detail. The guiding idea is to follow any existing action plan that the country may have, as well as forming a country team in the MFA with representation from relevant units. The strategy is created continuously by that group, while not necessarily written down. In 1999, the first written “strategy” document about the Finnish assistance to BiH was produced. It is a rather descriptive document covering not only BiH but the whole region, i e BiH, Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo, FYROM, and Albania. The regional approach has been maintained in the strategic planning. A new strategy was drafted during 2003 by the Unit, to be approved by the Ministry Steering Board. The new strategy paper outlines a number of guidelines and principles for the period 2004-2006, including:

• Finnish support will be in line with the assistance of the EU, and other EU members’ bilateral programmes. The Stabilisation and Association process will be the main framework for relations with BiH, with CARDS as the principal instrument for coherent community assistance for the whole region. Finland is already, and will continue to be active in the boards of the CARDS programme, and the Stability Pact, as well as through its membership in the World Bank, European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

• The Stability Pact will be an important supportive structure for regional cooperation and harmonisation.

• All support should be in line with the Finnish development cooperation policy aims and with special consideration of the Millennium Goals. Specific objectives (also shared with EU) include establishing multiethnic, democratic systems, based on the rule of law.

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• The following areas are identified as priority areas for the international community, and thus for Finland: a) Public administration reform including the judiciary with a view to achieve Good

Governance and the Rule of Law. b) Economic reconstruction and reorganisation of economic structures c) Social development, including health care and education d) Human rights, including the position of women and minority rights. e) Protection of the environment, including waste-water treatment and cleaner

production methods. f) Democracy and freedom of speech, and support for the civil society.

• Finland’s main approaches are to (1) develop human resources and administrative capacity, (2) support the development of civil society organisations to various liberties. An important guiding principle in this work will be that the assistance must support “the local authorities and administrative structures in a manner that allows their active participation in the goal-setting, planning and implementation of assistance”.

• The project format will dominate and the implementation will be done mainly by Finnish consultants, motivated by the lack of expertise locally. While the strategy opens up for sector support, it is estimated to be 3-4 years away. It also foresees adjustment of the cooperation as the region’s countries get closer to EU accession.

• Regional cooperation will be encouraged and supported, mainly through assistance via NGOs. It also states that NGO projects need to be long- term to be successful, and that the NGOs have to be culturally competent.

• As regards guidance on country level the strategy paper is brief and non- specific. It opens up for the possibility that the present evaluation will guide the operationalisation of the strategy.

The Finnish assistance to BiH has been substantial during the period studied, and it has consisted of many different types of support. In addition to the Development cooperation budget, humanitarian funds, and some of the civilian crisis management interventions can be counted as ODA according to DAC eligibility criteria. This is true also for costs for refugees seeking asylum. A large portion of the total Finnish expenditure to BiH is the force contribution to SFOR, which is not ODA. The value of the total is not known. As regards individual components, figures exist but they are conflicting. According to our ToR, the total commitments were the following 1996 to 2002 (in EUR million): Table 1. Commitments for BiH according evaluation ToR

Source 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total

Terms of reference

9,21 8,79 4,39 4,35 - 6,61 5,08 - 38,43

According to the Annual Report on Development Cooperation 2002, the total disbursements for BiH 1995-2001 were the following (in EUR million):

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Table 2. Disbursements for BiH between 1996-2001 (MFA Development year book)

Source 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total

Annual report 2002

11,59 7,71 8,05 7,62 4,64 5,34 - - 46,39

The project lists received from the MFA have been put into the following table (in EUR million). We are uncertain whether all of the figures really are disbursements. Table 3. Disbursements according to MFA project lists

Source 1996 1997-1998

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 total

Project lists from MFA

7,1 11,6 12,6 13,9 7,7 7,2 2,5 62,3

As a comparison, the following figures can be found on DAC-online. The different tables clearly show the confusing range of figures that circulate on the support to BiH. Table 4. Disbursements according to DAC Statistics

Source 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total

DAC Online

15,01 8,84 8,95 8,12 4,27 4,78 4,66 54,63

As regards humanitarian aid to BiH, there are clear statistics for the whole period. In 1996 EUR 3 million was given to WHO, WFP, IOM, UNHCR and some Finnish NGOs such as FinnChurchAid (FCA). After that it decreased every year. In 2003 only mine clearance was financed from the humanitarian budget with EUR 170 000. As can be seen in the table below, during recent years, the Balkan region as a whole received assistance at a value fully comparable with some of Finland’s long term partner countries such as Mozambique (EUR 12.5m), or Namibia (EUR 7.4m). Table 5. ODA disbursements to Serbia Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1999-2002, in million Euro. (source www.global.finland.fi)

Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Serbia Montenegro

2,05 21,01 12,22 14,29 9,52 4,13

Bosnia Herzegovina

- 7,62 4,64 5,34 4,95 2,47

ex-Yugoslavia 2,24 - 1,80 2,61 - 0,03

TOTAL 4,29 28,63 18,66 22,24 14,47 6,63

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In 1999, there was a drastic increase in spending on development cooperation in the region. In the autumn of 1999 Finland held the Presidency of the EU, which coincided with the erupting crisis in Kosovo. It is likely that this explains the sudden increase. The financial projection accompanying the draft strategy for the period 2004 -2006 sets the level of spending for the whole region to around EUR 10 million per year.

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4. THE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA CONTEXT BiH is an example of what is sometimes called the triple transition, and which is not uncommon in the post-conflict situations during the 1990s. The triple transition is a security transition from war to peace, a political transition as well as a socio-economic transition, including the rebuilding of economic capacities and, frequently, the movement from a controlled to a market economy. The Dayton Peace Accord, signed in December 1995, had one overriding objective: To end the war. Thus, much attention was paid to military aspects, much less to the need for solid political and civilian structures in a post-conflict area. The territorial issue became dominant, and the Dayton Agreement mainly confirmed the ethnic partition of Bosnia. The warring parties, whose leaders had fomented ethnic confrontation for personal, political and financial ends, were forced to accept compromises which they had little interest in implementing. In this way, a pattern from other, similar conflicts was repeated: To arrive at a peace settlement, agreement was reached on highly decentralised constitutional structures with a weak central authority, a system which enabled the nationalists to remain in power and obstruct political processes and social and economic reform. The central issue of nation building, including ethnic reconciliation and institutional development, suffered, i a from the great exodus to the West of about one million people who settled permanently there, many of them representing the best educated and dynamic strata of society. This is one of the reasons behind the absence of a competent, well-informed political opposition to the nationalist leaders. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was commissioned with the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. Initially, in 1996, 60.000 troops created a measure of peace and security in the war-torn country. Gradually, however, as direct ethnic tension slowly abated, the military presence has been reduced, and in December 2003, NATO announced that SFOR will be reduced in the coming months to a deterrent force of merely 7.000 troops. Determined action has also been taken in 2003 to reform BiH’s own defence establishment in order to create a State-level Ministry of Defence and a single Command Control structure. A Defence Reform Commission presented a package of reform proposals which were adopted by Parliament in November. In December, NATO offered BiH to join “Partnership for Peace” in 2004. This offer is conditioned on the implementation of defence reforms and cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. At present, no less than 10 % of BiH’s GDP is spent on defence, with staff costs as one important type of expenditure. On the civilian side, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was charged with the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord. The High Representative reports to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and its Steering Board, which has, on several occasions, found it necessary to extend the HR mandate and powers in order to propel the implementation of the Dayton agreement. The immediate post-war period was characterised politically by a lack of agreement between the nationalist parties, strong resistance in the two Entities to joint policies and institutions at State-level, and opposition in general to reforms. In November 2000, new “non-nationalist” politicians came to power, who supported the OHR priorities: refugee return, economic reform and strengthening of the common institutions. The new leaders

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exercised a positive influence on the implementation of the property laws and the return. Worryingly, in the national elections in the autumn of 2002, the nationalist parties strengthened their positions, but eventually coalition governments were formed at State, Entity and Cantonal levels. After constitutional and electoral reforms, the election period has been extended to four years. At present, there appears to be a broader acceptance among the political parties that cooperation is necessary at all levels of government to meet the requirements of the ongoing EU Stabilization and Association process (SAp), which began in 1999. During 2003, there has been a diminishing need for intervention by the High Representative in the reform process. It is necessary for BiH to convince the international community and the EU that the prerogatives of the High Representative are becoming less needed and are being substituted by a genuine local wish to implement the necessary reforms. Following the Dayton Agreement, a five-year Priority Reconstruction Programme amounting to USD 5.1 billion was presented by the European Commission and the World Bank to the December 1995 Peace Implementation Conference in London. Its purpose was to restore basic services, carry out essential infrastructure repairs, restart economic activities and build institutions for economic management, and promote the transition to a market economy. The return of refugees and internally displaced people was a major cross-cutting issue. Annual conferences were held with a wide group of donors who were committed in their support, and met their pledging targets. The fifth and last of these conferences was held in 1999, and the grand total amount of USD 5.1 billion was reached. As of today, international aid disbursements amount to around USD 6 billion. The total disbursement for security is estimated at USD 12 billion. The severity and complexity of the war and the proximity to Europe made the Bosnian conflict the absolute focus of attention. When peace came, the whole world wanted to be there and help. In addition to all the UN organs and international organisations, and bilateral donors, there were 400-500 non-governmental organisations from virtually all over the world. The character and quality of programmes varied considerably, as did the agendas of all these actors. Against this background, it is obvious that coordination of assistance has been a constant challenge during the period. During the war, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was the UN lead agency, which it continued to be for some years. After the war, the formal responsibility for the coordination of reconstruction assistance was on the Bosnian government. Since the country was in practice divided, more coordination was done on the entity level than would have been ideal. OHR gradually took on responsibility for aid coordination, establishing sector coordination structures for key sectors, in which donors were expected to participate actively. This sector coordination was on the national level, and had difficulty being effective on the reconstruction being organised on the local level, in spite the efforts of UNHCR, International Management Group (IMG) and other coordination initiatives like the ICVA NGO coordination programme. The only coordination scheme which can be said to have been truly successful is the RRTF, which was active on all levels, and had the firm support by all principal organisations and donors. A process is in motion to strengthen the role of the State Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations in coordination of domestic development efforts and external assistance flows. To establish an efficient system is important both in order to put the government in the driver’s seat, and to make efficient use of diminishing international assistance. UNDP has embarked on a project to support BiH in the creation of such structures. The project is funded by Japan, Norway and Italy. Today, the responsibility for

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coordination of development assistance is shared at State level between the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations and the Directorate for European Integration. At Entity level Development Units have been established (RS: in the Ministry of Economic Relations and Coordination; FBiH: in the Ministry of Finance) and a not yet formed Economic Policy Planning Unit is planned to come directly under the Council of Ministers at State level. This project will create mechanisms to handle the development programmes and projects in relation to BiH’s Economic Development Plans, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, including the Medium-Term Framework for Public Expenditure, and to other long-term strategies. At present, a standardised database for the utilisation of development resources in BiH is being established. Some databases for coordination of external resources have been inherited, i a from earlier projects supported by the IMG, from UNDP, and from various State institutions. It can be foreseen that the World Bank model of annual Consultative Group (CG) meetings will be introduced with donor pledges on a three-year basis. These CG meetings will also provide an opportunity for evaluation and monitoring of available development resources. The Dayton Agreement provided a framework not only for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of BiH, but also for the transition to a market-based economy. Legislation on macroeconomic management took place in 1997. Since then, a Central Bank, a single stable BiH currency, a low inflation rate together with banking reforms in 2000-2001 have been established successfully, and form a sound macroeconomic basis for further change. The economic situation continues, however, to be quite serious. The recently presented Development Strategy of BiH (2003-2007) – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) shows that one fifth of the population should be classified as poor, with a higher poverty incidence in the Republika Srpska (25%) than in the Federation (16%). Poverty is largely prevalent in small war-torn semi-urban and rural communities. Unemployment (at pre-war level, i.e. 40%) is high. However, in the poor households at least one person has a job, and as such belongs to the working poor. According to the World Bank, domestic production is not expanding vigorously enough to offset declining international assistance. Significant fiscal consolidation has been achieved. A substantial reduction in the public sector and less spending on e.g. defence and police are needed, however, to provide funding for a fiscally sustainable social sector development. At present, two-thirds of the State income is spent on a bloated public administration and only one third on citizens’ needs. The conclusion of the PRSP is that poverty can be combated through growth-promoting measures such as a considerable expansion of the private sector, speedier privatisation and the encouragement of foreign investments and exports. In September 2002, the new High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, launched a comprehensive “Jobs and Justice Agenda” with the aim of creating a reformed business-friendly economy supported by a reliable legal system. Within the framework of the Agenda, a “Bulldozer Initiative” in cooperation with the business community proposed 50 reforms to stimulate business development, which were all adopted in half a year. Since December 2002, OHR’s Mission Implementation Plan, is defined as “ensuring that BiH is a peaceful, viable state on course to European integration” and has the following core tasks:

• Entrenching the Rule of Law • Ensuring that extreme nationalists, war criminals, and organised criminal networks

cannot reverse peace implementation • Reforming the economy

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• Strengthening the capacity of BiH’s governing institutions, especially at State level • Establishing State-level civilian command and control over armed forces,

reforming the security sector, and paving the way for integration into the Euro-Atlantic framework

• Promoting the sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons As to the EU Association Process, a good number of the EU “Road Map” conditions presented in 2000 have been met. A European Feasibility Study presented in November 2003 allows BiH to move towards formal negotiations for an Association Agreement in the latter half of 2004. 2009 could be a possible target date for EU membership. However, real progress on a number of key reforms remains to be shown, above all a strengthening of governmental authority on the level of the State. In addition, a better compliance with existing international obligations and conditions (e.g. the Dayton Peace Accord, outstanding EU “Road Map” steps, co-operation with the Hague War Crimes Tribunal, etc.) is required. Many of the EU conditions coincide with those of the Council of Europe, of which BiH became a member in April 2002. A Post-Accession Cooperation Programme is assisting BiH to fulfil the commitments which that membership entails. The first EU Crisis Management Operation under the European Security and Defence Policy was launched in January 2003, when the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) with a staff of 500 police officers and 50 civilian experts took over from the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) and is now fully operational. The main task is to monitor, support and assist the BiH police, giving priority to the safety of returnees and fight against organised crime, including trafficking. Furthermore, the Government is explicitly required to establish both a proper State-level Police Force with investigative and law-enforcement powers, and a single Intelligence and Security Agency. Today, law-enforcement is divided between some 20 different police forces, according to the High Representative. These are reforms of key importance to the rule of law and also essential for European association. The OHR also has focused strongly on the rule of law and necessary structural and legislative reform. An Independent Judicial Commission has been in charge of restructuring the BiH Court System at all levels, complemented by revisions of Civil and Criminal legislation, Judicial Training Centres for judges and prosecutors, a single national High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (in April 2004) etc. When completed in March 2004, this judicial reform initiative will have created a basis for an independent and effective judicial system, free from political influence. This would, according to the OHR, make BiH the first country in the Balkans to completely separate the judicial branch from the executive. In October 2003, a total of registered refugee returns to and within BiH had risen to nearly 1 million people according to UNHCR statistics. In 2002, the State Ministry for Human Rights and Refugee Return (MHRR) together with relevant Entity Ministries assumed a greater leadership role in the return process and will gradually take on full responsibility. About 500.000 additional returns are expected to take place over the next four years. At the end of 2003, OHR’s Reconstruction and Return Task Force handed over responsibility to four regional centres which will be responsible for monitoring and evaluating return-related projects. A smooth transfer of the responsibilities of the Commission for Real Property Claims (CRPC) to local institutions remains. At the end of October 2003, according to the OHR,

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91% of Property Law Implementation cases are solved both in Republika Srpska and in the Federation, and in Brcko District 96%. Thus, the goal of substantial completion of Property Law Implementation by December 2003 is within reach, but coordination of returns within the region must be improved. Some bilateral donors will continue their support for return and reconstruction. During 2003, the domestic trial of war crimes in a special panel of the State Court of BiH has been discussed in a number of meetings. At the request of the UN Security Council and the PIC Steering Board, an Executive Board with representatives from BiH and the international community has been established by the OHR and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Financing has been secured by the international community for the first two years of a Special War Crimes Chamber in the Court of BiH and a War Crimes Department within the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH. The Special Chamber is expected to be operational by the beginning of 2005.

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5. FINDINGS In this chapter, the results of the fact-finding will be presented. It is structured on the basis of each studied project or group of projects, and these have been organised per sector in chronological order. Under each sector heading, there is a brief description of the background and recent development of the sector. The projects or groups of projects are then summarised and analysed in terms of the evaluation issues. The projects are also discussed from the point of view of future cooperation options including the possible transition from projects to sector- specific budget support.

5.1 SOCIAL SECTOR

5.1.1 Women’s projects in Mostar Background. During the war, a new kind of women’s groups were formed in BiH. They took organised action, assisting women who had become victims of war. Gradually, these groups were supported by international organisations, and became members of international solidarity networks which provided humanitarian aid. After the war, many of them continued their work into the reconstruction and development phase, establishing themselves as NGOs and focusing on education, legal aid, health care and psycho-social treatment. As these organisations were faced with problems caused by gender-oppressive domestic laws, i a on property rights, housing, employment and domestic violence, they began to cooperate with other NGOs in their neighbourhood, across the Entity borders or in other parts of former Yugoslavia. Almost ten years have passed since the Bosniac-Croat conflict – a war within the civil war – was brought to an end in 1994. Ever since, the international community has tried repeatedly to heal the partition of Mostar and the violent, lawless relationship between the two parties. After the war, the Croats and HDZ blocked every such effort. Now the roles are changed and the Muslims and SDA prevent any attempt to initiate a dialogue. The Croats gave up their resistance gradually, partly because the political scene in Croatia changed, partly because a slight Bosniac majority of citizens in 1991, before the war, was replaced in 2003 by a substantial Croat majority. This seemingly perpetual conflict has had severe economic consequences. Today, the city is still administered by three plus three municipalities and a joint City Administration which is twice as big as that of any comparable BiH city. The parallel structures permeate every aspect of daily life, from a dual court system and separate systems for electricity, telephone and postal services, to two fire departments and two public works enterprises. A major consequence of this maladministration is lack of resources for education, social security systems, medical services, unemployment benefits etc., in a city where the population is already hard hit by the consequences of war. In March 2003, the High Representative gave the task of reorganising the city to a Commission consisting of the local parties. The Commission failed to produce a constitutionally acceptable solution. In September 2003, the High Representative established another Commission, chaired by an international Chairman, with the instruction to “achieve a comprehensive settlement” by 15 December 2003. Still in

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January 2004, an agreement has not been reached on a single city administration. A resolution of the status of Mostar is a Dayton requirement, and also a condition for an EU Association Agreement. It can be foreseen that unless a compromise is reached, the High Representative will impose a solution.

Connecting Women in BiH (CWBIH) Background. A number of local and international NGOs were active in providing support to refugee women in the Mostar area during and after the war. In 1998, the Finnish organisation Marttaliitto began to support “Women in Reconstruction”, a project initiated by the international Croatia-based NGO Stope Nade. In 1999, the Finnish Refugee Council provided assistance to a “Consulting Centre” run by the local NGO IDEJA (previously the local Stope Nade branch). Later in the same year, a close coordination between IDEJA and the two Finnish NGOs was established, with the Finnish Refugee Council supporting the “Consulting Centre” and Marttaliitto supporting a group of women’s projects under the common heading “Connecting Women in BiH”:

A. Prijateljice, Konjic, 1997-2002 B. Stolac Women’s Centre, 2002 C. Women’s Centre in Capljina, 1999-2002 D. Blagaji container camp E. Tailoring Project Mila, 2000-2002 F. Sumejja, Bijelo Polje, 1998-1999

The overall project objective was “Improving the working conditions of the women support centres in the Mostar area.” The project objectives were:

• Rebuilding the communication network for women support centres • Improving the mobility of extension services and consultants (a Mobile Team with

two vehicles) • Support services for the women support centres

The target group and beneficiaries of the project were returnees, refugees and internally displaced women and girls in the Mostar area. Two excellent evaluation reports were made in June 2001 of “Connecting Women in BiH” and of the “Consulting Centre” in Mostar by Raisa Venäläinen. Thus, what remained for us to do was to examine the post-implementation impact and to follow up the short-term recommendations for the remainder of the project period. A. Prijateljice, Konjic “If you have an income you can live anywhere, but with a house and no income, you can’t live at all.” (Ramiza Zukanovic, Director, Prijateljice) Prijateljice is a local humanitarian NGO established in 1996. It received Finnish support during the period 1997/98 – 2002. Its aim is to promote women’s employment and strengthen women’s capacity in rural areas all over the Neretva Canton. It has a strong focus on the promotion of income-generating projects with education in combination with production and service. The organisation is still, in 2004, supported by a number of international donors. It is a strong NGO with a clear management structure. A management team meets regularly to discuss and solve problems, to plan for new

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initiatives and to coordinate the programme. This was the situation when the evaluation took place in 2001, and the description is still valid. The organisation has its own income-generating projects and can contribute financially to meet humanitarian needs in the community. From Marttaliitto the organisation has received material and equipment for work with reconciliation and education. In 2002, the project “Reconciliation – Connecting Women” was implemented and covered the entire Canton. Prijateljice visited municipalities, involving all three ethnic groups of refugees and local people, discussed, organised meetings and made people meet again. They gave the displaced an opportunity to visit their pre-war homes, which were occupied, and made them understand their rights in the municipalities. It opened for a dialogue between the ethnic groups. According to the Director: “It was a big project and it took a great deal of courage to work with it.” Prijateljice has had many projects, some are still running, and they apply for more support. The donors are on their way out, but there is still need for assistance. The staff knew from the beginning that this would happen, and that is the main reason for the income-generating projects. They provide sustainability. This is not the right time for donors to withdraw. The Director again: “We still do not have the rule of law, and the social system is out of order. The NGOs are left with the problems. The municipalities do not function.” B. Stolac Women’s Centre Stolac Centre was established with Finnish support in 2002 to promote reconciliation among the ethnic groups, and was implemented by Prijateljice in cooperation with IDEJA, which did not function very well. The Centre organised courses in IT, English and Spanish and also had some handicraft activities and a hairdressing course. The IDEJA Mobile Team visited the Centre regularly. Stolac was a divided town along ethnic lines and there were strong political tensions. The politicians manipulated the population and encouraged an influx from other parts of BiH to change the population structures. In spite of strong efforts from the Centre management, the project groups started to fall apart after some months. The Centre existed from January to July 2002, when it had to be closed. The equipment was moved to other projects which were also supported by Marttaliitto. Three women were each given a sewing machine, and at the end of 2003, they still get support from Prijateljice to market their products. However, the political situation in Stolac has now improved considerably, according to the OHR office in Mostar. HDZ has stopped obstructing and 98 per cent of the refugees have returned. There is a mosque in town, some 600 houses have been repossessed and there is a gradual return to a more normal life. Recently some youth organisations in Stolac lobbied for a new culture centre and got a wave of support from other citizens. The city authorities had to yield. But that is a rare example of a situation where an NGO could make a (political) difference. C. Capljina Education Centre

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Capljina Centre is an education centre which has received support from Marttaliitto from 1999 until the end of 2002. At the time of the evaluation in 2001, the participants in the various courses – English, IT, accounting and handicraft – were mainly Croats and the majority of the students were women. Hundreds were on the waiting list to the courses. The regular staff consisted of the Centre Organiser, one English teacher, one IT teacher and, later on, one person teaching Spanish. Administratively they were part of IDEJA and reported to the Director of IDEJA. The IDEJA Mobile Team visited the Centre once a week for counselling, primarily on legal, psycho-social or employment issues. There was also close cooperation with the local authorities, but there was no support by any volunteers. The evaluation contained recommendations regarding the improvement of the administrative routines, and advice on possible self-financing and expansion. Unfortunately the Centre did not have any telephone connection, and consequently the computer training could not include the use of Internet. The final report from the Centre in September 2003 shows the same staff structure, but in addition the counselling has been strengthened by the support of volunteers from the local administration or other NGOs. The project goal to facilitate the integration of refugees and displaced persons in support of community rebuilding remains, with significant results over the years. The project has continued to provide services which the local authorities are not able to supply. It is not possible for an NGO like IDEJA to assist in rebuilding the society without supportive political structures, but it can “build bridges” at local level. The course activities improve chances for employment and are of psycho-social importance. In addition, they bring people from various ethnic groups together to work and learn. The counselling activities of the Mobile Team encouraged refugees/displaced to return to their places of origin and inspired the creation of volunteer networks consisting of people with different professional and ethnic background. The process of return is still going on. The education programme also included information about people’s human rights and how to protect them, e.g. in connection with the discrimination of women in employment and protection of employee’s rights according to the labour laws. The psychological treatment was mainly related to refugee trauma (loosing identity and purpose of life, poor family relations, high risk factors among the school-age population etc.). Legal aid was mainly provided in connection with the return process: implementation of property laws and reconstruction of houses, often in connection with return to Capljina from Mostar Centre. There was cooperation with OSCE, OHR and the Ombudsman to obtain adequate support. Special support was provided to groups of demobilised soldiers in cooperation with the Federation Ministry of Refugees and Displaced Persons. That assistance – for 40 participants – was provided as part of a World Bank project to improve the ex-soldiers’ employment possibilities. The war had caused changes in the structure of inhabitants, as displaced Croats from Central Bosnia instead of returning to their communities of origin had become a dominant group, obstructing the process of reintegration of returning Bosniacs. These were willing to return to Capljina and wanted their property back by means of the property laws. Quarterly reports have been presented to the Director of IDEJA for monitoring and evaluation purposes. A database with records of all individual cases has been established as recommended by the evaluation in 2001. The beneficiaries are requested to state their

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opinion on the activities in special questionnaires. The volunteer work is also included in the regular monitoring process. As from January 2004, the Centre has become an independent self-supporting NGO. It is still a very popular training institution and there is an increasing interest in its services. The waiting time for participation in their courses is now 3 months. Gradually, the old computers will be replaced, and the problem with the telecommunication is solved. The main challenge will now be to earn enough money. D. Blagaji container camp At the time of the evaluation in 2001, 65-70 persons, mostly elderly, had lived for almost 8 years in a container village outside Mostar. Some NGO’s had provided clothing and utensils. Often the villagers had no electricity or water, as often they could not pay the bills. They lived in downright misery. According to IDEJA, today the majority of these persons in Blagai have returned to their earlier homes in the Stolac and Capljina areas. The Ombudsman in Capljina had assisted them. Some persons are still in “buffer accommodation” outside Mostar, in new and modern buildings. This will probably be their permanent solution. E. Tailoring Project Mila The tailoring workshop Mila started in Rodoc, then moved to Mostar and registered as a local NGO in 1999. It received Finnish support in 2000-2002 (Bosnian Marks - BAM 24.000, approx. EUR 12.000) to cover running costs: rent, telephone and electricity. The workshop had industrial sewing machines donated by a Spanish NGO, and some 15 students participated in an individual tailoring course. The workshop served the local population, and most of the clients were refugees. The products were made to order, and the prices were low. There were indications that the workshop could be sustainable to some extent. Thanks to the foreign support they had managed to share some profits. The 2001 evaluation recommended that Mila’s staff should get some training in business planning, management and marketing. Today, some of the machines are in poor condition and must be replaced. The premises are very small, which limits the workshop capacity. There is growing competition from shops selling cheap imported clothes and the running costs are high. They cannot afford to pay for the telephone and the heating costs, which are BAM 300 per month in the winter. When they have paid their bills there is hardly any money left. Now they are teaching 10 students in tailoring. If they had more space they could take on more students and cover the costs for rent with the income from the training, but that is not possible at present. The socio-economic situation in general is very difficult. As a teaching organisation it can hide behind the NGO status, but in actual fact they are “black” workers. The monthly salary is BAM 250 per month and the staff cannot afford to pay BAM 160 in social/pension fees. Maybe they will be able to pay taxes in the future. They think that Finland left them too early, as the economic recovery of BiH is very slow and the situation in Mostar still so difficult. The four women running the workshop are very professional, they have customers, organise fashion shows etc., and do not feel that

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marketing their products is a problem. They like their work and feel that they are respected as professional dressmakers. F. Sumejja, Bijelo Polje The evaluation in 2001 did not cover this project. This Small Management School received support from Marttaliitto from June 1998 until the end of 1999 with an amount of DEM 21.600. It also got support from a number of other international donors. The support was timely, “it helped the local organisation Sumejja to survive”, according to the project’s final report. The education programme comprised 2 courses covering IT, English and Marketing and Management with altogether 37 participants. 27 of those found a job, either as employees or from starting their own enterprise. The education programme was endorsed by the Federal Ministry of Education and was supported by local academics. The project director was herself an economist by profession, and active in a number of civil organisations. In spite of repeated efforts during a visit to Mostar in November 2003, a meeting with the Director could not be arranged. Relevance and effectiveness of CWBiH. The activities of the projects under the umbrella of CWBiH targeted immediate needs in a difficult post-war situation. Most of the project objectives have been achieved. The various NGOs carried out their work in a laudable manner. The cooperation with IDEJA’s Mobile Team worked well. There was a great demand for psycho-social assistance and for support to reintegration into original or new communities. The importance of legal assistance became evident in the return process. It can be concluded that the project activities were of great relevance in a demanding environment. Impact and Sustainability. CWBiH has definitely had an impact on the lives of a great number of women and men. It has brought people from various ethnic groups together. It has helped many to move back to their old homes and often also assisted them in gaining new professional competence. Great efforts have been made both by the Finnish NGOs and the local project management to achieve self-financing. But now the donors are gradually withdrawing, and unavoidably the socio-economic problems remain in many places. Concluding remarks. The evaluation report from 2001 tries to look into the future role of these women NGOs. The need for reconciliation, social service provision and self-sustaining activities will remain for quite some time. Today, we know that some of the NGOs have been dissolved, others struggle to survive, and yet another group is moving on, revising their goals and involving themselves in the efforts to achieve greater equality for women in everyday life (cf. the Chapter on GEEP). In the Mostar area, the target of self-financing activities is difficult to achieve. On the donor side this should be followed with more attention. The imminent closure of the Consulting Centre (see below) will be a great loss to these women NGOs working in areas of extreme hardship.

IDEJA Consulting Centre The Citizens Association IDEJA in Mostar is responsible for the planning and implementation of the Consulting Centre project. The Finnish Government has supported the Centre through the Finnish Refugee Council (FRC) for five years, 1999-

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2003. The total contribution amounts to EUR 235.462. The Centre also received support from other donors, i a the European Commission and MZC, a Spanish NGO. IDEJA was registered in 1999 as a service provision NGO. The Consulting Centre project was planned by IDEJA in cooperation with the Finnish Refugee Council (FCA) and implemented by the IDEJA staff together with IDEJA members working on a volunteer basis. In 2002, the organisation had 120 registered members, who were experts in various fields, mainly in medicine, education and law. Since 1999, IDEJA has been engaged in activities related to psycho-social support, legal advice and training in the Mostar area. The activities have been implemented in the Centre’s premises in Mostar and through the fieldwork of a Mobile Team. The Education Centre in Capljina was administered as part of IDEJA, but was funded through the project Connecting Women in BiH, also supported by Finland. The Manager of IDEJA monitored the Consulting Centre on a regular basis. The progress of project activities was followed through three-month working plans and reports. Databases and records on individual cases were kept in order to monitor the activities, and beneficiaries gave feedback on questionnaires. The Centre provided important services which the local authorities provided with difficulty due to lack of resources. Over the years, the counselling services played a crucial role in the reintegration of refugees, displaced and returnees. Many of them suffered from post-traumatic syndrome caused by ethnic tension, the poor socio-economic situation and constant migration. The project target group consisted of “people suffering from the effects of the war, school children and their parents, breast cancer patients and their families”. Both individual and group counselling service were offered by the Centre. The group counselling service was offered through special focused groups such as

• Help to Helpers, a programme for professionals in the social and health sectors

• New View, a programme for women suffering from breast cancer

• Workshops for Children, to address the problems in schools with a high concentration of refugee children, a mixed ethnic background etc.

In 2002 (the latest figures available), 144 persons received individual counselling and 229 participated in group-counselling services. The legal counselling service grew in importance, and in 2002 alone 561 persons received this support. Most of the cases dealt with property law and labour law. Round table seminars on legal issues and special education, on labour law and discrimination were arranged. For many years, the project was mainly focused on women. Experience showed, however, that the male population was in great need of a similar support. The project revised its target group and began working with both sexes, regardless of their socio-cultural and ethnic background. Relevance. Already in the work of the different women’s projects, it is obvious that the Consulting Centre had a big role. The Mobile Team was able to reach out to areas where people otherwise would have had no access to legal aid, nor to medical or psychological services.

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Impact. The Consulting Centre has played an important role in mitigating the harm and suffering caused to people through the ethnic tension and political mismanagement for several years. A great many people benefited from the qualified services provided by the Centre. Sustainability. IDEJA like many other NGOs in BiH has been totally dependent on external funding, although efforts have been made at fund-raising and to charge fees for membership and courses. The project activities were complementary to or provided the services, which in a well-governed, democratic society would be financed within the municipal social service. The need for this kind of counselling service will remain for a considerable time, and the many competent experts in different fields will use their skills and professional networks also in other contexts. Concluding remarks. At the end of 2003, twenty doctors, psychologists and other specialists from hospitals and health centres in both East and West Mostar were found on IDEJA’s volunteers’ list. The competence and knowledge gained by the staff and professional volunteers represent a valuable capacity which can be tapped if and when Mostar eventually starts restructuring its service provision system into a single City administration. The foundation has already been laid for a constructive reform cooperation through the already established contacts between the Centre and the City institutions. When interviewed in November 2003, the management team was convinced that they would have to close the centre at the end of December for lack of funding. Efforts to find other donors to replace the Finnish funding had failed. It seems a sad waste to dissolve this well-functioning, much needed service provision NGO, when so many good initiatives – the Mobile Team, the volunteer scheme, the involvement of both women and men, working groups on specific problems, such as child abuse etc. – have proven the quality of the Centre. Therefore, continued support for one more year is strongly recommended.

Kindergartens in Mostar During the EU administration of Mostar, 1994-1996, Finland supported the reconstruction of two kindergartens in 1995/96 at a cost of FIM 3.1 million in Mostar East and West, respectively. Mostar was badly damaged by the war, and the project was part of the humanitarian assistance to the city. The two kindergartens were visited in November 2003. One of them, “Zvijezdica”, on the East side, inaugurated in March 1996, was in good condition. Not enough parents can afford to pay the fees, however, so the upper floor is used by the Austrian Diakoniewerk, which runs a children’s project. Italy, Germany and the EC have also contributed to that kindergarten. The other, “Kuca od Kamena” on the West side, inaugurated in October 1995, has quite serious problems. 2 interior walls have simply collapsed and one is now in a very poor condition and will probably collapse, if not repaired. In spite of this problem, most of the premises are in use. Both kindergartens are now run by municipal authorities.

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5.2 ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE The reconstruction of basic infrastructure which was damaged in the war was started immediately after the Dayton agreement was signed, and continued at a large scale all through the 1990s and early 2000s. Now that most bridges and roads as well as basic repairs of railways have been completed, schools and medical facilities constructed, and energy supply restored throughout the country, the grant assistance in this sector is coming to an end, but major investments financed by credits are still needed to further develop and modernise sub sectors. International credit and investment in infrastructure is now increasingly being planned with a regional perspective. The European Commission and the World Bank established a Joint Office for South East Europe in 1999 to coordinate international assistance for the reconstruction and development. A regional Infrastructure Steering Group for South Eastern Europe was established in connection with the Stability pact in 2001, with representatives from all international banks and the European Commission. The purpose is to facilitate coordination between donors and ensure adequate prioritization of regional infrastructure investment in South East Europe, while at the same time promote regional cooperation among the countries of the region. Finland has contributed all in all approximately EUR 33,3 million to the infrastructure sector in BiH. Two of the projects – the Sarajevo District Heating project and the Donation of a railway tracklayer - are included in the evaluation sample and are discussed below. In addition, Finland has financed one more district heating project in Doboj, and two water related projects, one in each of the entities.

5.2.1 District Heating Project in Sarajevo Seven persons were interviewed in Helsinki and Sarajevo in connection with the district heating project. Sites were visited and a local consultancy company has been contracted to make a technical assessment of the works carried out. Background. The district heating (DH) project was part of a number of IDA (International Development Association) financed “Emergency projects” in priority sectors prepared by the World Bank (WB) in 1995 and approved by the BiH government in March 1996. A delegation from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland was informed by the World Bank of the planned projects during a field trip to Sarajevo in early March 1996. After correspondence in late April and May, it was decided that Finland would finance the technical assistance and part of the goods. A Finnish consultancy, Ekono Energy (now renamed Elektrowatt Energy) was contracted by the MFA to provide the technical assistance. Another consultancy, IVO, was contracted to provide procurement services in Finland. The counterpart and beneficiary in Sarajevo was Toplane, a public district heating utility owned by Sarajevo canton. The Sarajevo district heating system was the country’s largest before the war, providing heat to almost 50 000 apartments, or 45% of the pre-war population. Due to war damage, freezing, and corrosion, the system was in 1996 only partly working, heating merely 16 000 apartments. A similar project was planned by the WB for Banja Luka, and credit resources were set aside for that purpose. After DM 500,000 was embezzled from the credit account, these plans came to a halt.

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Project plan. Upon arrival in Sarajevo, Ekono Energy (EE) developed the WB project document based on assessments carried out by themselves and the mechanical faculty in Sarajevo. The project objectives were the following: (i) restore district heating services in Sarajevo as soon as possible by reconstructing the district heat supply system as well as building internal installations (pipes and radiators); (ii) enable BiH to reduce its gas consumption through fuel switching by Toplane from gas to fuel oil; (iii) strengthen Toplane’s institutional capacity; (iv) initiate network improvements. The objectives were to be reached through:

• technical assistance to enable Toplane to carry out the very large emergency project in a short time, and to improve Toplane’s institutional capabilities for the longer term, in the areas of project management, engineering, financial and commercial management, and system planning

• reconstruction of all parts of the district heating network, including boiler stations, substations, distribution network, internal installation in apartment buildings.

The project was planned to be implemented in two phases. The first phase was a “fast track” repair programme whose target was to bring the number of connected flats up from 16 000 to 30 000 before the end of the heating season 1996/97, i e March 1997. The second phase was the full reconstruction and improvement of the DH network system as well as the institutional strengthening of Toplane, to be finished by the end of September 1997. Financing. The cost was projected at USD 38,6 million distributed as follows: Boilers 16,8; distribution networks 7,4; Substations 1,7; Internal installations 8,2; Building and officer equipment 0,9; technical assistance 3,1; Data systems 0,5. The main financing of the USD 40 million project was an IDA credit of USD 20 million lent to the BiH government and then on-lent to the DH company Toplane. The rest was sought as co-financing from donors. The financing plan in September 1996 looked like this (in USD million): WB 19,5 Finland 6,7 European Union 6,5 Unidentified donors 5,9 Finland’s contribution of USD 6,7 million was made as parallel financing, i e the Finnish contribution would be used in accordance with Finnish conditions and procurement guidelines rather than the WB’s. Finland made a separate agreement with the BiH Council of Ministers for its part in the DH project. Finland agreed only to finance equipment and technical assistance. Materials and installation works had thus to be financed from the IDA credit and other co-financing sources. As for all World Bank credit financed projects, a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was created within the DH company itself, Toplane. The PIU was to be headed by a senior Toplane manager and supported by experts provided by Finland. Finnish technical assistance was originally planned for only the first year. In September all important procurement was to be finished so the PIU could go on without foreign assistance.

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Implementation. The fast track phase went according to plan. No less than 18,000 apartments were reconnected to the network, making the total number of apartments 36,000 by the end of the heating season 96/97. Emergency repairs were carried out in 27 boiler stations (out of 130); 9 new substations were installed and repairs were done in almost all (120 in all); internal installations (pipes and radiators) were repaired in more than 20,000 apartments; and 3 km of pipeline in the distribution network was reconstructed. The preparations and procurement for the reconstruction phase started in parallel with fast track phase. Already at the end of 1996 it became clear that the reconstruction phase would have to be extended beyond September 1997, with the target end of 1998. Since extensive engineering and procurement would be needed, extended Finnish support was requested. Additional delays, mainly due to shortfall in the financing and slow disbursement (see more below) pushed the end date of the project until June 2000. At that point most objectives had been reached. Another 9 000 apartments – severely damaged from the war - received heating bringing the total up to 45 000 out of the pre-war 50 000. Some apartments are situated outside Sarajevo canton, in Republika Srpska, and some are obliterated by the war, and still not rebuilt. Furthermore, 25 boiler stations were completely reconstructed and 18 repaired; 45,000 internal installations repaired; and all in all 9 km of the distribution network repaired. In the process, all large boilers (together providing 62% of the heat) were converted to allow for dual fuel, i e fuel oil or gas. A project financing gap of USD 3,5 million made it necessary to cut some components out. This affected the meter installations in each apartment, and rehabilitation of the monitoring and remote control system. Relevance. The project can be considered relevant for several reasons. Firstly, Sarajevo has cold winters, and from a humanitarian viewpoint it saved a lot of people from freezing to death and prevented the spread of communicable diseases. Secondly, to heat their homes during the war, thousands of people had resorted to improvised and very dangerous connections to the public gas system. The project made it possible to disconnect 34,000 such connections thus vastly improving security. Thirdly, the dual firing options make Sarajevo less dependent on gas. Fourthly, the project very probably had an important psychological effect on the Sarajevans including non-heating clients. It gave them the sense that things were back to normal and that peace was paying off. The latter is related to the project’s effect on the post-conflict situation and the building of peace. Not only were several thousand apartments in Sarajevo not included in the project as they were situated in RS, but a similar project in Banja Luka never materialised. Finland was early on acutely aware of the need to be perceived to treat the different ethnicities with an even hand. Exactly how is not known, but the ministry managed to identify Doboj as a town in RS where a district heating project could be supported by Finland, thus balancing the infrastructure support between the entities. Finland’s total contribution to the Sarajevo DH project was USD 8.48 million (4.88 for construction and 3.6 for technical assistance). In Doboj, Finland spent USD 2.7 million. No gender disaggregated statistics exist, either on the beneficiaries of the TA or on the end users of the heating. For the latter, there should not be any differences in how they are able to receive the improved heating services. In the TA-team from Finland, most were male engineers, but the Procurement specialist was a woman. In the management of

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Toplane, it is also known that the Head of the Finance Section is a woman, as is the Chief Engineer. Effectiveness. Considering the limited time available, the project was well planned. The project document is good in all formal aspects: It is thorough, well researched; risks are taken into consideration, etc. Its main weakness lies in its over- optimism. As mentioned above, the original project document states the finishing date for the full reconstruction to September 1997. Ekono Energy realised early on that this was not realistic. The WB had underestimated the amount of work needed on the system, and the time it takes to order, manufacture and transport large components like boilers. WB also overestimated the possibilities to make large turn key contracts for the reconstruction. The idea was that such contracts would be prepared and started by September 1997, and then implemented up until the closing of the credit in 1998. This turned out to be impossible. Furthermore, the WB also built its time schedule on the idea that the DH system would be concentrated to fewer but larger boilers in order to make the system more cost effective. As it turned out that such a solution would cost more than the budgeted amount, it was aborted. These weaknesses in the plan, and, more importantly, the many delays in disbursements of donor funding caused the project, and the Finnish role, to last significantly longer than planned. If this has had a detrimental effect on its cost efficiency is discussed in the next section. Here, we will focus on what was accomplished in the end. And a lot was accomplished, especially during the first year when an incredible amount of procurement and construction was carried out. The PIU was pushing its suppliers and contractors to the maximum. The reports frequently speak of shortage of contractors in Sarajevo, and the need to repeat inquiries to suppliers because the time to prepare the complex tenders was too short, often 10 days or less. In 1996 alone, 135 inquiries were sent out in total, and 102 purchases orders were made. That is roughly equivalent to one inquiry per working day from July to December. The WB had two sets of indicators to evaluate the achievement of project objectives: the number of flats reconnected to the DH system; Toplane’s revenue collected as a percentage of total annual operating costs. The project was rated as successful in the first category. All of the stated targets of the project were met, except the components which were taken out due to shortfalls in the financing. The latter parameter was deemed only partially successful. The revenue did not grow as high as planned. To improve the management of billing and collection, a new computer system was designed and installed by a Finnish firm contracted by EE. They also trained the Toplane staff on the system. While the system meant a vast improvement, it has been modified twice and is still not perfectly suitable for the company needs, according to Toplane’s financial manager. She said that they are thinking of buying another system from a local source. To get the current system updated from Finland would be too expensive. This highlights the disadvantage of buying a computer system from abroad. Updating and support becomes difficult and possibly very expensive. On the other hand, systems of equal capacity were probably scarce in Sarajevo in 1996. However, computer programmers and IT providers did exist and a creative project design could have integrated a local support mechanism from the beginning. As a result of the system, the collection rate went up drastically from zero to 80% initially, but stalled at 71% by 1999. WB and EE encouraged Toplane to try different means to

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improve the situation. Today, the collection rate is 84% and almost all of it is in cash, as opposed to earlier when vouchers stood for a large part of the payments. While the WB rates the technical assistance only as partially satisfactory, due to the slow improvement of the collection rate, this criticism is softened by the long list of complicating circumstances that they also refer to. One can also discuss the choice of indicators. The ratio of revenue and operating costs is not entirely within the means of Toplane to influence. The Federation government sets the gas price, presently BAM 0,42 per cubic metre. The Canton, on the other hand, sets the fee for the heating, not necessarily taking into consideration the gas price. The fees are controlled by the canton, and the gas prices are being set by the Federation government. The result is a constant shortfall for Toplane. According to the Finance manager of Toplane, the collection rate would not have been as high nor would they have as much control over their clients without the Technical assistance provided by EE. When asked what they valued the most in the technical assistance, Toplane highlighted the procurement methods. They learned procurement according to WB procedures, and the same routines are now used with a few adjustments. Project management is another skill, which has been very useful. Nowadays, most non-routine activities are organised as projects, with a temporary team of experts, and a designated and responsible team leader. Toplane has, as the first enterprise in BiH, managed to get ISO certification for environmental management as well as quality management. This could not have been done without the technical assistance provided by the Finns, according to Toplane. Furthermore, reporting has been improved by the project. While there was systematic reporting also before, it was only for technical purposes. Now, reports are also to show the public what is being done. The overall effectiveness of the project in terms of impact on society has without doubt been tremendous. It has literally changed the lives for a large part of the population of Sarajevo. Efficiency. The efficiency of the whole DH project was to a great extent controlled by the Finnish contribution. The Finnish experts in their key positions in project management and procurement more or less controlled the pace and quality of all the construction work that was done, as well as, of course, the technical assistance component. The work force from EE:s side was two full time persons (Project Manager and Procurement/cost control) and three almost full time engineers . They had two local staff as secretary and interpreter. In addition, there were four short term consultants who put in about 10-20 weeks per year in Sarajevo. From Toplane’s side there were about 20 staff persons in the PIU. As has been touched upon earlier, it seems that they and the whole PIU were stretched to the limit during large parts of the project period, and they seem to have managed well on the whole. The main problem in the reconstruction were delays, which were out-side the PIU’s control. The greatest problems were posed by lack of donor funds. The pledged EU contribution was not disbursed until 1999 and then it had shrunk to a fraction of its pledged size. Also, the WB was guilty of delays when it tried to juggle advances to several emergency projects at the same time, running out of funds in the process. Furthermore, at

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one point all available contractors in Sarajevo were busy so activities had to be postponed . The project became 11% more expensive than originally anticipated. The PIU has been in existence two years longer than originally planned, which added to the cost. According to the final reports from the WB and Toplane, however, this increase in the project cost is more than compensated for by the savings made by professional technical specifications and efficient competitive procurement. Almost all materials and equipment were procured from the outside. In a typical boiler station it was only the chimney and the salt (added in one of the processes) that was produced in BiH. The procurement financed by the Finnish contribution was almost exclusively made from Finland. In the bilateral agreement signed in July 1996 it is stated in article 4: “ The procurement shall be made primarily from Finland.” A special procurement procedure was designed for the project, in order to save time in view of the urgency of the fast track programme. The Finnish consultancy IVO helped out with procurement in Finland, based on specifications coming from the PIU. The quality assessment done by the Bosnian engineering consultancy IPSA Institute states that all procured equipment is of good quality and manufactured by renowned firms. The costs of materials were in fact lower than originally estimated which should be a sign of effective procurement procedures. The cost of works contracted in Sarajevo also decreased after the first year which shows that no cartels or rigging were affecting the market there. There is in other words no question about the quality of the procured goods from Finland. But it is of course not possible to know if equal quality could have been obtained at a lower cost somewhere else. The main problems encountered in procurement were a shortage of bids during a period, as has been mentioned. In addition to the short tender time, there was the difficulty that many firms were reluctant to do business in BiH. In spite of these problems, there is no reason to believe that any big mistakes were made in procurement. Ownership. Ownership of the project has not been an issue at all. This is partly due to the fact that the PIU was placed in Toplane itself rather than being an external body. It is also telling that the PIU was swiftly transformed into the Marketing and Development Department after the project was finished. The contact and cooperation between the EE consultants and Toplane staff seems to have been good. Also, contacts with the Finnish Ambassador were frequent. The former head of the PIU also visited Finland on several occasions and met with MFA in Helsinki. According to the World Bank, the Finnish consultants were unusually well received and appreciated. EE commented on the cooperation saying that the most important lessons they took with them home was the vital importance of having a good working relationship and full involvement of the local partner to achieve success. Sustainability. A worry during the project was that Toplane was without a general manager since the war. Without this key position filled with a competent person, a lot of the improvements brought by means of the projects could prove short-lived. The project team did what they could to speed this process up, but it was a decision to be taken on cantonal level. Both WB and the Finnish ambassador put pressure on the canton to take action, and eventually a manager was appointed in 1999. According to the interviewed persons from Toplane the new General Manager has meant a great change in the

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management; people work harder and are more disciplined. In return they have one of the better developed workplaces in Sarajevo and their pay checks are always on time. There could also be reason to worry about the future of the massive investment made in the DH system. Very little has been invested in Toplane since the project was completed, and the meagre resources are only enough to fix the most pressing problems. Next year, the canton has promised to provide BAM 700 000 for housing rehabilitation (not directly related to heating). Apart from that, investment seems too low and covers only the most necessary repairs. It is sustainable as long as the new installations work but when they start to deteriorate, no buffer funds will have been built up to finance replacement. Monitoring and management. The project document states clearly that MFA was to supervise the implementation of the project, and their representatives would participate in supervision missions. The MFA would also receive monthly progress reports, quarterly financial reports, and annual progress reports. Monthly reports were also sent to the WB. It seems that this was rationalised so that MFA was content to receive copies of the WB report.

5.2.2 Donation of a railway tracklayer machine Seven persons were interviewed and a site visit has been made. A local consultancy company has been contracted to make a technical assessment of the donated machinery. Background. The railway system in BiH was in a poor condition after the war. Even though some EUR 52 million has been spent by the international community to reconstruct and rehabilitate it, several factors make a full recovery difficult. One is the continuous rivalry and suspicion between the entities. Each entity has a public railway company. The Federation even had a second one shortly after the war in Herceg-Bosna, but that is now gone. Secondly, the railway used to get most of its revenue from transporting goods from the heavy industries in BiH. Now these industries are closed or work at a fraction of their capacity, hence lessening the need for transport. Thirdly, none of the companies has enough rolling stock (railroad cars). While the railway traffic has now started again, it is very slow due to the deteriorated tracks. In most of the system 50 km/h is the speed limit, often less. The BiH railway network is just over 1,000 km. Since BiH has many hills and mountains, there are 174 tunnels, 399 bridges and many sharp curves and steep gradients. The emphasis of the international support has been to modernise the railway management and reconnect BiH’s railway system to the rest of the region and Europe. For this to happen, BiH needs to have representation on the national, state level to be able to negotiate and make international agreements. For this purpose, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Railway Public Corporation (BHRPC) was established in 1998 with a Board of Directors from both entities. It is considered relatively successful compared to many other joint institutions. Currently, a modest level of passenger traffic has resumed all over the country, and the recent rebuilding of the Samac bridge over the Sava river enables international traffic through Croatia. Currently, a new railway law is being drafted by a working group consisting of all railway companies and ministries as well as OHR, and some international agencies like Swederail. The international community encourages and supports a process towards making BHRPC the infrastructure manager for the whole country, leaving the commercial operation to the entity companies. This will make BHRPC the owner and

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caretaker of all tracks, giving equal access to the operators. This has so far met with stiff resistance from the RS. On the positive side, recently new credits amounting to around EUR 80 million were approved by the European banks EIB and EBRD. These credits will finance several large track rehabilitation projects along the major lines of the network. Those projects are expected to end in 2005. In 1997, Finnish consultants (Blue Sky Consulting) working out of Zagreb, Croatia, participated in the Sarajevo SIRE fair as representatives for DESEC, a Finnish manufacturer specialised in Railway track layer machines. They established contact with what later became the Federation of BiH railway company, but at the time was the remnants of the former state railway company and still used the name BiH Railways. They became interested in the tracklayer, and with the help of DESEC submitted a request to the MFA. The MFA decided to contract VR Track (a Finnish state- owned railway consultant) to carry out a feasibility study regarding the request. The feasibility study concluded that there was a need for the machine, and that it could be well maintained in BiH. It was pointed out that if only the Federation railway company would be the recipient, the machine would not be utilised over the whole country. There was also noted a shortage of track building materials which of course must be at hand if the machine was to be utilized. MFA now moved to support the request for financing, but this could only happen on two conditions. First, only a joint BiH company could be the owner of the machine. Second, there should be some kind of cost sharing arrangement. Finland’s first proposal was that BiH should cover one fifth of the cost. The first condition was fulfilled by the signing of an agreement in April 1998 to establish the BHRPC. The second condition was fulfilled by BiH taking responsibility for some token costs for the transport of the machine after delivery from Croatia to Sarajevo, plus training arrangements. During the rest of the year, the dialogue went on between the MFA and from then on BHRPC, via faxes and MFA-missions to BiH. It was agreed that the use of the machine by the two entity companies would be regulated in a “book of rules”. The machine would be physically based in each entity every other year, but could be used in any entity depending on need. The Board of Directors of BHRPC approved the donation before it was made just as it does with all donations. The formal decision was taken in December 1998 and the machine and an accompanying package of spare parts and accessories were ordered from DESEC Ltd. It was delivered in August 1999. VR track, who themselves use the DESEC tracklayer carried out a 5-day training on location of how to operate the machine. DESEC provided a 2-week course in Finland for the Bosnian mechanics. The total price for the package was FIM 6 634 520 (EUR 1 124 000). The Finnish commitment was a maximum of FIM 7 million. The support to the railways was supposed to continue, and Finland had another request from BiH appraised by Finnish consultants. It was not pursued, however. Relevance. The whole railway sector in BiH faces an enormous challenge in terms of renovation of its network. It will need machinery, materials and labour to do it. The tracklayer machine would seem to fit into this picture, but it is not so. Before the war track overhaul was done with the help of four cranes, capable of replacing 200 metres of track per hour. These cranes are still in use and serve the needs of the entity railway companies, according to the local consultant’s report (see annex 4).

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The donated tracklayer has roughly the same capacity as one of these cranes, but only under very specific conditions. Its primary purpose is in fact to replace turnouts, and it can only work efficiently on level surfaces where there is room for manoeuvre. Such conditions are rare along the BiH railway network. Even if the tracklayer had been better suited for the local requirements, there is yet another reason why it is of limited relevance. Any kind of major track overhaul project would be contracted out to a national or regional construction firm. Most likely, they would use machinery of their own to do the job. It can be added that an in- kind donation always risks to become an isolated event in a situation when the sector needs long- term support, both institutional and material. In terms of the need for peace- building, the donation had the potential of speeding up rehabilitation, thus promoting normalisation of society. But that opportunity was lost when the feasibility study observations about the lack of materials was ignored. If one had been serious about promoting normalisation, a broader and integrated support intervention should have been planned, which could have included also materials. The donation also had the potential, in principle, to become one of building blocks for better relations between the RS and Federation railway companies. But this would have required much more, and longer term involvement from Finland. Effectiveness. According to the MFA memorandum on which the decision to finance the project was based, the project “supports the Bosnian rebuilding by improving the operating conditions for industry and trade. At the same time it promotes the normalisation of social conditions in the spirit of Dayton Peace Agreement. The immediate aim of the project is to increase the operating capacity of the BiH railway company as far as track and machine maintenance are concerned.” This is as close as one gets to any clearly stated objectives of this intervention. Implicitly, however, the following immediate objectives could be added: (1) To provide BHRPC with a tracklayer machine, in order to (2) make it available to both entity companies for urgent railway rehabilitation. The project has not been very successful in reaching these objectives. The tracklayer was successfully delivered to Sarajevo, but after that two fundamental problems have haunted the donation. Despite the elaborate arrangement for sharing the machine, it has been placed only in the Federation since delivery. In fact, nobody from the RS is trained on the machine. BHRPC sent four people from the Federation to Finland instead of 2 from each entity. When asked about that, BHRPC simply says that no one came from the RS. There were a few people sent from the RS to the on location- training upon delivery of the machine. According to BHRPC, these persons abandoned the training, stating that the machine was nothing for them. Regardless of whether this explanation is valid , the one- sided representation went against the explicit instructions from MFA and DESEC and the basic condition for the whole donation. There was, however, no action taken from the MFA regarding the issue. The other main problem with the donation is that while the machine fulfils all technical and capacity requirements, it has hardly been used at all during the last four years. Since 1999, the machine has operated approximately hundred hours, laying not more 2,6 km of rail, most of it in the immediate surroundings of Sarajevo. According to BHRPC, the reason has been the lack of resources to procure building materials for the renewal of tracks. The new credits from EIB and EBRD will increase

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the chances that the machine would come to increased use in 2004 and 2005, but there would still be a need for training in the RS. Efficiency. MFA made the assessment that DESEC could produce the tracklayer “significantly cheaper” than its central European competitors. Of course, this claim would have been more convincing if an open tender procedure had been used. This was not done, however. Sustainability. The work carried out by the tracklayer is estimated to be of good and long- lasting quality. The main sustainability issue in this project is, however, the fact that the recipient side does not seem to take very good care of its expensive machine. It is standing in the open in the derelict Blazoj depot outside Sarajevo. Corrosion is beginning to show here and there, and some of the instruments/meters are damaged by the humidity . Ownership. The ownership of the Tracklayer was the big issue when the request started to be discussed in the MFA. MFA realised early that the requesting company was representing only one of the entities, and if they were to be the recipient, (a) Finland could be seen as not treating the entities even-handedly, and (b) the machine would not be used for the needs of the whole country. It seems however, that Finland underestimated the political machinations going in Sarajevo at the time, and expected the agreement to be respected. Another aspect of ownership is the level of self- help that the intervention creates. This donation was planned and packaged in a way to make the recipient as independent as possible of Finnish help regarding the machine. The package included ample spare parts and training for the local mechanics as well as the operators. Management, Monitoring, and administration. The main reason for the project’s waywardness is poor monitoring and follow-up. While obviously a lot of energy and time was spent on the planning of the donation, attention lapsed when it came to the implementation. The fact that four Bosniacs, and no Bosnian Serbs, were sent to training in Finland was not discovered, or at least not acted upon. The same goes for the training carried out by VR Track in which only Bosniacs participated. Documentation regarding this project has been very poor. No final report is available about the delivery of the machine.

5.3 RECONSTRUCTION AND RETURN

5.3.1 The return process In 1998 OHR introduced a new body, the Return and Reconstruction Task Force (RRTF) in the international effort to promote return. This task force had regional and local bodies spread out over the country overseen by OHR. The idea of the RRTF was to gather all actors involved in return issues around one table and jointly determine priority return areas, needs and projects. Joint pressure would also be put on obstructing municipalities and authorities to implement the Property Law, i e to evict illegal occupants and let the true owners return. By uniting the donors, aid could also be used conditionally, so as to bar obstructing municipalities from international assistance. RRTF has varied success in different parts of the country, but after 1,5 years the persistence of the international

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community began to pay off. Evictions began to take place and returns occurred in increasing numbers. The RRTF has also gone a long way to coordinate the multitude of actors involved in reconstruction and other return related activities. This is an extremely complex task, made even more difficult by such factors as uncertain financing, double occupancies , etc. A useful tool in this coordination has been the mandatory approval by the RRTF for each return project. While not being an approval procedure in the formal sense, this has forced all NGOs and other organisations to communicate with the RRTF, which thus gained the necessary overview to coordinate effectively. It worked largely because most donors supported it by not financing proposals unless they had RRTF approval. To date, more than a million refugees and IDPs have returned, and most municipalities have carried out all necessary evictions. This constitutes a huge success. Another 500 000 will return during the next four years according to the projections. In 2003, the process towards handing over the responsibility for return has been intensified. Amendments to the legislation prescribe that the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR) will take over responsibility for return at the beginning of 2004. The amendments also contain changes in the State Commission for Return, and the creation of a Return Fund. The Return Fund will be an independent institution (with the State Commission as a Board), which will finance return initiatives in the municipalities. The fund will be financed by the State, the Entities and Brcko District. Matching funds are anticipated to come from the international community. Four regional centres will be set up as the field structure of the MHRR. The current regional RRTF offices will hand over responsibility to the new regional centres by the end of 2003. After that, only a small unit at the OHR will be left to monitor the implementation of the new legislation. Several informants have been critical of the process, which they view as premature and unrealistic. The regional centres will need time to become functional. As it is, they hardly have time to recruit staff before the end of the year. It remains to be seen if the handover will take place as foreseen or if last minute changes will take place.

5.3.2 Fida International in the Doboj area

Background. Fida International (former Finnish Free Foreign Mission and LKA) is a mission and development cooperation organisation serving the Pentecostal Churches in Finland. Fida International (FI) is one of the seven so-called “framework organisations” which receive long-term support from MFA’s Unit for Non-Governmental Organisations. At present, FI receives EUR 3.7 million annually in support of its development projects and humanitarian aid programme. In addition to the shelter programmes in BiH, FI has begun to support local Roma communities in community development, in cooperation with Finnish Roma who belong to the Pentecostal Church. FI began its work in what was Yugoslavia already during the war, providing humanitarian aid and starting a shelter programme in 1995. The Terms of Reference for the present evaluation include the evaluation of FI’s shelter programmes in the Doboj area during 2000-2002, at a cost of EUR 500.000. These shelter programmes covered the villages Besic (2000-2001), Suho Polje and Sjenina Rijeka (2001), and Kukavac/Donja Brijesnica area (2002). In BiH, the work of FI with the shelter programmes is guided by the BiH

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Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Strategy of BiH for the implementation of Annex 7 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (the Dayton Agreement). Doboj is situated on the Inter-Entity Border Line and is divided into three parts: old, central Doboj, which is located in the Republika Srpska, and Doboj East and Doboj South, which are located in the Federation. There are two city administrations. Over the years, a great number of donors have been, and still are, engaged in reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts, including other countries’ government agencies and international NGOs. In an interview, the Chief for Reconstruction and Development and Liaison Officer for International Organisations in the central Doboj municipality praised the good relationship between Doboj and Finland, both on project and on the official level, with frequent visits by Finland’s roving ambassador. Over the years, several return projects had been implemented with the assistance of FI and the Finnish CIMIC, and in addition a basketball school had been initiated, which is very popular among local youngsters. All agreements on housing projects followed the RRTF guidelines, including the three parties: the municipality, the beneficiaries and the implementing organisation. For each shelter programme, FI makes an assessment of the needs together with a local architect. Immediately after the war, construction material was not easily available, but these days both imported and local material can be bought. To begin with, tenders were invited from a number of companies, but now mostly 1-2 entrepreneurs with subcontractors are entrusted with the delivery of materials. The greatest difficulty has been to judge how serious or determined the former inhabitants of a village are in their wish to return. There is mostly a spokesperson representing the return community, and some are honest and enthusiastic. It happens, however, that the person in question is mainly looking after his own interest, and sometimes this is discovered too late. The team visited three villages in which the shelter programmes for 2000-2002 were implemented. Comments from the interviews during these visits are presented below, followed by general remarks as per our Terms of Reference. Besic village (2000-2001) This village is located in Doboj municipality in Republika Srpska. The aim of the programme was to enable the minority return of Bosnian refugees to their homes in a Serb community. The organisation for the Bosniac refugees in Doboj participated closely in the implementation of the programme. FI cooperated with the Finnish CIMIC Company, as the programme was implemented in its area of operation. 20 houses were repaired, and 20 families, altogether 92 persons, could return to their homes. We interviewed a young couple who had returned to the village at the beginning of 2000, after several years as refugees. They had lived for three years in Doboj East in houses belonging to other people, which was the main reason for their return. The man was the village leader. Due to the difficulties to earn a living, they were now, much to their own disappointment, on the verge of leaving their house and the village to try to find work in the Federation. The reconstruction of the village had not been accompanied by any agricultural credits or farming machines. A severe hail storm had destroyed the latest harvest. Before the war, most of the people had worked in Doboj, combined with

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agriculture in the village. The young man said that if he left, 30 other persons would probably do the same. Suho Polje village (2001) We visited an elderly couple in one of the villages which received support in 2001. They had returned in 2000 from Doboj East, where they had lived during the war. More than 130 Serb families had stayed in the village, but had later returned to Lukavac, Maglaj etc. FI, the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) and Mercy Corps had assisted in the reconstruction and repair of houses. Compared with many other villages, Suho Polje was less destroyed. The couple had received some assistance from CRS for their agriculture, and the husband had also started to work as a floor-layer, buying his machinery on credit. Before the war he had worked in the wood industry in Doboj. They manage to support themselves, but wish they had some more cattle and farming machines. They have good relations with their Serb neighbours and have started a water project together with them. Now they are looking for funds to complete the village water system. Altogether 30-40 families have returned. This programme also was implemented in close cooperation with the Finnish CIMIC, which assisted in the preparation of roads in Besic village (receiving continued support in 2001) and coordinated a USAID electricity project. Lukavac municipality (2002) In 2002, a shelter programme was implemented in Tuzla Canton, in the Federation, in Donji Brijesnica village in the Lukavac municipality for 20 Serb families, and in Dubnica village in the Kalesia municipality for 1 family, altogether 62 persons. This programme supported the first minority return of Serbs to this Bosnian municipality, and the implementation was not disturbed by any negative incidents. The tension among the returnees decreased and the atmosphere improved significantly as the programme went on. At the end of 2002, repair was going on in several houses, but out of 21 houses only 5 were inhabited. At the time of our visit in November 2003, there were many repaired houses, but most of them were still empty. This programme was a great disappointment to the FI representative. The Serb community had promised that they would return. He felt betrayed by the Serb spokesmen. Much work and much money had been wasted. FI had cooperated with the Finnish CIMIC which had built a network of roads and a bridge, and assisted in the coordination with USAID for the electricity installation. This, unfortunately, was never implemented, as USAID decided to scale down their commitment in the area. We interviewed an elderly woman and her neighbour, an old retired man. In 1995, the house of the woman and her husband was completely destroyed in the last military offensive in the area, which became part of the Federation. However, they receive their pension from Republika Srpska, only BAM 178 per month. They cannot farm, as their land is mine-infested. Only 6 persons live in the village, in 3 houses. There is no electricity. 17 families say that they would return if electricity were installed. Relevance. The aim of FI’s shelter programmes is “to promote the free and safe return of the refugees to their homes”. There has also been pressure on the municipalities created by the Property Law Implementation Plan to ensure that the original owners can repossess their homes. The programmes have been part of the peace and reconciliation

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process and have thus been highly relevant in the context of the immediate needs of numerous returnees. Effectiveness. In a long-term perspective, the difficulties to earn a living in the old environment have clearly been underestimated. The fact that the Serb refugees are less willing to return to the Federation than the Bosniacs and Croats to return to Republika Srpska has caused unforeseen problems to many donors, not only to FI. But the difficulties to earn a living are the same in most of the projects, whatever the ethnic group. In its annual report for 2002, FI was hoping for a more complete return picture when the electricity network had been reconstructed and when economic activities had restarted. In 2003, however, it became evident that USAID will not solve the electricity problem, and that the economic recovery is much slower than expected. Efficiency. The construction activities of the shelter programmes have been well planned and implemented. The average cost per house is estimated at EUR 7-8.000. The FI annual reports are detailed and informative enough. The houses were reconstructed in good cooperation between the parties concerned, save for the unfortunate, only partly fulfilled programme in Lukavac municipality. The Serb returnees had in fact carried out the reconstruction of their houses themselves, and the Republika Srpska had financed those repairs that required professional labour. Sustainability. In some areas the sustainability is quite low due to the slow general economic recovery, but it is difficult to judge if this applies to a majority of the returnees. Efforts are made in FI’s annual report for 2002 to analyse the failures. Conclusion. The shelter programmes have functioned very well from a technical point of view, but it is necessary to pay more attention to the possibilities for the returnees to support themselves when returning to their home villages. FI should provide advice on whom to contact with regard to agriculture credits and extension services. Experience from other areas within Tuzla Canton show that various credit schemes are indeed available. FI should find it well worth to study such examples e.g. from the cooperation between other donors and the Lutheran World Federation in Tuzla.

5.3.3 FinnChurchAid/Lutheran World Federation in Ostra Luka/Orasje Background. FinnChurchAid (FCA), as part of its international development programme, supports projects which are implemented by the Lutheran World Federation (LWF). These projects receive financing from a global network of Evangelical Lutheran churches which provide assistance to poverty-stricken people in acute need all over the world. All along the frontlines of the war in BiH the civilian population was severely affected. One of these areas, in northern Posavina Canton along the Sava river, is the so-called “Orasje Pocket”. Not being in the centre of events and, before the war, closely related to Croatia, Orasje town and its surroundings received little attention and reconstruction support after the war in spite of heavy destruction and densely mine-infested land. But LWF, in cooperation with FCA, had programmes for humanitarian aid during the war in this area, which then changed into activities to support reconstruction and return after the end of the hostilities in 1995/96.

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In 1996, FCA began to assist in the reconstruction in Orasje and surroundings. A project plan to get more support to the village Ostra Luka was prepared by FCA and LWF and submitted to the MFA in January 1997. Unfortunately, it took more than one year before a decision was taken by the MFA, in March 1998, to support the project with an amount of FIM 2.445.000. The project was to be coordinated by the LWF office in Osijek, Croatia, north of the Sava river. The project was implemented in two phases: Phase I January-May1998, and Phase II June-October 1998. A final report was submitted in October 1998. The Project. The overall objective of the project was to help the people of Ostra Luka to move back to their homes and to return to normal life. The project had two main objectives: to repair some 70 private houses and to repair essential community buildings to be able to re-establish the most basic communal and social services. Thus, the Community Centre with a municipality office and premises for the village health centre, and an agricultural warehouse were repaired and reconstructed by local contractors. The repairs of family houses were carried out by the owners, except for some special cases where elderly persons and single parents (mothers) received technical assistance. The houses were divided into four categories, some of them needing only minor repairs, whereas others were seriously damaged. FCA/LWF provided all the construction material. All the construction work was carefully planned, with account taken of the background and needs of the beneficiaries, the quality and quantity of construction material etc. Eventually, 104 families, among them several social cases in desperate need, had their houses repaired. Two inspection rounds by FCA/LWF staff were made, and all work was completed by the end of October 1998. When preparing the project, attention had been paid to the aspects of self-sufficiency. A special survey was carried out to verify the agricultural potential of the beneficiaries. It showed that 101 families had roughly 140 ha of land, but 60 ha, i.e. 42 per cent, were still mined. Every second family, or 59 families, had mines in their fields. The families used to live from farming, husbandry and home gardening. Most of their cattle, some 800 cows, and other animals were lost in the war. They were also engaged in the production of baskets and furniture which was their primary source of money income. The fields used for growing willows, the material for this industry, were heavily mined as well. FCA had assisted this production already in 1996 by providing new machinery. In the final project report in October 1998, FCA/LWF were recommended to follow up the reconstruction project and investigate whether it would be possible to start a dairy cattle programme. This, however, would require a comprehensive and costly de-mining programme. According to the final report the de-mining of 50 ha (out of the 560 ha of arable land still mined) would cost between DM 2.5 and 5 million. In 1998 the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO) was engaged in some de-mining activities but lacked funds for fuel, repair and maintenance. A request was submitted from LWF via FCA to the MFA amounting to DM 114.000 for a 5 months de-mining programme. This operation did not materialise. In November 2003, the evaluation team visited Ostra Luka together with a representative from LWF in Osijek and the former Project Manager for the reconstruction project. Our

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discussion with representatives of the beneficiaries of the project, the former Village Council President and his successor, was completely dominated by the difficulty to make one’s living. All the reconstructed buildings, both private and communal, were of good standard and well kept. The possibilities to sustain oneself were, however, almost non-existent. The tobacco harvests, representing half of the agricultural production, had failed during the last three years due to bad weather. The basket making had come to a stand-still as the competition from other parts of the world is too keen. The mines continue to be the main problem. A good part of the best land is still mine-infested and not much clearing is going on. Out of 700 men who participated in the war, only some 200 have jobs. They feel that they were indirectly punished because they managed to remain and resist. Before the war, 300 people went abroad. Relatives sent money during the war, but that has gradually stopped. Visits to some families’ houses confirmed the description of the living conditions by the Village Council President. Unemployment is a heavy burden, and the receding market for their wicker products and the mines are the dominating problems. Large fields close to the houses are inaccessible and present a great danger, especially to the children. The reconstruction project had provided individual support, for which they were very grateful. Would it be possible, in a second project, to assist in a more general way? The LWF office in Tuzla is supporting a number of projects to engage people in economic activities – could LWF offices in Tuzla and Osijek cooperate? Relevance. As people wanted to return and highly appreciate the assistance they received, the project can be described as most relevant. The project was implemented in a participatory manner, engaging the beneficiaries in the reconstruction of their own homes. The ownership factor is high. Effectiveness. People have been able to come back, the houses have been well repaired, but there has not been a return to “normal life”, as a great number of the families cannot make a living. The heavy mining prevents them from using their land. Efficiency. The implementation of the project was very efficient. The villagers repaired their own houses, with few and understandable exceptions, and the FCA/LWF coordinator monitored the project skilfully. Sustainability. Very low, primarily due to the lack of de-mining. Conclusion. Apparently the LWF representatives from Osijek and the former project coordinator were taken aback by the depressing picture with which they were confronted. The wisdom of supporting house reconstruction to an amount of FIM 2.445.000 for people who cannot sustain themselves must be questioned. The successful Sida-supported cooperation between LWF and World Vision and the local agro-industry in the villages around Tuzla could be studied and perhaps inspire alternative solutions. The project in Ostra Luka was carefully planned, and under the heading “economic and financial sustainability” in the project proposal it is stated that “the village may need some further help for the rehabilitation of agriculture. This can only happen if de-mining takes place in the village.” For humanitarian and ethic reasons, but also for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency, it is desirable that the request from FCA for support to de-mining be revived and supported. The way things look today, this project is not completed.

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5.3.4 The Finnish CIMIC work Background. CIMIC, or Civil –Military Cooperation, is originally a NATO concept. It denotes the activities that a NATO contingent carries out to secure and uphold good relations between itself and the civilian society in which it is posted. While the concept may have existed for a long time, it is probably safe to say that it had not been applied in practice before the peace keeping mission in BIH. This is where it has been practiced and where it has developed into what it is today. The NATO-led multinational peace keeping force in BiH has consisted of up to 40 different nations, and each participating nation is expected to take care of its own relations with the surrounding society in the way it sees fit. In many cases this is done simply by keeping an open dialogue with people and the local authorities, trying to solve any conflicts or problems that occur. Quite early in the mission, however, CIMIC started to take on a more tangible character in BiH. The reasons behind this development have partly to do with the powerful machinery that the armies had with them and which could be put to use for the war-devastated communities. It also gave the soldiers something to do, apart from patrolling, something which made them feel useful. Additional factors were pressure and requests from the civilian authorities (to help reconstruct roads and bridges), and later from the rest of the international community (to be a supportive force in the return process). CIMIC in terms of relief and reconstruction projects is known to have been carried out by Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Turkey, Italy, Germany and USA Surprisingly, the SFOR central command in Sarajevo has no overview or systematic knowledge of what has been accomplished by CIMIC in BiH.. In some cases, like Finland, this has evolved further. The Finnish force contribution became a dedicated CIMIC company. It has received special funding to enable it to carry out projects in the local environment. The Finnish government has taken a great interest in the CIMIC activities. The Ministry of Defence established a working group in 1998 to plan and design leadership training for the specific purpose of CIMIC in crisis management. This has been followed by other initiatives, some in cooperation with the other Nordic countries. After contributing successfully with a CIMIC company also in Kosovo, Finland was asked by the allied forces to send a CIMIC company to Afghanistan as well. Furthermore, Finland will in the near future finance CIMIC courses in three locations in Africa to promote the concept among peace keeping troops there. CIMIC, and in particular the Finnish CIMIC experience, has also been the subject of a dissertation at the Military Academy by Major Petteri Kurkinen. According to him, the government work and involvement in CIMIC is one of the ways in which Finland is strengthening its resource base and its international crisis management capacity to meet the requirement from EU on both the civilian and military side. The Finnish CIMIC concept. The development of the Finnish CIMIC concept in BiH can be divided into three phases. The first phase was 1996 – 2000 in which the formation of CIMIC took place. Finland’s first contribution to SFOR (or IFOR at the time) was a reconstruction battalion. It was stationed in Doboj in the NordPol brigade, which until 2001 was the home of the Finnish as well as Swedish, Polish, Danish, and Norwegian SFOR contingents. When it had completed the construction of the camp the Finnish battalion went on to carry out some small projects “outside the wires”, such as the reconstruction of schools in the area. The battalion’s own funds were used for the minor costs that occurred.

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In 1997, the reconstruction battalion was replaced with an infantry battalion, but the small projects continued, in close cooperation with the other contingents. Finnish MFA funding started in 1998 with a FIM 3 million grant until the end of 1999. After that, a new decision was taken each year until 2003 of approximately the same value. In addition, there was funding from the European Commission as well as minor national funding from Sweden and Norway. All financing was channelled through the G5 office, which is a brigade- level section which coordinates with other international agencies and has the overall responsibility for all civil- military relations. CIMIC units report to G5. The second phase was from February 2000 to May 2001, when a new Finnish commander (LtCol Reima Helminen) of the G5 started to work on a new and more effective CIMIC structure. He put Major Heikki Wala in charge of creating the new structure. The result was the CIMIC Company. This company was a mix of all nationalities of the Nordpol Brigade. There was a project office, which was responsible for designing and planning the projects. Their planning input came from the field from three “centres” dividing the Area of Responsibility (AOR) between them. A Finnish construction platoon was also part of the parcel, which could perform various tasks requiring heavy machinery. The company was led by a Company Commander and a Deputy, with the help of an Information Officer and local interpreters. In addition, a National Support Element handled project payments to local contractors. The project office had six project officers, two per CIMIC centre, and a Project Office commander. Clearly, the company was well equipped in terms of human resources. The third and final phase started when the CIMIC company was moved to Tuzla Eagle base. From May 2001 to July 2003, Finns provided a CIMIC company to the Multinational Brigade North, serving two American task forces and one Russian task force, and in 2003, also the Nordpol brigade. In Tuzla, the whole Finnish contingent of 60 soldiers was completely specialised and concentrated on CIMIC. No heavy machinery was included, however. Local contractors were hired to do the jobs needed and occasionally American machinery was utilised. While the AOR in Tuzla was four times bigger than in Doboj, the same organisational structure was applied. There were three CIMIC Centres, with 2-3 teams in each. Each team had between 2-8 members, each covering 2-4 municipalities, which included a maximum of 20 return villages. Activities depended, on the military side, on the wishes of the task forces, which were communicated to CIMIC via “cooperation meetings”. On the civilian side, the central forum was the Return and Reconstruction Task force, RRTF. Most reconstruction projects were initiated through the RRTF. In Tuzla, CIMIC’s role was also formalised in writing. Procedures and criteria were included in the overall Standing Orders for the Brigade, and it was drafted by the Finns. The purpose remained to provide direct and indirect support for the battalion’s operations. For example, the projects always had an indirect impact on the SFOR troops in that they improved security and gave good publicity for SFOR. In 2001, 27 projects were implemented: 16 road projects, and 6 housing projects. The total value was EUR 1,193,646. In 2002, 46 projects were implemented, e g: 13 roads, 7 bridges, 7 housing projects, and 10 miscellaneous micro projects. The total value was EUR 1,120.857

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In 2003, 74 projects were implemented, e g: 15 roads, 17 housing projects, 9 water projects, and 25 miscellaneous micro projects. The total value was EUR 827,519 (only six months) Reconstruction projects during 2002 and 2003 are the primary focus of the present evaluation. From statistics available, it can be seen that there is a clear general trend towards smaller and less costly projects, so- called “miscellaneous micro projects”. In terms of value, housing projects dominate the picture, although there are a larger number of road projects. It can also be seen that the pace of implementing projects became higher. During the last six months, no less than 74 projects were implemented. Not only MFA funding financed these projects. There were some EU funding and some from USAID through the US SFOR contingent. Finally, the CIMIC company had its own funds which were devoted to certain projects. Five projects were financed by EU during 2002-2003. From the ministry’s side there were two important limits on the projects: They could cost a maximum of 50 000 EUR and they should last no longer than the current SFOR mandate (extended on a yearly basis). From the brigade command’s side the following criteria on projects were important: The project should: (i) support minority return; (ii) have the support of RRTF; (iii) repair the damages caused by war; (iv) have a de-mining certificate; (v) involve the municipality and the beneficiaries; and (vi) minimise the use of SFOR resources. Projects visited. In the following section, the projects visited by the team are described one by one. In the subsequent section they will be assessed together in terms of the various aspects prescribed in the ToR. 1. Zeljova village, in Banovici municipality in the Federation, 2001-2002. This is the largest and probably the most controversial of the CIMIC projects. Zeljova was identified by Banovici municipality and CIMIC as a Serb return village. RRTF, however, did not believe that many Serbs would actually return, so it was not approved. CIMIC went ahead anyway, which caused some tension with the RRTF. The pace of return was disappointing at first, but according to Mr Wala, who was then in charge, only seven out of 74 houses are still unoccupied. Regardless of the occupancy rate, there was another valid argument for pursuing the Zeljova project. By reconstructing these houses, at the Serbs’ explicit request, it became possible to evict the beneficiaries where they were displaced (i e in Divic, RS) on the grounds of double occupancy, and thus free Bosniac houses for return. CIMIC did everything in Zeljova: roads, water and construction of houses and installations. The cost of the Zeljova project was all in all about EUR 800,000. It was part of a larger reconstruction package for which CIMIC received special funding in 2001, about EUR 1.1 million. In addition to Zeljova, it covered housing projects also in Banovici in the Federation and Bratunac, Srebrenica and Zvornik in the RS. This was the first time that CIMIC actually reconstructed houses, and it was the first large scale project. It was not repeated, mainly because it tied up too many CIMIC resources for too long. The above mentioned guidelines in terms of maximum total value and time limits were adhered to in all later projects. 2. Vrasevac, 2002

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This is another Serb village in Banovici municipality where CIMIC reconstructed two houses, the road and the water installation. In both Vrasevac and Zeljova, cooperation with FCA and LWF made it possible to provide the returnees with agricultural inputs, which will help them to sustain themselves and get established. The beneficiaries can compose their own package up to a value of BAM 2500 (EUR 1275), which means for example a maximum of 8000 strawberry plants or a green house, or 250 fruit trees. 3. Upgrades of housing in Josanica: Budget EUR 34 000, RS, 15 km south of Zvornik. Josanica was a predominantly Muslim village before the war. It was in the frontline during a period, so the houses were totally destroyed. It is quite a large village. Return has been going on since 1998, and there are still people returning. Many donors and agencies have been involved in the reconstruction and support to the returnees. At one point, there was a joint programme with two NGO’s with house reconstruction in phases. But after the first phase had been finished, the second NGO stopped its activities for some reason. The result was that over a hundred houses were unfinished. CIMIC took responsibility for 21 of these, and installed electricity, a front door, and a complete bath room in all of them. In one of the houses lived a father and a son, and they had been living there off and on since 1999. They were now waiting for the rest of the family. They were very satisfied with their installations, even though they have had to pay for some of the works needed. 4. Road reconstruction in Rasevo, 20 km south of Zvornik. In Rasevo, the first mixed return project took place in 2001, which was an important objective at the time of the RRTF, to serve as an example. Two neighbouring villages, one Muslim and one Serb, had co-existed before the war, and both populations had become displaced, as the frontline went back and forth in that area. All houses were completely destroyed and the villages were mined. There was never any violence between villagers, however. When the first Serb returnees came in 2001, they had to walk 2-3 km through the forest because the road was destroyed. When RRTF found out that there was a will to return also on the Bosniac side, CIMIC was asked to build the road. In this case the road was essential for the project. No material or machines could make it to the village without it. Now, most of the original inhabitants in both villages have returned and once again co-exist in peace. 5. Housing for Roma families in Srednja Trnova, 2003: Budget EUR 46 100, outside Bijeljina. Roma people are as marginalised in BiH as elsewhere in Europe, and although they were often hard hit by the war, they are often forgotten. UNHCR had identified a group of Roma families who had been living in sheds made of plastic for three years and tried to persuade different donors to help them. In the end, it was only CIMIC who managed to assist them. Three houses were reconstructed in spring 2003. (CIMIC delivered material and the families paid neighbours and friends to build the houses). Now they have houses but the electricity is only provisionally (and illegally) connected via a neighbour. Also this group was visibly appreciative of the assistance they had received. 6. Janjari school in Ugljevik, RS , 2002: Budget EUR 12 750.

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CIMIC staff came into contact with the school when reconstructing houses nearby. The school was run down, and since it would get new pupils through the return, it was decided to renovate it. It is a school with 32 pupils, grade 1-5 , but with room for more. The school maintenance man was disappointed by the quality of the work that had been done. The fire stoves were too small to heat the large class rooms, so the children were freezing. The paint was already after one year cracking and coming off the walls. The reservoirs for the toilets were of such a bad quality that they were broken more often than working. 7. Roads and house clearing in Gorni Trestanica, 2003. This Serb return village was one of the last projects for CIMIC during the spring of 2003. It is actually a FinnChurchAid (FCA) project in which 26 houses will be reconstructed. FCA has, of course, a special relation with CIMIC since their country representative, Mr Wala, was one of the leading figures within CIMIC previously. CIMIC’s role in this project was to reconstruct the roads and driveways, and to clear house foundations. The returnees are given the material and will build their own houses. When the buildings are ready, FCA has contracted local firms to install electricity, water pipes, ceramics, and gutters/drainage pipes. At present 9 houses are ready and people are moving back from Zvornik, Doboj, Brcko and Bijeljina. Relevance. The relevance of all reconstruction projects for return was ultimately assessed by the RRTF structure. Finnish CIMIC always followed the RRTF line. There was, as mentioned, the exception of Zeljova, and there is another example, Visori village in Celic. These are the only known two cases where CIMIC has acted outside the RRTF. The conclusion is therefore that the CIMIC projects have been relevant in terms of serving priority needs for minority return. It should be added that the CIMIC interventions were often the key contribution that was lacking for successful return. In terms of post-conflict and peace building, the return process is absolutely central. It should not be forgotten that the projects were only the most tangible part of the CIMIC work in support of return. The contracting of local construction firms gives a positive side effect in the form of a boost to the local economy. Quite often return projects created tension between the majority population and the minority returnees. Projects were therefore increasingly incorporated measures which benefited also the majority population. The constant assessments and patrolling by CIMIC made returnees and IDPs feel more secure and accompanied. Their willingness and ability to provide information and channel communication is another example of how they contributed. The projects have been implemented in the Federation slightly more than in the RS, but targeting Bosnian Serbs slightly more than Bosniacs. Effectiveness. Effectiveness in terms of goal fulfilment has been high in all of the visited projects. The quality of the works has been checked by CIMIC weekly site inspections, as well as by a routine of not paying the last 5% of a contract until 12 months after the job is finished. In this way the quality and durability of construction could be checked. This procedure could, of course, not be applied during 2003, since the company was to leave BiH in the same year. Related to this or not, the few complaints about CIMIC work has been about poor quality of the work. The school in Janjari is one example out of the sample studied here. OHR

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stated that there also had been complaints about poor quality in projects in Bratunac and Srebrenica in RS. Efficiency. Finnish CIMIC always used competitive bidding to choose the contractor for a project. It seems safe to say that the construction work could not have been much cheaper with the same level of quality. Even though this is of course positive and a sign of efficiency, it is not possible to say that CIMIC is an efficient way of implementing reconstruction in general. While on the surface it looks great: zero Euros from the development cooperation budget going to overhead and administration, it is in reality an extremely expensive way of working. The Defence forces have not been able to give information on what the costs have been in BiH, but Kosovo can be used as a comparison. In the first deployment to Kosovo in 1999 there were a total of 700-800 Finnish troops. The total cost was estimated at 445 million marks. This means that every soldier cost 556 250 marks (EUR 93,555) for the first year (445 million divided by 800). If you have 60 CIMIC soldiers in the field, you immediately have an astronomical overhead, which cannot be compared to any other aid agency. One aspect is also the number of people involved. Seen from a strictly organisational viewpoint, 60 people are a huge number seen in relation to the tasks. One can compare with FCA which will now continue the work after CIMIC, and which has one international staff person in the country. Ownership. In the beginning, CIMIC projects were done by the military with military machinery for the local population. Gradually the projects became more sophisticated and included self-help components. The use of contractors instead of doing the work also helped to increase the sense of local ownership. Towards the end more and more energy was devoted to persuading the municipalities to contribute to the reconstruction projects. In a few cases this also succeeded. Sustainability. The big risk with return-projects is that the beneficiaries are not serious about returning, and intend only to sell the house or use it as a summer house. There are hundreds of newly built houses financed by the international community in BiH, which have met this fate. According to one of the interviewed CIMIC Officers, each return project was for this reason thoroughly researched before it was started. As an example, in the above described Gorni Trestanica project, all beneficiaries were checked individually, to see if they have received land plots in their current location, if they had the right motivation for returning, etc. Out of 62 applicants only 26 were accepted, even though the project was planned for 30 houses. Even if all the intended beneficiaries do return, there is a multitude of problems which threaten the sustainability of any return project, the most common one, of course, being the often complete lack of jobs and ways to support a family. The same criticism as in the previous chapter regarding unsustainable return projects can to a great extent be levelled at the projects studied here. It is true that CIMIC did not design most of these projects, and was in most cases only providing one component, but this does not lessen the problem, nor take away responsibility of CIMIC for the effects of their activity. A responsible donor must see to the big picture and endeavour to reach the end goal which must be sustainable return. Monitoring, administration and management. The field organisation of the CIMIC company has been described above, and monitoring of the projects has been found well

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working. What is less clear is how monitoring and management of the CIMIC activity has been handled in Finland. There have been several different actors involved on the Finnish end. The organisation around CIMIC was changed in 2001, when the Peace Support Operations Branch (PSO) of the Finnish Defence Forces took over all operational responsibility for the CIMIC units. Logistically, CIMIC and all peace- keeping troops are served by the International centre (or FINCENT). It was previously under the Ministry of Defence but has now been transferred to the Defence Forces. At the same time, the CIMIC company has had more or less direct relations with the Desk Officer at MFA regarding the projects, bypassing PSO. In the Final report, the CIMIC commander expressed frustration over a confusion of roles, and recommended that one point of contact in the Defence Forces should have responsibility for projects- related issues. PSO comments that the procedures are in line with that recommendation since 2001, but have not been followed, mainly because of old habit. The reorganisation led to a drastic improvement in the documentation of the CIMIC company. Before 2001 there is very limited information available on what was actually done, but from then on, each project was documented and accounted for. It has not been possible for the evaluation team to speak to the person working with CIMIC in the Unit for West Balkans, so very little is known about how the MFA has monitored the CIMIC activities, about the administrative procedures and how the Ministry actually views the CIMIC project implementation. The financing of the CIMIC activities has come from the development cooperation budget, and each project proposal from CIMIC has been individually approved by the Project Committee in the Department for Development cooperation in the MFA. There has been an agreement between the MFA and The Ministry of Defence on the use of the funds. It is a standard agreement for using services of any governmental authority in development cooperation. CIMIC units as aid actors. The SFOR Mission Statement says that ”The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) will deter hostilities and stabilise the peace, contribute to a secure environment by providing a continued military presence in the Area Of Responsibility (AOR), target and coordinate SFOR support to key areas including primary civil implementation organisations, and progress towards a lasting consolidation of peace, without further need for NATO-led forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” It is mainly by force of the “contribute to a secure environment” clause that the CIMIC activities have been motivated. How has the CIMIC company been perceived from the point of view of beneficiaries and other actors in BiH? For this purpose, interviews have been made with some local government officials, beneficiaries, the principal organisations responsible for return, OHR and UNHCR, as well as with several organisations with which CIMIC has cooperated, like the international NGO Mercy Corps, and FIDA International and FinnChurchAid from Finland. One of the strengths of the Finnish CIMIC company was its access to flexible and reliable funding. This meant that CIMIC could do what other donors and organisation could not, and many times this has proven crucial for the success of a return project. This could be the road which was absolutely essential for trucks to be able to deliver building materials, but which no donor could build due to budget restrictions. The funding

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arrangement also made it possible to take swift decisions. Approval for a project could be received in a matter of days. This made them reliable. When CIMIC said that they could do it, one could trust them that it would be done. Some of the strengths of Finnish CIMIC that have been pointed out by different interviewees stem from the simple fact that they are part of a large military mission. One example is their vast field presence. Like no civilian organisation, no matter how large, were SFOR able to cover ground. Finnish CIMIC had enough personnel and vehicles to be in 5 or 10 different places or meetings at once, where any other organisation could cover at the most one or two. CIMIC could pick up information in one place, verify it in another and send it to a third place, everywhere in person. Having said this, CIMIC, or rather SFOR, has been criticised by some for having very poor communication between nations/AORs. Another obvious strength is the access to all the resources that a modern military mission possesses. As an example, when UNHCR in Bijeljina had problems with verifying the distribution of land plots at the outskirts of the town, Finnish CIMIC could respond by taking aerial photographs from a US helicopter. Swift mobilisation of a large number of trucks to transport returnees and their belongings is another example. Being Finnish seems to have worked to their advantage. According to one of the officers who served in Tuzla, and also Kurkinen, being Finnish was perfect in an area where US and Russia had to cooperate. CIMIC was sometimes a communication link between these two nations. They are also more uncontroversial than the major powers in the eyes of the civilians. Apart from the symbolism of being from a small and neutral country, Finnish CIMIC benefited from the fact that its recruitment was from army reservists who had civilian professions and experience. In this sense, Finland did not send out anything else than its absolute elite for CIMIC purposes. For work with civilian projects for civilians, experience from civilian life is of course an asset. Many other, professional armies cannot provide this type of expertise. Furthermore, the Finnish CIMIC company had developed and tested a field structure before coming to Tuzla, which also was an asset. According to the UNHCR, the Finns with their personal style – low key, happy, calm, friendly, smart, educated, prestige- less - had a special way of working with which they could assess the security situation much better than other SFOR nations. In the process they improved the security situation. One limitation that has been found is that CIMIC soldiers are not the best negotiators, and they are not comfortable in all types of difficult and tense situations which sometimes occur in return processes. Nor are they well versed in legal issues and human rights or humanitarian law. They discovered themselves that they had a definite disadvantage when it came to reaching the women in the returnee communities. In the last year they recruited 2 female soldiers which made a great difference, but it was not enough . While many, including UNHCR, appreciated all the information gathered and shared by CIMIC, it goes without saying that in terms of gathering information and crosschecking it, local Bosnian people are far better at it than any foreign soldier with a limited stay in the country.

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One could think the non-transparency, and unpredictability (if a crisis occurs, it will of course have priority) which is perhaps inevitable for the military, could be perceived as a problem for partners. This does not seem to be the case, however. Rotation is a weak point for most SFOR contingents. Many organisations find it difficult to cooperate with military officers who are replaced after six months with a complete newcomer. The Finnish model of rotation in which all stay at least a year and only half of the contingent rotate at the same time, received a lot of praise. This is an important lesson for all nations wanting to engage in CIMIC. In order to have time to fully grasp a complex and often politicised context on the ground, a 12 month rotation is minimum. As has been stated above, a CIMIC company is very expensive to keep in the field. This is the number one reason why a CIMIC company can never be fairly compared to an NGO. A CIMIC company can only be a sensible alternative tool if it is already on the spot for other reasons. All humanitarian actors interviewed were asked if it was not odd or even unsuitable to have military carrying out reconstruction for return. While they acknowledge that there are situations where military involvement in humanitarian affairs is inappropriate, no one felt that it presented a problem in the BiH context at this stage of the peace- building process. Possibly, it would have been different in the years immediately after the war. A weak point is the time limit of the engagement to one year max (SFOR mandate) which makes lasting quality control and follow- up difficult. Here, the Defence Forces and MFA have taken the right decision to limit activity to small and simple projects only. For some reason, no reports from CIMIC have been in English. This is in spite of the fact that the agreement between the Ministry of Defence and MFA says that reporting should be in English. The Finnish-only reporting makes it difficult for evaluators, but also inhibits Finnish sharing of its experience of CIMIC with other countries. While the documentation regarding the project activity was improved – or rather started – in 2001 it has still some way to go before it reaches an acceptable standard. The figures in the final report are inconsistent and the fact that the final report is the only analytic document in five years is telling. In conclusion, a CIMIC company is a very efficient and powerful instrument, and it can well be used for implementing small scale reconstruction and humanitarian projects. In this work, however, it needs to be guided by the specialised civilian agencies that are the proper agencies to set priorities and coordinate the work.

5.4 THE JUDICIARY In the wake of armed conflict, law and order suffer. During the years immediately after the war, the reconstruction programme was mainly focused on the rehabilitation of infrastructure, the restart of economic activities and the re-establishment of social services in support of refugee and IDP return. Subsequently, however, the lack of initiatives concerning the reform of justice and law-enforcement structures has been criticized. According to several commentators, it should have been a major priority from the start. Important opportunities early on to establish firmly the rule of law were lost, allowing for corruption, financial crime and trans-national organised criminal networks to grow and consolidate.

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5.4.1 Independent Judicial Commission Background. Among the population in general there is little confidence in the judicial system. For poor people it is not easy to get access to the law. There is a great need for a reliable and independent judiciary, free from political influence. The rule of law is a basic requirement for a functioning democratic society. In addition, in BiH of today, it is an absolute condition for the participation in the EU harmonisation process. A large number of donors are active in this sector. The EU is the major donor, providing economic assistance through the CARDS programme (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation), which has been designed as the main instrument for support to the countries covered by the Stabilisation and Association Process. The most urgent elements in the “Road Map” presented by the European Commission in March 2000 are gradually implemented, albeit at a slow pace. Already in 1998, and repeatedly, the Peace Implementation Council urged the High Representative to develop a comprehensive plan for judicial reform and welcomed the establishment of a Judicial Structure Assessment Programme (JSAP) (initiated by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Elisabeth Rehn). Further, in July 1999, the OHR presented a “Comprehensive Judicial Reform Strategy for BiH”. This plan covered the entire criminal justice system, from the initial investigations by police, through prosecution, and trial appeal, to the correctional system. Based on the findings of JSAP and on this Strategy, and with the participation of i a Finnish expertise, the legal structures were created for an Independent Judicial Commission (IJC), which was established in March 2001 to be responsible for reforming the judicial and prosecutorial system of BiH. The IJC consists of judges, prosecutors and lawyers, both local and international, and it reports to the High Representative, who provides the means necessary for the execution of the work. During most of 2001, a Comprehensive Judicial Review process based on a peer review of judges and prosecutors took place, only to be declared a failure on completion in December 2001. Instead, in January 2002, the IJC recommended re-selection of judges and prosecutors, using a more investigative approach covering their professional background, examining complaints against them, assessing their suitability for office and taking action against those “who act in violation of their legal obligations”. In addition, it was decided to reinforce the review through a reappointment process to

• ensure independence by depoliticising the appointment process • streamline the review system by eventually creating a single High Judicial and

Prosecutorial Council at State level with decision-making powers over selection, recruitment appointment, career progress or termination.

• restructure the Court system by reducing the number of courts and adapting the number of judges and prosecutors to the new Criminal and Civil Procedure Codes.

There was a strong negative reaction from high-level members of the judiciary to these proposed measures. However, the reinforcement of the review process through the reappointment of judges and prosecutors became one feature of a larger package of tangible judicial reform measures in 2002-2003, including laws on the establishment of three High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils (HJPC) at State and Entity levels. IJC received a new mandate from the OHR lasting until the end of December 2003, which was recently extended until the end of March 2004. By then, the process of

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reappointment solely on the basis of merit, under way since September 2002, of some 1.000 judges and prosecutors on middle and lower levels should be completed. The intention is to merge the three High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils into one single BiH HJPC as of April 2004, and with some sections of IJC as its permanent secretariat. Draft legislation has been prepared by the BiH and Entity Ministries of Justice and submitted to Parliament for adoption. A single HJPC is one of the conditions for an EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The IJC was expected to be down-sized by 1/3 in December 2003 and then to wind up at the end of March 2004. By then, the total judicial reform process will have gone on for more than five years. The EU and the US have been the main donors to IJC together with a substantial contribution from Norway for court administration and management. As already stated, Finnish legal experts - altogether 7-8 persons – have participated in the reform process in various capacities since 2000. Most of them have been employed by the OHR. One of them was seconded by the MFA. Financial support, EUR 159.500, was provided by Finland in August 2001 for the recruitment, training, deployment and supervision of local legally qualified staff (8 lawyers and 4 investigators) to assist in the review and appointment of judges and prosecutors in the Entity HJPCs. Their recruitment was delayed and the agreement was extended until May 2003, when a final report was submitted by the IJC. Additional support was provided in October 2003, amounting to approximately EUR 30.000, for the recruitment of another 6 local investigators to assist in January – March 2004 with the back-log of cases in the HJPCs. All costs related to the IJC are covered by Finnish Civil Crisis Management funds. The Dayton Agreement provided for the establishment of a UN International Police Task Force (IPTF), which in January 2003 was replaced by the EU Police Mission (EUPM) for a period of three years. This project is an EU Crisis Management Operation in close cooperation with the IJC, and Finland participates with a contingent of 18 police superintendents. This support will be gradually downsized. Relevance. Entrenching the law is one of the core tasks of the Office of the High Representative in support of the BiH constitution. Furthermore, respect for the rule of law is a condition for full participation in the EU Stabilisation and Association Process and of a high priority in the country’s transition to a democratic state. It is also one of Finland’s priority areas in the development cooperation with BiH. Thus, Finland’s support to judicial reform, even if limited, has been highly relevant. The provision of local lawyers and investigators in support of the long and cumbersome reappointment process was – and still is – most timely. The participation of highly qualified Finnish expertise in the drafting of laws, restructuring and consolidation of courts etc. has been most valuable. Effectiveness. The local lawyers and investigators of judges and prosecutors financed by Finland on two occasions provided good support in the appointment and review work. They established procedures for a successful reselection process, examining complaints, preparing profile reports, conducting investigations, providing legal support to the IJC. According to the IJC they contributed to a stronger and more effective judiciary and prosecutorial service in BiH. The wealth of data collected during the reselection process has now been fed into a tailor-made database to serve as an information resource for the permanent secretariat of the future State HJPC.

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The qualified Finnish legal experts have been intensively engaged in the comprehensive judicial reform process. All except one have been directly recruited by the OHR or the EC. Efficiency. IJC’s use of the funds under the first Finnish contribution was well administered, with a request in the final report in May 12001 for permission to use a minor unspent amount for additional investigative activities, if possible together with additional funding. Sustainability. The issue of sustainability of the judicial reforms, i.e. the financing of physical structures, equipment, staffing etc. can be complicated during the first years because of severance payments, renovation of premises etc. In the long run it is expected that the reforms will yield substantial savings for the court system, i a as a result of the merger or closure of courts. Experience from a Norwegian project on “Court Administration and Management Reform in the Courts of BiH”, targeting three pilot courts, will benefit all courts in the country. This includes the case registration system, case management, back-log reduction, staff issues, installation of compatible computer systems etc. Three reports on Court budgeting and funding have been issued by the IJC with short- and long-term recommendations. The issue of sustainability is also one of ownership, which can be jeopardised unless enough attention is paid to the participation of the local community. There has been much criticism on the local level, not only of the judicial reform process as such, but also of its content, i.e. the change from a traditional continental system where the judge has a prominent role, to a system in which lawyers and prosecutors get increased investigative powers. According to the critics, there has not been enough interaction with the local community, and insufficient consultations in connection with the drafting of the new laws. The American experts have been accused of ignorance of other legal systems than their own etc. Some of this criticism probably reflects the agony of transition and is unavoidable when such far-reaching reforms are introduced. Administration. As mentioned, the rule of law is one of Finland’s priority areas in development cooperation. It appears, however, that most of the Finnish experts had to find their way to the OHR on their own, by way of personal contacts, rather than through any action on the part of the MFA. Only one of them is seconded by the MFA, financed by Civil Crisis Management (CCM) funds in the MFA’s Political Department, as were the two projects in support of local lawyers and investigators in BiH. Apparently, work is going on in several ministries to coordinate training, working conditions, recruitment, rules for leave of absence etc. According to information, the Ministry of the Interior is drafting new rules for CCM and has the national responsibility for the national resource base, whereas the Political Department in the MFA has the budget responsibility and takes the (political) decisions. In spite of repeated efforts we have not obtained a copy of the decision on the second Finnish contribution to BiH (October 2003), nor information about the exact amount allocated. There was also a poor follow-up capacity in the West Balkans unit, with out-dated and incomplete information about project staff serving in the IJC etc. Conclusions. The Finnish support to judicial reform in BiH has been valuable and timely. When interviewed, the Finnish legal experts have expressed concern regarding the strong pressure from the international community to speed up the reform. Reforms must

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be allowed to take time. The more you involve local staff, the better the results. Now it is time for the BiH court system to assume responsibility for recruitment and discipline. Any future Finnish support to the legal sector should not only be based on the priorities of BiH, but also be carefully coordinated with the initiatives of other donors. Much information and experience is to be found in Slovenia, which will become an EU member state in May 2004. There is a great need for continued support in various areas of the legal sector in order to implement the reforms: Legal drafting and much training, study visits and international exchange (as the Nordic countries have systems corresponding to those of BiH), equipment to the courts, support to Law Faculties and their libraries etc. The Finnish experts’ long and comprehensive experience from BiH should be tapped for advice and knowledge.

5.5 OTHER ALREADY EVALUATED PROJECTS In line with the Terms of Reference, the results of some recent evaluations carried out by others will also be taken into consideration in this evaluation. The projects evaluated are: the Social Sector Support project, the Gender Equity and Equality Project, the Teacher Education Development Project, and the Support to the ERNO News exchange. The evaluations have been studied, but we have also interviewed some of the projects’ stakeholders in BiH to be able to correctly assess the evaluation results.

5.5.1 The Social Sector Support Project Background/sector. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of BiH, which was concluded in 2003, after extensive consultations, describes a social welfare system in acute crisis. The pensions systems and the systems for protection of war veterans and invalids are bleeding, since there are so few employees paying pensions fees. Large groups in BiH are on the verge of slipping below the poverty line, and needs are increasing rapidly while budget resources are very limited. As in several of the Balkan states, the social expenditure far outweighs the budget resources. At the same time, BiH and in particular the Federation has the lowest public spending in relation to GDP on social welfare in the region. The systems are fragmented with authority on several levels (in particular in the Federation), and statistics of beneficiaries are very unreliable. According to the evaluation of the SSSP carried out by Kendra Gregson in August 2003, in BiH “the social sector has been compartmentalised with social assistance being looked at under one ministry, health another, education another, the built environment another etc. NGOs were perceived as carrying out activities in the interim until the government could take them over. Businesses were not seen as playing a role at all”. Reforms to decrease and harmonise various pensions and welfare payments are severely needed, but are of course politically sensitive and difficult to initiate. The main international actor in the social sector is the World Bank which has launched two credit- based programmes for reforming the social sector, Social Sector Technical assistance Credit (SOTAC) and Social Sector Adjustment Credit (SOSAC). A SOSAC II programme worth US$ 50 million has been prepared but is now pending, awaiting fulfilment of number of conditions on the part of BIH Governments, namely, progress in

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inter-entity pension issues, adoption of entity veterans' laws, unification of veterans' administration and entitlement system in the BiH Federation. Summary of project. The Social Sector Support Project (SSSP) has been implemented by Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI), an independent BiH chapter of an international NGO with the same name. It was implemented in two phases: SSSP I (1999-2000) and SSSP II (2000-2003). In the first phase, UNDP acted as the Finnish counterpart, but in the second phase Finland decided to work directly with IBHI. The project concept, which has been developed by IBHI, is to show by example that it is possible to deliver social welfare services in municipalities with limited financial resources. The solution is sought by good planning, cooperation across sectors, and making optimal use of all types of willing and able organisations, public and private – the so-called mixed model of social welfare. Four pilot municipalities have been involved in the project, two in each entity. The end goal was that the lessons learned from the pilot municipalities would be disseminated to other municipalities and influence entity and state policy and lawmaking. The project has had four components: (i) establishing management boards with broader representation than previously, which would identify key areas for intervention; (ii) grant- financed Special Focus Projects in mentioned key areas, carried out by public or non-governmental organisations, (iii) training for social sector professionals; (iv) dissemination of lessons learned. Evaluation results. The evaluation by Kendra Gregson considers SSSP to be very relevant given the social situation in the country. Its focus on the municipal level is also considered apt, since this is the level where policy meets people. According to the evaluation, the project has “…succeeded in launching the idea of a mixed concept of social welfare both in theory and practice. It has established structures assessing and implementing this model in four municipalities in BiH plus disseminating information on these models other municipalities in the country.” However, the results are mainly found locally, in the way of doing things. The project’s wider policy impact is less clear. The evaluation states that the targeted municipalities have improved their capacity to respond locally to social needs, and that the project also made them increase spending on social welfare. Furthermore, the project has had an impact on and influenced several other municipalities. It has aroused interest in wide circles in the country, and managed to provide input both into legal drafting processes, and the PRSP consultation process. Among the proposed measures in the PRSP are the promotion of NGOs as social service providers, and new legislation allowing tax reductions for donations from the private sector. The project has also promoted relations between NGOs and municipalities, increasing the municipalities’ awareness of NGOs’ comparative advantages. Interestingly, it is also concluded in the evaluation that the SSSP project has meant a great deal for the institutional development of IBHI as well as turning it into a well- known and credible actor in BiH on social policy issues. The project is getting some moderate criticism regarding the sustainability of the improvements. The mechanisms and commissions created by the project were established, but whether they work according to the original idea and whether they will

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continue working at all after the project is not certain. Also, the training did not sufficiently build local capacity to continue training after the project was finished. The Special Focus Projects were not assessed in any detail, but it was observed that many of them showed the need for continued donor assistance, thus not indicating sustainability. One can also question the realism in the project claim to be showing examples to be replicated in other municipalities. All municipalities cannot rely on the type of grant funding and training schemes that the pilot municipalities received. The evaluation also discusses the fact that IBHI was implementing both the SSSP and the Gender Equity and Equality Project. The expectation was that the two projects would be able to create synergies, being under the same organisational roof, and dealing with complementary areas. The evaluation concludes that such synergies have been elusive, mainly because the GEEP has been acting on the policy level, driven bilaterally between the Finnish and BiH governments while SSSP has been IBHI driven and operating mainly on the municipality level. Significant points for the country level. One of the weaknesses of the evaluation is that it does not at all address the project organisation and how the project was monitored and followed up by the Finnish MFA. In fact, the project organisation and how the project results have been anchored among the stakeholders is one of the strong points of the project. Both IBHI and the Federation Ministry for Social Affairs, highly appreciated the Steering committee, which included the MFAs from both countries and all levels of government in BiH. It was also in this context the project’s central aim: influencing policy by example was most effective. The entity ministries for social affairs, who both have been represented in the Steering Committee, have submitted a joint proposal to Finland for how to continue after SSSP II. According to IBHI, Finland has something slightly different in mind, however, which is more oriented towards policy making on the entity level. IBHI’s own assessment is that a window of opportunity is now opening up. A new policy oriented project will be able to draw upon the PRSP implementation process, which is the base for further legal drafting. Other supportive factors are the EU SA-process as well as the regional cooperation dimension with calls for harmonisation of social benefits etc. The SSSP project is a good example of how Finland is not coordinating enough with its donor colleagues. As has been mentioned, the World Bank is heavily involved in the restructuring of the social sector on both entity and state level. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has started a similar project as SSSP, also in cooperation with IBHI. According to the evaluation, German GTZ is involved in developing the legal framework around private donations. Although MFA is now seeking to extend the support for social sector reform, and a tender process is being prepared, it is unclear how the Finnish support should relate to DFID, the World Bank or indeed any other international assistance. The Desk Officer commented on the DFID project as a copy of the Finnish project. If so, there is perhaps no harm done. There are enough municipalities to implement pilot projects in for all donors. The next phase, however, will be more sensitive to uncoordinated behaviour from the donors. The entities should move in the same direction.

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5.5.2 The Gender Equity and Equality Project Background. Women’s NGOs and groups started early to network and joint action was taken to influence the authorities and to lobby for the understanding of women’s rights in everyday life. Reports such as “The Status of Women in the Legal System of BiH” (1999), seminars and debates provided forums for discussion and caught media attention. The presence of international organisations in BiH helped to put pressure on the government for reform and new legislation. The awareness of international conventions, the Beijing Platform for Action (1995) and the opportunities to learn more about women’s position in other countries made these organisations increasingly determined in their efforts to promote women’s rights and issues of equality, and support women in politics. As the BiH authorities should have been aware, BiH like other UN Member States is bound by the Beijing Declaration. In addition, the ongoing EU Stabilisation and Association process has reached a stage where BiH now is allowed to move on towards formal negotiations for an Association Agreement in 2004. Among the conditions to be met by BiH before then, there are many reforms promoting gender equality and which are also required for membership in the Council of Europe. A Gender Centre was established in the Federation in March 2000, and a similar Centre was opened in RS in March 2002. In May 2003 the very important Law on Gender Equality was adopted by the BiH Parliamentary Assembly. The implementation of this law shall be supervised by a Gender Equality Agency within the BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR). The Entity Gender Centres shall also monitor and supervise the implementation of the law and submit annual reports to the MHRR. Three Gender Equality Parliamentary Committees at State and Entity levels have been established to undertake gender screening of draft laws submitted to the Parliaments. BiH ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1993. A draft CEDAW report on the implementation of the Convention was presented by the Ministry of Human Rights and Returnees for comments at the end of 2003, and is expected to be finalised soon. The NGO’s have already written their “Shadow Report”, to be submitted simultaneously to the CEDAW Committee. In December 2003, a group of experts from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNDP, and UNICEF has participated together with the Gender Centres in the process of creating a State Action Plan to confirm the methods of implementation of the Gender law. At present, on the initiative of the Gender Centres, a Law on Domestic Violence is also being drafted in cooperation with NGOs, judges, policemen and social workers. The Project. A Pilot Phase of the Finnish-supported Gender Equity and Equality Project (GEEP) started in January 2000 and ended in July 2001. The budget amounted to FIM 3 million. A Mid-term Review of this first phase was made in April 2001, recommending continued cooperation. Phase II started in October 2001 and will continue until October 2005. The Finnish contribution to this phase amounts to EUR 1 million, and the BiH contribution is estimated at EUR 0.5 million (in kind). In May 2003 a Mid-term Review was made of this ongoing second phase. The project’s objective is the “attainment of a situation where conditions for gender equity and equality exist and are prerequisites for democracy and good governance”. The project purpose is the development of gender mainstreaming as a strategy, and

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development of techniques and tools for gender equality in the BiH context. The aim is to enable direct and indirect partners to apply the gender mainstreaming method in their work, using the tools and techniques developed by the project. The five expected results of the project are:

• Developed and engendered legal and policy frameworks • Increased awareness through debate on gender equity and equality in the BiH

context • Increased gender disaggregated statistical information • Strengthened media capacity to promote equity and equality • Strengthened capacity of the two Gender Centres and Municipal Management

Committees to promote gender equality in collaboration with all levels of government and NGOs

The project agreement was concluded between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in BiH and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland. In BiH the two Gender Centres in FBiH and RS function as Government Coordinating Agencies, and the Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI/BiH) is the Executing Agency. The Central Management structure consists of a Supervisory Board, a Steering Committee and a Management Team with representatives from IBHI and the two Gender Centres. Government Ministries at State and Entity levels and municipal authorities constitute Implementing Agencies. Municipal and Community NGO representatives form Municipal Management Committees at municipal level. Mid-Term Review of GEEP, May 2003. According to the Mid-Term Review team, the first part of the second phase of the GEEP had successfully continued to support legal and policy frameworks in the country. The newly established Gender Centres (GC) were recognised as important policy actors. The review team, however, had difficulties in assessing the exact outcomes of the project work, as the activities were described more as part of an ongoing process and not related to quantified results. It was also difficult to judge the exact role of each partner: the Gender Centres, the executing agency IBHI and others. It was recommended that the project should prepare a list of quantified outputs and outcomes for each goal and report on them at the end of the project. The overall objectives of Phase II were still valid, and the review mission agreed with the stage-wise and focused approach. But the time and resources allocated for reaching full maturity of the mainstreaming were not realistic. The major technical support required could not be expected from the BiH government alone. In general, the review mission observed, gender projects were still planned with inadequate resources and with complex results expected out of relatively short projects. Therefore, the review mission recommended a third phase of minimum two years of Finnish support, either in co-financing or singly, for the project from October 2005 onwards. Relevance. The review team found the project relevant as it had helped to fulfil requirements for membership both in the EU and in the Council of Europe. Beyond this, we would add, the project meets a widely felt demand in the BiH society for the reforms embodied in the Law on Gender Equality. The efforts during several years by many citizens to bring an end to gender discrimination have been widely recognised. Effectiveness. The Gender Centres had worked together, exchanging information and learning from each other, and in accordance with a joint plan of work. A good foundation

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for a gender mainstreaming through a decentralised structure had been established, but still needed major strengthening. Government – civil society relationships had been initiated. Improved awareness on gender equity and equality had been achieved through training and media campaigns. Media and national statistics institutions had been sensitised. There had also been a constructive cooperation with NGOs, parliamentarians and other groups. The project had gained visibility among donors as well as more widely in BiH. Efficiency. As will be readily seen, the management structure of the GEEP is rather too complicated, and somewhat confusing. Thus, the review team’s wish for clearer structure, roles and responsibilities between the Gender Centres and IBHI appears justified. At present, the Gender Centres are running a huge network of Gender Focal Points (GFP) at the different government levels, in the municipalities etc. Already at the presentation of the project document for Phase II in 2001, a figure of 250 GFPs was mentioned. The need for training and up-dating of these cadres must be a heavy administrative and economic burden. Sustainability. The Mid-term review team recommended the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to undertake an additional phase of the project for a minimum of two years, providing support especially to the Gender Centres and Gender Focal Points. The main reason for this proposal is the fact that gender projects require multiple efforts and more extensive technical assistance than other sector projects. This argument is supported by the “Strategy and Action Plan for Promoting Gender Equality in Finland’s Policy for Developing Countries 2003-2007”, which states that “gender mainstreaming requires more (resources), both human and financial. --- If there are no specialist personnel resources, mainstreaming may fade away and change from ‘mainstreaming’ to ‘disappearing’ ”. Concluding remarks. The Gender Centres, when contacted, seemed quite overburdened with work and should definitely get more support to increase their institutional capacity. In a long-term perspective, adequate gender-disaggregated data as a basis for information, planning, research etc. is indispensable. The GEEP documents mention that it is an explicit goal to gender-sensitise all relevant statistics. Therefore, GEEP ought to lobby for a Gender Unit in the national Statistics Agency to be responsible for the production of essential socio-economic, gender-related statistics. The next 4-5 years will be critical for the Gender Centres. The recently adopted law will be enforced at Entity level. Poverty and unemployment require a gender dimension. The administrative structure is complicated and staff allocations unclear between IBHI and the Gender Centres. Many internationally supported activities pay insufficient attention to gender concerns. In response to the Mid-Term Review, IBHI has taken action during the latter part of 2003, to implement several of the recommendations and include others in the work plan for 2004. If Finland decides to continue its support to GEEP during a third phase, this can be done either bilaterally or in a co-financing arrangement with another donor, or possibly as a regional intervention.

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5.5.3 The Teacher Education and Professional Development Project Background. The education sector remains one of the most controversial sectors in post-war Bosnian society. Due to nationalist interests, a variety of discriminatory practices has prevailed throughout the education system. Over the years, the international community has tried to mediate and to introduce compromise solutions, but to no avail. Parallel classes in the same school, ethnically biased textbooks (especially in “national” subjects like history and language), bussing of children to schools in neighbouring towns, racist attitudes among teachers and parents are some of the problems which have marred the school atmosphere. These attitudes, combined with vested political and economic interests, have caused antagonism and frustration and prevented long overdue reforms of the entire education system. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) identifies a low education level as the most striking reason for poverty, and holds a thorough education reform to be necessary for the successful implementation of all other poverty reduction measures. According to the PRSP, the education sector suffers from insufficient financing and outdated and inflexible systems that fail to meet the needs of a modern market economy. The World Bank’s Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (PEIR-2002) highlights wasteful expenditures, and poor services and results, particularly in higher education. Pre-school education is unavailable to the poor children, who need it most. Access to general (i.e. not vocational) secondary schools and subsequently to tertiary education is much too limited and unequal. The present enrolment rates at secondary and tertiary level are very low. Three quarters of the secondary education students are in vocational schools with a narrow and out-of-date range of occupational choices and with few real job opportunities. At present, the guiding policy paper for education is the Education Reform Agenda that was presented to the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in November 2002. Earlier that year, OSCE had been mandated to coordinate the international support to education. Thus, this Reform document had been prepared by OSCE in cooperation with six working groups, where the majority of the participants were local specialists. More or less in parallel, and as part of the EC-supported TAER project (Technical Assistance for Educational Reform), another reform initiative was prepared and launched in October 2003 by the Entity and Cantonal Education Ministers as a White Paper on Primary and Secondary Education in BiH. This document presents in great detail a most comprehensive policy and strategy, based on the overall objective to realize an education for all in BiH through a modernised education system in accordance with European standards. The White Paper covers not only curriculum development, standards and certification but also structural issues such as legislation, finance, organisation, and management. It constitutes a commitment to reform by the BiH Educational Authorities. Thus, there is a professional consensus on the need for reform clearly stated in the PRSP, the PIC Strategy and in the White Paper. However, political and institutional resistance based on vested interests and ethnic loyalties lingers on and must not be neglected. From a Finnish point of view it can be noted that the White Paper refers to the results of the TEPD project on inclusive education financed by Finland. In addition, a special interest is expressed in the training of head-teachers in the second phase of the Finland/BiH programme cooperation.

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A number of donors are supporting the education reform programme. The World Bank and the EC are not only the major donors, but also the only ones which have provided significant funding for systemic reform. There is also close cooperation between the World Bank, the Council of Europe and OSCE on higher education reform, e.g. on legislation, which is part of the association conditions of the EU and the Council of Europe. Several UN agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs have supported specific projects such as teacher training, school repairs, IT-equipment etc., but are now gradually phasing out. The World Bank has so far provided support to three education projects. The two first were emergency school reconstruction projects. The third Education Development Project (2000-2004) supports the introduction of common education standards. The World Bank is now about to finance a fourth Education Restructuring Project which focuses on secondary and higher education. This project will provide much of its funding through a Higher Education Fund, upon applications from schools and universities, which will thus compete for funding to implement policy changes. This method is used in the ongoing third Education Development Project with good results. A measure of conditionality, however, will be applied: universities will not be eligible to apply for funding unless they have undertaken institutional reform and have abolished the autonomous status of the numerous faculties, thus consolidating the management of the university into a single legal body. So far, only the University of Tuzla has implemented such a reform. Another condition is the passing of a Framework Higher Education Law, which is required also for a BiH membership in the Council of Europe and for accession to the Lisbon Convention (recognition of qualifications concerning Higher Education) and the Bologna Declaration Process (meeting European standards of university education). These accessions would give BiH students increased mobility, easier recognition of qualifications and improved quality of degree programmes. The Project. The first phase of the Finnish-supported Teacher Education and Professional Development Project (TEPD) project started in September 2000 and was concluded in July 2003. The project budget amounted to EUR 2 million. The overall objective was to contribute to initial teacher education and professional development in education in order to meet the needs of the education system in BiH and European standards. An evaluation was carried out in October 2003. The project had two components:

1. Inclusive education seminars for teacher educators and teachers, including a seven-day seminar in Finland

2. The establishment of a Master’s Degree Programme at the University of Sarajevo’s Faculty of Education with an emphasis on inclusive education

This initiative was expected to have a multiplier effect, and to contribute to a continuing dialogue throughout the country about education of children with special needs and the concept of inclusive education. An overall goal of the project would be the building of peace and democracy. Relevance. At long last, in 2004, the BiH education sector appears to have reached a phase of reform implementation. When the TEPD started in 2000, it was still a most controversial sector, and many donors avoided cooperation in education projects. The choice of intervention model and content was difficult, even if the need for teacher

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training was obvious. Inclusive education turned out to be a good choice both for the training of teacher’s educators and as a core subject for the Master’s Degree Programme. Moreover, support to special needs education projects is one of the priorities in the education sector in Finnish development cooperation. Effectiveness. The project became one of the components in the efforts to achieve European education standards, albeit of a modest dimension – it involved less than 100 persons directly. The participants were active both as providers and as receivers of skills and knowledge, and they were eager to learn more about inclusive education; the project coincided with the intense debate on education reform. They acted as mentors, authors, members of working groups and advisory bodies, and they contributed to the quality of the programme. According to the evaluation report, they have a strong feeling of “ownership” of the project. The interactive, participatory approach and the modern, child-centred methodology were much appreciated. The project kept a gender balance in all its activities: in the recruiting of Master’s Degree students, seminar participants, project staff, advisory boards, and guest lecturers and tutors. The project also managed to promote peace and democracy at a professional level and over the ethnic and political divide. Efficiency and Sustainability. The project management model with a joint Supervisory Board and a Steering Committee worked well. There has been good cooperation between the Federal Ministry of Education and the TEPD. It should be noted, however, that the Entity level Ministry of Education has little authority over the Canton Ministries, which constitute the responsible authority for education in the Federation. In the Republika Srpska the system is centralised and the Ministry of Education is the counterpart to international donors. Thus, from a management point of view, it will be necessary for the project to establish closer contacts at Canton Ministry level in the future. It is a question of sustainability (and a recommendation in the evaluation report). Policy and budget decisions are taken by the Canton authorities, and support from the Canton Ministry is needed for a proper introduction of inclusive education. The Cantonal staff are administrators and have little knowledge of education reforms. However, as a consequence of reform legislation, the Cantons will probably have to accept a gradual shift of responsibility to Entity level. Future. The second phase of the project will start in February 2004 and will last until the end of 2006 with a Finnish contribution of EUR 2 million. A post-diploma course in inclusive education for class-room teachers will be one of the project activities. The major component will focus on the education reform through the development of education policy, administration and school management. The programme is designed to make use of local competence and capacity from the outset and will build on achievements and experience from the first phase. The project identification was based on requests from both Entities. The on-going structural changes in the education system make coordination with other donors and with the coordinating bodies indispensable. The evaluation recommends Finland to develop a public relations component in its project to make people aware of the importance of inclusive education and of the tools offered by the project. Even more important would be a determined action by the project management to liaise with other donors and to participate in the coordinating structures, both national and international. A number of other donors and actors in the education sector, when interviewed, were

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completely ignorant about the existence of this project – and, in fact, of Finnish presence in BiH.

5.5.4 The ERNO News Exchange Background. Media, and especially broadcast media, played a significant role in fanning the ethno-nationalist hatred leading up to the war in BiH. In the reconstruction and peace process, the media sector has received a lot of attention and donor support. The focus has been mainly on the independent or commercial media. Public media, i e after the war the Radio and Television of Republika Srpska (RTRS) and BiH Federation TV (FTV), has received little or no international support, and mainly in the form of training of personnel. One reason is that they receive financing from the respective entity government. Another reason is that they, or at least FTV, has a hopelessly oversized payroll, and refuses to take measures to lower its costs. In June 2003 the old state Radio and television company of BiH, RTV BiH, was liquidated by decree from OHR. The reform was implemented by the new state broadcaster PBS, Public Broadcasting Service, established in 1999. Following these decisions, a comprehensive public broadcasting system has, at least on paper, been established, with the PBS on the national level and component services in each of the entities, i e new versions of the current companies. All three components will have their own boards of OHR appointed members, and there will be one board for the whole system as well. The process driven by OHR is extremely controversial and delicate. The divisions are still very real among journalists, which is reflected by the fact that there are three different journalist unions in BiH. Media is addressed on a regional level by the Stability pact Working table 1 (incidentally chaired by Finnish Ms Elisabeth Rehn). The countries of the pact have formulated a Charter for media freedom. ERNO means European Regional Network (the “O” is just added), and it is a cooperation scheme between southern European countries within the framework of the Eurovision Network of the European Broadcasting Union, EBU in Geneva. Eurovision offers its members free usage of a daily selection of news items. These items are sent on special channel which has computerised supplementary information on each item. The EBU has organised its members in 4 regional services, and each region has its slot during the day when its news items will be shown. Each regional window gets between 15 and 30 minutes depending on size and other factors. One of the regions is South Eastern Europe, or ERNO. ERNO was inspired by the above- mentioned Charter, and when it was created it was also the Stability pact countries who were invited: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Turkey and the protectorate Kosovo. Greece and Turkey have not yet joined the exchange, as they are already members of another EBU network. Finnish support to the media sector started in 1996, when a journalist at the Finnish national Broadcasting company YLE with extensive experience from former Yugoslavia the Balkan managed to persuade the Global Department handling multilateral funding at MFA to finance a salary of a UNESCO media advisor in Sarajevo. The advisor function continued until 2002 with Finnish funding limited to the salary and DSA. One of the

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concrete achievements of this support is the creation of the Programme Bank, a media library with TV programmes to lend to Bosnian TV-stations. As opposed to most of the other broadcasted material at the time, this was legally obtained tapes donated from broadcasters in Europe, including YLE. The next Finnish project was the reconstruction of the BH TV, (now the Federation TV) news desk in 1998-1999. Again, the same journalist initiated this project, which was a conscious targeting of public service while nearly all international support went to commercial stations. YLE contributed the manpower, and MFA contributed to the direct costs with FIM 1,5 million. The third Finnish intervention – the support project for ERNO - is also a cooperation project with YLE. It is also part of a UNESCO media programme which is supported financially by the EU, Finland and Denmark. Finland has supported ERNO since the start in 2000 with EUR 168 000 per year until 2003. A continuation is now being planned. UNESCO funds for ERNO are already committed until 2006. The objectives of the ERNO project have been to establish cooperation between the public TV companies in the region, developing them to become more open and pluralistic. The cooperation around the exchange of news material is meant to increase the exchange of information and thereby the awareness and knowledge of the people in the regions. According to the project document the operational goal is “to develop a system, infrastructure and organisation facilitating television stations in the region of SEE to shoot, send and receive news material according to the specific regional needs.” The support is rather comprehensive and consists of general management administration by a Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) at YLE in Helsinki. The project is financing the ERNO staff in the regional coordination office, as well as bi-annual coordination meetings and seminars of all 11 members. It has also provided training, in 2003 primarily on how to use digital equipment. Some equipment has also been provided, mostly financed by UNESCO. Furthermore, staff exchange is part of the project activities as well as a TV programme bank created by YLE, where everything exchanged is archived in Helsinki. ERNO started in 2000 and it is now running five days a week with a coordination office in Sarajevo with a full- time and a half- time journalist. The day- to- day work of the ERNO coordination office in Sarajevo is to organise the daily supply of news items to be shown in the window. News desks in the member countries call up and order items. Others inform on what they have. ERNO has a 15 minute slot, so max 5-6 items per day can go in. The ERNO coordination office has the final say on the selection, and submits a list to the EBU in Geneva, who does the actual broadcasting. The items are transmitted via satellite to EBU in Geneva for further broadcasting. Once it is broadcast, any member of Eurovision can use any item for free. An evaluation of the support project was carried out in 2003 by Ullamaija Kivikuru. She sees the exchange as well worth supporting as it is becoming more and more professional and is turning into a major agent in the news arena in the Balkan, at a time when the big media companies are decreasing their coverage and presence. Her recommendation for the future is among other things to continue support and increase the yearly volume to EUR 200 000 per year to allow for an extra coordination meeting per year during three years and then declining support for 2-3 years, with only EUR 100 000 per year. An explicit recommendation is also to localise control of ERNO

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from Helsinki to the region. She also feels that the project could do more to widen and deepen ERNO’s client base within the member companies to include other departments than the news desks. For the purposes of the present evaluation the following issues could be considered:

• ERNO is the only regional project in the sample and as such it is highly relevant in the Balkans. It is good that material is exchanged on a regional level as much as possible to increase consciousness about the conditions in the neighbouring country subtly affecting values and outlook of professionals and viewers to decrease suspicion and prejudice. If one looks only at BiH, with all its difficult problems in the media sector one can of course question whether a news exchange should be prioritised.

• Most countries in the region have financial difficulties in purchasing material, and ERNO suits them perfectly. For example, RTRS is a very frequent user of Eurovision material, for the simple reason that they cannot afford buying material from news agencies. All their foreign news items are from Eurovision. RTRS does not submit material so often, but this has mainly to do with the fact that not so much of international interest takes place in RS.

• The project seems reasonably effective in reaching its stated goals. The relations between the companies have improved to the point that when RTRS get a request for a news item they always try to deliver in spite of this being without payment. It is the culture of the ERNO network members to support each other in this way. From an efficiency point of view there may be questions regarding the fact that nearly half the budget goes to the international CTA’s travel expenses. In the operations there seems to be little waste. According to the ERNO coordination office, they have an 80% usage rate out of a total of approx 85 items per month. The office staff consists of one coordinator and 2 half time assistants.

• One difficulty for ERNO could be to find its place in the chaotic media structure of BiH. Presently, ERNO rents offices from FTV. As the ERNO office is also the external focal point for BiH in the exchange, this is inappropriate. The proper place for ERNO would be to become a part of PBS. Furthermore, RTRS has its own EVN desk and participates now more or less as an additional country member. Banja Luka enters the statistics for the exchange with the same status as the other capitals.

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6. CONCLUSIONS ON THE COUNTRY LEVEL In this chapter, a number of conclusions concerning the whole Finnish programme in BiH will be presented. They are based on the findings in the previous chapters, and against the background outlined in the context chapters. We have structured this chapter according to the evaluation issues, rather than by sectors or otherwise. When looking at the Programme, the first question that comes to mind is if there is something which holds it together. Is there a consistent pattern in the type of interventions or something common about the profile, which makes it a programme rather than just a list of projects? We are aware that the programme has grown and developed “organically” rather than according to a strategy based on the results of systematic consultations between the countries. We have also learnt that there has been a process of afterthought and analysis in the MFA during the period under review which has also manifested itself in the programming. This is evident at least in the latter part of the period. At the same time, can be noted, the programme has become increasingly varied. In 1996 there were six projects (counting CIMIC as one project) in two sectors worth slightly over EUR 7m. In 2002, there were eight projects in six sectors worth roughly the same amount. Perhaps a fair description is that the programme has evolved organically, but basing each new step on the experience of the previous. In this way it has become more consolidated over the years.

6.1 THE INSTRUMENTS The terms of reference stress that the instruments used in BiH should be assessed, both how they have functioned in BiH as compared elsewhere, and in terms of their utility in-country to achieve the desired objectives. There are two types of instruments involved. The first is the modality used for assistance, or type of cooperation. The second type of instrument is the channel, the implementing partner. Several combinations of these instruments can be found in BiH. The main modality used by Finland in BiH is project financing. In most cases Finland has been the only donor, but in some cases they have been co-financing a larger project. In some cases Finland, i e MFA has designed its own project, but for the most part the projects have been designed by others and submitted to MFA for financing. Notably, Finland has managed to persuade the BiH government to contribute to the cooperation on a couple of occasions (e g GEEP and the tracklayer). The modality also depends on the type of budget funding. In addition to the development cooperation budget line, there has also been Finnish multilateral funding to the UN, civil crisis management funds, humanitarian assistance, as well as the Finnish contribution to the EU programme in BiH. The implementers, or partners, include BiH public companies, Finnish consultants, Finnish NGOs, international NGOs, UN organisations, Finnish public companies and the Finnish Defence Forces. They will be commented on as appropriate in the following sections, but a few general comments are called for. Consultants have played a comparatively big role in BiH, since they are often the only permanent Finnish representatives in the country. They have no embassy to turn to for

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guidance in difficult situations, so they have to take on a greater responsibility than their colleagues from other countries. This requires them to be more informed about the country and the situation. This is of course especially true for a post-conflict country like BiH, where the slightest thing can get politicised. The consultants used in the District heating project were rated highly both in terms of their technical and social competence. There have been instances, however, of less successful consultancies. For example, the consultants who carried out the feasibility study for the railway tracklayer donation did not have any previous experience, and they severely underestimated the difficulties of arranging joint utilisation of the machine. About 10 Finnish NGOs are active in the region, and several of them were active in BiH already during the war on humanitarian mandates. NGOs get funded by MFA through a special budget window. In the Bosnian case, however, several NGO’s projects, e g FCA, have been funded directly from the Unit for West Balkans. According to FCA, this way of working has been very encouraging. With the Unit for WB as an informed dialogue partner the content and purpose of their project has been at centre stage. They have thus avoided strict compartmentalisation and managed to bridge the shift from humanitarian to reconstruction aid in an unusually seamless way. In general, Finnish NGOs have been found to be quite efficient in their project activities. They need however to pay attention to capacity building of their local NGO partners. There is one example of having a local NGO as an implementing partner, IBHI. While many positive things can be said about this cooperation, perhaps the most interesting is how much it has meant for the institutional development of IBHI. It has also given the organisation a platform as a well known and credible actor in BiH on social policy issues. The most eye-catching of the implementers is probably the use Finnish peacekeepers for reconstruction for return. The Finnish CIMIC rebuilt infrastructure, but promoted return also by providing security, information protection of transports, monitoring return, etc. The conclusion is that a CIMIC company is a very effective and powerful instrument, and it can well be used for implementing small scale reconstruction and humanitarian projects. In this work, however, it needs to be guided by the specialised civilian agencies that are the proper agencies to set priorities and coordinate the work.

6.2 RELEVANCE Is the programme relevant? By and large, the answer is in the affirmative. The programme has a strong profile towards reconstruction and normalisation with more than 50% of the total value directed towards infrastructure and 10 and 13 % respectively on return and education. The emphasis has shifted during the period reflecting rather well the changing primary needs of BiH during the period from the early WB assessments to the PRSP of 2003. Has Finland been true to its own stated policy aims when assisting BiH? In the table below it can be seen that there is only a strong relevance in relation to Human rights and democratic governance. The weak correlation to poverty reduction should not come as a surprise, as this is not necessarily the main priority in “other” partnerships.

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Policy aim

Reduction of poverty

Sustainable development

Human rights and democratic governance

Global security promotion

Promotion of economic interaction

Ob

serv

atio

ns Only indirectly.

Very few projects have poverty reduction as primary objective.

Only slightly. Positive environmental effects of district heating, and small forestry project.

Definitely. The SSSP, TEPD, the IJC support and the GEEP all contribute to better governance on different levels. The media project somewhat less

Difficult to assess, but it continues to be the primary reason for staying in BiH

Some business contacts may have been created in connection with the projects.

The large proportion of return related projects, and projects which in various ways normalised or instilled a sense of normalisation among people, makes the programme relevant also from a Dayton and post-conflict perspective. In this context, Finland seems to have managed to strike a reasonable balance in its support between the two entities and between ethnicities in the same entity. This is commendable, considering the fact that it has been a very difficult environment and that the RS side was extremely complex to work with.

6.3 EFFECTIVENESS Goal fulfilment and impact ranges from satisfactory to good in the projects studied. The question is if the programme has had any impact on the country level. One could argue that major impact has been achieved in the promotion of return as well as in some of the infrastructure projects. In the social and education sector a platform has been built and national level impact is within reach. The NGO implementation models and capacity has generally proven very effective, although in several cases their administrative structure leaves something to be desired. Of special interest is also the case of CIMIC, which became a marvellously effective reconstruction agency in North Eastern BiH. Its effectiveness was partly due to the personnel strength and military organisation, and partly due to its flexible funding arrangement. While the former can hardly be replicated in the civilian sphere, the latter could. It should be possible to experiment with the same kind of arrangement with a NGO.

6.4 EFFICIENCY There are many aspects of efficiency in development assistance. The limits of this evaluation have prevented any scientific approach. Instead, reason has been used, and estimates of proportionality between input and output. Project implementation is in general efficient. The implementers know what they are doing, and the projects are well enough designed. No wastefulness has been encountered in the study.

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There have been instances of inefficiency, but these have more to do with the circumstances than the Finnish contribution. One example in point is the District heating project in Sarajevo, which took 4 times longer than expected to achieve its goals. No text book example of efficiency it would seem, but the reasons were optimistic planning on the part of the World Bank and financing gaps. CIMIC, on the other hand, can be seen as extremely efficient, but only if one ignores the fact that the huge overhead was paid for by the defence budget. Possibly, the ample use of consultants in every phase of the project cycle could be questioned. This makes project planning and preparations comparatively expensive compared with some aid agencies. On the other hand, it makes it possible to keep the number of staff down, which could even it out. An important conclusion is that efficiency could be enhanced by some sort of field presence. A field presence would yield more and better information, the ability to solve problems at the source, and to promote synergies between projects, short distance between decision and implementation, etc.

6.5 SUSTAINABILITY In most projects studied, there are questions regarding the sustainability of the results achieved. The return and reconstruction sector is perhaps the most difficult one in this regard, but we find that the projects have not been inventive enough in addressing the issue. Credit schemes and extension programmes, are too few and far apart. Also the SSSP evaluation questions the sustainability of several of the mechanisms and committees put in place by the project, and the Special Focus Projects needed additional funding to continue. There is, however, a limit as to how much responsibility the donors can be expected to take in this context. In the case of the District heating in Sarajevo for example, the project included a component of preventive maintenance, which was not fully implemented. This can be attributed to the shortcomings of Finland and its implementers. The fact that the Sarajevo Canton does not allocate any budget means for investment, however, is a systematic problem, which could not have been put right by the project. Furthermore, one cannot expect all the outputs of a project to become permanent. The key objective of the SSSP is to provide an example, to plant an idea, and whether such ideas survive is the most important question. The projects have had varied success in anchoring the activities and results in the relevant BIH authorities. Both SSSP and GEEP seem to have a high level of ownership, in particular on the municipal, but also on the entity level, which should increase their chance of having permanent impact. Other signs of increasing focus on local ownership are the fact that the second phase of the TEPD will have more local staff; that some of the local women NGOs (in Mostar) have very dedicated and responsible management groups; and that many of the reconstruction projects build on a strong participatory approach.

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6.6 PROJECT MANAGEMENT Several of the projects (SSSP, GEEP and TEPD) have had a well working structure and organisation. The steering and supervisory committees have had real functions and have managed to involve the different stakeholders to a degree not otherwise possible. They have also provided opportunities for direct interaction for the Desk Officer and the Ambassador. This particular form of project structure has been developed and used by Finland in developing countries. Thus, it is an example of how experience and models from developing countries can constructively be put to use in a transition and post-conflict context. Unlike some other donor countries, Finland has negotiated and agreed on each project individually with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of BiH, rather than trying to arrive at one overall agreement. This has been appreciated by BiH, since such comprehensive agreements are very cumbersome to prepare. For the bilateral projects there is also an established project cycle from feasibility study to evaluation and decision on extensions, etc, which seems well adapted to the MFA way of working. Most of the steps are implemented by consultants, leaving decision making, and management to the MFA. The main general weaknesses in project management would be lack of manpower and lack of field presence. A general observation is that the bilateral projects which are managed directly from Helsinki are the best managed, and it is confirmed by the desk officers in MFA who felt that the bilateral way of working brought them into closer contact with the partners, and this benefited the projects. On the other hand, it also meant a greater work load. For projects other than the bilateral, things are a bit different. NGO projects are normally funded by the NGO department. While the approval of each project is needed from the policy making unit, the link with the implementer becomes very weak. For consistency purposes, it was a wise move, therefore, by the former desk officer to fund some of the NGOs directly from the Unit for WB. Other examples of how overall programme management is weakened are the projects funded by the civil crisis management budget line. The Political department is controlling the funds but consults with the Unit for WB before decisions. The observed result is that the Unit for WB knows very little about this support although it is of central importance for the continued development of BiH and the SA-process.

6.7 OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS The criticism levelled from previous studies of the Finnish development cooperation regarding weaknesses in the administration can largely be confirmed also by this examination. A ministry is not the ideal development administration and especially not the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for several reasons. There is a high turnover and rotation of personnel; the normal mode of working is current affairs – short planning horizons and quick solutions; the documentation/archiving system will all affect continuity and is not conducive to follow-up and evaluation. The reorganisation of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs aimed at greater policy coherence, and several measures have been taken to improve the development

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cooperation administration. Systematic routines have been established for various formalities and agreements between donors, beneficiaries and municipalities, and a handbook for how the development cooperation should be administered was published in 2000. The new system has received credit. DAC considers it positive and enhancing the interrelation between development cooperation and other areas. In practice, however, it will take several years before the new organisation will show its full merits. In the short term, the reshuffles and changes have caused uncertainty of roles and responsibilities in the MFA, which in turn has affected performance. At present, there are too few advisers in the Department for Policy Development, and several vacancies in the Unit for West Balkans, which creates a completely unrealistic workload. The reorganisation probably affected the West Balkans Unit (and before 2000 the Division for Europe) more than many other units. Before 1995, the Department did not work with development cooperation at all, and its desk officers had to address completely new issues. To further complicate things, the Unit for West Balkans still has separate desks for development cooperation for each country, and has still some way to go before completing the intentions of the reorganisation. The human resource issue is not new, however. In 1996, while there was a very strong will on the political level in Finland to engage in BiH, this was not matched at all by human resources in the MFA. In fact, there was not even a specific Desk Officer appointed until September 1997. The aspect that suffers most from the lack of capacity is monitoring and follow-up. This was reflected i a in the outdated information from MFA staff on some of the projects included in the evaluation. Follow-up is especially important for return projects where the beneficiaries continue to be vulnerable long after the project is terminated. This is an area where also the CIMIC projects could be found lacking. The lack of a permanent field presence means that many issues, which could have been solved by an embassy have to be solved in Helsinki and add to the work burden. It should be said, however, that the performance of the present roving Ambassador was praised by many respondents. She has shown an interest and visited projects far more often than some of her colleagues stationed in Sarajevo. A positive characteristic, which may be in part attributed to the political culture within the MFA, is the responsiveness which can be observed. Responsiveness is important for post-conflict situations, where developments on the ground are rapid. Over time, the programme has also been adjusted in response to the needs and developments in BIH. The decision to channel substantial reconstruction funds through the Peace keeping force was unorthodox but pragmatic and motivated by the positive earlier experience and the estimated potential. Likewise, there has been swiftness when needed, as in the case of the Sarajevo district heating, where the rather complex Finnish contribution was mobilised within two months. On the other hand, sometimes sluggishness has been demonstrated. The bilateral project cycle has also proven to cause large time gaps, which can hurt continuity in the projects. NGO projects are only screened once a year, which is not conducive to post-conflict work. Strategic planning is rather weak. In 1999 the first written “strategy” document about the Finnish assistance to BiH and the West Balkans was produced. It is widely referred to as a

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strategy, but is really more a memo describing the Finnish assistance at the time. The new strategy is significantly improved, although it needs refining to become a useful guiding instrument, firmly based on Bosnian priorities. Having said this, there are definitely instances of strategic thinking in the programming. One example was the original plan to connect the gender project with SSSP, TEPD and Finnish support in the media sector. This plan was not realised for unknown reasons. The lack of a written country strategy as a starting point, presents a problem when evaluating a programme like this. The results cannot be measured against any original expression of will or intention on the part of the donor. Several other problems encountered in the course of this evaluation point to the fact that the present system is not very conducive to evaluation. It has been time-consuming to obtain project related documents from the MFA. Some documents have not been received at all, despite numerous requests. Another problem for a non Finnish speaking evaluation team, is that most documents are in Finnish only. Eight documents have been translated for the sake of this evaluation. It is not a question of very unusual or special requests. The documents requested have been basic project documents, decisions, statistics, etc. The preparedness for identifying and providing the documents to the evaluation team has been surprisingly low. A frequent reply from several different persons has been: “Sorry, I cannot help you, that was before my time” which illustrates the problem of continuity and institutional memory. A frequent rotation of personnel from the capital to missions abroad, in combination with deficient filing routines, makes it difficult to track even recent activities a few years back. The Finnish system for reporting and evaluation was also criticised by the DAC peer review. We can only concur, and recommend improvements as well as introducing the consistent use of country strategies with clear goals. Despite efforts, it has also proven impossible to get a complete overview of the totality of the Finnish assistance, including development cooperation, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, civil crisis management projects, elections monitoring, and possibly other interventions. A request directed to the Global Department about the Finnish multilateral aid and how much of it goes to BiH, went unanswered, as did a request to the Political Department on the civil crisis management activities in BiH. The difficulties involved are illustrated by the fact that the Head of the Unit West Balkans himself tried, at one point, to get such an overview, but failed. This is somewhat surprising considering how much Finland is spending, and the political value that such figures have in the external relations. It is also a reasonable question from any tax payer.

6.8 COORDINATION AND COOPERATION Finland’s presence in the established coordination forums in BiH has been minimal. The Finnish consultants and other implementing agencies have kept a low profile. A modest approach is typically Finnish, and is an asset in most circumstances. However, it does not contribute to visibility, something which can be very important for the success of a project.

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While real coordination cannot be expected from a consultant, who is only mandated to implement a contract , there could be more specific instructions to Finland’s implementing agencies to interact and share information with other agencies. The exception is the CIMIC company, which has been exemplary in its coordination with the RRTF in Doboj and Tuzla. The fact that the RRTF was such an effective coordination mechanism has probably prompted all organisations involved in return to coordinate better. In terms of strategic and operational coordination, this can only effectively be done by MFA staff or, of course, diplomatic representation. Some periods it is even more crucial to coordinate closely with colleagues in the field. The SSSP is presently in such an obvious period. Still, MFA has not approached either DFID, or the World Bank to discuss how to divide the task between them in the social sector.

6.9 POST-CONFLICT ISSUES At a recent lecture in England, the High Representative Paddy Ashdown discussed the lessons learned from peace building in BIH. The need for a robust military presence was one. The mistake of not having a good plan ready from the start was another. The civilian authority, i e OHR was not given enough powers to do its job from the start. This partly explains another mistake: not addressing the major structural reforms, above all the rule of law at an early stage. Late action in these areas has made the normalisation slower and more difficult than necessary, according to Ashdown. Another lesson is for the international community to organise in a manner which enables it to move fast and take decisions. This means delegation of authority from the capitals to the people in the country to move the process forward. Also, the international community should make full use of the stick and carrots instruments, but in a coordinated and determined way – coordinated conditionality. The most important lesson, according to Ashdown, is that peace- building takes time. In addition, regional stability is necessary, and there is a need for legitimacy and vision of a civilian authority. The post-conflict context has been touched upon several times in the present report in connection with the discussion of the relevance of each examined project. It has also been discussed in relevant parts of this chapter. In this section some of these lines will be drawn together. Some of the most important findings from BiH are the following:

• In spite of having no previous BiH experience and limited post-conflict experience, Finland has managed to create a programme which was relevant to the post-conflict challenges facing Bosnia in 1996. It has since then gradually been adjusted to the transition agenda. The most important features are the large proportion of return- related projects, and projects which in various ways normalised or instilled a sense of normalisation among people.

• Finland has had a neutral image and no previous political luggage which has been an advantage in some of its work in BiH

• In response to the ethnic divisions and in support of national building, Finland has endeavoured and managed to strike a reasonable balance in its support between the two Entities and between ethnicities in the same Entity. This is commendable,

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considering the fact that it has been a very difficult environment and that the RS side was extremely complex to work with.

• At the same time, treating the entities and ethnicities even-handedly is at best only a passive measure, in that it prevents things from getting worse. It is possible that Finland could have done more for reconciliation and peace. In some cases, valuable opportunities for increasing the peace building impact of the projects have been lost. In a post-conflict country, the underlying conflict is still there. To help people work on peace-building and reconciliation is as important as any reconstruction or development objective.

• The reorganisation of MFA and the integration of development issues with other policy issues is interesting from a conflict management perspective as it narrows the gaps between political analysis, needs analysis and project design.

• The development of the CIMIC concept is an example of how Finland could prepare itself for participation in international crisis management. Any corresponding development on the civilian side does not seem to have taken place. The intervention regarding the rule of law in BiH was modest, and did not seem to have any pretensions of being a test case for a future rapid reaction capability in this sector, as most of the Finns were recruited on their own rather than being seconded by the MFA.

• Finland has insisted on bilateral government-to-government agreements even where not expressly required to do so. this has lent recognition to the government, thereby in some measure strengthening it, and contributed to stabilisation.

• It is difficult to handle aid in a post-conflict situation without having representation/info gathering permanently on the ground. One needs knowledge to act appropriately. This does not have to imply a full-blown – and costly – diplomatic representation.

Any future Finnish post-conflict assistance will be part of a joint effort, and if the crisis is close to Europe, the EU will be an important, if not the main player. The EU will have to respond to the crisis, and if it fails preventively, also assist in the post-conflict stage. Thus, what remains important for Finland is to consider how best to prepare for a contribution to a joint effort. Such discussions must also take other related policy areas into consideration. One such related area is assistance for conflict prevention/management and Civilian crisis management, which Finland and some like-minded countries like Sweden helped to put on the EU agenda, and which is now being developed. Another related area is civil-military cooperation within the framework of Finnish peacekeeping forces, which has turned into something of a Finnish speciality, and which has been addressed in the section on CIMIC above. Development cooperation should be mutually supportive with both CCM activities and peace- keeping efforts. For this to happen, joint strategic planning is required. This is most important on the level of EU, but also on country level, as each country should participate in a coherent manner. In sum, Finnish development cooperation in post-conflict situations should ideally work closely with Finnish civilian and military crisis management competence.

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It has been reported to us that there now exists a group which discusses Iraq and how Finland should best approach that particular situation. The group is said to have representatives from all relevant departments and ministries as well as humanitarian, development and business actors. Such groups are important steps towards good coordination. The key challenge, however, is to make it operational enough to produce some type of response characterized by clear priorities and division of labour.

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7. THE FUTURE/RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 THE NEED FOR CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Great progress has been made in BiH. The Bosnians are now gradually shifting focus from the challenges of post-conflict rehabilitation to the challenges of political and economic transition. The country is moving to a stage in which its government institutions will have to shoulder the full responsibility for the country. This is a tall order, however, considering the level of administrative capacity and governance today. There are great needs of capacity- building, and the international community is re-positioning itself to provide key support for the continued process. It will be a more limited support but provided to key areas under specific conditions. It should support, not replace, Bosnian efforts. Selective external support is absolutely necessary for BiH to complete its transition, but it is also true that we cannot afford BiH not to complete its transition. The truth is that no one with any knowledge of the country would say that the risk of renewed violence is over yet. In BiH, the International Community will increasingly mean the EU. Finland is active in three of the most central sectors for the SA process. EU will be there for the long term, and in accordance with its EU associated policy so should Finland.

7.2 THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF FINNISH ASSISTANCE As mentioned in Chapter 3 a regional strategy for the Balkans is being finalised in the MFA. While there is no time period specified, the financial annexes indicate continued commitment to bilateral assistance to BiH as part of the Balkan region, at least for the coming three years. In the planning of the coming years’ activities, the MFA will of course take into account the fact that the evaluations carried out for the three bilateral projects are all in favour of extensions of the projects. Likewise, there are propositions emanating from the present evaluation which could be considered. It is found, for instance, that the reconstruction project in Ostra Luka should be supplemented with an additional component of mine clearing in order to reach the objectives of the project. It also transpires as a good idea to support the Consulting Centre in Mostar another year in order to make use of its capacity and cadre of qualified volunteers in the preparation of municipal reforms which can be expected to start in 2004. This should allow for a constructive phasing out of cooperation between the consulting centre and the Finnish Refugee Council In addition the following points could be considered by MFA:

• Develop the new draft strategy into a really useful guiding tool with measurable goals.

• Until the administrative capacity in the MFA has improved, the number of sectors should be kept low. By focusing assistance on 2-3 sectors, the cooperation can become intensified and possibly achieve greater impact.

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• It seems a good idea to continue working with the social and education sector. Finland is now an established and credible player, and the two projects have the potential to be developed and adjusted to the evolving context. The sectors are also highly relevant to the EU Stabilisation and Association process.

• To promote regional cooperation is an explicit aim both of the EU and Finland. The regional news exchange is a positive example of such cooperation. There seems to be a potential for regional interaction also in the social sphere, and this could be explored in the next phase of the SSSP. Furthermore, the GEEP could possibly continue as a regional project

• Types of assistance: Project vs. Sector support. Sector support on the state level could have positive effects on nation building, strengthening the state level and forcing the entities to conform and cooperate. Sector support has to be well prepared and monitored, however. There may be ways to design the project support during the coming years in a way that prepares the ground for sector support.

• Any future Finnish support to the legal sector should not only be based on the priorities of BiH, but also be carefully coordinated with the initiatives of other donors. There is a great need for continued support in various areas of the legal sector in order to implement the reforms: Legal drafting and training, study visits and international exchange (as the Nordic countries have systems corresponding to those of BiH), etc. The Finnish experts’ long and comprehensive experience from BiH should be tapped for advice and knowledge in this endeavour.

• The SSSP has a potential of having serious impact on the organisation of the social service system. In coordination with other donors, the project will be able to make the most of any opportunities that may open up in terns of legislation reforms.

• Plan for, and carry out improved coordination, for example by instructing implementers to share information with other donors and to inform about project achievements.

• Improve capacity-building components in the cooperation between Finnish and local NGOs.

• Carry the reorganisation at MFA out fully, as originally planned. Provide the staff training and guidance focussing on the administration of development cooperation as envisaged in various annual plans and recommended by the Holkeri commission. Improve routines for documentation in order to facilitate evaluation and follow-up.

• In project proposals for reconstruction and return projects, the MFA should require special emphasis on adequate sustainability components, like analysis of the employment opportunities, need for credit schemes, etc.

• There are now examples of a field presence which is not necessarily embassies. Finland has so-called Liaison offices in Kabul and in Pristina. Perhaps this is an alternative for Sarajevo as well.

Specifically regarding post-conflict programming, recommendations include:

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o Measures to ensure/increase the political awareness of implementing partners of their role and the - intended or unintended - effects their work may have on their surroundings. Such measures could include specific instructions on how to monitor and handle risks.

o Measures to strengthen conflict analysis in all phases of the project cycle and project management.

o Involve the NGO unit as to make it more responsive to suggestions and requests. New creative procedures for funding NGOs are encouraged, possibly on the basis of experience from the CIMIC company. When working in a sensitive environment NGOs should have closer contact with the policy making unit.

o Continue to develop CIMIC as a channel for ODA. Awareness should be raised, however, on the user side of the particular advantages and limitations involved.

o Increase resources for advisory functions regarding post-conflict and peace building

o Ensure that the Finnish experience from working with the Independent Judicial Commission is not lost and use it in the strengthening of the rule of law in a civil crisis management context.

ANNEX 1

Terms of Reference for Evaluation of Finnish Development Cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. Subject of the Evaluation After signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, Finland, together with the international community committed herself to securing peace process and to support reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The overall objective was to stabilise the society and to create favourable conditions for refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homes. It was estimated that four years of heavy external financing would have been sufficient to revitalise different economic sectors to function again and to ensure that a majority of refugees and internally displaced people would have returned to their homes. Total external commitments in 1995-1998 amounted to 4.7 billion dollars. Yet in 1998 the international community noticed that the objectives were far from being realised. Peace Implementation Council (PIC) pointed out in 1998 that the peaceful situation is fragile and wholly depended on external support. Later in 1999 Office for Higher Representative (OHR) listed necessary projects and activities for the coming two years and pledged for long term international support especially for judicial, human rights, police, border control and media institutions. Finnish support activities in BiH begun in 1996. Since 1999 Finnish support has been based on a strategy “Aid for Reconstruction of the Western Balkans”. The overall objectives of the Finnish support were focused on the stabilisation of the society and creation of favourable conditions for refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homes. In addition, emphasis is laid on institutional capacity building which requires longer term partnerships and 2-3 years financial commitments. Finland has strived for ethnic balance and reconciliation in its support activities. Through these activities Finland is supporting the implementation of the Stabilization and Association Pact for the Eestern Balkans of the EU, the purpose of which is to bring the countries in this region closer to the European standards and societies. The Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has prepared new guidelines to support the Western Balkans. Finland participates to the reconstruction of BiH as a member of the EU, and supports Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) which is the main EU strategy for provision of long term support to the region. According to the EU strategy, reconstruction of the Western Balkans will include: • support to increasing livelihood • development of civil society • establishment and revision of government institutions • support to macroeconomic structures. The Finnish guidelines emphasise that physical and institutional reconstruction and cooperation has to be based on active participation of the local authorities and institutions in all phases, including objective setting, planning and implementation. As the institutional capacity and budgetary monitoring systems develop, Finland considers transition from projects to sector specific budget support. Project-based support will, however, be needed for some years especially in education

sector. According to the guidelines, Finnish support to BiH is politically justified as long as Finland provides support to Serbia and Montenegro, as well. According to these new guidelines cooperation with Bosnian and Herzegovina is based on Finland’s general development cooperation aims, on close cooperation and coordination with EU`s CARDS programme, and with the bilateral programmes of other EU member states. The strategy envisages transition to sector specific budget support but points out that especially in education sector, bilateral, project based support will be needed for additional 3-4 years. Total Finnish commitments from 1996 to 2002 amount to approximately € 38.5 million. The table below illustrates how Finnish support has developed since 1996. Finnish commitments to Bosnia and Herzegovina, million euros by sectors 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 TOTALsocial infra 0,40 7,65 0,57 1,66 5,11 4,87 20,26economic infra 5,26 1,05 3,12 0,93 10,35emergency 3,36 0,68 1,05 0,49 0,21 5,78WID 0,06 0,00 0,04 0,55 1,01 1,66debt 0,00 0,00planning 0,14 0,08 -0,01 0,17 0,38TOTAL 9,21 8,79 4,39 4,35 6,61 5,08 38,42

Support to social infrastructure has been the most important sector, especially after 1999 with the introduction of the Finnish strategy, whereas during the first years of support, reconstruction of economic infrastructure was the biggest sector. Emergency aid was substantial in 1996 but has declined. Other sectors, Women in Development, debt related activities and planning activities are all rather modest. Finnish support to BIH has utilized a number of different instruments. Finnish support to BiH has been channelled through various instruments. Among bilateral projects the most substantial ones have been District heating projects in Doboj and Sarajevo, and Support to Public Railway Corporation to support economic infrastructure. In support of social infrastructure the biggest bilateral projects are Teacher Education and Professional Development Programme, Water and sanitation project, Support to social sector and Gender equity programme. Support to social sector was first implemented as a multi-bi operation together with UNDP, but the second phase of the project is being implemented by a local NGO Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI). IBHI is also responsible for the implementation of phases 1 and 2 of gender equity programme, funded by Finland. Also Finnish NGOs have been active in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The biggest projects have been implemented by the Finnish Red Cross (prostheses and mine awareness programmes), FIDA international (Support programme for physically impaired, Shelter programmes in Doboj and Odzak), SASK to support labour unions and Marttaliitto and Suomen pakolaisapu to support refugees/returnees and refugee/returnee women especially. Finland has supported international organisations and structures by providing technical assistance, staff, to OHR, and Independent Judicial Commission, UNESCO and OSCE, PIC and EU police operations. Finally Finnish contingent/CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) in Bosnia and Herzegovina has identified and financed numerous small reconstruction projects. This evaluation will study policy relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of bilateral development co-operation activities between Finland and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996-2003

and the administration of Finnish development co-operation in regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition the evalaution will assess how successfully Finland has operated in a post-war country as a member of the international donor community. Based on the country analysis, findings and conclusions, the evaluation is also expected to provide justified and well grounded recommendations for future orientations of Finnish cooperation including consideration of potential sectors and modalities of future cooperation. 2. Background of the evaluation In 2001 and 2002 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland commissioned a number of country programme evaluations1 in the Finnish long-term development partner countries. Synthesis report of the seven country programme evaluations concludes that cooperation has been effective and relevant on a single project level, but there is little evidence on effectiveness on a programme or country level. Furthermore impact and sustainability is largely unknown or unimpressive. Also embassy staffing levels, training, “tools”, techniques and methods all required urgent improvement for Finland to act as a partner in development. As the annual commitments to Bosnia and Herzegovina have exceeded those to many developing countries it is justified to see how Finnish cooperation has operated in BiH. As in the previous country programme evaluations, the underlying question is “have we been in right place at right time with appropriate instruments?” Whereas the previous country programme evaluations addressed traditional developing countries, this evaluation is expected to increase knowledge and understanding on how different development cooperation instruments and practices function in a post conflict country, and is required to identify the needs for reorientation and adjustment of approaches. Linked to this, the evaluation will also assess the utility of different development cooperation instruments in a post conflict situation. The evaluation results will be used in directing Finnish support to reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other post conflict countries in the future. 3. Evaluation issues The aim of the evalaution is to assess Finland’s development cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina in its totality. However, in the absence of clear country level objectives and indicators, the evaluation’s conclusions will have to be based on project level findings. The evalaution will assess implementation of Finland’s development co-operation priorities by testing the relevance of Finnish activities relative to country needs and other donors’ activities and further by testing the implementation of Ministry’s goals (has a particular approach been implemented as planned?) and the results of that implementation (has implementation resulted in the intended outcomes?). On an intervention/project level, the evaluation will address the following evaluation questions: Relevance - the extent to which the objectives of an intervention are consistent with beneficiearies’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and donor policies, more specifically: 1 By definition, a country programme evaluation covers one donor’s entire portfolio of development interventions to a partner country.

• To Dayton Agreement, peace process and reconstruction; • Finnish Development cooperation priorities, overall policy priorities and the strategy for

reconstruction of the Western Balkans, including ethnicity balance; • Priority needs of Bosnia and Herzegovina (based on verifiable documentation); • Beneficiaries. Effectiveness - extent to which the objectives of an intervention were achieved? Efficiency - how economically different resources (funds, expertise) are converted to results. How rapidly allocations are disbursed? If possible, the efficiency assessment could include comparison of similar activities carried our by different aid instruments, e.g. small reconstruction projects (houses) implemented by Finnish NGOs and CIMIC in the same region. Sustainability - continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major assistance has been completed. Sustainability evaluation will concentrate on insitututional and economic sustainability, and the main questions include: do the beneficiaries have financial and human resources to carry out activities without external funding, and/or has ending of external funding caused weaking of quality and/or quantity of services? Assessment of the extent of commitment of the Government of BiH (budget appropriations) and other stakeholders, including the NGO community. Consistency - how complementary the different elements of Finnish assistance to BiH have been? In addition, the evaluation will assess • Administration in the Ministry, and • Coordination and cooperation with other donors and international organisations, as well as the

overall framework of SAP process. To fully appreciate Finnish contributions to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the evaluation should explore and discuss the overall environment in BiH where the activities started and how different state and cooperation structures have developed since Dayton Agreement. This context analysis should include description of the immediate needs for reconstruction, and possibilities and limitations for cooperation between the different ethnic groups and within the international donor community. 4. Methodology The evaluation will be based on primary data (project management documents, interviews and site visits) and secondary data (other evaluations and research).

The main task of the evaluation team is the acquisition of primary data, analysis of project management documents, arrangement and conduct of interviews in Finland and in BiH and the site visits. Concerning secondary data, the Ministry will provide the evaluation team with a compilation of all available data including management documentation (agreements, reports, agreed minutes etc.), other evaluation reports, reviews and other studies.

The evaluation will proceed inductively starting from project level and proceeding to country level analysis. The main concern in this inductive approach is to ensure that a sufficient number of projects are evaluated to enable country level assessment. This means that in order to obtain as full

a picture of the cooperation activities as possible, the selection of projects to be evaluated will have to consider three variables:

1. Projects from all main sectors; social infrastructure, economic infrastructure, emergency aid and women in development;

2. All main cooperation modalities, support through bilateral project support, local NGOs, Finnish NGOs, INGOs and international organisations, and Finnish contingency/CIMIC;

3. Geographical representation covering activities in the Fedaration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Mostar, and in the Republica Srpska.

In addition to this evaluation, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is currently evaluating four of its projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Teacher Educator Development Programme (TEPD) is being evaluated in on-going education sector evaluation, Support to Social Sector will be evaluated in summer-autumn, a mid-term review of Phase II of Gender Equity project is being carried out in summer 2003 and of TV News exchange project in autumn 2003. These evaluations will be considered and will benefit country level conclusions and recommendations of this country programme evaluation. In addition to the information gained from evaluations/mid-term reviews in the social sector mentioned above the following projects are proposed to be looked at: Bilateral project support: • Support to District Heating Programme in Sarajevo. Finland has supported World Bank

coordinated reconstruction programme of district heating with total amount of € 6.7 million. • Support to Public Railway Corporation, € 1,177 million, committed in 1998. The objective of this

project was to promote economic activity and reconstruction of railways by providing Public Railway Corporation with a machine to rehabilitate the tracks.

Finnish Battalion/CIMIC • Small projects managed by CIMIC in Doboj (activities in Tuzla will not be included in this

evaluation). Total commitments € 3.6 million in 1999 - 2003. The objective of this small project facility has been to improve the socio-economic situation of the people living in the area and returnees by providing support to reconstruction of small scale constructions (houses, schools).

Finnish NGOs • Doboj shelter programme by FIDA international, € 500 000 in 2000-2002. The objective of this

project has been to support return of refugees by reconstruction and renovation of houses. • Women reconstructing Bosnia and Herzegovina by Marttaliitto, € 180 000 in 1998-2002. The

project supported women in five centres for women in Mostar by providing skills training, entrepreneurship training, psycho-social counselling etc.

• Establishment of Counselling Centre in Mostar, by Suomen pakolaisapu, € 190 000 in 1999-2002.

The project assisted in establishing a Counselling Centre for women in Mostar. • Support to Ostra Luka families, returnees and displaced people. Reconstruction of family houses

and community buildings in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina by Finnchurchaid. Total commitment € 411 000 in 1998.

Support to International Organisations: • Hiring legal experts to Independent Judicial Commission, € 160 000 in 2001-2002. The objective

was to support IJC operating under OHR. Emergency aid: • Reconstruction project of Zgoni kindergarten in Mostar West and construction of Zulic

kindergarten in Mostar East, total € 517 000. Projects were implemented by EU Administration in Mostar in 1995 and 1996.

Duration of the evaluation should not exceed six months if not agreed otherwise between the Ministry and the Consultant. The evaluation is proposed to begin with a desk study phase, including review and analysis of all availalble documentation and interviews in the Ministry and relevant organisations in Finland, followed by a field visits to Sarajevo, Mostar and Doboj at least. During the field visits, the team should try to meet the intended final beneficiaries2 of the Finnish support to assess, wheter the projects have been relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries and whether they have brough sustainable benefits to the target groups. Other key informants include the projects’ implementing partners and immediate beneficiaries3.

6. Evaluation team The tenderer is requested to propose a team that the tenderer seems most fit to undertake the evaluation. The Team should include nominated Team Leader who bears the overall responsibility of the evaluation. In addition the Team must include sector experts and independent local expert(s). In the proposal the tenderer is requested to clearly allocate tasks between the members of the Team. The Team should possess individually and as a Team the following qualifications:

- experience in carrying out development co-operation evaluations - experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina - knowledge of Finnish Development Co-operation policies and understanding of the

principles of Finnish development co-operation - thorough knowledge and understanding of the critical development related issues in

the sectors under evaluation - good command of English

The tenderers are welcomed to point out and highlight any other qualifications that the Team and its members possess that are of relevance to the evaluation. Evaluation teams consisting of both men and women are encouraged. 7. Reporting On the basis of the desk study, the evaluator is requested to prepare a general description of Finnish support to Bosnia and Herzegovina as an inception report. This report should briefly present main political and economic developments in the country after Dayton Agreement, main national and international strategies, international cooperation and coordination of aid activities, and a general

2 Those who are to benefit from the improved services provided by the project. 3 Those who benefit immediately from the project, implementing organisations.

appreciation of Finnish support in that context. Also, the inception report should include more detailed evaluation questions to be addressed during the field visit. The evaluator will submit draft final report within six months from the signing of the contract. The report should include concise summary of main findings, conclusions and recommendations. The evaluator is encouraged to take a critical approach and not to shy from even provocative statements. The report should be written in a reader-friendly way. After submission of the draft final report there shall be a presentation of the report in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, after which possible changes and amendments are made, and final report is submitted. Both the interim and final report shall be submitted in English language (word- and PDF-form).

ANNEX 2

LIST OF INFORMANTS

Aaltola, Matti, former Desk Officer for BiH, MFA Agic, Hariz, Professor, Director, Pedagogical Institute, Tuzla Bach, Helene, Regional FRESTA Coordinator, Royal Danish Embassy, Sarajevo Backström, Lars, Head of Humanitarian Unit, MFA, Helsinki, Finland Balta, Klelija, Gender Programme Manager, Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees Begovic, Emir, Infrastructure Department Manager, BHRPC Benes, Avis, Head of Public Affairs, OHR South, Mostar Blomberg, Jouko, Head of Agency International Development Cooperation, YLE, Helsinki Brankovic, Omer, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Economic Relations and Cooperation, RS Bryant, Roger, Head of Regional Centre Banja Luka, OSCE Bundalo, Zlatko, Professor, Advisor, Ministry of Education and Culture, RS Carrico, Renne, Senior Public Administration Reform Advisor, OSCE RC Banja Luka Cicic, Miroslav, Assistant of Minister of Roadway and Traffic, RS Conrad, Christof, Deputy Director, Education Department, OSCE, Sarajevo Curcic, Faruk, Vice General Manager, BHRPC, Sarajevo de Boer, Jan, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Netherlands, Sarajevo Djurdjica Brankic, UNHCR Satellite office Bijeljina Dockhorn, Juergen, LTC, SFOR HQ, CIMIC Liason Officer to WB, USAID and IMF Elding, Bo, Head of Sida Office in Sarajevo Ellmen-Parmala, Sari, Head of Recruitment Unit, MFA, Helsinki Francic, Vesna, Dept of Infrastructure, World Bank, Sarajevo Golubovic, Nada, President, United Women, Banja Luka Granulo, Asima, Finance Manager, Toplane, Sarajevo Hadzialic, Mirzo, Marketing and Development Director, Toplane, Sarajevo Hakola, Harri, Director for Development Cooperation, Fida International Halilovic, Hazim, Deputy Minister of Education, Tuzla Canton Hansen, Steen Malthe, First Secretary, Royal Danish Embassy, Sarajevo Hanssen, Jon, Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Sarajevo Helminen, Reima, Lieutenant Colonel G.S., Personnel and Training, Peace Support Branch Hranic, Tomas, Project Coordinator, LWF, Osijek, Croatia Hrzic, Branka, Director, IDEJA, Mostar Iivonen, Eija, Head, Restructuring Department, Independent Judicial Commission, Sarajevo Ikonen, Pertti, Director, Unit for NGOs, MFA, Helsinki Jolkkonen, Ritva, Director General, Dept. for Development Policy, MFA, Helsinki Junozovic, Azra, National Education Officer, OSCE Sarajevo Kangasniemi, Kaija, Marttaliitto ry, Helsinki Keating-Chetwynd, Sarah, Education Officer, Council of Europe, Sarajevo Kelles Viitanen, Anita, Consultant on gender issues Kieffer, Claude, Director of Education Department, OSCE Sarajevo Kiesiläinen, Kari, Director General, Dept. of Judicial Administration, Ministry of Justice, Helsinki Kljajic, Tanja, journalist, coordinator of ERNO at RTRS, Banja Luka Knjezevic, Ivana, Teacher, Capljina Education Centre Kokkala, Heikki, Education Adviser, Dept. for Development Policy, MFA, Helsinki Kopic, Luna, Village Council, Ostra Luka Koskenniemi, Eero, Counsellor, Political Department, MFA, Helsinki Krunic, Spomenka, Director, Gender Centre, RS Kumpulainen, Lena, Project Coordinator, Finnish Refugee Council, Helsinki Kurkinen, Petteri, Major G.s., Staff Officer, Eastern Command HQ, Finland

Ladjabi, Meriem, Coordinator, IDEJA Counsulting Centre, Mostar Larson, Erik Nils, ABA –CEELI Larsson, Marie, Programme Officer, Sida Office, Sarajevo Lehikoinen, Eeva-Liisa, Project Manager, Jaakko Pöyry Infra, Espoo, Finland Lekic, Zeljka, Coordinator, ERNO, Sarajevo Lesic, Zorica, Operations Analyst, World Bank, Sarajevo Loman, Timo Henrik, Deputy Head of Investigation, Independent Judicial Commission, Sarajevo Lottrup, Axel, LTC, CIMIC Chief, SFOR HQ, Butmir/Sarajevo Manninen-Visuri, Helena, Programme Officer/Humanitarian Aid, FinnChurchAid, Helsinki Masnikosa, Milan, Chief Engineer, Toplane, Sarajevo McKean, Michael, Mercy Corps, Tuzla McMinn, Meredoc, Head of Satellite Office in Zvornik, UNHCR Möllander, Anders, Ambassador of Sweden to BiH, Sarajevo Morel, Terry, Head of Protection Unit, UNHCR Sub Office for Northern BiH, Tuzla Mulaomerovic, Resad, Manager, Infrastructure Area Sarajevo, Railways of Federation of BiH Muratovic, Hasnija, Adviser for Education Development, Federal Ministry of Education, Sarajevo Nayar, Haridas, Programme Manager/Sr. Policy Adviser, UNDP Olsson, Katarina, Kvinna till Kvinna, Stockholm Overland Andersen, Frode, First Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Sarajevo Papic, Zarko, Resident Director, IBHI, Sarajevo Pasalic-Kreso, Adila, Dr., MA Programme Director, University of Sarajevo Pasic, Zijad, Federation Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sport, Sarajevo Pavelic, Svetlana, Portfolio Manager, UNDP Pejic, Tunjo, Village Council, Ostra Luka Pesic, Mariko, Project Coordinator, LWF, Osijek, Croatia Petric, Aleksandra, Human Rights trainer, United Women, Banja Luka Petric, Natalija, Legal Adviser, United Women, Banja Luka Pihlatie, Heidi, (former Head of Unit for Latin America and Mediterranean), Embassy of Finland, Rome Pinjo, Mirza, Head of Department for Multilateral relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BiH Pirvola, Lauri, Manager District Heating Systems, Elektrowatt-Ekono, Espoo, Finland Pozderovic, Ediba, Coordinator, Education Centre, Pedagogical Institute, Tuzla Prins, Margriet, Deputy Head RRTF, OHR Head office, Sarajevo Radojcic, Novak, Chief for Reconstruction and Development, International Liaison, Doboj Municipality Rasidagic, Esref –Kenan, Project Manager, IBHI, Sarajevo Rautanen, Pekka, Maintenance Manager, VR Track Ltd, Helsinki Rehn, Elisabeth, Chairperson Working Table 1, Democratisation and Human Rights, Stability Pact Rizvanovic Sefik, Adviser, Ministry of Civil Affairs, BiH Robinson, Jonathan, Head of RRTF, OHR Tuzla regional office Roche, Ralph, Judicial Reform Officer, Independent Judicial Commission, Sarajevo Rudic, Zivko, Inspector, Ministry of Transport and Communications, RS Ruhomäki, Olli, Advisor, Dept. for Development Policy, MFA, Helsinki Schröder, Holger, Deputy Head of Operations, Delegation of the European Commission to BiH. Sarajevo Selimovic, Semina, Director, LWF, Tuzla Siliämaa, Leo, Head of International Programmes, FinnChurchAid, Helsinki Sirkiä, Paula, Desk Officer for BiH, Unit for West Balkans, Europe Division, MFA Smajlovic, Saban, Coordinator, Education Centre, Pedagogical Institute, Tuzla Somun, Lejla, GEEP coordinator, IBHI, Sarajevo Stenius-Mladenov, Birgitta, roving Ambassador, MFA, Helsinki Suomalainen, Nina, Adviser to the Chair Working table 1, Stability Pact, MFA, Helsinki Takala, Elsi, (former Desk Officer for BiH) Regional Manager, Unit for East and West Africa, MFA, Helsinki Tarpai, William, Head of UNHCR Office Tuzla, BiH Tepponen, Antti, Head of FIDA International, Tuzla, BiH

Thomasson, Ristin, Kvinna till Kvinna, Sarajevo Tisma, Valerija, Education Department, OSCE, Banja Luka Uusihakala, Juho, Consulting and Advisory Services, Helsinki Väänänen, Juhani, Head of Unit for West Balkans, MFA, Helsinki Vainikka, Vesa-Pekka, Senior Advisor, District heating systems, Elektrowatt-Ekono, Espoo, Finland Vejzovic, Majda, Director of Kindergartens,Stari Grad Municipality, Mostar Vilo, Jarmo, Cpt, formerly with CIMIC Company, Multinational Brigade North, SFOR Virtanen, Pirjo, Counsellor, Unit for Evaluation and Internal Audit, MFA, Helsinki Vukmanic, Vesna, Project Coordinator, ICVA Sarajevo, Wala, Heikki, FinnChurchAid, Banovici, BiH Weiner, Michael, Head of Office for Technical Cooperation with BiH, Embassy of Austria Westler, Richard, Senior Transport Sector Advisor, Economic Dept., OHR, Sarajevo Withrow, Scott, Senior Democratisation Officer, OSCE RC Banja Luka Zecevic, Asim, Assistant of Minister of Labour and Social politics, Federation of BiH, Sarajevo Zecevic, Hazim, General Manager, Toplane, Sarajevo Zillén, Eva, Kvinna till Kvinna, Stockholm Zukanovic, Ramiza, Director, Prijateljice, Konjic

ANNEX 3 LIST OF REFERENCES Statistics

• Finland’s ODA net disbursements 1991 – 2002 according to budget classification, Table, 2 p, from website

• Finland’s ODA, budget appropriations 1991 – 2003, • Bilateral and multilateral Development assistance in 1991-2002, disbursements • Finland’s bilateral ODA disbursements, Main recipient countries, 1999-2002 • The 25 largest recipient countries of Finland’s ODA in 1970-2002 • Finland’s ODA 1961 -2003, Budget appropriations • Finnish bilateral ODA disbursements by country and region 2002 • www.oecd.org

Strategy

• Finland’s support for the Western Balkans, Draft strategy, 20 April 2003 o Table of total disbursements 1999-2002, and planned appropriations for 2003-2006

• Finland’s Development cooperation, yearly report 2002, selected chapters: o How the objectives are reached o Reconstruction of the western Balkans

• Strategy for Assistance to Post conflict Western Balkans, Nov 1999 • Strategy and Action Plan for Promoting Gender Equality in Finland’s Policy for Developing

Countries 2003-2007 • A Development Co-operation Manual for Non-Governmental Organisations, Principles and

Guidelines, MFA, July 2003 • Education for All – Finnish Development Cooperation in the Education Sector, MFA, 2001 • De mänskliga rättigheterna och Finlands utrikespolitik, MFA, November 2000 • Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of BiH, 2003, Council of Ministers

Project-specific documentation

• Women’s Projects in Mostar o Connecting Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Project Evaluation Report, June 2001 o Various Annual Reports on the separate women’s projects o Report for Stolac Center, January-July 2002 o Support to the Consulting Centre in Mostar, Evaluation Report, June 2001 o Project document: Connecting Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (undated) on a Consulting

Centre in Mostar; Marttaliitto ry and the Finnish Refugee Council (or MFA?) o Annual Report 2002 from IDEJA Consulting Centre o Quarterly Reports January-March and April-August 2003 from IDEJA Consulting Centre o Comprehensive Project Descriptions from IDEJA Consulting Centre, November 2003 o Agreement between the EU Administration in Mostar and the MFA of Finland on

support to two Kindergartens in Mostar, July 1995 o International Crisis Group: Building Bridges in Mostar, November 2003 o OHR documents on the Mostar Reform Commission on a single city administration,

September 2003 – January 2004 • District Heating Project

o Fax correspondence btw MFA and World Bank from April –June 1996 o Assessment report from Sarajevo, Jun 1996, Ekono Energy o Agreement between the Government of Finland and the Government of BiH concerning

Finnish support to the emergency district heating reconstruction project, July 1996 o Project Continuation plan for the year 1999, Toplane, Sarajevo, 20 August 1998

o Decision memo of MFA for 1999, December 1998, MFA o Project continuation plan for the year 1998, Toplane, Sarajevo, 26 August 1997 o Final report, May 2000, Ekono Energy Ltd. o Implementation Completion report- BiH Emergency District heating reconstruction

Project Trust fund credit no. 024034, October 1999, World Bank o Reconstruction and development program in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Progress update,

June 2002, The World Bank

• Railway project o Fax correspondence btw BiH and MFA from 1998-1999 o Agreement between the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska on the

establishment of a joint railway public corporation as part of transportation corporation o Decision memo for the aid to Bosnian railways, December 1999, MFA o Company Profile and current situation, August 1996, BiH Railways o Agreement between Finland and BiH concerning Finnish support to Railway Public

Corporation in Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina o Letter to BiH MFA concerning the Finnish donation of a truck layer machine. August,

1998 o Memorandum for Govt Decision, 16 December 1998, MFA o Terms of Reference for the Appraisal of a proposal for a Master Plan for maintenance

and repair of railway infrastructure in BiH, August 1999, MFA o BiHTMAP – The JICA Study on Tranport Master Plan in BiH, Seminar III, February

2000, Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) o Rehabilitation and development of railway infrastructure in BiH, 2003, BHRPC o List of priority rehabilitation and reconstruction projects of the railway infrastructure on

pan-European corridor Vc and parallel to corridor X financing by EBRD and EIB loans, 2003, BHRPC

• Fida International in the Doboj Area

o Annual Reports 2000 – 2001 from Fida International o Memo from Fida International on Doboj Municipality, construction material provision

etc., October 2003 o Evaluation of LWF’s Agricultural Rehabilitation Assistance in Northeast BiH, October

2002, Stockholm Group for Development Studies AB

• Support to Ostra Luka families, returnees and displaced o Project document, November 1997 o Final Report, October 1998 o Returnee and Reconstruction Programme in Western Balkans 2002 - 2004

(FinnChurchAid)

• Finnish CIMIC work o Svenska Bataljonens humanitära insatser i Kosovo, 2001, Sida Evaluation o www.nato.int o Government decision to grant FIM 3 million to Finnish Engineering battalion, 1998,

MFA o Law on amendment to the law on Refugees from BiH and displaced persons in BiH o Final report on the use of project funds by the Finnish SFOR troops in Bosnia and

Herzegovina in 1998-2003, 2003, CIMIC Company Commander Major Markus Rento o Civil-military cooperation in Crisis management operations, 2001, Dissertation by Petteri

Kurkinen for General Staff Officers’ course at the National Defence College o Various texts on CIMIC by Petteri Kurkinen, 2003

• Independent Judicial Commission

o OHR: Jobs and Justice – Our Agenda, September 2002

o OHR: Decision of the High Representative on the Establishment of the Independent Judicial Commission, March 2001

o MFA Decision to grant support to IJC for recruitment of local lawyers and investigators, May 2001

o Project Plan, August 2001 o Agreement between MFA and OHR, October 2001 o Request for Extension of project period, May 2002 o IJC Progress Reports (8), April 2001 - May 2002 o Final Report, May 2003 o IJC publications: o Uniting Judicial Services – Achievements, September 2002 – August 2003 o Work Plan of HJPCs and IJC September 2002 - December 2003, November 2002 o Work Plan of IJC, March – December 2003 o Analysis: Estimated Cost Impact of Reform and Forecasted Long-run Savings, May 2003 o Court Budgeting and Court Funding in Federation and Republika Srpska, June 2003 o HJCPs publications: o Periodic Report No.1, September – December 2002 o Interim Report, August 2003 o Statistics on Ethnic and Gender Representation; November 2003 o The IJC Mandate to be completed on March 31, 2004; November 2003 o International Crisis Group o Rule over Law – Obstacles to the Development of an Independent Judiciary in BiH, July

1999 o Courting Disaster – The Misrule of Law in BiH, March 2002

Other evaluations

• Evaluation of Bilateral development cooperation between __ and Finland, Generic ToR for all country programme evaluations, 2003

• Evaluation of the Support to Social Sector–Project (SSSP) in BiH o ToR, June 2003 o Report August 2003

• Mid term review of Gender Equity and Equality Project (GEEP) in BiH o ToR May 2003 o Report June 2003

• Review Mission on Finnish support to News Exchange in the Balkans o ToR, August 2003 o MISSING: Final Report, expected 1 Oct

• Evaluation of Finnish Teacher Education and Professional Development project (TEPD), o ToR, March 2003 o Final Report, October, 2003

• The level and quality of Finland’s Development cooperation, Special Committee Report, Other donors

• CARDS, various documents • Svenska Bataljonens humanitära insatser i Kosovo, Sida Evaluation 01/10/03 • Sweden’s assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sida Evaluation 99/24 • Sweden’s Country Strategy for development cooperation BiH, 2003-2005, Swedish Ministry for

Foreign Affairs • Evaluating external assistance to the Western Balkans – with special emphasis on BiH, UTV

Working Paper 2001:5 • Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Strategy Paper 2002- 2006, European Commission, Directorate

Western Balkans • The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe- Second annual report, 2003,

European Commission

• Shared Modernisation Strategy for Primary and Secondary Education in BiH, Bih Educational Authorities, EC-TAER programme and EU, October 2003

• Council of Europe: Framework Programme of Co-operation with the Entity Ministries of Education in BiH 2002-2004, July 2002

• Open Society Fund BiH: Education Programme 2003-2005 • OSCE/Mission to BiH: Programme Summary, October 2002 • UNDP: BiH Human Development Report 2002 • International assistance to BiH, 1996-2002 – A tentative analysis: who is doing what, where, 2003,

UNDP/Govt of BiH • FRESTA South Eastern Europe Programme, Programme Document 2003-2004, Danish Ministry

of Foreign Affairs • Draft proposal for an integrated system for economic planning and development resources

coordination, October 2003, BiH Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic relations. • BiH – From Recovery to Sustainable Growth; World Bank Country Study 1997 • BiH Country Assistance Strategy, World Bank, July 1997 • BiH Priority Reconstruction Update, World Bank, September 1999 • BiH Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report, World Bank, October 2002 • World Bank Reconstruction and Development Program - Progress update, 2003 • The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe, A Regional Strategy Paper, World

Bank, March 2000 • World Bank: 4th BiH Education Restructuring Project, Project Appraisal July 2003 Other reference material • OHR BiH: Essential Texts – General Framework Agreement for Peace (Dayton Agreement),

Protocols from Peace Implementation Council Meetings etc. • Law on Gender Equality in Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 21, 2003 • International Crisis Group: Implementing Equality – The “Constituent Peoples” Decision in

Bosnia & Herzegovina, April 2002 • International Crisis Group: Bosnia’s Nationalist Governments. Paddy Ashdown and the

Paradoxes of State building, July 2003 • Sveriges Utrikesdepartment:: Mänskliga rättigheter i Bosnien-Hercegovina 2002 • A wealth of OHR speeches and pressreleases 2002-2004 • Finland vill bli bäst på bistånd, article in Sida’s magazine Omvärlden,

PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50

ANNEX 4 A Technical evaluation of Donation of tracklayer machine GENERAL INFORMATION Project Reference

Donor Government of the Republic of Finland Contractor/Supplier DESEC Ltd., FIN-39700 Parkano, Finland Acceptor Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina Recipient Bosnia-Herzegovina Railways Public

Corporation (BHRPC) Project title Donation of Finnish Tracklayer Machine Project code 863 030 01 Sector Railways Beneficiary (ies) Railways of Federation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina (ZFBiH) and Railways of Republic of Srpska (ZRS)

Project value €1.177.315,001 Project Overview This Project was considered by the Government of Finland within general incentive of this Government to maintain solid relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The basics for this consideration was the following: • The desire to strengthen the existing cordial relations between the two

countries; • To emphasize the importance of adherence to the Dayton Peace

Agreement, specially in respect of democracy and human rights; and • Recognition of the urgency for reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was recognized before, through the Donor Conferences organized by local Government, IFI’s and particular donors/Governments, that railways sector in the country would have important role in overall rehabilitation of economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, the team of two Finnish experts came to Bosnia and Herzegovina in June 1998. The purpose of their visit was to spot critical aspects of required rehabilitation of the railways system in the country with the specific focus on the railway infrastructure. In addition, they were authorized to link the local needs with potential supply abilities of companies from Finland. As the outcome of this activity, the Government of Finland approved 1 This value corresponds to the value of Finnish currency called Finnish Mark, which was still valid in 1999. At that time, the value of the equipment was FIM 7.000.000,00, which was equal to the value stated in the Project Evaluation Sheet.

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PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50

the Project of Tracklayer Machine TL 50 to be supplied by DESEC Ltd. to the local recipient in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50

PROJECT DESCRIPTION Project Background The total length of railway network in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 1.031km. It is mainly composed of two main railway lines with North-South and West-East orientation. Main line of North-South orientation is actually alignment of the Pan-European Corridor V, branch C, which connects Budapest in Hungary with Ploče Port in Croatia through the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is very important corridor for Bosnia and Herzegovina because it enables the link to Pan-European Corridor X in Croatia and it also enables connection to the Port of Ploče, as the main Port for economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Main line of West-East orientation is the parallel line to aforesaid Corridor X and it has importance for economies located along the line with the access to Corridor V, branch C and link to Serbia and further on towards Eastern Europe. The network is based on standard European gauge of 1.435mm and most of the network is classified as D4 category, which means maximum loads of 22,5 tons per axle or 8,0 tons per linear meter. All the lines are single-track, except one section of 87kms along the Corridor Vc (Zenica-Doboj). Around 75% of the network is electrified with mono-phase 25kV, 50Hz AC system. The only part of the network, which is not electrified, is located in the Northeast part of the country in the region of Tuzla. In that part of the network, trains are operated by diesel-locomotives. Enclosure 1 gives an overview on the railway network in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The performance of the Sector of Railways in the pre-war time (1990) was the following: • Freight Traffic Volume: 25,2 millions of tons and 4.410 millions of ton-km; • Passenger Traffic Volume: 13,0 millions of passengers and 1.318 millions of

passenger-km The Sector of Railways in Bosnia and Herzegovina is facing with a lot of challenges in the post-war period. As a consequence of the war activities, the railways system sustained heavy damages as most of its facilities have been put out of operation. Total war damages were roughly estimated to around 1 billion Euros. More than one third of these damages pertains to the infrastructure: 20 bridges were completely destroyed, numerous tracks were broken, overhead contact lines damaged and signalling and telecommunication facilities destroyed. Moreover, the heavy machinery for infrastructure maintenance was destroyed, as well as the rolling stock. In order to rehabilitate this condition, local Government, Railway Authorities and international institutions started with implementation of relevant programme of railways recovery. This programme was foreseen to be implemented in three stages. The aim of the first stage of the programme was to put back into operation all railway lines along the network with minimal technical requirements such as reduced transport volumes, low operational speeds and minimal safety

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PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50

measures. This stage was covered by the Emergency Transport Reconstruction Program (ETRP) and may be regarded as completed. The second stage of rehabilitation, which is still underway, aims to achieve approximate pre-war level of functionality, although it does not imply a compulsory return to all pre-war conditions. The implementation of the second stage is supposed to respect technical and operational changes arisen in the meantime, namely signalling, telecommunications and remote control. The third stage, whose starting time is not yet stated, relates to the further development of railways in line with contemporary trends in Europe, traffic demand and economic potential of the country, in order to compete effectively with other transport means. The post-war performance of the Sector of Railways is given by the tables below.

Table 1 - Railway Freight Traffic in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Growth Trend

ŽFBiH ŽRS BiH in total Year 103 Tons 106 Ton-

km 103 Tons 106 Ton-km 103 Tons 106 Ton-

km 1996 1,394 18 127 7 1,521 251997 1,632 44 178 2 1,810 461998 2,605 73 265 11 2,870 841999 2,774 115 473 31 3,247 1462000 3,328 140 951 82 4,279 2222001 3,796 164 1,060 119 4,856 2832002 4,200 177 1,174 132 5,374 309

Source: Annual Statistical Bulletins published by Office of Statistics in FBiH and RS 2002. Table 2 - Railway Passenger Traffic in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Growth Trend

ŽFBiH ŽRS BiH in total Year 103 Pass. 106

Pass.-km 103 Pass. 106 Pass.-km 103 Pass. 106

Pass.-km1996 1,232 30 1,648 32 2,880 621997 225 6 1,236 33 1,461 391998 181 5 1,570 53 1,751 581999 182 10 1,299 41 1,481 512000 197 9 1,145 38 1,342 472001 200 12 1,100 41 1,300 532002 218 15 904 38 1,122 53

Source: Annual Statistical Bulletins published by Office of Statistics in FBiH and RS 2002. Such low transport volumes by railways in BiH in relation to the pre-war volumes are the consequence of the political and economic situation in the country, which is still away from full recovery. On the other hand, another factor was the very low level of technical performance of the railway infrastructure in terms of allowable loads, speeds and safety. Enclosures 2 and 3 present the current track condition along the railway network in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the situation in spite to the fact that international community allocated some €52 millions for recovery of railways in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The key obstacles were slow recovery of industry to be served by railways and very slow implementation of the second stage of railways recovery.

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PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50

The aforesaid amount was mainly dedicated to the implementation of projects under the first phase of railways recovery. In addition, there is new financial support, given by the EIB and EBRD with total amount of around €80 millions, which is to be allocated to the Sector of Railways in Bosnia and Herzegovina to proceed with the implementation of projects under the second phase of railways recovery. This is the package of projects funded over the loan arrangements and implementation of these projects is underway. The most important projects under aforesaid projects and that are related to this project, are given in the table below. Table 3 – Relevant Railway Projects Under the EBRD/EIB Package (€)

Item FBiH RS BiH in total Continuing-action Line Tamper 1.750.000 0 1.750.000

Dynamic Stabiliser 1.450.000 0 1.450.000Ballast Regulator 575.000 1.150.000 1.725.000Track Overhaul Bradina-Konjic 13.500.000 0 13.500.000

Track Overhaul Jošavka-Banja Luka 0 9.500.000 9.500.000

Track Completion Tuzla-Zvornik 800.000 185.000 985.000

Total: 18.075.000 11.335.000 28.910.000Source: EBRD – Bosnia and Herzegovina: Project Scoping for Railway Rehabilitation, 2001 Components stated in the table above pertains to required heavy machinery for the track maintenance and to the most critical sections along the network, which require urgent overhaul activity. The last component of section Tuzla-Zvornik relates to the completion of the track since the line was put into operation just before the start of the war but with lot of technical and operational restrictions (missing sleepers, fastenings, welds, ballast, etc.). The implementation of these projects is underway. However, construction works have not started yet since the majority of Tenders are under evaluation of the Banks. It is to expect that most of these projects will be completed in 2005. Two railway companies in both entities, Railways of FBiH (ZFBiH) and Railways of RS (ZRS), have the full scale of responsibilities for the management over railway infrastructure (maintenance, operations, construction and modernisation) in the respective entities. This is a direct consequence of the Dayton Agreement, which regulates the transport infrastructure issue at the entity level. At the same time, it leaves the space for the entities to form “public corporations” to act as the “joint structures” between the entities in order to regulate inter-entity and international transportation issues2. Consequently, the first Public Corporation was formed in the Sector of Railways in April 1998.

2 Look in Enclosure 4 – Dayton Agreement Annex 9.

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PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50

This body is called Bosnia – Herzegovina Railways Public Corporation (BHRPC) and it is managed in accordance to the Agreement on Establishment3. It has to be noted that responsibilities of the Corporation are rather “delegated” than real ones. Also, the sources of funding are mostly depending on donations or entity subsidies, since there is no opportunity for the Corporation to act as the infrastructure manager along main part of the railways network at least and to collect the “access fee”. Everything is strongly dependable on entities and entity railway companies. The legislation framework in the field of railways, which defines division of responsibilities among various bodies in the country, is the following: • Law on Railways of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ŽFBiH) –

Official Gazette of FBiH N°. 41/01; • Law on Railways of Republic of Srpska (ŽRS) – Official Gazette of RS N°.

58/01; and • Law on Public Corporations Established pursuant to the Annex 9 of the

General Framework Peace Agreement for BiH– Official Gazette of FBiH N°. 19/00.

Project Components According to the Agreement between two countries4, signed on February 4th 1999, the project components were the following: • Delivery of the Tracklayer machine (turnout and track element replacing

machine); • Delivery of pertaining accessories; and • Training of operating staff. According to the Quotation no. 910997D, dated from December 4th 1998, the selected supplier was Finnish company DESEC Ltd. Annex II of the above-mentioned Agreement presents the details of the support. This support included fund of maximum FIM 7.000.000,00 and it was supposed to cover the following costs: • Purchase of the tracklayer machine and its accessories; • Training of maximum six trainees within the period of maximum two weeks

in Parkano, Finalnd; and • Costs of the Finnish agency responsible for the implementation of the

Project from the Finnish side.

3 Look in Enclosure 5 – Agreement between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska on the establishment of a joint railway public corporation as part of transportation corporation. 4 Agreement between the Government of the Republic Finland and the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning Finnish Support to Railway Public Corporation in Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6

PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50

On the other hand, the Council of Ministers (Government of BiH) was obliged to bear transportation costs of the machine and accessories. Also, this authority needed to provide sufficient and qualified personnel in timely manner, to provide the DESEC Ltd. with the radio frequency required for the remote controller of the machine and to render any other assistance needed for the facilitation of this Project. PROJECT OBJECTIVES/OUTPUT Project details about objectives and output are not very clear. Although there is signed Agreement between two Governments about implementation of this Project, there is no section in the Agreement which clarifies the objectives and expected outputs of the Project. There are only declarative sentences, stated in the introductory part of the Agreement, which describes in a general way the background of the Project from the Finnish point of view. However, looking at the available documents, it is to suppose that the objectives of the Project were the following: • In general, to support the recovery of the country destroyed by the war; • In general, to support the need of rehabilitation of the railway infrastructure

in Bosnia and Herzegovina because of war-damages mostly; and • In particular, to enforce the position of the BHRPC in implementation of

Projects, funded by international donors or institutions, as a part of defined responsibilities in the BHRPC Agreement.

Expected outputs are impossible to be clearly stated on the basics of available information and documents. In that respect, only the following can be assumed: • A number of turnouts replaced by the machine within a number of

months/years, as a part of the track overhaul activities; • A number of kilometres of track overhauled by the machine, as a part of the

track overhaul activities; • Responsible Railways in Bosnia and Herzegovina are fully capable for

operations and maintenance of the machine; and • BHRPC manages successfully with the machine in terms of time allocation

to the responsible Railways.

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PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50

SITE SURVEY FINDINGS Interviews In November 2003, the expert team of evaluators conducted the interview and the site visit to the place of current base of the machine. The interviews were completed with the ZFBiH Manager for Mechanised Track Maintenance, Mr. Resad Mulaomerovic and his staff responsible for operation and maintenance of the machine. The main outcomes of these interviews are stated below. In 1997, local Railways were introduced with information about the tracklayer machine TL 50 for the first time by the DESEC. It was stated that the machine operates as the tracklayer for both turnouts and track. It is also possible to handle with the machine by the remote controller with a fixed radio frequency. The machine is built on the “straddle-carrier” principle, which makes this machine very flexible and with high load capacity. It can be transported on the flat-wagon or on the special trolleys built for such purpose. Although this document states that the machine may be used in multi-purpose applications (track layering, turnout replacement, track maintenance,…), Mr. Mulaomerovic stated that primary purpose of this machine type (TL 50) is turnout replacement. Also, he stated that the machine could be used for track replacement and layering but only on railway sections without terrain difficulties in railway access and space for manoeuvring. The situation is that local Railways used heavy rail cranes for this type of works before the war. There were 4 cranes in operation of Geismar type in total, which could replace around 200m of track in an hour, if worked coupled in doubles. So, practical capacity of a single crane was some 50m/hour. Similar capacity was achieved in use for TL 50 machine, although with rather occasional use. Those 4 cranes are still in operation and they are used by the local company authorised for the track maintenance, called “Remont pruga d.d Sarajevo”. This expert confirmed that the recipient of the Project was BHRPC and this authority is the owner at the same time. The machine is currently in operational condition but not in use. The explanation was that there is no concrete plans for its use because above-mentioned track overhaul activities were in delay. Also, it is not known if the future contractor of these works will use this type of the machine for overhaul works. The machine has not been used in FBiH as well as in RS as foreseen. Actually, it has been used in FBiH only. The explanation for non-use of the machine in RS was that responsible people in ZRS were not interested for its use, since they thought there are more important projects for themselves. This company did not even send the personnel to be qualified for the use of this machine to Finland. Unfortunately, there is no clear and written evidence about it. It was also confirmed by the trained technicians in ZFBiH that ZRS additionally sent few people from their side to be introduced with the TL 50, upon its delivery to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, they abandoned the “training” with explanation “this is not for them” or “we do not need this”. Again, there is no written evidence of it. The machine is physically based in Blazuj, nearby Sarajevo, in the Workshop facility of Railways, which was used before for exclusive maintenance of

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PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50

heavy machinery. Unfortunately, due to the war activities, this Workshop was severely damaged and it can hardly work now without appropriate equipment, tools and materials. As a temporary solution, most of the existing and operational machinery is repaired in the Central Workshop Rajlovac, located also in the vicinity of Sarajevo. This workshop at the moment has some better conditions for the repair of the machinery. However, reconstruction of Blazuj Workshop is also in the EBRD/EIB package, so it is to expect that some better conditions will be provided by this Workshop after 2005. The maintenance has been properly conducted in the meantime and the whole container with accessories is available on site. There was a critical failure of one hydraulic engine just after the first action in the country. This has been resolved by the local trained technicians, which replaced the engine immediately. The additional delivery of this part was promptly resolved by the original supplier in order to fulfil the commitment to have full set of accessories available on site. This engine belongs to this set. At the time of machine’s operations, there were no problems with the supply chain of other materials (track, sleepers, etc.). However, the main problem was rather seldom use of the machine within the period of 4 years (1999-2003). The table below presents the total use of the machine in the meantime. Table 4. Use of TL 50 in period 1999-2003

No. Description of works

Location of works

Time of works Quantity

Number of working hours

(engine-hours)

1 Training of 4 technicians

Parkano, Finland

17-28/05/1999 10 days 83

2 Track layering on new railway overpass

Line Sarajevo-Ploce at section 8+500-8+710

13-16/07/2000 210m 20

3

Track layering of a new station track at market centre “Merkator”

Freight Railway Station Sarajevo

22/09/2000 1.200m 16

4 Track layering on tramway section

City of Sarajevo

02-12/08/2001 1.160m 50

5

Track and turnout layering of industrial siding at the Distribution Centre

Rajlovac 15/09/2001 30m and 1 turnout 7

6 Track and turnout layering in the Workshop

Blazuj 30/04/2002 50m and 1 turnout 10

Source: Report of Mr. Mulaomerovic, Sarajevo, November 5th 2003.

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PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50

EVALUATION AND RATINGS

Evaluation The evaluation criteria include relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the Project. Relevance: the implementation of this Project partially respond to the needs prioritised by the local authorities. Although track overhaul projects have been highlighted as top priorities, this type of machinery has not been mentioned at all on any official priority list by the local Railways or other Bosnian Authorities. There are few reasons for that. First of all, local Railways have available cranes for the same type of works as for TL 50, which satisfies their needs in terms of capacity. Secondly, local Railways expected that use of heavy machinery for this type of works would be finally defined by a contractor, which will complete the planned overhaul works. Finally, it has been confirmed by the local experts that there are serious technical limits for use of this machine under heavy alignment conditions, such as Sarajevo-Capljina Line for instance, which focuses use of this machine for turnouts only on some sections. Effectiveness: it is very difficult to evaluate this criterion having in mind absence of clear objectives and outputs. However, some remarks can be used for the evaluation if we include assumptions stated before. First of all, this Project did not help to the local Railways to rehabilitate some sections along the main lines in the country. There was one application in that sense only (the second one from table 4). The use of this machine has been facilitated partially, because one of stated beneficiaries did not use it at all and the adequate training has not been done. The BHRPC is the owner but still not enforced sufficiently to plan maintenance activities along with the use of the machine. Finally, as the output, the result of TL 50 use is 2 turnouts replaced, 2.650m of track replaced, out of which only 10% along main lines, and 196 working hours in total, out of which 83 working hours were done as training on the same machine. Efficiency: this Project was mostly efficient since the funds foreseen to be spent were in line to the estimations, as well as time, material and staff. The critical issue in terms of efficiency is the Project did not achieve assumed objectives. Two main points of it are “type of evaluation of priorities” done by Finnish experts5 and evaluation of incomplete part of the assistance – ZRS staff. Sustainability: considering the level of achieved outputs, it can be stated that the works done by this machine are sustainable and long lasting. However, it must be noted that any further results will depend on management over this machine by the BHRPC, ZRS, ZFBiH or other contractors for track overhaul works.

5 It seems like strategic miss from the BHRPC but good marketing by DESEC. These funds could be spent in a more efficient way.

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PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50

Rating Rating of each evaluation criterion is as follows: • Very good: mark 5 • Good: mark 4 • Medium: mark 3 • Poor: mark 2 • Very poor: mark 1 Based on the aforesaid evaluation and marks, the table below presents the result of the evaluation. Table 5. Evaluation of the Project Criterion Rating

Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Sustainability Total (in average)

Descriptive Poor Poor Medium Very God Poor/Medium

Mark 2 2 3 4 2,75

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PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50

12

Photo Documentation

Figure 1. Parking location of the Tracklayer Machine in Blazuj Workshop Figure 2. Container with Accessories

Figure 3. Tracklayer Trolleys for Transport Figure 4. The Environment of Blazuj Workshop

ANNEX 4 B

CITY HEATING

EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

IN SARAJEVO

DESIGN EVALUATION

Sarajevo, November 2003

INSTITUT IPSA SARAJEVO

Author: Majušević Momir, dipl. Ing. maš.

Manager:

Prof. Dr. Ešref Gačanin, dipl. Ing. Maš.

DESIGN EVALUATION

I PART: GENERAL PART Design number 863. 01. 301

Design title EMERGENCY CITY HEATING RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT IN SARAJEVO

Sub - sector ENERGY, CITY HEATING Beneficiary BOSNA AND HERZEGOVINA, SARAJEVO CONTRACTS ON AID

Year Project Title Source and type of assets

Mio USD Purpose of the means

1996 -2000

Emergency District Heating Reconstruction Project Sarajevo

IDA WORLD BANK - Basic loan - Dutch loan I - Dutch loan II

20,00 5,00 3,50

Material, work and local supervision.

1996 -2000

E.D.H.R.P. Sarajevo

FINLAND - Material 1996 - Technical Support

3,35 5,35

In the phase of emergency works for all parts of design. 1996 – 2000.

1997 E.D.H.R.P. Sarajevo

DENMARK - Material 1997 - Technical Support

1,30 0,10

Distribution pipelines, sub-stations, in-door installation. Financial training.

1998 E.D.H.R.P. Sarajevo E.U. 1,90

“Turnkey” contract (in-door installations for 7.000 apartments)

TOTAL AID: 40,50 Comment: Part of the 20 Mio USD loan, provided by World Bank, was temporarily divided among Banja Luka Heating Systems (500.000 USD), Elektroprivreda (3.800.000 USD) and part for the realization of the gas installation project (5.000.000 USD). This resulted with financial problems during the implementation of emergency city heating project in Sarajevo.

II PART HISTORY Central heating system was used in Sarajevo, from the beginning of the XX century, for heating of residential and offices. First large buildings, which were built at that time (1910 – 1911) all had central heating installations (the Court, Railroad Head Office, Presidency etc). The mass construction of residential buildings containing multiple apartments began at the end of World War II and the central heating installations became wide spread.

II – 1 – STATE OF AFFAIRS BEFORE THE WAR City heating system in Sarajevo started developing since 1968 when J.K.P. “Toplane” Sarajevo was founded. In 1991 J.K.P. “Toplane” Sarajevo, was providing services to 40% of the population (apartments) in the wider Sarajevo area. Approximately 180.000 of inhabitants were users of this system, as well as the large part of the business and public areas in the city. City heating system consisted of 130 boiler rooms; big stand-alone boiler rooms with more multiple boilers inside; smaller boiler rooms with one boiler inside. Total of installed power of all boiler rooms measured 515 MW, from which 387 MW (75%) was working capacity. This heat was transported by city pipeline hot-water network with total length of 62 km, to the end-users. There were 120 heating sub-stations included in the system and located either in the boiler room itself or in the buildings of end-users. System had two technologies implemented: - first, 43 boiler rooms were providing independent networks with warm or hot water for heating. - second, each building or separated block of buildings had their own roof boiler room (total of 87 roof boiler rooms). Combined boiler rooms feeding system was used for the first type of boiler rooms (gas/heating oil) and gas-only feeding for the second type of the boiler rooms. Approximately 225.000 of the radiators were installed in the apartments, business and public spaces.

II – 2 – CONDITION AFTER THE WAR – PRIOR TO THE PROJECT

During the war city heating system was largely devastated due to war and lack of the liquid fuels or irregular and insufficient supply with natural gas. The second reason resulted in major damage due to: installation freezing accelerated corrosion and problems with insulation of the elements of the system. End result was such that in 1996 only 16.000 (32%) users out of pre-war 50.000 could use the heating from the city system. “Toplane” were producing and supplying the consumers with only 141 MW or 36% of 387MW before the war. Out of the 130 boiler rooms, only 60 were operational with total approximate installed capacity of 200MW, which is ca. 39% of the pre-war capacity.

Due to freezing, corrosion and insulation damages to the pipeline network, ca. 15% of a total length of 62km had to be repaired (reinstalled). Most of the sub-stations

were out of order due to damages (freezing, corrosion) or lack of maintenance or spare parts. Out of total 225.000 radiators in the system before the war, only 30% or approximately 65.000 were operational.

III PROJECT CONTENT A – “Emergency programme” of reconstruction

The aim of this part of the reconstruction programme is to make functional the city-heating network for heating of min. 30.000 apartments before winter. “Emergency program” started in June 1996, and it was financed by Finland. Main components of the “emergency programme” were: - Reparation of the heating installation in approximately 20.000 apartments. - Reparation of major damages and dilapidated parts of the distribution network (ca 3 km). - Reparation of the sub-stations for this part of the network. - Emergency repairs in the boiler rooms in order to increase the working capacity to 50 – 80%, in the settlements where apartments heating-ready. - Reestablishment of the system of payment of service.

B – "Main programme of reconstruction"

Along with emergency programme of reconstruction, the main reconstruction has begun. Goals of this part of reconstruction were: - Reestablishment of the production, distribution and consumption of heat equal to the pre-war level - Enabling the decrease in the gas consumption and increase in natural oil consumption - Improvements to the system during the process of reconstruction - Strengthening of the institutional capacity of “Toplane” – Sarajevo. In order to complete these goals following components are involved in a reconstruction project: - Boilers and boiler rooms - Distribution networks - Sub-stations - House installations - Providing equipment for the buildings for "Toplane" Administration - Establishment of database collection of financial and other (billing and payment, preventive maintenance, geodesic information system) - Mechanism (meters) for measuring of heat consumption. State of affairs of the heating system – Sarajevo:

IV – EVALUATION OF THE SUCCESS OF THE PROJECT IV – 1: SUCCESS OF THE PROJECT REALIZATION A.- "Emergency programme" of reconstruction

a.) Until the end of 1996, 30.000 apartments were heating-ready, and until the end of the heating season 1996/1997 (April 1997), the total of 34.000 apartments.

b.) Reparation of the installations was conducted in ca 20.000 apartments,

including the installation of new radiator units, radiator valves and radiator connections and cleaning of internal networks. Approximately 3 km of damaged and dilapidated parts of distribution network were rehabilitated.

c.) 9 sets of new heating substations were installed, and existing sub-stations

inside the buildings were repaired (damaged segments were replaced).

d.) Emergency repairs in 27 boiler rooms were made in order to satisfy the needs of the repaired home installations.

e.) Billing and payment system is operational since December 1996.

f.) ''Toplane'' offices were repaired for the staff of Toplane Administration and for

the requirements of the PIU project implementation team.

Main goal, to heat-up 30.000 of apartments until winter 1996, has been achieved. B. – "Main Reconstruction Programme"

a.) Some 45.500 apartments were heated at the end of the project, which is slightly less than the number of apartments connected to the network before the war (ca 48.300 apartments). The reason for this is the level of devastation of some of the apartments, which renders the reparations of the heating impossible.

b.) Ca 9 km of the distribution network has been reconstructed according to the plan

c.) All foreseen sub-station reparation works have been done and 80 sub-stations now have flow meters installed.

d.) 26 complete or partial reconstructions of the boiler rooms, has been done including the construction of additional 8 roof boiler rooms. Another 17 boiler rooms have undergone smaller or insignificant repairs in order to achieve pre-war level of heat production.

e.) I. phase of the reconstruction of remote control and monitoring, which consists of 66 roof boilers (of total 87), 9 out of 43 main boiler rooms and 9 out of 120 sub-stations

Standalone boiler rooms: Boiler room Čengić Vila 1 – before and after reconstruction IV – 2. WORKING CAPABILITY OF THE PROJECT Standalone and roof boiler rooms

Evaluated working capability (readiness) in reconstructed boiler rooms (normal and roof ones) amounts to 100% comparing the plan (the assets spent). However, in the boiler rooms where only essential repairs have been made while repairs of the secondary priority have not, it is hard to estimate the capability of these boiler rooms to produce heat for a longer period of time neither are these considered to be reliable for an extended period of time. All these boiler rooms are operational despite their outdated equipment so they require increased attention and frequent maintenance. The aim of the project was accomplished in the boiler rooms where full reconstruction or replacement of the basic equipment has been completed. The capability for the efficient operation and achievement of the designed capacity of these boiler rooms is 100%.

Distribution network

Main part of the known damages to the distribution network was repaired and this part of the network has been enabled for long-term (safe) operation. Works must be continued after the detailed tests of the network have been conducted. These works are gradually being done by Toplane in accordance with their limited financial possibilities.

Heat sub-stations

Total of 14 new packages, which have been installed solved problems in the respective parts of the system, however, more than 100 sub-stations with outdated equipment remains so they do not provide for long term safety. The works must be done continually and consist mainly of replacements of the dilapidated component with new ones and

installation of new flow meters. Additionally, inclusion of these sub-stations into a remote control and monitoring system must continue.

House (in-door) installations

All physically functional apartments in the areas covered by city heating network are, connected to the heating system. Until the end of 1999 number of apartments with introduced central heating reached 45.000, which was the achievable maximum at that moment. This number could not have been increased without major architectural works or new consumers. The problem of replacement of old convectors with new modern radiator units remains. Hence, the projected goal has been achieved.

IV – 3. SELF-SUSTAINABILITY

All parts of the heating system which are part of heating system Toplane – Sarajevo, and which have been thoroughly reconstructed as a part of this project are capable of uninterrupted work and are self-sustainable assuming that there is regular and quality maintenance, which was the case during 2000 – 2003. Toplane – Sarajevo have undertaken a number of necessary organisational and personnel changes in order to elevate the quality of this segment to a required level, which was done with success.

IV – 4. QUALITY AND DURABILITY OF THE WORKS CONDUCTED

All works encompassed by the reconstruction process have been done with necessary quality. This was the finding of the inspection of a part of the reconstructed boiler rooms (standalone and roof boiler rooms), sub-stations and house installations. Durability is guaranteed by the selection of the equipment and materials used during the reconstruction. All important parts of particular installations are product of renowned European companies in this field.

V. – CONCLUSION All works foreseen by the “City heating emergency reconstruction projects” in Sarajevo have been done according to the programmes:

- " Rapid Programme" of the reconstruction - " Main Programme" of the reconstruction

An important aspect to emphasise is the respect of deadlines during the works as a part of

the Emergency reconstruction programme. The works of the rapid reconstruction

programme have been completed as planned (until winter 1996) which significantly aided

to relatively fast stabilisation of the situation in Sarajevo after the 4-year war as far as the

city heating is concerned.

Main reconstruction programme has helped to reach the pre-war level of production, distribution and consumption of heating energy. In addition to this utmost important segment, the same programme resulted in significant level of modernization of the heating production system in general:

- Installation of the flow meter - Automated water preparation (softening) for the whole system - New water filtration system etc.

Particularly great progress has been made in the field of equipment for the data collection for billing and payments of the consummated heat, which increased the percentage of service payments to Toplane Sarajevo. The works have been done with quality, using quality materials, which will significantly increase the functionality, efficiency and durability of the heating system in the city of Sarajevo. Particularly important expert and organisational help was provided by the expert team from Finland, who were present on the spot during the reconstruction process.

VI – RECCOMENDATIONS

In order to fully modernise and complete the heating system in Sarajevo we recommend raising funds for the following tasks:

- Replacement of the remaining old boilers, mainly in smaller boiler rooms with the installation of the corresponding equipment - Replacement of the remaining parts of the old and outdated equipment in normal

and roof boiler rooms. - Replacement of old parts of the equipment in sub-stations - Completion of reconstruction of dilapidated distribution network - Further replacement of the dilapidated convectors with new and modern radiator

units (in-door house installations) - Connecting remaining smaller boiler rooms, roof boiler rooms and house sub-

stations to the remote control and monitoring system. - Starting the implementation of the Programme of installation of heat meters for all

consumers of the heat energy which are part of the Toplane Sarajevo heating system

- Replacement of the manual radiator unit’s valves with automated thermostatic valves

ANNEX 5

OTHER DONORS’ PROGRAMMES AND EXPERIENCES

Norway. From humanitarian aid, Norway went straight into democratisation and human rights. Only later, and parallelly, did reconstruction come into the picture, mainly with a shelter and return focus. Both democratisation and reconstruction have now largely been phased out. Some demining activities will continue. Norway supports rule of law by providing substantial financial support to the IJC, and is, like Finland, also seconding experts to the Independent Judicial Commission. Economic development will be the predominant focus in the next period. Norway’s strategy is to create clusters of mutually supportive projects in sectors where Norway has a comparative advantage: small industry, fishery, IT etc. They view institutional development and capacity building as central and if they will go into some infrastructure support it will only be the carrot for an institutional capacity building component. Norway does not want to participate in basket funding or sector support. If they finance something they would rather be the only donor, which is a quite rare attitude among donors who generally want to share the responsibility. The Norwegian embassy had no knowledge about the Finnish aid programme. The Netherlands. The Netherlands provided hundreds of millions of Euro for reconstruction during the years after Dayton. This assistance was spread around the country but concentrated to the region around Srebrenica. Projects were mostly implemented by NL NGOs and targeted infrastructure, roads, electricity, water and heating. Currently they have phased out reconstruction completely and are now focusing on good governance and economic development. NL represents BiH in the World Bank and IMF as the leader of their group. Among other things, they will support the transfer of authority for return to the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees. The Commission for Real Property Claims will transfer their database to the Ministry with Dutch support, and NL – like Sweden - will support the ministerial field presence in the form of Regional Centres, see more below Interestingly, the NL has an organisational structure of its MFA similar to the Finnish in which they have completely integrated the development department in the geographical departments. They made the reorganisation earlier than Finland and according to the embassy, it works very well. The respondent felt that it was often a strength being able to understand the political and often thorny context when administering aid projects. Dutch CIMIC has channelled development financing on the same scale as the Finnish according to the respondent. They have a limit of merely KM 50 000 (approx. EUR 25 000) for reconstruction projects, but they have been involved in a larger scheme where business development and contacts between Dutch and Bosnian business has been the focus. This has i a resulted in minister level meetings and matchmaking trips for joint ventures in both directions. The NL expressed worry over the lessening interest from donors at a time when BiH still was not beyond the point of no return. Austria implemented a sizable rehabilitation programme after the war. As a result of austerity measures taken by the Austrian government in 1997-2000, the allocations for

development cooperation were severly curtailed. In 2002, Austria made available 0.26% of its GNI for development cooperation. Now Austria has set a goal of raising these funds to at least 0.33% of the GNI by 2006. Reconstruction of the infrastructure still plays a central role. The Austrian cooperation with BiH is focused on three sectors:

• environment, in particular water

• support to higher education

• economic development, especially promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises

In addition, some support to public administration, democracy and human rights is planned. The water projects have been finalised after complete restructuring of the water facilities in six municipalities. At present, implementation support in the form of technical assistance is provided to safeguard the investments. The Austrian reconstruction programme for FBiH is focusing on Cantons 4 (Zenica-Doboj) and 6 (Central Bosnia, Travnik-Vitez), and in RS on Banja Luka and Mrkonjic Grad. Support to higher education is on-going together with Austrian Universities, and will continue.There will be a strong emphasis on economic regeneration. This will include support to information points and to an Entrepreneurship Centre together with Tuzla University and the business society. There is also a significant CARDS Programme, and Austria wishes to add on to that. In January 2004, the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) was established as a state-owned company, supervised by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Although ADA does not avail itself of country strategies, it does have sectoral strategies. It seems probable that these will be broken down in due course into country chapters. Sweden. At present, a Country Strategy for Swedish Development Cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003-2005 provides the guidelines for Sweden’s engagement in BiH. The objectives laid down for Swedish cooperation with countries in the Balkans include the objectives peace and stability, and the transition to a market economy, which also are reflected in the cooperation with BiH. The aim of Sweden’s cooperation is to support the integration of BiH into European structures through the Stabilisation and Association Process. In addition, Sweden is guided by BiH’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which is yet another instrument for closer integration with EU structures. Many donors are currently decreasing their support or have already left the country. However, Sweden has the intention to continue providing substantial assistance for some years to come. During this strategy period, there will be an emphasis on institution building, support in the financial sector for the transition to a market economy, and increased assistance to the social sector. The need for contributions to sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons is still great and will continue, containing i.a. micro-credit schemes in support of amsll-scale agriculture and enterprises. In the area of democratic governance there will be a focus on institution building at central government level and on the strengthening of the judiciary. The programme will also comprise assistance to projects for youth, media, culture, HIV/Aids prevention and protection of the environment.

Denmark has something of a unique approach in BiH. While devoting DKR 100 million in 1996 on reconstruction, a principle decision was taken in 1999 not to direct any development cooperation resources to BiH or other parts of Europe. Such funds would only go to the least developed and poorest countries in the world. Instead, Denmark created the so-called FRESTA programme in 2000. With the sub title “Peace and Stability through cross-boundary civil society collaboration”, it is based on NGO activity. The model for the programme came from the Danish support to the EU candidate countries e g the Baltic countries. It is structured as a fund with a value of about DKR 150 million per year. It is in principle global in scope, but special emphasis has been given to South Eastern Europe since the start, where about a third of the total budget is spent. The FRESTA South Eastern Europe (SEE) programme objectives are in line with the Stability Pact. The heaviest components are media and refugee issues followed by youth and human rights. European Commission. The EC began to provide non-humanitarian assistance to BiH in 1996 throught two programmes, Phare and OBNOVA. These covered a multiplicity of interventions in a wide range of sectors guided by annual programmes. Humanitarian assistance from the EC was delivered during 1991-2000 through the ECHO programme. Until 2000, the EC programmes in BiH covered refugee return, economic reform, employment regeneration, reconstruction of technical and social infrastructure, institution building, social cohesion and development (including education and health), peace implementation, democratisation, human rights, and civil society. Since 2000, BiH is a full participant in the Stabilisation and Association process and the EC Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 states the priority areas for cooperation. The EC CARDS programme assists BiH in meeting these objectives by focusing on democratic stabilisation, administrative capacity building, economic and social development, environment and natural resources, and justice and home affairs. BiH determines its own rate of progress within the SAP, but in order to meet the objectives, the BiH authorities have to take ownership of reform, take the European agenda seriously and address issues of conflict prevention and poverty reduction. Under this Country Strategy, BiH has the opportunity to build up the country into a modern democratic state. A Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP), which is part of the Country Strategy Paper (but covering only 2002-2004) sets out the objectives, expected results and conditionality in greater detail. In 2004, the final year of the present MIP, the programme will focus on administrative capacity building, justice and home affairs, economic and social development and to some extent environment and return. In November 2003, a European Feasibility Study confirmed that BiH can move forward in 2004 towards formal negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. This is, however, conditioned on a number of important commitments still not implemented: economic reform, the rule of law, governance, and media, plus compliance with existing international obligations an conditions (cf. Chapter 4 in main report).