evolution to basel ii(fdic)

Upload: jjanggu

Post on 04-Apr-2018

224 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    1/45

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    2/45

    First Basel Accord

    The first Basel Accord (Basel I) was

    completed in 1988 Set minimum capital standards for banks

    Standards focused on credit risk, the main riskincurred by banks

    Became effective end-year 1992

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    3/45

    Reason for the Accord

    To create a level playing field for

    internationally active banks Banks from different countries competing for the

    same loans would have to set aside roughly thesame amount of capital on the loans

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    4/45

    1988 Accord Capital Requirements

    Capital was set at 8% and was adjusted by a

    loans credit risk weight Credit risk was divided into 5 categories: 0%,

    10%, 20%, 50%, and 100%

    Commercial loans, for example, were assigned to

    the 100% risk weight category

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    5/45

    Risk-Based Capital

    The Accord was hailed for incorporating risk

    into the calculation of capital requirements

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    6/45

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    7/45

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    8/45

    Risk Weights

    Risk weights were based on what the parties

    to the Accord negotiated rather than on theactual risk of each asset

    Risk weights did not flow from any particularinsolvency probability standard, and were for the

    most part, arbitrary

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    9/45

    Operational and Other Risks

    The requirements did not explicitly account

    for operating and other forms of risk that mayalso be important

    Except for trading account activities, the capitalstandards did not account for hedging,

    diversification, and differences in riskmanagement techniques

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    10/45

    Banks Develop Own Capital

    Allocation Models

    Advances in technology and finance allowed

    banks to develop their own capital allocation(internal) models in the 1990s

    This resulted in more accurate calculations ofbank capital than possible under Basel I

    These models allowed banks to align theamount of risk they undertook on a loan withthe overall goals of the bank

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    11/45

    Internal Models and Basel I

    Internal models allow banks to more finely

    differentiate risks of individual loans than ispossible under Basel I

    Risk can be differentiated within loan categoriesand between loan categories

    Allows the application of a capital charge toeach loan, rather than each category of loan

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    12/45

    Variation in Credit Quality

    Banks discovered a wide variation in credit

    quality within risk-weight categories Basel I lumps all commercial loans into the 8%

    capital category

    Internal models calculations can lead to capital

    allocations on commercial loans that vary from1% to 30%, depending on the loans estimatedrisk

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    13/45

    Capital Arbitrage

    If a loan is calculated to have an internal

    capital charge that is low compared to the8% standard, the bank has a strong incentiveto undertake regulatory capital arbitrage

    Securitization is the main means used by U.S.

    banks to engage in regulatory capitalarbitrage

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    14/45

    Example of Capital Arbitrage

    Assume a bank has a portfolio of commercial loans with the followingratings and internally generated capital requirements AA-A: 3%-4% capital needed

    B+-B: 8% capital needed B- and below: 12%-16% capital needed

    Under Basel I, the bank has to hold 8% risk-based capital against all ofthese loans

    To ensure the profitability of the better quality loans, the bank engagesin capital arbitrage--it securitizes the loans so that they are reclassifiedinto a lowerregulatory risk category with a lower capital charge

    Lower quality loans with higher internal capital charges are kept on thebanks books because they require less risk-based capital than thebanks internal model indicates

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    15/45

    New Approach to Risk-Based Capital

    By the late 1990s, growth in the use of

    regulatory capital arbitrage led the BaselCommittee to begin work on a new capitalregime (Basel II)

    Effort focused on using banks internal rating

    models and internal risk models June 1999: Committee issued a proposal for

    a new capital adequacy framework to replacethe 1998 Accord

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    16/45

    Basel II

    Basel II consists of three pillars: Minimum capital requirements for credit risk,

    market risk and operational riskexpanding the1988 Accord (Pillar I)

    Supervisory review of an institutions capitaladequacy and internal assessment process (Pillar

    II) Effective use of market discipline as a lever to

    strengthen disclosure and encourage safe andsound banking practices (Pillar III)

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    17/45

    Pillar I

    In the United States, all banks that will be

    required to conform to the new capitalstandard will use the Advanced InternalRatings Based approach (AIRB)

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    18/45

    AIRB Approach Requirements

    Collect sufficient data on loans to develop a

    method for rating loans within variousportfolios

    Develop a Probability of Default (PD) foreach rated loan

    Develop a Loss Given Default (LGD) for eachloan

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    19/45

    Example: Safe v. Risky Loans

    Safe loans:

    Over a 1-year period, only 0.25% of these loansdefault

    If a loan defaults, the bank only loses 1% on theoutstanding amount

    Risky loans:

    Over a 1-year period, 1% of loans default everyyear

    If a loan defaults, the bank loses 10% of theoutstanding amount

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    20/45

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    21/45

    Example: Safe v. Risky Loans

    (continued)

    For a $100 million in a risky portfolio the

    bank would expect to see $1 million indefaults in a year and a loss on the defaultsof $100,000

    ($100 million X 1% = $1 million)

    ($1 million X 10% = $100,000)

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    22/45

    Goal of Pillar I

    Although simplistic, this example

    demonstrates what Pillar I is trying to achieve If the banks own internal calculations show thatthey have extremely risky, loss-prone loans thatgenerate high internal capital charges, theirformal risk-based capital charges should also behigh

    Likewise, lower risk loans should carry lower risk-based capital charges

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    23/45

    Complexity of Pillar I

    Banks have many different asset classes

    each of which may require different treatment Each asset class needs to be defined and theapproach to each exposure determined

    Minimum standards must be established for

    rating system design, including testing anddocumentation requirements

    The proposals must be tested in the real world

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    24/45

    Assessing Basel II

    To determine if the proposed rules are likely

    to yield reasonable risk-based capitalrequirements within and between countriesfor banks with similar portfolios, fourquantitative impact studies (QIS) have been

    undertaken

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    25/45

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    26/45

    Operational Risk

    Pillar I also adds a new capital componentfor operational risk Operational risk covers the risk of loss due to

    system breakdowns, employee fraud ormisconduct, errors in models or natural or man-made catastrophes, among others

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    27/45

    Pillars II and III

    Progress has also been made on Pillars IIand III

    Pillar II focuses on supervisory oversight

    Pillar III looks at market discipline and publicdisclosure

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    28/45

    Pillar II

    Supervisory Oversight

    Requires supervisors to review a banks capitaladequacy assessment process, which mayindicate a higher capital requirement than Pillar Iminimums

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    29/45

    Pillar III

    Market discipline and public disclosure

    The United States is currently in the forefront ofdisclosure of financial data SEC disclosure requirements for publicly traded banks

    Bank regulators require quarterly filing of call reports forall banks

    U.S. authorities are currently considering whatbanks should publicly disclose about their Basel IIcalculations

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    30/45

    U.S. Implementation of Basel II

    Based on results for QIS4, which show thepotential for substantial declines in capital,the U.S. banking regulators have proposed arevised implementation timeline

    The revised timeline includes a minimum three-

    year transition period

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    31/45

    Revised U.S. Timeline for Basel II

    Implementation

    Year Transistional Arrangements

    2008 Parallel Run

    2009 95% floor

    2010 90% floor

    2011 85% floor

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    32/45

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    33/45

    Basel I-A: The Search for Equal

    Capital Treatment

    In the U.S., concerns that Basel II could givethose banks operating under it a competitiveadvantage over other banks has resulted in aproposal called Basel 1-A

    Basel 1-A is designed to modernize the way

    allU.S. banks and thrifts calculate theirminimum capital requirements

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    34/45

    Implications

    The practices in Basel II represent severalimportant departures from the traditional

    calculation of bank capital The very largest banks will operate under a

    system that is different than that used by otherbanks

    The implications of this for long-term competitionbetween these banks is uncertain, but meritsfurther attention

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    35/45

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    36/45

    Implications

    The proposed Accord will elevate theimportance of human judgment in theprocess of capital regulation

    Despite its quantitative basis, much will dependon the judgment of banks in formulating theirestimates and of supervisors in validating theassumptions used by banks in their models

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    37/45

    I li i

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    38/45

    ImplicationsAdditional Data Needed to Counterbalance to Changes inEnvironment

    Higher

    Leverage

    Unproven

    Rating

    Systems

    Evolving

    Control

    Structures

    Three Year

    Floors/Leverage

    Ratio

    Improved RiskManagement

    Changes in environment

    necessitate changes in riskanalysis for banks and

    supervisors/insurers

    Additional information will be

    needed to:

    Inform policy development.

    Supplement other sources of

    risk information used in

    supervisory resource planningand overall risk assessments

    Serve as an input into deposit

    insurance pricing and overall

    insurance funds adequacy

    analyses

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    39/45

    Why XBRL ?

    Internal ratings based and standard approachmeasures require complex data model Common data requirements flow from Accord and

    Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS I IV)

    Domestic and international comparisons needed to ensureconsistent application

    Taxonomy needed to compare banks internal ratings of

    similar and diverse risks

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    40/45

    Common Data Elements Flow from Accord:Standardized Internal Risk Estimates

    Exposure

    Internal RiskEstimate

    P

    D

    LG

    D

    EA

    D

    M

    Other

    Wholesale X X X X -

    Retail X X X - -

    Securitization - - - - X

    Equity - - - - X

    Market Risk - - - - X

    Operational

    Risk

    - - - - X

    Data Types Reporting Granularity

    Portfolio

    Level Data

    Individual

    Exposure Data for

    All Transactions

    Summary

    Data

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    41/45

    Why XBRL ?

    Internal ratings based measures and standard approach requirecomplex data model

    Supervisors need detailed information to qualify banks foradvanced approaches (IRB, AMA, and Market Risk)

    Data can be shared across different supervisory regimes

    - Independent of systems, platforms, geography and languagetranslation

    Consistent data needed to help identify risk estimates

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    42/45

    Consistent data needed to help identify risk estimatesthat may be inconsistent with peer estimates.

    Follow-up: Can differences between Banks PD and benchmark be adequately

    explained by differences in risk?

    0

    5

    10

    15

    20

    25

    30

    35

    40

    AA or better A to AA BBB to A BB to BBB B to BB >B

    Banks PD Distribution Mapped to S&P Rating Scale

    Peer Banks PD Distribution Mapped to S&P Rating Scale

    % of Wholesale Exposures

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    43/45

    Why XBRL ?

    XBRL provides a framework for complex datamodel

    Open standard facilitates reuse and innovation

    Analysts can spend more time analyzing data

    Reduced reporting burden, especially for

    organizations operating in multiple jurisdictions

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    44/45

  • 7/31/2019 Evolution to Basel II(FDIC)

    45/45

    Why XBRL ?

    FINIS