evaluation of parties and coalitions with regard to party manifestos

23.07.2010Andranik Tangian. 10th Meeting of Society for SCW, Moscow, HSE1

Evaluation of parties and coalitions with regard to party manifestos

Andranik TangianHans-Böckler Foundation D-40476 Düsseldorf University of Karlsruhe D-76128

[email protected]


Agenda

1 Introduction

2 Model for elections 2005

3 Evaluation of parties

4 Evaluation of coalitions

5 Summary

6 Extension of the model to elections 2009

7 Mathematical annex


1.1 Introduction: Bundestagswahl 2005

% Votes

SPD (social democrats) 34.2

CDU/CSU (conservators) 35.2

Green (ecologists) 8.1

FDP (neoliberals) 9.8

Left-Party (left social democrats & communists)

8.7

19 minor parties 4.0


1.2 Introduction: Data (2005 on party manifestos)

Opinions of parties and unions Weighting

SPD CDU Green FDP Left-Party

Unions Expert Google

Relax the protection against dismissals

No Yes No Yes No No 5 25300

Sector-dependent minimal wages

Yes No Yes No No Yes 4 367

Statutory minimal wage

Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 3 32500

Combined wages No Yes No No No No 3 54000


1.3 Introduction: Methodology

Data like for the Wahl-O-Matrepresentation of programs by Yes/No answers

Task is different Wahl-O-Mat: fit single voters to parties

Our model: fit parties to the electorate

Method: indicators of popularity and universality

Goal of the paperto evaluateve leading parties and coalitions

2.1 Model: Representativeness


2.2 Model: Indicators

Popularity: % of the electorate represented, averaged on 95 questions spatial aspect of representativeness

Universality: frequency of representing a majority temporal aspect of representativeness

3.1 Evaluation of parties: Indices


3.4 Evaluation of parties: Implications

SPD is the most popular and universal party in spite of shortage of votes

High representativeness of trade unions no interrogation of public opinion

Weighting plays a negligible role henceforth, only unweighted indicators

are considered


4.1 Evaluation of coalitions: Definitions

Unanimity of a coalition is the weight of questions with unanimous opinions of coalition members

Proportionality of impact to weight on non-unanimous questions, the impact of

coalition fractions (probability that the opinion is decisive) is proportional to their size

total uncertainty (equal chances of alternative opinions)

both factors are considered with weights p and (1 - p), 0 ≤ p ≤ 1


4.2 Evaluation of coalitions: Definitions (continued)

Popularity of coalition is its expected representativeness

Universality of a coalition is ist expected rounded representativeness

Accuracy of prediction of the indicators is the standard deviation of representativeness and of rounded representativeness

4.3 Evaluation of coalitions: Indices


4.4 Evaluation of coalitions: Principal component analysis

Principal components

First axis

Second axis

Third axis

Popularity 0.0568 -0.2327 -0.9709

Universality 0.2677 -0.9333 0.2394

Unanimity 0.9618 0.2735 -0.0093

Std deviation of w.r.t. axes

24.9417 8.3166 3.3827


4.5 Evaluation of coalitions: Implications

Coalition SPD/CDU (now in power) has high popularity but low unanimity and mediocre universality

Coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party (much discussed but not realized) has higher unanimity, lower popularity but much higher universality


4.6 Evaluation of coalitions: Implications (continued)

Coalition CDU/FDP (held before the elections) has a higher unanimity but low indices of popularity and universality

Coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party (failed due to personal conicts between party leaders) might be the best alternative


5 Summary

The indices of popularity and universality are derived from votes and party manifestos for parties, their coalitions, and trade unions

The SPD was the most representative party, although it was not the election winner

A better alternative to the actual coalition CDU/SPD: SPD/ Green/Left-Party

Simple computing algorithms


6.1 Remake for elections 2009(Matthias Hölzlein)


The SPD is the most popular party (65%)

FDP the is most universal

The CDU/CSU as the strongest party in parliament has only mediocre indicators

Contradiction to the shares of votes received: Electors, seem to pay more attention to the traditional image of parties rather than to what they vote for

6.2 Evaluation of the remake 2009


6.3 Electorate profile for 32 Wal-o-mat questions

Survey data on balance of opinions on each question:

Opinion polls like of the Politbarometer by institutes Wahlen or Forsa

6 of 38 Wal-o-mat questions 2009 are not covered by the polls and are omitted

A few questions from the retained ones are matched to survey questions

Equal weighting of questions


6.4 Model 2009 for directly estimated electorate profiles


Under the direct method, the three left/ socialist parties are most popular and universal. The Left-Party is the strongest. The two governing parties CDU/CSU and FDP have the lowest indicators

Electors vote for the parties with whom they disagree on most of issues:

Irrational behavior of the electorate?

Left-Parties are considered populist rather than reliable for government work?

6.5 Evaluation 2009 for directly estimated electorate

profiles


7.1 Mathematical annex Notation

dichotomous questions

{ } weights of (probabilitymeasure)

candidates for election (parties)

{ }, 1, matrix of candidate opinions

{ } candidate weights (probability votes received)

{ }

q

qc qc

c

q

q

q

c

b b

a

μ

B

ξ

a B

. element-by-element product of vectors

balance of opinions in the society

1 abs(sign ) vector of indicators of tie opinions

a b

ξ

aa


7.2 Mathematical annex Definitions (parties)

Representativeness:

0 5

weight of protagonists if 1

weight of antagonists if 1

P popularity of

U round[ ] universality ofqc

qc

qcqc

c q qcq

c q q qcq r q

br

b

r c

r c


7.3 Mathematical annex Theorem 1 (indices of parties)

Analogy with force vectors in physics:

The most popular (universal) candidate has the largest projection of his opinion vector bc on the µ-weighted social vector of balance of opinions, respectively, of majority opinion

1 1{P } ( . )

2 21 1 1

{U } ( sign )2 2 2

c

c '

μ a B

μ μ a Ba


7.4 Mathematical annex Definitions (coalitions)

coalition (subset of candidates)

member weights

{ } matrix of member opinions

balance of coalition opinions

C Cc

ccc C

C

qc

C C C C

q

C

c C

b c C

b

ξ

B

b Bξ


7.5 Mathematical annex Theorem 2.1 (on coalitions)

sign is the number of members

P P , U P weighted member indicators

C C

q cqc C

C C

C c c C c cc C c C

s n b n

s

where

Unanimity of 1

1P P (1 )( ) .

2

1U U (1 )( sign )

2

C

C C

C C

C C

C C

C

p

p '

μs

μ a s b

μ a s b


7.6 Mathematical annex Theorem 2.2 (on coalitions)

If the coalition opinions on non-unanimous questions are independent (= independent negotiations on every question) then

2 2 2

2 2 2

1V . 1

4

1Vround[ ] sign . 14

C C

C

C C

C

r p

r p

'

'

μ a s b

μ a s b

evaluation of parties and coalitions with regard to party manifestos

Documents

meeting of society

coalitionsandranik tangian

consideredandranik tangian

indices andranik tangian

fit parties

indicators of popularity

unanimous questions

universal party