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The Post-Cold War International System

The end of the Cold War has opened up a ‘real world laboratory’ inwhich to test and refine general theories of international relations. Usingthe frameworks provided by structural realism, institutionalism and liber-alism, The Post-Cold War International System examines how majorpowers responded to the collapse of the Soviet Union and developed theirforeign policies over the period of post-Cold War transition.

The book argues that the democratic peace has begun to generatepowerful socialization effects, due to the emergence of a critical mass ofliberal democratic states since the end of the Cold War. The trend thishas produced is similar to a pattern that classical realists have interpretedas ‘bandwagoning’ within a unipolar power structure. Case studies ofGermany, China and Japan – identified as key states with the potentialto challenge US dominance – provide evidence to support the assessmentof international change. The author concludes by exploring the implica-tions of September 11 for the analysis developed.

This important volume argues that the end of the Cold War was amajor historical turning point in the development of world politics withfundamental implications for the basic way in which the dynamics of theinternational system are conceptualized. It will interest all students andresearchers of international politics.

Ewan Harrison is the Hedley Bull Junior Research Fellow at St Anne’sCollege, University of Oxford.

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R U N N I N G H E A D

The New International RelationsEdited by Barry Buzan, London School of Economics and Richard Little, University of Bristol

The field of international relations has changed dramatically in recentyears. This new series will cover the major issues that have emerged andreflect the latest academic thinking in this particular dynamic area.

International Law, Rights and PoliticsDevelopments in Eastern Europe and the CISRein MullersonThe Logic of InternationalismCoercion and accommodationKjell GoldmannRussia and the Idea of EuropeA study in identity and international relationsIver B. NeumannThe Future of International RelationsMasters in the making?Edited by Iver B. Neumann and Ole WæverConstructing the World PolityEssays on international institutionalizationJohn Gerard RuggieRealism in International Relations and International Political EconomyThe continuing story of a death foretoldStefano GuzziniInternational Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of OrderBeyond international relations theory?N.J. RenggerWar, Peace and World Orders in European HistoryEdited by Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice HeuserEuropean Integration and National IdentityThe challenge of the Nordic statesEdited by Lene Hansen and Ole WæverShadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New WarsA political economy of intra-state warDietrich JungContemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace ResearchEdited by Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich JungObserving International RelationsNiklas Luhmann and world politicsEdited by Mathias Albert and Lena HilkermeierDoes China Matter? A ReassessmentEssays in memory of Gerald SegalEdited by Barry Buzan and Rosemary FootEuropean Approaches to International Relations TheoryA house with many mansionsJörg FriedrichsThe Post-Cold War International SystemStrategies, institutions and reflexivityEwan Harrison

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The Post-Cold WarInternational SystemStrategies, institutions and reflexivity

Ewan Harrison

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First published 2004by Routledge11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

© 2004 Ewan Harrison

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataHarrison, Ewan, 1973–

The post-Cold War international system: strategies, institutions, and reflexivity/Ewan Harrison.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. International relations. 2. World politics – 1989– I. Title.JZ1305.H37 2004327′.09′049–dc22 2003026280

ISBN 0–415–32836–5

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This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.

ISBN 0-203-36623-9 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-67118-X (Adobe eReader Format) (Print Edition)

For if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form arepublic (which by its nature is inclined to seek perpetual peace), this willbecome a focal point for federal association among other states. Thesewill join up with the first one . . . and the whole will gradually spreadfurther and further through a series of alliances of this kind.

Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*

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* Reiss, H. (ed.) (1991) Kant’s Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,p. 104.

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Contents

List of illustrations ixSeries editor’s preface xPreface xiiiAcknowledgements xixList of abbreviations xxi

1 Introduction 1

Theoretical framework 4Operationalizing liberal predictions 14Chapter structure 22

2 Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 28

The neorealist model 30The institutionalist model 33The liberal model 36Towards a general synthesis 40Conclusions 48

3 German foreign policy after the Cold War 50

Neorealism 51Institutionalism 57Liberalism 1: domestic variation 61Liberalism 2: Germany’s choices 65

4 Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War 70

Neorealism 70Institutionalism 76Liberalism 1: domestic variation 79Liberalism 2: Japan’s choices 83

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5 Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War 91

Neorealism 91Institutionalism 97Liberalism 1: domestic variation 100Liberalism 2: China’s choices 106

6 Conclusions 112

International relations theory after the Cold War 113General patterns of institutionalized activity 121Foreign policy adjustments 128

Postscript: September 11, 2001 and its aftermath 137

Bibliography 149Index 166

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viii Contents

Illustrations

Figures

2.1 The linear model 412.2 The triangular model 426.1 Reflexivity in the international system (Part A) 1186.2 Reflexivity in the international system (Part B) 134

Tables

1.1 Summary of theories and predictions 232.1 Summary of theoretical framework 406.1 General patterns of institutionalized activity 1216.2 State strategies 1989–1999 128

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Series editor’s preface

It is generally acknowledged that almost all theorists and practitionerswere taken by surprise not only by the speed with which the Soviet Unionand its empire in Eastern Europe collapsed at the end of the twentiethcentury, but also by the relatively peaceful transfer of power when theestablished communist regimes gave way to the emergent post-communistregimes. Experts on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union completely failedto anticipate these dramatic events that precipitated the end of the ColdWar, but so too did theorists in international relations. To the extent thatthere had been any previous discussion of a Soviet collapse in the fieldof international relations, the fear was that the demise of the Soviet systemwould be accompanied by an irrational nuclear strike on the West.

As the Cold War recedes into the past, however, international sys-tems’ theorists are starting to make sense of what happened at the end ofthe Cold War, and to get a grasp on subsequent developments in the post-Cold War era. But the discipline of international relations has still not come to any consensus about either the theoretical or the practical impli-cations of the ending of the Cold War. And it is not likely to do so in the near future because the discipline is so deeply divided on theoretical,normative and policy fronts.

Realists and institutionalists have developed two broadly competingpositions. From the theoretical perspective of the institutionalists, the endof the Cold War and the elimination of the Soviet Union left the struc-ture and character of the international system essentially unchangedbecause during the course of the twentieth century a wide array of multi-lateral institutions came into existence that had crucial and system definingconsequences. The survival of these institutions into the post-Cold Warera has ensured that this crucial feature of the international system remainsunaltered. Realists, however, start from a very different theoretical per-spective, and argue that the essentially bipolar world that prevailedthroughout the Cold War has given way to a radically different unipolarworld in the post-Cold War era. But although most realists agree on thisbasic position, they are then sharply divided between those who arguethat this unipolar world is inherently unstable and will eventually give

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way to a multipolar world and those who insist that there are a varietyof factors that are likely to ensure that unipolarity will persist for someconsiderable time.

In this book Ewan Harrison draws on these divergent positions in theprocess of articulating a liberal theoretical perspective. Although he buildson the work of previous theorists, this is the most developed and sophis-ticated attempt yet made to articulate a distinctive liberal approach tosystemic theorizing and it enables him to throw new light on systemicdevelopments in the post-Cold War period.

In the process of developing the theory, moreover, Harrison makes anumber of important moves that allows him to position the liberalapproach at the centre of any attempt to theorize about the internationalsystem. In the first instance, the debates surrounding Waltz’s neorealismare used as a springboard for developing this liberal systemic theory.Contrary to mainstream interpretations, Harrison insists that neorealismeschews rationality and instead relies on the reflexive processes associatedwith emulation and socialization. But whereas neorealists assert that theseprocesses necessarily push states to adopt balancing strategies, Harrisonaccepts Wendt’s constructivist argument that a change in the prevailingidentity of states in the international system can affect the process ofsocialization within the international system and give rise to a change insystem outcome. If it is accepted, for example, that after the end of theCold War, a critical mass of liberal democratic states has come to dom-inate the international system, then the end of the Cold War can also beassociated with a major system change, but a very different kind of changeto the one highlighted by the realists.

Having established the theoretical framework, Harrison goes on to applythe theory to the foreign policies of three key states – Germany, Japanand China – during the first decade of the post-Cold War world. It revealsthat all three states have had difficulty adjusting to the changes in thecharacter of the international system. But he also looks at these casestudies through realist and institutionalist lenses and reveals their strengthsand weaknesses for understanding the foreign policies of these states insystemic terms. One of the many strengths of this book is the way thatHarrison strives to find links between the different approaches, using themall as building blocks, that allow us to develop a more comprehensivepicture of the post-Cold War international system.

Harrison, however, is also very aware that he is shooting at a movingtarget and that much has happened in the international system since thetime period examined in this book. In a very illuminating postscript, ratherthan attempting to bring the case studies up to date, he draws on his lib-eral theory in conjunction with realism and institutionalism to reflect onthe implications of the US responses to the events of September 11, 2001,and, in particular, the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. Harrison franklyacknowledges that both realism and institutionalism can be drawn upon to

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Series editor’s preface xi

provide interesting accounts of what has happened since 2001. But he alsoargues that what the liberal model suggests is that, like Germany, Japanand China, the United States has also had difficulty adjusting to the changesin the international system associated with the ending of the Cold War.Whether the failure of a hegemonic state to adjust will cause the inter-national system itself to regress remains to be seen.

Richard Little

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xii Series editor’s preface

Preface

It is often remarked that although Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory was intended as a refinement of Kenneth Waltz’s balance of power theory, it actually served to undermine it. Conventional balance of power theory associated with neorealism assumes that balancing behav-iour emerges in response to the distribution of material resources amongststates in the international system (Waltz 1979). In an anarchic context, units that are more powerful will pose a threat to others. States will consequentlyhave no choice but to ‘assume the worst’ and balance against more powerful rivals in order to maintain their independence and autonomy.Paradoxically, therefore, the chronic insecurity of the international systemis such that it encourages states to join the weaker rather than the strongercoalition of forces that it faces. Walt sought to elaborate on this accountof alliance formation by incorporating a role for geographic proximity,offensive capabilities and, most significantly perhaps, offensive intentionsinto Waltz’s structural framework (Walt 1984). Walt therefore blurred therigid unit-structure distinction at the core of Waltz’s system level argument,and introduced a significant role for unit level variables in influencing thedecisions of states to balance or bandwagon. Walt’s ideas were the first ina long line of literature reviving the classical realist perspective, a theoret-ical movement frequently referred to, perhaps somewhat inelegantly, as‘neoclassical realism’ (Brown et al. 1995b; Rose 1998). However, con-structivists have subsequently noted that if identity based influences areindeed systematic determinants of state behaviour, then this weighs heav-ily in favour of Wendt’s argument that anarchy is ‘what states make of it’ rather than being inevitably characterized by vigorous competition forsecurity and/or power.

The observation that Walt’s balance of threat approach has potentiallyrevolutionary implications for systemic theory is often made, but hasseldom been developed in a systematic fashion. This book may be readas a comprehensive attempt to pursue this line of inquiry in relation to the grand strategies pursued by the major powers over the post-ColdWar period. It develops the argument that with the collapse of the SovietUnion, a critical mass of liberal states has emerged at a global level. The

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democratic peace has consequently begun to generate powerful socializa-tion effects that encourage states at the margins of cultural change toadopt shifts in their identity. This feeds back into the properties of the system by strengthening the dominance of the liberal core. A self-perpetuating positive feedback loop is created that locks in progressivechange and opens up a permissive space in which further development isencouraged. At this stage, the system thus achieves reflexivity, defined byWendt as a capacity for critical self-reflection and cultural change on thepart of units. This theoretical framework is utilized to account for theway in which three major powers responded to the collapse of the SovietUnion and developed their foreign policies since the end of the Cold War.Behaviour interpreted by classical (or ‘neoclassical’) realists as band-wagoning within a unipolar structure is better interpreted in terms of thenorm cascade generated by the emergence of a stable core of liberal demo-cratic states within the international system. Whilst socialization pressures are subject to domestic cultural and institutional variation, thehistorical momentum generated by systemic trends is encouraging each of the major powers to adjust their domestic political structures and internalize cultural change.

An argument is therefore made that the end of the Cold War may beunderstood as reflecting a major historical turning point in the develop-ment of world politics, and as having fundamental implications for thebasic way in which the dynamics of the international system are concep-tualized. The empirical focus is on the initial decade of the post-Cold Wartransition between 1989 and 1999. This historical juncture presents alogical, if inevitably somewhat arbitrary, cut off point for the project. Thedecision to end the research project at the close of 1999 has been furthercomplicated by the course of recent international history. The events ofSeptember 11, 2001 and the subsequent US military interventions inAfghanistan and Iraq have presented major global crises that have impactedin very important ways on the dynamics of the international system thathas been emerging since the end of the Cold War. In particular, the greatpower bandwagoning trend that characterized the first decade of post-Cold War transition has appeared to wane, and structural conflicts ofinterest between the major states have resurfaced as a much more predom-inant feature of international affairs. Neorealists will no doubt use thisturn of events to make their case that structural pressures encouraginggreat power balancing will inevitably surface given enough time. Despitethe significance of recent developments for the underlying argument ofthis book, the decision to take 1999 as the cut-off point for the projectremains reasonable and appropriate. It is sometimes noted that inter-national crises are like trams in the sense that they pass regularly andoften. Recent events may have generated much interest and debate, butgiven hindsight any time frame chosen would quickly become outdated.Thus although the close of the first decade after the end of the Cold War

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xiv Preface

is a somewhat unsatisfactory point of closure, it nonetheless represents asgood an historical perspective as any from which to survey the featuresof the post-Cold War order. At the very least it provides an extendedperiod during which the major powers had an opportunity to adjust tothe ‘systemic shock’ posed by the Soviet collapse and adjust their grandstrategies accordingly.

Nevertheless, a postscript considering the major events that haveoccurred in the international system in the period since 1999 has beenprovided in order to provide a provisional assessment of their significancefor the thesis developed in the book. The postscript discusses two specificissues. First, it analyses the extent to which September 11 may be consid-ered comparable to the collapse of the Soviet Union in terms of itssignificance for the study of international relations. The book developsthe argument that the Soviet collapse has fundamental implications forhow the dynamics of the international system are conceptualized, andsome commentators have made the parallel argument that September 11,2001 should be understood in these terms. However, on inspection it isnot clear that this analysis stands scrutiny. If the 9/11 attacks are under-stood as a response to the residual elements of unipolarity in the post-ColdWar world, there are clear precedents for this pattern of events in conven-tional realist understandings of the international system. The postscriptalso reflects on the significance of the apparent breakdown of the band-wagoning trend that characterized the first decade of post-Cold Wartransition. It interprets the resurgence of power politics in the period since September 2001 as reflecting an instance of failed learning by theUnited States within the permissive post-Cold War international environ-ment rather than as an inevitable product of America’s default status as the world’s sole remaining superpower. In particular, recent trendsreflect ‘blowback’ generated by the decisions made by the United Statesto maintain a Cold War defence posture in the post-Cold War world.The asymmetrical costs imposed on the United States by this blowbackare likely over the longer term to encourage it to adjust its grand strategyin more fundamental ways to meet the demands of the post-Cold Warera. This line of reasoning develops the argument put forward by insti-tutionalists that a ‘boomerang effect’ will encourage the United States toreturn to multilateral channels because of the risk of overstretch associ-ated with pursuing a hegemonic strategy. However, it locates the causeof overstretch in US domestic politics and its foreign policy choices since1989, rather than in terms of a functional logic about the costs of systemmanagement for the hegemon. It therefore presents a more volunturistaccount of the dilemmas currently facing American foreign policy thanthat associated with institutionalist theory.

This book draws heavily on constructivist theory to develop an argu-ment about the distinctive character of the international system in thepost-Cold War period. One of the major criticisms of constructivism is

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Preface xv

that it has been unsuitable for use in the empirical analysis of world poli-tics. An initial wave of constructivist literature has sought to respond to this claim by demonstrating the utility of constructivist theory in illuminating specific aspects of international relations (Katzenstein 1996).Nevertheless, to date constructivism has failed to challenge realist argu-ments about overall patterns of alliance formation in the internationalsystem. This book seeks to engage directly with this limitation by drawingon the affinities that exist between classical/neoclassical realist analyses ofgreat power adjustments to the end of the Cold War and constructivistarguments. Developments in the international system since 1999 haveunderscored the necessarily provisional nature of this assessment of post-Cold War international relations. However, unless and until constructivistscholars seek to challenge core realist claims about the dynamics dis-played by the international system, constructivist thinking will remainunnecessarily marginalized within the field. A related point regarding theconstructivist literature concerns the recent interest of constructivists instate socialization and international norm dynamics. Alexander Wendt’sSocial Theory of International Politics (1999) was published in the periodafter my Ph.D. was complete. Nevertheless, his account of the three culturesof anarchy and the problem of structural change in the internationalsystem, as well as his discussion of reflexivity, were extremely useful inrefining my own thinking on these matters. Finnemore and Sikkink’s normlife cycle model has also stimulated much interest within the field(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Finnemore and Sikkink developed theirlife cycle to apply to the operation of a variety of humanitarian regimes.However, their claims coincide neatly with the international normdynamics that this book postulates may be associated with the democ-ratic peace. Realists claim that security interests trump humanitarianinterests because states must conform to the survival imperative, and thusthe norm life cycle model may be problematic when carried over into thesecurity sphere. Yet strong affinities exist between the norm cascade or‘norm bandwagoning’ associated with the second stage of Finnemore andSikkink’s life cycle and the patterns of alliance formation that classicalrealists have identified as a central feature of great power relations in thepost-Cold War world.

A final salient theme of this book is its attempt to extend liberal argu-ments about the democratic peace to the system level by linking them toconstructivist insights. The democratic peace literature emerged in directresponse to the success of neorealist theory in developing systemic levelanalyses of international politics. It was overtly reductionist in the sensethat it stressed the importance of the domestic level as a casual determi-nant of state behaviour. Somewhat paradoxically, however, today bothproponents and opponents of the democratic peace both accept the basicterms on which the debate takes place. Essentially, the debate betweenrealists and liberals revolves around whether a ‘separate peace’ exists

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xvi Preface

between democratic regimes that share the same regime type. Nevertheless,this consensus may inhibit the emergence of deeper questions about thepossibility of a more general relationship between liberalism and peace.Narrowing the scope of its claims has made the democratic peace argu-ment remarkably robust in the face of criticism. Yet it also foreclosesmore fundamental questions about realism’s dominance as a generalaccount of the international system. Ironically, proponents of the demo-cratic peace are tacitly supporting a structure of research within thediscipline as a whole that does not favour the liberal school. Given thepromise demonstrated by the democratic peace proposition as a means of gaining a foothold against the hegemony of realist theory, this seemsan unfitting culmination to the research programme that it has gener-ated. Rather than accepting realism’s gambit, a better way of sustainingmomentum in the democratic peace research agenda is for its proponentsto push the debate onto terms more favourable to the liberal paradigm.One way of achieving this might be to begin to challenge realist argu-ments on the ‘high ground’ currently occupied by the system level. In theshort term, this approach involves moving away from the relative safetyprovided by a rigid defence of the narrow proposition associated with theseparate peace claim. However, in the longer term it holds out the promiseof extending research into the democratic peace into a second generationby greatly increasing its scope and significance. Indeed, analyses extendingarguments about the democratic peace to the system level have becomean important and growing part of the literature in the field in recent years (Huntley 1996; Ray 2000; Russett and Starr 2000; Cederman 2001;Russett and O’Neil 2001; Harrison 2002; Mitchell 2002). As with theconstructivist literature on socialization and norm dynamics, much of thisresearch has been published while the work was being conducted for thepresent study. Nevertheless, it resonates strongly with the broad theoret-ical line of inquiry being pursued, and it is therefore to be hoped thatthis book stimulates further debate in this important area.

My interest in the academic study of international relations was verymuch the product of reading Robert Keohane’s edited volume Neorealismand its Critics as an undergraduate at Bath University in the early 1990s(Keohane 1986a). Although I discovered this book relatively late in mystudies, it did provide me with a foothold on the methodological prob-lems and issues that underpin the contemporary theoretical literature.Aside from the quality and sophistication of the debates between thecontributors, what interested me about this book was that, although the various authors disagreed fundamentally, I sympathized in differentways with all the sides in the argument. The same summer I had alsodeveloped my interest in Kant’s political theory, and it struck me thatKant’s thought might provide a framework within which the differentcontributions to the Keohane edited volume could be synthesized. Thepresence of both Nick Rengger and Richard Little meant that Bristol

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Preface xvii

University proved an ideal place in which to develop this admittedly ratherunorthodox line of inquiry, and the results were eventually published inthe Review of International Studies (Harrison 2002). Nevertheless, myinterest in the debates over neorealism has continued, and this book in many ways may be considered as an attempt to both develop and apply more extensively the framework I set out in my article in the Review.In the acknowledgements to Neorealism and its Critics, the editor expressedthe sentiment that some readers might respond to reading the collectionof essays by making contributions to the debate themselves in the future(p. x). It is to be hoped this book makes a further modest contributionto the ongoing discussions that have been stimulated by Keohane’s volume.

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xviii Preface

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the staff and research students of the Departmentof Politics at Bristol University between 1996 and 1999 for providing acongenial environment within which to develop my ideas, and for theirinterest in my research. Roger Eatwell, my undergraduate tutor at BathUniversity, also deserves particular thanks for his early interest in mywork, and for his encouragement since.

At Bristol University, Nick Rengger, Molly Cochran and RichardShapcott were especially helpful in the early stages of my research, andtheir influence was essential in further stimulating my interest in the studyof international relations. Mark Wickham-Jones kindly took time out ofhis schedule to provide me with support that proved absolutely crucial asI entered a competitive academic recruitment market. Amongst the grad-uate students, Lucas Blasco, Piers Robinson and Chris Armstrong eachprovided particularly important feedback, support and criticism.

Many people and several institutions have supported me in the periodsince my postgraduate study ended. At Birmingham University, I especiallyappreciated the encouragement and company provided by FiorellaDell’Olio, Elke Krahmann, Matthew Watson and Steve Buckler. At Edin-burgh University, I accumulated debts to Kim Hutchings, John Ravenhill,Sally Cummings, and especially Luke March and Cas Mudde for theiradvice and mentoring. Tony McGrew of Southampton University was alsoextremely supportive during this period, for which I am most grateful. Itwas also at this time that Patrick James of the University of Missourishowed an interest in my work. His general feedback and guidance sincehas been invaluable. However, I have found our discussions of realism, neorealism and systems theory especially helpful, and he therefore deservesparticular credit for the development of my thinking.

At Oxford University it was my privilege to be appointed the HedleyBull Junior Research Fellow, a position based at St Anne’s College duringthe period of my tenure. Aside from the great honour of being associatedwith one of the most prominent international relations theorists of thetwentieth century, this fellowship has allowed me the ultimate academicprivilege by providing three consecutive years of post-doctoral study during

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which time my principle responsibility has been to reflect, research andwrite in complete independence. This period has been invaluable in manyways, but in particular it has provided me with time for my ideas todevelop and mature. I would therefore like to express my thanks to theGoverning Body at St Anne’s and the managers of the Cyril Foster Fundswho have administered and financed this post during my occupancy. Iwould also very much like to thank David Williams, my immediate pre-decessor, for his encouragement, guidance and discussions while I havebeen at Oxford. The influence and support of both Neil Macfarlane andNigel Bowles at St Anne’s has been greatly appreciated, and AmritaNarlikar, Alan Renwick and Rochana Bajpai have proved good colleaguesand friends.

At Routledge, Heidi Bagtazo and Grace McInnes deserve particularthanks for their expertise in helping me turn the completed manuscriptinto book form. To them, and the rest of the publishing team involvedin the production process, I am extremely grateful.

My greatest intellectual debt is to my former Ph.D. supervisor, RichardLittle, for his consistent support and his commitment to the very highestprofessional standards. This was available to me not just during my enjoy-able stay at Bristol University, but also over the whole of the subsequentperiod. I have been privileged to benefit not just from his experience,patience and pragmatism, but also from the sheer volume of time he hasgenerously made for me.

Finally, I have been extremely fortunate to receive constant advice andencouragement during the entire period I have worked on this book frommy parents and also from my sister Fiona. Without their unfailing personalsupport, this book would not have been possible. I therefore dedicate thefinished product to them with my deepest thanks.

Ewan HarrisonSt Anne’s College, Oxford

October 2003

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xx Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

ADB Asian Development BankAPEC Asia Pacific Economic Co-operationARF ASEAN Regional ForumASEAN Association of South East Asian NationsASEM Asia-Europe MeetingAWACS Airborne Warning and Control SystemsCAP Common Agricultural Policy (EU)CDU Christian Democratic Union (Germany)CFE Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty)CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in EuropeCTBT Comprehensive Test Ban TreatyEAEG East Asian Economic GroupingEBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentEEC/EC European Economic CommunityEFTA European Free Trade AssociationEMU European Monetary UnionERM Exchange Rate Mechanism (EU)EU European UnionFDR Federal Republic of GermanyG7 Group of SevenGATT General Agreement on Tariffs and TradeGDP Gross Domestic ProductGDR German Democratic RepublicIFOR Implementation Force (UN)IGC Inter-Governmental Conference (EU)IMF International Monetary FundKFOR Kosovo Force (UN)LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)MDB Multilateral Development BankMFN Most Favoured Nation (GATT)MST US-Japan Mutual Security TreatyMTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

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NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NATO)NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNDPO National Defence Program OutlineNPT Non-Proliferation TreatyODA Overseas Development AssistanceOECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in EuropePfP Partnership for Peace (NATO)PHARE Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic ReconstructionPKO Peace Keeping Operations (UN)PLA People’s Liberation Army (PRC)PRC People’s Republic of ChinaQMV Qualified Majority Voting (EU)SDF Self Defence Force (Japan)SDP Social Democratic Party (Germany)SFOR Stabilization Force (UN)SII Structural Impediments Initiatives (talks)TACIS Technical Assistance to the CISTMD Theatre Missile DefenceUN United NationsUNSC United Nations Security CouncilWEU Western European UnionWTO World Trade Organization

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xxii Abbreviations

1 Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union provided an historic opportunity toexamine how key states respond to large-scale change in the internationalsystem. Between the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and theaborted August coup that preceded the demise of the Soviet Union in1991, the international system witnessed the disintegration of the bipolarstructure of power that characterized the post-1945 international order.Few, including the majority of experts, anticipated the dramatic changesthat took place during this period. Furthermore, the ‘systemic shock’ asso-ciated with the demise of the Cold War order provides a unique contextwithin which to test and refine theories of international relations. The endof the Cold War has therefore opened up questions about the overallnature of international change at the turn of the twentieth century. The‘real world laboratory’ provided by the end of the Cold War can now beused to assess the structural realist, institutionalist and liberal models ofthe international system. Since 1989, the preconditions for these theoriesto make a discrete set of predictions about the overall nature of post-Cold War change have been present. In line with the neorealist model,the collapse of the Soviet Union has brought about a major shift in the global balance of power. In line with the institutionalist model, thereare variations in patterns of economic and institutional interdependenceacross the international system. In line with the liberal model, since 1989a relatively stable core of liberal democratic states now dominates theinternational system. Moreover, over a decade has now passed since theend of the Cold War. States have been provided with a prolonged periodto respond to the dramatic changes that began to take place in the late1980s. If the system within which they interact with others affects thebehaviour of states, the incentives and constraints this has generated oughtto be beginning to exert their influence on outcomes observed. Using theopportunity presented by the close of the first ten years of the post-ColdWar period, an examination is made of how major powers have respondedto the changes which have taken place in the international system sincethe end of the Cold War. By applying general theories of internationalrelations to the strategies of major states between 1989 and 1999, the

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aim is to identify the overall nature of change in the international systemafter the Cold War.

The decade following the end of the Cold War posed a particularlyinteresting puzzle for conventional wisdom regarding international rela-tions. Unlike other major shifts in the balance of power, the end of theCold War was not accompanied by a great power war. Moreover, peacefuladjustment extended through the first decade of the post-Cold War tran-sition. Of course, in many parts of the world the power vacuum left bythe end of the superpower conflict led to brutal outbursts of violence. Yettragic though these wars were, unlike earlier historical periods they failedto generate a system-wide international conflict. It was only natural thatthe general public in the West would assume that the relatively benignsituation they faced was the logical consequence of the crumbling of Sovietpower. However, in the context of both international history and inter-national relations theory, this outcome was highly unexpected. Historically,the twentieth century has been characterized by continuous great powerconflict on an unprecedented scale. Theoretically, it is acknowledged thatthe international system has a powerful anti-hegemonial quality. The endof the Cold War left the United States in a position of unchallenged pre-eminence. However, contrary to established theory, this has not led to aperiod of instability and great power conflict. The Soviet Union acqui-esced peacefully in the collapse of its empire without mounting a finalcounter-hegemonial backlash. Moreover, there has been an absence ofgreat power security balancing against the US which conventional wisdomin the early post-Cold War period had anticipated. Indeed, it is only reallyin the first years of the new millennium – some twelve or so years afterthe end of the Cold War – that concerns about the significance of Americanpower have re-emerged prominently in public and policy debates for thefirst time since prior to the Soviet collapse. Viewed in historical andtheoretical perspective, that it has taken such an extended period for thesequestions to surface is truly remarkable. What explains this era of greatpower stability? Even approaching a decade and a half after the end ofthe Cold War, this question continues to present a major anomaly forestablished conceptions of international relations. Yet its importance forunderstanding the nature of the global order cannot be under-estimated.The close of the first decade of the post-Cold War period has presenteda unique context in which to systematically examine this puzzle to shedlight on both the character of the emerging international system, and theway its dynamics are best conceptualized.

In applying theories of the international system to understanding thestrategies of major powers in the post-Cold War period, the templateprovided by two collaborative projects carried out at Harvard Universityduring the 1990s is followed. The first is the Keohane et al. edited volumeAfter the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies inEurope 1989–1991 (Keohane et al. 1993). This book, published shortly

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2 Introduction

after the end of the Cold War, examines how the US and the majorEuropean powers used international institutions in adjusting to the changestaking place. The findings draw conclusions about the relative merits of the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models in explaining inter-national outcomes during this critical period. The second book is the more recent Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the ColdWar (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999). This differs from the Keohaneet al. volume in two ways. First, it examines realist theories rather thandebates across competing schools. Hence it focuses on strategies of themajor powers, rather than on the nexus between institutions and strategies.Second, it examines post-Cold War state strategies at a global level, ratherthan focusing on a European context. Following Keohane et al., evalua-tion of competing theoretical paradigms is provided, requiring examinationof the nexus between international institutions and state strategies.Following Kapstein and Mastanduno, state strategies are analysed at aglobal level. Nevertheless, commonality exists with both the Keohaneet al. and Kapstein and Mastanduno projects in that the aim is to usetheories as frameworks to analyse how major states have responded tothe changes in the international system since 1989.

To provide points of reference with the two projects discussed the defi-nitions of ‘the end of the Cold War’, ‘state strategies’ and ‘internationalinstitutions’ are compatible with their use in these books. FollowingKeohane et al., ‘the end of the Cold War’ refers to the withdrawal of Sovietpower from Central Europe, and the reunification of Germany that resulted(Keohane et al. 1993: 1–2). The end of the Cold War is therefore viewedas predating the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, referring to the periodfrom 1989 during which the disintegration of the bipolar distribution ofmilitary power became apparent in the global international system. ‘Statestrategies’ refers to the ways whereby states deploy their material and diplo-matic resources to pursue their national interests. Following the pattern setout in both the Keohane et al. and Kapstein and Mastanduno projects, thefocus of the analysis is upon grand strategies, rather than detailed aspectsof foreign policies. Finally, following the conventional definition of an international regime, ‘international institutions’ are understood as sets ofprinciples, norms, rules and operating procedures around which statesorient their expectations (Krasner 1983: 2). This provides a broad defini-tion of an international institution, encompassing not only formal but alsoinformal aspects of institutionalization.

The general aim is to investigate the overall nature of change in thepost-Cold War international system. It is therefore necessary to specifythe terms in which this change can be measured. The ‘overall nature ofchange’ in the international system is defined in terms of variation alongthree dimensions derived from the theories utilized. The theories generateradically different predictions about: (1) the key variable affecting greatpower behaviour; (2) the general pattern of institutionalized activity

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Introduction 3

between major states; and (3) the foreign policy adjustments made byindividual powers to the end of the Cold War. Following Kapstein andMastanduno, the purpose of analysing the overall nature of internationalchange is both theoretical and empirical (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999:1–2). At a theoretical level, an examination is made of whether it ispossible to make any general statements about patterns of behaviourobserved. At an empirical level, the grand strategies of important actorsare analysed to account for how they have adjusted to the end of theCold War. By so doing, a contribution will be made to the assessmentof competing theoretical paradigms, and conclusions drawn about thetrajectory of change as the international system enters the twenty-firstcentury.

The introduction is organized into three sections. The first section setsout the theoretical framework by outlining the different models, andprovides key definitions. It also identifies the predictions made byneorealism and institutionalism about the post-Cold War internationalsystem. However, because liberalism is the least developed of the threetheories the first section of the introduction focuses solely on the rede-velopment of the liberal model. It is left until the second section to dealwith methodological questions relating to the operationalization of empir-ical hypotheses for the liberal model. This section draws upon the templateprovided by Unipolar Politics to develop two criteria to facilitate themeasuring of liberal predictions. The final section of the introduction setsout the organization of the book, explaining the purpose of the theoret-ical chapter and its relationship to the case studies.

Theoretical framework

A theoretical approach to international relations is adopted in this book.The study seeks to be clear about the assumptions underpinning it, andto apply these to examining the nature of change in the post-Cold Warinternational system. The promise of a theoretical approach is that itmoves beyond a descriptive analysis by offering generalizable explanationsof international behaviour (Waltz 1979). However, following Keohaneet al. it is necessary to recognize that existing theories are too impreciselyspecified to permit the rigorous testing of hypotheses. Keohane et al.’sprescription of using theories to devise frameworks for the constructionof more sophisticated empirical investigations is therefore adopted(Keohane et al. 1993: 7).

Also following Keohane et al., the neorealist, institutionalist and liberalmodels are utilized (Keohane et al. 1993: 3–6). Kenneth Waltz (1979)systematically formulated the structural or neorealist model. Waltz distin-guishes between the structure of domestic and international politicalsystems. Domestic systems are hierarchical because they have a centralagency capable of enforcing law and imposing political stability. By

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4 Introduction

contrast the international system is decentralized and anarchic. States mustmake provisions for their own security to ensure survival. They will doso until equilibrium is reached in the balance of power. It follows thatthe distribution of material capabilities between states is the structuraldeterminant of international behaviour, constraining the behaviour ofactors regardless of their internal attributes or preferences. This materialstructure is provided by the system’s polarity, which reflects the numberof great powers. International systems can be unipolar (containing a singlehegemon), bipolar (containing two superpowers) or multipolar (containingthree or more great powers). Bipolar systems are likely to be the leastprone to great power conflict. Under unipolarity, the anti-hegemonialnature of the international system will encourage other major states tobalance against the dominant state to preserve their independence andautonomy. Multipolar systems are more complex and harder to managethan bipolar systems because there are a greater numbers of actors in thebalance of power, and because states can switch allegiance within alliances(on collective action see Olson 1971; Sandler 1992). The emphasis on theinternational system as motivating state behaviour distinguishes neo-realism from earlier ‘classical’ realist approaches which account for warand the balance of power in terms of nature of particular states or policymakers (Keohane 1986a).

In the early 1990s, neorealists used their theory to make predictionsabout the emerging international system (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993;Waltz 1993; for the most recent statement see Mearsheimer 2001). Withthe end of the Cold War, the system had shifted from bipolarity to uni-polarity. Neorealists predicted that this structural change would generatetensions in the alliance systems that had emerged under bipolarity. Duringthe Cold War, the US developed a strong defence presence in both WesternEurope and East Asia. This was reflected in its key alliances, namelyNATO (1949) and the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan (1954). Throughthese institutions, America undertook security guarantees aimed at pro-tecting the independence of Western Europe and Japan against a Sovietconventional or nuclear attack. The containment strategy pursued by theUS also led to the emergence of a range of economic institutions in globaltrade (GATT) and finance (the IMF and the World Bank), and fosteredthe development of European reconstruction through the EEC. Neorealistsargued that this system of cooperation would come under pressure afterthe Cold War because, regardless of the diplomatic face it presents, theUS’s pre-eminence would be perceived as undesirable. In the absence ofa clear Soviet threat, conflicts of interest between the major powers wouldsurface. Secondary states would be encouraged to engage in balancingstrategies, targeted principally at America. Neorealists explicitly identifiedGermany or a unified European state, Japan and China as candidates formajor power status. These countries had the potential capabilities to chal-lenge American dominance, and for them to forgo the greater influence

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Introduction 5

this promised would present a structural anomaly. The US would havestrong incentives to roll back its security presence in both Europe andEast Asia, and rely instead on offshore balancing in these key regions.The resurfacing of indigenous rivalries in Europe and East Asia wouldprovide a more effective way of containing challenges to America’s posi-tion in the absence of a common external threat. Overall, neorealistspredicted that unipolarity would yield to a more complex and less stablemultipolar balance of power reminiscent of that of the late nineteenthand early twentieth centuries. Positional competition and a concern withrelative capabilities would increasingly characterize great power politics,and war between the major states would be more likely than during theCold War.

By the end of the 1990s a consensus emerged among realists that thetrends towards great power balancing against the US had not been the pre-dominant feature of the international system since the end of the Cold War.This led to William Wohlforth’s prominent attempt to salvage the struc-tural realist framework by refining Waltz’s argument about unipolarity(Wohlforth 1999). Wohlforth offered an elaboration of the structural real-ist model compatible with hegemonic stability theory. He argued thatunipolarity is compatible with a stable structure of great power relationsgiven the very high concentration of US capabilities within the internationalsystem. Wohlforth’s claim about the stability of unipolarity had two cen-tral components. First, he argued that America’s dominance in terms of itsmaterial resources is historically unprecedented, much greater even thanBritain’s lead in the nineteenth century. America’s military and economicstrength exceeds by a remarkably wide margin any other country or set ofcountries combined, and this makes the costs associated with balancingagainst its global hegemony prohibitive. The US is the only major state tomaintain a genuinely global power projection capability after the Cold War,and by devoting only three per cent of its GDP to defence it greatly out-spends all the other powers combined. Second, Wohlforth points to the way in which local security dynamics in key strategic regions also lock inthe stability of a unipolar world. In Europe and East Asia, serious attemptsto balance against the US by countries such as Germany, Russia, Japan and China would first trigger regional security anxieties. These regionalsecurity dynamics would check local powers much more than they wouldthe US. Thus attempts to balance US hegemony by secondary states wouldprove counterproductive and are unlikely to be attempted. By developingthese various arguments for the stability of an international system over-whelmingly dominated by the US, Wohlforth has sought to modify theorthodox neorealist model whilst retaining its structuralist and materialistlogic.

However, Wohlforth’s modified formulation of neorealism shall not beevaluated for two related reasons. First, his argument runs against thebasic logic of Waltz’s theory. Wohlforth claims that a high concentration

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6 Introduction

of capabilities on the part of the hegemon can foreclose the possibility ofgreat power balancing within a unipolar international system. By contrast,conventional Waltzian neorealism indicates that a high concentration ofcapabilities with the hegemon will, if anything, increase the structuralincentives that exist for secondary states to balance against their morepowerful peer rival. Indeed, this explains why there was such a strongconsensus among prominent neorealists so early on in the post-Cold Warperiod about the shape of the emerging international order. Neorealistswere drawing on the distinctive ability of structural theory to highlightgeneral patterns of behaviour, and were using this powerful tool to cutthrough confusion by making strong predictive statements. A second andrelated reason why Wohlforth’s variant of neorealism shall not be oper-ationalized is that this perspective is vulnerable to the criticism that itoffers a post hoc rationalization of the predictive failures associated withthe conventional neorealist model. Neorealists themselves have acknowl-edged that the emerging international system presents an ideal opportunityto test their predictions against patterns of behaviour as they emerge. Forneorealists to subsequently move away from this position in such a wayas to salvage their central theoretical analysis allows neorealism to competeagainst other perspectives on a playing field that is skewed heavily in itsfavour. Wohlforth’s argument could become more coherent and persua-sive if it was able to draw upon more comprehensive and rigorousepistemological foundations. In particular, it might benefit by being linkedup more explicitly to an elaborated structural realist model which system-atically integrates a continuum of capabilities-based elements into theconventional Waltzian framework (James 2002). However, the develop-ment of an elaborated structural realist model along these lines is arelatively recent occurrence, and not all theories can be accommodatedand tested within the scope of a single study. For these reasons, the conven-tional Waltzian version of neorealism and its associated predictions areoperationalized in the present analysis.

The institutionalist model identifies the distribution of interdependenceand international institutions as a variable affecting state behaviour.Institutionalism asserts that cooperation between states is possible even inthe absence of a centralized authority at the international level. Althoughthe lack of an enforcement agency increases incentives for states to cheaton agreements, cooperation under anarchy is possible given pre-specifiedconditions. Where there is scope for joint gains, a small number of actors,and repeated interactions over a long-term time horizon, international institutions can take on instrumental value to states in pursuing theirnational interests. Institutions can facilitate cooperation by reducing thecosts of diplomacy, decreasing uncertainty and shaping states’ expectations.Institutionalists recognize that interdependent relations are an importantprecondition for international cooperation. Well-developed patterns of economic interdependence are crucial, because they increase scope for joint

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Introduction 7

gains as well as the range and frequency of contacts between states. Thus institutionalists recognize that their framework best models patternsof cooperation between advanced industrialized states. Institutional inter-dependence can also help facilitate cooperation between states in the institutionalist framework. International institutions are difficult to set upin an anarchic environment. However, once in place they can become func-tional for states, and may persist even when structural conditions alter.Thus institutional inertia may lead to ‘path dependent’ change in whichcooperation established during an initial period affects behaviour at sub-sequent stages. Typically, institutions emerge under the auspices of a hegemon. Alternatively, they initially reflect alliance commitments under a particular distribution of power. In general, however, institutionalistsview cooperation as reflecting the pursuit of national interests rather thanaltruism (Keohane 1984).

Institutionalists responded to neorealist predictions about emerging mul-tipolarity. In so doing they have predicted continuity in the post-War mul-tilateral arrangements between the major states. Institutionalists point tothe dense network of alliances and international institutions that developedbetween the Western powers under bipolarity. These multilateral frame-works helped stabilize diplomatic relations between the industrializedstates, and proved useful in pursuing economic gains. Now that Cold Warbipolarity has disintegrated, the functions these institutions perform willcontinue to be useful for their members, and should tend to persist despitethe shift in the balance of power. This would result in the consolidation ofinstitutional frameworks that had been established in the early post-Warperiod. Whilst incremental change may take place reflecting adaptations tothe post-Cold War world, more fundamental change is unlikely. Moreover,the post-War institutions also provide a stable platform for the engagementof Russia and China, and the integration of these states into internationalsociety. The most prominent exponent of this argument was Joseph Nye inhis influential book Bound to Lead (Nye 1990). Nye argued that the emerg-ing structural conflict predicted by realists was unlikely to materialize.Instead, a ‘layer cake’ system would emerge, with the US maintaining hegemony in the military sphere, and secondary states specializing in thesupporting of systems of governance to manage economic and ecologicalinterdependence. Nye’s argument fed heavily into Hans Maull’s relatedclaim that Germany and Japan had become ‘civilian powers’, orientatingthemselves away from military force, and gearing themselves towards themanagement of multilateralism and interdependence (Maull 1991). Thus,in contrast to neorealism, institutionalist analysis stresses continuity ratherthan change after the Cold War.

However, institutionalists acknowledge that the status of their predictionsvaries across Europe and East Asia. A West European context is ideallysuited to institutionalist analysis because well-developed patterns of eco-nomic and institutional interdependence are present (Keohane et al. 1993:

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8 Introduction

6). German unification and the problems generated by enlargement of theEuropean Union and NATO may have distributional consequences thatcould increase the complexity of multilateral negotiations. Nevertheless, achange in institutional frameworks under these conditions is likely to be mar-ginal because actors retain incentives to cooperate (Keohane 1993). By con-trast, East Asia presents a harder case for institutionalism. Structural realistswere quick to identify that East Asia appeared ‘ripe for rivalry’ in the after-math of the Cold War (Buzan and Segal 1994; Friedberg 1994; more recentlysee Friedberg 2000). In addition to America and Russia’s presence, East Asiaencompasses Japan and China. Both these states are identified by neoreal-ists as serious candidates for polar status within the international system.Furthermore, patterns of economic and institutional interdependence aremuch less well-developed than in Western Europe. Whilst Japan is integratedinto Western multilateral systems, China’s emergence as a major militarypower in the wake of Russia’s decline might well encourage a regional secu-rity rivalry. In turn, an increasingly assertive Japan could loosen its involve-ment in the multilateral structures. In his capacity as Assistant Secretary ofState for Defense in America in 1994–1995, Nye oversaw the most import-ant review of America’s post-Cold War security policy in the region. Thisremained the corner-stone of US policy over the 1990s. It recommended thatAmerica should maintain its forward defence presence in East Asia.Although this would not substitute for well-developed interdependence, abenign hegemon could provide some of the preconditions necessary for thedevelopment of multilateralism after the Cold War (Nye 1995; Office forInternational Security Affairs 1995).

The liberal model focuses the interaction between domestic politicalsystems and the international system. However, liberalism is the least wellspecified of the three models. Traditionally, liberalism is viewed asproviding a ‘bottom up’ perspective in which the internal characteristicsof states explain state behaviour. Understood in these terms, liberalisminverts structural realism’s emphasis on the constraints imposed on statebehaviour by the international system. This, for example, is the versionof liberalism operationalized by Keohane et al. (1993: 4). It is also theformulation of liberal theory used to explain the ‘democratic peace’. Thedemocratic peace refers to the apparent absence of war between consti-tutionally secure liberal democracies over the past two centuries. In theeighteenth century, Immanuel Kant first postulated the relationshipbetween liberal republics and a zone of peace (Reiss 1991). However, itwas only in the late twentieth century that empirical research by politicalscientists subjected this proposition to empirical scrutiny. Michael Doylewas the most prominent contemporary analyst to point to systematicevidence supporting Kant’s predictions (Doyle 1983). Whilst the democ-ratic peace thesis remains disputed, it has nevertheless emerged as one ofthe most robust findings produced by the modern discipline (Brown et al.1995a). Drawing on Kant’s three ‘Definitive Articles’ (or preconditions)

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Introduction 9

of peaceful interstate relations, Doyle accounted for the democratic peacein terms of the institutional, cultural and commercial features of liberaldemocracies. Constitutional checks and balances, a shared culture ofrespect for mutual legitimacy, and the material incentives provided bytransnational social and economic contacts between liberal polities coin-cided to tightly constrain the ability of constitutionally secure republicsto go to war with one another. Doyle also qualified his argument bynoting the ways in which the very same factors that underpinned peacefulrelations within the zone of peace exacerbated conflicts between liberaland non-liberal regimes. Nevertheless, he identified that over the last two centuries an informal ‘pacific federation’ between liberal states hasconsolidated and expanded (Doyle 1983).

As a result of Doyle’s research, the view that liberalism stresses theinternational consequences of internal structure has become widespread.Indeed, a recent codification of liberal theory by Moravcsik generalizesthis claim, setting out a model of international relations that highlightsthe causal significance of domestic preferences (Moravcsik 1997). Not-withstanding this consensus, however, there remain problems with sucha formulation of liberalism. Re-evaluations of Kant’s political writingshave led to a ‘second generation’ research agenda in which the democ-ratic peace is understood as a systemic proposition (Huntley 1996; Ray2000; Russett and Starr 2000; Cederman 2001; Russett and O’Neal 2001;Harrison 2002; Mitchell 2002). This line of enquiry has pursued tworelated ideas. First, it has investigated the role that the international systemitself plays in constructing the domestic structure of states through long-term processes of cultural selection. Cultural selection generated by ananarchic environment favours more liberal states which will tend to out-perform authoritarian systems in extended rivalry. Thus over the historicallong term, the international system itself will foster the spread of liberaldemocracy. Second, it has explored the possibility that changes in theproportion and relative weight of democratic states within the internationalsystem will cause the effects of the democratic peace to vary over time.One line of reasoning has proposed that once a critical mass of statesapproximating to liberal democratic ideals exists the democratic peace willreplace the balance of power as the international system’s equilibriumtendency (Harrison 2002). The socialization effects generated by the liberalcore encourage states at the margins of cultural change to adopt shifts intheir political identity. In turn, this feeds back into the properties of thesystem by further strengthening the liberal core. Overall, the socializationdynamics envisaged by the liberal model postulate the existence of powerfulhomogenizing forces in the international system encouraging its long-term convergence around the democratic peace. Individual states may, ofcourse, resist pressures to engage in cultural change being generated bythe system. Thus, as Moravcsik’s formulation of liberalism stresses,domestic variation is built into socialization dynamics because of the

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10 Introduction

influence of embedded political and economic coalitions and social iden-tities. Nevertheless, particularly once the norms of the democratic peaceare entrenched in the system, socialization pressures will encourage statesto internalize shifts in their identities through a powerful mixture of bothnormative and material incentives.

There are affinities between such a formulation of liberal theory andthe ‘constructivist’ approach to international relations. Following Wendt,constructivists argue that the cultural rather than the material structureof the international system is the crucial systemic determinant of statebehaviour. Neorealism and institutionalism presuppose egotistical culturalnorms established through their prior encounters with other units. Ratherthan assuming states seek to maximize their interests, constructivistsexamine the way in which states construct their interests through processesof socialization within the international system. In this view, self-help andpower politics are not necessary features of an anarchic environment, butinstead reflect the internalization of particular identities by actors. Itfollows that the international system is at least potentially open to trans-formation away from a logic of self-help through changes in the cultureof the units that populate it (Wendt 1992). A problem with this line ofreasoning is that constructivists have been unclear about the mechanismscapable of bringing about a systemic shift of this nature. Wendt hasresponded to such criticisms in his recent Social Theory of InternationalPolitics by providing a general account of how patterns of socializationwithin the international system might vary historically. Wendt claims thatthe states system has reflected a Lockean culture embodying the behav-ioural tendencies associated with neorealism. Today this system is beingtransformed into Kantian culture due to a critical mass of states predis-posed to interdependence and the norms of the democratic peace (Wendt1999). Not all constructivists follow Wendt, and there is no necessaryaffinity between constructivist and liberal arguments. Nevertheless, distinctcomplementarities between Wendtian constructivism and the insights ofthe sociological strand of the liberal tradition have been underscored byWendt’s book. Wendt’s insights are therefore utilized to produce a moresystemic formulation of liberal theory than is available in orthodox formu-lations of the democratic peace. Whilst acknowledging that socializationdynamics are subject to domestic variation, this formulation views systemicnorms as capable of trumping internal political structure as a causal vari-able once the system is overwhelmingly dominated by a stable liberal core.

The concept of reflexivity is central to the socialization dynamics mod-elled by liberal theory. Wendt defines reflexivity as reflecting a capacity forcritical self-reflection and cultural change on the part of units (Wendt 1999:375). Reflexivity as a property of the international system pre-supposes thatstates are reflexive actors capable of internalizing cultural norms anddeploying these in conducting their foreign policies. However, reflexivitycannot be reduced to this generic feature of social action, and should be

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Introduction 11

understood as reflecting very specific historical circumstances. In particu-lar, reflexivity is associated with social systems experiencing a shift in thetrajectory of socialization within them. The liberal model postulates thatonce a critical mass of liberal states emerges, the democratic peace willreplace the balance of power as the international system’s dominant ten-dency. This will result in a spillover or cascade effect being generated inwhich socialization pressures dynamically encourage the diffusion of liberalnorms. A self-reinforcing positive feedback loop emerges in which thespread of liberal norms strengthens the dominance of the liberal core,thereby further enhancing momentum within the system (Huntley 1996;Cederman 2001; Harrison 2002; Mitchell 2002). A system characterizedby reflexivity is marked by two distinctive properties. First, units within itachieve increased latitude for autonomous action. This reflects the way inwhich the effects of persuasion and demonstration create a permissive spacethat allows actors to voluntarily engage in cultural change. Second, a sys-tem characterized by reflexivity is distinctive in terms of the structure ofinteraction it embodies. This condition is satisfied by the emergence of astable liberal core that overwhelmingly dominates patterns of interactionwithin the international order. Through a potent combination of coerciveand economic incentives and cultural appeal, the core encourages states tocomply with the norms of the democratic peace. This same structure ofmaterial and normative dominance also locks in progressive change, ensur-ing that any general reversal of the positive spiral is extremely difficult.

Liberal theory has traditionally suffered from the weakness that it offersan idealistic perspective on international politics. This was a criticismmade in particular of the Wilsonian liberalism of the 1920s associatedwith the notion that a general system of collective security could formthe basis for the international order. E.H. Carr exposed the weaknessesof such arguments, and since Carr’s critique liberalism has been sidelinedas a tradition of thought within the discipline (Carr 2001). Carr’s criti-cisms of the utopian strands of liberal thought still resonate today, andany attempt to revive the liberal tradition must be able to respond persua-sively to realist arguments. The version of liberal theory operationalizedin the present study is one that disavows the utopian elements of thistradition of thought. It is instead influenced by Keohane’s attempt todevelop a ‘sophisticated liberalism’ which takes into account the constraintsimposed by international anarchy and the competitive character of thestates system (Keohane 1991). Ironically, Keohane’s attempt to formulatea sophisticated version of liberalism led him to focus on the problem ofcooperation under anarchy, and in so doing marginalizes both domesticpreferences and processes of state socialization from his theoreticalperspective. For this reason, he has subsequently acknowledged that histheoretical perspective is better labelled institutionalist rather than liberal.By contrast, the version of liberalism operationalized in the present studyoffers a route to achieving sophisticated liberalism on terms different to

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12 Introduction

those set out by Keohane himself. Keohane has interpreted realism as a rationalist theory and this has encouraged him to develop the insti-tutionalist critique. However, realism may alternatively be understood ascontaining a strong reflexive dimension due to its focus on processes of selection and socialization arising from the generative consequences ofanarchy. This opens a second line of critique of realism that has muchcloser affinities with a formulation of liberal theory influenced by construc-tivism. As has been noted, liberal theory as operationalized in the presentstudy prioritizes systemic processes of socialization over the role ofdomestic preferences, although it accepts that domestic variation plays astrong role in mediating socialization dynamics. It therefore differs fromMoravcsik’s specification of the liberal model. Nevertheless, it does sharein common with Moravcsik’s reformulation the notion that liberalism maybe understood as a non-utopian, non-ideological social scientific theoryof international relations which is analytically co-equal in status to bothrealism and institutionalism (Moravcsik 1997: 513).

Drawing on the affinities that exist between sociological liberalism andWendtian constructivism contains potential pitfalls, however. One of thecriticisms of Wendt’s approach is that it relies upon theoretical terms thatare difficult to define (Keohane 1989b; Keohane 2001). A recent studyby Alderson has, however, engaged a conceptual ‘mine sweeping’ exer-cise that facilitates the application of constructivist concepts to empiricalanalysis (Alderson 2001). Alderson defines ‘socialization’ as the inter-nalization of norms. He notes that approaches to socialization differ overthe conditions favourable to internalization, the causal mechanismsthrough which its effects are produced, and whether normative or mater-ial factors are more important. However, by defining socialization as anoutcome rather than a process he provides a definition of socializationthat is capable of subsuming all of these potential uses. As long as theoutcome is that the norms are internalized, then this can legitimately beencompassed by the label socialization (Alderson 2001: 417). This raisesthe question of the definition of internalization. Internalization reflectsinstitutionalization of international norms. Institutionalization occursthrough the state, and will be mediated by domestic social, political andeconomic coalitions. By the same token, however, internalization shapesthe internal identity of a state, biasing it in favour of compliance withinternational norms. Also contained in Alderson’s definition of socializa-tion is a definition of international ‘norms’. According to Alderson, normscan reflect shared expectations about behaviour which are adopted becausethey are either instrumentally valuable for states or because they reflectshared cultural standards of legitimate behaviour. Thus the defining featureof state socialization is the outcome of internalization rather than itsnormative content (Alderson 2001: 418–423).

Definitions are also required relating to the cultural norms associatedwith democratic peace. The notion of the democratic peace as a set of

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Introduction 13

international norms reflecting the shared institutional, commercial andcultural predispositions of liberal republics is well established. The firsttwo of these predispositions reflect tangible institutional or economic variables that are more straightforward to operationalize. However, thecultural strand of the democratic peace argument reflects a diffuse and informal set of international norms. Thus it is essential to define thesenorms and specify the behavioural effects with which they may be asso-ciated. Following Wendt, culture refers to shared ideas about legitimatebehaviour (Wendt 1999: 141). Applying this definition to the sociologicalstrand of liberal theory highlights the respect for mutual legitimacy that constitutes the core of the pacific union. However, this raises thequestion of what constitutes a ‘democratic state’. Orthodox formulationsof democratic peace theory associated with Doyle draw a distinctionbetween constitutionally secure liberal republics and illiberal regimes. This distinction is normally inferred empirically with respect to a varietyof institutional characteristics associated with liberal democracies. Thisdistinction breaks down, however, when liberal theory is reformulated asa macro-historical or systemic tendency that transcends any particularstate (Cederman 2001; Harrison 2002). On this view, states exist alonggradual continuum, and any one state can at best approximate liberalideals. Expressed in Wendt’s terms, liberal democracies are not pureKantians. Systemic forces therefore act on all units along the core-peripheryspectrum regardless of their formal political status. Thus even states thathave a constitution that is formally liberal may adopt preferences thatreflect either competitive security practices or a mercantilist economicorientation. Similarly, states that are formally non-liberal in orientationmay behave in accordance with the norms of the democratic peace. Liberalculture is therefore best measured empirically by examining domestic pref-erences as they are revealed in the grand strategies of states. It followsthat ‘cultural change’ may be said to have taken place when preferencesalter due to shifts in internal social, political and economic coalitions.When cultural change reflects socialization, a causal link will exist betweennormative and material pressures encouraging the internalization of inter-national norms and domestic restructuring.

Having outlined the theoretical framework and provided definitions ofkey terms, it is necessary to examine the issue of the predictions aboutbehavioural trends in the post-Cold War order generated by the liberalmodel. This raises methodological questions related to operationalizingliberal predictions.

Operationalizing liberal predictions

Huntley has argued that reformulating the democratic peace in systemicterms allows liberal theory to offer distinctive predictions about the post-Cold War international system. In particular, it makes it possible to view

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14 Introduction

the end of the Cold War in terms of a major historical turning point in the development of world politics. With the collapse of the SovietUnion, powerful forces exist which are capable of facilitating the dynamicspread of peaceful relations between the major powers globally. A systemicformulation of liberal theory therefore predicts a form of great power‘bandwagoning’ in the post-Cold War era (Huntley 1996: 70). Band-wagoning refers to flocking to the dominant state and is conventionallycontrasted to balancing, which involves joining the weaker coalition.Balancing is typically viewed as the more common strategy because band-wagoning carries with it the risk of exploitation by the stronger side.Nevertheless, bandwagoning has occurred historically, and is extensivelydiscussed in the literature (see Walt 1984). Huntley compares the band-wagoning he associates with liberal predictions to both the balance ofpower configuration predicted by neorealism and the institutional inertiarelied upon by institutionalist analysis. The liberal approach provides muchstronger grounds for optimism about the future of world politics thaneither of these perspectives, suggesting ‘an unprecedented potential . . . forgeneral great power peace’ (Huntley 1996: 70). The notion that the demo-cratic peace will spread and produce a general pacification of great powerrelations strongly parallels the argument that with the end of the ColdWar the democratic peace will generate socialization effects beyond acertain stage in the development of the international system. Moreover,both the bandwagoning and socialization metaphors suggest a spillovereffect in which change generates a self-reinforcing cycle of progress. Thusa ‘dialectical causal loop’ emerges in which feedback produced by theinternational system enhances the spread of liberal norms (Huntley 1996:59). On the basis of his argument that liberalism provides distinctivepredictions about world politics, he proposes that the end of the ColdWar provides a historic opportunity to test liberal arguments againstsystemic claims put forward by competing paradigms. However, he alsoacknowledges that a more systematic application of his ideas to theemerging international system would be desirable.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) provide another precedent indicatingaffinities between socialization dynamics and bandwagoning. Rather thanbeing influenced by the literature on the democratic peace, Finnemore andSikkink draw on constructivism. However, their arguments shadow themesin a systemic formulation of liberal theory (Mitchell 2002). Finnemore andSikkink argue that the influence of norms may be understood in terms of athree-stage process: norm emergence; norm acceptance (the norm cascade);and norm internalization. The characteristic mechanism of the norm emer-gence stage is norm entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs attempt to convince acritical mass of states to embrace new norms. In the second stage, the norm‘cascades’ through the population through pressures to conform or thedesire to enhance legitimacy. The final stage of the cycle is norm internal-ization, during which norms acquire a taken for granted quality. Finnemore

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Introduction 15

and Sikkink point out that not all norms reach the second stage. Only aftera critical mass of states accepts a norm does it reach a ‘tipping point’ thatsets in motion a cascade. In their discussion of the life cycle, Finnemore andSikkink suggest that ‘norm bandwagoning’ may be used interchangeablywith ‘norm cascade’ to depict the pattern of behaviour during the stage inthe cycle at which the tipping point is reached (Finnemore and Sikkink,1998: 893). They apply their life cycle to various international regimes, typ-ically those associated with humanitarian concerns. Nevertheless, theirframework might plausibly be applied to the cultural structure of the international system. This way of fusing liberal and constructivist insightsindicates that once a critical mass of democratic states has emerged, aprocess of norm bandwagoning will be set in motion (Harrison 2002;Mitchell 2002).

It is possible to use the affinities between bandwagoning and socializa-tion as descriptive metaphors to highlight behavioural tendencies in thepost-Cold War international system compatible with liberal predictions.Recent research has indicated that between 1989 and 1999 the major powers bandwagoned within a unipolar power structure. The most com-prehensive attempt to document overall patterns of behaviour by majorstates during this period has been provided by Kapstein and Mastanduno’sUnipolar Politics (1999). Whilst maintaining a commitment to the realisttradition, this study breaks with the structural realist framework that heldprominence in the initial aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The con-tributors are influenced heavily by classical realism, taking a perceptualapproach to power rather than relying on structural logic. Their centralargument is that through diplomatic engagement and reassurance, Americahas encouraged other major actors to support its hegemonic position. Whilethey stress that the emerging order contains elements of positional compe-tition, Kapstein and Mastanduno explicitly argue against core structuralrealist claims. In particular, they ‘find little evidence of military balancingby the major powers of Europe and Asia against the world’s only super-power’ (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999: 4). Kapstein and Mastanduno’sargument about bandwagoning may be broken down into two discretedimensions along which this trend may be measured. The first dimensionconcerns general patterns of institutionalized activity among the majorpowers. The second dimension concerns the foreign policy adjustmentsmade by individual states to the end of the Cold War. Along these dimen-sions, the trends documented by Kapstein and Mastanduno pose majoranomalies for both structural realism and institutionalism.

Neither neorealism nor institutionalism is able to account for the generalpattern of institutionalized activity documented by Unipolar Politics. Theargument that major powers have bandwagoned with the US since theend of the Cold War suggests that trends in the international system havebeen the reverse of those anticipated by structural realists. America hassuccessfully used diplomacy to assuage other powers, and convince them

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16 Introduction

of the benign character of its dominance. Rather than balancing againstAmerica, other major states have acquiesced in its predominance becauseit is perceived as relatively unthreatening. This has been reflected in threetrends. First, rather than disentangling itself from its enormous Cold War security commitments, the US has maintained and extended a strategyof deep engagement. It has sought to preserve the status quo in its relations with Germany and Japan, locking these states into a subordinaterole within US dominated structures. Second, with former Cold War adver-saries, the US has pursued a strategy of engagement and integration ratherthan confrontation. This is in order to dissuade Russia and China fromchallenging American hegemony. Even NATO expansion may be seen as a way of restraining a unified Germany, and has also been accompa-nied by a variety of efforts to make it politically acceptable to Russia.Finally, the US has also adopted a preference for multilateralism becausethis allows it greater leverage to legitimize its power (Kapstein andMastanduno 1999: 151–157). The pattern documented by Kapstein andMastanduno also poses puzzles for institutionalist predictions aboutgeneral patterns of institutionalized activity. In particular, the band-wagoning trend indicates that patterns of international cooperation havebeen more encompassing geographically than institutionalists anticipated.In terms of geographic scope, bandwagoning provides a much more robust framework for peaceful transition between the major powers thaninstitutionalist logic. Rather than relying on patterns of economic andinstitutional interdependence, which are uneven across the internationalsystem, bandwagoning relies on benign policing and engagement by thehegemonic power. Thus the general pattern of institutionalized activitywithin the bandwagoning model is more extensive than institutionalisttheory anticipates.

Both neorealism and institutionalism are also faced with anomalies interms of the pattern of foreign policy adjustments identified by UnipolarPolitics. In addition to its general claims, Kapstein and Mastanduno’sstudy provides valuable accounts of the ‘grand strategies’ of the majorpowers during a period of flux. The results indicate that the end of theCold War has led to a remarkably wide diversity of strategies beingpursued by important actors. This reflects the way domestic preferenceshave had a key role in shaping responses to the Soviet collapse. The editorsinterpret this as indicative of bandwagoning within a unipolar structure.The constraints imposed on the major powers by the system are relativelyweak, allowing domestic coalitions a high degree of influence on foreignpolicy formulation. Structural realists might make the qualification thattheir theory is designed to explain international outcomes, rather thanforeign policies of particular states (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999: 10;see also Waltz 1996). Yet, as Kapstein and Mastanduno highlight, if noneof the major powers are balancing against the US, this does pose a cumu-lative puzzle for neorealism. Institutionalism also faces difficulties in

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Introduction 17

explaining the foreign policy adjustments documented by Unipolar Politics.Institutionalism finds it difficult to account for the degree to which coop-erative frameworks within the international system have been internalizedby the major powers. Institutionalism relies on the instrumental benefitsof cooperation for states. By contrast, Unipolar Politics records the wayin which the major powers accepted the legitimacy of American domi-nance. Whilst major states have attempted to maintain some independentcapacity for action, their strategies accept and even presuppose acquies-cence in American hegemony. Of course, there is a general case that thedomestic level is a factor explaining international behaviour. However,Unipolar Politics documents the way each of the major powers has pursuedstrategies that strongly reflect the influence of behavioural tendencies builtup under bipolarity. This path dependency suggests that the effect ofdomestic factors on foreign policy have varied dramatically across the endof the Cold War. Thus the generic problem for neorealism and institu-tionalism posed by the foreign policy adjustments documented by Kapsteinand Mastanduno is the systematic influence of domestic variables on thegrand strategies of the major powers.

However, given the potential affinities between bandwagoning andsocialization dynamics, Unipolar Politics may also provide useful insightsinto the behavioural tendencies associated with systemic liberal theory.Points of similarity between hegemonic bandwagoning and liberal social-ization may be identified in relation to both the general pattern ofinstitutionalized activity between the major powers and the foreign policyadjustments of individual states. In terms of general patterns of institu-tionalized activity, both classical realist and liberal models indicate thata peaceful structure of great power relations will emerge at a global levelin the post-Cold War period. In the classical realist account, bandwagon-ing reflects benign perceptions of American dominance. In the liberalmodel, this reflects the socialization effects generated by the emergence ofa stable core of liberal democratic states. However, the outcome is thesame across both models. The second similarity between the two modelsconcerns individual foreign policy adjustments. Both classical realism andliberalism predict a high degree of domestic cultural and institutional vari-ation in the strategies of major states in the post-Cold War internationalsystem. In the classical realist account, this reflects relative autonomy fromtight structural constraints. In the liberal model, this variation reflects an‘internalization lag’ during which domestic institutions adjust to social-ization pressures and internalize cultural change. In this account, domesticvariation is a direct reflection of socialization pressures, and the dialecticproduced when these pressures interact with embedded coalitions withinstates.

Indeed, one of the contributions to Unipolar Politics explores connectionsbetween classical realist and liberal hypotheses. Deudney and Ikenberryprovide the only contribution to the collection of essays that is informed by

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18 Introduction

liberal rather than realist theory. Following the thrust of Kapstein andMastanduno’s study, it is argued that stability is locked into the post-ColdWar international system. However, Deudney and Ikenberry diverge fromother contributors by explaining this continuity in terms of what they refer to as ‘structural liberalism’, or the institutionalization of a system ofconsensual relations among Western states. Deudney and Ikenberry specifythat the key features of this system reflect security ‘co-binding’ through theuse of mutually constraining security institutions (notably NATO and theMutual Security Treaty with Japan), extensive levels of interdependencewhich imbue American hegemony with a ‘penetrated’ and open character,self-imposed constitutional constraints on the use of force by key secondarystates (notably Germany and Japan), structural economic openness and civicrather than ethnic national identities (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999:105–123). However, a problem with this formulation of liberal theory isthat it is so similar to classical realism as to be over-determined. Deudneyand Ikenberry’s argument reflects the way benign perceptions of Americanpower have enabled other actors to internalize a supportive role within aunipolar international structure. Thus Kapstein and Mastanduno are quickto draw attention to the way in which the system described by Deudney andIkenberry ‘remains remarkably Washington centred. American hegemony is so essential to the maintenance of the system that it is built in to theirdefinition of its essential features’ (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999: 15–16).Essentially, Deudney and Ikenberry view American hegemony as a necessarybut not a sufficient condition for states to become socialized to a liberalinternational order (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). As a result, the inter-national system they envisage remains highly asymmetrical, with the UStaking on a disproportionate share of rights and responsibilities formaintaining the international order. In practice, therefore, they concedesignificant ground to realist arguments.

The over-determined character of Deudney and Ikenberry’s version ofliberal theory raises the question of whether it is possible to reformulateliberalism to separate its predictions about patterns of institutionalizedactivity more clearly from those provided by both institutionalists andclassical realists. One criterion useful for this purpose is to examine moreclosely the type of institutionalized activity predicted by the two theories.In a more genuinely liberal international order, hegemony would notprovide a necessary condition for socialization to liberal norms. Instead,the major powers would take on equal status within the system, sharingrights and responsibilities on a symmetrical basis. In this view, a criticaldistinction between hegemonic bandwagoning and liberal socialization is the degree of symmetry in institutionalized relationships between themajor states. This pursues a line of inquiry initiated by Buzan (1993).Buzan argues that rather than being opposites, the concepts of inter-national system and international society are symbiotic. The latter naturallyevolves out of the former such that system and society are linked in a

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Introduction 19

developmental sequence. A Waltzian balance of power is incorporated or‘folded into’ a broader institutionalized structure of norms and rules.Extending Buzan’s argument further and connecting it to the frameworkprovided by Wendt (1999), a Kantian culture might be viewed as a welldeveloped Lockean international society. Understood in this way, it is notnecessary to define a Kantian culture ambitiously as a partial and spatiallylimited collective security system as Wendt does. Instead, it is betterregarded as a highly developed balance of power system in which concertdiplomacy is premised on recognition of mutual equality of status by themajor states. This in turn might be viewed as a natural progression ofDoyle’s proposition that respect for mutual legitimacy and sovereignequality is at the core of the liberal pacific union. Such a system of greatpower balancing is so sophisticated that ‘balance of power’ ceases to bethe most appropriate label to refer to the pattern of organization producedbecause the risk of great power war has effectively been eliminated. Insteadthe term ‘pacific union’ is more suitable, and it remains meaningful torefer to the democratic peace displacing the balance of power as the domi-nant system-wide equilibrium once a Kantian critical mass has emerged.

This approach to distinguishing between hegemonic bandwagoning andliberal socialization may be operationalized empirically by examiningadjustments in burden sharing arrangements within central multilateralframeworks. Central in this regard are America’s key alliance commit-ments in Europe and East Asia, and the status of secondary states withinthese regimes. According to Deudney and Ikenberry, for example, thesemi-sovereignty and partial great power status of Germany and Japanwill remain important features of the emerging international order. Theyclaim that this reflects liberal features of the international system, specific-ally self-imposed constitutional constraints on the use of force abroad andthe integration of Japan into wider security and economic institutions(Deudney and Ikenberry 1999: 104–105). However, it may instead beargued that asymmetrical features of the relationship of Germany andJapan with the US actually inhibit a more liberal pattern of security coop-eration based on greater equality in terms of burden sharing arrangements.An international order structured along such lines would reflect a quali-tatively different pattern of cooperation than that envisaged by Deudneyand Ikenberry. Thus burden sharing arrangements between the majorpowers emerge as a key qualitative test of general patterns of institu-tionalized activity that have emerged in the post-Cold War period.

Debates about burden sharing are frequently framed in terms of a cost-benefit framework amenable to institutionalist analysis. In this view, suchdebates reflect concerns over gains through cooperation. Thus the emer-gence of a more equal structure of great power relations might conceivablybe better accounted for using institutionalist rather than liberal theory.However, two points may be made against this argument. First, in prac-tice institutionalists have manifestly not anticipated major changes in terms

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20 Introduction

of burden sharing relationships between the major powers. Their over-whelming emphasis has been on continuity within post-War internationalsociety, in contrast to the emerging multipolar system envisaged byneorealism. Indeed, this focus follows logically from institutionalism’sstress on the path dependent nature of institutional adjustment. Thisimplies that the end of the Cold War is seen as producing incrementalchange, rather as a qualitative turning point in the institutional develop-ment of the international system. Second, bargaining over the distributionof costs and benefits within multilateral institutions also occurs within aframework in which perceptions of legitimacy are important. For example,Kapstein and Mastanduno suggest that the perception of America as abenign hegemon eases its ability to sustain patterns of cooperation withinthe international system. In the liberal model, respect for mutual equalityof status can be viewed as having a similar functional effect. Moreover,it is perfectly possible for cost driven behavioural logic to reinforce aframework of political legitimacy once that structure has becomeembedded. Instead of the causal process behind institutionalized activity,the key indicator should therefore be the international outcomes produced.If signs of change are incremental, this should favour institutionalist predic-tions. Indications of a more fundamental qualitative shift in the structureof institutionalized great power relations, however, will weigh in favourof liberalism. Over-all, the degree of symmetry in the pattern of institu-tionalized activity in the international system since the end of the ColdWar provides a viable criterion for evaluating the competing predictionsof different theories.

A second criterion for distinguishing between hegemonic bandwagoningand liberal socialization is the impact of systemic pressures on the prefer-ences of the major powers. Kapstein and Mastanduno hold that the domes-tic variation they record reflects the way the impact of structural forcesencouraging balancing is relatively weak. The major powers ‘cross atightrope’ as they negotiate the tensions between unipolar politics and posi-tional competition built into the emerging order. They ask whether or notthey can cross these tightropes without falling, and find ‘that the contem-porary order may be stable for the time being, but the walk will continueto be a delicate one’ (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999: 6). The critical fac-tor determining the durability of the current order will be the diplomaticprowess displayed by the major powers. In this view, the autonomy ofaction that states have acquired is compatible with the coexistence for per-haps an indefinite period of a remarkably wide variety of strategies by keystates. In the liberal model, a degree of domestic cultural and institutionalvariation is built into the socialization dynamics generated by the liberalinternational order because of the existence of an internalization lag.However, as the system develops, it might be expected to generate mount-ing pressures for the major powers to adopt ‘liberal’ strategic preferences.This encompasses participation in a peaceful system of diplomatic concert,

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Introduction 21

and acceptance of broad equality of status with other major powers in theinternational system. It also includes an economy that is relatively open tointernational trade and a predisposition towards interdependence. Such cri-teria rule out strategies reflecting a competitive security tendency (includ-ing participation in asymmetrical alliance systems) and/or a mercantilisteconomic orientation. The impact of systemic pressures on the strategicpreferences of states provides a test through which to examine the predic-tions of the classical realist and liberal hypotheses. If socialization towardsa liberal core is taking place, homogenizing tendencies within the systemwill encourage convergence around liberal preferences.

In summary, the operationalization of liberal predictions about changein the post-Cold War international system has been developed in threestages. First, structural similarities between the behavioural metaphorssuggested by bandwagoning and socialization were identified. Second, thiswas linked to empirical research in Kapstein and Mastanduno’s UnipolarPolitics. Two parallels between the behavioural trends associated withhegemonic bandwagoning and liberal socialization were identified. First,both predict a peaceful and densely institutionalized structure of greatpower relations will emerge at a global level. Second, both predict domes-tic variation will be built into the responses made by major powers tothe Soviet collapse. The way these trends pose serious empirical anom-alies for the neorealist and institutionalist models was noted. Finally, amore fine-grained discussion distinguishing hegemonic bandwagoning andliberal socialization yielded distinct criteria against which liberal predic-tions might be measured. Using these criteria should enable liberalpredictions about the behaviour of major states over the post-Cold Warperiod to be evaluated against those of neorealism and institutionalism.

Table 1.1 summarizes the predictions associated with the three theoriesoperationalized with respect to the post-Cold War international system.

Chapter structure

The remainder of the introduction outlines the organization of the book,and considers its contribution to the literature. A theoretical chapter isfollowed by three case chapters examining the foreign policies of Germany,Japan and China between 1989 and 1999. The purpose of the theoreticalchapter is summarized before addressing the organization of empiricalresearch.

The theoretical chapter considers the implications of the end of the ColdWar for the way in which the international system is conceptualized.Neither the Keohane et al. nor the Kapstein and Mastanduno projects link their analysis of trends since 1989 with an assessment of the causes of the Soviet collapse. The implication of this is that the causes and conse-quences of the end of the Cold War are treated as discrete units of inquiry.There are, however, costs involved in framing research in these terms.

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22 Introduction

In particular, the unexpected nature of the end of the Cold War raised questions about the way in which the international system’s long-term tendencies are modelled theoretically. For this reason the theoretical chapter seeks a reassessment of established theories of international relations, and the way in which the relationship between them is con-ceptualized. The aim of the chapter is to achieve a new synthesis of theinsights of neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism that is capable oflinking a coherent overall account of the end of the Cold War with an analysis of trends in relations between major powers during the subsequentperiod of post-Cold War transition. Thus, unlike other studies, this bookseeks to provide an assessment of the underlying causes of the Soviet collapse as a pre-requisite to the analysis of trends in relations between the major states.

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Introduction 23

Table 1.1 Summary of theories and predictions

Variable General pattern of Foreign policy institutionalized adjustmentsactivity

Neorealism Major change in 1 Balancing trend Domestic global balance of globally variationpower 2 Conflictual structure low

of great power relations

3 Weaklyinstututionalized

Institutionalism Cross regional 1 Great power Domestic variations in stability in variation economic and Western Europe lowinstitutional 2 Great power conflictinterdependence in East Asia

3 Incremental changesin post-1945 multilateralframeworks

Liberalism Emergence of 1 ‘Norm Domestic ‘critical mass’ of bandwagoning’ variation broadly liberal towards liberal highstates core

2 Stable structure ofgreat power relationsglobally

3 Non-incrementalchange towards greatersymmetry in burdensharing

During the 1980s and 1990s, the dominant theories of the internationalsystem were neorealism and institutionalism. These approaches have beenperceived as relying upon the assumption that states act rationally inpursuit of their national interests, thus ‘black boxing’ the internal char-acteristics of states (Baldwin 1993). During the same period, liberalismwas viewed as adopting a reductionist perspective. Neorealism and insti-tutionalism have therefore tended to be regarded as being more compatiblewith one another than with the liberal approach in virtue of their systemicorientation. The theoretical chapter challenges the established consensusover the relationship between the three approaches, arguing that it has inhibited a new synthesis of their insights suited to the post-Cold War world. This argument develops in two stages. First, the conventionalrationalist interpretation of neorealism is re-evaluated. It is proposed thatthe neorealist model does not require the assumption of actor rationalityfor it to produce explanations of international behaviour. Instead it maybe interpreted as relying on a selection logic in which units that fail torespond to the imperatives of the balance of power are punished or elim-inated as significant actors. In this account, competitive processes socializeunits to adopt an egotistical identity, and then ensure this is reproducedover time. The second stage in the argument is to reinterpret the conven-tional, reductionist account of liberal theory through constructivist insightsabout socialization. The emergence of a constructivist school over the1990s has facilitated the process of linking the democratic peace to systemlevel analysis.

Rereading both neorealism and liberalism in this fashion places the issueof socialization much more firmly in the centre of debates than the earlierconsensus around rationalism. Debates between neorealism and institu-tionalism focused on the problem of cooperation under anarchy. Bycontrast debates between neorealists and liberals concern the overall trajec-tory of identity construction and socialization in the international system.This new axis of contention as a focus for contemporary debate offerstwo distinct theoretical advantages. First, a focus on socialization dynamicsis more amenable to integrating questions about the causes and conse-quences of the Soviet collapse than the rationalist consensus. It raises the possibility that the collapse of the Soviet Union reflected long-termselection processes operating through socialization mechanisms at the inter-national level. A second advantage of this approach is that it opens upthe possibility that the end of the Cold War may be viewed as reflectinga shift in the trajectory of socialization generated by the internationalsystem. The neorealist model has a narrow view of socialization becauseit implies that systemic tendencies encourage the simple reproduction ofa Waltzian balance of power. However, reformulating the liberal modelindicates that socialization dynamics at the international level could bemore complex than neorealism envisages. Once a critical mass of liberalstates emerges, the democratic peace may displace the balance of power

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24 Introduction

as the dominant equilibrium tendency within the international system.Debates between neorealists and liberals over processes of state identityconstruction and socialization in international relations therefore suggestthe possibility of subsuming the insights of neorealism and also of insti-tutionalism within a broader synthesis compatible with viewing the endof the Cold War as a major historical turning point in world politics.

Case studies are examined in individual chapters. The universe ofpossible cases is drawn from candidates for great power status in theinternational system. Thus the countries are drawn from the critical statesthat have been identified by neorealists: the US, Russia, Germany, Japanand China. The Middle East is, of course, a key strategic region and asite for much potential and actual great power rivalry and competition.However, because it contains no major power potentially capable ofdirectly challenging US hegemony, the universe of possible cases does not extend to this area. Case selection within the list of polar states identified by neorealists follows logically from the theories under exam-ination. In particular, cross-regional variations in patterns of economic and institutional independence are useful in structuring research becausetheir presence allows each of the theories being tested to make discretepredictions. The neorealist model predicts a universal trend towards aconflictual, multipolar international system characterized by great powerbalancing. In particular, a unified Germany, Japan and China have eachbeen identified by neorealists as ‘rising powers’ within the emerging struc-ture of international politics. These states find themselves at the marginsof change within the system, and therefore will pose critical tests ofneorealist assessments. The institutionalist model is prepared to challengethis prediction in Western Europe, where patterns of economic and insti-tutional interdependence between states are well developed. In East Asia,however, these preconditions are lacking. By contrast, the liberal modelchallenges neorealist claims in both Western Europe and in East Asia, andpredicts the emergence of a peaceful structure of great power relations at a global level. Overall, cross-regional variations in patterns of inter-dependence mean that analysing the foreign policies of the major powersin both Western Europe and East Asia should test the predictions madeby competing models.

The time frame covered is the decade between 1989 and 1999.Neorealists might argue that this does not necessarily allow a long enoughperiod for balancing tendencies to develop properly. This argument wasdeployed recently, for example, by Mearsheimer (2001). Indeed, this claimhas gathered significant weight since the important developments that haveoccurred in the international system after 1999. In the wake of theSeptember 11 crisis, as well as the subsequent US interventions in bothAfghanistan and Iraq, the argument has increasingly been made thatneorealism is growing in relevance. Robert Kagan’s recent assessment ofthe ‘power divide’ emerging between the US and secondary powers, for

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Introduction 25

example, may be read in the light of neorealist predictions (Kagan 2003).The issue of the extent of the time period needed to adequately testneorealist predictions about the emerging international system does drawattention to neorealism’s indeterminacy as a tool of foreign policy analysis.Nevertheless, having acknowledged this fundamental problem withneorealism, the exclusive focus on the 1989–1999 transition may also bejustified on methodological grounds. First, a decade already constitutesan extensive time frame in which to analyse neorealist predictions. Anystudy of the nature of the post-Cold War order at the present historicaljuncture can provide at best a provisional survey of trends. However, adecade does allow an extended period during which the major states havebeen exposed to the incentives and constraints generated by patterns ofinteraction among them. Moreover, the close of the first decade of thepost-Cold War transition provides a logical, if inevitably somewhat arbi-trary, cut-off point for the analysis. Extremely important developmentshave recently occurred, particularly the September 11 attacks and subse-quent crises. In analysing the impact of the major crises of the post-1999period, however, the methodological problems posed by the lack of avail-able evidence, literature and historical perspective are particularly acute.Nevertheless, in recognition of the importance of these more recent devel-opments and their significance for the key themes in the book, a postscriptconsiders September 11, 2001 and its aftermath. The aim of this post-script is not to achieve a comprehensive and systemic extension of theframework of the book to cover the period since 1999. Instead, it seeksto draw attention to the increased importance of the project engaged inby the book in the light of recent trends, and point to how current eventsmay be interpreted given its overall argument.

The case study chapters are organized into four sections. The first twosections analyse the predictions of the neorealist and institutionalist modelsrespectively. Liberal predictions are then dealt with in the two subsequentsections. The third section assesses if there is evidence of domestic culturaland institutional variation in the grand strategies of the major powers.This might pose anomalies for both neorealist and institutionalist predic-tions, and would indicate an ‘internalization lag’ of the sort anticipatedby liberal theory. Thus even if states are pursuing non-liberal strategies,at this stage in the analysis this remains perfectly compatible with a liberalaccount of socialization dynamics within the international system. Duringthis section, extensive use is made of empirical research in both the Kapsteinand Mastanduno, and Keohane et al. projects to identify the distinctiveforeign policy preferences articulated by individual countries. The fourthsection considers the strategic choices faced by each of the major powers,analysing the direction in which their foreign policies have been devel-oping over the 1989–1999 period. This section considers whether the state in question is coming under systemic pressure to adjust its domesticculture by internalizing the norms of a Kantian culture. It discusses the

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26 Introduction

extent to which the strategy adopted by the state in question is sustain-able, or whether it is facing pressures to adjust its orientation. If thereare pressures for change, they are assessed in relation to the criteria dis-tinguishing hegemonic bandwagoning from liberal socialization. It isconsidered whether there are indications of the state altering its approachto burden sharing so as to adopt a more equal role with the US, and ifthere is evidence of pressures to internalize cooperative norms across both security and economic issues.

The conclusions draw out the three central themes of the book. First,the future of international relations theory after the Cold War is consid-ered. The implications of the collapse of the Soviet Union for the way inwhich the international system is conceptualized are discussed, and theprospects for a new theoretical synthesis suited to the post-Cold Warworld are evaluated. Second, an assessment is made of general patternsof institutionalized activity in the international system that emerged overthe 1989–1999 period. This section considers overall trends in terms ofthe relationships between the major powers since the end of the ColdWar. Finally, conclusions are drawn about the individual foreign policyadjustments made by major states to the Soviet collapse, and whether theyhave come under pressure to become socialized to the norms associatedwith a concert of democratic states. Overall, a systematic evaluation isprovided of theories of the international system through comparative studyof state strategies during the first decade of the post-Cold War period. Atthe present time, global trends remain opaque and are difficult to extrap-olate. However, the information and analysis contained in this study shouldprove useful in understanding the historic changes that took place in theinternational system over the 1989–1999 period. In turn this knowledgecan be brought to bear on the grand theories that shape our understandingof the emerging international system (Keohane et al. 1993: 19).

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Introduction 27

2 Reassessing the logic ofanarchyRationality versus reflexivity

Drawing on the insights of constructivism and recent attempts to developa liberal model of international relations, this chapter compares neo-realism, institutionalism and liberalism in terms of their competing con-ceptualizations of the composition and dynamics of the international system. The argument is made that prominent institutionalists have mis-takenly interpreted neorealism as a rationalist model of the internationalsystem in order to develop their own arguments countering its centralpropositions. Rather than relying on rational actor assumptions, neo-realism instead adopts a reflexive logic focusing on processes of identityconstruction and socialization arising from the generative consequencesof anarchy. Thus whilst neorealism and liberalism differ fundamentally interms of their assessment of the nature and long term consequences of anarchy, they may actually be closer to each other in terms of theirconceptualization of system composition and dynamics than neorealismand institutionalism. On the basis of this argument, a ‘linear’ under-standing of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism andliberalism in which institutionalism is seen as providing the point of syn-thesis on a spectrum that runs between neorealism and liberalism isdisputed. Instead, a ‘triangular’ understanding of the relationship betweenthese three models is proposed in which the debates between neorealistsand institutionalists constitute its rationalist leg, and debates betweenneorealists and liberals constitute its reflexivist leg. Understood in theseterms, liberalism’s focus on the overall trajectory of identity constructionand socialization within the international system is likely to prove moreproductive in the search for a general synthesis of competing theories of international relations than attempts by institutionalists to refinerationalist models.

All three theories agree that anarchy is constituted through the inter-action of units. However, they identify two different mechanisms throughwhich this interaction occurs. One mechanism is that states are rationalactors which seek to maximize their national interests through their inter-national behaviour. Units which behave rationally ‘possess consistent,ordered preferences, and . . . calculate the costs of benefits of alternative

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courses of action . . . to maximise their utility in view of these prefer-ences’ (Keohane 1984: 27). Rationalist approaches take the self-interestedstate as the starting point for their analysis, and therefore exogenize theinternal characteristics of units. An alternative means through which unitscan interact is on the basis of reflexive behaviour. Reflexive actors act onthe basis of the cultural meanings that they ascribe to either materialobjects or the actions of others (Wendt 1992: 396–399). In this view,‘national interests’ cannot exist independently of a shared cultural contextfor action. Interests are not given exogenously, but ultimately reflectcultural identities that states have internalized through processes of socialization within the international system.

A second important distinction is between the reflexive behaviour onthe part of units and ‘reflexivity’ as a property of social systems. In asystem that has achieved reflexivity, actors acquire an ability to think self-consciously about which behavioural practices to adopt (Wendt 1999: 375). Cultural change becomes pervasive as a result of the processthrough which actors are internalizing new identities. In turn, this reflectsa shift in the overall trajectory of socialization within the internationalsystem. The achievement of reflexivity presupposes that actors are cap-able of reflexively monitoring the context in which they interact withothers. However, reflexivity as a property of social systems cannot bereduced to reflexive monitoring of action on the part of units. It is per-fectly possible to have a social system in which units interact on the basisof reflexive behaviour, but which has not achieved reflexivity. Within such a system, socialization dynamics define a negative feedback loop that discourages cultural change from taking place, and the identities ofunits will remain stable over time. It is argued below, for example, thatthe international system envisaged by neorealism may be interpreted asoperating in precisely this fashion. Thus reflexivity as a feature of socialsystems under specific historical circumstances must be distinguished fromreflexive monitoring as a generic feature of social action.

The neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models are reviewed respec-tively. Each theory’s assumptions about the nature of anarchy are analysedto highlight differences in its ontological status across them. The way inwhich the theories conceptualize the constitution of the internationalsystem is also examined to identify whether a rationalist or a reflexivistlogic is adopted. A fourth section considers the relationship between thethree models and the possibilities for a general synthesis of their insights.This section sets out the linear and triangular views of debates betweensystemic theories, and discusses the implications of these theoreticalconcerns for the structure of research programmes within the field afterthe Cold War. Conclusions then summarize the theoretical argumentsdiscussed and their implications for the study of international relations inthe post-Cold War period.

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Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 29

The neorealist model

The key variable identified by neorealism is the polarity of the internationalsystem, defined in terms of the distribution of material capabilities betweenstates. This conclusion is drawn from the specification of neorealist theory.Waltz sharply distinguishes the structure of domestic and international systems. Domestic political systems are centralized and hierarchical, whilst the structure of the international system is anarchic due to the absence ofa centralized law enforcement agency. Due to its anarchic organization, theinternational system becomes a self-help one, and a balance of power will consequently emerge as a result of the efforts of states to achieve security. This balance will reflect a structural equilibrium in the distribu-tion of capabilities within the international system (Waltz 1979).

As Dessler identifies, neorealism relies on a positional model of struc-ture focusing on a unit’s placement within a given arrangement of actors(Dessler 1989: 449; also Wendt 1987: 341). Thus the system Waltz envisages has a reproductive character. Unintended consequences of inter-action cause patterns of behaviour to reoccur even against the wishes ofthe system’s members. Waltz does allow scope for the transformation of the international system if its ordering principle shifts to hierarchy,although this is unlikely because of the anti-hegemonial nature of thebalance of power. However, despite the reproductive role of structure in neorealism, the model retains a dynamic or ‘generative’ quality. Struc-ture acts as a selector, and over time eliminates units that fail to respondto the imperatives of the system. This leads Waltz to emphasize the ‘pervasive’ importance of competition and socialization. Socialization is a process of emulation, and competition a process of elimination. Statesface strong structural incentives to emulate the effects of the most success-ful and become ‘socialized’ to the international system. If they fail to doso, competition will tend to eliminate them. This has internal and externalconsequences for states. Internally, they will adopt equivalent organi-zations. Externally, states will adopt structurally similar repertoires ofbehaviour. Competition and socialization encourage the homogenizationof units such that they are functionally alike, and promote conver-gence of the system around a balance of power equilibrium (Waltz 1979:74–77).

Waltz’s suggestion that anarchy is generative has important implica-tions for the way that he conceptualizes the role of the state. Waltz isconventionally interpreted as assuming states are rational actors. Keohane,a prominent institutionalist, adopts this understanding of neorealism(Keohane 1986b: 167). However, in making this claim Keohane know-ingly counters Waltz’s own assertion that his theory ‘requires no assump-tions of rationality . . . on the part of . . . the actors. The theory simplysays that if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall bythe wayside’ (Waltz 1979: 118; see also Keohane 1986b: 201 fn 15).

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30 Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

Waltz does hold that his theory requires the assumption that at least somestates seek to survive. However, he does not assume that they pursue thisstrategy rationally. Hence Waltz stresses the importance that he attaches,and which Keohane denies, to the process of selection that takes place incompetitive systems (Waltz 1986: 331; James 2002: 122).

Buzan et al. have argued that implicit in Waltz’s model is a ‘top down’theory of the state. Once states are co-acting in a competitive environ-ment, anarchy does have a bearing on their development. For this reason,Waltz observes the importance of the imitation of successful practiceswithin the international system. In turn, the ability to engage in imitationimplies cultural selection through the spread of shared ideas rather thannatural selection relying on material incentives. Reasoning along theselines, Buzan et al. argue that the international system modelled by neo-realism may be understood as operating through reflexive self-regulationon behalf of units rather than through rational action. On this account,patterns of behaviour are perpetuated not because of rational calculationsof interest, but because shared knowledge has been internalized by states(Buzan et al. 1993: 107 and 117–118). Dessler makes the same pointwhen he notes that the structure envisaged by neorealism implicitly gener-ates rule following activity on the behalf of units. Thus ‘[r]ules, whichgive shape and meaning to rationality and thereby make survival possible,are a necessary (if theoretically suppressed) component of structure in theneorealist model’ (Dessler 1989: 461). Distinguishing empirically betweenrational action and reflexive self-regulation is difficult because the outcomesmay be identical. However, these theoretical considerations do affect theway central features of the international system envisaged by neorealismare conceptualized.

For example, one way of viewing the balance of power is that statesrationally respond to the incentives generated by their relative position.However, the balance of power may instead be understood in terms ofnegative feedback produced through the international system. In thisconception, ‘the balance is systemic in that the norms have been inter-nalized through socialization as the actors watch and interact with theirpeers’ (Jervis 1997: 136). The most compelling examples of reflexive self-regulation within the international system have occurred when majorstates have behaved apparently ‘irrationally’. Important actors have occa-sionally been eliminated as significant units because of their failure toimitate the practices of rivals. A specific case is the Anglo-Dutch conflictof the seventeenth century. Although Holland survived as a sovereignentity, the failure of the Dutch to prepare for war led to their defeat andelimination as a major power. On a rationalist interpretation of neorealism,Dutch behaviour is difficult to accomodate. Although the ‘rational’ optionof developing its military capabilities was open, Holland failed to takethis course. However, understood in terms of the system’s capacity forreflexive self-regulation through selection and socialization, the outcome

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Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 31

of the Anglo-Dutch conflict is easily accounted for by neorealism.Moreover, as Waltz appreciates, even a small number of cases such asthe one discussed provide an important example for other units. They aretherefore extremely effective in ensuring the reproduction of a competi-tive environment. Thus Waltz is quick to recognize that the neorealistmodel is all the more powerful if it relies on imitation arising from thegenerative consequences of anarchy rather than the assumption of rationalbehaviour.

Waltz’s account of socialization is not without problems, however. Earlyon in the debate over neorealism, Ruggie recognized that system struc-ture was not fully generative for Waltz (Ruggie 1986: 135–136 and148–152; Waltz 1986: 328). Wendt has subsequently identified the waysin which Waltz’s account of socialization is underdeveloped. Wendt acceptsthe view that neorealism is committed to a rationalist account of the state.However, in order to understand both when and how the assumptionsunderpinning neorealism operates, it is necessary to expose the socialtheory that remains implicit in Waltz’s formal model. Wendt identifiedthat Waltz is committed to both individualist and materialist assumptions.Neorealism is individualist because structure is generated only throughinteraction of pre-existing units. Neorealism is materialist because it is the distribution of capabilities between states that motivates state behav-iour under anarchy. Wendt argues that as a result of these assumptionsneorealism’s account of socialization is truncated. Socialization can havetwo distinct objects, behaviour and properties, and neorealism’s accountfocuses exclusively on the former. Waltz’s individualist premises ensurethat neorealism’s account of socialization permits only homeostatic repro-duction within the system. Moreover, Waltz’s materialism ensures that hisaccount of socialization is a ‘thin’ one that reduces norms and rules topatterned behaviour on the part of units. Thus the normative content ofWaltz’s account of socialization is so insignificant as not to be meaningful(Wendt 1999: 98–102). To provide a fully developed account of statesocialization, the international system must be understood in terms thatare holist (structure affects properties not just behaviour) and idealist(structure defined in cultural rather than material terms). Thus Wendt hasrevealed that once the philosophical assumptions underpinning neorealismhave been properly exposed, it is ultimately a distortion to claim that its account of the international system operates through reflexive self-regulation.

Indeed, neorealism’s ambiguity at a philosophical level has fed directlyinto its problematic status as a model capable of explaining the activitiesof states. In particular, Waltz is unclear about the extent to which unitshave autonomy from the pressures generated by system structure. Waltzasserts that neorealism can explain foreign policy only when external pres-sures dominate the internal disposition of states. However, if theinternational system is not fully generative then the question becomes how

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32 Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

to explain variation in the influence of system structure over time. Therelative influence of unit and structure on behaviour is therefore funda-mentally ambiguous in neorealism (Elman 1996a; see also Elman 1996b).This practical problem associated with applying neorealism ultimatelystems from weaknesses in his underlying philosophical premises, as Wendthas identified. Neorealism is vague about the extent to which structuremay be viewed as fully generative. Yet whilst at a philosophical levelWendt’s critique of neorealism is penetrating, it is also important to recog-nize the historical context in which Waltz formulated his model. Wendthas the advantage of the hindsight provided by two decades of sustainedcritical reflection on Theory of International Politics. It is entirely unsur-prising, therefore, that the account of socialization developed by Waltz isnot fully specified. A fairer evaluation of neorealism, given the contextfrom which it emerged, is that Waltz’s model of socialization within theinternational system is simply underdeveloped. Understood in these terms,it seems more appropriate to conclude that the status of the state inneorealist theory remains somewhat unclear. This, for example, is theposition adopted in one recent analysis (James 2002: 122). Neorealismhas a thin conception of socialization that makes it amenable to a ratio-nalist interpretation. Nevertheless, whilst neorealism’s conception ofsocialization is truncated, the stress that Waltz places on its role doesindicate that it is not unreasonable to interpret his model in reflexivistterms.

In summary, two aspects of the neorealist model have been highlighted.First, it relies upon a positional model of structure. It thereby takes on areproductive character and has a homeostatic bias. Second, neorealism isnot necessarily, as is widely supposed, committed to the assumption thatstates are rational actors. Neorealism can be read in this way, as Keohanehas proposed. Yet neorealism might also reasonably be viewed, as Waltzhimself would prefer, as relying on the selection and socialization producedby the system’s generative consequences. Waltz’s account of anarchy is notfully generative, and his model of state socialization is ambiguous.However, neorealism can be interpreted as relying on a reflexive logicbecause it does provide an incipient theory of state identity constructionwithin the international system.

The institutionalist model

The key variable identified by the institutionalist model is the distribu-tion of information and institutions within the international system. Byfocusing on the systemic impact of information and institutions, institu-tionalists seek to demonstrate that international cooperation is possiblefrom the same assumptions about the international system as neorealism.The essence of the institutionalist argument is that neorealism’s conclu-sions do not follow from its premises.

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Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 33

Two qualifications should be made about the version of institutional-ism to be presented. First, the account draws principally on Keohane’sformulation of institutionalist theory (see especially Keohane 1984).Keohane’s work has now generated a wide secondary literature. Never-theless, it remains the most comprehensive statement of the theory fromwhich this literature ultimately derives. This perspective is often referredto as ‘neoliberal institutionalism’. However, following Keohane’s explicitpreference, the label institutionalism is adopted because it distinguishesinstitutionalism from the liberal model. A second qualification is that theaccount of institutionalism below has a narrow methodological founda-tion premised on rational choice analysis. Sociological and historicalstrands of institutionalist theory also exist as middle range theories withinpolitical science (Hall and Taylor 1996). However, they have not beenformulated into a general theory of the international system in the waythat Keohane’s rational choice institutionalism has. Similarly, rationalchoice institutionalism has a very particular assessment of the operationof international regimes. The account of regimes that follows thereforedoes not deny the existence of alternatives drawing on constructivism andvariants of realism. However, it does focus on the rational choice approachto regimes because this perspective makes an attempt at providing a para-digmatic alternative to neorealism. These qualifications make it possibleto avoid the problems that might be associated with inappropriatelycomparing grand systemic theories with middle range theories when therelationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism is analysedin the final section.

Institutionalists purport to accept neorealist claims about the impact ofanarchy on state behaviour. However, they also presuppose the existenceof complex patterns of interdependence that create extensive commoninterests amongst industrialized states. They therefore suggest that theproblem of cooperation between these states can often be modelled interms of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Within such a game, two participantscould benefit from cooperation but fail to do so due to the incentivesgenerated by the structure of interaction that exists between them. Drawingon theories of rational choice, Keohane suggests that whether defectionis the dominant strategy within a Prisoner’s Dilemma depends on thenumber of times the game is played. If the game is played only a smallnumber of times, defection will dominate. However, if the game is playedon an iterative basis, cooperation can rationally emerge if the participantsvalue future rewards and practice specific reciprocity. This is because therepeated playing of the game generates a shadow of the future (Keohane1984: 65–85; Axelrod and Keohane 1993). Keohane also holds that inter-national regimes can play a functional role in facilitating cooperationamong rational egoists. First, regimes reduce transactions costs or the costsof negotiating, monitoring and enforcing agreements. Second, regimesreduce uncertainties and provide information that shape states’ expecta-

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34 Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

tions of future behaviour. Under anarchy, regimes will be difficult to createsince it is difficult for states to establish legal liability through regimes.However, once brought into existence they will be functional for statesand therefore tend to endure (Keohane 1984: 85–109). Keohane alsoexplores the implications of assuming ‘bounded rationality’ and of limitedredefinition’s of actor interests away from egoism. However, he is alsoclear that these move beyond a functional theory of regimes. Keohanetherefore acknowledges that ‘rationalist theories contain no endogenousdynamic (because) . . . preferences are assumed to be fixed’ (Keohane1989b: 171).

There is a body of literature reviewed comprehensively by Hasencleveret al. that attempts to endogenize preference formation within a rationalchoice framework (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 139–154). In particular,dynamic rationalist models incorporate a role for changes in state pref-erences and feedback from context. Within such a framework, regimesare capable of acting as ‘autonomous variables’ that over time are ableto alter states conceptions of their interests (Krasner 1983). Nye’s assess-ment of the non-proliferation regime during the Cold War has been oneof the most influential studies of this kind. Nye’s analysis of the regimeindicates that through their ongoing interactions, US and Soviet policymakers rationally responded to new information signalling the dangersassociated with the use of nuclear weapons by adjusting their conceptionsof their interests. The superpowers went beyond ‘simple learning’ in whichthey adjusted means without adjusting their deeper goals, and engaged in‘complex learning’ in which they altered their preferences as a result ofnew information. New norms within the regime consequently emergedassociated with the operation of deterrence reflecting the way in whichthe two superpowers had altered prior beliefs about their usage of nuclearweapons in a first strike capacity. Moreover, once in place, feedbackhelped reinforce the norms that emerged through the process of complexlearning. For example, regimes established regular diplomatic contacts that‘locked in’ new information about the value of stable deterrence bychanging standard operating procedures and the attitudes of participantsin negotiations (Nye 1987: 382–401).

Attempts to endogenize preference formation have demonstrated thatrational choice analysis can be versatile. However, Keohane acknowledgesthat this approach to analysing state preference formation privileges arationalist framework by requiring justifications for deviating from itsassumptions without symmetrically demanding that rationalism justify the interests and identities of the actors with which it begins its analy-sis (Keohane 1996: 473). Hasenclever et al. make a similar point whenthey note that attempts to endogenize preference formation within arational choice framework reflect ‘weak’ rather than ‘strong’ cognitivism.A focus on interest formation is used to complement rationalist approachesby supplying an account of how interests may change as the result of

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Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 35

new knowledge being acquired by actors. However, these approaches do not systemically consider the way in which national interests are firstdefined by the prior socialization of states (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 155).Thus the account of complex learning and identity change provided islimited in two ways. First, the central problematic remains that of co-operation under anarchy. Anarchy is viewed as reproductive rather thantransforming, and as providing a constraining rather than an enablingenvironment. As a result, institutionalism lacks a systematic account ofthe way in which cultural selection may be encouraged by the internationalsystem itself. Second, institutionalism also lacks a systematic account ofthe conditions under which the international system might allow scopefor cultural change resulting from the exercise of voluntary agency on thepart of units. Such change remains viewed as merely reflecting residualdomestic variance that will be constrained by systemic conditions (Keohane1986b: 193). Thus attempts to endogenize preference formation within arationalist framework leaves open a space for a more fully developedaccount of socialization dynamics in which cultural selection and culturalchange play a more prominent role.

In summary, two aspects of the institutionalist model have been high-lighted. First, like neorealism, institutionalism takes on an essentially repro-ductive rather than a transformative view of the logic of anarchy. Second,unlike neorealism institutionalism remains unambiguously committed tothe assumption that states behave as rational actors. This framework iscompatible with explaining a degree of complex learning on the part ofunits. However, because the rationalist framework has a reproductive orientation it may underestimate the scope for cultural change within theinternational system.

The liberal model

This section reformulates liberal theory in the light of constructivism. Themost prominent recent attempt to develop a liberal model of the inter-national system has been made by Moravcsik. In agreement withMoravcsik, the approach set out here assumes that liberalism can be iden-tified as a distinct systemic theory that makes general statements aboutinternational behaviour (Moravcsik 1997: 515–516). However, this formu-lation of liberal theory reverses Moravcsik’s injunction that the domesticpreferences of states take causal priority over the cultural structure of theinternational system. It draws upon constructivist insights to argue thatMoravcsik overlooks an important systemic dimension that is central tothe sociological strand of the liberal tradition. However, the label ‘construc-tivism’ is eschewed in favour of terminology that acknowledges the liberalnormative content of socialization dynamics. In particular, this formula-tion of liberal theory hypothesizes that the cultural norms associated withthe democratic peace may generate socialization effects that encourage

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36 Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

their spread through the international system. Advocates of both liber-alism and constructivism have acknowledged the close affinities that existbetween these positions (Wendt 1992: 394; Moravcsik 1997: 539–540).Whilst influenced by Moravcsik’s attempt to systemize liberalism, thisaccount draws upon constructivism to set out a modified formulationwhich gives more prominence to the role of socialization dynamics andcultural change within the international system.

Due to its focus on the cultural structure of the international system asthe key variable affecting state behaviour, the status of anarchy in liberaltheory differs fundamentally from the neorealist and institutionalist mod-els. Liberalism relies upon what constructivists have referred to as a trans-formational model of structure in which anarchy is viewed as potentiallyopen to transformation through changes in the culture and identity of theunits that populate the international system (Dessler 1989: 452–454).However, a liberal model moves beyond this general claim by specifying aset of determinate historical and sociological dynamics that encourage theemergence and perpetuation of this trend. In particular, Huntley has sug-gested that anarchy may have a self-transforming logic. Huntley proposesthat an interpretation of Kant’s writings that focuses only on the domesticsources of the democratic peace overlooks the role that is played by anar-chy in its emergence and spread. Kant suggested that over the long term,the effects of competition and socialization within the international systemencourage convergence and homogenization around the liberal state formand thus the expansion of the liberal pacific union. Understood in theseterms, the democratic peace becomes an equilibrium position around whichthe international system will gradually tend to approximate. Thus althougha liberal model adopts the same modalities of system reproduction sug-gested by neorealism – competition, socialization and equilibrium – itunderstands these characteristics in very different terms (Huntley 1996:57–63; Harrison 2002: 148–154).

The notion that anarchy may have generative consequences of a trans-formative nature raises important questions about how the compositionand dynamics of the international system are conceptualized. Within theliberal model, the international system is viewed as operating throughlong-term cultural selection processes. Anarchy is therefore understood ashaving a reflexive logic in which states internalize cultural identitiesthrough socialization pressures generated by the international system. Thetransformation of the international system can be viewed as being broughtabout through both unintended and intended consequences of interaction.In terms of unintended consequences, Huntley identifies that during long-term competition liberal states will tend to out-perform non-liberal states.Similarly, in the context of an anarchic environment, the distinctivecapacity of liberal states to be trusted casts a long shadow on the futurethat unwittingly socializes them to the democratic peace (Huntley 1996:57–58). This shadow must be sharply distinguished from that discussed

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Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 37

by institutionalists, in as much as it emerges as a result of the collectiveidentity adopted by liberal states rather than the interaction of rationalegoists. In Wendt’s terminology, it reflects the constitutive rather thanbehavioural effects of interdependence (Wendt 1999: 344–349). How-ever, the most distinctive element of a liberal model of the internationalsystem is its stress on the role of cultural change in the operation ofcompetition and socialization. Unlike the unintended effects of anarchy,cultural change involves the exercise of voluntary agency. States will freelychoose to join up with the democratic zone of peace, thereby facilitatingits further expansion. As such, cultural change is particularly importantat the margins of development within the international system. Over thehistorical long term, the intentional choices of states reinforce the unin-tended cultural selection effects generated by international anarchy(Harrison 2002: 151–152).

As Wendt identifies, states can internalize the norms of a Kantian cultureto different degrees (Wendt 1999: 302–307). They may be coerced intocomplying with its norms, or adopt them instrumentally because theyrecognize the material advantages of so doing. Wendt refers to this asinternalization to the first and second degrees respectively. For example,states in the periphery will simply lack the capabilities to pursue effectivebalancing strategies against states within the liberal core. Similarly, statesmay comply with a Kantian culture for the economic benefits this brings,for example in terms of access to international trade with and investmentfrom the liberal core. States that fail to comply with the system’s domi-nant norms will fall behind others in terms of overall performance, andrisk punishment or elimination as significant actors. States may also intern-alize a Kantian culture to the third degree reflecting a situation in whichthey comply with its norms because they recognize them as legitimate.Traditionally this mechanism of ensuring compliance with internationalnorms has been seen as weak given the absence of effective enforcementagency in the international system. However, within a Kantian culture themost powerful states will already have internalized a broadly liberal iden-tity. The cultural norms of the democratic peace will therefore haveachieved a taken-for-granted status amongst the dominant units. Individualstates may resist selection processes. Nevertheless, paradoxically, thestronger the potential challenge a state may pose to the core, the moreconstrained by the system it will be. In order to maintain the high levelsof performance necessary to maintain great power status, actors will beexposed to intense pressures to adopt the behavioural practices of thecore. There are, therefore, powerful background pressures within the inter-national system encouraging states to comply with the norms of thedemocratic peace.

However, despite the existence of these powerful background pressures,a focus solely on compliance does not fully capture the complex dynamicsencouraging the spread of liberal norms. This is because the socialization

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38 Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

effects generated by the democratic peace can open up a permissive spacethat allows them to engage in cultural change through the exercise ofvoluntary agency. Huntley indicates ways in which competition and social-ization generate a ‘dialectical “causal loop”’ of self-reinforcing feedback(Huntley 1996: 59). The socialization effects developed by the liberal coreencourage states at the margins of cultural change to adopt shifts in theiridentity. This in turn feeds back into the properties of the system bystrengthening the dominance of the liberal core. Under these conditions,the cultural choices made by units will greatly affect the degree of progres-sive momentum being generated by historical forces. The system willachieve reflexivity, defined by Wendt as ‘a capacity for critical self-reflection . . . that helps . . . [actors] overcome a false sense of determinism’(Wendt 1999: 375). At this stage, units acquire the autonomy of actionnecessary for them to freely accept cultural change. Thus built into theliberal model of socialization is a theoretical account of the general condi-tions under which voluntary cultural change on the part of units is possiblewithin the international system.

Of course, units may use their heightened autonomy of action to resistpressures to engage in cultural change. Socialization dynamics will there-fore be subject to cultural and institutional variation related to the impactof domestic preferences on systemic norms. Moravcsik claims that for thisreason states domestic preferences should take causal priority in the liberalmodel (Moravcsik 1997: 539–540). However, under these circumstancesthe powerful background pressures in the international system capable ofgenerating compliance with liberal norms will exert their influence. Thus,at least once these background pressures become well developed withinthe international system, Moravcsik’s argument may be qualified. Toappropriate Wendt’s language, under these conditions there is ‘reason tothink that states will alter their identities over the course of an inter-action’ (Wendt 1999: 367). After this stage, a period of lagged transitioncan be expected as states adjust to the norms of the liberal core and internalize cultural change. Overall, the trajectory of change within thesystem becomes irreversible. In part this is due to the sunk costs involvedin resisting the dominant norms of the liberal core. It is also partly dueto the way in which the cultural norms of the core are internalized byactors and are widely accepted as legitimate. However, the strongest reasonwhy regression is not likely is because of the snowballing generated bythe system. In a system that has achieved reflexivity, a situation emergesin which structural and cultural change become mutually reinforcing.

In summary, two aspects of the liberal model have been highlighted.First, liberalism adopts a transformational model of structure. Anarchy isunderstood as recursively drawn into an ongoing process of cultural devel-opment within the international system. Second, due to its focus uponsocialization dynamics, it is legitimate to argue that liberalism postulatesa conception of the state as a reflexive rather than a rational actor. Like

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Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 39

neorealism, liberalism provides a theory of state identity construction andsocialization within the international system related to its conception ofthe generative consequences of anarchy. Whilst socialization dynamics willbe subject to domestic variation, the international system defines a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop encouraging long term convergence ofthe international system around the democratic peace. Having outlinedthe three models, Table 2.1 summarizes their central attributes.

Towards a general synthesis

Having analysed the three models, the relationship between neorealism,institutionalism and liberalism and the prospects for a general synthesisof their insights can be considered. The discussion is framed around acomparison of the ‘linear’ and the ‘triangular’ conceptualizations of therelationship between the three theories. Each of these conceptualizationssuggests the possibility of a general synthesis. However, they differ overthe terms on which such a synthesis can be achieved. In turn, this hasimportant implications for the content of research programmes within thediscipline after the Cold War.

Keohane has characterized institutionalism in terms of a mid-pointbetween the two extremes of neorealism and liberalism. He argues that‘institutionalists accept a version of liberal principles that eschews deter-minism and that emphasises the pervasive significance of internationalinstitutions without denigrating the role of state power’ (Keohane 1989a:11). Understood in these terms, institutionalism is uniquely positioned tosubsume the best features of both the neorealist and liberal perspectives.On the basis of his understanding of neorealism, Keohane reasons thatneorealism and institutionalism share rationalist assumptions. By contrast,although institutionalism and liberalism have a common concern withinternational institutions, their approaches differ because the former isrationalist and the latter reflectivist. This suggests the intuitively plausibleargument that neorealism is closer to institutionalism in terms of its under-standing of the composition and dynamics of the international systemthan are neorealism and liberalism. Keohane’s argument might be syncretic

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40 Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

Table 2.1 Summary of theoretical framework

Key variable State-as-actor Status of anarchy

Neorealism Material Ambiguous Reproductivestructure

Institutionalism Institutional Rational Reproductivestructure

Liberalism Cultural Reflexive Transformativestructure

rather than synthetic in as much as it could be understood as proposinga choice between either rationalist or reflectivist approaches to the studyof world politics. Yet this seems unlikely because the statement fromKeohane quoted above clearly claims that institutionalism incorporatesthe most persuasive elements of both the neorealist and liberal perspec-tives. By modelling cooperation on the basis of rationalist premises,Keohane seeks an institutionalist middle way. Such an analysis implies a‘linear’ conceptualization of the relationship between neorealism, institu-tionalism and liberalism. Institutionalism is seen as providing the pointof synthesis on a spectrum that runs between neorealism and liberalismas depicted in Figure 2.1.

Keohane’s opinions on the relationship between schools of thought haveled directly to his assertions on future research within the discipline. He suggests that future research should attempt to refine rationalist models. Theoretical debates should focus on the conditions under whichstates will be concerned about relative and absolute gains. Empirically,researchers should test neorealism against institutionalism in the emergingpost-Cold War international system (Keohane 1993: 273–291). With theend of the Cold War, neorealists have anticipated that the tendency ofthe international system to encourage states to pursue balancing strategieswill mean that a phase of US led unipolarity will revert to a more complexmultipolar order prone to great power conflicts and even war. Majorsecondary states identified as the unified Germany, Japan and China arelikely to seek to restore equilibrium in the balance of power by bringingUS power into check (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993; Waltz 1993;Mearsheimer 2001). Institutionalists have responded that the presence ofwell-developed patterns of economic and institutional interdependencebetween states in a West European context means that neorealism andinstitutionalism develop divergent hypotheses about international change(Keohane 1993: 272–273). Thus Western Europe provides the most fruitfulcontext in which to test competing rationalist theories. By contrast, inEast Asia there are candidates for polar status whilst patterns of economicand institutional interdependence inherited from the Cold War era areless well developed. In this regional context, the logic of institutionalistarguments indicates that it is less able to challenge neorealism’s pessimismabout the future (Buzan and Segal 1994: Friedberg 1994; Friedberg 2000;Mearsheimer 2001).

However, it is possible to question the interpretation of neorealism putforward by Keohane. Instead of making rational actor assumptions,

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Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 41

I LNR

Rationalism Reflectivism

Figure 2.1 The linear model

neorealism may be understood as providing an incipient theory of stateidentity construction and socialization related to its conception of thegenerative consequences of anarchy. Understood in this way, neorealismadopts a reflexive logic and is closer to liberalism than it is to institu-tionalism’s rational choice framework. Rather than conceiving of therelationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism in termsof a linear spectrum, it becomes possible to conceptualize the relationshipin triangular terms. Within such a conceptualization, debates betweenneorealists and institutionalists constitute the rationalist leg of the trianglebecause neorealism’s commitment to a positional model of structure meansthat it can be viewed as amenable to a rationalist interpretation. Bycontrast, debates between neorealists and liberals about the generativeconsequences of anarchy and the overall trajectory of identity construc-tion and socialization within the international system constitute thereflexivist leg of the triangle. The triangular model of the relationshipbetween neorealist, institutionalist and liberal theories is illustrated inFigure 2.2.

Such a conceptualization calls into question the validity of Keohane’sclaim that institutionalism provides the strongest basis for subsuming theresearch programmes of competing approaches. It suggests that liberalism’sfocus on the generative consequences of anarchy and the overall trajec-tory of socialization within the international system is likely to be moreproductive in the search for a general synthesis of competing theories thanattempts by institutionalists to refine rationalist models. Liberalism’s mostimportant characteristic in this regard is its ability to provide an accountof how patterns of socialization within the international system might varyhistorically. The account of variation in socialization offered by liberalismmay be described as follows. In the early stages of development, the inter-national system will operate within the ranges predicted by neorealism.The distribution of material capabilities will be the dominant factor moti-vating state behaviour, and institutional density will be limited. The system

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42 Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

NR

I L

Reflexivist(Identity construction/socialization)

Rationalist(Rational choice)

Figure 2.2 The triangular model

will be characterized by regular wars and the recurrent formation ofbalances of power. Institutional density will rise as the effects of compe-tition and socialization become entrenched and there is cultural changewithin the system. Assuming that competition and socialization encouragecultural change at a constant rate over time, institutional density will risegradually within the system. A modification to the basic liberal model ispossible that incorporates the insights of institutionalism. In this scenariocertain levels of functional cooperation are considered a prerequisite tothe emergence of a relatively stable core of liberal democratic states. Once this point has been reached, socialization effects generated by thedemocratic peace can begin to operate and institutional density will risemore rapidly. The overall trend produces a ‘kinked’ pattern of develop-ment in which the rate of cultural change within the system speeds updramatically beyond a certain stage of maturity.

Incorporating institutionalist insights sequentially into an account of the historical development of the international system highlights the leg of the triangle that links institutionalism with liberalism. As Sterling-Folker identifies, to separate out functional and cultural explanations on the grounds that the former is rationalist and the latter is reflexivistcreates a crude and ultimately unnecessary ontological divide betweenthem. Arguments about functional institutional efficiency can complementconstructivist insights if it is recognized that environmental circumstancesare in a process of evolution. Over time, functional logics can generateselection effects in which the organizational forms that survive are theproduct of an efficient history. Similarly, institutionalist arguments containa role for identity transformation because any self-interested actor’s choiceis always embedded in a larger set of social practices and identities.Successive acts of cooperation can through feedback create effects whichotherwise would be inexplicable if interests were held constant. Ratherthan drawing a rigid divide between the two logics, the choice instead‘amounts to explaining short term, behavioural cooperation in the momentor its development into communal cooperation and systemic transform-ation in the future’ (Sterling-Folker 2000: 113). Similar themes haveemerged in the debates between Buzan and Little. Buzan has drawn onthe functional logic associated with neorealism to show how states lockedinto a competitive international system and lacking a common culture willeventually be pushed into developing a basic international society. Littlehas argued that there is no reason to expect that this process cannot workthe other way around, with states from an outer sector of internationalsociety only being permitted to join the inner sector once states in theouter sector have accepted their cultural norms (Buzan 1993; Little 1995).Overall, the triangular conception of the relationship between neorealism,institutionalism and liberalism provides a potential framework for inte-grating different forms of explanation into a single coherent account ofthe overall historical development of the international system.

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Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 43

The modified scenario also provides a useful supplement to the accountof structural change developed by Wendt. Wendt has identified four ‘mastervariables’ capable of driving transformation in the cultural structure ofthe international system: interdependence, homogeneity, common fate, and self-restraint. Each of these factors will be present in an internationalsystem characterized by a strong convergence of liberal preferences. How-ever, Wendt also recognizes that although these master variables are necessary conditions for structural transformation, they are not sufficientones. This is because transformation requires ‘not just that identitieschange, but that their frequency and distribution cross a threshold atwhich the logic of the structure tips over into a new logic’ (Wendt 1999:365). The existence of such a threshold supplies the ‘missing link’ inWendt’s account by highlighting the significance of a point of criticalityin a developmental sequence of change in the international system.Criticality may be identified as a point at which a system’s emergent prop-erties switch, resulting in a dramatic change in patterns of alignmentwithin it. The system effects that are envisaged by the liberal model aretherefore different to those identified by neorealism. The neorealist modelenvisages linear effects, in which negative feedback promotes homeostaticreproduction. By contrast, system effects in the liberal model are non-linear because there is ‘a disproportion between the magnitude of thecause and the results, which will depend on the system as a whole’ (Jervis1997: 146). After the point of criticality, what were initially small andinsignificant changes within the system suddenly produce an enormouschange in its overall characteristics. A ‘cascade’ or ‘catastrophe jump’ istriggered as the system’s old equilibrium condition becomes unstable andis replaced by a new one (Rosenau 1984: 262; Nicholson 1989: 170–171;Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 901). An example from the physical worldis the type of spinning top designed so that once it reaches a certainvelocity its centre of gravity shifts and it flips to spin on its head. Sucha point is provided by the emergence of a stable core of liberal democ-ratic states. Until this stage, the existence of democratic states may havesome effect on international behaviour, but does not result in a funda-mental shift in the emergent properties of the system. After this point,however, the structure of interaction within the system alters. Reflexivityis achieved as the socialization effects generated by emergence of the corebegin to transform overall patterns of alignment within it.

It seems plausible to hypothesize that an obvious point of historicalreference for the emergence of a critical mass of liberal democratic statesis provided by the recent collapse of the Soviet Union. Liberalism isuniquely positioned to both explain this development, and account forwhy it might constitute a point of enormous significance for the overallcourse of historical change in world politics. First, the liberal model couldplausibly claim to provide an endogenous account of the collapse of theSoviet Union. Exponents of neorealism and institutionalism have both

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44 Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

argued that the sudden and unexpected end of the Cold War is best viewedas an exogenous shock to the international system. According to Waltz,the Soviet collapse was a unit level development that has produced struc-tural effects, thus accounting for the collapse of the Soviet Union is beyondthe purview of systemic theory (Waltz 1993: 49). Keohane has likenedthe event to the impact of a meteor strike in the study of palaeontology.It is not, therefore, a development which social scientists ought to havebeen expected to have predicted (Keohane 1996: 463). By contrast, theliberal model is capable of viewing the Soviet collapse as itself being symp-tomatic of overall historical trends within the international system. Inparticular, this development may be understood as reflecting cultural selec-tion processes arising from the long-term effects of competition andsocialization under anarchy. This does not imply that the Soviet Union’ssuccessor state, Russia, has itself become a fully liberal democratic republic.However, it does reflect the way in which rigidity of the Soviet politicalsystem simply proved unable to keep pace with the more adaptable liberalstates of the West. In this view, the collapse of the Soviet Union, one ofthe most important developments in world politics in the second half ofthe twentieth century, was not merely an isolated development reflectinga peculiar conjunction of forces in a particular historical context. Instead,the demise of Soviet communism is perfectly compatible with the longterm patterns of change in international politics postulated by liberalism(Huntley 1996: 65–72; Harrison 2002: 156–161).

Moreover, liberalism may shed light on the wider historical significanceof the collapse of the Soviet Union for the development of world poli-tics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seems plausible to hypothesizethat the international system is now overwhelmingly dominated by a stablecore of liberal democratic states for the first time in world history. Therehave been theoretical debates about the extent of norm convergencerequired to push the international system beyond the point of criticality.Finnemore and Sikkink estimate that at least one-third of total stateswould have to adopt a given norm before a tipping point is reached.However, they also acknowledge that attempts to quantify the tippingpoint are likely to prove elusive because not all states have equal weightwithin the system (Finnemore and Sikkink 1999: 901). Wendt takes amore sophisticated approach that recognizes the open-ended nature of thecritical threshold. He proposes that criticality should simply be viewed asbeing ‘multiply realisable’, by which he means that it may be realized bydifferent combinations of states that have internalized different culturalnorms to different degrees. There is thus no one necessary route that mustbe taken to achieve it (Wendt 1999: 342–343). However, one of thefrequently commented upon features of the post-Cold War order is theemergence of a relatively stable cluster of liberal states at its centre.Goldieger and McFaul have proposed that a core-periphery formation hasdisplaced polarity as the international system’s dominant structural feature

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Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 45

(Goldieger and McFaul 1992: 467–491). Robert Cooper provides a three-tier model of structure divided into a ‘postmodern’ centre, a ‘premodern’periphery and a ‘modern’ semi-periphery (Cooper 1998). Buzan suggestsa continuum, arguing that patterns of uneven development are likely toproduce concentric circles of commitment to the norms of a core as theinternational system matures (Buzan 1993: 349). Each of these approachesprovide a strong precedent in the literature that is entirely compatiblewith the hypothesis that the collapse of the Soviet Union reflects one routeon a multiply realizable path to change in the cultural structure of theinternational system.

Viewing the collapse of the Soviet Union as symptomatic of a shift inthe cultural structure of the international system generates a much broaderresearch programme than that proposed by the debate which has takenplace between neorealists and institutionalists. Huntley draws on liberalinsights to hypothesize that in the post-Cold War era powerful systemicforces exists which will encourage the spread of a peaceful structure of great power relations in world politics. In particular, he argues thatliberalism anticipates that a form of ‘bandwagoning’ behaviour will emergebetween the major states. This contrasts with the balance of power config-uration anticipated by neorealism, and unlike institutionalism relies onmore than institutional inertia to anticipate an alternative future (Huntley1996: 70–71). Huntley’s bandwagoning metaphor suggests a strikinglysimilar pattern of development to the notion that the democratic peacemay have begun to generate powerful socialization effects that are encour-aging its world-wide spread. Two features serve to distinguish such apattern empirically from the trends envisaged by both neorealism andinstitutionalism. The first relates to the geographic scope of the spread ofpeaceful relations between the major powers. Liberalism predicts that a peaceful structure of great power relations will emerge at a global level, even in regions such as East Asia where there are candidates forpolar status but patterns of economic and institutional independence are poorly developed. This reflects the socialization effects arising fromthe liberal core and their effect on the system’s periphery. A second dis-tinctive feature of liberal predictions is the stress it places on the impactof systemic forces on the domestic political structure of the major powerswithin the international system. Liberalism anticipates that a period oflagged transition will emerge during which key states will come undersustained pressure to internalize the norms of the democratic peace. The pattern of change in the internal identity structure of states thereforealso generates a set of predictions about behavioural tendencies withinthe international system that is discrete to the liberal model. Overall, liberalism offers a research agenda that is both more extensive geo-graphically and penetrates more deeply into domestic-international inter-actions than that which has resulted from debates between neorealist

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46 Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

and institutionalists. This agenda is able to separate predictions of liberaltheory from competing theoretical perspectives, and also indicates a potential set of behavioural criteria through which these predictions may be measured. Viewed in this way, the end of the Cold War hasopened up a unique historical context in which to comparatively assessthe predictions of different theoretical models of international politics(Huntley 1996: 72).

In summary, it is possible that prominent institutionalists have miscon-strued the nature of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalismand liberalism, and in so doing underestimated the possibilities for ageneral synthesis of their insights. Keohane has proposed a linear con-ceptualization of the relationship between the three schools. Understoodin these terms, attempts to refine rationalist models provide the mostfruitful way forward for the discipline. The research programme thatfollows from this focuses on a relatively narrow range of theoretical issues, and moreover on a European rather than a global context. It alsoimplies that theories of the international system developed during the Cold War do not have to be revised fundamentally in the light of devel-opments in international politics over the post-Cold War period. However,it is possible to dispute the validity of such a research agenda by ques-tioning the interpretation of neorealism as a rationalist theory. Instead,neorealism might be viewed as adopting a reflexive logic focusing on selection and socialization arising from the generative consequences ofanarchy. This implies a triangular conceptualization of the relationshipbetween the three theories in which debates between neorealists and institutionalists constitute its rationalist leg, and debates between neore-alists and liberals constitute its reflexivist leg. Understood in these terms,liberalism’s focus on the generative consequences of anarchy and longterm socialization dynamics in the international system is likely to be more productive in the search for a general synthesis of competing theo-ries of international relations than institutionalists’ attempts to refinerationalist models. This is because of the ability of liberalism to offer afully generative model of the international system providing an accountof how socialization dynamics within it may vary historically. Theseconclusions indicate that the collapse of the Soviet Union may have moreprofound implications for the international system than institutionalistsanticipate. In concluding his recent book, Wendt suggests that the centralquestion faced by the field today is ‘can the states system achieve reflex-ivity . . . and what are the implications if it does?’ (Wendt 1999: 375).Liberalism hypothesizes that with the collapse of the Soviet Union andthe emergence of a critical mass of liberal states, the international systemhas achieved reflexivity. In turn, this has resulted in a dramatic shift inthe pace of cultural change and the overall trajectory of socializationwithin it.

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Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 47

Conclusions

One of the most distinctive features of debates within international relations over the past quarter of a century has been the attempt to developsystemic theory. Systemic theory offers parsimonious, general explanationsof patterns of behaviour in international politics, and promises the disci-pline the logical rigour and explanatory insight that its status as a modernsocial science demands. However, debates that have taken place betweenneorealists and institutionalists have become increasingly unproductive,both theoretically and empirically. Even major contributors to the debatehave long recognized that it has ‘tended to obscure rather than clarify’(Powell 1994: 313 and 344). Yet the reason for this failure is not thatthe attempt by institutionalists to criticize neorealism on its own terms ismisconceived. A more sophisticated approach might be to recognize thatKeohane and subsequent institutionalists have relied upon an uncriticalunderstanding of the relationship between schools of thought. They haveadopted a linear model of the relationship between neorealism, institu-tionalism and liberalism in which institutionalism is seen as providing the point of synthesis on a spectrum that runs between neorealism andliberalism. As such it is viewed as the model that is most able to recon-cile the competing claims of alternative positions. Whilst superficiallyplausible, such a view of the relationship between schools of thoughtunderestimates the significance of similarities between neorealism and liber-alism. Indeed, it is possible that it has been institutionalism’s commitmentto rationalism that has actively blocked the development of a model ofthe international system compatible with liberal insights. A more nuancedapproach proposes a triangular understanding of the relationship betweenthe three models, with debates between neorealists and institutionalistsconstituting its rationalist leg, and debates between neorealists and liberalsconstituting its reflexivist leg. Such a conceptualization allows a fullerappreciation of the complex linkages that exist between the three schools.Moreover, it highlights the way in which liberalism’s focus on the gener-ative consequences of anarchy allows it to subsume the combined researchprogrammes of neorealism and institutionalism.

Finally, these theoretical considerations have important implications forthe content of research programmes within the discipline in the post-ColdWar period. Proponents of neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism haveidentified that the collapse of the Soviet Union provides an historic oppor-tunity to test their competing theoretical claims. Neorealists have developeda pessimistic analysis of the nature of systemic change after the Cold War,predicting a return to conflictual multipolarity on a global scale. Theresponses derived from institutionalism and liberalism varies considerably.On the basis of their preference for refining rationalist models, institu-tionalists have suggested that the discipline should focus on testing arelatively narrow range of propositions about the conditionality of relative

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48 Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

gains seeking, and to do so primarily within a European context. In makingthese claims, however, institutionalists have not fully considered the wayin which the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the most significantdevelopments in world politics over the past half-a-century, was notpredicted by either neorealist or institutionalist international relationstheory. As such, they do not give enough consideration to the possibilitythat the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a relatively stablebody of liberal democratic states has raised fundamental questions aboutthe long-term historical dynamics embodied by the international system.By contrast, the liberal model is capable of both accounting for this devel-opment in terms of the long run effects of anarchy, and of providing aricher and more challenging agenda for research into the nature of post-Cold War international change. International relations specialists can andmust learn from the debates between neorealists and institutionalists thathave taken place over the last two-and-a-half decades in order to revi-talize systemic theory for the post-Cold War period. However, to do sothey need to engage critically with what have become deeply ingrainedtheoretical assumptions, and think imaginatively about the overall trajec-tory of international political change at the turn of the century.

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Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 49

3 German foreign policy afterthe Cold War

The reunification of Germany was one of the most striking manifestationsof the changes in the European order associated with the end of the ColdWar. This event, perhaps more than any other, symbolized the withdrawalof Soviet power from Eastern Europe and the collapse of the bipolar inter-national system that had dominated world politics since the end of theSecond World War. Yet grounds for optimism about this developmentwere also tinged with a re-emergence of more traditional anxieties aboutthe future of the European order. Unification reopened the issue ofGermany’s effects on the stability of the international system. From 1870to 1945, the European order had been plagued by the so-called ‘GermanQuestion’, stemming from Germany’s emergence as a major state and the consequences of this for the balance of power. After the Second WorldWar, however, Germany’s division offered a temporary solution to thisproblem. During this period, the Federal Republic of Germany became a ‘semi-sovereign’ state in the sense that the predominant interpreta-tion of Article 24 of the Federal Republic’s constitution precluded theBundeswehr’s involvement in anything other than ‘self-defence’ activities.In addition, West Germany became firmly locked into patterns of economicinterdependence and international institutions, notably NATO and theEuropean Economic Community, which emerged under the shelter pro-vided by the bipolar Cold War international system. As a result, thetraditional geopolitical problems associated with the management ofGerman power in Europe were suppressed by the overwhelming impera-tives of superpower rivalry. With the sudden collapse of the Soviet bloc,however, the German problem suddenly and unexpectedly re-emerged asa central issue. This chapter applies neorealist, institutionalist and liberalmodels of international relations to analysing the strategies adopted byGermany over the 1989 to 1999 period. On the basis of this discussion,conclusions are drawn about the nature of Germany’s response to the endof the Cold War, and the strategic choices it faces in the emerging inter-national system.

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Neorealism

Despite differences in emphasis, prominent neorealists have arrived atbroadly pessimistic conclusions about the role a united Germany will play in the emerging structure of international politics (Mearsheimer 1990;Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; Mearsheimer 2001). Mearsheimer predicts areturn to multipolarity within Europe, whilst the emphasis of Layne andWaltz is on the emergence of multipolarity at a global level, with Germany,Japan and China rising to balance US power. However, there are under-lying similarities between their predictions about German foreign policy.Each sees unification leading Germany to seek much greater prominencewithin the international system. Moreover, each recognizes that in theabsence of a strong Soviet threat there is much less need for Germany to remain tied to the security guarantee provided by NATO. Germany istherefore likely to become more assertive in defence of its national inter-ests, and act more independently in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives.A more moderate position compatible with a modified version of neorealismthat retains affinities with neorealist arguments has been offered by a number of analysts (Baring 1994; Garton Ash 1994; Gillessen 1994; Joffe1994; Schollgen 1994; Schwarz 1994; Bluth 1995; Otte 2000). Whilst suchanalyses have a different emphasis to neorealism’s starker predictions, theydo support the neorealist claim that changes in the international system will encourage Germany to behave more independently within multilateralinstitutions than it has in the past.

Neorealists could identify various aspects of the unification process asreflecting their predictions about Germany’s post-Cold War strategies. First,the Kohl administration failed to consult Anglo-French opinion on the issue of German unification before making this policy a stated objective.Second, negotiations over unification with the Soviet Union and Polandwere conducted bilaterally. The Germans negotiated with the Soviets independently before taking the agreed conditions for unification to be rat-ified within the Two-Plus-Four framework. In the case of Poland, Kohlapparently hesitated to guarantee the Oder-Neisse as a permanent easternborder (Horsley 1992: 230–232; Muller 1993: 129 and 146–150). Theseevents point to a refusal of German statesmen to contemplate use of multilateral decision-making frameworks in cases of decisions where vitalinterests may be at stake, and a willingness to contemplate violation ofexisting international law when this conflicts with potential future Germanterritorial gains. They also illustrate just how quickly sloppy diplomaticconduct could unintentionally re-establish traditional security anxieties ina European context. Regardless of Germany’s actual intentions, countriessuch as Britain, France and Poland suffered considerable worries aboutGerman behaviour during this period.

Further evidence in support of neorealist hypotheses comes from Germanbehaviour in international crisis situations in the early post-unification

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German foreign policy after the Cold War 51

period. In December 1991, on the eve of the Maastricht summit, Germanyannounced that it would formally recognize Slovenia and Croatia by theend of the year even if this meant doing so unilaterally. This promoted ECrecognition of these countries in January 1991, and Germany had used thethreat of unilateral action to prompt a change in the European line (Muller1993: 152). By contrast, it is Germany’s apparent weakness during the Gulfcrisis that may be cited as evidence of a reluctance to pursue multilateral-ism. The German government contributed over DM16 billion to the coali-tion, and made limited deployments in Turkey and in the EasternMediterranean (Muller 1993: 138; Otte 2000: 93). However, it was unwill-ing to commit ground forces to the area of action, unlike Britain, Franceand Italy. Salmon has noted that Germany is one of ‘a number of states[which] have fairly consistently maintained their freedom of manoeuvre’ inthe crises in the former Yugoslavia and the Gulf. He argues that both crisesillustrate ‘that while consensus might readily be achieved . . . on secondorder problems, on matters of first order importance . . . [there arose] forcedfissures in policy and actions’ by EC countries, including Germany (Salmon1992: 235 and 248). This argument implies that Germany has shown a pro-nounced tendency to place its own interests over a common internationalresponse, and ‘free-ride’ on other states if this reduces the risks it faces.

As the 1990s progressed Germany showed a growing tendency to engagein the use of military force outside of the NATO area in return for substan-tial gains in influence. This became acutely apparent to German statesmenin the light of the weakness of their diplomacy in the Gulf conflict andthe early stages of the Yugoslav crisis. As a result, during the first halfof the 1990s the German government began an incremental process ofadjustment in its participation in multilateral institutions. After the GulfWar the government began to authorize deployment of Bundeswehr tech-nical and medical support groups, most notably in Cambodia and Somaliain 1992 to 1993. Participation of German crews in AWACS (AirborneWarning and Control Systems) flights deployed to enforce the UN author-ized ‘no-fly zone’ in Bosnia between 1993 and 1995 also played a majorrole in the government’s step-by-step preparation of public opinion foran out of area role for German forces. Participation in interventions inSomalia and Bosnia led to a series of debates in the Federal ConstitutionalCourt over the legality of this behaviour in the light of Article 24. Thesedebates were finally resolved by a July 1994 ruling, which made it clearthat German forces could participate in military operations outside theNATO area as long as they took place under UN auspices and wereapproved by the Bundestag (Hyde-Price 2001: 145–147). During the firsthalf of the 1990s Germany also undertook a major reorientation of defenceplanning to deal with multilateral crisis management by allowing moreflexible responses to international crises and to increase its capacities toproject the use of military force outside of the NATO area (Linnenkamp1993: 100; Gutjahr 1995: 311; Otte 2000: 112).

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52 German foreign policy after the Cold War

During the second half of the 1990s the trend towards a more activeGerman military role became more pronounced. The massacre in Srebrenicain 1995 was a major catalyst for change on the part of the German left,leading many within the SDP and Greens to shed their traditional pacifism.The result was that by the mid-1990s a new cross-party consensus hademerged amongst the German elite around the legitimacy of humanitarianintervention. This underpinned authorization of 4,000 non-combat troopsto participate in the post-Dayton IFOR peace implementation force inBosnia (Lefebre and Lombardi 1996). When SFOR took over from IFORin 1996, Germany’s contingent including combat forces and troops wereregularly stationed in Bosnia itself. However, the most significant shift inGermany’s policy with respect to the use of force abroad came in 1999 dur-ing the Kosovo crisis. Germany participated in air strikes during NATO’sOperation Deliberate Force, and contributed some 8,000 ground troops tothe subsequent KFOR peace implementation force (Baumann and Hellmann2001: 67 and 75). The sheer scale of the operation and the extent of Germanmilitary forces deployed in an offensive capacity constituted major devel-opments in German foreign policy. However, Germany’s involvement waseven more remarkable in two respects. First, the intervention took placedespite a major shift in government to an SDP-Green coalition. It thereforedemonstrated the extent of the emerging elite consensus with respect to the issue of Germany’s involvement in the use of military force in an out of area capacity (Otte 2000: 196). Second, air strikes carried out byNATO took place without a clear UN mandate, and in the face of strongopposition from Russia. They therefore moved well beyond previous stepsin this direction (Hyde-Price 2001: 158–159). Overall, a case can be madethat during the 1990s Germany has undergone a ‘return to normality’ inits foreign policy (Heilbrun 1994: 48). In line with neorealist predictions,it has shed many of its constitutional and political misgivings on this matter in the light of the weaknesses of a purely diplomatic response tointernational crises.

Neorealists might also point to German efforts to strengthen Europeandefence integration over the 1990s, and the problems this generates for itsparticipation in NATO. In the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty, Germanywas a leading actor pushing for closer defence integration. Negotiationswith the French over the 1990–1991 period formed the basis of the provi-sions for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that were con-tained in the eventual Treaty On European Union. Whilst instruments forachieving a common defence policy could not be agreed, Germany advancednegotiations bilaterally with France outside of the formal EC frameworkduring the same period. This culminated in October 1991 when the twocountries announced the creation of a European corps (‘Eurocorps’) for theWestern European Union (WEU) that would become operational in 1995.In June 1992, the announcement of the Petersberg Tasks specified that thefunction of the Eurocorps was to defend the territory of NATO and WEU

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allies, provide humanitarian assistance and conduct peacekeeping andpeacemaking operations in an out of area context. However, the ambitiousscope of the Eurocorps proposal caused anxiety in Britain and the UnitedStates, with both expressing concerns that Germany intended the measureto weaken NATO (Horsley 1992: 235; Muller 1993: 156). In the run-upto the Amsterdam IGC, Germany pushed for and achieved integration ofthe Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP. It also aimed for Qualified MajorityVoting (QMV) to be partially extended to CFSP in order to facilitate thecreation of ‘coalitions of the willing’ conducting missions under EU aus-pices, and pressed for the appointment of a High Representative For ForeignPolicy in the EU. The Kosovo crisis gave further impetus to the develop-ment of the CFSP, including agreement on incorporation of the WEU intothe EU framework, and establishment of a 60,000 strong rapid reactioncorps capable of conducting EU-led missions autonomously from NATO(Hyde-Price 2001: 196). However, these developments have again createdcomplications for Germany’s transatlantic relations. While the Clintonadministration was supportive of efforts to strengthen the ‘European Pillar’of the Alliance, it remains concerned about the emergence of an EU caucuswithin NATO, and the sequencing of European and NATO-led operations(Hyde-Price 2001: 198). Neorealists might plausibly interpret these diplo-matic difficulties as reflecting nascent tensions in German diplomacy, andthe emergence of a more multipolar international structure in whichAmerica and its key European allies pursue conflicting objectives. From thisperspective, Germany is using European defence cooperation to pursue itsinterests separately from an Atlantic framework and as a diplomatic vehi-cle with which to develop a more active military dimension to its foreignpolicy.

Indeed, neorealists might cite other evidence in favour of Germanyhaving weakened its ties to NATO. Whilst it has generally favoured internalreform and expansion of the alliance over the 1990s, this strategy hasnot been pursued without costs. With the dissolution of the Soviet empirein East Europe and the unification of Germany, the Federal Republic hasacquired a considerable range of new security interests in the East-CentralEuropean area (Drake 1997). In addition, the decline in the immediatethreat of an invasion by Russia from the East means that it has less needto remain firmly anchored to the security guarantee that NATO provides.Neorealists therefore argue that it is now more likely for Germany to bepredisposed to developing favourable relations with Russia than it wasduring the Cold War (Otte 2000: 181). Germany’s participation in NATOactivities over the 1990s has, however, generated strains in its relationswith Russia, and this has led German elites into a series of significantinternal debates. The tensions between the unified Germany’s interests indeveloping its relations with Russia and participation in NATO firstbecame apparent in debates over NATO enlargement in the early 1990s.Disputes emerged in the early to mid-1990s between Defence Minister

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54 German foreign policy after the Cold War

Ruhe who favoured enlargement and Foreign Minister Kinkel who objectedto it on account of Russian concerns. These were eventually resolved byChancellor Kohl who came down in favour of enlargement in the face of US aims at the 1994 Brussels summit (Tewes 2001: 12–16). Germanyhas engaged in initiatives designed to placate Russian fears over NATOexpansion. German support for further institutionalization of the CSCEand its transformation into the OSCE became one of Germany’s foreignpolicy priorities in the second half of 1994. Moreover, as a result of anintense flurry of diplomatic visits to Russia by Kohl in 1996 to 1997,Germany played a central role in the negotiation of the NATO-RussiaPermanent Joint Council, a consultative body that came into being in1997 to strengthen NATO’s ties with Russia (Tewes 2001: 18–19). How-ever, both the OSCE and NATO-Russia agreement are institutionally weak,and may be viewed as at best papering over underlying divergences inGermany’s interests in NATO. Similarly, although Germany participatedin intervention in Kosovo, in diplomacy preceding the crisis Germanyplaced emphasis on achieving a negotiated settlement, and during theconflict maintained close diplomatic connections with Russia (Hyde-Price2001: 158–159). Again, this may be interpreted by neo-realists as reflect-ing the loosening of Germany’s Atlantic ties and the emergence of a multi-polar constellation of interests in the European security order.

Aspects of Germany’s economic diplomacy since 1989 are also amenableto a neorealist interpretation. Germany’s role in the GATT during theearly to mid-1990s revealed tensions between its obligations to France asits key partner in European integration and its commitment to the broaderinternational economic order. France and the US came into dispute innegotiations over subsidies to agriculture and audio-visual production. The German government lent their support to France (at some economiccost to themselves), thus forcing American concessions (Wood 1995:229–231). Whilst this did not prevent conclusion of the Uruguay Round,it did highlight tensions in Germany’s relations with the US and Europe.Moreover, by the end of the 1990s Germany was taking a much moreforceful role in negotiations over agricultural trade liberalization withFrance (Rittberger 2001: 249). Germany’s trade relations with Japan inthe early 1990s were not smooth, the automobile industry being partic-ularly sensitive for both countries (Sato 1993: 378). Furthermore, in thesummer of 1992 the Bundesbank raised German interest rates in responseto inflationary pressures arising from the impact of unification. This causedserious economic difficulties in southern European states, including France,and most dramatically forced Britain’s exit from the ERM. This greatlystrained the Franco-German relationship, and also made Germany vulner-able to the accusation that it was using its position in European currencymarkets to impose the costs of unification on its neighbours. This issupported by the failure of German politicians to heed the advice offeredby the Bundesbank, which cautioned against rapid German Economic

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and Monetary Union (Lippert and Stevens-Strohmann 1993: 41). Germanpoliticians seemed willing to suspend the imperatives of the Bundesbankwhere the vital national interests were at stake, but not subsequently wherethe interests of other ERM members were at risk. In support of neorealistclaims, therefore, there is evidence that Germany’s trade and financialdiplomacy has become more assertive and narrowly self-centred than inthe past.

With regard to Germany’s economic diplomacy within the EU, Heilbrungoes as far as to propose that Germany is losing interest in deepeningEuropean integration with France, and is instead attempting to achievehegemony over Eastern Europe. Heilbrun suggests:

Germany is using the widening of the EU as a means of emancipatingitself from France. The new EU members will allow Germany to create a Northern bloc, whose new members are acutely aware oftheir debt to Germany and they may look to Berlin rather than Paris for direction.

(Heilbrun 1994: 46)

Kirschner (1996: 169) also recognizes this possibility. With regard to EMU, differences of emphasis emerged in negotiations between Germanyand France over the so-called Stability Pact agreed in 1996 to facilitateconvergence of European economies prior to the launch of the Euro. These disputes culminated in acrimonious disputes over the French desireto have a Frenchman as head of the European Central Bank. Germanyhas also taken a much firmer role in pushing for reductions in its con-tributions to the EU budget, and in routine budgetary battles in Brussels(Anderson 1999: 49–52; Otte 2000: 149–151). Finally, Germany hasbecome increasingly sensitive to the tension between broadening and deepening the EU arising from the problems associated with extension of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural funds in theevent of enlargement. However, a further reason why enlargementthreatens Franco-German relations is the way in which the admission ofnew members may unravel consensus within the EU. France is now wary about extension of QMV and the power of the European parlia-ment, which have been traditionally supported by Germany. France fearsthey would increase the relative power of the unified Germany within the EU, and shift its focus away from France and towards Central-East European states (Hyde-Price 2001: 186–187). These developmentsmay be viewed by neorealists as reflecting tensions in the traditionalFranco-German entente within the European Union. On a neorealist interpretation, this development places growing strains on the generalprocess of integration and reflects the beginning of the breakdown of theinternational cooperation within Europe that emerged under the shelterof the Cold War.

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Overall, a range of developments may be interpreted in terms favourableto neorealist predictions about German strategies since 1989. Significantaspects of Germany’s behaviour point to the emergence of a more aggres-sively unilateral stance in international institutions. There are also signsof incompatibilities of interest between a united Germany and the US, as well as Germany’s European partners. This has been highlighted inaspects of the unification process, Germany’s growing military role in out-of-area missions, conflicts of interest within NATO over the WEUand CFSP, the crisis within the ERM, and the issue of German influenceover Eastern Europe. These could point to splits within the AtlanticAlliance, or the beginnings of a German hegemony in Europe. They there-fore weigh in favour of neorealist analysis of a united Germany’s role inthe international system after the Cold War.

Institutionalism

Germany may reasonably be assumed to be locked into a complex patternof interdependent relations with the other advanced industrial democra-cies, and participates in a dense web of multilateral frameworks establishedover the post-War period. Institutionalism predicts that, under these conditions, international institutions can take on instrumental value forstates in pursuing their national interests. Where international coopera-tion brings net benefits for states in terms of enhancing their security orwelfare within the international system, states will pursue institutional-ized activity. However, where institutionalization imposes net costs onstates, requiring considerable accommodation and adjustment on theirbehalf, they are likely to reject institutional options.

Institutionalists can present a significant body of evidence to support theirpredictions with respect to Germany’s strategies since 1989. First, it is notclear that a neorealist interpretation of the unification process is entirelysatisfactory. Kohl expressly intended unification to be anchored within boththe EC and NATO. In the first quarter of 1990 alone, there were 29 meet-ings on German unity at head of state and ministerial level with Germany’sEuropean partners. Although Germany did not consult Britain or Francebefore negotiating with the Soviets, it did receive US backing (Muller 1993:128). Furthermore, the terms for unification reflect a multilateral orienta-tion. They ensured continued German membership of NATO, limitationson the size and character of the Bundeswehr, and generous economic andtechnical assistance to the Soviets (Macardle-Kelleher 1993: 20; Schlor1993: 49). Germany became a signatory of the 1990 Conventional Forcesin Europe (CFE) Treaty in which it limited the size of the Bundeswehr to370,000 (Linnenkamp 1993: 95). Kohl took the further step of renewingGermany’s commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is alsopossible that a neorealist interpretation of the Polish Border incident is inaccurate. Muller proposes that Kohl’s hesitation had little to do with

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strategic posturing, but instead reflected domestic electoral considerations(Muller 1993: 145–147). Thus the argument that negotiations over unifi-cation were conducted bilaterally oversimplifies the extent to which thisprocess was heavily institutionalized. Indeed, Muller points out that ‘giventhat the highest national interests were at stake, the unification process wasembedded in an astonishing web of consultations and mutual adjustments’(Muller 1993: 129).

Germany’s post-unification strategies may also be interpreted in the light of institutionalist theory. Over the 1990s Germany continued to display very strong and continuous support for NATO (Otte 2000: 157).Hyde-Price argues that the Alliance serves important functions forGermany. NATO provides it with a firm security guarantee, offers a visible demonstration of continuing integration with the West, ensures a US commitment to European security, and represents a tried and testedinstitutional framework. Germany’s support for NATO expansion may also be understood with reference to the stabilizing effect this could bringto its eastern border. Expansion has occurred through direct NATOenlargement to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (Hyde-Price 2001: 153). It has also occurred indirectly through the formation inOctober 1991 of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), nowthe Partnership for Peace (PfP). Finally, Germany has also consistently supported the CSCE/OSCE process itself over the post-Cold War period.Although Germany does not see either NACC/PfP or the CSCE/OSCE as asubstitute for NATO, they do complement it in various ways (Hyde-Price1996: 187–188). From an institutionalist perspective, Germany’s com-mitment to European security institutions reflects the functional benefitsthey bring.

The evolution of Germany’s attitudes towards the use of force outsidethe NATO area may also be interpreted as reflecting institutionalist predic-tions. Maull has argued that the united Germany will remain a ‘civilianpower’, displaying a strong commitment to multilateralism and ‘the concen-tration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure nationalgoals’ (Maull 1991: 92). Maull’s analysis is compatible with institution-alism’s prediction that the multilateral frameworks in which Germany hasparticipated since the 1950s will continue to have value for it after theCold War. Maull suggests that Germany’s behaviour in both the Bosniaand Kosovo crises supports his view that Germany adopts a civilian powerstrategy. He argues that Germany’s low profile in the crisis in no waysuggests a decisive move away from Bonn’s post-War foreign policy orien-tation (Maull 1995; Maull 2000). Meiers identifies the benefits of such astrategy, noting ‘when Germany takes a stronger policy line it raises suspi-cions amongst its allies. To prevent misconceptions . . . [Germany is ableto] pursue its policies . . . within the Euro-Atlantic framework’ (Meiers1995: 96–97). Furthermore, Germany’s civilian power status provided itwith a continued security guarantee, and limited the financial expenditure

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and human costs associated with increased military involvement. Thus itmay be argued that Germany has strong net incentives to continue tomake heavy use of established multilateral institutions with respect to theuse of force abroad.

Germany’s strategies towards economic regimes at both global andregional levels may also be seen as supporting institutionalist claims. Sinceunification, the German government has displayed a commitment to theGATT/WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, and the G7/8. Despite tensionsbetween French and American interests over agricultural and audio-visualtrade liberalization, Germany managed to broker a compromise agreement(Wood 1995: 231). Sato identifies that growth in trade and investmentbetween Germany and Japan are grounds for continued optimism abouttheir economic relationship (Sato 1993: 367–375). Germany’s role in theresolution of the conflict over Japanese aid to the Soviet Union in 1991 may also be interpreted as indicating that Germany appreciated its interestin brokering this diplomatic process. Katzenstein reflects this reasoningwhen he notes that Germany’s willingness ‘expresses the awareness thatsubstantial Japanese aid would help to stabilise conditions in Russia and enhance German security’ (Katzenstein 1993: 79). Germany has alsocontinued to provide both political and economic support for Russia over the period since German unification, both through multi-lateral forumssuch as the G7, the EU and GATT, as well as on a bilateral basis (Zhurkin1996: 212–216). Again, institutionalists may interpret this as reflecting a functional logic. Thus important aspects of Germany’s economicstrategies at a global level are potentially compatible with institutionalism’sprediction that Germany, as a state with strong incentives to use inter-national economic institutions, will tend to rely heavily upon them.

Aspects of Germany’s support for European integration may also favouran institutionalist interpretation of its strategies. Since the end of the ColdWar, Germany has encouraged the deepening of European integration.With France and the European Commission, it pushed for two Inter-governmental Conferences on economic, monetary and political union (LeGloannec 1993: 260). These began in December 1990, and culminated ayear later in the agreements reached at Maastricht in 1991, most notablyon pursuit of European Monetary Union (EMU). An implicit deal hademerged between France and Germany on the conditions of reunification.France traded acceptance of unification for its long sought after goal ofEMU, which it saw as a means to contain German power (Rice and Zelikow1995: 123; Otte 2000: 46). In the event, the agreement on the IGC onPolitical Union was largely of symbolic value because France discouragedGermany from pursuing further political integration in order to maintainits own sovereign autonomy. Nevertheless, France’s bargaining over unifi-cation and EMU may be viewed as an example of the cooperation formutual gains modelled by institutionalist theory. At the Amsterdam IGC in 1997, Germany proposed weakening the Commission’s capability for

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legislative initiative, favouring strengthening of an inter-governmental rolethrough the European Council (Frenkler 2001: 41). Nevertheless, it didmaintain its commitment to strengthening QMV on all areas except asy-lum and immigration. It also supported strengthening the European parliament’s role in the legislative process (Rittberger 2001: 198–202).Institutionalists might view the combination of incremental hardening ofGermany’s diplomatic stance with persistence of a generally favourable atti-tude towards deepening European cooperation across a wide range of issuesas reflecting the way in which it finds use of European institutions instru-mentally valuable in the pursuit of its national interests.

Germany has also been a leading proponent of the expansion of theEU to include EFTA states and countries in Eastern Europe. This hasincluded spearheading the establishment of the PHARE and TACIS assis-tance funds for East European states established by the EU (Anderson1999: 53). Widening the European Union helps the process of stabilizingEast-Central Europe, and offers Germany large gains from its compara-tive advantage in trade with this region (Otte 2000: 141–145). Thus inline with institutionalist predictions, there are tangible benefits for Germanyin pursing this policy. Also in accordance with institutionalist theory,Germany’s trade and aid policies in the Central and Eastern Europeanregion are strongly multilateral in character because they are carried outwithin the EU framework (Katzenstein 1997: 22). However, there remainaspects of German strategies that are difficult to correlate with institu-tionalism’s predictions. Whilst Germany does have strong incentives toeither broaden or deepen the European Union, it is less clear that it is inits interest to pursue both objectives simultaneously. The contradictionsinvolved in pursuit of such a policy have become increasingly apparentbecause of the increases in the size of the EU budget that would occur ifthe CAP and structural funds were extended to new members (Tewes1998: 123). Institutionalism highlights the instrumental value of institu-tions. Where commitment to institutions creates considerable costs forstates, they will reject institutional options. Thus the kind of behaviourpredicted by institutionalism would be the advocacy by Germany of eithersome form of ‘core Europe’, or alternatively, a ‘wider Europe’ (Gutjahr1994; Hellmann 1996). The former envisages a core of West Europeanstates pushing ahead with monetary and political union as provided forin the Maastricht Treaty. The latter involves extension of the EU east-wards as a free trade area. The instrumental logic of institutionalist analysistherefore implies that Germany should be making clearer choices betweenbroadening and deepening the EU.

Overall, the institutionalist model offers plausible explanations of manyaspects of German strategies since 1989. This includes aspects of the unifi-cation process, its commitment to Atlantic security institutions, its apparentreluctance to take on military commitments abroad, its participation inthe global international economic system, and dimensions of Germany’s

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strategies towards European integration. Whilst institutionalism suggeststhat Germany is beginning to face important choices in its integrationstrategies, there is evidence of significant continuity in Germany’s use ofinternational institutions over the post-Cold War period.

Liberalism 1: domestic variation

Liberalism predicts that domestic cultural and institutional variation willbe built into the dynamics displayed by the emerging international system.The process of internalizing liberal norms will be affected by domestic coali-tions within states reflecting embedded social identities, economic interestsand political institutions. For this reason, domestic preferences play a crit-ical role in explaining international behaviour and outcomes in the liberalmodel. Liberalism also anticipates that states that adopt preferences thatreflect a competitive security orientation or mercantilist economic tendencywill come under pressure to internalize a liberal identity. This predictionwill be assessed in the final section addressing the strategic choices faced bythe unified Germany. First, however, it is necessary to establish that domes-tic factors may plausibly be viewed as playing a more autonomous role inshaping Germany’s foreign policy over the post-Cold War period thananticipated by either neorealism or institutionalism.

Important aspects of Germany’s behaviour during the unification processmay be viewed as reflecting a distinctive set of foreign policy preferences.First, the sheer generosity of the terms of unification agreed within theTwo-Plus-Four framework belies an interpretation of these measures asan instrumental function of Germany’s interests. Under circumstances inwhich pressures for unification had become virtually unstoppable, Germanycould have taken advantage of the intense uncertainty surrounding eventsto push for a less onerous set of preconditions. Instead, however, itconsulted extensively with other major powers and agreed generous termsthat offered substantive benefits to both the US and France. Moreover, itdid so at considerable cost to the new German state’s sovereign rights.Thus Katzenstein concludes that during the negotiations surrounding uni-fication the ‘political reassurance that Kohl and Genscher could offer indicated . . . that the West German political leadership had . . . inter-nalised the norm of peaceful international cooperation’ (Katzenstein 1993:76). Moreover, in the diplomacy surrounding unification Germany bothreaffirmed and deepened considerably its support for NATO and otherbroader Euro-Atlantic security institutions. The terms in which Germanpoliticians were thinking suggests that their use of NATO in this periodreflected not merely the instrumental value of its preservation, but a funda-mental policy reflex. Anderson and Goodman identify that there is noevidence of elite reappraisal of Germany’s membership in NATO occur-ring as a result of the prospect of unification. Instead, ‘the question posedby German politicians was not whether to remain in the Atlantic Alliance

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but rather how to adapt the alliance . . . to the rapidly changed circum-stances on the continent’ (Anderson and Goodman 1993: 29). ThusGerman strategies during the unification process may plausibly be viewedas reflecting a deeply embedded preference for operating within the Atlanticsecurity framework.

Similarly, during the 1989–1990 period Germany actually deepened considerably its support for the process of European integration, even at potential risk to its future economic stability. In April 1990, Kohlannounced a willingness to waive Community structural fund assistance forthe former GDR, although the EC later refused to accept Kohl’s offer.Furthermore, ‘[i]n the face of domestic concerns about the . . . risks of EMU,voiced principally by the Bundesbank and the Ministry of Finance, theChancellor committed his country to accelerated progress toward . . . eco-nomic and political reform in the EC’ (Anderson and Goodman 1993: 32and 33). Even given the risk of losing the economic stability and credibil-ity associated with the Mark, Germany was prepared to make a major con-cession on EMU in order to signal reassurance to France. Thus in 1993Katzenstein pointed to the way in which ‘despite German unification, theexpectations about the extent of political, economic and monetary integra-tion far exceed those held when the EC92 process was launched . . . in1987–1988’ (Katzenstein 1993: 77). Overall, increased German use of bothEuropean integration and NATO during the unification period indicatesthat its support for these institutions was not merely instrumental.Anderson and Goodman have argued that during this period:

institutions . . . restructured and remolded German interests, so that, inthe eyes of German political elites, institutional memberships were notmerely instruments of policy but normative frameworks for policy mak-ing. The development of reflexive support for institutions . . . has playedan important role in shaping German interests since unification.

(Anderson and Goodman 1993: 24)

Drawing on Anderson and Goodman’s analysis, Keohane et al. have char-acterized Germany’s foreign policy preferences between 1989 and 1991as ‘reflexively institutionalist: its institutional ties were viewed as intrinsicto the German’s view of themselves’ (Keohane et al. 1993: 10 emphasisadded; see also Katzenstein 1993: 75).

Germany’s foreign policy over the post-1991 period has displayed a pat-tern of development that may be viewed as remaining broadly compatiblewith Anderson and Goodman’s initial characterization of its preferences.This has been clearly expressed in Germany’s policies with respect to Euro-Atlantic security institutions. As has been noted, Germany has maintainedstrong support for the development of NATO over the post-Cold Warperiod. At the same time, however, it has been among the leading statespushing for the development of a European defence identity, and has also

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played a central role in the development of the NACC/PfP and CSCE/OSCE.As Duffield identifies, this ‘across-the-board’ approach to developing inter-national security institutions poses a significant anomaly for institutional-ist theory. Germany has attempted to develop a range of differentinstitutional forms simultaneously, despite the way in which these forumsmay be of limited instrumental value (as in the case of the PfP/OSCE), ormay actually be dysfunctional (as when Germany’s partners have criticizedsuch an approach for being contradictory or even counter-productive)(Duffield 1999: 143). Similarly, Germany has attempted to use new insti-tutional initiatives, even if they are of minimal instrumental value, to reas-sure its key partners about its established institutional commitments. ThusSchlor identified the way in which the real significance of NACC to Germanstatesmen was not so much in its security benefits for Eastern Europe, butin its Atlantic connection: ‘NACC demonstrates Germany’s commitment toNATO and can be used to deflect criticism about its involvement with theCSCE and West European defence integration’ (Schlor 1993: 47). Overall,Germany’s approach to developing international security governance inEurope can be viewed as reflecting a distinctive national security cultureand an ingrained national preference for multilateralism.

Many commentators have argued that Germany’s stance towards theissue of the use of force in out of area activities may be viewed in termsof its foreign policy culture (Berger 1998; Banchoff 1999; Duffield 1999).These commentators follow Maull and Meiers in arguing that the changesin Germany’s attitudes towards the use of force over the 1990s havechanged only incrementally, and should not be viewed as representing afundamental shift in its attitudes. However, rather than explaining acivilian power orientation in terms of incentives such as the signal thissends to key allies, it is located in Germany’s distinctive foreign policyidentity and preferences. From this viewpoint, Germany remains stronglyaffected by a ‘culture of restraint’ arising from the impact of its role inthe Second World War on its domestic political system. This is widelyunderstood within Germany as providing it with special responsibilitiespertaining to the use of force, and placing a particular obligation uponit to adopt a low military profile. Some commentators have even extendedthis reasoning by making the argument that Germany’s non-military orien-tation and focus on economic and European institutions has been a majorsource of power for it. Germany’s power is over constitutive politics (thepower to shape the overall framework of international cooperation) ratherthan over its regulative politics (specific policies within international insti-tutions) (Bulmer 1997: 50). For example, Markovitz and Reich hold that:

armed forces are not the basis of Germany’s . . . power. Power liesin the prominence of the German economy, the Deutsche Mark’sstrength; the Bundesbank’s role as de facto central bank for all ofEurope; the volume and profitability of German exports; the size of

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German foreign investment; and varied forms of foreign ‘subsidies’.The costs and benefits are palpable. Germany makes the most,Germany pays the most – and on balance Germany wins.

(Markovitz and Reich 1997: 180–181)

Others have highlighted equally distinctive features of Germany’s pref-erences over European integration during the post-Cold War period.Contrary to institutionalist predictions, these analysts see no necessarycontradiction between Germany making commitments to both broadenand deepen the EU simultaneously. Again, the notion of constitutive poweris used to explain why this may be so. On this account, the close corre-spondence between German and European political institutions grants itan indirect influence within the EU that is greater than that which it couldachieve through the use of its tangible resources. Germany’s integrationstrategy pursues a loose set of ‘milieu’ goals aimed at shaping the generalcharacter of the integration policy rather than bargaining for specific issueson a case-by-case basis. Bulmer and Paterson identify prominent areas ofintegration policy that indicate how Germany has been able to shape thepreferences of other states involved in the integration process. The bestexample is EMU, which ‘exports’ German domestic norms and institu-tions abroad, whilst leading other states to ‘import’ German monetaryrigour. This externalization of Germany’s internal characteristics throughits foreign policy allows Germany to mobilize institutional bias in favourof institutions that suit its own interests. Germany’s pursuit of enlarge-ment of the EU also reflects an explicit attempt at shaping the regionalmilieu. Enlargement facilitates the further expansion of European institu-tions which closely match Germany’s domestic institutions. It has alsoencouraged a wide range of domestic actors within Germany to interactheavily with Central-East Europe, thereby encouraging these countries tostructure their domestic political institutions and economy in accordancewith those that exist in Germany. Finally, export of Germany’s ‘milieushaping’ approach to foreign policy decision-making feeds back to generatea virtuous circle in which other actors become predisposed towards contin-uing participation on the European integration process. Once Central andEast European states enter the EU, therefore, pressures to quicken thepace of integration are likely to accelerate rather than slow down. Overall,Germany’s constitutive power is likely to facilitate its general strategy ofbroadening and deepening the EU simultaneously (Bulmer and Paterson1996: 129–135; see also Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson 2000; Pond andSchoenbaum 1996; Bulmer 1997).

Overall, there is a case to be made that Germany’s preferences haveencouraged it to remain committed to a more deeply internalized patternof institutionalized activity than predicted by either neorealism or insti-tutionalism. Between 1989 and 1999, both the Atlantic security frameworkand European institutions took intrinsic rather than instrumental value as

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normative frameworks for German policy makers. This view is compat-ible with Anderson and Goodman’s characterization of Germany’spreferences during the unification period. However, this assessment hingesheavily on the validity of the thesis that Germany has acquired consid-erable constitutive power over the structure of European governance. Ittherefore remains possible that the costs involved in Germany’s pursuitof reflexive multilateralism are high enough to place considerable pres-sure on Germany to abandon its distinctive orientation. The final sectionof this chapter therefore addresses the strategic choices faced by Germanyat the close of the first decade of the post-Cold War period.

Liberalism 2: Germany’s choices

In terms of their assessment of the sustainability of Germany’s foreignpolicy, there are important limitations in the position taken by both institutionalist analysts and those who have explained Germany’s postunification strategies with reference to its ‘constitutive power’. Both neo-realists and historians have highlighted compelling arguments that majorchanges have taken place in Germany’s strategic orientation over the1990s. Those who have adopted civilian power arguments have underes-timated the significance of important changes in Germany’s security policiesover the 1990s. Germany’s attitudes towards security institutions haveshifted through the upgrading of its support for European defence coop-eration, and in terms of its stance towards the use of military force abroad.Similarly, in the latter half of the 1990s Germany has taken very seri-ously the potential costs of pursuing a strategy of both broadening anddeepening the EU simultaneously. These changes indicate that there hasbeen a major shift in the manner in which Germany has pursued its foreignpolicy over the 1990s. The benefits brought by institutional membershipshave simply not prevented it from making important choices about itsinstitutional commitments. Nevertheless, the changes should not be under-stood as verifying neorealist predictions about Germany’s foreign policy.This is because it is equally apparent that the changes in Germany’sstrategies over the 1990s have not just preserved but strengthened itscommitment to the multilateral frameworks within which it operates. Thispoints the way towards the analysis presented by a liberal model of theinternational system.

Smith argues explicitly that the development of Germany’s stance on theissue of the use of force in out of area activities may be viewed as reflect-ing its reflexive multilateralism. Germany changed its approach only whenit perceived that ‘multilateralism in general and Germany’s support for itin particular could be at risk’ (Smith 1996: 50). Moreover, to achieve itsaim Germany has over-ridden its traditional pattern of participation inNATO, and exposed itself to increased financial costs and human risks.However, by upgrading its institutional commitments, Germany sought to

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sustain and enhance the Atlantic Alliance. Thus it oversimplifies to inter-pret these developments in the utilitarian terms suggested by institutional-ist analysis. Only a focus on the intrinsic value of NATO captures thenorm-governed character of the evolution of Germany’s attitudes regard-ing the use of military force. Baumann and Hellmann have refined such ananalysis in the light of trends revealed during the Kosovo crisis. They iden-tify two interpretations of the development of Germany’s attitudes withregard to out of area activities. One is that Germany remains dominatedby a ‘culture of restraint’, but this account cannot adequately explain sig-nificant shifts in Germany’s position. A second view is that German elitesused ‘salami tactics’ to gradually shift public opinion towards ‘normaliza-tion’ and acceptance of involvement in military operations. This explana-tion is compatible with discontinuity, and stresses the agency of Germanpolicy makers. However, it does not capture the way in which shifts inGermany’s position were motivated by a desire to strengthen multilateralsecurity cooperation. Baumann and Hellmann suggest that a more adequateapproach is that strategic culture was not a passive constraint on Germanpolicy makers, but instead actively drove the process of foreign policy adap-tation. In this way, the distinctive German self-image led to a pattern ofintervention that more instrumental calculations of interests might haverefused (Baumann and Hellmann 2001: 62–66 and 79).

A similar pattern of institutional change may be identified with respectto Germany’s European integration strategies. Anderson, who originallycharacterized Germany’s orientation towards multilateralism as reflexive,has identified tensions in Germany’s European policies in three areas:competition policy, the CAP, and structural funds (Anderson 1997;Anderson 1999). He argues that between 1990 and 1992, the Germangovernment submitted to established procedures despite the huge coststhey imposed on domestic actors. However, since then the German govern-ment has paid more attention to issues of distribution and redistribution.Anderson does note continuity in one area, specifically trade policy. Thushe concludes that whilst

[u]nification did not precipitate a major domestic revaluation ofGermany’s role in Europe . . . [t]o describe the united Germany’s rela-tionship towards Europe in terms of seamless continuity would beinaccurate. . . . [Overall] what emerges is a mixed pattern of changeand continuity.

(Anderson 1997: 104–105)

Tewes similarly acknowledges that German statesmen have been address-ing the potential tensions in their involvement in both deepening andwidening the EU. This first surfaced in proposals for a ‘variable geom-etry’ Europe in which the ‘precondition for the enlargement towards theEast was a tightly integrated core’ (Tewes 1998: 127). Janning has put

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66 German foreign policy after the Cold War

forward the related concept of ‘differentiated integration’. He notes thatsuch a strategy ‘would lead to the concentration of leadership roles onthose member states which are actively involved in . . . sectoral deep-enings. . . . [In turn this would] open up new possibilities for active partici-pation and a higher density of integration’ (Janning 1996: 41). The ultimate aim of a variable geometry strategy is that by pursuing institu-tional flexibility Germany should prove able to sustain its strongcommitment to European integration. By adjusting policy instruments,Germany has therefore attempted to pursue broadening and deepeningintegration simultaneously. As Tewes notes, to understand the mix ofcontinuity and change in Germany’s integration strategies ‘one . . . has tolook first at . . . German identity and at the way it shaped foreign policyculture’ (Tewes 1998: 130; see also Letourneau and Rakel 1997: 122–125).

A liberal analysis of Germany’s post-Cold War foreign policy suggeststhat an emphasis on Germany’s distinctive identity as an actor is not whollymisplaced. Nevertheless, it must also be developed and refined. Germany’scommitment to multilateralism has not been a passive policy reflex inher-ited from the post-1945 period. Instead, Germany played an active andreflexive role in adjusting the rules and procedures through which it par-ticipated in key international institutions in order to preserve and extendtheir underlying normative framework. As Harnisch and Maull recognize,‘identities are not fixed preference orders but thick and sticky cognitivestructures that are often confirmed but sometimes challenged and changed’(Harnisch and Maull 2001: 148). The latter implies an understanding ofsocialization that places a much greater emphasis on the voluntary natureof change on the part of actors, and the capacity for agency on the part ofstates. Instead of emphasizing the ‘constitutive’ aspects of German power,it stresses what Bertram terms its ‘generative’ nature. On this view:

the real problem for German power . . . [is] not how to constrain itbut how to generate ways to use it, how to get Germans to think oftheir contribution as essential for the common good, and how to getthem to accept responsibility for leadership as the major power inWest and central Europe.

(Bertram 1994: 61 and 104–105)

Wallace makes a similar point when he argues that today’s Germanyrequires a more sustained and active approach to building partnershipsthan has been evident in the past (Wallace 1995: 63). Thus, shifts inGermany’s approach to multilateralism over the 1990s need not neces-sarily dilute its participation in international cooperation, or reflect theessentially unsustainable nature of its reflexive orientation towards multi-lateralism. Instead, Germany’s active approach to adapting patterns ofinternational cooperation may be viewed as revealing the great extent towhich Germany has internalized multilateral norms.

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There have been two generic ways in which Germany has sought a moreprominent role in patterns of multilateral institutions over the 1989–1999period. The first is that it has shifted from what Anderson refers to as a ‘pol-icy taker’ to a ‘policy maker’ role (Anderson 1997: 105). Second, Germanyhas increased the degree of equality reflected in burden-sharing arrangementsbetween itself and its major partners. In the context of NATO, these pro-cedural adaptations have led to Germany exposing itself to the increasedcosts and risks associated with military involvement abroad. Germany hasalso attempted to take on burden-sharing responsibilities in the securityarena by pushing for security cooperation within the EU. In terms of its economic diplomacy, Germany has increasingly argued that its asymmetri-cal contribution to EU finances must be changed. Nevertheless, whilst thepattern of costs and benefits for Germany varies across issue areas, theunderlying trend is the same. Germany is increasingly demanding equalityof status with other major actors, approaching institutional bargaining with the expectation of making contributions proportionate to its size andcapabilities. The concern for Germany’s partners is, of course, that thisreflects the re-emergence of a unilateralist foreign policy. Anderson notesthat the risk ‘is not the return of the Third Reich, but the re-emergence ofyet another UK in Europe – a second awkward partner, sceptical and oftenunconstructive on the European stage’ (Anderson 1999: 209; see also Otte2000 for a similar assessment). However, a greater role for Germany andEurope in security affairs enables it to contribute more effectively to bothmanaging international crises and international burden sharing. Similarly, amore sustainable level of contributions to the EU budget enables Germanyto continue to play a major role in sponsoring the integration process.Anderson may therefore draw a false analogy by heralding the emergenceof ‘another Britain’ in Europe. It is equally possible that Germany may actually strengthen its relations with its major partners, and increase the density of networks of cooperation within which it participates.

The process of identity transition which has led to changes in Germany’sapproach to foreign policy had been driven by the emergence of a strongcross party consensus within the state elite (Stuth 1992; Voigt 1996;Baumann and Hellmann 2001). By contrast to the relatively smooth andtransparent evolution of the views of the elite, however, the wider publicdebate in Germany about its changing foreign policy orientation hasinevitably raised deeper questions about German national identity. Policiesover the use of military force, or how far to proceed with European integration, profoundly affect the mass of its populace. During the ColdWar, Germany’s position in the bipolar power structure sheltered it fromhaving to make decisions on such matters. Correspondingly, Germanydeveloped a conception of itself as having a ‘post-national’ identity linkedto its distinctive strategic orientation. Adjustments made during Germany’s transition in the post-Cold War period have therefore forced it to faceissues that had been largely suppressed in the pre-unification era.

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68 German foreign policy after the Cold War

Germany’s crisis of national identity has been reflected most acutely inthe controversy caused by the huge public debate over Germany’s use ofmilitary force abroad (Meiers 1995: 84; Hellmann 1996: 20; Smith et al.1996: 11; Dorff 1997: 60–65). However, it is also reflected in the intensepublic discussion of Germany’s future role in European integration.Germany’s conception of itself as an actor within the international systemis therefore in a process of profound change. Yet without reclaiming aconception of itself as an actor with a legitimate sense of its national iden-tity, Germany will be unable to play the full role in the internationalsystem that its new status demands. Debates between realists who suggestthat Germany is becoming a normal actor and those who see Germanyas still far from normal because of its internalized commitment to multi-lateralism set up a false dichotomy. As Dorff suggests, ‘the two theses arenot really mutually exclusive . . . . [because] what we understand normalcyto include . . . may be changing’ (Dorff 1997: 66–67). Germany’s ‘normal-ization’ is an essential precondition for the continuation of its deepcommitment to multilateralism, not its antithesis. Germany is thereforeundergoing a ‘reinventing’ of its sense of national identity in the light ofits changing foreign policy (Glees 1996: 279).

However, over the 1990s the German political elite showed considerableskill in managing this process of identity transition. Unlike the politicalestablishments in either Japan or China, they have taken some significantsteps towards finding workable solutions to the problems being generatedfor them in the emerging international system. Over the 1989–1999 period,Germany has therefore begun a process of purging the historical legacy itinherited from its role in the conflicts of the first half of the twentieth cen-tury. This legacy caused Germany to take on a distinctive policy reflexfavouring cooperation in Euro-Atlantic multilateral institutions. Since theend of the Cold War, signs of discontinuity in German foreign policy haveemerged. Whilst these shifts are very important, they should not be inter-preted as heralding a return to the Germany of old. Instead, they reflectprocedural adjustments that actually upgrade Germany’s contribution tosustaining established frameworks for cooperation. Making these adjust-ments provides Germany with a stable platform with which to continue itsactive role in the development of international cooperation on a wide rangeof issues, and has encouraged it to play a more prominent part in diplo-macy over burden sharing issues. In so doing, Germany is playing a crucialrole in the consolidation of both regional and global multilateral structures.Today, a reunited Germany has been presented with an unprecedentedopportunity to break decisively with its turbulent past. This process has notbeen simple or without anxiety, and the ‘Berlin Republic’ needs confidencein its own judgement if it is to use its increased power to make up for the errors of its past history. Yet Germany shows signs that it has begunto establish a new foreign policy suited to the challenges of the post-ColdWar era.

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4 Japanese foreign policy afterthe Cold War

Just as the end of the Cold War led to a re-emergence of the GermanQuestion in Europe, in Asia it reopened the Japanese Question. UnlikeGermany, Japan had not been physically divided into East and Westbecause of the Soviet Union’s late entry into the Pacific conflict duringthe Second World War. Nevertheless, the problem of containing Japanesepower was resolved through similar means. Article 9 of Japan’s con-stitution was generally interpreted as renouncing its sovereign right todeclare war. For its security, Japan relied instead on guarantees providedthrough the Mutual Security Treaty (MST) signed in the early 1950s withthe United States. During the Cold War, Japan’s foreign policy was basedupon the Yoshida Doctrine, a strategy that had both political and economiccomponents. Politically, it accepted a limited military role, in line withJapan’s constitutional commitments. In economic terms, it was under-pinned by economic nationalism oriented towards Japan’s post-Warrehabilitation. However, the end of the Cold War has thrust the issue ofJapan’s role within the emerging international system to the forefront ofcontemporary debates. With the removal of the threat of a direct attackfrom the Soviet Union, Japan’s anchor to the alliance with the US hasbecome open to question in a way that was previously not the case. Thisin turn raises the broader possibility that the Yoshida Doctrine has itselfbecome anachronistic as a basis for Japan’s foreign policy. This chapterapplies neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of international rela-tions to analysing the strategies adopted by Japan over the 1989–1999period. On the basis of this discussion, conclusions are drawn about thenature of Japan’s response to the end of Cold War, and the strategicchoices it faces in the emerging international system.

Neorealism

A number of analysts have used the neorealist model to make predictionsabout the behaviour of Japan in the post-Cold War international sys-tem (Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; Layne 1996; Mearsheimer 2001). Thesecommentators anticipated that the end of the Cold War will lead to

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structural pressures for change in Japan’s relations with other majorpowers. In the absence of the Soviet threat, the US is less likely to wishto maintain a costly and risky defence presence in East Asia as part ofthe policy of guaranteeing Japan’s security. In turn, this will generate pres-sures for Japan to become more independent and assertive in pursuit ofits national security. The removal of the suppressing influence of the ColdWar power structure will lead to the resurfacing of indigenous securityrivalries in East Asia, and fuel growing security rivalries between Japanand China. Overall, Japan will come to play its role in a more conflictual,multipolar order within East Asia and in the wider international system.During the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was widely presumed that Japan had acquired the capability to become a serious geopolitical chal-lenger to the US (Buzan 1988: 558; Waltz 1993: 55; Layne 1996: 71).By the late 1990s, the situation had changed significantly as a result ofthe impact of the East Asian financial crisis on Japan’s economy. In 1999Japan’s per capita GDP dropped to seventh place in the world, afterattaining first place in both 1993 and 1994. Moreover, the differencebetween Japanese and US GDP increased from 10 per cent in 1990 to 20per cent in 1999 (Funabashi 2001: 78). Neorealists can view Japan’scurrent economic difficulties as further increasing its incentives to pursuea more independent and assertive foreign policy in order to increase itsrelative influence. The turn around in Japan’s economic fortunes shouldnot, therefore, be viewed as undermining the significance of neorealistpredictions, which rely on Japan’s structural incentives to balance againstAmerica’s dominant position.

There have been indications that Japan’s status as a potential rival to theUS has led to tensions in the US-Japan security alliance. The Gulf War wasthe most important event highlighting the ‘politics of burden-sharing’ withthe US (Pharr 1993). Japan’s contribution came in the form of a dispatchof minesweepers and a $13 billion contribution to allied efforts paid in anumber of instalments. According to Lincoln, this response was madebecause ‘Japan would be severely criticised by the United States if the nationdid nothing’. Japan’s ‘cheque book diplomacy’ provoked criticisms of free-loading from the US, and of American ingratitude from the Japanese side(Inoguchi 1993: 253; Lincoln 1993: 233; Sasae 1994: 30). In the Gulf con-flict, it was Japan’s failure to contribute militarily that lay behind disputeswith the US. However, there are also signs of strains in the US-Japan rela-tionship arising from increased Japanese assertiveness. Japan has adoptedan increasingly independent stance towards North Korea in response toindications that it is moving towards nuclear weapons capability (Hughes1996b; Jung-Hoon and Moon 2002). This has frustrated the attempts bythe US to orchestrate sanctions against North Korea to help reduce the pos-sibility of nuclear proliferation in the region (Yahuda 1996a: 251). In 1995the rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by US soldiers stationed at the major USmilitary base on Okinawa island caused considerable local resentment.

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Furthermore, by the late 1990s Japan had become concerned that Americanengagement with China would begin to supplant Tokyo’s privileged role asthe key American interlocutor in the region. Thus Japan resented the wayin which President Clinton failed to affirm the importance of the US-Japanalliance in talks with Jiang Zemin in 1998. This has led Japan to considerseriously what it should do to refashion its own relations with China(Funabashi 2001: 75–76; see also Wang 2002; Drifte 2003). Developmentssuch as these can be interpreted from a neorealist perspective as reflectingemerging tensions in relations between Japan and the US. With the declineof the Soviet threat, other priorities will emerge in the calculations madeby these countries, and their interests will gradually diverge. In turn, thiswill inevitably weaken the alliance between the US and Japan which existedduring the Cold War.

However, the most significant tensions in US-Japan relations over the1989–1999 period emerged in the late 1990s during the East Asian finan-cial crisis. Japanese diplomacy during the late 1990s revealed fissures inrelations with the US. The responses of the US and Japanese to the crisiswere very different. Tokyo favoured an initiative to create an AsianMonetary Fund funded largely by Japan, a more generous policy that waspopular among governments in the region. By contrast the US favouredan IMF programme to avoid problems of moral hazard and encourageeconomies in the region to undertake structural reform. As the crisis deep-ened, the US began to blame Tokyo directly for its failure to reform itsown economy and play a greater role in leading the East Asian economyout of recession. In turn, these conflicts reflect fundamental differences ofopinion over the causes of the crisis (Johnstone 1999: 125–130). Japanhas responded to this situation by pushing for The Manila FrameworkGroup to operate under the aegis of APEC. This forum is to provide aregional framework for consultation for finance ministers. Although theGroup will supplement and not supplant the IMF it has been viewed asan attempt by Japan to develop regional economic cooperation ratherthan relying exclusively on the US and global institutions (Drysdale 2002:69). The acrimony of the disputes surrounding the crisis reveals a patternreminiscent of Japan’s response to the Gulf War. The Japanese used gaitsuto force through policy changes, whilst the US made intrusive demandsupon Japan. Various analysts have recognized that this dynamic is unsus-tainable and that it could fundamentally weaken the US-Japan alliance(Johnstone 1999; Rapkin 2001; Kirschner 2003).

Furthermore, changes in US-Japanese relations will rebound on Japan’srelations with other regional powers. Buzan and Segal identified the reduc-tion in US forces in East Asia in the early 1990s as being at the root ofa significant arms build-up in the region (Buzan and Segal 1994: 7).Alternatively, by the late 1990s the problems associated with Japan devel-oping its local relations largely through the prism of the US alliance werebecoming apparent, leading it to pursue a more autonomous regional

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policy (Inoguchi 2002; Drifte 2003). Sino-Japanese relations are centralto this regional dynamic, and indeed there have been signs of tensionsbetween these countries. These have been most apparent over Chinesenuclear testing, China’s moves towards blue-water naval capability, andgrowing support in Japan for closer ties with Taiwan (Calder 1996: 144;Green and Self 1996: 36–37; Garrett and Glaser 1997: 397). Tensionsbetween Japan and China also interact with the question of policy towardsthe two Koreas, particularly in response to indications that North Koreais moving towards nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, there are indi-cations that Japan’s attempt to normalize relations with North Korea inorder to secure a more independent political influence in the region hasstrained relations with South Korea (Ahn 1993: 270–272; Drifte 2003:161). These trends may all be interpreted by neorealists as arising as aresult of the withdrawal of Cold War overlay. On the other hand, thereare anxieties in China about the continuation of the US-Japan securityarrangement. In the light of the April 1996 US-Japan Joint Declarationthat renewed their commitment to the MST for the post-Cold War period,the Chinese have become increasingly concerned that the alliance is aimedat ‘checking’ China. The possible acquisition by Japan of a Theatre MissileDefence (TMD) system that may allow it to neutralize China’s nucleardeterrence capability has also caused alarm (Garrett and Glaser 1997: 384and 392–394). These developments may be viewed by neorealists assignalling that the end of the Cold War has caused China to reassess thevalue of the US-Japan security framework.

Local rivalries within Asia reinforce incentives for Japan to becomeinvolved in the regional arms dynamic. Japan is in dispute with Chinaover the Senkaku Islands and Russia over the Kurile Islands. Relationsover these issues have both shown signs of deterioration over the 1990s.Indeed, until Germany brokered a compromise, Japan was reluctant toparticipate in the IMF’s assistance package to the Soviet Union in 1991because of this issue (Berton 1993: 32–42; Saito 1993: 278; Garrett andGlaser 1997: 397). There are also sources of geopolitical dispute withinthe region that have had indirect implications for Japan. Closer Japaneseties with Taiwan have become a source of tension with China, and Chinesemanoeuvres in the Taiwan Straits in 1995 and 1996 have heightenedconcerns in Japan. The prospect of Korean unification is a source ofconcern to Japan, particularly given the possibility of nuclear prolifera-tion in this area (Yahuda 1996a: 250; Pyle 1998: 133). The launch of aNorth Korean rocket across Japanese territory in August 1998 dramati-cally highlighted the need for Japan to develop a more robust defencecapability. Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan has also profoundlyshaken Japan’s adherence to a non-nuclear orientation (Funabashi 1998a;Jain 2002). Disputes between China and ASEAN members over the SpratlyIslands also have implications for Japan through its vulnerability to itsoil supply from the Middle East and precedents set in international law.

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Some analysts suggest that this lies behind Japan’s attempt to broker Sino-American tensions over China’s erection of structures on Mischief Reefin 1995 (Calder 1996: 144; Er 1996: 998–1001 and 1005). Furthermore,the complexity of disputes is reinforced by the legacy of Japanese impe-rialism, notably in China and the Koreas (Buzan and Segal 1994: 4). Thiscould be understood as lying behind the outstanding issue of Japan’sfailure to formally apologize for the atrocities committed under its impe-rial rule. The number as well as the historical and geopolitical complexityof emerging tensions between Japan and other regional players may becited by neorealists as evidence of problems resulting from the change inthe distribution of power in the international system.

Since the early 1990s Japan has also displayed an inconsistency towardsthe UN that suggests it places its own policy-making autonomy over thewishes of the international community. Since 1994 Japan has madedemands for a permanent Security Council seat (Itoh 1995: 283). However,unlike Germany, Japan has not yet reinterpreted its constitution so as toallow Self Defence Forces (SDF) participation in the multilateral use offorce in an international context. In 1992, Japan did establish a lawallowing SDF participation in non-combat UN Peacekeeping Operations.Since that time it has participated in a number of such activities, notablyin Cambodia (Itoh 1995). However, George identifies that the proposalwas not ‘a unilateral, . . . unprompted gesture . . . ; the Gulf War dictatedits timing, while external pressures largely shaped its content’ (George1993: 563). Akaha recognizes the contradiction in Japan’s stance to theUN, noting that ‘[t]here is a near consensus among the Japanese that theydeserve . . . [permanent UNSC] status. . . . However, there is widespreadconcern that this would be contingent on Japan’s willingness to partici-pate in . . . combat activities’ (Akaha 1995: 68). Such views fit the neorealistprediction that Japan will seek the benefits of UNSC membership (theveto and the prestige) whilst avoiding associated costs. Moreover, it isnot contradictory for neorealists to interpret Japan’s PKO legislation asa first step on the road to Japan’s remilitarization, as well as a reluctantresponse to external pressures. Japan may be pursuing both these strat-egies, using brinkmanship to maximize its interests whilst minimizing itscommitments.

Economic dimensions of Japan’s strategies also provide indications thatfavour neorealist predictions about its foreign policy. There have beentensions emerging in US-Japan relations since 1989. Gilpin has consis-tently identified the cause of these tensions as Japan’s status as a politicaland economic rival to the US. Whilst the conflicts generated by the US-Japan trade imbalance were muted during the 1990s because of the USeconomic recovery, underlying conditions have remained ripe for struc-tural conflict (Gilpin 1991; Gilpin 2003). Conflicts that may be interpretedin this light are: the unilateral Super 301 provision of the 1989 US TradeAct; the bilateral Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII) talks in 1990;

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74 Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War

and disputes over the co-development of the FS-X fighter; and increasedtensions over trade in automobiles and semi-conductors (Sasae 1994:22–23; see also Mastanduno 1991; Bhagwati 1996; Hook et al. 2001:109–113). Throughout the 1990s there has also been a tendency for theJapanese to open their markets only in response to ‘gaitsu’ or foreignpressure. In a study of a key sector, Mulgan notes that ‘the consensusamongst analysts of Japan’s agricultural trade policy is that foreign pres-sure (particularly US pressure) has been the single most important factoraccounting for market opening’ (Mulgan 1997: 171; see also Bullock2000). Japan’s economic relations with the EEC/EU also provide signifi-cant evidence in favour of neorealist predictions. Relations between Japanand Europe in the early 1990s were troubled by disputes over trade, indus-trial competition being particularly fierce over automobiles (Inoguchi 1991;Lehmann 1992). Developments in relations between Japan and Europehave further corroded US-Japanese relations. A tacit alliance between theEuropeans and the Japanese emerged during the US-Japan car parts dispute(Nuttal 1996: 120). Similarly, Europeans undercut the US in the devel-opment of the FS-X, selling advanced technology cheaply to Japan(Inoguchi 1993: 80). Tensions in economic relations with the US andEurope may be cited as evidence of emerging structural conflict withinthe international system.

Furthermore, Japan’s economic strategies with respect to East Asiancountries have displayed strong mercantilist tendencies. Its policies towardsforeign investment, Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), and multi-lateral development banks (MDBs) reflect this pattern. In the 1990s,policies emerged involving close business-government cooperation and theuse of private investment to help Japanese multinationals build verticallyintegrated production networks throughout Asia (Pyle 1998: 128). Thisstrategy has been supported by Japan’s use of ODA and its role in theAsian Development Bank (ADB). Japan’s aid policy, one of the largest inthe world over the 1990s, has a ‘strongly commercial orientation’ and isdonated largely on a bilateral basis (Lincoln 1993: 111 and 118). Japanplays a low-key role in both global and regional multilateral developmentbanks, with the exception of the ADB, within which it plays a leadingrole. Such behaviour has also attracted criticisms that Japan is attemptingto establish a regional hegemony in Asia. Accusations became particularlystrong in the wake of Malaysia’s call in 1991 for an East Asian EconomicGrouping (EAEG) to be led by Japan. Unlike other regional economicinstitutions, the proposal would have included Japan but excluded the US.In the event, Japan distanced itself from the proposal (Buzan 1998: 82–83).Nevertheless, Japanese government officials talked openly in the early1990s about emerging regionalism under Japan’s leadership. Hall is suspi-cious that the Japanese have been very much behind Malaysia’s proposal,and have avoided offence to America by ‘letting others do the talking’.He sees this as part of Japan’s ‘cultural gap’ ploy to foster an image as

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an Asian leader (Hall 1994: 22). Further evidence for such a ploy isprovided by Japan’s human rights policies in Asia. Arase identifies that a‘pattern of Japanese effort to shield Asian governments from Western pres-sure emerges when one examines Japanese responses to . . . flagrantviolence against unarmed civilians demonstrated by East Asian regimes’(Arase 1993: 945). Overall, although no firm evidence exists for Japan’sinvolvement with the EAEG proposal, or a wider ‘cultural gap ploy’ aimedat regional hegemony, these remain distinct possibilities. Thus Japan’seconomic strategies in East Asia could plausibly be interpreted as favouringneorealist predictions.

Overall, there are significant trends indicative of a neorealist assessmentof Japan’s strategies between 1989 and 1999. Tensions first began toemerge in the early 1990s when Japan’s cheque book diplomacy duringthe Gulf War came under severe criticism from allied powers, and whenJapan become involved in a regional arms dynamic with China. Duringthe late 1990s disputes between the US and Japan were brought to a headby the effects of the East Asian financial crisis and Japan’s strongly mer-cantilist economic orientation. Important aspects of Japan’s behaviourduring this period therefore revealed tensions in its relationships withother major powers, and indicate that it has begun to consider pursuinga more assertive role in international affairs.

Institutionalism

According to institutionalist theory, international institutions can take oninstrumental value for states. Where institutions are useful for states inpursuing their national interests, they will be utilized. However, whereinstitutionalization imposes net costs on states, requiring considerableaccommodation and adjustment on their behalf, they will reject institu-tional options. The conditions under which institutions can become valuedby states are where there are complex patterns of interdependence and/ora well-developed body of pre-existing international institutions. Japan’srelations with states in North America and Western Europe may beregarded as fitting broadly within this pattern. However, Japan’s inte-gration into the world economy varies across the regional and global levelsand reverses Germany’s situation. Japan is more tightly integrated intothe US and the global economy than it is in a regional context (Grieco1999: 326; see also Gangopadhyay 1998: 14). Moreover, unlike Europe,East Asia did not inherit from the Cold War period a well-developed bodyof international institutions (Buzan and Segal 1994: 15–17). Indeed, insti-tutionalists have themselves recognized that the conditions for theirpredictions to hold do not exist between most states in an Asian context.Joseph Nye, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for Defense in1995, recommended that the US maintain a strong forward defence pres-ence in East Asia as a basis for developing multilateralism in the region

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(Office for International Security Affairs 1995; see also Nye 1995). Whilstnot fully substituting for a more mature pattern of interdependent rela-tions in Asia, Nye argues that such a strategy can provide some of thepreconditions necessary for international institutions to take on value forkey states, particularly Japan.

Aspects of Japan’s strategies between 1989 and 1999 are amenable toan institutionalist interpretation. The MST has shown signs of endurancein the post-Cold War period. US commitment to Japan was made concreteby the 1995 Department of Defense report. Moreover, Garret and Glaseridentify that despite the anxieties caused by the 1996 Joint Declarationon the US-Japan security framework, ‘Beijing has not yet reached theconclusion that the alliance . . . pose[s] a threat to China’ (Garrett andGlaser 1997: 392; see also Christensen 2001; Christensen 2003). Insti-tutionalists have explicitly linked the continuation of the MST frameworkto debates over the status of Japan as a ‘civilian power’ in the post-ColdWar international system (Maull 1991; see also Funabashi 1991, 1992and 1995; Nye 1992). The 1995 National Defence Program Outline(NDPO), published shortly after the Nye report, indicates no significantchange in Japan’s long-term defence planning strategy. This does suggestthat strengthening Japan’s theatre missile defence capabilities, as has beennoted, has caused some alarm in China. However, remarkably it suggestsa possible reduction in the level of its SDF personnel from the current180,000 to 150,000 (Sasae 1994: 17). Notwithstanding neorealist predic-tions, Japan has actually approached the issue of permanent UNSC statusvery cautiously over the post-Cold War period, and eschews any signifi-cant departure from established policy (Drifte 2000). Thus institutionalistscan identify significant evidence that, despite some ‘transitional’ tensionsin the post-1989 US-Japan relationship, its underlying centrality to bothcountries remains intact. This would support Nye’s claim that by contin-uing the US security guarantee and maintaining Japan’s civilian powerorientation, there can be a strong US-Japanese relationship even in theabsence of the Soviet threat (Nye, 1992: 113–115).

Institutionalists could also point to Japan’s involvement in regional secu-rity institutions in East Asia, notably the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).The ARF was founded in 1994 as a forum for the discussion of securityissues pertaining to the East Asia region (Mak 1998: 116). Its member-ship is broad, including India, the European Union and the US, Japanand China. Japan played an instrumental role in the establishment of theARF. The ‘preventive diplomacy’ aims of the institution are modest, andthe ARF has been criticized for its vulnerability, particularly to China(Segal 1998: 325). Nevertheless, institutionalists could identify Japan’ssupport for the ARF as indicating that its wider global commitments aretempering its response to emerging tensions in East Asia. Such argumentsare supported by Japan’s involvement in European regional security insti-tutions through its acquisition of observer status in NATO and the

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CSCE/OSCE in the early 1990s (Inoguchi 1992: 83–84). ‘Civilian power’arguments could, in principle, be extended to explaining constitutionaldebates within Japan over its military role. Japan has shown extremereluctance to revise the dominant interpretation of Article 9 of its consti-tution limiting the SDF involvement in overseas conflicts, and this hasbeen reflected in its non-military involvement in the Gulf conflict and itsstance with respect to UNPKO.

Institutionalists can supplement their arguments with evidence fromJapan’s economic strategies since 1989. Central here has been Japan’s useof international economic institutions. At the global level, Japan hascontinued its membership in major bodies such as GATT/WTO, the G7and the OECD (Hook et al. 2001: 331–338). Inoguchi argues that Japan’srole in international trade, money and technology transfers is essentiallythat of a ‘supporter’ (Inoguchi 1993: 58–62). This accords with institu-tionalist claims that the presence of international institutions can facilitateinternational cooperation. Such arguments may be augmented by exam-ining Japan’s recent role in regional economic institutions in East Asia,notably its involvement in Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC).Established in 1989, APEC is the dominant regional international insti-tution with an economic focus. As with the ARF, Japan, together withthe US, was instrumental in bringing this institution into being. Like theARF, its status as merely a forum for discussion makes it relatively weak,and it is overshadowed by GATT/WTO. Nevertheless, at APEC’s firstmeeting in 1989, ministers issued a declaration stressing their firm commit-ment to timely completion of GATT’s Uruguay Round (Soesastro 1995:480). Japan’s formal resistance to the EAEG proposal takes on particularsignificance in this regard because it determined the failure of this option.This could be interpreted as signalling Japan’s commitment to an openEast Asia within the global trading system. In 1996, the Asia-EuropeMeeting (ASEM) was also established because of the exclusion of the EUfrom APEC. Japan’s participation in ASEM since its inception provides afurther broad indication of Japan’s commitment to economic multilater-alism (Hook et al. 2001: 250–252). Such developments bolster theinstitutionalists’ case that Japan’s integration into the global economy hasencouraged it to adopt a ‘trading state’ function in the international system.

Finally, it is possible for institutionalists to offer an interpretation ofJapan’s aid and investment policies. Inada has argued that political considerations are not the only factor behind the provision of aid. Japan’s own desire to maintain good relations with the country in ques-tion and to demonstrate its readiness to fulfil its political responsibilitiesalso comes into play (Inada 1989: 412). With regard to overseas invest-ment, Japan has shown signs of increased involvement with MDBs at the global and extra regional levels. Its share of voting rights in both the IMF and the World Bank increased in the early 1990s. In 1989, Japanannounced its decision to join the then newly established European Bank

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for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Lincoln 1993: 133–134;Yasutomo 1993: 330). Finally, at least one analyst has attempted to arguethat the significance of the US-Japan disputes during the East Asian finan-cial crisis was not great, either for the future of financial cooperation inthe area or for the US-Japan security alliance more generally (Holt-Dwyer2000). From an institutionalist perspective, these developments mightsupport the view that Japan is responding to growing incentives for it tocooperate internationally on economic issues.

Overall, there is significant evidence that Japan’s use of internationalinstitutions reflects the way in which its interdependence varies acrossregional and global levels. At a global level, Japan makes extensive useof international security and economic institutions. At a regional level, itsuse of institutions is weaker, but still significant. Indeed, in importantrespects, the account offered by institutionalism is more convincing thanthat offered by the neorealist model. Whilst neorealism can highlight signsof tensions in Japan’s relationships with other powers, institutionalistscould respond by arguing that its commitment to global internationalinstitutions would appear to remain strong on the basis of its post-ColdWar behaviour.

Liberalism 1: domestic variation

Liberalism predicts that domestic cultural and institutional variation willbe built into the dynamics displayed by the emerging international system.The process of internalizing liberal norms will be affected by domesticcoalitions within states reflecting embedded social identities, economicinterests and political institutions. For this reason, domestic preferencesplay a critical role in explaining international behaviour and outcomes inthe liberal model. Liberalism also anticipates that states that adopt acompetitive security orientation and/or mercantilist economic tendency willcome under pressure to internalize a liberal identity. This prediction willbe assessed in the final section addressing the strategic choices faced byJapan. First, however, it is necessary to establish that domestic factorshave played a more autonomous role in shaping Japan’s foreign policyover the post-Cold War period than anticipated by either neorealism orinstitutionalism.

There are indications that Japan’s post-Cold War strategies have influ-enced its foreign policy in a way which poses anomalies for both neorealistand institutionalist predictions. Heginbotham and Samuels identify thatJapan’s failure to remilitarize is problematic for neorealism. As the NDPOindicates, ‘there is little evidence that Japanese planners are thinking seri-ously about a defence strategy independent of US forces’ (Heginbotham andSamuels 1999: 193). According to neorealists, Japan finds itself in a regionalcontext in which instability looms large. For Japan to pursue a ‘free-riding’strategy with regard to potential direct threats to its security requires it to

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run definite risks. To some extent, the conclusions of the Nye report couldhelp persuade Japanese policy makers that there is still a strong US com-mitment to East Asia. However, as Buzan recognizes, ‘this raises the possi-bility that the guarantee . . . would not be honoured if Japan got intodifficulties with a regional neighbour’ (Buzan 1995: 33). Under these cir-cumstances, Japan’s tight interpretation of Article 9 of its constitution is nolonger a convenient diplomatic fig leaf, but becomes a liability. Thus Japan’sfailure to revise its defence planning commitments in 1995 makes it diffi-cult for neorealists to sustain an overall interpretation of Japan’s strategies.

However, according to Heginbotham and Samuels, ‘[p]erhaps the oddestthing from the perspective of structural realism. . . . has been the Japanesefailure to exhibit a sensitivity to the relative distribution of gains thathave accrued to China from its economic relations with Japan’. China isJapan’s strongest potential military rival in the East Asia region. Yet:

Japan has competed vigorously for a major investment presence inChina. The Japanese used their influence in the Asian DevelopmentBank and elsewhere to argue actively for the early lifting of the sanc-tions imposed on China after the suppression of the Tiananmendemonstrators in 1989, and Japanese business leaders visited Chinawithin months to reform the commercial relationship. Today, moreJapanese ODA goes to China than to any other country. As a partialconsequence of Japanese . . . investments, the Chinese economy hasgrown at a double digit pace for over a decade.

(Heginbotham and Samuels 1999: 195)

This has enabled China to modernize its navy and airforce. Furthermore,in the face of the signs of increased Chinese assertiveness in East Asia,Japan’s 1991 announcement that in future Japan’s ODA would be tiedto China’s military behaviour has proved hollow (Heginbotham andSamuels 1999: 195). Such behaviour runs heavily against the grain ofneorealist predictions about Japan’s behaviour within the post-Cold Warinternational system.

Japan’s economic diplomacy poses equally significant problems for insti-tutionalist predictions. Institutionalist arguments overlook Japan’s troubledeconomic relations with industrialized states, and the significance of gaitsu.As has been noted, this has been visible in Japan’s trade relations withthe West over the 1990s. It became particularly acute in the East Asianfinancial crisis, where external pressure from the US caused considerableacrimony before Japan yielded to reform. This pattern is hardly charac-teristic of the cooperative relationship anticipated by institutionalists.Institutionalist arguments also suffer from the limitation that Japan’s aidand investment strategies are strongly bilateral and oriented in favour ofJapanese business interests. Indeed, the degree of politicization of Japan’sinvestment through the ADB is so strong that Wan has interpreted it as

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evidence that it has taken on intrinsic rather than instrumental value forJapanese policy makers. He insists that Japan’s behaviour ‘cannot beexplained away simply as a coincidence of what Japan wants and whatthe ADB wants. . . . Japan defines what it wants in the light of what thebank wants’ (Wan 1995: 527). Wan’s argument remains unconvincingbecause Japan’s use of the ADB is highly distinctive when compared with its use of all other regional and global MDBs (Yasutomo 1993).Nevertheless, his account does identify the limitations of an institution-alist account of its economic strategies in East Asia, highlighting Japan’sdistinctive preferences over investment policies.

Heginbotham and Samuels have developed a characterization of Japan’sstrategic orientation capable of explaining the anomalies faced by neo-realism and institutionalism. They argue that Japan’s strategies reflect‘mercantile realist’ preferences. Mercantile realism shares common elementswith other forms of realism, including the assumption that states are themost important actors in world politics, that states seek to maximize theirpower, and that states are in competition for relative gains (Heginbothamand Samuels 1999: 198). However, unlike other forms of realism, mercan-tile realism stresses the primacy of techno-economic strategic goals in themaking of foreign policy decisions. Importantly, a state with mercantilerealist preferences may pursue techno-economic interests at the expenseof politico-military interests. It will define its strength in the internationalsystem in terms of its wealth and technology, and its position in termsof its industrial structure. As a result, mercantile realists will balanceagainst wealthy states endowed with strong, technology-intensive indus-tries, and will not see states with different industrial structures asthreatening (Heginbotham and Samuels 1999: 200; see also Kawasaki2001 for a similar account).

A mercantile realist characterization of Japan’s preferences can explainthe distinctive features of its behaviour since 1989. Japan’s low politicaland military profile fits well into a mercantile realist explanation of itsstrategies. From a mercantile realist perspective, it reflects the priorityJapan gives to techno-economic rather than politico-military priorities inthe formulation of its national interests. This explains why Japan doesnot appear to be particularly concerned about the political risks involvedin pursuing such a strategy. It is not that Japan is ‘free riding’ on USpolitico-military capability, but rather that politico-military risks simplydo not receive a high priority in terms of its techno-economic foreignpolicy decision making calculus. Furthermore, the concept of mercantilerealism can also explain aspects of Japan’s relations with China whichare anomalous to neorealism. Unlike the US and Japan, China and Japanhave very different industrial structures, and so from a mercantile realistperspective may develop a complementary relationship.

Mercantile realism also explains why there are also anomalies in usingJapan’s failure to remilitarize in interpreting its strategies in institutionalist

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terms. The concept of mercantile realism shares with institutionalism theprediction that states will give highest priority to their economic interests.In this sense they both predict that Japan will adopt a primarily non-military response to the end of the Cold War. However, institutionalismcannot explain the manner in which Japan has gone about pursuing a non-military strategy. Japanese economic relations with Asian states fit poorlywith the predictions of the institutionalist model because they are highlypoliticized. Yet it is precisely such tendencies that fit well with a mercan-tile realist strategy. The tendency of Japan’s economic relations with itsAsian neighbours to have been good, whilst those with Western powerscontinue to be troubled, again fits the pattern of behaviour suggested bymercantile realism. States with mercantile realist preferences will balanceagainst rivals with similar industrial structures, whereas institutional-ism will predict that states sharing advanced industrial structures will beencouraged to cooperate.

Thus, unlike both neorealism and institutionalism, a focus on Japan’smercantile realist preferences can develop a single consistent account ofthe characteristic way in which Japan prioritizes techno-economic overpolitico-military goals. From a mercantile realist perspective, these aspectsof Japan’s strategies are not only more amenable to an overall explana-tion, but are also mutually reinforcing. Indeed, other specialists on Japan’sforeign policy have also identified these general characteristics of itsstrategies over the post-Cold War period (Blaker 1993; Pyle 1998). Morefundamentally, ‘mercantile realism’ displays remarkably strong affinitieswith the Yoshida Doctrine. As Katzenstein and Okawara note, the break-up of the Soviet Union has ‘elicited no sharp changes’ in Japan’s securitypolicies. They conclude that ‘[w]hen international structures change . . .rapidly . . . Japanese policy makers have defined the objectives and modal-ities of their political strategies partly in response to the cues that domesticstructures provide’ (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993: 116–117; see alsoMacleod 1997; Inoguchi and Jain 2000; Katzenstein and Okawara 2001).Despite the end of the Cold War, Japan has continued to articulate thestrategic preferences that it developed during the early post-War period.

Overall, a strong case can be made for the predictions of the liberalmodel, although this is not to claim that Japan has articulated a broadlyliberal set of strategic preferences. Instead, Japan’s foreign policy be-haviour falls outside the ranges predicted by both neorealism and institutionalism due to the influence of its domestic identity on its inter-national behaviour. A mercantile realist characterization of Japan’s foreignpolicy provides the most consistent overall account of patterns of behav-iour which are anomalous to both neorealist and institutionalist models,notably the way it combines a non-military, non-political orientation withstrong elements of economic nationalism. Moreover, it enables otherwisecontradictory elements of Japan’s foreign policy to be understood as mutu-ally reinforcing aspects of a single underlying strategy. This strategy, which

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has its origins in the Yoshida Doctrine, strongly reflects domestic struc-tures that developed during the Cold War, and in this sense Japan’spost-Cold War foreign policy has been marked by a high degree of conti-nuity. However, such a conclusion merely raises the deeper issue of theextent to which this strategy is sustainable.

Liberalism 2: Japan’s choices

In 1989, Van Wolferen attempted to refute the argument that fundamentalchanges are in store for Japan’s political system. He argued that what the‘Japan at the crossroads’ thesis failed to take into account was that ‘[t]hesystematic deprivation of choice in practically all realms of life bearingon the political organisation of Japan is essential for keeping the [Japanese]System on an even keel’ (Van Wolferen 1990: 409). Notably, he identi-fied absence of choice in the Japanese party system, and in its integrated,keiretsu-dominated economy. Van Wolferen concluded that despite thechanges forecast by many in the late 1980s, fundamental domestic reformwas not likely for Japan in the foreseeable future.

More recent developments in Japan call into question Van Wolferen’sassessment of the prospects for continuity in the Japanese ‘System’ in theface of international change. Two have been particularly important:changes in Japan’s party system, and changes in the structure of its domesticeconomy. Whilst these changes have roots that may be traced to at leastthe early 1970s, they only came to fruition in the years since 1989. In1993, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) found itself unable to forma government for the first time since it was founded in 1955. Pyle hasidentified that ‘[a]lthough issues of electoral reform were the proximatecause of the vote of no confidence . . . the primary motive force waschange in the international system’ (Pyle 1996: 149). Specifically, it reflectsmounting pressure for a decisive move away from the Yoshida strategyarising from the end of the Cold War:

The fundamental issue was defining a new national purpose for Japanin the post Cold War world and making the institutional changesrequired for such a transformed role. . . . In the face of . . . criticism[of Japan’s role in the Gulf War], a new generation of assertive polit-ical leadership in the LDP demanded abandonment of the Yoshidastrategy, reinterpretation of the constitution, and the accommodationof the new realities of the post Cold War international system.

(Pyle 1996: 151–152)

Moreover, a fluid situation in Japanese party politics continued throughoutthe 1990s (Jain 1997; Akikiko 2000; Park 2001). Changes in Japan’seconomy have been more recent, but equally dramatic. After years of slowdown, Japan’s economy went into recession in 1998. Japan’s economic

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problems have raised serious questions about its basic system of economicmanagement (Funabashi 1998a: 28). In combination, these dramaticchanges have challenged the aspects of the Japanese ‘System’ identified byVan Wolferen in 1990 as so durable.

Such developments have important implications for the viability ofJapan’s mercantile realist strategies. Citing the precedent of fifteenth-century Venice, Heginbotham and Samuels argue that skilful use of diplo-macy may allow Japan to prosper in its pursuit of mercantile realist axioms(Heginbotham and Samuels 1999: 208). Indeed, Tadokoro identifies ahigh degree of domestic support in Japan for a ‘conservative’ positionwhose adherents are reluctant to change Japan’s existing stance on foreignpolicy and domestic economic policy. However, he also recognizes thatconservatives in Japan face severe problems because their approach wouldperpetuate the difficulties that Japan faces (Tadokoro 1994: 1011; see also Blaker 1993: 31). A classic example of the problems posed by aconservative response to Japan’s current crisis is the way in which succes-sive LDP governments have responded to the need to reduce Japan’srapidly accumulating public debt. Budgetary stimulus has been used as ameans to bring about economic recovery, justified in terms of the needfor injections of demand into the economy. In practice, however, theseenormous expenditures serve the pork-barrel politics of the LDP by keep-ing in employment thousands of inefficient construction companies andemployees engaged in government-funded public works (Funabashi 2001:78). More generally, however, Japan’s political elite has proved extraor-dinarily reluctant to provide the leadership necessary to initiate radicalreforms. This has only resulted in continued stagnation for Japan andfurther underscored the urgent need for major changes (Schoppa 2001:76). In summary therefore, the political and economic changes takingplace within Japan have undermined the basis of the Yoshida strategy,which presupposed that political passivity and economic nationalism couldbe pursued simultaneously. These pillars of Japanese foreign policy havebeen undermined, and at least one of them must give.

Institutionalists might interpret the changes taking place in Japan as evi-dence that Japan is being pushed in the direction of a civilian power strat-egy. This would require it to undertake significant domestic political andeconomic adjustments. It must ‘evolve into a wholly new type of power thathelps furnish international public goods . . . and also exercise leadership’across a wide variety of non-military issues (Funabashi 1992: 37; see alsoFunabashi 1995; Lincoln 1993: 258–266). This might allow Japan torespond to international pressures for it to play a larger political role in theworld whilst not engaging in remilitarization that would stimulate fears byits Asian peers. It would also mean a move away from economic national-ism. Institutionalists could argue that Japan’s economic difficulties suggestthat it cannot continue its position as a global economic power while main-taining a keiretsu-organized domestic economy. Institutionalists could also

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identify a significant group of civilian power advocates within Japan (Nye1992: 108; Inoguchi and Jain 1997: 3–4; see also Tadokoro 1994: 1013).

However, an institutionalist interpretation of the domestic changestaking place in Japan faces a crucial limitation. Specifically, advocating a civilian power strategy plays directly into the hands of conservativeswho oppose fundamental change in Japan’s foreign policy. As Pyle notes,post-War diplomats were careful to stress a commitment to internation-alist goals as a pretext for their more genuine concern with the pursuitof economic nationalism (Pyle 1996: 122). Indeed, presenting a morerespectable image to the outside world is an integral aspect of mercantilerealist diplomacy. Japanese statesmen have deliberately placed a benigngloss on their policies in public whilst, as has been noted, in practice theyhave consistently pursued other objectives. Critical here is the impact ofthe US on Japan’s behaviour over the 1990s, since a security guaranteeis central to mercantile realism. As Pyle has identified, adherents to the Yoshida strategy were elated by the Nye report (Pyle 1996: 172).Moreover, a civilian power stance also leads Japan to become ‘caught inthe triangular vortex’ of Sino-US-Japanese relations. This term is used byDrifte to capture the negative and counter-productive results of pursuingthe engagement of China through the vehicle of the security alliance withthe US. Particularly concerning for Japan is China’s gradual distancingfrom its previous acceptance of the MST as the lesser of two evils (Drifte2003: 162–173). Thus an institutionalist interpretation of the direction inwhich Japanese foreign policy is evolving is internally contradictory. Anyattempt to develop Japan as a civilian power actively discourages it fromadopting the more internationalist orientation that such a strategy seeksto achieve.

A third possible interpretation of domestic change in Japan might beoffered by neorealism. Neorealists could interpret the dramatic domesticchanges in Japan as signalling that it is being edged towards abandoningCold War constraints. As has been discussed, Japan has shown some signsof greater political assertiveness in its post-Cold War strategies, causingalarm in other states. Moreover, Japan’s current economic difficulties haveleft it exposed and vulnerable within the international economy. Thesemay threaten the viability of the US-Japanese security relationship.Neorealists could suggest that these pressures are likely to lead to increasedincentives for the pursuit of mercantilism and closed regionalism by Japan.Contrary to mercantile realism, this would mean that Japan’s aid andinvestment strategies with respect to China would become tighter. In turn,these economic developments would reinforce Sino-Japanese rivalries.Finally, a move towards a strategy in line with neorealist predictions wouldplay to a definite domestic constituency within Japan – that of ‘traditionalnationalism’ (Tadokoro 1994: 1014). Although this is not a position thathas gained much popularity amongst reformers, neorealists could arguethat support for such a political standpoint is likely to grow in the future.

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Nevertheless, the most influential domestic constituency within Japanpushing for political reform is neither the traditional nationalists nor theadvocates of a civilian power role for Japan. Instead it is proponents ofJapan as a ‘normal state’ (Tadokoro 1994: 1012). The emergence of thisgroup of reformists has been widely interpreted as a direct response to the‘mounting external pressures and internal demands that Japan contributesmore fully to the multilateral solution of regional and global problems’(Inoguchi and Jain 1997: 10, emphasis added; see also Fukushima 1996:55). It is important to consider the possibility that the emergence of the‘normal nation’ school represents a response to pressures arising from theinternational system. This implies a third interpretation of the internationalsources of domestic changes in Japan since 1989 to counter those put for-ward by both institutionalists and neorealists. Indeed, a consensus hasemerged in a large body of prescriptive literature of Japan’s post-Cold Warforeign policy that indicates that the debate between neorealists and advo-cates of a civilian power role for Japan set up a false dichotomy. The critical issue identified in this literature is the implication of shifting Japan’sattitudes with respect to the use of military force. Many commentators haveconcluded that by altering its stance on this vital issue, Japan couldstrengthen its alliance with the US, provide a more coherent framework forthe engagement of China, and encourage Japan to take a more responsiblestance on issues of economic diplomacy and internal reform.

In an extensive recent study of the US-Japan security relationship,Mochizuki outlines his ‘liberal vision’ for its future. He advocates removalof US combat forces from Okinawa by 2003 (leaving air-force, naval andlogistical units), reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution to allow itto participate in collective self-defence, and cooperative US-Japaneseresearch into TMD. This would imply major shifts from the current USstrategy through a significant reduction in its forward defence posture inEast Asia. Mochizuki identifies that through this reduction the overallthreat to China’s security posed by the MST would be decreased withoutweakening its overall deterrent capabilities. Such measures would alsostrengthen the US-Japan security relationship, making it a ‘more recip-rocal partnership’, and encouraging Japan to become an ‘active ally’ ratherthan a ‘passive partner’ (Mochizuki 1998: 7 and 8). Pyle similarly concludesthat a comprehensive revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty based on‘a more equal and reciprocal alliance’ presents Japan with a stronger alter-native to either a global civilian power approach or a balance of powerstrategy (Pyle 1996: 174–177). Buzan proposes the need for Japan toadopt a ‘non-offensive defence’ strategy containing the following fouringredients: a robust capacity for self-defence; a high sensitivity to theconcerns of neighbours; a capability to play a significant role in inter-national aid and peacekeeping; and a capability for recessed deterrence(Buzan 1995: 40–41). Advocating such a strategy challenges the assump-tion of automatic mistrust of a Japan that moves away from a civilian

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power orientation, and points to the benefits for Japan and its key alliesin shifting Japan’s attitudes with respect to the use of military force abroad.Overall, it is possible that a more equal US-Japanese relationship mightalso help Japan develop more stable relations with China than it wouldotherwise be able to. As Johnson and Keehn propose, a United States thatcontinues to distrust Japan’s ability to act as a true ally could and evenshould be considered a greater threat to security in East Asia than a risingChina (Johnson and Keehn 1995: 110; see also Johnstone 2000; Drifte2003).

The same principles may also be extended to the political economy ofJapan’s relationships with other major powers in the international system.Sato has noted that greater equality in the US-Japan relationship mightalso facilitate a more consistent set of principles for China’s engagement.It would enable the West to convey a more consistent diplomatic messageto China, and reduce China’s scope to play off the US and Japan againstone another to achieve its own objectives (Sato 1998). The beneficialnature of Japan negotiating its relationship with other major powers onthe basis of equality is also illustrated in cases where it has itself sufferedas a result of failing to pursue this course. Perhaps the best example isprovided by Japan’s dispute with the Soviet Union over the Kurile Islandsin 1991. On the surface, Japanese intransigence might conceivably beconstrued as confirming neorealist predictions of emerging multipolarity.However, a recurrent theme in the literature is that Japan’s response wasshaped more by its dependent relations with the US than by structuralconflict with the Soviet Union. On this account, Japan’s response reflectsthe increasingly outdated focus of the US-Japan security alliance on thecontainment of Russia (Carlile 1994: 415; Menon 1996: 74; Hasegawa2000; Rozman 2002). This pattern highlights the way in which Japan’sresponse was not structurally determined, but rather reflects its preferencefor a low political profile. Thus Japan might strengthen its relations withRussia by developing them on a more independent footing, facilitatingmore flexible negotiations on the Kuriles issue.

Johnstone develops an interpretation of Japan’s diplomacy during theEast Asian financial crisis that highlights its reluctance to engage in internaleconomic reforms. He sees the tensions that emerged between the US andJapan in this period as symptomatic of the general corrosion of the US-Japan relationship in the absence of a clear Soviet threat. Johnstonerecognizes that to some extent emerging structural conflict has been miti-gated by the Nye defence initiative, and that continued close cooperationbetween the US and Japan on security issues has reduced tensions in theUS-Japan relationship. However, this only serves to underscore the limitedand narrow scope of cooperation between these two states (Johnstone1999: 133–135). Indeed, it is plausible that the asymmetrical character ofthe current US-Japan security relationship actively contributes to theemerging economic tensions between these countries. In the context of

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general patterns of behaviour in Japan’s foreign policy, the government’sreliance on gaitsu to push through reform during the crisis would seemsymptomatic of its mercantile realist strategy. In turn, this strategy presup-poses reliance on the US security umbrella. Paradoxically, therefore, USsecurity policy makes it very hard for it to encourage Japan’s coopera-tion over economic issues. Whilst the US was critical of Japan’s responseto the East Asian crisis, America fails to acknowledge that its own poli-cies in the security arena are encouraging Japan to pursue this pattern ofbehaviour. By enabling Japan to take a more independent stance on foreignaffairs, the US could encourage a more responsible and robust Japaneseleadership on issues of economic management. By the same token, however,the US would need to reduce its tendency to dictate policy to Japan, andallow it a greater say in managing the world economy.

Overall, it is possible to question the prevalent assumption that growingpolitical independence in Japan’s foreign policy would reflect a neorealistanalysis of its post-Cold War strategies. Indeed, the most likely scenariois for Japan to increase its capacity for defence within a restructured US-Japan security framework. Fears that this would spark destabilizingsecurity anxieties amongst Japan’s partners do not necessarily follow ifJapan’s defence posture is predominantly non-offensive, and this iscombined with a limited withdrawal of the US forward presence in EastAsia. Similarly, this strategy could enhance Japan’s sense of responsibilityand willingness to cooperate more generally in the international arena.Thus ‘normal nation’ school of reformers have a strong case that Japanshould make a more active contribution to the international communityin both economic and political terms. This conclusion implies that Japanfinds itself in an emerging international context that is encouraging it toshift away from its mercantile realist orientation. Japan must today playa more active role in negotiating and sustaining a more equal structureof great power relations. Such an analysis is in line with the predictionsof liberal theory about the general pattern of institutionalized activityemerging in the post-Cold War international system.

In turn this raises important questions about what Buzan refers to as‘Japan’s relationship with itself’ (Buzan 1995: 38). Pressures arising fromthe international system are presenting major challenges to the mercan-tile realist stance that Japan has adopted over the 1990s. These havealready had a dramatic bearing on developments in Japan’s party systemand its system of economic management. However, perhaps the clearestexpression of the crisis of transition being experienced by Japan has beenthe severe difficulties it has experienced in coming to terms with the atroc-ities it committed during its imperial past. This has raised acute problemsfor Japan in terms of the way in which its government has handled issuessuch as dealing with its defence capabilities or apologizing to the victimsof its wartime aggression. Berger traces Japan’s extreme reluctance toremilitarize since 1989 to its domestic politics, in particular its ‘anti-

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military culture’ (Berger 1993: 131). Japan’s refusal to face its recenthistory even affects mundane aspects of daily life in Japan such as the content of school textbooks on Japanese history (Ienaga 1993).Furthermore, deeply ingrained attitudes persist, even when this means thatJapan itself pays the highest price of all for failing to address the issuesthey raise. Mukae characterizes Japan’s failure to apologise for its wartimeatrocities as a symbolic manifestation of the ongoing identity crisis in theJapanese political system today. This crisis persists, he identifies, evenwhen this means that it is Japan itself that pays the highest price of allfor failing to address the issues raised. For example, rather than mani-festing its current difficulties, Japan’s failure to apologize for its wartimeatrocities in the Diet Resolution on the fiftieth anniversary of the PacificWar ‘might instead have been a rare opportunity to turn . . . that verycrisis [around]. . . . In that sense, the Japanese government failed not onlyother nations but also its own’ (Mukae 1996: 1030).

At the source of this crisis of identity transition is a search for a legit-imate Japanese nationalism and a new, non-exclusively economic role inthe world. Japan is ‘divided and confused about what its national self-image should be and how it should project its identity into the internationalsystem’ (Buzan 1988: 561). Similarly, Pyle suggests that the domesticadjustments taken within Japanese politics represent a search for a newsense of national purpose appropriate for Japan in the post-Cold Warperiod. He notes that:

assertions of Japan’s inability to play a broader role in the inter-national community are now losing much of their persuasive poweras a result of changes in the international system. Japan’s emergenceas an economic power and the end of the Cold War have . . . raisedquestions about Japan’s future national purpose, its policies towardscollective security arrangements, and its capacity to change from acountry intent solely on its own mercantilist aims to one capable ofinternational leadership.

(Pyle 1996: 121)

Pyle’s diagnosis for Japan requires it to begin the process of building anew sense of national identity better suited to the post-Cold War worldto that which developed in the post-1945 period. To achieve this, Pyleproposes, Japan must become more self-reliant, breaking fundamentallywith the deference that characterized the Yoshida strategy. The Japanesepolitical system, which less than ten years ago Van Wolferen identified ascharacterized by ‘the systematic deprivation of choice’ in almost all arenas,is now faced with the task of making decisions that will enormously affectthe future well being of its citizens. This involves Japan confronting adiversity of possibilities that it has not previously faced, and presents itwith both dangers and opportunities. Japan must break with established

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patterns of behaviour, or run the risk that its relationships will becomebrittle and at some point might break down. On the other hand, byactively confronting the situation in which it finds itself, Japan has theopportunity to conduct its diplomacy with others on the basis of inde-pendence and equality rather than dependency. More fundamentally, thishas implications for Japan’s ability to trust itself. In the words of onemajor reformist politician, ‘Japan’s most pressing need is a change in theconsciousness of our people. Let us begin by removing the fences andeducating the people to their own responsibility for themselves’ (Ozawacited Stockwin 1997: 75). Until Japan has learned to develop its strategieson a more autonomous basis, it will not be able to achieve a true senseof security within the emerging international system.

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5 Chinese foreign policy afterthe Cold War

The consequences of ‘the rise of China’ as a major power has been oneof the most prominently discussed issues of post-Cold War internationalpolitics. The origins of this debate, however, may actually be traced backto trends that began in earnest considerably earlier. During the mid- tolate 1970s there emerged a change in China’s attitude towards interde-pendence with the West following the death of Mao Tse Tung and hisreplacement by Deng Xioping. Under the new regime, China began tofoster economic ties with the wider world in order to underpin economicgrowth and modernization. These events coincided with the gradual stag-nation of the Soviet Union, further enhancing the shift to multipolarityand China’s growing relative status within the international system.Between 1989 and 1991, China witnessed the culmination of these twolong-term trends. First, the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989led to the realization by the Chinese elite that economic interdependenceand modernization that China had pursued under the post-Mao regimehad significant political implications. Second, the collapse of Soviet commu-nism led to the dismantling of the USSR’s Pacific fleet. This left China asan emerging power capable of filling the vacuum left by the decline ofRussian influence in East Asia. The period that saw the end of the ColdWar therefore raised important questions about China’s future role in theinternational system in the wake of these major changes. This chapterapplies neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of international rela-tions to analysing the strategies adopted by China over the 1989–1999period. On the basis of this discussion, it draws conclusions about thenature of China’s response to the end of the Cold War, and the strategicchoices its faces in the emerging international system.

Neorealism

Waltz, Layne and Mearsheimer have used the neorealist model to makepredictions about the behaviour of China in the post-Cold War inter-national system, identifying it as a ‘rising power’ within the internationalpower structure (Waltz 1993; Layne 1996; Mearsheimer 2001). Indeed,

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Dibb identifies the general consensus that China can sustain growth ratesimplying a doubling of its GDP every eight to eleven years, a develop-ment which would ‘herald the emergence of a new international power(Dibb 1995: 27). Other major analysts echo this view (Roy 1994: 149;Layne 1996: 69; Bernstein and Munro 1997: 18; Nye 1997: 70; Pumphrey2002). Neorealists predict that China’s position within the emerging struc-ture of international politics will encourage it to define its interestsaccording to its rising relative capabilities. Outcomes compatible with thisbehaviour are a move to conflictual multipolarity within East Asia andin the wider international system.

Indeed, neorealists could identify that over the 1990s China’s risingeconomic status has been accompanied by the modernization of its military. Estimates of increases in China’s defence expenditures over the1990s vary widely. Some have suggested that trends in China’s defenceexpenditure should not be over-estimated (Nathan and Ross 1997:146–148; Karmel 2000). Yet others have cautioned against too sanguinean interpretation of China’s military modernization. Nye warns ‘even after stripping away the hyperbole . . . the rise of the Chinese military . . . power must be taken seriously as a new factor in the [East Asia]region’ (Nye 1997: 70). There is evidence that China is moving from astrategy of ‘minimum’ to ‘limited’ nuclear deterrence. The People’s Liber-ation Army (PLA) has been dramatically downsized and qualitativelyupgraded (Godwin 1996: 482; Godwin 1998: 179). The navy and airforce are increasing their power projection capabilities. As well as estab-lishing military bases in the South China Sea, fleets of major surfacecombatants and submarines are undergoing generational change. This hasbeen supplemented by purchases of advanced fighter aircraft, diesel-electric submarines and destroyers from Russia, and reports of future deals over aerial refuelling and Airborne Warning and Control Systemaircraft (Ji 1997: 79 and 80; Godwin 1998: 181). Bernstein and Munroargue that ‘China is now engaged in one of the most extensive and rapid military build-ups in the world’ (Bernstein and Munro 1997: 25–26).Whilst such claims might be exaggerated, there is certainly evidence thatChina’s rapid economic rise has encouraged it to pursue an increasinglysignificant military strategy.

Buzan and Segal note that ‘China feels it is fully within its rights tochange the territorial status quo [within East Asia]’ (Buzan and Segal1994: 6; see also Dibb 1995: 26). Tow relates this to the way ‘Chineseanalysts have concluded that the original bipolar pattern [of global secu-rity politics] is being replaced by a multipolar one’ in which it plays amore influential role (Tow 1994: 146; see also Jisi 1997: 14). Whilstdating from the Sino-Soviet split in the 1970s, neorealists could arguethat this pattern has persisted and become exaggerated in the 1990s. Inparticular, concern over the need to balance against US unipolarity in thewake of the Gulf War was a strong factor influencing China’s defence

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modernization programme (Robinson 1994: 597). China’s rising power isgenerating regional anxieties, especially combined with the lack of trans-parency in Beijing’s strategic planning (Hughes 1996b: 241; To 1997:252; Godwin 1998: 186; Roy 1998a: 149).

Neorealists might also draw attention to emerging tensions betweenChina and other states. Difficulties in China’s relations with the UnitedStates first became apparent in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacrein June 1989. The US led economic sanctions against China, which werelifted only gradually over three years. This was a clear signal that ‘[t]heend of the Cold War . . . ended the special exception from human rightscriticism that China had enjoyed as a prospective US ally against theSoviet Union’ (Roy 1998a: 150). China’s abstention with regard to UNSecurity Council Resolution 678 sanctioning the use of force against Iraqduring the Gulf conflict must be understood in the context of its post-Tiananmen isolation. During the conflict China managed to extractmaximum payoffs from the US with minimum support (Kim 1994: 423).This is compatible with a neorealist analysis of its behaviour. Moreover,America has continued to maintain an explicit or implicit linkage betweenhuman rights and China’s trade status. China has viewed this as inter-ference in China’s internal affairs (Wan 1997: 240–242; Seymour 1998:221). In line with neorealist logic, therefore, the collapse of bipolarity hasincreased tensions between the US and China over human rights.

Important security issues have also affected Sino-US relations. In August1992, China re-established full diplomatic relations with North Korea,viewing it as a significant buffer between itself and South Korea andimplicitly the US (Kim 2001: 371). Bernstein and Munro note that theprospect of Korean unification could be an important factor in changingChina’s attitude to the US military presence in Northeast Asia (Bernsteinand Munro 1997: 30). Such a shift would be in line with the neorealistprediction that China will be increasingly brought into conflict with theregional status quo. However, the future of Taiwan is considered by Beijingto be the major issue between the US and China. The PRC’s 1993 ‘WhitePaper’ on China’s reunification publicly reiterated its claim to sovereigntyover Taiwan (Gu 1996: 199). Moreover, in March 1996, just prior toTaiwan’s first presidential elections, the PRC carried out large-scale offen-sive military exercizes, including test-firing live missiles in Taiwan’s coastalwaters. This resulted in the US dispatching two aircraft carrier battlegroups to the area. Friedman even draws parallels between China’s behav-iour during the Taiwan missile crisis and Germany’s behaviour in theinter-war period (Friedman 1997: 233). Thus there are signs that China’sgrowing power is encouraging it to challenge the regional status quo assuggested by neorealist logic.

There have been parallel developments in relations between China andJapan. In the wake of the 1996 ‘revitalization’ of the Mutual SecurityTreaty, the Chinese have become increasingly concerned that the alliance

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is aimed at containing China. A particular point of tension for China is thepossibility that the US could encourage Japan to deploy a theatre missiledefence system that may undermine China’s deterrence capability (Garretand Glaser 1997: 384 and 392). More general indications that Japan isbecoming more assertive have caused concern in China. Significant havebeen: the freezing of Japan’s aid grant to China in response to its nucleartesting in 1995; Japan’s toleration of extremist activities on the Diaoyo/Senkaku islands in 1996; growth of backing in Japan for closer ties withTaiwan; increases in Japan’s defence expenditure; and Japan’s participationin UNPKO. China’s worries about Japan are similarly reflected in Japaneseanxieties over China’s reiteration of its ownership of the Senkaku Islands,and the expansion in China’s power projection capabilities. Prior to itsresponse to China’s nuclear testing, Japan had also expressed concern over China’s possible acquisition of in-flight refuelling technology and itpublicly warned it against purchasing an aircraft carrier (Segal 1993: 30;Roy 1994: 163). Trends such as these may be identified as supporting neorealist predictions about emerging structural conflict between Japan and China.

China’s role in wider geopolitical dynamics within Asia reinforces a neo-realist interpretation of its post-Cold War strategies. China has displayed azero-sum view of its sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao in negotia-tions with Britain and Portugal. Moreover, it has been insistent that nego-tiations over these territories are conducted bilaterally (Hinton 1994: 353;Neves 1995; Yahuda 1996b: 14). China’s policies over the disputed Paraceland Spratly Islands in the South China Sea also provide evidence of China’sgrowing assertiveness. In 1992 China passed a Law on Territorial Watersand their Contiguous Areas that formalized its claim to sovereignty overthese territories, as well as the Senkaku Islands disputed with Japan.Furthermore, it granted an oil concession in the Paracels, pledging to pro-tect rights to the concession with force. In 1995, shortly after the with-drawal of US military forces from the Philippines, Chinese structures werediscovered on Mischief Reef. These developments have heightened concernsabout China’s intentions in the area (Leifer 1997: 160; Godwin 1998: 176).China has refused to discuss solutions to competing territorial claims withinthe region, fudging its 1995 agreement that the UN Conference on the Lawof the Sea would form the basis for the resolution of conflicts. The possi-bility that large deposits of oil and gas lie beneath the South China Seaincreases the incentive for China to stake a territorial claim to this areabecause of China’s growing dependence on oil imports (Salameh 1995: 133; Valencia 1995: 13–16; Foot 1998: 433). Furthermore, this series ofterritorial rivalries is exacerbated by the historical animosities that havedeveloped between China and other states in the region (Buzan and Segal1994: 4). The number and complexity of the disputes in which China findsitself embroiled in East Asia may be cited by neorealists as symptomatic ofdeeper structural tensions resulting from China’s rising power.

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Developments in China’s relations with Russia, India and Pakistan, andstates in Africa over the 1990s are also amenable to neorealist explana-tion. With the decline of the Russian threat, Sino-Russian relations haveimproved dramatically in a number of areas (Goo 1993: 293; Garver1998: 119–129). Sino-Russian détente could be seen in terms of the effectsof an emerging multipolar structure ‘in which a “continental” Russian-Chinese bloc balances a “maritime” American-Japanese bloc’ (Garver1998: 131; see also Bilveer 1998). China’s relations with states in SouthAsia reinforce neorealist claims. Sino-Indian relations thawed in the early1990s, culminating in an agreement over their disputed Himalayan borderin 1993. However, this improvement occurred in the wake of Beijing’sdiplomatic isolation after the Tiananmen Square massacre. Underlyinggeopolitical tensions remain between the two powers in South Asia. Thecollapse of the Soviet Union, India’s traditional ally against China andPakistan, provides incentives for India to acquire a nuclear deterrent (Malik1995: 346). Tibet has continued to complicate the Sino-Indian relation-ship (Roy 1998b: 171). Finally, China’s relations with traditional clientsin Africa have changed in line with shifts in international structure. Inthe aftermath of Tiananmen, China engaged in a major diplomatic offen-sive in Africa. However, with China’s continued economic modernization,these contacts have become obsolete (Snow 1994: 320). The overall patternof China’s relations with Russia, India and Pakistan, and African statesmay therefore be understood in terms of neorealist predictions. Chinadeals favourably with these states when marginalized, but as its margin-alization wanes its policies reflect interests derived from its changingcapabilities.

In line with neorealist analysis, China’s behaviour with respect to UNpeacekeeping strongly reflects a concern with sovereignty. In October 1991China participated in a UNSC authorized deployment of a force to overseeelections in Cambodia, and brought pressure on the Khmer Rouge not todisrupt the peace-process. However, these actions coincided with the cessation of Soviet aid to Vietnam leading to Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia (Tow 1994: 151; Yahuda 1996a: 214). Moreover, Chinarejected the suggestion of bringing the perpetrators of Cambodian geno-cide to an international tribunal to avoid creating awkward legal precedents(Seymour 1998: 229). Over the first half of the 1990s, China has upheldthe principle of sovereignty with regard to intervention and consistentlyopposed non-traditional aspects of peacekeeping. China’s stance reflectsthe way in which the Chinese leadership fears that multilateralism ‘maylimit China’s diplomatic leverage or even directly challenge China’s claimsover Taiwan and the South China Sea’ (Fravel 1996: 118). This stanceculminated in China’s objections to the NATO intervention in Kosovo in1999, which turned into heavy criticism after a US warplane bombed theChinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese citizens (Miles 2000).China’s complaints about the marginalization of the UN during the crisis

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reflected their own concerns over diminished influence in determining theterms on which intervention took place. This diplomatic marginalization,combined with local interests arising from the geographic proximity of the conflict, contributed to the emergence of a softer approach to negotiations over Security Council authorization of an Australian led inter-national force in East Timor, during which China offered no public critiqueof UN actions. However, China’s behaviour was primarily motivated byconcerns about its influence, rather than by a fundamental shift in its attitudes towards sovereignty (Gill and Reilly 2000: 50). Thus China’sbehaviour with respect to international intervention over the 1990s wascompatible with neorealist predictions.

China’s stance with regard to the non-proliferation regime may be inter-preted as reflecting behaviour compatible with neorealism. China accededto the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, to the NPT extension in 1995,to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1994. In 1995China also cooperated with the US in exerting pressure on North Koreaover the issue of nuclear proliferation. However, these developments maybe explained in a manner consistent with neorealist theory. As a nuclearpower within the regime, the NPT and the 1995 NPT extension in noway constrained China’s ability to develop its nuclear weapons (Godement1997: 103). China’s actions to control North Korean proliferation areentirely compatible with neorealist predictions because of its interest intaking such measures. Moreover, China did not endorse economic sanc-tions imposed by the UNSC, but insisted on bilateral action. It therebymade its efforts contingent upon American concessions on human rightsand upon unconditional extension of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN)trading arrangement (Gu 1996: 312). China’s decision to join the MTCRmay seem surprising because this was targeted at China after allegationsthat it provided missile technology to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran andSyria. However, China only joined when the US agreed to rescind sanctions in the high-technology area, and has stressed its pledge is byno means irreversible (Godement 1997: 102). Moreover, allegations havecontinued to be made that China is violating the rules of the regime(Mullins 1995: 138). Thus in line with neorealist predictions, the MCTRis either so weak that it imposes no real constraints on China’s missiletransfers, or the regime is likely to be ineffective.

Finally, aspects of China’s economic strategies provide evidence thatsupports neorealist arguments. China’s trade surplus with the US has beensignificant, and China has come under increasing pressure from the USto cut trade barriers and increase the transparency of its legal system(Levine 1998: 104–105). Over the 1990s, China’s attempts to gain admis-sion to GATT/WTO were blocked by the US on the grounds that Chinaneeded to liberalize its economy more extensively, a problem complicatedby China’s desire to join this organization with developing country status.It has been argued that the US has covertly discriminated against China.

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Finally, Harris identifies that over the 1990s the US was the one majortrading country not unconditionally applying MFN treatment to Chinabecause its ability to do so was limited by the Jackson-Vanik amendment(Harris 1997: 147; Feeny 1998: 257–259). Between 1992 and 1994, the Clinton administration linked MFN to China’s progress on humanrights (Levine 1998: 106). China views this as unfair trade competition.Furthermore, China uses mercantilist strategies to encourage trade andinvestment competition both between Europe, Japan and the US, andamongst European states (Cable and Ferdinand 1994: 255; Moller 1996; Maull 1997; Klein 1998). Such behaviour could be understood interms compatible with the emerging structural conflict anticipated by theneorealist model.

Overall, there is a significant body of evidence favouring a neorealistinterpretation of China’s strategies between 1989 and 1999. In line withits rising economic power, China has modernized its military capabilities,and pursued an increasingly revisionist agenda over the post-Cold Warperiod. This has brought China into conflict with both Japan and the US,particularly over unresolved territorial disputes in East Asia. China’s relations with other states in the international system have changed inline with its relative capabilities, and its attitudes towards interventionand the non-proliferation regime, and joining the WTO all show indica-tions of patterns of behaviour that may be associated with neorealistpredictions.

Institutionalism

According to institutionalist theory, international institutions can take oninstrumental value for states. Under certain conditions states will beencouraged to institutionalize aspects of their inter-relations when thisfacilitates the pursuit of national interests. However, where institutional-ization imposes net costs on states, requiring considerable accommodationand adjustment on their behalf, they will reject institutional options. Theconditions under which institutions can become valued by states are wherethere are complex patterns of interdependence and/or a well-developedbody of pre-existing international institutions. In terms of absolute levelsof interdependence, China’s economy has indeed developed important ties.Over the last twenty years, China’s economic interdependence with theworld has risen dramatically in terms of trade and foreign investment.However, in terms of its distribution, China’s economic interdependencewith the outside world is highly uneven across both geographic regionswithin China and industrial sectors (Funabashi 1994: 35–36; Segal 1994:34–52; Robinson 1998: 204–210). Moreover, unlike Europe, East Asiadid not inherit from the Cold War period a well-developed body of inter-national regimes across a variety of issue areas (Buzan and Segal 1994:15–17). Indeed, institutionalists have themselves recognized that complex

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patterns of economic and institutional interdependence may not be saidto exist between many states in an Asian context. Joseph Nye, in hiscapacity as Assistant Secretary of State for Defense in 1995, recommendedthat the US maintain a strong forward defence presence in East Asia as a basis for developing multilateralism in the region. Whilst not fullysubstituting for a more mature pattern of interdependent relations in EastAsia, Nye suggests that such a strategy can provide some of the pre-conditions necessary for international institutions to take on value forstates such as China (Office for International Security Affairs 1995; seealso Nye 1995).

Aspects of China’s strategies are amenable to an institutionalist inter-pretation. Institutionalists could identify evidence that China has moder-ated its international behaviour significantly, even in core areas of itssecurity strategies. There are signs that China has tolerated the US-JapanMST because it checks an expansion in Japan’s military role. In Nye’swords, ‘[i]n the absence of other institutions, Washington’s presence in EastAsia provides stability. As long as the US exercises its power reasonably sothat other countries (including China) continue to benefit from its stabilis-ing influence . . . no country or coalition is likely to challenge it’ (Nye 1997:77; see also Christensen 2001; Christensen 2003). Thus institutionalistscould argue that the MST has moderated China’s behaviour and signifi-cantly reshaped its security expectations. Institutionalists could also arguethat the MST means that the use of force by China to settle regional dis-putes entails major hazards. Gallagher applies this logic to the Spratly’s dispute. Segal concludes from China’s failure to resort to its threats of uni-lateral action over Hong Kong that Chinese behaviour was to some extentconstrained (Gallagher 1994; Segal 1996: 21). Similar arguments can be made with respect to Taiwan. The PRC’s future economic vitality islinked closely to its extensive and rapidly growing trade and invest-ment links with Taiwan. Invading or blockading Taiwan would also beextremely risky militarily given the continuation of the US military pres-ence (Nye 1997: 75–77; Roy 1998b: 205–206; see also Shinn 1996: 75).Institutionalists might therefore downplay the significance of rising Chineseassertiveness in East Asia.

China’s involvement in regional multilateral security arrangements maybe used to bolster institutionalist claims. Notable here is China’s partici-pation as a founding member in the ARF since 1993 (Yahuda 1996a: 215).China uses the ARF as a purely consultative institution (Garrett and Glaser1994: 21). Nevertheless, Foot identifies a number of specific achievementsit has made. First, it has encouraged Chinese officials to make public state-ments that have reiterated their government’s commitment to peaceful set-tlement of disputes within the region, except over Taiwan. Second,discussion within the ARF has led to China’s acceptance that some level oftransparency does contribute to security. Finally, working within the ARFdoes impose constraints on China’s international actions because the image

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costs associated with any transgression of embryonic norms or obstruc-tionist behaviour are gradually increasing. Thus there are indications thatthe ARF has moderated China’s strategic expectations, albeit in a limitedfashion.

Institutionalists could also construct counter arguments to neorealistclaims about China’s use of the non-proliferation regime. The NPT canreduce the likelihood that China’s neighbours will acquire nuclear weapons,thereby mitigating China’s need for deterrence (Garrett and Glaser 1995:76). With regard to the MTCR, Rynhold suggests that ‘[t]he Chinese appearto perceive the proliferation issue as a bargaining chip . . . to smooth overthe relationship [with the US], or to extract concessions on more vital mat-ters such as Taiwan’ (Rynhold 1996: 109; see also Wallerstein 1996: 64).Such behaviour reflects tacit recognition of MTCR norms. China’s acces-sion to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in June 1996 potentiallyprovides even stronger evidence in favour of institutionalist predictions.Whilst China did carry out a nuclear test in 1995, the acceptance of a zero-level CTBT has frozen China’s nuclear capabilities. Commentators haveexplained China’s acceptance of the CTBT by pointing to the way in whichit sees ‘security gains . . . in a test ban that further discourages nuclear proliferation, freezes the gap in nuclear weapons development betweenChina and India, and prevents the gap between Russia and the US fromwidening’ (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 76; see also Mak 1998: 106). China’sincentives to freeze this gap were increased greatly because it had conductedits own nuclear test in May 1995, and indeed it had delayed the CTBTprocess to allow it to complete its nuclear modernization programme (Roy1998b: 151). However, adhering to the CTBT also requires China to riskproliferation in South Asia, as has indeed recently occurred. In line withneorealist theory, Carpenter suggests that any attempt to lock India intothe CTBT furthered India’s incentives to close the gap between its nuclearcapabilities and those of China (Carpenter 1998: 2–3). China’s accessionto the Treaty is therefore notable from an institutionalist perspective, especially if it continues to abide by it in the light of recent developments(Gill 2001: 261).

Finally, over the 1990s China has made important adaptations to thenorms of the major economic international regimes. In 1994 and 1996China took major steps to comply with IMF exchange rate proceduresand has been highly successful over the 1990s in gaining World Bankfinancial assistance for its modernization programme. China was insulatedfrom the effects of the East Asian financial crisis because speculationagainst its currency was difficult given its lack of convertability for capitalaccount transactions. Nevertheless, it resisted the temptation to devaluedespite the immediate term benefits this might bring. It did so partly toprevent contagion of the crisis and partly because of its reputation as acooperative member of the international financial order (Moore and Yang2001). China has also pushed throughout the 1990s for membership of

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GATT/WTO, progressively lowering tariffs and adjusting to standards oneconomic transparency, despite Taiwan’s ‘customs territory’ status withinthis institution (Harris 1997: 139–140; Feeny 1998: 245–248; Roy 1998b:92–94). In November 1999, China had signed an agreement with the USthat guaranteed bilateral market access and committed it to meeting mostof the difficult issues raised by WTO accession (Pearson 1999: 337).China’s involvement in APEC since 1991 also provides evidence in favourof institutionalist predictions. As well as enhancing China’s status, Chinaviews APEC as a means of pursuing its WTO accession objectives, andespecially to put pressure on the US with respect to non-discrimination.APEC commitments ‘have been less specific than for the WTO but theyhave generally required constructive and co-operative participation’ (Harris1997: 142). This has involved China in routine dialogue with APECmembers, again implicitly including Taiwan (Funabashi 1994: 44; Yahuda1996a: 215). China’s extensive use of and adaptation towards the normsof international economic regimes over the 1990s could be interpreted assupporting institutionalist’s predictions about its behaviour.

Overall, however, general qualifications must be made concerning thestrengths of an institutionalist interpretation of China’s post-Cold Warstrategies. The case for institutionalism relies on the negative argumentthat whilst China has shown signs of increasing assertiveness, this hasbeen tempered by institutional frameworks. As has been discussed, thereis available evidence that international institutions have affected importantaspects of China’s foreign policy since 1989. However, it is difficult tomake a convincing positive case that international institutions shapedunderlying features of China’s post-1989 foreign policy.

Liberalism 1: domestic variation

Liberalism predicts that a high degree of cultural and institutional varia-tion will be built into the dynamics displayed by the emerging internationalsystem. This is due to the way in which the process of internalizing liberalnorms will be affected by domestic coalitions within states reflectingembedded social identities, economic interests and domestic political insti-tutions. For this reason, domestic preferences play a critical role inexplaining international behaviour and outcomes in the liberal model.Liberalism also anticipates that states adopting a competitive security orien-tation and/or mercantilist economic tendency will come under pressure tointernalize a liberal identity. This prediction will be assessed in the finalsection addressing the strategic choices faced by China. First, however, itis necessary to establish that domestic factors have played a moreautonomous role in shaping China’s foreign policy over the post-ColdWar period than anticipated by either neorealism or institutionalism.

There is considerable evidence that neorealism and institutionalism failto account for important dimensions of China’s post-Cold War strategies.

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Neorealism and institutionalism share a focus on the way in which astate’s foreign policy is driven by external developments that can enhancea country’s relative or absolute status. By contrast, liberalism draws atten-tion to the way in which China’s foreign policy may be influenced bydomestic considerations. Kim, for instance, comments that the ‘definingfeature [of China’s foreign policy] . . . is the high level of internal threatsto the government’s security and legitimacy. External events . . . are seenprimarily in terms of how they affect the state’s internal stability andlegitimacy’ (Kim 1998: 19). His analysis suggests that China’s concernwith its status had yielded to more immediate anxiety about its internalcohesion as a source of motivation for its international behaviour.

In terms of its internal political organization, China faces profoundeconomic, social and ideological changes that threaten to undermine itsdomestic regime. In economic terms, China’s pursuit of an export-ledgrowth strategy has been associated with the devolution of control overthe economy and foreign trade from central ministries to provincial, municipal and even county levels. In consequence, the Chinese executivehas lost much of its authority over core areas of economic planning suchas taxation and controlling the money supply (Segal 1994: 12–14; seealso Kitano 1994: 154). Wider social changes have also seriously under-mined the Chinese state. China is undergoing a general transition to anew generation of civilian and military elites. This has been accompaniedby a rise in political mobilization reflecting increased ability and desire ofsocial groups to influence domestic and foreign policy issues (Swaine 1995:1). These developments have impacted on core areas of security concern to the Chinese state. Most obviously, they affected succession politicssurrounding the death of Deng Xioping in 1996. Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, had to rely primarily on instruments of power other thanpersonal authority such as his position within the executive and supportfrom bureaucratic groupings, notably the PLA. Yet the PLA itself is no longer the cohesive entity it once was because corruption and its extensive involvement in non-military sectors of China’s export economyhave severely undermined discipline and professionalism (Segal 1994: 26; Joffe 1997: 56). In combination, therefore, economic change and socialmodernization within China threaten core aspects of the regime’s internalsovereignty.

A third challenge to the Chinese state is the threat to the legitimacy ofCommunist ideology brought on by economic and social change. Analystshave depicted this development in terms of the ‘legitimation crisis’ or a‘crisis of faith’ in Communism. Levine identifies a shift from formalideology Communism to ‘informal ideology’ in the form of a genericChinese nationalism (Harding 1993: 38; Hamrin 1994: 94; Levine 1994:43). However, even here Chinese authorities are facing mounting prob-lems. First, it is difficult for Chinese authorities to bridge the gap betweenCommunism and nationalism

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because for forty years the party has been denouncing just about everyfeature of Chinese culture as a feudal abomination that should beobliterated. [Moreover] . . . it is not easy to articulate what exactlyare the Chinese qualities that should be defended . . . [except] thebelief that leaders have a claim to moral superiority as the defendersof the moral order, even if this means acting in . . . arbitrary ways.

(Pye 1991: 63)

Second, the Communist Party’s attempt to appeal to nationalism is troubled by the emergence of a severe nationalities problem, particularly inChina’s outer provinces. Separatist disturbances in Xinjiang, Tibet andInner Mongolia have been widespread, and have been taken very seriouslyindeed (Segal 1994: 30–31). Overall, China’s state elite faces an ideologi-cal vacuum at the heart of its attempts to consolidate its sovereignty.

Many of the pressures on the Chinese regime have their roots in theliberalization that began in the 1970s. However, only after the develop-ments in Tiananmen Square in 1989 did the scale of the challenges thatthe Chinese state faced become apparent. After June 1989:

CCP hardliners attempted to address the accumulated ideological prob-lems of the past decade. Unfortunately, no ready solution was at hand.Having drained the fouled oil of Maoist identity from the crankcaseof Communist power, Deng and his associates had nothing to replaceit with. So . . . they poured the oily sludge back in, hoping the enginewould still run.

(Levine 1994: 32)

Tiananmen forced the Chinese elite to recognize the problems that modernization posed to their own legitimacy. Yet, in so doing it onlymade them aware of the necessity of continuing this strategy. In the wake of the Beijing massacre, many observers expected China to backaway from economic reforms but Deng Xioping instead sped up economic reform to reinforce the legitimacy of the Communist Party (Segal 1994:13). Furthermore, given the scope of the changes taking place in China,there is no easy way out of its predicament without widespread politi-cal upheaval affecting the whole of Chinese society. As Segal notes, ‘thisis not just a crisis of the regime; it has important elements of a crisis of national identity’ (Segal 1994: 62; see also Kim and Dittmer 1993: 257).

One major analyst has attempted to relate China’s internal politicalcrisis to its international behaviour. Johnston argues that China hasadopted ‘identity realist’ preferences. Identity realism suggests:

Chinese leaders believe the primary dangers in their environment comefrom . . . challenges to the cohesiveness of internal order. The Chinese

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leadership has tried to intensify popular identification with the regimeand the nation-state, with the result that we have seen a . . . hard-ening of realpolitik discourse and behaviour.

(Johnston 1999: 263–264)

According to Johnston, the concept of identity realism is drawn fromresearch into group identity formation and conflict. This literature holdsthat the creation of in-group identities leads directly to the devaluationof out-groups. This in turn leads to competitive interpretations of the rela-tionship with the out-group. It is important to recognize that the in-groupdoes not resent or distrust the out-group because of some tangible threatto in-group interests as neorealism/realism posits. Rather it is socializedand learned whether or not a tangible threat exists. Thus the causal arrowruns the other way to the direction suggested by neorealism because iden-tity construction determines anarchy and how much fear and competitionresults. Under these circumstances, ‘the group needs to provide argumentsabout the competitiveness of the environment in order to reinforce ingroupidentification. This is what realpolitik as ideology does’ (Johnston 1999:288–291).

Johnston argues that ‘efforts to increase the intensity of identificationwith the Chinese state – while never absent in post-1949 history, of course– picked up . . . after June 4, 1989’. Tiananmen ‘provided information toChinese leaders that suggested more work needed to be done to intensifyingroup identification’ (Johnston 1999: 293–294). Johnston is clear thatthe critical shift in the intensity of ingroup identification occurred afterthe Tiananmen incident rather than in response to the collapse of theSoviet Union in 1991. It is not, therefore, a product of structural changesassociated with the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, Johnston alsorecognizes that the end of the Cold War has been extremely importantfor China’s crisis of identity. This is because the end of the Cold Warhas ‘reinforced information about ingroup-outgroup differences that were made especially apparent with June 4th’ by reducing US incentivesto downplay political differences with China’ (Johnston 1999: 295). Moreover, the demise of the Soviet Union has dramatically reduced China’s vulnerability to direct invasion, such that for the first time in thehistory of the People’s Republic of China does not face an identifying orpressing external threat. As Segal notes, under these circumstances centralgovernment has more difficulty appealing to the myth of national unity(Segal 1994: 10; Shambaugh 1994: 48). Thus, paradoxically, the relativelybenign systemic context poses a threat to the domestic legitimacy of theruling elite. In this way, the close coincidence of the Tiananmen incidentand the collapse of the Soviet Union had mutually reinforcing effects.Together they starkly revealed the fragility of the regime’s legitimacy sothat, within the space of a few years, Chinese elites dramatically changedtheir perception of the strength of their political authority.

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The literature on China’s foreign policy frequently develops themes thatresonate strongly with the motivational logic suggested by the concept ofidentity realism. Johnston points out that although China’s defencemodernization drive ‘persists under near unipolarity, . . . Chinese assess-ments describe the post-Cold War period as the most benign period inChinese strategic security since at least 1949’ (Johnston 1999: 263). Otheranalysts propose that China’s aggressive stance in the South China Seareflects the way in which ‘economic reforms . . . . have put China’s conser-vatives on the defensive, and they are using nationalistic issues, likesovereignty over the Spratly’s, to assert themselves’ (Valencia 1995: 18;see also Segal 1994: 45). Austin argues that it is China’s public ordercrisis which lies behind increasingly assertive Chinese rhetoric over itsdisputes concerning Taiwan and Hong Kong and with Japan (Austin 1995:15). More generally, Shambaugh comments that ‘[t]he end of the ColdWar and the absence of an overt threat . . . belies a complex picture.China still feels insecure despite an unprecedented peaceful national secu-rity environment. This gives rise to an increasingly assertive nationalismand military build-up’ (Shambaugh 1994: 55; see also Shambaugh 1992:89). Overall, identity realism suggests that domestic pressures have ledChina to pursue a foreign policy that, whilst superficially resemblingneorealist behaviour, is actually underpinned by a very distinctive kind ofpolitical realism.

Identity realism is capable of providing a consistent overall explanationof apparently contradictory features of China’s post-Cold War foreignpolicy behaviour. Whilst China has displayed a pronounced tendencytowards a predominantly ‘realist’ foreign policy, it has also made signif-icant use of international institutions over the 1990s. Goldstein arguesthat China pragmatically combines a subtle realpolitik effort at developingnational capabilities with a level of diplomatic and economic engagementdesigned to maximize the benefits from interdependence (Goldstein 2003).However, a problem with this ‘neo-Bismarckian’ view of China’s grandstrategy is that a mix of pragmatic acceptance and functional incentiveshas not motivated China’s significant use of institutional frameworks asinstitutionalism postulates. As Yahuda identifies:

it is not that the entanglement with the outside world has tied [theregime’s] hands . . . or taught them the value of co-operativeapproaches to security, but rather that the harsh realities of the prob-lems of maintaining their rule at home has persuaded China’s rulersof the imperatives of deepening economic engagement with the outsideworld.

(Yahuda 1997: 7; see also Roy 1998b: 104)

In line with identity realist behaviour, the overriding concern of the rulingelites with their internal sovereignty has led them to participate in inter-

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national institutions. Moreover, the professionalization, pluralization anddecentralization of the foreign-policy establishment has introduced uncer-tainties and incoherence into the policy-making process. Commentatorshave identified that policy uncertainty has lead to a reactive stance, andexplains the somewhat opaque nature of China’s posture on many keyissues such as the future of Taiwan or Korean unification. It also helpsaccount for the anomalously high levels of its participation in some multi-lateral frameworks, for example the CTBT (Gill 2001; Kim 2001; Lampton2001; Swaine 2001). An identity realist explanation of China’s post-ColdWar foreign policy therefore reveals structural tensions at the core ofChina’s management of its interdependent relations. Whilst the elite havebecome reliant on engagement with the outside world for their legitimacy,this very interdependence poses a threat to its authority. Under thesecircumstances, the regime adopts realpolitik discourse and behaviour asthe only means available to them to strengthen in-group identification. Inturn, however, this generates structural policy incoherence and deep prob-lems in China’s relations with the West.

Johnston identifies the contradictions that lie at the core of China’sdiplomatic conduct. He notes that:

China’s self-identification has undergone . . . a blurring. The tradi-tional sovereign-centric, autonomous major power identity . . . hasbeen uneasily linked to a newer identity . . . [associated with respon-sible] participation in institutions. . . . This linkage has created atension in diplomacy between China’s desire to show itself as anactive, involved participant in international institutions . . . , and thedesire to minimise commitments and constraints that are required bythis participation.

(Johnston 1998: 77)

Similarly, Robinson recognizes that as China’s interdependence has risen:

Beijing’s foreign policy could only become highly interactive, partici-patory and co-operative. But these attitudes by themselves did notspell interdependence. Rather a complex mix of dependence, autonomy(termed independence by the leadership), and interdependence ensued.

(Robinson 1998: 40)

This mix of inconsistent motivations is impossible to capture through afocus on China’s relative or absolute status as neorealism and insti-tutionalism suggest. As Beylerian and Canivet conclude, the real preoc-cupation of the Chinese regime over the 1990s was not with status butwith identity (Beylerian and Cavinet 1997: 222). Thus, unlike neorealistand institutionalist alternatives, identity realism neatly captures the distinc-tive way in which China’s foreign policy reflects the complexity of the

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relationship between its regime’s domestic authority and its external environment.

Overall, a convincing case can be made for the prediction of the liberalmodel with respect to China’s post-Cold War strategies. This is not to claimthat China has articulated a broadly liberal set of strategic preferences.Instead, China’s foreign-policy behaviour falls outside the ranges predictedby neorealism and institutionalism due to the strong influence of its strategicpreferences on its international behaviour. China’s realist diplomatic con-duct arises because of the distinctive way in which its ruling elite is bothdeeply reliant on the benefits of interdependence and fears its consequences.The concept of identity realism is able to explain apparently contradictoryelements of China’s behaviour as consistent dimensions of a single under-lying strategic orientation. However, this raises the deeper question of theextent to which China will be able to continue along its present path.

Liberalism 2: China’s choices

The ‘engagement-containment debate’ has provided the most prominentway of framing the discussion about China’s political choices in the post-Cold War international system. This debate is concerned with how the USand the West more generally should conduct relations with a ‘rising China’.The engagement school follows institutionalist logic in advocating enmesh-ing China in international regimes in order to maximize the smooth inte-gration of China into the international order. By contrast, the containmentschool follows neorealism in regarding conflict with China as likely in theface of its rising capabilities. They see China as a threat to the internationalsystem, and advocate balance of power tactics to deter or contain China(Shambaugh 1996: 184–185; see also Layne 1996; Shinn 1996).

As a way of discussing China’s strategic options, the engagement-containment debate is highly problematic. However, apparently polarizedthe positions are, in practice they are difficult to distinguish. Segal identi-fies that the debate is ‘often unsophisticated’, suggesting that although containment can work, China’s neighbours and powers further afield needto appreciate that they must use elements from a strategy of engagement aswell (Segal 1996: 134). Similarly, on Shinn’s formulation, it is necessary to pursue a strategy of ‘conditional engagement’ as a more sophisticatedalternative to unconditional engagement and pre-emptive containment(Shinn 1996: 3–4). What this blurring reflects is that in the absence ofinformation about China’s intentions, its response to Western polices isdifficult to anticipate. Advocates of either position must therefore qualifytheir prescriptions by making them in some way dependent or ‘conditional’on certain types of behaviour. As Shambaugh identifies:

[o]ften missing in the [engagement-containment] debate . . . is a consid-eration of China’s potential responses to these polarised policies and

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. . . of the domestic variables inside China that will condition itsexternal orientation. . . . The Western debate . . . treats China as astatic entity that will simply have to adjust to whatever policy theother nations pursue.

(Shambaugh 1996: 182; see also Sato 1998)

Johnston provides an alternative framework for analysing China’s choicesthat is more amenable to consideration of internal factors. He distin-guishes between learning and adaptation as different responses China couldmake to its changing international environment. Learning occurs:

if change in policy is due to shifts in the central paradigm held bythe policy makers . . . as new information about the external envi-ronment is internalised by the decision-makers. In contrast, in theadaptation model, a change in policy is due to tactical adjustment tochanging external conditions. We should therefore expect to see nochange in paradigm but rather a re-evaluation of the costs and bene-fits of previous tactics . . . as exogenous conditions change.

(Johnston 1996: 31)

Some proponents of engagement have made the argument that China hasengaged in foreign-policy learning. For example, Harris argues that in theeconomic realm China did undergo a learning process. Chinese policythinkers abandoned many deeply rooted assumptions and came to acceptand internalize the need for economic cooperation. This provides evidencethat China has engaged in ‘socialization’ towards liberal norms (Harris1997: 150–151).

However, such a view is rather simplistic because it presumes a rela-tionship between China’s use of economic institutions and change in itsunderlying preferences. Pearson adopts a more cautious assessment. Whilenoting that there are some indications that economic engagement hasshaped China’s domestic political and economic coalitions in line withthe norms of international economic regimes, she also points out thatcompliance was strongest when international regimes coincide withdomestic commercial interests, thus weakening the argument for engage-ment having a socializing influence. Johnston and Evans similarly notethat there are very few, if any, cases of security institutions altering China’sconceptions of its interests (Johnston and Evans 1999; Pearson 1999: 229).Even where there are limited signs of socialization, this reflects the growingdisjointedness and incoherence of the foreign policy-making process andthe policy uncertainty this has generated, and is not indicative of funda-mental cognitive change (Gill 2001; Lampton 2001; Johnston 2003). Wangconcludes that the argument that China is becoming socialized to thenorms of multilateral institutions through its policy of engagement lacksplausibility. The norms these institutions embody ‘are far from being

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internalised . . . and are nowhere near being taken-for-granted’ by Chineseelites (Wang 2000: 486).

These commentators are more sophisticated in their evaluation of theeffects of China’s engagement because they recognize the way Chinese eliteshave ultimately embraced interdependence only in order to preserve their domestic authority. Indeed, China has adopted policy discourse andpractices compatible with realism to compensate for the way in which interdependence poses a threat to its regime’s legitimacy. Thus China’sbehaviour must be understood in terms of adaptation rather than learning.However, it is possible to develop a more sophisticated version of the argu-ment that China today faces systemic pressures to fundamentally changethe central paradigm held by foreign policy makers. On this formulation:

interdependence is a predicament countries must deal with rather thana worldview or foreign policy strategy, and what matters most isChina’s behaviour coping with this predicament, not whether its behav-iour reflects learning or adaptation.

(Moore and Yang 2001: 226)

From this perspective, it is China’s distinctive inability to fully appreciatethe consequences of its interdependence with the outside world that liesbehind its deep crisis of national identity.

One possible response the Chinese elite could make to this predicamentis a shift towards ‘neo-conservatism’. Whilst a neoconservative revival inChina may encourage it to adopt a more hard-line version of realpolitik,it should not be understood in neorealist terms. Rather, neoconservatismmay be seen as a response to the intensification of China’s crisis of nationalidentity since the late 1980s. Fewsmith notes that in the post-Tiananmenera, neoconservatism must be seen as a reaction to the way in which ‘thequestion is not so much whether to reform as how to hold on in the faceof reform’ (Fewsmith 1995: 635). Neoconservatism shares the orientationof traditional conservatism towards maintaining cohesion in Chinesesociety. However, it is characterized by an acceptance of a much broaderand more important role for market forces than traditional conservativethinking ever contemplated. Similarly, neoconservatism suggests that apatriotic appeal would be more effective than traditional socialist ideologyin providing social integration. However, neoconservatism has importantlimitations as a viable political course for China because it

has not yet presented any convincing arguments to address effectivelythe problems in Chinese society that it has identified. . . . [N]eocon-servatives have not explained how their sense of nationalism can matchChina’s evident need to continue importing capital and exportinggoods.

(Fewsmith 1995: 649)

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A neoconservative shift would therefore only exacerbate China’s currentproblems and speed up the process of regime transition. For this reason,the neoconservative option is perhaps not the most likely for China.

A second course for the Chinese regime would be to continue with itspresent stance. Such an approach would be characterized by incrementalresponses to the challenges faced by the Chinese state, rather than theacceptance of fundamental political change. This strategy should there-fore be seen as a form of ‘muddling through’ or adaptation, rather thanin terms of learning. However, as with the neoconservative course, thereare question marks about the sustainability of such an approach. Hardinguses the term ‘decay’ to describe this direction for China (Harding 1993:36; see also Harding 1994). The case of the handover of Hong Kong toChina provides a useful indication as to why this is the case. Yahudanotes that how China handles the handover ‘will not only determine thefate of the former British colony . . . , but it will also shape the evolutionof China’s political identity and its integration into the internationalcommunity’ (Yahuda 1996b: 1). He identifies that there are strong func-tional incentives for China to demonstrate a commitment to the rule oflaw in Hong Kong. It would ease China’s entry into the WTO, and providea strong precedent for a ‘one country, two systems’ approach to the integration of Taiwan into the PRC. However, he also stresses that:

the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty will pose many prob-lems to China itself. If the actual process of the transfer of sovereigntycould be successfully managed, Hong Kong could then pose furtherchallenges to the Chinese Communist government . . . as an attrac-tive model for all those . . . who seek the benefits of a greater legalityand an increased democratic accountability.

(Yahuda 1996b: 4)

Thus the handover of Hong Kong represents a ‘turning point’ for China. Itpoints up the limitations of China accepting adaptation without addressingthe more fundamental political issues this raises for the Chinese state.

An alternative course to either neoconservatism or pragmatic adapta-tion would be for China to adopt a basic change in the cognitive frameworkinforming its policy choices. This response would represent learning ratherthan adaptation by China. Once again, Hong Kong’s handover exempli-fies China’s predicament. Whilst Hong Kong poses a major threat to thesovereignty of the Chinese regime, the problems it poses arise because theelite is reluctant to recognize processes of decentralization. Accepting afederal solution could be of great benefit to China, although as Segal iden-tifies, at present ‘it is unlikely that . . . [it] will adopt a formally federalstructure’ (Segal 1994: 63). As has been noted, there are important func-tional incentives for China to accept a ‘one country, two systems’ approachto the integration of Hong Kong. More fundamentally, however, such a

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solution would provide a more sustainable framework through which toenhance the legitimacy of the Chinese state. Whilst the regime would riskgreatly increased separatist demands, pressures for decentralization areunlikely to wane unless a viable framework to accommodate them canbe found. By acknowledging some decentralizing trends, Chinese author-ities might make a formal break-up of China less likely. In this way, ‘[t]herecovery of Hong Kong . . . is occurring at a time when it could play anexceptional role in easing China’s painful transition’ (Yahuda 1996b: 14;see also Segal 1994: 64).

If China were to adopt a learning response to its ongoing identity crisis,this could provide a more stable framework from which to engage othermajor powers, and might also promote China’s equality of status withthem. China’s realist self-identification currently encourages it to behavein a confusing and inconsistent manner towards Western powers seekingengagement with it. At the same time, the debate over engagement versuscontainment of China in the West reflects uncertainties about China’s strategic intentions (Abramowitz 1998: 40; Funabashi 1998b: 53). Byshifting towards an identity that allows China to articulate a more con-sistent set of priorities favouring engagement, it could facilitate this pro-cess and benefit accordingly from the economic benefits that flow fromthis. Furthermore, a change in the cognitive framework informing China’sforeign policy could promote its equality with other major powers. Thisis because China could reciprocally demand that Western powers developmore coherent policies towards engagement than they have to date. The1996 Taiwan Straits missile crisis provides a suitable case in point. Thereare strong reasons to believe that incoherence in US policy rather thanChinese assertiveness lay behind this incident. US policy towards Chinahad been poorly defined and sent ambiguous signals about the US’s inten-tions (Shinn 1996: 14; Lampton 1997: 1102). The US has subsequentlyclarified its policies through the publication of the conditional engagementstrategy. Nevertheless, as a whole the West’s engagement policy remainsfundamentally inconsistent. The unequal nature of the US-Europe and theUS-Japan relationship has sent confusing messages to China. In the shortterm, this allows China to play off Western states against one another to achieve its own objectives (Moller 1996; Maull 1997; Sato 1998).However, it also inhibits China’s full participation in the internationalsystem, preventing China from developing its relations with both the USand Japan at the same time. Sato notes the ways in which an engagementstrategy based on a more symmetrical US-Japanese relationship wouldreduce the threat to China’s security posed by the forward US defencepresence, and allow China a greater role in shaping trilateral relations(Sato 1998: 14–20). The key principle is that by adopting a learningresponse to interdependence, China can more effectively demand reci-procity in the clarification of the West’s engagement policies (Jisi 1998:22–23).

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However, only a response involving a basic shift in the central para-digm held by Chinese policy makers – or learning – would provide it witha cognitive framework fully consistent with engagement with the outsideworld. Thus whilst the West can take significant steps to facilitate China’sintegration into the international system, it is ultimately China itself whichmust make the most crucial decisions about its future international role.Since 1989, China’s political future has been radically open. The currentelite’s stop-gap approach is unsustainable in the long term. Overall, ‘signsthat China is changing shape are increasingly clear. A closer look at itsnational identity reveals fissures and pressures that have long been maskedby an official determination to uphold the myth of national unity’ (Segal1994: 54). In the face of this predicament, China could move in any oneof a number of different directions. Both a shift towards neoconservatismor a compete break-up of China should not be ruled out. Ultimately, thefate of China will depend critically on how the Chinese manage theirreforms. The elite’s distinctive political identity is currently the majorobstacle preventing China from adopting a ‘learning’ response to the chal-lenges it faces. Whilst the elite continues to block off fundamental change,the probable path in the medium term will be a continuation of prag-matic adaptation. As Segal recognizes, ‘[t]he most likely outcome is aprolonged crisis of identity, where changes short of a complete collapsehave an important impact on the lives of the Chinese and its neighbours’(Segal 1994: 62).

Overall, the Communist regime is facing the problem that its ideology isno longer able to provide China with the national purpose it was once ableto supply. Under these circumstances, China must be prepared to confrontthe way in which its existing political identity is no longer able to deal withthe new challenges it faces. This requires the state elite to accept funda-mental political change. However unlikely in the short term, China’s fail-ure to take this course can only exacerbate its sense of insecurity within theinternational system. China’s identity crisis reflects the way in which thestate lacks a stable ontological foundation in the sense that Communismhas not been replaced by an ideology able to restore a stable sense ofnational cohesion. In an external environment full of changes the Chineseregime is preoccupied by possible risks to its existence, and finds itself par-alyzed in terms of practical action. Moreover, the Chinese regime hasbecome morally ‘empty’, and lacks legitimacy because it is unsure about thebasis for its existence. Under these conditions it has difficulty formulatinga coherent foreign policy, and consequently subjects its behaviour to constant scrutiny. Indeed, the essence of China’s identity crisis is that, paradoxically, the intensification since 1989 of its traditionally realist foreign policy orientation lies at the root of its deep sense of unease withthe world. Until the regime comes to recognize this, China will continue to face structural problems in managing the transition to the post-Cold War world.

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6 Conclusions

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War generatedboth major opportunities and important problems for the study of inter-national politics. Whilst these developments opened up extraordinary newavenues for research within the field, they have also been deeply unset-tling for widely held assumptions. The period of post-Cold War transitionhas presented a historic context in which to test and refine competingtheories of international relations. The preconditions are present for eachof the three dominant perspectives on the international system to makea discrete set of predictions about the emerging international order. Inline with structural or neorealism, the end of the Cold War has broughtabout a major shift in the global balance of power. In line with institu-tionalism, patterns of economic and institutional interdependence varywidely across key strategic regions. In line with liberalism, a stable coreof liberal democracies overwhelmingly dominates the emerging inter-national system for the first time in world history. Thus students ofinternational relations have been presented with a situation that genuinelyapproximates a ‘real world laboratory’ for the evaluation of their centralconceptual frameworks. Paradoxically, however, the end of the Cold Warhas placed enormous strains on the contemporary discipline. More thana decade on, the larger historical significance of the changes that tookplace in the international system between 1989 and 1991 is still far fromclear. It remains wide open to debate, for example, why the Soviet Unioncame to such an abrupt end during this period, despite having been widelyassumed to be stable throughout the Cold War. Similarly, the conse-quences of the disintegration of the Soviet empire for the emerginginternational order continue to be highly uncertain. The situation in whichthe international system finds itself today is not necessarily entirely new.Yet the unexpected nature and enormous scale of the changes associatedwith the end of the Cold War have added weight to the argument thatthe international system may be undergoing a transformation that estab-lished perspectives are poorly equipped to comprehend.

Ambivalence about the significance of the end of the Cold War forresearch within the field has given rise to difficulties. In particular, there

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has been a paucity of attempts to systematically address the conceptualproblems raised by the failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union,and to use the resulting framework to analyse trends in the emerginginternational order. By confronting directly the full range of theoreticaland empirical issues raised by the end of the Cold War, the present studyhas attempted to address this gap in the literature. The theoretical chapteraddressed the issue of reconceptualizing the international system for thepost-Cold War period. It scrutinized the conventional understanding ofthe relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism, andevaluated the prospects for a new synthesis of their insights. This newsynthesis sought to both integrate the collapse of the Soviet Union intoa conception of overall historical tendencies within the internationalsystem, and generate a broader research agenda into the nature of post-Cold War order than that produced by debates between neorealists andinstitutionalists. Case studies of the foreign policies of major states overthe period between 1989 and 1999 were then examined in the light ofthe theoretical models. Studying the responses of these countries to theend of the Cold War provided indications of empirical trends in theemerging international system. The conclusions summarize the theoreticaland empirical findings of the study in three sections. The first sectionreflects on the implications of the Soviet collapse for systemic approachesto international relations, and sets out the implications of liberal theoryfor research programmes within the field after the Cold War. It highlightsthe distinctive capacity of liberalism to synthesize the insights offered bycompeting schools of thought, and the importance of the concept of reflex-ivity. The remainder of the conclusion summarizes the empirical findingswith respect to the nature of change in the post-Cold War internationalsystem. The second section focuses on general patterns of institutional-ized activity in relations between the major powers. The third sectiondiscusses foreign policy adjustments between 1989 and 1999. The bookconcludes by reflecting upon the methodological status of the knowledgeabout the post-Cold War international system that it has produced. Inparticular, consideration is given to the relationship between knowledgeabout changes in the international system it contains, and the reflexivityin the international system documented.

International relations theory after the Cold War

The collapse of the Soviet Union raised important questions about theway in which long term dynamics within the international system areconceptualized. This was dramatically revealed by the failure of estab-lished theories to predict this development. The publication of Waltz’sTheory of International Politics in 1979 placed the concept of the ‘inter-national system’ in a position of central importance in the discipline.Systemic approaches promise generalizable explanations, and offer strong

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Conclusions 113

predictive statements. Thus failure to predict perhaps the most importantgeopolitical development in world politics during the second half of thetwentieth century ought to be of particular concern. The most prominentexponents of systemic theory have suggested that this development shouldbe understood as an exogenous shock in international relations. Waltzhimself argues that the Soviet collapse should be viewed as an event withunit level causes, but as generating structural consequences. Keohane hassimilarly argued that a development of the magnitude of the Soviet collapseis simply beyond the purview of systemic theory to either predict orexplain, and likens this event to the impact of a meteor strike in the studyof palaeontology. Yet the irony in these judgements ought to be clearlyapparent from the logic of systemic arguments. It is precisely the ‘few bigand important things’ that occur in international politics that systemictheory is uniquely positioned to identify. Thus neither Waltz nor Keohanegive enough consideration to the possibility that conceptions of the inter-national system established during the Cold War were simply too narrowto adequately capture overall historical tendencies within it.

Limitations of the debates between structural realists and institutional-ists are also reflected in the research programme they have proposed forthe post-Cold War period. Debates between these schools have suggestedthat attempts to refine rationalist models provided the most fruitful agendafor research in the field after the Cold War. Theoretically, research shouldfocus on the conditionality of relative gains-seeking behaviour. Empirically,research should focus on the interaction between international institutionsand state behaviour within Western Europe. As a region where patternsof economic and institutional interdependence are well developed, realismand institutionalism offer divergent hypotheses about the nature of inter-national change. Indeed, an important body of research has emerged from these theoretical controversies. This has provided a preliminary assessment of the way in which the major powers in Europe used inter-national institutions in adapting to the changes of the 1989–1991 period(Keohane et al. 1993). However, a limitation of this research programmeis its remarkably narrow nature, with the result that it excludes majorarenas of inquiry. For example, realists have identified that in East Asia there are clear candidates for major power status, but patterns ofeconomic and institutional interdependence remain under-developed. Inthe absence of the preconditions for peaceful change identified by insti-tutionalists, realist predictions about growing instability in this region afterthe Cold War remain unchallenged. Keohane acknowledges that the endof the Cold War has added a dialectic between theory and practice tothat between competing schools (Keohane 1993: 297). Nevertheless, theresearch programme put forward by realists and institutionalists clearlyimplies that theories of the international system established during theCold War do not need to be revised fundamentally in the light of devel-opments in international politics over the 1990s.

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William Wohlforth has attempted to reformulate the neorealist modelso as to make it compatible with a broader research agenda that includesthe prospect of great power stability at a global level (Wohlforth 1999).According to this argument, the concentration of American capabilitieswithin the international system is so great that it prohibits systematicattempts at counter-balancing by secondary states. However, there arevarious problems faced by this variant of hegemonic stability theory. First, like orthodox neorealism and institutionalism it cannot provide anendogenous account of the collapse of the Soviet Union in terms compat-ible with the orthodox neorealist model. Wohlforth has developed asophisticated classical realist account of the end of the Cold War thattakes account of the way in which the Soviet Union was a declining chal-lenger rather than a declining hegemon. This historical contingency can,Wohlforth proposes, help realism explain the timing and peaceful char-acter of the end of the Cold War (Wohlforth 1995). However, as Wohlforthfully acknowledges, this approach dilutes systemic logic in the attempt tobroaden realism’s explanatory power. Second, as was noted in the intro-duction, Wohlforth’s argument about the stability of the unipolar worldis not compatible with the essential logic of orthodox neorealist theorydespite its structuralist and materialist orientation. Orthodox neorealismassociated with Waltz holds that a high concentration of capabilities withthe hegemon will, if anything, further encourage lesser countries to balanceagainst the most powerful actor within the international system. Thehegemon’s disproportionate power will generate structural conflicts ofinterest to emerge between it and secondary states, and the hegemon willalso be tempted to abuse its unchecked power. Thus the concentration ofcapabilities within the system will gradually ‘wash out’ as the globalbalance of power is restored. Wohlforth’s modification of neorealist theoryis therefore open to the criticism that it provides a post hoc rationaliza-tion of the predictive failures associated with conventional neorealism’saccount of the emerging structure of international politics. For this reason,Wohlforth’s modified structural realist argument for the stability of aunipolar world has not been operationalized and tested within the scopeof the present study. Instead, the debates between orthodox neorealismand institutionalism have been taken as the key points of reference forsystem level theory.

Clark has argued that more than a decade’s theoretical debate in thefield has failed to provide an overarching framework for the analysis ofthe post-Cold War order. He therefore eschews this approach in favourof a historically informed analysis (Clark 2001: 36). If correct, this repre-sents a damning indictment of debates that have taken place in inter-national relations theory over the past two decades. Systemic approachesimply that the end of the Cold War should have provided as close as ispossible an ideal situation in which to test and refine competing theories.An alternative view, however, is that patterns of change since 1989

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necessitate a more thoroughgoing reassessment of theories of the inter-national system than has been put forward to date. Contrary to the claimsof realists and institutionalists, systemic theory must be comprehensivelyrevised in the light of the end of the Cold War. First, theories of inter-national relations must be able to offer an endogenous account of theSoviet collapse. This development cannot be considered as simply a reflec-tion of internal processes particular to the Soviet Union at a specifichistorical juncture. Instead, it must be integrated into a coherent accountof long-term tendencies within the international system. Second, theoriesof the international system developed during the Cold War must be thor-oughly overhauled if they are to adequately capture the dynamics of theemerging international order. The end of the Cold War should be seenas marking a fundamental shift in the overall trajectory of socializationgenerated by the international system. This shift has affected the struc-ture of relationships between all the major powers, and has radicallyaltered the prospects for peaceful change in the international system ona global scale. It therefore requires a much broader agenda for researchthan that put forward by established theories.

The starting point for this alternative approach is to question institu-tionalism’s interpretation of neorealism. Prominent institutionalists havedeveloped the argument that neorealism relies on the assumptions thatstates act rationally in pursuit of their national interests. In turn, institu-tionalists use their interpretation of neorealism to develop their owncritique of its central arguments. Drawing on rational choice analysis andtheories of market failure from microeconomics, institutionalists seek todemonstrate that international cooperation is possible even in the absenceof a centralized enforcement agency in the international system. However,on closer examination institutionalists may have distorted neorealism’scharacter. Waltz has consistently rejected the view that his theory relieson the assumption of rational behaviour. Instead, he insists it relies onselection effects generated by interaction in a competitive environment.Viewed in this way, neorealism should be understood as focusing onprocesses of identity construction and socialization arising from the gener-ative consequences of anarchy. In this sense it relies on a reflexive logicand is therefore closer to liberalism in terms of its conception of systemcomposition and dynamics than it is to institutionalism. Of course, theaccount of state socialization provided by the neorealist model is a trun-cated one. Neorealist assumptions about the nature of anarchy commit itto the reproduction of a competitive environment organized around thebalance of power. For this reason, neorealism remains possible to viewthrough rationalist lenses. Nevertheless, this should not detract from neo-realism’s reflexive quality, and Waltz’s preference for relying on social-izing feedback within the international system.

On the basis of this interpretation of neorealism, it is possible to rejecta linear understanding of the relationship between neorealism, institu-

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tionalism and liberalism in which institutionalism is seen as providing the point of synthesis on a spectrum that runs between neorealism andliberalism. Instead, the relationship between the three models should beunderstood in terms of a triangle, with debates between neorealists andinstitutionalists constituting the triangle’s rationalist leg and debatesbetween neorealists and liberals constituting its reflexivist leg. This viewof the relationship between the three models also implies a reformulationof current orthodoxy on liberal theory. The current consensus is that liber-alism focuses on the international consequences of domestic structure.Moravcsik (1997) has recently generalized such a framework to developa liberal model granting casual priority to the domestic preferences.However, drawing on Wendt’s constructivist research, it is possible toproduce a more systemic formulation of liberal theory in which the inter-national system is regarded as having a self-transforming logic. Understoodin this way, liberalism’s focus on the generative consequences of anarchyand the overall trajectory of socialization within the international systemis likely to prove more productive in the search for a general synthesisof competing theories of international politics than institutionalists’attempts to refine rationalist models. This view of contemporary debatesshifts the emphasis away from refining rationalist models by opening upmore fundamental questions about how patterns of socialization withinthe international system might vary historically. In so doing, it points theway forward to a new synthesis in which the democratic peace is viewedas generating socialization effects once a critical mass of liberal democ-racies has emerged at global level. Prior to this stage, institutionalizationmay occur within the narrow ranges specified by institutionalist theory,but the dominant equilibrium will continue to be provided by a Waltzianbalance of power. After this stage, however, there is a shift in the trajec-tory of socialization away from the balance of power and towards thedemocratic peace. Institutional density will therefore increase more quicklyreflecting a shift in the system’s cultural structure. Thus the distinctiveability of liberalism to provide a general account of variation in social-ization promises to subsume the insights of neorealism and institutionalisminto a much broader account of the historical development of world politics.

The concept of reflexivity has been identified as central to a liberalmodel of socialization. Following Wendt, reflexivity is defined in terms ofa capacity on the part of units for critical self-awareness and culturalchange (Wendt 1999: 375). A system that has achieved reflexivity is expe-riencing a major shift in the overall trajectory of socialization within it.Under these conditions, a permissive space is opened up which encour-ages actors to voluntarily adopt shifts in their identity. Once a criticalmass of liberal states emerges, this produces a shift from a Lockean to aKantian culture as the dominant structure of interaction within the system.This change is associated with a switch in the underlying trajectory of

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socialization away from a Waltzian balance of power and towards thedemocratic peace. The overwhelming strength of the states approximatingliberal norms within the system’s core means that a wide range of func-tional and material incentives also exist to engage in cooperation andinteract commercially with states within the core. However, a system thathas achieved reflexivity will also open up a space for states to exercisevoluntary agency and freely choose to join the core. Individual states may resist this trend, but over the longer term great powers will not have this option because in order to maintain a high level of performancethey require extensive and routine engagement with more liberal states.Domestic coalitions reflecting embedded domestic political institutions,cultural identities and commercial interests will mediate the socializationpressures generated by the system. Thus a high degree of domestic culturaland institutional variation is built into the socialization dynamics modelledby liberal theory. Nevertheless, the system will allow a space for units toengage in cultural change and punish through cultural selection processesthose that fail to do so. Over time, therefore, a range of systemic forcesencourages the emergence of a growing normative consensus around thedemocratic peace. This consolidates the dominance of the system by acore tending towards liberal cultural norms, thereby further enhancingreflexivity within the system. The system as a whole begins to snowballas progressive change gathers historical momentum through the creationof a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop. This process is illustrated inFigure 6.1.

It seems plausible to hypothesize that an obvious point of historicalreference for the emergence of a critical mass of liberal democratic statesis provided by the recent collapse of the Soviet Union. Liberalism is distinc-tively positioned to offer a plausible explanation of this development, and

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Increased unit autonomy(capacity for critical

self-reflection)

Identity construction(cultural change)

Socialization pressures(internalization, subjectto domestic variation)

Reinforced structure ofinteraction

(strengthened liberal core)

Figure 6.1 Reflexivity in the international system (Part A)

account for why it may constitute a point of enormous significance forthe pattern of development in world politics. Rather than understandingthe end of the Cold War as an exogenous shock, as prominent neoreal-ists and institutionalists have argued, the Soviet collapse may instead beunderstood as reflecting cultural selection processes within the internationalenvironment. In this view, highly illiberal regimes lack flexibility and willbe eliminated as significant actors in long-term competition with moreopen societies. This is a systemic argument that does not rest on claimsabout the particular political status of Russia as the Soviet Union’s primarysuccessor state. Instead it posits a transformative logic produced by culturalprocesses that are deeply embedded in overall tendencies contained withinthe international system. Viewing the Soviet collapse in these terms allowsit to be understood as symptomatic of general forces at work in worldpolitics rather than being understood as a contingent occurrence reflectinga peculiar conjunction of forces unique to a particular state at a specificjuncture. It therefore facilitates the incorporation of one of the mostimportant occurrences in international affairs in the second half of thetwentieth century into a coherent overall picture of global historical change.

Moreover, liberalism is uniquely positioned to identify the wider histor-ical significance of the collapse of the Soviet Union for the subsequentdevelopment of world politics. With the end of the Cold War, the inter-national system may plausibly be viewed as having achieved the extentof norm convergence required to push it beyond a point of criticality.Once the tipping point has been reached, the democratic peace begins togenerate powerful socialization effects that will affect great power rela-tions on a global scale. Following Wendt, it is acknowledged that changesin the cultural structure associated with the achievement of criticalityshould be viewed as being multiply realizable. Different combinations ofstates that have internalized different cultural norms to different degreesmay realize different cultural structures. There is thus no single a prioriroute by which a critical mass of liberal states may be brought into exis-tence. Given difficulties in quantifying precisely the tipping point, a moresensible approach is to hypothesize the existence of a critical mass andtest the behavioural predictions that this implies against the empiricalrecord. Indeed, one of the most distinctive and persistently commentedupon features of the post-Cold War order is the replacement of polaritywith a core-periphery formation as its dominant structural feature. Inmany parts of the world, such as the Middle East, states tend to divergeheavily from the norms of the liberal core. However, it remains plausiblein the post-Cold War period to argue that enough great powers approx-imate to membership of a liberal pacific union to push the system as awhole beyond criticality. Following this precedent, it becomes reasonableto pursue the hypothesis that the Soviet collapse does indeed representone path on a multiply realizable route to structural change in the inter-national system. This hypothesis is, of course, open to falsification. It

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would only be confirmed if the prediction that the democratic peace hasbegun to generate socialization effects can be substantiated with evidencedrawn from empirical trends in post-Cold War international relations.

In Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt proposes that it ispossible that the international system may be in transition from a Lockeanculture organized around the balance of power to a Kantian culture inwhich the norms of the democratic peace define the dominant socializa-tion tendency. Wendt’s book already has attracted sustained criticalattention. In a prominent response, Keohane has argued that whilst Wendtprovides a penetrating theoretical framework, his approach fails to connecttheoretical themes with identifiable empirical trends (Keohane 2000: 126).Wendt responds that the framework he sets out does contain definitehypotheses of use in framing empirical research. However, he is forcedto concede that his own book ‘does not adduce much empirical evidence’to support his theoretical claims (Wendt 2000: 174). The applied compo-nent of the present study directly addresses the empirical questions raisedby Wendt through a systematic study of the strategies of major statesbetween 1989 and 1999. Embarking on such an endeavour inevitablyraises methodological questions about the measurement of the theoreticalpredictions offered by liberalism. If the democratic peace has replaced thebalance of power as the dominant trajectory of socialization in the inter-national system, there is a need to identify a set of criteria capable ofidentifying this empirical trend. It has therefore been proposed that thesocialization pattern envisaged by liberal theory may be compared withtrends that Kapstein and Mastanduno have associated with bandwago-ning within a unipolar power structure (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999;see also Huntley 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Harrison 2001;Mitchell 2002). Using Unipolar Politics as a template for research designprovides a convenient springboard for the identification of two discreteand operationalizable points of comparison between these empirical trends.

The first point of similarity between hegemonic bandwagoning andliberal socialization concerns the general pattern of institutionalized activitythat occurs in the international system. Both trends predict the emergenceof a peaceful structure of great power relations on a global scale. Hege-monic bandwagoning and liberal socialization may be distinguished byexamining the type or quality of institutionalized relations which emergebetween major states. A liberal international system will be characterizedby a more equal structure of great power rights and responsibilities thanwithin a hegemonic system. Nevertheless, the overall outcome of a peacefulglobal structure of great power relationships is common to both trends.The second point of comparison between liberal socialization and hege-monic bandwagoning concerns the foreign policy adjustments made byindividual states to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In terms of this criter-ion, both trends envisage that there will be a wide degree of domesticcultural and institutional variation in the strategies pursued by the major

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powers. In the bandwagoning model, this reflects the weakness of systemicpressures encouraging balancing, whereas in the liberal model this is viewedas indicative of an internalization lag during which states are exposed tosystemic pressures encouraging them to engage in cultural change. Thusexamining closely the long-term viability of the foreign-policy adjustmentsof major states over the period of post-Cold War transition should providean indicator with which to assess the predictions of the liberal model.The following two sections of the conclusions summarize the empiricalfindings of the three cases examined in this study in terms of the twobehavioural indicators specified.

General patterns of institutionalized activity

The Cold War has now been over for more than a decade, providing anextended time frame in which to test the predictions of general theoriesof the international system. If the environment in which major powersinteract with others does significantly affect their behavior, the tendenciesthat this is giving rise to ought to be apparent. Indeed, each of the threetheoretical frameworks under assessment is useful in explaining thedynamics of great power relations during the period under examination.However, general patterns of institutionalized activity between major statesalso pose significant puzzles for both neorealist and institutionalist predic-tions. Anomalies for neorealism and institutionalism combine to provideevidence of the type of qualitative shift in the structure of institutional-ized great power relationships predicted by liberal theory. Table 6.1summarizes the findings of the book with respect to this criteria formeasuring change in the post-Cold War international system.

Both neorealism and institutionalism are useful in explaining aspects ofgreat power activity in the international system that emerged between1989 and 1999. Neorealism does appear to account for some dimensionsof German strategies. Parts of the process of unification, the recognitionof Slovenia and Croatia, the ERM crisis, and concerns over the EU budget

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Table 6.1 General patterns of institutionalized activity

Country Restructuring of institutionalized activity

Germany Shift from ‘policy taker’ to ‘policy maker’ role within NATO and EU (particularly shift to use of force abroad in support of the former).

Japan Incoherence of Yoshida Doctrine; mounting pressures to make an independent contribution to major security and economic regimes.

China Engagement of China on the basis of its growing equality ofstatus with the US and Japan.

all caused significant tensions with Germany’s major partners. Japan’srelations with both the United States and China have shown signs ofstrain, and this has increased anxieties about security in the East Asiaregion. In line with neorealism, China’s rise as a major regional powerhas certainly raised alarms about the effects of its revisionism on thebalance of power. Institutionalism also provides a useful lens with whichto examine aspects of the strategies of the three countries. Germany’sbehaviour towards major multilateral frameworks such as NATO, the EUas well as global economic regimes has certainly been heavily influencedby functional incentives to engage in cooperation. Japan has participatedin regional multilateral institutions, and its role in major global regimescan broadly be characterized as supportive. Despite China’s rising capa-bilities, it has been drawn into at least a tacit acceptance of cooperativesecurity and economic regimes at both global and regional levels. Thispartly reflects the benefits that China stands to accrue through participa-tion in such institutions. It is also the case that some combination ofneorealist and institutionalist explanations may be required to understandtrends within specific issue areas. Coherent accounts of the operation ofthe non-proliferation regime in East Asia can be constructed using eitherneorealism or institutionalism. Similarly, economic diplomacy between themajor powers is characterized by both high levels of cooperation and alsoexhibits concerns over relative gains.

However, the overall pattern of institutionalized activity that has emerged does not fit well into the predictions offered by neorealism andinstitutionalism. Within this debate, neorealists predicted discontinuity inkey multilateral frameworks, and interpret signs of discontinuity as favour-ing the emergence of a conflictual multipolar international structure. Insti-tutionalists responded to neorealist arguments by anticipating continuity inthe post-War structure of multilateral arrangements between the majorpowers. Changes would occur, but these would be of an incremental nature. East Asia provides a difficult case for institutionalist predictions in the absence of well-developed patterns of economic and institutional interdependence. However, following Nye’s assessment of security consid-erations in the region, institutionalists argued that if the US acts as a benignhegemon then this could provide a basis for the development of multi-lateralism. The problem faced by neorealism and institutionalism is that it is not clear that these models adequately capture the underlying trend.Contrary to neorealism, trends between 1989 and 1999 appear to have consolidated a peaceful and cooperative structure of great power relationsat a global level. Contrary to institutionalism, there are signs of discon-tinuity in the basic structure of relations between the great powers.Problems for both neorealism and institutionalism are particularly acute inEast Asia, where there are indications that the US security presence mayactually be an obstacle to a peaceful structure of relations between themajor states.

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Between 1989 and 1999 there was evidence of considerable restruc-turing in general patterns of institutionalized activity between the majorpowers across both Europe and East Asia. In a European context, themost notable shift has been Germany’s attitude towards the use of forcein a non-self-defence capacity. Pressure for change began to mount as farback as the Gulf War, when Germany was accused of relying upon cheque-book diplomacy. In the wake of the Yugoslav crisis, Germany reinterpretedits constitution so as to allow its armed forces to take part in interven-tions outside the NATO area. The Yugoslavia crisis further galvanizedthe emerging view within the German elite that military contributionswere required to support NATO/UN interventions. By the time of theKosovo crisis, Germany accepted a major role in the bombing campaignduring Operation Deliberate Force. This was despite a change in admin-istration from the CDU to an SDP-Green coalition. Moreover, during thisperiod the US encouraged growing German military involvement in outof area NATO activities. Although it remained anxious about the poten-tial implications of this shift for the division of responsibilities betweenNATO and European institutions, the US appeared to accept the prin-ciple that the Cold War status quo on security burden sharing shouldalter. Overall, therefore, the first decade of the post-Cold War period ledto important shifts in the division of responsibilities within key multi-lateral security frameworks on the part of both Germany and America.

The unified Germany also came to play a more active role in the devel-opment of European integration than it had done during the Cold Warperiod. This was as a result of the costs imposed by German unification,and the constraints imposed on German financial contributions to the EUby simultaneous enlargement and deepening of integration. The first stepsin this process became apparent in the early 1990s when increases inGerman interest rates in the wake of the economic problems posed byunification caused strains in relations with other European states. By thelatter half of the 1990s, Germany was showing signs of a definite shiftin its attitude towards European integration. In key areas relating to itsbudgetary contributions to the EU, Germany had shifted from a policytaker to a policy maker orientation. This reflected Germany’s concernsthat its disproportionate contribution to the European budget wouldbecome unsustainable if the EU was to expand to the east. Strains betweenGermany and France also began to emerge over voting rights and QMVwithin the European Council and over issues such as the nationality ofthe chair of the European Central Bank. Thus there are indications thatGermany’s increased size and population has upset the traditional post-1945 Franco-German entente. However, Germany’s overall commitmentto sponsoring the European integration process increased dramaticallyduring the 1990s. It is therefore also possible to view the changes thathave taken place as indicating that Germany is increasingly moving towardsequal negotiating status with other major powers within the EU. On this

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account, changes in Germany’s stance reflect a maturing of its relationswith its key European partners that parallels the shift in its relations withthe US within security institutions.

In the case of Japan, elites have been slower to accept changes in the status quo. Like Germany, Japan adopted a civilian power orientation during the Cold War, and came under pressure in the wake of the Gulf con-flict to make direct military contributions. Yet it has subsequently provedextremely reluctant to participate even in non-combatant peacekeepingactivities within a UN framework. In 1992 it did alter its constitution soas to allow SDF participation in these activities, although it did so in theface of intense external diplomatic pressure. Japan’s National DefensePlanning Outline in 1995 actually made provisions for a significant reduc-tion rather than an increase in Japan’s defence capabilities, indicating anintention to continue to rely on American security protection. Nevertheless,the reactive character of the development of Japan’s attitudes with respectto the use of force abroad is indicative of the incoherence of its stance.There is a growing consensus that the current structure of US-Japanese secu-rity relations is unsustainable. Sheltering Japan under the US securityumbrella discourages it to contribute more to the maintenance of inter-national security, and invites American criticisms of free-riding. A reduc-tion in the US’s defence presence in East Asia therefore would provide ameans of strengthening the Mutual Security relationship. Only in this waywill it be possible to encourage Japan to make a more active military con-tribution than it does at present. This would require a comprehensivechange in the present structure of US-Japanese security relations. A moreequal structure of rights and responsibilities for maintaining internationalsecurity between the two powers represents a more viable and sustainableoption for both countries than attempts to either preserve the current status quo or pursuit of power balancing.

Japan faces a parallel set of issues in terms of its economic diplomacy.Over the 1990s Japan continued with an economic strategy that had adistinctly mercantilist character. It used a variety of economic levers ofstatecraft in pursuit of this objective. On trade policy, Japan was slow toengage in liberalization, and frequently did so only in response to gaitsu.Japan also used extensive aid donations and its leading role in the AsianDevelopment Bank to lever open foreign markets for Japanese firms.However, the inadequacy of this strategy was exposed during the EastAsian financial crisis in the late 1990s. The crisis exposed the way inwhich linkages between economic and security dimensions of its grandstrategy created tensions for Japanese diplomacy. During the crisis, rela-tions between the US and Japan deteriorated significantly. For Japan, itexposed the acute vulnerability it faced by remaining dependent on theUS military guarantee for its security. In times of economic difficulty, thisgave America a hugely exaggerated influence over Japan’s economy. Forthe US, the crisis revealed the extent to which the security umbrella it

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provides has fostered a passive Japanese political role that favours mercan-tilist economic priorities. It also highlighted the way that ‘civilian power’arguments are open to manipulation by domestic elites wishing to presenta benign diplomatic face to the outside world whilst in reality focusingon narrower nationalist objectives. The effects of the crisis on US-Japanrelations can be understood as reflecting latent conflicts that are resur-facing in the post-Cold War period. In the absence of a clear Soviet threat,economic priorities are emerging as a potential source of dispute betweenthe two countries. However, an equally plausible assessment is that thetwo countries are being pushed towards a more balanced and mature rela-tionship across a range of economic and security issues. Japan is beingencouraged to adopt a more liberal stance on issues of economic diplo-macy, whilst the US is likely to face a Japan that adopts a more activepolitical role in managing its external relations with key partners.

The engagement of China also appears to be driving considerable restruc-turing in relationships between the major powers. An engagement strategyis an important prerequisite to locking China into peaceful relations withother key actors. However, if engagement is to be successful it is import-ant that it occurs on the basis of broad equality of status between Chinaand other major states. The continued American defence presence in EastAsia is viewed as threatening by China. Restructuring the US security rela-tionship with Japan and reducing the American military presence in theregion is therefore likely to provide an effective means of enhancing regionalstability. Moreover, assertive behaviour by China should not always beviewed as arising from aggressive Chinese revisionism. US policy can alsosend confusing messages to Beijing and generate a negative reaction, imply-ing that America must also shoulder some responsibility for periods of poorrelations. It is highly plausible, for example, that the 1996 Taiwan Straitsmissile crisis was a result of the unclear diplomatic messages sent by aninexperienced US administration. Inequities in the relationship between theUS and Japan as well as the US and Europe also undermine the effective-ness of engagement because differences between the policies of Westernstates generate contradictory sets of incentives and constraints for China.This also allows it to play different partners off against one another toachieve its own objectives. This is a particular issue in US-Japan engage-ment with China, where US diplomacy on human rights and security issuesis frequently undermined by Japanese economic diplomacy. Finally, Chinatoo stands to benefit from promoting its equality of status with other majorpowers rather than seeking regional hegemony. By accepting equality withother major powers, it can more reasonably expect to both reduce the USsecurity presence in East Asia, and facilitate more consistent treatment byWestern states. It can in this way build the most stable long-term platformto ensure extensive engagement and sustain continued economic growth.

Across all three cases, it is important to emphasize the complexity ofthe linkages that exist between diplomacy on security and economic issues.

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In particular, institutionalists tend to view these components of diplomacyas discrete when there are actually close connections between them. Thisfollows logically from the argument that there will be underlying conti-nuity in the structure of post-War relations between the major powers.The structure of multilateral relations inherited from the Cold War isskewed heavily in favour of security agreements that are strongly asym-metrical because they presuppose US military hegemony. They thereforeimply a functional division of labour involving horizontal stratificationwithin the international system. Within this ‘layer cake’ arrangement,secondary states take on civilian power roles, and specialize in supportsystems of governance to manage economic and ecological interdepen-dence. This allows institutionalists to counter structural realist claims aboutemerging positional great-power competition. However, this way offraming the debate over the nature of change in the post-Cold War international system fails to recognize the possibility that the asymmet-rical structure of multilateral frameworks that developed during the ColdWar may actually inhibit the overall development of international coop-eration between the major powers. It can encourage Cold War allies toadopt a passive role and foster dependency on the US. With former ColdWar adversaries, extensive security involvement in key strategic regionsby the US is seen as threatening and complicates the diplomacy under-pinning economic engagement. Overall, the dominant trend in theinternational system appears to be producing a more symmetrical struc-ture of rights and responsibilities between the great powers across bothsecurity and economic issues. This implies a vertically stratified divisionof labour structured around growing functional equality between the major powers. Moreover, this pattern is apparent in both Europe andEast Asia, despite wide variations in patterns of economic and institu-tional interdependence across these regions.

In general, there are indications of major discontinuities in the generalpattern of institutionalized activities between the great powers over thefirst decade of the post-Cold War period. There are pressures on the USto reduce the military involvement in Europe and East Asia that it builtup during the Cold War. There are also pressures on secondary states inthese regions to upgrade their contributions to multilateral security andeconomic institutions, and also exert their own influence on a moreautonomous basis than in the past. These discontinuities pose anomaliesfor institutionalist predictions of continuity in the structure of post-1945multilateral agreements after the Cold War. However, neither do they fit well with neorealist hypotheses. While elements of positional great-power competition are present in the emerging international order, thedominant tendency actually appears to be towards a qualitative shift in the density and structure of multilateral relations between the majorpowers. This is visible in two pronounced trends. First, patterns of changein relations between the major powers have been peaceful, and this has

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126 Conclusions

been the case on a global scale. It has occurred not only in WesternEurope, but critically also this trend is equally well developed in EastAsia. Thus the scope of pacification in great power relations within theinternational system has a global geographic extent, operating in all strategic regions in which there are serious candidates for polar status.Second, there is a general trend towards growing equality of status betweenthe major powers within multilateral institutions. This distinguishes theoverall trend observed from bandwagoning within a unipolar power structure. The US is being encouraged to downgrade its commitments inkey strategic regions, and renegotiate multilateral frameworks between the other major powers. This is leading to a shift in the structure ofburden-sharing arrangements between the major powers that are affectingdiplomacy on both security and economic issues. Indeed, equalization ofrights and responsibilities in the security arena facilitates a parallel changein the economic arena because of the dependencies fostered by America’smilitary hegemony. Thus the quality or type of institutionalization withinthe international system is increasingly symmetrical. Together these twotrends combine to highlight the way in which anomalies for neo-realismand institutionalism are compatible with the predictions made by liberaltheory.

The causal mechanisms underlying this pattern are broad, and vary acrossthe continuum from the core to the periphery. There is a powerful rangeof material incentives for major states to establish their relations with othergreat powers on a peaceful basis. Of the cases examined, China appears tobe responding most heavily to this set of incentives. China simply lacks thematerial capabilities to pursue an effective strategy of balancing against theliberal core, and stands to gain enormously from extensive economicengagement with them. Alternatively, states can be predisposed towardsvoluntarily accepting liberal norms of conduct. Germany appears to fit moreclearly within this pattern of adjustment than Japan. Germany has adopteda much more pro-active role in restructuring its relations with other majorpowers on the basis of growing equality of status. This has been apparentin both its role in taking on direct military responsibilities for the mainten-ance of European security, and its shift to a more autonomous contri-bution to policy debates within the European integration process. It hasprobably also been assisted by the way in which on the basis of past practices German policy elites were heavily inclined to approach global economic regimes more favourably on questions of economic liberalization.By contrast, Japan has tended to resist altering the pattern of institutionalcommitments that it had built up during the Cold War. It was more inclinedto engage in free-riding in major security and economic regimes, even when this had the effect of leaving it acutely vulnerable to exploitation by the US. The reason why Germany has been able to adopt a more active role in restructuring its multilateral diplomacy is probably to do with the way in which its preferences during the Cold War were a better

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‘match’ with current trends than those of Japan (Cortell and Davies 2000:73–81). As a result change has been easier to internalize domestically.Nevertheless, it seems clear that only the pace of change appears to beaffected by the fit between previous orientation and current trends.However closely existing strategies match post-Cold War tendencies, all themajor powers analysed were encouraged to adopt significant changes intheir orientation towards multilateralism over the first decade of the post-Cold War period.

The complexity of institutional dynamics in the post-Cold War inter-national system underscores the insight that the emerging order can beviewed as a distinctive hybrid that reflects an aggregate composite of manydifferent trends and tendencies (Buzan 1993; Wendt 1999). Nevertheless,this should not detract from the way in which a strong underlying trendemerges from this aggregate that indicates a qualitative shift in generalpatterns of institutionalized relations between the major powers. This hasincreased the prospects for peaceful change on a global scale, and isworking towards a more equal structure of burden-sharing rights andresponsibilities within the emerging international order. The general trendobserved has been associated with a complex mixture of continuity andchange that poses major anomalies to the predictions of both neorealistand insistitutionalist theory. By contrast, it is compatible with the rangesof behaviour associated with the liberal model.

Foreign policy adjustments

Over the first ten years of the post-Cold War period, Germany, Japan andChina each pursued strategies that reflect a distinctive set of strategic pref-erences. These preferences fall outside of the ranges of behaviour antici-pated by either the neorealist or the institutionalist models. Whilst posinganomalies to established frameworks, this pattern may be understood asreflecting an ‘internalization lag’ of the kind predicted by liberal theory. Thepreferences articulated by the states analysed are summarized in Table 6.2.

The preferences articulated by the unified Germany have been charac-terized by Anderson and Goodman as reflexively institutionalist. As itadjusted to the post-Cold War transition, ‘institutions . . . restructured andremoulded German interests, so that, in the eyes of the German political

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128 Conclusions

Table 6.2 State strategies 1989–1999

State Strategic preferences Analyst(s)

Germany Reflexively institutionalist Anderson and GoodmanJapan Mercantile realist Heginbotham and

SamuelsChina Identity realist Johnston

elites, institutional memberships were not merely instruments for policybut normative frameworks for policy making’ (Anderson and Goodman1993: 24). Although Anderson and Goodman’s characterization was developed through an analysis of Germany’s strategies in the initial post-unification period, it may legitimately be extended to its behaviourthroughout the 1990s. Contrary to neorealism, the united Germany didnot begin to relax its major institutional commitments within NATO andthe European Union. Contrary to institutionalism, Germany’s use of insti-tutions reflected not only instrumental calculations about its interests butthe way in which institutional commitments had reshaped its foreign-policy preferences. Thus there is evidence to indicate that Germany hadextensively internalized cooperative norms associated with key multi-lateral institutions within the international system.

Following Heginbotham and Samuels, it is possible to characterizeJapan’s preferences over the 1990s as mercantile realist (Heginbotham andSamuels 1999). Mercantile realism combines economic nationalism with alow political profile. Contrary to neorealism, Japan consistently prioritizedtechno-economic over politico-military interests, defining its strength interms of wealth and technology and its position in terms of its industrialstructure. This has been most notable in its pronounced tendency to con-tinue to free ride on the US for its security over the 1990s, in particularduring the Gulf War and in the 1995 National Defence Planning Outline.It has also been apparent in its close economic relations with China overthe 1990s, which according to neorealist theory should be a major poten-tial military rival for Japan. Contrary to institutionalism, Japan’s economicrelations with other states have been strongly mercantilist in orientation.This has been reflected in the character of its aid and investment strategiesin Asian countries, and in its troubled economic relations with Westerneconomies. In line with mercantile realist behaviour, Japan is cooperatingeconomically with Asian states with complementary industrial structures(notably China) whilst balancing against advanced industrialized states.Thus, as with Germany, the distinctive preferences articulated by Japan overthe 1990s are not compatible with either neorealist or institutionalist pre-dictions. Instead they strongly reflect the influence of domestic economicand political coalitions built up over the post-1945 period.

Following Johnston, China’s preferences since 1989 may be character-ized as identity realist. Identity realism suggests that Chinese leaders believethat the primary dangers from their security environment come from chal-lenges to the cohesiveness of internal order, and under these circumstancesuse realpolitik discourse and behaviour to prop up regime legitimacy(Johnston 1999). China’s identity realism has its origins in the regimes’realization in 1989 that pursuit of a strategy of developing interdepen-dent relations with the West as a key to modernization had major domesticramifications. In turn this was magnified by the reduction of a directexternal threat to China since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

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As with the other two cases analysed, the preferences articulated by Chinaover the 1990s are anomalous to both neorealism and institutionalism.Contrary to neorealism, the intensification of Chinese realpolitik discourseand behaviour since 1989 has been largely symbolic, and has been temperedby tacit acknowledgement by the ruling elite that engagement with theWest is necessary to sustain the high growth rates required for continuedregime legitimacy. Contrary to institutionalism, the Chinese elite’s deepsense of unease with the effects of increased interdependence on itsdomestic politics results in foreign policy practices with a strongly realistorientation. The consequence is an inconsistent mix of motivations under-lying Chinese foreign policy that highlight the underlying concern of theregime with identity rather than its relative or absolute position.

In terms of the content of their strategies, Germany, Japan and Chinahave responded very differently to the changes that have taken place inthe international system since 1989. However, it remains possible to gener-alize about the foreign-policy behaviour of these major states over the1990s. Each of these states has acquired a wide latitude for autonomousaction in the international system. Their distinctive strategic preferencesfall outside the ranges predicted by both neorealism and institutionalism.This is because of the combined influence of domestic social identities,economic interests and political institutions on their foreign policies. Thisfinding conforms to the predictions offered by a liberal model of the inter-national system. As has been stressed, a liberal account of socializationanticipates a period of lagged adjustment during which states achieve awide latitude for independent action. This reflects their increased capacityfor critical self-reflection and cultural change. By extension, however, thisalso allows considerable scope for states to articulate a variety of pre-ferences reflecting the influence of domestic coalitions. Neorealists andinstitutionalists might object that they could accept that, in particularinstances, the domestic preferences of states might influence their inter-national behaviour. However, three responses may be made to thisargument on the basis of the cases examined. First, these findings applyin relation to the behaviour of three major states that neorealists haveidentified as candidates for polar status within the international system.Such states ought to find themselves exposed to the full force of pressuresarising from the international system. Second, Germany, Japan and Chinaoperate within radically different circumstances in the sense that there arewide variations in patterns of interdependence faced by each of the threestates. Yet across all three, domestic preferences have heavily influencedinternational behaviour. Third, the cases have been examined over a ten-year time frame. Thus, preferences have been a consistent factor ininfluencing foreign policies. It cannot be suggested that, in the cases exam-ined, preferences have influenced foreign policies in an ad hoc fashion.Rather, they decisively shaped their grand strategies throughout the 1990s. It is difficult for neorealists and institutionalists to suggest that

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130 Conclusions

these consistent patterns of behaviour across three major states that operatein very different circumstances represent temporary anomalies to thepatterns of behaviour their theories predict. By contrast, the patternobserved can be explained with reference to the liberal model.

A further general trend may also be identified in terms of the patternof foreign policy adjustments across the three cases. In particular, Germany,Japan and China each face a major crisis of identity transition in the faceof the changes that have taken place in the international system since1989. This may be interpreted as reflecting pressures to internalize liberalnorms and engage in cultural change. Germany’s crisis of identity reflectsthe way in which, as the 1990s progressed, many of the institutionalcommitments that had underpinned its strategies in the past became unsus-tainable. In the initial period of adjustment between 1989 and 1991,Germany continued to pursue strategies compatible with the distinctiveorientation that it had developed over the post-1945 period. However,the institutional commitments this involved have proved impossible forthe unified Germany to maintain. This was felt most acutely in relationto Germany’s participation in the use of military force outside the NATOarea, and the economic pressures placed on it by the costs of unificationand the further development of European integration. These have raisedfundamental questions about the viability of Germany’s grand strategyover the 1990s. In redefining its role within NATO and the EU, Germanyhas consequently adopted a more active approach to managing its inter-national affairs than in the past. Germany has made major changes inthe way in which it participates in these international institutions, andthis has raised uncomfortable questions about its ‘normalization’ as anactor. However, through this process of change Germany has actuallystrengthened its commitment to multilateralism. By altering the terms ofits participation in international institutions, Germany has increased itsrole and functions within these frameworks. Its preference for multilat-eralism has therefore evolved in a norm-governed fashion. Whilst Germanyhas altered the procedures through which it participates in internationalinstitutions, it has done so precisely in order to preserve its normativecommitment to them.

Japan’s predicament mirrors the one facing the unified Germany in thesense that the distinctive strategies it developed after the Second WorldWar have proven increasingly inappropriate to its position within theinternational system. The preferences that Japan has articulated duringthe 1990s reflect the central tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine, originallydeveloped in the 1950s. As the 1990s progressed, the domestic under-pinnings of the Yoshida strategy were rapidly eroded in response to thechanges that have taken place in the international system. Two majordevelopments made this trend increasingly apparent. The first came in1993, with the demise of the Liberal Democratic Party as the party ofgovernment for the first time since it was founded in the 1950s. Although

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the proximate cause of this development was electoral reform, the primarymotive force was pressures for Japan to play a more active political rolein the international system. The second came in 1998, when recessionmeant that structural problems with Japan’s system of economic manage-ment became evident. Taken together, these changes indicate the extentto which Japan’s mercantile realist strategy is increasingly out of line withthe trajectory of change in the international system. They have thereforeraised questions about the way in which Japan defines its identity as anactor within the international system. At the root of this crisis is a searchfor a legitimate Japanese nationalism and a new, non-exclusively economicrole in the world.

China’s crisis of identity has been reflected directly in the distinctiveforeign policy it has pursued. It follows from Iain Johnston’s analysis thatthe Chinese regime’s intensification since 1989 of its ‘realist’ foreign policyorientation lies at the root of its deep sense of insecurity in the world.Identity realism is not a coherent reaction to China’s strategic problemsbecause it is not capable of resolving any of the difficulties it faces in anystructural sense. This is due to the way that China remains dependent ona high level of engagement with the outside world if it is to ensure itssurvival as an important actor in the international system. During the1990s, China has intensified realist foreign policy discourse and behaviorin response to the threat posed to its political regime by growing inter-dependence. The initial impetus to this process came after the TiananmenSquare massacre in 1989, when the Chinese elite first came to realize theextent of the challenge to its political authority posed by domestic changesbegun in the mid-1970s. However, the relatively benign internationalcontext China has faced since the end of the Cold War is equally importantin explaining China’s realpolitik behaviour. China uses a revisionist foreignpolicy orientation to foster internal political cohesion. However unlikelyit seems in the short term that China will adopt a shift in its grandstrategy, its ongoing identity crisis provides evidence that pressures aremounting for it to do so. Ultimately, if China fails to embrace change,then this identity crisis threatens to culminate in disintegration arisingfrom engagement with the West and the impact of globalization on itsdomestic political structure.

Many of the pressures for change facing Germany, Japan and Chinatoday have origins that may be traced back to the early 1970s or evenearlier. Debates over Germany’s role in both NATO and the EU tookplace prior to the unification. In Japan, the issue of burden sharing andpressures for economic liberalization may be traced back for decades. Inthe case of China, the process of economic and social liberalization thatculminated in pressures for decentralization began as far back as 1976.However, in all three cases, 1989 to 1991 proved to be a decisive periodof transition. For Germany, the costs imposed by unification and its moreprominent position in the European international system decisively

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132 Conclusions

constrained its ability to pursue its traditional foreign policy. In the caseof Japan, the end of the Cold War dramatically altered the context inwhich it sustained its relations with the US. Specifically, the removal of the Soviet threat made the principles of the Yoshida Doctrine funda-mentally anachronistic. Finally, for China the 1989–1991 period provedcrucial in altering the way that the ruling elite perceived the consequencesof interdependence. Thus although pressures for change were present ineach of the cases examined prior to the end of the Cold War, the1989–1991 period crystallized their crises of identity transition in eachinstance.

Discontinuities arising from these pressures could, of course, be inter-preted as reflecting neorealist predictions. In this view, these pressuresreflect latent trends towards a more conflictual multipolar order in whichsecondary states adopt a more assertive orientation than has been the caseover the period under examination. However, in each of the three cases itseems more likely that trends actually reflect the need for these countriesto internalize a more liberal strategic orientation. In the case of Germany,change has underscored the extent to which elites have internalized thenorms of key multilateral frameworks. In Japan, the need to move awayfrom the Yoshida strategy reflects pressures to liberalize its economy andplay a more prominent role in burden-sharing arrangements in the securityarena. A lurch in a more genuinely hostile direction by China would riskseverely eroding the domestic political basis of the Chinese elite by stem-ming economic flows deriving from engagement. China’s crisis of identitytransition in the post-1989 period is intimately bound up with its failure toabandon its realist foreign-policy. Overall, the pattern of foreign policyadjustment may be viewed as reflecting the way in which the system as awhole has achieved reflexivity. Units have acquired wide latitude for inde-pendent action that reflects their increased capacity for critical self-reflec-tion and cultural change. The international system therefore can be said tobe in a period of lagged transition in which states internalize liberal normsthrough a process of socialization. This cyclical process is summarized in Figure 6.2.

If it is reasonable to conclude from the foreign-policy adjustmentsobserved that over the first decade of the post-Cold War transition theinternational system has indeed achieved reflexivity, this opens up acomplex set of questions about the nature of the knowledge provided bythis book. It has been argued that achievement of reflexivity is associatedwith a shift in the overall trajectory of socialization within the inter-national system away from the balance of power and towards thedemocratic peace. This behavioural trend has been identified and measuredin relation to a set of pre-defined empirical criteria. Thus a set of posi-tive social scientific hypotheses has been verified as reflecting a plausibleassessment of the empirical properties of the post-Cold War internationalsystem. The conclusion that the system has achieved reflexivity, however,

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logically implies that a purely descriptive and explanatory approach cannotadequately capture what is perhaps its most distinctive historical feature.As Wendt identifies, once reflexivity exists in a system ‘then collectivesbecome aware of the social . . . [structures] they are constituting, and[become able to] move to change them’ (Wendt 1999: 76). Two pointsfollow logically from Wendt’s assessment of reflexivity. First, the researchembodied in this book must itself be understood as part of the reflexivityin the international system that it identifies. The knowledge provided abouttrends in post-Cold War international relations therefore represents anexplicit and formal social scientific articulation of the very process of crit-ical self-reflection that the study seeks to document. Conversely, the bookmust also be viewed as part of the reflexivity that it identifies. If actorsbecome aware that the system is in a process of transformation, then thiscan actively contribute to the pattern of foreign policy adjustments thatis taking place within it. Knowledge about the existence of a permissiveinternational environment that encourages states to internalize culturalchange may in principle become a powerful input into the self-reinforcingpositive feedback loop that the system embodies. In this way, it may helpcreate a self-fulfilling prophesy in which the expectation of future changeitself is a major factor in realizing it.

These theoretical issues about the nature and purpose of social scien-tific enquiry have a very direct impact upon the knowledge containedwithin the present study. If the conclusions that have been reached arethat the international system has indeed achieved reflexivity, then it followsthat this study has a very different methodological status to the bulk ofresearch being conducted within the contemporary field. Like the majorityof research, this study does make a series of positive claims about empir-ical trends in the international system over the 1989–1999 period.However, it also explicitly acknowledges that the knowledge it has gener-ated is both a reflection of and contribution to the reflexivity in theinternational system it documents. It therefore adopts an overtly criticalorientation that recognizes the way in which social scientific research isitself constantly drawn into the patterns of behaviour that it seeks toaccount for. This point is not a trivial theoretical aside, but rather servesto draw out fully the significance of the conclusions reached by this study.As Wendt has recognized, a feature of reflexivity as a property unique tosocial systems is that it ‘gives us perspective on our social environmentand . . . opens up the possibility of thinking self-consciously about whatdirection to go in’ (Wendt 1999: 375). The dramatic and largely unex-pected nature of the changes which have taken place in the internationalsystem since 1989 have opened up fundamental questions about the overalltrajectory of the international system at the turn of the century. In aremarkably short period, the apparently immutable structure of the super-power conflict disintegrated. After a period of uncertainty, the contoursof the new international order are now becoming discernable. The trends

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Conclusions 135

that are becoming apparent provide good reasons to believe that theemerging international system is in the midst of a historic process of trans-formation. Under these circumstances, critical thinking takes on heightenedhistorical significance. Powerful background forces that are at work withinit will foster transformation regardless of the foreign policy adjustmentsmade by any individual great power. However, the speed of change willvery much depend on how aware key actors are of emerging trends, andthe extent to which they are able to incorporate this knowledge into theirgrand strategies. Thinking differently about international relations afterthe Cold War may itself contribute knowledge that plays an importantrole in facilitating the historic transition taking place in the emerging international order.

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136 Conclusions

PostscriptSeptember 11, 2001 and itsaftermath

Since 1999 the international system has been rocked by a series of majorglobal crises that have arguably been on a scale not witnessed during thefirst ten years that followed the Cold War. The attacks launched on NewYork and Washington on September 11, 2001 were closely followed byAmerican dominated military campaigns directed at regime change in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Developments such as these inevitably haveimportant consequences for an analysis of the shape of the emerging inter-national order, and it is therefore appropriate to reflect upon theirsignificance for the nature of post-Cold War international change. Themethodological constraints faced in analysing the post-1999 period areeven greater than those raised in examining the first decade of the post-Cold War transition. The aim, therefore, is not to provide a comprehensiveextension of the framework for the book to the period after 1999. Instead,some preliminary reflections are offered on the implications of recentevents for global trends. A brief summary of the series of crises that haveoccurred in world politics in the period since 1999 is first provided. Theextent to which the underlying causes of the September 11 attacks canbe understood with reference to conventional accounts of the internationalsystem is then considered. The scale and unexpected nature of the systemicshock posed by the attacks has raised parallels with the events surroundingthe collapse of the Soviet Union. It is therefore appropriate to debate theextent to which it may be legitimate to understand September 11, 2001in similar terms to the end of the Cold War. The implications of devel-opments since 1999 for the character of the emerging international systemare also discussed. The events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermathhave generated important questions about whether the great power band-wagoning trend that characterized the initial decade of post-Cold Waradjustment is sustainable. Arguably recent developments reflect a shiftback towards international instability and great power balancing that have long been anticipated by neorealists. The extent to which the apparentbreakdown of great power bandwagoning can be understood as reflect-ing neorealist predictions about the emerging post-Cold War order willtherefore be examined.

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In the period immediately after September 11, 2001, commentators werequick to note that the crisis constituted the first large-scale direct attack onthe homeland of the United States since the Japanese bombing of PearlHarbor in 1941. For this reason alone, there is a strong prima facie casefor its immediate strategic significance for all the major powers and theinternational system being directly comparable to a development on thescale of the collapse of the Soviet empire. Furthermore, the events ofSeptember 11, 2001 were followed by a series of other major internationaldevelopments. In responding to the attacks, the US and its allies launcheda large-scale military intervention aimed at toppling the rule of the Talibanin Afghanistan. By spring of 2002 this had been achieved, although in pur-suing its aims the US also relied significantly on local resistance. Unlike the1991 Gulf War, the Afghanistan intervention was not carried out under theauspices of a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing actionagainst an identified threat to international peace and security. The US didachieve an important string of UNSC resolutions condemning terrorism.However, within international law the US justified its actions in terms ofself-defence in the face of a perceived act of aggression. In an unprecedentedstep, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in response to9/11, despite the way in which the attack was on the US homeland ratherthan on Western Europe. Again, however, the US preferred to act outsidemultilateral frameworks by assembling a ‘coalition of the willing’. The year 2003 saw a third major international crisis, with the US pursuing a policy of ‘pre-emptive’ intervention and regime change in order to deposeSaddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq. Again, this US-led military interventionproved successful in achieving its immediate military objectives in a remark-ably short period of time. In contrast to its intervention in Afghanistan, the US attempted to seek approval for its actions from the UN SecurityCouncil. However, the threat of permanent member veto from France ultimately forestalled the attempt to reassemble the UN coalition formedin response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. The US justified its 2003 intervention in Iraq in terms of alleged attempts by Saddam Hussein’sregime to acquire nuclear and broader weapons of mass destruction capabilities, rather than the threat posed by international terrorism and the Al-Queda network. Senior US officials made attempts to link inter-national terrorism with the issue of WMD proliferation. However, it is open to debate whether the intervention in Iraq would have taken placeregardless of whether September 11 had occurred. A case could be madethat the George W. Bush presidency was committed to a policy of regimechange in Iraq prior to the terrorist attacks. It is certainly possible that theSeptember 11 attacks actually delayed any potential plans for action on the Iraq question.

One major set of questions raised by September 11 relates to the under-lying causes of the attacks. Due to the magnitude and unexpected natureof the crisis, 9/11 has been compared by some experts directly to the end

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138 September 11, 2001 and its aftermath

of the Cold War, not only in the sense that it provided a major globalshock to which all significant actors would have to respond, but alsomore fundamentally in that it has challenged core conceptions about howthe international system operates. On such an account, September 11 hasheralded a new era of world politics in which the basic principles thathad previously been taken for granted about its operation altered dramat-ically. In the case of September 11, however, there are good reasons tobe sceptical about whether the attacks did represent a new category ofevents. In stark contrast to the peaceful end of the Cold War, the eventsof September 11 followed a very old and familiar pattern that is entirelycompatible with well-established conceptions of international relations. Inparticular, they may be viewed as reflecting a response to the residualelements of unipolarity that remain a significant feature of the post-ColdWar international system. Notwithstanding widespread claims of the ‘newworld order’ ushered in by 9/11, students of international relations havelong been aware that one of the most fundamental features of the international system is that it is inherently anti-hegemonial. The US seemsvery likely to have been attacked because since the Gulf War it hasstationed large numbers of troops in the Middle East to ensure Kuwait’sindependence and protect its perceived regional security interests. Thishas, unsurprisingly, been intensely controversial and has led many localactors in the region to view America as an aggressive and imperial power. There is a dramatic contrast between this pattern and the eventssurrounding the end of the Cold War. The disintegration of the SovietUnion is much less amenable to a conventional system-level explanation.Prominent structural realists, including Waltz himself, have explicitlyaccepted that this development is best understood as a domestic collapsewith purely unit level origins. Of course, the end of the Cold War maybe viewed as a consequence of the relative decline of the Soviet empireunder the weight of imperial overstretch. However, it has long been recog-nized by realists that this explanation faces the anomaly posed by thepeaceful character of the 1989–1991 transition (Wohlforth 1995). Thusthe events of 9/11 are qualitatively different from those surrounding theend of the Cold War in the sense that only the causes of the former arebroadly compatible with conventional accounts of the international system.

Moreover, on close inspection September 11, 2001 represents nothinglike the kind of predictive failure posed by the Soviet collapse. Dramaticthough the events of September 11 were, the real question they have raisedis how and why so many analysts failed to apply one of the most basicprinciples of history to the emerging international order. Writing in 1999,Kapstein and Mastanduno were confident enough to argue that Americanhegemony remained largely unchallenged for the foreseeable future. Thusalthough one could envisage threats to America on the horizon, such asIslamic fundamentalism, ‘presumably . . . [such threats] would test othercountries as much if not more than the United States’ (Kapstein and

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Mastanduno 1999: 22). The September 11 attacks have exposed the limitsof this benign assessment of America’s global reach. They ought to havereminded students of international relations of a lesson that the end ofthe Cold War perhaps made them forget. What is anomalous to theemerging order is less the September 11 attacks, and more the continuedAmerican dominance in the international system that tended to prevailover the 1990s. Other commentators have, however, been less sanguineabout the consequences of unipolarity. It is relatively straightforward tofind references in the extant literature maintaining that a direct terroristattack on the US homeland of the sort that occurred on September 11was a distinct possibility. By contrast, the end of the Cold War wasgenuinely and universally unanticipated. Even the most careful search ofthe available literature prior to the late 1980s would not reveal a singleprediction of the imminent demise of the Soviet empire. Thus whilst it istrivially true to note that both September 11 and the end of the ColdWar presented major predictive failures for the majority of analysts andcommentators, the deeper and more interesting issue is whether thesedevelopments fall into the broad ranges of behaviour that may be asso-ciated with established conceptions of the international system. In the caseof the former event, there are clear precedents in established debates withinthe field. With the latter development, this is not so. It is therefore muchmore persuasive to argue that the end of the Cold War rather thanSeptember 11 presents a fundamental challenge to the way in which thelong-term dynamics of the international system are conceptualized.

The consequences of September 11, 2001 and its aftermath for the inter-national system has also generated considerable debate. In particular, thesedevelopments have placed enormous pressures on the bandwagoning trendthat classical realists have argued has characterized the structure of greatpower relations since the end of the Cold War. In different ways, September11, the Afghanistan intervention, and the invasion of Iraq have all exposedthe latent contradictions and problems for the US in attempting to main-tain its unipolar status. In the initial wake of September 11, the responsesof the major powers appeared to fit remarkably well into the analyticalframework put forward by Kapstein and Mastanduno. In managing thecrisis, all the major states bandwagoned with the US whilst maintainingsome capacity for independent action. The US took the lead in providinga direct military response in Afghanistan, with states in Europe and to a lesser extent Japan playing a supportive role. Most remarkably of all, Russia and China accepted direct intervention by the US in an areathey both consider their sphere of influence. NATO did suffer a majorsetback when the US declined to respond to 9/11 under Article 5 of theWashington Treaty, despite the unprecedented nature of its invocation.Nevertheless, if viewed as a statement of diplomatic support by theEuropean members of NATO for the US rather than a firm militarycommitment, this development too may be viewed as a form of band-

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wagoning. Neorealists, however, have remained sceptical about theprospects of maintaining a broad international consensus in tackling sucha wide-ranging and complex issue as ‘international terrorism’. KennethWaltz observed in the period immediately after 9/11 that although theUS-led coalition was a mile wide it was only an inch deep (Waltz 2002).Indeed, within a year of the Afghanistan intervention, US pre-emptiveaction in Iraq led to extremely divisive disputes between the major powersover the management of the non-proliferation regime.

The latest intervention in Iraq has highlighted the way in which bymaintaining its vastly superior military capabilities, the US encouragesserious conflicts of interest to emerge between it and other secondarystates. In his recent and influential book, Robert Kagan refers to the existence of a ‘power divide’ between the US and other countries. Heargues that divisions between the US and European countries over howthe Iraq crisis was managed do not reflect a lack of diplomatic skill orcompetence on either side of the Atlantic. Instead, they are symptomaticof differences in power between the US and other major actors in theinternational system. The US defines threats very differently to Europeanstates partly because of its uniquely vulnerable position as the world’shegemon, and partly because as hegemon it has the capabilities to usemilitary force to counter these threats (Kagan 2003). The salience of these arguments in the period since 9/11 has decreased the relevance of Kapstein and Mastanduno’s argument about the bandwagoning trendthat apparently characterized the international system since the end of theCold War. Conversely, Kagan’s analysis has made a major impact oncurrent debates because it strongly echoes the logic of structural realisttheory. Kagan’s book was directed at the broader policy-making ratherthan at an academic audience. However, readers with even a cursoryfamiliarity with the available theoretical literature will immediately recog-nize that Kagan’s analysis fits well with neorealist predictions. Like theneorealists, Kagan acknowledges the way in which unipolarity generatesstructural conflicts of interest between the US and other major states. Thus a neorealist assessment of the nature of the emerging post-Cold War order has gained some currency as a consequence of the major devel-opments that have occurred in the international system in the period since 1999.

If hegemonic bandwagoning is proving unsustainable, an alternative andmore optimistic scenario for the future might be offered by institutionalisttheory. The logic of institutionalist arguments would tend to indicate thatthe risk of hegemonic decline and overstretch which is intrinsic to the US’s unipolar status will, at least over the longer term, encourage it to relyheavily on multilateralism. This theoretical perspective relies on rationalchoice methodology and a functional logic of cooperation. On the issue of international terrorism, institutionalist logic would identify that thethreat posed by terrorist networks is not only potentially very great for

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the US, but that use of military power alone is likely to provide a very crude instrument in tackling the problem. To deal with international terrorist activities effectively, the US will need to cooperate heavily withother actors on a wide range of issues connected to low politics such asimmigration, policing, and the pooling of intelligence. In the case of uni-lateralism and pre-emptive intervention, institutionalists might identify thelong-term costs for the US associated with consistently behaving in this way. Such actions are likely to generate what Keohane terms a ‘boomerangeffect’ in which the US is subsequently encouraged to return to multilateral channels and instruments to achieve its goals, or sets precedents that it subsequently finds costly or awkward when dealing with other situations(Keohane 2002). Thus a ‘shadow of the future’ may emerge in which thehegemon has long-term incentives to restrain its behaviour so that it can then encourage and demand reciprocity in the future from others.Overall, institutionalism is more optimistic about the prospects for a stable international order, with the post-1945 system of multilateral insti-tutions being the key to maintaining this stability. East Asia’s short historyof multilateralism and poorly developed structure of international interde-pendence arguably remains vulnerable to the resurgence of great powerrivalries and conflicts. However, to date the ‘war against terrorism’ has had Central Asia rather than East Asia as its key focus, and major powerssuch as China and Russia have strong domestic incentives to be reluctantin directly sponsoring terrorist activities directed at the US, at least in the short to medium term. The issue of nuclear proliferation, of course, ismuch more problematic in the East Asian context, especially with respectto North Korea but also including China and potentially Japan. Never-theless, institutionalists could offer a more optimistic scenario for the post-9/11 world based on their arguments about the costs of system man-agement for the hegemon, and the long-term advantages for it in utilizingmultilateral diplomacy.

Arguably, however, the difficulties faced by the US run much deeperthan the functional logic utilized by institutionalist theory indicates. Inhis influential book Myths of Empire, Jack Snyder attempts to integratedomestic and systemic levels of analysis to explain why it is that histor-ically over-extension has been much more common for hegemonic powersthan under-extension and appeasement (Snyder 1991). His ideas may besuggestive in probing the more fundamental implications for Americanforeign policy of the events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath.According to Snyder there is no a priori reason to suppose that systemicfactors can explain the tendency of powerful states to over- rather thanunder-deploy their resources given that territorial expansion can often becounter-productive and actually decrease the security of a state. In orderto explain the tendency to over-expand, he proposes that the domesticpolitical context and the role of ideas in the foreign policy process mustbe considered. Political elites under pressure to consolidate their own

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internal power-base often unintentionally initiate a complex process ofdomestic institutional logrolling in which they make rhetorical commit-ments that play up the risk posed by external threats to foster nationalcohesion and solidarity. This ‘myth of empire’ subsequently spirals out ofcontrol of the ruling elite due to the activities of parochial imperialist andmilitary lobby groups that are able to hijack the state. Eventually the stateelite even comes to believe its propaganda through unintended conse-quences generated by commitments that were initially purely rhetorical.The result of this complex interaction of domestic institutional and inter-national political dynamics is that the state in question eventually comesto find itself seriously over-committed abroad. The political rhetoricemphasizing external threats generates ‘blowback’ for the ruling elite byinitiating a process leading to severe over-extension. Snyder’s argument isa classical (or ‘neoclassical’) realist one which draws upon the role ofdomestic politics and the role of ideas in the policy-making process torefine neorealism’s failure to explain the frequency of over-extension.However, it is possible to extend this argument a stage further than Snyderhimself has done by moving beyond classical realism’s attempt to supple-ment structural realist theory. This may be achieved by locating the originsof blowback and over-extension not just in a domestic institutional contextemphasizing the role played by political myths and logrolling, but in adomestic identity transition undergone by the state arising from the inter-action between domestic and international politics. This line of inquiryserves to further underscore the affinities that exist between the classical/neoclassical realist literature and insights drawn from systemic liberaltheory.

Chalmers Johnson has provided an account of American foreign policycompatible with such a perspective (Johnson 2002). He argues that the foreign-policy dilemmas currently faced by the US are not the inevitableconsequence of its material preponderance. Instead they reflect the failureof the US elite to adjust their foreign-policy goals in fundamental ways toreflect the end of the Cold War. Thus the underlying causes of the currentwar on terrorism as well as the increased stress on unilateralism and pre-emptive intervention actually stem from the long-term fall out generated bythe collapse of the Soviet Union. Specifically, the US did not use the oppor-tunity presented by the Soviet collapse to scale back the global military pres-ence it has developed since 1945 during its struggle with the Soviet Union.According to Johnson, continuation of a Cold War defence posture in apost-Cold War world has resulted in the US today facing severe ‘blowback’arising from the way in which attempts to shore up its national securityinterests are increasingly counter-productive. Blowback shares familyresemblances with imperial overstretch, but its effects are likely to be more acute because they will be associated with a powerful backlash in the international system. In the blowback scenario, the declining hegemondoes not attempt to adjust to its declining power but instead responds

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to this situation by seeking to consolidate an exploitive hegemony. A clas-sic example of blowback in action is, of course, the September 2001 attacks.Johnson can legitimately lay a claim to being one of the few commentatorswho identified that a major terrorist attack on the US homeland was to beexpected when his book was first published in 2000. He also recognized,prior to the emergence of the George W. Bush presidency, the difficultiesthat America’s overwhelming military superiority posed for US engagementwith both former Cold War allies and adversaries alike (Harrison 2004).Johnson concludes that in the opening years of the twenty-first century theUS is likely to face severe blowback arising from its decision to maintain aCold War defence posture in the post-Cold War world. He therefore con-curs with the logic of Snyder’s position that over-extension is more likelyto be a problem for the world’s remaining superpower than the risk ofunder-extension. However, Johnson does not see this issue as simply a resultof domestic institutional logrolling. Rather, the situation reflects a broadercrisis of national purpose arising from the legacy of the end of the ColdWar. Johnson’s account of dilemmas in US foreign relations therefore pro-vides a much more voluntarist assessment of the recent series of inter-national crises the country has faced than that offered by commentators,who assume that America’s current dilemmas have resulted simply from itsposition as the world’s sole remaining superpower. To Johnson, its predica-ment ultimately arises from the very specific way that the US foreign-policyestablishment has chosen to respond to the enormous latitude for actionthat the US has acquired in the post-Cold War world.

Johnson’s assessment of the dilemmas facing US foreign policy is onewhich is compatible with an instance of failed learning within the systemicversion of liberal theory that has been operationalized in this book. Johnsondoes not believe that a logic of violent conflict is an inevitable feature ofthe post-Cold War world. Instead, instability arises from blowback andis the product of a series of strategic choices made by the US since theend of the Cold War. Johnson is not necessarily a revisionist who believesthat everything the US has done internationally since 1945 has been funda-mentally flawed. Rather he believes that the Cold War has distorted theforeign-policy making process in the US, and that America needs to recovera sense of perspective in its foreign policy in the post-Cold War world.If it does so, it may come to recognize that it could achieve much moreto promote global stability and prosperity if it did much less in terms ofglobal ‘engagement’. Alliances and structures of multilateral cooperationbetween the US and other major powers would be much healthier if theyare predicated on the basis of greater equality of status rather than beingasymmetrically organized, and this would also enhance the prospects ofthe peaceful integration of Russia and China into the international system.This would, of course, require a major reduction in the US forward militarydeployments in both Europe and Asia. Moreover Johnson’s voluntarismand his stress on the importance of the strategic choices made by the US

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may be understood as indicative of the way in which reflexivity has becomea pervasive feature of the post-Cold War international system. Once thesystem has achieved reflexivity, a permissive space is opened up in whichactors achieve a heightened capacity for critical self-reflection and culturalchange. What individual actors do with this space is largely a matter forchoice, and this allows for and even systemically generates scope forinstances of failed learning. There is no reason to expect that the USshould have any less difficulty in adjusting to the post-Cold War worldthan Germany, Japan or China, each of which have felt enormously thestrains of this external shock on their domestic political systems. Likethese other major powers, domestic political inertia has led the US to seekto adjust to the end of the Cold War by broadly continuing the defencestrategies it pursued prior to 1989. However, it too is finding that thenew international context is very different and that this has major impli-cations not just for its grand strategy, but also for the organization of itsdomestic political system.

Johnson remains profoundly sceptical about the prospects for a stableinternational order in the opening years of the twenty-first century, whichhe asserts will be defined by a reaction against America’s imperial pres-ence. In this sense there is a different emphasis from the relatively optimisticscenario for a peaceful and liberal international order centred on the demo-cratic peace presented in the present volume. To accommodate this researchby Cederman into the possibility of both ‘maturity effects’ and ‘epochaleffects’ their role in the spread of the democratic peace should be consid-ered (Cederman 2001). Cederman has argued that the democratic peaceis best understood as a macro-historical learning process rather than astatic historical condition. Maturity effects reflect a growth in socializa-tion pressures and increased momentum within the international system,and are associated with a period of accelerated learning and culturalchange. Epochal effects allow for dialectical reversals and periods of slowedhistorical progress that are caused by failed learning and reactions againstthe overall macro-historical trends. Interestingly, the concept of reflexivityallows for the possibility that maturity effects and epochal effects mayactually operate in tandem within one another during the same historicaljuncture. Once the international system has achieved reflexivity, the normcascade produced opens up space for actors to voluntarily accept culturalchange. Since this critical space is a permissive one, failed learning is alsoa systematic possibility and this may stall the overall pace of historicalprogress. Nevertheless, considerable systemic pressures exist for the stateengaging in failed learning to adopt changes in their identity. In the caseof the US, this may take the form of the effects of blowback and over-stretch generated by the attempt to maintain its global military hegemony.As long as this blowback does not result in a general collapse of the inter-national system, there remains considerable latitude for the actor involvedto adjust its foreign policy. Indeed, the US is a relatively open and liberal

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society that over the long term probably has the domestic flexibility toadjust to the demands on its political institutions generated by blowbackand the associated systemic constraints on its foreign policy. Once blow-back has taken its toll on the ability of the US to maintain its globalhegemony, therefore, the progressive underlying dynamic may begin tooperate again with full force, and even gather further momentum.

Of course, it remains distinctly possible that the US will not suffer severeblowback from pursuit of its hegemonic post-Cold War grand strategy. Ifreliance upon benign diplomatic engagement is breaking down, the US mayinstead simply draw upon its sheer military and material dominance in theinternational system to maintain its primacy. Indeed, if anything, eventssince September 2001 have been interpreted by most commentators asreflecting a period of untrammelled American superiority within the inter-national system. Paul Kennedy, who famously identified a post-War trendtowards America’s relative decline in the late 1980s, has now openly con-ceded that his assessment at that time should now be revised (Kennedy2002). Writing in the Financial Times in February 2002, Kennedy hasexpressed the extent to which he was impressed at the ability of the US toproject its military power to respond effectively to the challenge posed bythe Al-Queda attacks. In its response to the 9/11 attacks in Afghanistan,the US had demonstrated an incredible, and historically unprecedented,capacity to use its power resources to effectively police the internationalsystem whilst drawing on diplomatic support by secondary powers inEurope and Asia which was at best of token significance. The theoreticallogic underpinning Kennedy’s new assessment of world politics stronglyreflects William Wohlforth’s modified structural realist argument about thestability of a unipolar world, and indeed this perspective has becomeincreasingly fashionable (Wohlforth 1999). Nevertheless, whilst it hasgained in purchase in the wake of recent developments, at the very least itis important to recognize that this theoretical stance presents an extremelybold empirical prediction. Historically, no hegemon has ever proved capable of maintaining its dominant position in the international systemindefinitely. Moreover, ironically Wohlforth’s argument about unipolarityhas gained widespread popularity in the aftermath of the September 11attacks despite the way in which it is difficult to imagine a more vivid symbol of the fragility of America’s primacy than the collapse of the twin World Trade Center towers captured live on all the major global television networks. For the foreseeable future, the US will remainextremely exposed to such attacks. Despite and perhaps even because of thedoctrine of pre-emption now being pursued by the US, these attacks maywell in future involve weapons of mass destruction. The domestic and inter-national costs associated with taking counter-measures to deal withinternational terrorist threats will also surely impact on the ability of theUS to maintain its global position in future. Arguments for the stability ofunipolarity such as those provided by Kennedy and Wohlforth are

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therefore questionable, and open to the charge that they too heavily discount short-term US military successes over the longer-term domesticand international difficulties that are likely to be faced in sustaining thisstrategy.

Ironically, this argument has actually been made with reference to thepost-9/11 world by none other than Paul Kennedy himself. Writing in theimmediate wake of the September 2001 attacks rather than in the triumphalperiod that followed US intervention in Afghanistan, Kennedy’s assessmentof America’s place in the emerging international system was much less sanguine. Indeed, the conclusions of his contribution to a prominent collec-tion of essays discussing the strategic implications of the new ‘age of terror’express sentiments that capture clearly the long-term necessity for the US to begin to reflect in more fundamental ways on its current grand strategy.The ultimate question raised by 9/11, Kennedy suggested, may be that the strategy of America preserving its ‘Number 1’ status is itself called into doubt:

what if a younger generation of Americans . . . favour the diffusion ofpower and responsibility and burden, and a voluntary alteration ofAmerica’s role from being the hegemonic policeman to being the seniorpartner in a world of democratic states that work out global problemsthrough shared international structures and policies? This sounds fan-ciful in our present age of terror and war . . . [but] even those Americanshostile to the very notion of sharing global power and of the US becom-ing a ‘normal’ country may sooner or later have to accept that it isunavoidable, and is in fact going to happen anyway because of the verysort of liberal and open society we are. The terrorists threat, commit-ted within our own borders though planned from thousands of milesaway, has shown that we need the rest of the world and cannot ignoreit. We cannot ignore making diplomatic compromises, and we can nolonger shun or scorn international organisations. Above all, we cannotstop long term shifts in economic and strategic balances, because byour social and economic policies we are the very artificers of thosefuture changes. . . . Whether we accept that transformation gracefullyand manage the relative change in America’s world position withadroitness – or instead, resent and combat this secular trend, insistingthat the US is exceptional – may be the biggest strategic question of all.

(Kennedy 2001: 77–78)

Kennedy continued by recognizing that for the present time the US proba-bly does have the resources to effectively manage the international systemusing its primacy, and thus these issues are not yet at the forefront of cur-rent debate. Yet it does seem significant that so prominent a proponent ofhegemonic stability theory is prepared to recognize the longer term possi-bility – and indeed inevitability – of alternative futures.

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If the events of September 11, 2001 have underscored one salient featureof the post-Cold War international system it is the chronic uncertainty thatplagues understandings of the world that has been emerging since 1989.Ultimately, even specialists cannot be sure of what the future will bring andwhat the underlying trend in international relations will be. It does seem,at least for the time being, as though the bandwagoning pattern that clas-sical realists identified as characterizing the first decade of the post-ColdWar transition is breaking down. If so, the US may be moving towards relying less on benign perceptions of its power, and more on its sheer mater-ial dominance to regulate the international system. If it is successful in pursuit of such a strategy, then perhaps the theoretical position adopted byWohlforth may prove tenable. Alternatively, it may transpire that the neo-realists were correct in the pessimistic predictions about the future of theinternational system that they made in the initial period after the euphoriasurrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall. Given the overwhelmingly conflict-ual nature of international history and the demonstrated tendency of themodern Westphalian system to collapse into unstable multipolarity andneorealist-style great power balancing, this bleak future for world politicswould surely not be entirely surprising. However, it is also possible that thebreakdown of hegemonic bandwagoning may simply be indicative of theway in which the least stable features of the post-Cold War internationalsystem have been precisely those elements that have been unduly supportedby unipolarity, and the most stable elements those predicated on a broad-based system of great-power concert. Conducting its international diplo-macy from a position of superior military strength, however benign in intentthis may be, was never likely to provide an effective long-term platform for the development of a coherent post-Cold War grand strategy by the US.Alliances founded on inequality may endure for a period and even consol-idate, but sooner or later both the disproportionate costs and risks of sucha strategy for the hegemon and the problems this generates for the statesthat are the object of US ‘engagement’ will surface. This will tend to pro-duce transitional difficulties within the international system and lead to a period of restructuring of great-power rights and responsibilities. Yetif the international order proves able to survive such a period without amajor-power war occurring, then it may conceivably emerge as more robustand mature as a result of this process of change. Precisely what the futureholds nobody can truly be certain. As professional social scientists, inter-national relations scholars have a responsibility to apply their theoreticalmodels and predictions to the patterns that are emerging. They also needto remain open-minded about how the evidence fits their theoretical frame-works. Only if these professional obligations are fulfilled will researcherstruly be able to capitalize on major opportunities offered by unfolding the‘real world laboratory’ that continues to confront them.

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Bibliography 165

ADB see Asian Development BankAfghanistan 25, 137, 138, 140, 141,

146, 147Africa 95Akaha, T. 74Alderson, K. 13Al-Queda 138, 146Amsterdam IGC 54, 59anarchy 7–8, 10, 11, 13, 28–49, 116,

118Anderson, J.J. 61–2, 65, 66, 68, 128–9APEC see Asia Pacific Economic

Co-operationappeasement 142–4Arase, D. 76ASEAN see Association of South East

Asian NationsASEM see Asia-Europe MeetingAsia-Europe Meeting 78Asian Development Bank 75, 80, 124Asian Monetary Fund 72Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation

72, 77, 78, 100Association of South East Asian Nations

73; Regional Forum 77, 98–9Austin, G. 104Australia 96

balance of power 1, 10, 12, 15, 20,30, 31, 43, 112, 116, 117, 118, 120,137

bandwagoning 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,21, 46, 120–1, 127, 137, 140–1,148

Baumann, R. 66Berger, T.U. 88–9

Berlin Wall 1, 148Bernstein, R. 92, 93Bertram, C. 67Beylerian, O. 105bipolarity see polarityblowback 143–4, 145–6Bosnia 52, 53, 58Britain, Anglo-Dutch conflict 31; ERM

55; German reunification 51, 57;Gulf War 52; nineteenth-century 6

Brussels summit (1994) 55Bulmer, S.J. 64burden sharing 20–1Bush, George W. 138, 144Buzan, B. 19–20, 31, 43, 46, 72, 80,

86, 88, 92

Cambodia 52, 74, 95Canivet, C. 105Carpenter, T.G. 99Carr, E.H. 12Cederman, L.E. 145CFE (Treaty) see Conventional Forces

in Europe TreatyChina 5, 9; Afghanistan 140; Africa

95; air force 80, 92; APEC 100;ARF 77, 98–9; ASEAN 73; Belgradeembassy bombed 95; Cambodia 95;Cold War ends 145; Communistideology 101–2; Comprehensive TestBan Treaty 99, 105; cultural life100–6; defence expenditure 92;Diaoyo/Senkaku islands 73, 94;domestic variation 100–6; East Asianfinancial crisis 99; East Timor 96;economy 91, 101, 132; European

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Index

investment 97; foreign policy(1989–99) 91–111, 128–36; GATT96, 99–100; GDP 92; Gulf War 93;Hong Kong 94, 98, 104, 109–10;human rights 93, 96, 97; identityrealism 102–4, 129; identitytransition 131–3; IMF 99; India 95;Inner Mongolia disturbances 102;institutionalized activity 121;interdependence 91, 97, 108, 132,133; Iran 96; Japan 71, 73, 77, 80,81, 85, 86, 87, 93–4, 97, 98, 104,122, 129; Khmer Rouge 95; Koreanunification 105; Kosovo 95–6; Lawon Territorial Waters and theirContiguous Areas 94; Macao 94;major powers and 127; MischiefReef 74, 94; modernization 91, 101; Most Favoured Nation status96, 97; MTCR 96, 99; multipolarity51; nationalism 101–2; navy 73, 80, 92; neoconservatism 108–9;Non-Proliferation Treaty 96, 99; and North Korea 93; nuclearprogramme 73, 94, 96, 99, 142;Pakistan 95, 96; Paracel and Spratly Islands 73, 94, 98, 104;peaceful integration 144–5; PLA 92,101; political choices 106–11; Russia 95; sanctions against 80, 93;Saudi Arabia 96; socialization 107;South China Sea 104; Soviet Union92, 129; Syria 96; Taiwan 93, 94,98, 100, 104, 105, 109; TaiwanStraits crisis (1996) 110, 125;Tiananmen Square 80, 91, 93, 95,102, 103, 108, 132; Tibetdisturbances 102; UN 93, 95; United States 6, 17, 41, 74, 79, 85,93, 96, 100, 125; World Bank 99;WTO 96, 99–100, 109; Xinjiangdisturbances 102

Clark, I. 115Clinton, Bill 54, 72, 97Cold War, end of 1, 2, 3–4, 15, 18,

21, 41, 45, 103, 112, 113–21, 137,138–9, 140, 143–5; defined 3

collective security 12Communism 101–2

competition 30–2, 38–9, 43Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 99,

105Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe 55, 58, 63,78

constructivism 11, 13, 15, 28, 36, 118; see also liberal model of theinternational system; socialization

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty(1990) 57

Cooper, Robert 46Croatia 52, 121–2CSCE see Conference on Security and

Cooperation in EuropeCTBT see Comprehensive Test Ban

Treatyculture: cultural change 29, 38, 43,

118, 119; cultural identity 29;defined 14

Czech Republic 58

democratic peace, the 9–10, 11, 12,13–14, 15, 36, 37, 38, 43, 117, 118, 119, 120, 145

Deng Xioping 91, 101, 102Dessler, D. 30, 31Deudney, D. 18–19, 20Diaoyo Islands 73, 94Dibb, P. 92domestic and international systems

distinguished 3–4, 4–5, 30, 36Dorff, R.H. 69Doyle, Michael 9–10, 14, 20Drifte, R. 85Duffield, J. 63

EAEG see East Asian EconomicGrouping

East Asia: US military presence 5–6, 9, 71, 72, 76–7, 80, 93, 98, 110,122, 124, 125, 126, 127

East Asian Economic Grouping 75–6,78

East Asian financial crisis 71, 72, 76,79, 80, 87, 88, 99, 124

East Timor 96EBRD see European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development

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Index 167

EFTA see European Free TradeAssociation

epochal effects 145ERM see Exchange Rate Mechanism EU see European UnionEuropean Bank for Reconstruction

and Development 78–9European Central Bank 56, 123European Commission 59–60European Council 5, 60, 123European Free Trade Association 60European Union: Afghanistan 140;

ARF 77; ASEM 78; budget 56, 60,121–2, 123; CAP 56, 60, 66; CFSP 53, 57; competition policy 66; EMU 56, 59, 62, 64;enlargement 9; ERM crisis 55–6, 57, 121–2; Eurocorps 53–4;European Parliament 60; expansion60, 64, 65, 66; Germany 50, 57, 59, 64, 68, 122, 129, 131, 132;High Representative for ForeignPolicy 54; Japan 75; QMV 54, 56,60, 123; rapid reaction corps 54;structural funds 60, 62, 66; Treatyon European Union 53; UnitedStates 5–6, 125

Evans, P. 107Exchange Rate Mechanism 55–6, 57,

121–2

Fewsmith, J. 108Financial Times, the 146Finnemore, M. 15–16, 45Foot, R. 98foreign policy adjustments 16, 120–1France: EMU 56; European Central

Bank 56, 123; European Council123; European integration 59;Germany 51, 55, 57, 59, 61, 123;Gulf War 52; Iraq 138; QMV 123;Stability Pact (1996) 56; UnitedStates 55, 59

Friedman, E. 93FS-X fighters 75

G7 see Group of SevenGallagher, M. 98Garrett, B.N. 77

GATT see General Agreement onTariffs and Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade 5, 55, 59, 78, 96, 99–100;Uruguay Round 55, 78

Genscher, Hans Dietrich 61George, A. 74‘German Question’ 50Germany 5; Amsterdam IGC 54, 59;

AWACS flights 52; Berlin Wall 1,148; Bosnia 52, 53, 58; Bundesbank55–6, 62, 63; Bundeswehr 50, 52,57; Cambodia 52; CAP 56, 60, 66;CDU 123; CFSP 53, 57; ‘civilianpower’ 8; Cold War ends 145;constitution 19, 50, 52, 123;Conventional Forces in EuropeTreaty (1990) 57; Croatia 52;CSCE/OSCE 58, 63; domesticvariation 61–5; Eastern Europe,German influence over 57; economicproblems 123; EMU 56, 59, 62, 64;ERM crisis 55–6, 57, 121–2; EUbudget 56, 60, 121–2, 123; EUcompetition policy 66; EU expansion60, 64, 65, 66; EU structural funds 60, 62, 66; Eurocorps 53–4; European Central Bank 56,123; European Commission 59–60;European Council 60, 123;European integration 59, 62, 64, 66,67, 123, 127; European Parliament60; European security 62, 127;Federal Constitutional Court 52;foreign policy (1989–99) 50–69,128–36; France 51, 55, 57, 59, 61,123; G7 59; GATT/WTO 55, 59;Greens 53, 123; Gulf War 52, 123;identity transition 131–3; IFOR 53;IMF 59; institutionalized activity121; Japanese trade relations 55;KFOR 53; Kosovo 53, 55, 58, 66;Maastricht Treaty 52, 53, 59, 60;major powers 127–8; militaryactivity outside NATO 52, 57, 58,63, 65, 68, 123, 131; Ministry ofFinance 62; multilateralism 67, 68;multipolarity 51; NAAC/PfP 58, 63;NATO 50, 51, 53, 54, 57, 58, 61,

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168 Index

62, 63, 65–6, 68, 122, 129, 131,132; Non-Proliferation Treaty 57;Oder-Neisse border 51; OperationDeliberate Force 53, 123; PetersbergTasks 53–4; PHARE and TACISfunding 60; Polish Border incident57–8; political choices 65–9; QMV54, 56, 60, 123; reflexivelyinstitutionalist 62, 128; reunification3, 9, 50, 51, 54, 57, 59, 61, 121–2,123; Russia 54, 59; SDP 53, 123;SFOR 53; Slovenia and Croatia 52,121–2; Somalia 52; Srebrenicamassacre 53; Stability Pact (1996)56; status 20; Treaty on EuropeanUnion 53; United States 6, 20, 41,57, 61, 123, 124; Western EuropeanUnion 53–4, 57; World Bank 59;Yugoslav crisis 52, 123

Gilpin, R. 74Glaser, B.S. 77Goldieger, J.M. 45–6Goldstein, A.J. 104Goodman, J.B. 61–2, 65, 128–9Group of Seven 59, 78Gulf War 52, 71, 72, 74, 76, 78, 83,

92, 93, 123, 124, 129, 138, 139

Hall, I.P. 75–6Harding, H. 109Harnisch, S. 67Harris, S. 97, 107Harvard University 2–3Hasenclever, A. 35–6hegemony 146; hegemonic stability

theory 6, 113–21; US 8, 17, 18, 21,122, 126, 139, 141, 142, 145–6

Heginbotham, E. 79, 80, 81, 84, 129

Heilbrun, J. 56Hellmann, G. 66Hoffman, S. 2–3, 4, 9, 22, 26, 62,

114Holland: Anglo-Dutch conflict 31Hong Kong 94, 98, 104, 109–10Hungary: and NATO 58Huntley, W.L. 14, 15, 37, 39, 46Hussein, Saddam 138Hyde-Price, A. 58

identity: construction 28, 42; realism102–4, 129; transition 143

Ikenberry, J. 18–19, 20IMF see International Monetary

Fundimitation 31imperial overstretch 143–4Inada, J. 78India: ARF 77; China 95; nuclear

testing 73, 99Inner Mongolia 102Inoguchi, T. 78institutionalist model of the

international system 1, 3, 4, 7–8, 11,12; China 97–100, 130; defined 24,40, 57, 76, 97, 101; Cold War ends112, 114; foreign policy adjustments17–18; Germany 57–61;institutionalized activity 121;international change 41;international terrorism 141–2; Japan76–9, 81, 82, 84–5; key variable 33;‘linear’ relationship with neorealismand liberalism 28, 40, 41, 48, 113,116–17; logic of anarchy 33–6;neoliberal institutionalism 34;rationality 117; synthesis withneorealism and liberalism 40–7;theoretical framework 40; theoriesand predictions 23; ‘triangular’relationship with neorealism andliberalism 28, 40, 42, 43, 117

institutionalization 16, 121–8; defined13; reflexive 62

internalization 13international and domestic systems

distinguished 3–4, 4–5, 30, 36international institutions: defined 3International Monetary Fund 5, 59,

72, 73, 78, 99Iran 25, 96, 138, 141; Kuwait invaded

138, 139; regime change 137, 138,140, 141; weapons of massdestruction 138

Islamic fundamentalism 139Italy: Gulf War 52

Jackson-Vanik amendment 97Janning, J. 66–7

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Index 169

Japan 9; ADB 75, 80, 124;Afghanistan 140; AMF 72; APEC72, 77, 78; ASEM 78; Cambodia 74;car parts dispute 75; China 71, 73,77, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 93–4, 97, 98,104, 122, 129; ‘civilian power’ 8;Cold War ends 145; constitution 19,70, 74, 78, 80, 86, 124; CSCE/OSCE 78; Diet Resolution 90; EAEG75–6, 78; domestic variation 79–83;East Asian financial crisis 71, 72, 76,79, 80, 87, 88, 124; EBRD 78–9;economic strategy 124; EU 75;failure to remilitarize 79, 80, 88–9;foreign investment 75; foreign policy(1989–99) 70–90, 128–36; FS-Xfighters 75; G7 78; gaitsu 72, 75,80, 88, 124; GATT/WTO 78; GDP71; Gulf War 71, 72, 74, 76, 78, 83,124, 129; human rights 76; identitycrisis 90; identity transition 131–3;IMF/World Bank 72, 73, 78;imperial past 88–9; institutionalizedactivity 121; integration of 20;kieretsu 83, 84; Korean unification73; Kurile Islands 73, 87; LDP 83,84, 131–2; low political and militaryprofile 81, 82, 88–9; major powers127–8; Manila Framework Group72; mercantilism 75, 76, 81, 85, 88,129, 132; MST 19, 70, 71, 73, 77,79, 85, 86, 87, 88, 93–4, 98, 124,125, 129; multilateral developmentbanks 75, 78, 81; multipolarity and51; National Defence PlanningOutline (1995) 77, 79, 124, 129;NATO 77; North Korea 71, 73;nuclear programme, potential 142;OECD 78; oil supply 73; Okinawa86; overseas aid 75, 80, 124; partysystem 83, 88; Pearl Harbor 138;PKO 74, 78; political choices 83–90;post-War rehabilitation 70; rape ofJapanese girl 71; recession (1998)83–4; SDF 74, 77, 78, 124; SenkakuIslands 73, 94; SII 74; South Korea73; status 20; Taiwan 71; TaiwanStraits 73; TMD 73, 77, 86; traderelations with West 80; UN 74, 77;

United States 5, 6, 20, 41, 71, 72,74–5, 77, 80, 85, 86, 87, 122,124–5, 133; US-Japan JointDeclaration (1996) 73; YoshidaDoctrine 70, 82, 83, 84, 85, 90,131, 133

Jeffery, C. 64Jervis, R. 44Jiang Zemin 72, 101Johnson, C. 87, 143–5Johnston, A.I. 102–4, 105, 107, 129,

132Johnstone, C.B. 87Jones, C. 31

Kagan, R. 25–6, 141Kant, Immanuel 9–10, 11, 14, 20, 26,

37, 38, 117, 120Kapstein, E.B. 3, 4, 16–19, 21, 22, 26,

120, 139–40, 141Katzenstein, P.J. 59, 61, 62, 82Keehn, E.B. 87Kennedy, P. 146–7Keohane, R.O. 2–3, 4, 9, 12–13, 22,

26, 28–9, 30, 33–5, 40–2, 45, 47,48, 62, 114, 120, 142

Khmer Rouge 95Kim, S.S. 101Kinkel, Klaus 55Kirschner, E.J. 56Kohl, Helmut 51, 55, 57–8, 61, 62Kosovo 53, 54, 55, 58, 66, 95–6Kurile Islands 73, 87Kuwait: Iraq invades 138, 139

‘layer cake’ system 8Layne, C. 51, 91Levine, S.I. 101, 102liberal model of the international

system 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14;China 100–6, 106–11; Cold Warends 112; defined 24, 61, 79, 101;Germany 61–5, 65–9;institutionalized activity 121; Japan79–83, 83–90; ‘linear’ relationshipwith neorealism and institutionalism28, 40, 41, 48, 113, 116–17; logic ofanarchy 36–40; predictions 14–22;socialization 130; Soviet collapse

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170 Index

118–21; synthesis with neorealismand institutionalism 40–7; theoreticalframework 40; theories andpredictions 23; ‘triangular’relationship with neorealism andinstitutionalism 28, 40, 42, 43, 117;see also socialization

Lincoln, E.J. 71Little, R. 31, 43Locke, John 11, 20, 117, 120

Maastricht Treaty 52, 53, 59, 60Macao 94McFaul, M. 45–6Malaysia 75Manila Framework Group 72Mao Tse Tung 91, 102Markovitz, A.S. 63–4Mastanduno, M. 3, 4, 16–19, 21, 22,

26, 120, 139–40, 141master variables 44maturity effects 145Maull, H.W. 8, 58, 63, 67Mayer, P. 35–6Mearsheimer, J.J. 25, 51, 91Meiers, F.J. 58–9, 63mercantile realism 81–2, 85, 88, 129,

132Middle East 119Mischief Reef 74, 94Mochizuki, M.M. 86Moore, T.G. 108Moravcsik, A. 10, 13, 36, 37, 39, 117Mukae, R. 89Mulgan, A.G. 75Muller, H. 57–8multipolarity see polarityMunro, R.H. 92, 93

NACC see North Atlantic CooperationCouncil

national interests 29NATO see North Atlantic Treaty

Organizationneorealist model of the international

system 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 141;ambiguity 32; Berlin Wall 148;China 91–7, 130; Cold War ends112, 114; defined 24, 41–2, 101;

foreign policy adjustments 17–18;Germany 51–7; institutionalizedactivity 121; international change41; international terrorism 141;Japan 70–6, 81, 82, 85; key variable30; ‘linear’ relationship withinstitutionalism and liberalism 28,40, 41, 48, 113, 116–17; logic ofanarchy 30–3, 36, 37, 40; over-extension 143; polarity 6, 8;rationalist model 28; reflexive logic28; September 11, 2001 137; Sovietcollapse 139; synthesis withinstitutionalism and liberalism 40–7;theoretical framework 40; theoriesand predictions 23; ‘triangular’relationship with institutionalismand liberalism 28, 40, 42, 43, 117;unipolarity 146

New York 137–48Non-Proliferation Treaty 57, 96, 99norms 13; cascade 15–16, 145North Atlantic Cooperation Council

58, 63North Atlantic Treaty Organization

5, 9, 19; Czech Republic 58;enlargement 17, 54–5, 58; Germany50, 51, 53, 54, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63,65–6, 68, 122, 129, 131, 132;Hungary 58; Japan 77; NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council 55;Poland 58; Russia 55; September 11,2001 138; Washington Treaty 140–1

North Korea 71, 73; China 93; nuclearprogramme 71, 73, 96, 142; USsanctions 71

NPT see Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear proliferation: China 73, 94,

96, 99, 142; India 73, 99; Japan142; North Korea 71, 73, 96, 142;Pakistan 73

Nye, J.S. 2–3, 4, 8, 9, 22, 26, 35, 62,76–7, 80, 85, 87, 92, 98, 114, 122

Oder-Neisse border 51OECD see Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development Okawara, N. 82Okinawa 71, 86

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Index 171

Operation Deliberate Force 53, 123Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development 78Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe 55, 58, 63,78

OSCE see Organization for Securityand Cooperation in Europe

over-extension 142–4

pacific union 20Pakistan: and China 95, 96; nuclear

testing 73Paracel and Spratly Islands 73, 94, 98,

104Partnership for Peace 58, 63Paterson, W.E. 64‘path dependent’ change 8Pearl Harbor 138Pearson, M.M. 107Petersberg Tasks 53–4PfP see Partnership for PeacePHARE see Poland and Hungary Aid

for Economic Reconstruction Philippines 94Poland: Border incident 57–8; German

reunification 51; NATO 58; Oder-Neisse border 51

Poland and Hungary Aid for EconomicReconstruction 60

polarity 5; bipolarity 5, 8; multipolarity5, 6, 8, 148; unipolarity 5, 6, 115,139, 140, 147

Prisoner’s Dilemma 34Pye, L.W. 102Pyle, K.B. 83, 85, 86, 89

rationality 28–49reflexivity 11–12, 13, 28–49, 113, 116,

117–18, 133–5, 145; defined 39regime change see Afghanistan; IraqReich, A. 63–4Rittberger, V. 35–6Robinson, T.W. 105Ruggie, J.G. 32Ruhe, V. 54–5Russia 45, 119; Afghanistan 140;

China 95; East Asia 9; Germany 54,59; international society 8; Kosovo

53, 54; Kurile Islands 73; NATO 55;peaceful integration 144–5; terroristactivities 142; United States 6, 17;see also Soviet Union

Rynhold, J. 99

Salmon, T.C. 52Samuels, R.J. 79, 80, 81, 84, 129Sato, H. 59, 87, 110Saudi Arabia 96Schlor, W.F. 63Second World War 50, 63Segal, G. 72, 92, 98, 102, 103, 106,

109, 111Senkaku Islands 73, 94September 11, 2001 25, 26, 137–48Shambaugh, D. 104, 106–7Shinn, J. 106Sikkink, K. 15–16, 45Slovenia 52, 121–2Smith, M.E. 65Snyder, Jack 142, 144socialization: the liberal model 10–11,

12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 28,29, 30–2, 33, 36, 38–9, 42, 43, 47,116, 118, 119, 120–1, 130, 145;defined 13, 30

Somalia 52South China Sea 73South Korea 73Soviet Union: August coup (1991) 1;

collapse of 1, 2, 3, 15, 17, 24, 27, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 54, 82,91, 103, 112, 113–21, 125, 129,137, 138, 139, 140, 143–5; German reunification 51, 57; IMFpackage 73; Kurile Islands 87;Pacific Fleet dismantled 91; Second World War 70; Sino-Sovietsplit 92; stagnation 91; Vietnam aid ended 95; withdrawal of powerfrom Central Europe 3; see alsoRussia

Srebrenica 53state strategies: defined 3Sterling-Folker, J. 43structural realist model of the

international system see neorealistmodel

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172 Index

Syria 96systemic theory 48, 114

TACIS see Technical Assistance to theCIS

Tadokoro, M. 84 Taiwan 71, 93, 94, 98, 100, 104, 105,

109Taiwan Straits 73; crisis (1996) 110,

125Technical Assistance to the CIS 60Tewes, H. 66, 67Tiananmen Square see ChinaTibet 102Tow, W.T. 92Two-Plus-Four 51, 61

UN see United Nationsunder-extension 142–4Union of Soviet Socialist Republics see

Soviet Unionunipolarity see polarityUnited Nations 93, 95; Conference on

the Law of the Sea 94; Gulf War138; Implementation Force 53;Japan and 74, 77; Kosovo Force 53;Stabilization Force 53

United States of America: Afghanistan146, 147; APEC 78; ARF 77;blowback 145–6; China 6, 17, 41,74, 79, 93, 100, 125; ‘coalition ofthe willing’ 138; Cold War ends 2,143–5; containment strategy 5;dominance 6, 16–17; East Asianmilitary presence 5–6, 9, 71, 72,76–7, 80, 93, 98, 110, 122, 124,125, 126, 127; Europe 5–6, 58, 126,127; foreign policy dilemmas 144,146; France 55, 59; GDP 6;Germany 6, 20, 57, 61, 123, 124;Gulf War 52, 71, 72, 74, 76, 78, 83,92, 93, 123, 124, 129, 138, 139;hegemony 8, 17, 18, 21, 122, 126,

139, 141, 142, 145–6; Iraq 137,138, 139, 140, 141; Japan 5, 6, 20,41, 71, 72, 74–5, 77, 80, 87, 122,124–5, 133; military capabilities141; overstretch 145–6; PearlHarbor 138; Philippines withdrawal94; pre-emption 146–7; Russia 6,17; Sino-US-Japanese relations 85;Soviet Union collapses 143–5; TMD86; Trade Act (1989) 74; unipolarity41, 92, 140, 141

Van Wolferen, K. 83, 84, 89variation 33Vietnam 95

Wallace, W. 67Waltz, K.N. 4–7, 20, 30–3, 45, 51,

91, 113–18, 139, 141Wan, M. 80–1Wang, H. 107–8Washington, DC 137–48Washington Treaty 138Wendt, A.E. 11, 13–14, 20, 32–3,

38–9, 44–5, 47, 117, 119–20, 135

Western European Union 53–4, 57Westphalia, Treaty of 148WEU see Western European UnionWilson, Woodrow 12Wohlforth, W. 6–7, 115, 146–7, 148World Bank 5, 59, 72, 73, 78, 99World Trade Center, New York

137–48World Trade Organization 55, 59, 78,

96, 99–100, 109WTO see World Trade Organization

Xinjiang 102

Yahuda, M. 104, 109Yang, D. 108Yugoslav crisis 52, 123

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Index 173