ex parte us bank national association and us bancorp
TRANSCRIPT
REL:02/07/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advancesheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made beforethe opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014____________________
1120904____________________
Ex parte U.S. Bank National Association and U.S. Bancorp
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc.
v.
U.S. Bank National Association and U.S. Bancorp)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-11-1241)
BOLIN, Justice.
U.S. Bank National Association and U.S. Bancorp
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "U.S. Bank") seek a
1120904
writ of mandamus ordering the Jefferson Circuit Court to
dismiss the malicious-prosecution case filed against them by
Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc. ("Sterne Agee"), that arose out of
a lawsuit prosecuted by U.S. Bank entirely in the State of
Washington.
Facts and Procedural History
In 2002, Sterne Agee, a Delaware corporation with
headquarters in Alabama and offices in Seattle, Washington,
acted as the underwriter in Washington for securities offered
by a Washington business entity. Under the Washington State
Securities Act, Sterne Agee was a "seller" of the securities.
In 2004, in federal district court in Washington, U.S. Bank
sued Sterne Agee, among others, alleging that the defendants
had violated the Washington State Securities Act through a
series of material omissions in the securities offering.
U.S. Bank obtained default judgments or entered into
settlement agreements with all the defendants except Sterne
Agee. In 2006, U.S. Bank's claims against Sterne Agee
proceeded to trial. The trial court granted Sterne Agee's
motion for a judgment as a matter of law. U.S. Bank appealed,
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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vacated the federal district court's order and remanded the
case to the federal district court. Following a second trial
in 2009, the federal district court entered a judgment in
favor of Sterne Agee. U.S. Bank appealed, and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment in 2011.
On July 1, 2011, Sterne Agee sued U.S. Bank in the
Jefferson Circuit Court, alleging malicious prosecution
arising out of the lawsuit prosecuted by U.S. Bank in
Washington. The case was removed to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, which
subsequently remanded the case to Jefferson Circuit Court. On
January 31, 2013, U.S. Bank filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that under Alabama's choice-of-law rules applicable when two
or more jurisdictions have an interest in the outcome of a
dispute, Alabama would apply the law of the state where the
injury occurred. Because this is a malicious-prosecution
action, U.S. Bank argued, the injury was forcing U.S. Bank to
defend an allegedly malicious securities action in Washington
state and the injury thus occurred in Washington state. On
April 11, 2013, the circuit court denied U.S. Bank's motion to
dismiss. On April 16, 2013, U.S. Bank moved the circuit court
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to certify its order for a permissive interlocutory appeal
pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P. On April 16, 2013, the
circuit court denied the motion. On May 1, 2013, U.S. Bank
petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.
Standard of Review
U.S. Bank sought to have the circuit court certify the
conflict-of-law issue for a permissive appeal pursuant to Rule
5, Ala. R. App. P. Rule 5 allows for an appeal of an
interlocutory order involving a controlling issue of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
when an immediate appeal would materially advance termination
of the litigation and would avoid protracted and expensive
litigation. This Court has allowed permissive appeals to
address conflict-of-laws situations where the trial court has
certified the issue for permissive appeal under Rule 5. See,
e.g., Precision Gear Co. v. Continental Motors, Inc., [Ms.
1110786, July 12, 2013] So. 3d (Ala. 2013); Fitts v.
Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 581 So. 2d 819 (Ala. 1991).
In the present case, the circuit court refused to certify
the conflict-of-laws issue for a permissive appeal. We
recognize that a certification allowing a party to seek a
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permissive appeal under Rule 5(a) is discretionary with the
trial court. Ex parte Burch, 730 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 1999). In
Ex parte Burch, we treated a mandamus petition addressed to a
trial court's denial of a motion in limine as a petition
seeking a permissive appeal. Even though the petitioner in
Burch had not asked the trial court to certify the issue for
permissive appeal, the transcripts from the hearing on the
motion in limine revealed the trial court's belief that this
Court's resolution of the motion in limine was important to
materially advance the litigation. We note that here the
trial court stayed the taking of depositions until this Court
ruled on the mandamus petition.
In Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 825 So.
2d 758 (Ala. 2002), three of the eight sitting Justices agreed
that mandamus would lie to direct a trial court to certify an
interlocutory order for permissive review when the trial court
had refused to do so upon a showing that the court had clearly
exceeded its discretion, a showing not apparent on the face of
the complaint in that case. Two Justices wrote separately to
explain their belief that a Rule 5 certification was entirely
discretionary "in the [trial] judge's opinion," Rule 5(a),
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Ala. R. App. P., and that an appellate court could not force
a trial judge to hold any certain opinion. In his special
writing, Justice Harwood wrote that appellate courts should
resist asserting mandamus power to compel certification of an
interlocutory order for permissive appeal. He noted that it
would be a truly rare situation in which it would be
appropriate for this Court to require certification of an
issue of compelling importance, "comparable at the State level
to 'a controlling issue of national significance,'" and he
cited Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 431 (11th Cir.
1982), a case that involved deportation, jurisdiction, and a
foreign forum. 825 So. 2d at 768-69 (Harwood, J., concurring
specially). However, U.S. Bank is not seeking mandamus to
compel the circuit court to certify the conflict-of-laws issue
for permissive appeal. Instead, U.S. Bank seeks mandamus as
its only remedy to review the conflict-of-laws issue raised in
its motion to dismiss because its certification to seek
permissive appeal has been denied and because this Court and
the Court of Civil Appeals have granted mandamus review in
cases involving conflict-of-laws issues. See Ex parte Exxon
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Corp., 725 So. 2d 930 (Ala. 1998), and Batey & Sanders, Inc.
v. Dodd, 755 So. 2d 581 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991), respectively.
In Ex parte Exxon, supra, this Court held that a mandamus
petition is an appropriate method by which to seek review of
a trial court's misapplication of conflict-of-laws analysis in
a class-action certification. Although the Court in Exxon
recognized the well settled principle that mandamus is a
proper tool by which to challenge certification of a class
action, it also recognized that, in determining whether there
is a common question of law for class-certification purposes,
Alabama will determine the rights of an injured party
according to the law of the state where the injury occurred.
In Batey & Sanders, supra, an employee sued his employer
seeking worker's compensation benefits; he also sought damages
for an alleged retaliatory discharge for seeking worker's
compensation benefits. The employer had an office in Alabama
and one in Georgia, and it hired the employee to work out of
its Georgia office. The trial court originally dismissed the
employee's retaliatory-discharge claim but later reinstated
it. The employer petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus, and we transferred the case to the Court of Civil
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Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals held that under the rule
of lex loci delicti the law of Georgia governed the employee's
tort claim of retaliatory discharge because his employment had
been terminated in Georgia. The Court of Civil Appeals stated
that, "[b]ecause the wrong complained of occurred in Georgia,
the law of Georgia applies," and it granted the petition and
ordered the trial court to dismiss the retaliatory-discharge
claim because Georgia law does not recognize a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge. 755 So. 2d at 583.
This Court has held that a writ of mandamus is an
appropriate means by which to review the following: subject-
matter jurisdiction, Ex parte Johnson, 715 So. 2d 783 (Ala.
1998); standing as a component of subject-matter jurisdiction,
Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 974 So. 2d 288 (Ala. 2007);
nonjusticiability as a component of subject-matter
jurisdiction, Ex parte Valloze, [Ms. 1111335, September 27,
2013] So. 3d (Ala. 2013); personal jurisdiction, Ex
parte Duck Boo Int'l Co., 985 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 2007);
immunity, Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000); failure
to exercise due diligence in identifying, before expiration of
the statute of limitations, a fictitiously named defendant as
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the party to be sued, Ex parte Chemical Lime of Alabama, Inc.,
916 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 2005); a denial of a motion for a change
of venue when venue has been challenged as improper, Ex parte
Daniels, 941 So. 2d 251 (Ala. 2006); a denial of a motion to
dismiss where the doctrine of forum non conveniens is
applicable, Ex parte Kia Motors America, Inc., 881 So. 2d 396
(Ala. 2003); a refusal to enforce an outbound forum-selection
clause when the issue is presented in a motion to dismiss, Ex
parte Bad Toys Holdings, Inc., 958 So. 2d 852 (Ala. 2006);
class certification, Ex parte Caremark RX, Inc., 956 So. 2d
1117 (Ala. 2006); a motion to dismiss an action based on
abatement, Ex parte J.E. Estes Wood Co., 42 So. 3d 104 (Ala.
2010); the grant of a motion adding a real party in interest,
Ex parte Tyson Foods, Inc., [Ms. 1110931, May 24, 2013]
So. 3d (Ala. 2013); the availability of a jury trial, Ex
parte BancorpSouth Bank, 109 So. 3d 163 (Ala. 2012); a ruling
on a motion to dismiss a counterclaim that was a compulsory
counterclaim in a previous action, Ex parte Cincinnati Ins.
Co., 806 So. 2d 376 (Ala. 2001); rulings on discovery motions
where a privilege is disregarded, when discovery orders the
production of patently irrelevant or duplicative documents
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such as to clearly constitute harassment or impose a burden on
the producing party far out of proportion to any benefit that
may be obtained by the requesting party, when the court
imposes a sanction effectively precluding a decision on the
merits or denies discovery going to a party's entire action or
defense so that the outcome is all but determined and the
petitioner would merely be going through the motions of a
trial to obtain an appeal, or when the trial court
impermissibly prevents the petitioner from making a record on
the discovery issue so that the appellate court cannot review
the effect of the trial court's alleged error, Ex parte Ocwen
Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 810 (Ala. 2003); denial of a motion
objecting to the appointment of a special master, Ex parte
Alabama State Pers. Bd., 54 So. 3d 886 (Ala. 2010); grant of
a motion to set aside previous supersedeas bond amount, Ex
parte Mohabbat, 93 So. 3d 79 (Ala. 2012); indefinite stay of
an action, Ex parte American Family Care, Inc., 91 So. 3d 682
(Ala. 2012); a trial court's failure to comply with an
appellate court's instruction on remand, Ex parte Williford,
902 So. 2d 658 (Ala. 2004); ruling on denial of motion to
admit an uncontested will to probate where a finding that the
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testator lacked testamentary capacity was not precluded by the
appointment of a conservator, Toler v. Murray, 886 So. 2d 76
(Ala. 2004).
Although this list may seem to contradict the nature of
mandamus as an extraordinary writ, we note that the use of
mandamus review has essentially been limited to well
recognized situations where there is a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought; an imperative duty upon
the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
the lack of another adequate remedy; and properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court. Those well recognized situations
include making sure that an action is brought in the correct
court (e.g., subject-matter jurisdiction and venue) and by the
correct parties (e.g., personal jurisdiction and immunity),
reviewing limited discovery rulings (e.g., patently irrelevant
discovery), and reviewing erroneous decisions by a trial court
where there is a compelling reason not to wait for an appeal
(e.g., abatement). Here, the circuit court concluded that
this action could be maintained when it is apparent on the
face of the complaint that there is an obvious conflict-of-
laws issue as to whether Alabama law or Washington state law
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applies. It would waste the resources of the court and the
parties, and an appeal after a final judgment would be an
inadequate remedy, where an action would be barred if the law
of another state applied. We mention U.S. Bank's attempt at
a permissive appeal under Rule 5 only to emphasize that
mandamus review is proper and not to indicate that a writ of
mandamus is available in any action where a trial court has
denied certification of an issue for permissive appeal. A
determination of which state's law applies is deserving of
mandamus review when there is a true conflict between the laws
of two states apparent on the face of the complaint and the
application of one state's law over the other would bar the
action from proceeding.
It is well settled that
"[m]andamus is a drastic and extraordinary writthat will be issued only when there is: 1) a clearlegal right in the petitioner to the order sought;2) an imperative duty upon the respondent toperform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) thelack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properlyinvoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex parte AmSouthBank, N.A., 589 So. 2d 715 (Ala. 1991); Ex parteDay, 584 So. 2d 493 (Ala. 1991)."
Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503
(Ala. 1993).
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In the present case, we reiterate that it is apparent on
the face of Stern Agee's complaint that there is a conflict-
of-laws issue. The complaint alleges malicious prosecution
based on a civil action brought by U.S. Bank in Washington
state. Stern Agee sets out in detail the course of the
Washington action. Stern Agee, in its complaint, recognizes
that there is a conflict-of-laws issue and contends that
Alabama law applies to the exclusion of Washington law because
Alabama is the forum state, because Alabama applies the rule
of lex loci delicti, and because Stern Agee's injury occurred
in Alabama. In filing a motion to dismiss and subsequently
seeking permission to appeal and then filing a petition for a
writ of mandamus, U.S. Bank contends that, under the rule of
lex loci delicti, Washington law should apply to Stern Agee's
malicious-prosecution claim because, it says, the injury
occurred in Washington. Because U.S. Bank sought permissive
appeal and was denied certification for permissive appeal by
the circuit court, a petition for a writ of mandamus is U.S.
Bank's only adequate remedy for the circuit court's denial of
its motion to dismiss based on conflict of laws.
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In choosing to address U.S. Bank's mandamus petition
seeking review of the circuit court's ruling on its motion to
dismiss, we are cognizant that in order for the writ of
mandamus to issue, U.S. Bank must have a "clear legal right"
to the order of dismissal. Although the legal issue before us
has not been definitively settled, this does not mean that
mandamus relief is unavailable. In other words, the mere fact
that a legal issue is debatable does not change the
responsibility of this Court, as a "court of law," to decide
the law and provides no basis for denying relief. We find the
following persuasive:
"The general statement is made: 'That if therebe doubt as to what his legal right may be,involving the necessity of litigation to settle it,mandamus must be withheld.' ... It is evident thatthis statement is too general. There are many caseswhere the right is disputed, and where the ultimateright depends upon questions of law which may nothave been definitely settled, where the writ willissue. If the right be made clear by proof ..., andthe case is one where the party is without adequateremedy[,] mandamus may issue .... Can it be said... that the remedy will be denied simply becausecertain questions of law may arise that are notclearly and definitely settled?"
2 W.F. Bailey, A Treatise on the Law of Habeas Corpus and
Special Remedies 801 (1913).
One federal court has explained:
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"The dissent argues that mandamus lies only tocompel clear, mandatory duties, so that to theextent we find the state law issue unclear, theavailability of mandamus relief is called intoquestion. This argument fails, however, for thelimitation of mandamus remedies to refusals toperform clear, mandatory duties is not intended toforestall judicial review of difficult legal issues,but primarily to prohibit intrusion on discretionaryfunctions."
Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078, 1093 (3d Cir.
1985)(emphasis added; citation omitted).
The considerable research and reflection provided by the
Oregon Supreme Court in State ex rel. Maizels v. Juba, 254 Or.
323, 460 P.2d 850 (1969), is helpful:
"The issue thus drawn is whether, where there isno dispute in the facts, mandamus will lie to decidein a certain way an especially complicated questionof law, the answer to which is in extreme doubt andthe solution of which requires the use of legaljudgment and acumen. The Oregon statute onmandamus[,] ORS 34.110, is as follows:
"'A writ of mandamus may be issued toany inferior court, ... to compel theperformance of an act which the lawspecially enjoins, as a duty resulting froman office, ... but though the writ mayrequire such court, ... to exercise its ...judgment, or proceed to the discharge ofany of its ... functions, it shall notcontrol judicial discretion. The writ shallnot be issued ... where there is a plain,speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of the law.'
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"The statements of this court in its decisionsconcerning the use of mandamus have been fairlyuniform. Generally, the court has said that when thefacts are not in dispute and there is a clear ruleof law requiring the matter to be decided in acertain way, mandamus will lie. It has also saidthat mandamus will not lie to control the exerciseof discretion or judgment. While, at times, aspreviously demonstrated, the court has refused theuse of mandamus because of difficult legal problemsbeing involved, more frequently it has used the writto decide problems where the law was far from clearand where the exercise of legal judgment wasrequired for a solution. As an illustration, thiscourt has often used the writ to decide difficultquestions of law involving the adequacy ofsubstituted service of summons. State ex rel.Carroll v. Redding, 245 Or. 81, 418 P.2d 846 (1966);State ex rel. Pardee v. Latourette, 168 Or. 584, 125P.2d 750 (1942); State ex rel. Hupp, etc., Corp. v.Kanzler, 129 Or. 85, 276 P. 273 (1929); State exrel. Sullivan v. Tazwell, 123 Or. 326, 262 P. 220(1927). The cases in which the court has so usedmandamus are not limited to those testing theadequacy of substituted service of summons. See thefollowing cases where difficult questions of lawhave been decided in the interpretations of statutesand the constitution: State ex rel. Public WelfareCommission v. Malheur County Court, 185 Or. 392, 203P.2d 305, 307 (1949); State ex rel. Pierce v.Slusher, 119 Or. 141, 248 P. 358 (1926); City ofAstoria v. Cornelius et al., 119 Or. 264, 240 P. 233(1925); Peterson v. Lewis, 78 Or. 641, 154 P. 101(1915); Crawford v. School District No. 7, 68 Or.388, 137 P. 217, 50 L.R.A., N.S., 147 (1913); Statev. Ware, 13 Or. 380, 10 P. 885 (1886).
"It is plain, regardless of what this court hassaid to the contrary, that mandamus has repeatedlybeen used to require public officers, includinginferior courts, to act in a certain way where theapplicable law governing their actions was
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legitimately in dispute. There is ample authorityelsewhere that justifies this use of the writ. F.Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies § 210 (1926),has the following statement:
"'Notwithstanding that courts will notgrant mandamus to control discretion, therule does not apply to preliminaryquestions of law. It applies only to theact to be commanded by the writ.* Thecharacter of a purely preliminary question,though judicial, does not test the right tomandamus because the decision of such aquestion is a mere incident leading up tothe main function or act.' (* footnotesomitted).
"In Poucher v. Teachers' Retirement Board, 130Misc. 896, 225 N.Y.S. 176, 178-179 (1927), the courtused the following language:
"'The sole question, then, is one oflaw, ....'
"'... (R)espondent contends thatmandamus will only lie where there is aclear legal right, and as an importantquestion of law is involved, which admitsof a reasonable doubt or controversy, thepetitioner should be relegated to an actionat law against the retirement board. Thereis no reason why difficult question[s] oflaw cannot be determined upon thisapplication, as well as in an action atlaw. The clear legal right referred to inthe cases such as Matter of Whitman, No. 1,225 N.Y. 1, 121 N.E. 479 [(1918)], means aright which is inferable as a matter of lawfrom uncontroverted facts, regardless ofthe difficulty of the legal question to bedecided. ...'
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"For similar language, also see Stewart v. WilsonPrinting Co., 210 Ala. 624, 627-628, 99 So. 92, 96(1924); Robinson v. Enking, 58 Idaho 24, 31-32, 69P.2d 603, 606 (1937); Eberhardt Construction Co. v.Board of Com'rs of Sedgwick County, 100 Kan. 394,396, 164 P. 281, 282-283 (1917); Cahill v. Mayor andCity Council of Baltimore, 173 Md. 450, 455, 196 A.305, 307 (1937); Perkins v. Burks, 336 Mo. 248, 254,78 S.W.2d 845, 848 (1934); Fooshee v. Martin, 184Okl. 554, 557, 88 P.2d 900, 903 (1939); State v.Town Council South Kingstown, 18 R.I. 258, 266, 27A. 599, 602, 22 L.R.A. 65 (1893). Finally, thefollowing language is found in 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 53 (1948):
"'A "clear legal right," within themeaning of the rule under consideration,means a right clearly founded in, orgranted by, law;* a right which isinferable as a matter of law fromuncontroverted facts regardless of thedifficulty of the legal question to bedecided. ...' (* footnote omitted).
"It appears that much of the difficulty in thecase law revolves around the use of the terms'discretion' and 'judgment'; i.e., in the case of ajudicial officer, 'judicial discretion' asdifferentiated from 'judicial judgment' or 'actingjudicially.' They have been confused and usedinterchangeably. 'Discretion' refers to the power orprivilege to act unhampered by a legal rule. Itdescribes a situation where a choice can be madeamong several courses of action, any one of which islegally permissible and not subject to review. Insuch a situation mandamus or any other method ofreview is inappropriate. The present case does notpose such a situation. Petitioner either is entitledto have the warrant quashed and his propertyreturned or he is not. There is only one legallypermissible answer. The exercise of 'judgment' meansthe formation of an opinion concerning something by
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exercising one's mind upon it. Some courts,including this court, have, at times, used the termsinterchangeably and, therefore, have erroneouslysaid that mandamus will not lie to decide difficultquestions of law because the exercise of judgment,judicial or official, was necessary for theirsolution. State ex rel. Ricco v. Biggs, 198 Or. 413,422, 255 P.2d 1055, 38 A.L.R.2d 720 (1953); State exrel. Coast Holding Co. v. Ekwall, 144 Or. 672, 681,26 P.2d 52 (1933); and State ex rel. Harvey MalheurCounty Court, 54 Or. 255, 258, 101 P. 907, 103 P.446 (1909).
"It is also apparent that in a mandamus context,'clear rule of law' and 'clear legal right' havebeen used erroneously at times to describe asituation where there can be no dispute as to theproper legal theory rather than a situation where aright is inferable as a matter of law fromuncontroverted facts. See Poucher v. Teachers'Retirement Board, supra, and 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 53 (1948). We are now satisfied that in an otherwiseproper case, mandamus may be used to decide disputedand difficult questions of law."
254 Or. at 327-31, 460 P.2d at 852-53.
This Court has stated:
"There remains for consideration but onequestion. It is, abstractly the most important inthe case. It is also the most difficult. It iswhether the secretary of state was under a duty toerase and expunge the alleged unauthorized entriesfrom the house journal. That he was under such dutymust be made to clearly appear before the writ ofmandamus will lie against him in respect of it. Ifthe duty exists, it is purely statutory. Thesecretary of state has no duties to perform exceptthose imposed upon him by the constitution andstatutes of the state. Mandamus is a conservative,not a creative, remedy. It enforces existing duties,
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but does not impose new duties. By it the officermay be coerced to an act which it was his duty toperform without it, but to no act as to which he wasunder no duty before its issuance. And the duty mustbe clear upon the statute. The rule as to the dutyand the right to its performance is variously, andnot always accurately, expressed in the adjudgedcases. The right must be 'certain and positive.'Beaman v. Board, 42 Miss. 237 [(1868)]. The dutymust be 'clear, and if there be doubt, involving thenecessity for litigation,' the writ will not lie.Townes v. Nichols, 73 Me. 515 [(1882)]. There mustbe 'a specific legal right and a positive duty.'State v. Burnside, 33 S.C. 276, 11 S.E. 787[(1890)]. 'Duty must be specifically enjoined bylaw.' Freon v. Carriage Co., 42 Ohio St. 30[(1884)]. Right 'must be clearly established. Ifright doubtful, writ will be refused.' Mobile & O.R. Co. v. People, 132 Ill. 559, 24 N.E. 643[(1890)]. 'Writ will not issue, where there is asubstantial doubt of respondent's duty.' State v.Buhler, 90 Mo. 560, 3 S.W. 68 [(1887)]. 'Will not beawarded when there is a doubt of the relator's rightto the relief sought.' People v. Salomon, 46 Ill.415 [(1868)] 'Duty must be clearly enjoined by law.'Draper v. Noteware, 7 Cal. 276 [(1857)]. 'It must beclearly commanded by law.' Puckett v. White, 22 Tex.559 [(1858)]. 'When the legal right is doubtful,writ will be denied.' State v. Appleby, 25 S.C. 100[(1886)]. Issued when there is a failure to perform'plain official duty' (Maddox v. Neal, 45 Ark. 121[(1885)]), not 'when well founded doubt as to thealleged duty arises' (People v. Johnson, 100 Ill.537 [(1881)]; People v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9 [(1839)]).'Where the validity of a judgment of conviction isdoubtful, writ will not issue to enforce it.' Rex v.Broderip, 5 Barn. & C. 239; Reg. v. Ray, 44 U.C.Q.B.17. The act sought to be compelled, must be 'clearlydefined and enjoined by law.' Glasscock v.Commissioner, 3 Tex. 51 [(1848)]. 'The writ does notlie to compel a county judge to perform an act whichthe law does not specifically enjoin upon him as a
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duty resulting from his office.' State v. Napier, 7Iowa 425 [(1858)]. The duty must be either imposedupon the officer 'by some express enactment, ornecessarily result from the office he holds.' Pondv. Parrot, 42 Conn. 13 [(1875)]. Officer must be'expressly authorized by law' to do the act.Chisholm v. McGehee, 41 Ala. 192 [(1867)]. 'A clearspecific legal right' to have the act performed mustbe shown. 3 Brick. Dig. p. 625.
"As we have said, some of the foregoingexpressions are inaccurate or misleading. A doubtthat may arise in the mind of the court in matter oflaw, as to the existence of the duty, will not, assome of the cases seem to hold, require or justifythe denial of the writ. It is the court's provinceand duty to solve all such doubts, and declare theduty as it finds it to be, after its misgivings asto the intent and meaning of the statute involved,or as to any other question of law, have beeneliminated. Substantial doubt as to whether thefacts of the particular case present the conditionsupon which the officer is bound to act may, it wouldseem, justify or require a refusal of the writ. Ofcourse, the doubts of the officer as to his duty areof no consequence. State v. Tarpen (Ohio) [43 OhioSt. 311,] 1 N.E. 209 [(1885)]. Again, the duty neednot be 'specifically enjoined' or 'expresslyprescribed' by law. The true rule in thisconnection, we apprehend, is that the duty must beimposed in terms by the statute, in cases like theone in hand, or must result therefrom by fair andreasonable construction or interpretation. It mustappear from the statute in terms or by fairimplication."
State ex rel. Brickman v. Wilson, 123 Ala. 259, 280, 25 So.
482, 488 (1899)(some emphasis added).
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In light of the foregoing, we now turn to the legal issue
before us.
Discussion
The principle that governs which state's substantive law
applies to tort claims in a conflict-of-laws analysis is well
settled: "Lex loci delicti has been the rule in Alabama for
almost 100 years. Under this principle, an Alabama court will
determine the substantive rights of an injured party according
to the law of the state where the injury occurred." Fitts v.
Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 581 So. 2d at 820. Accordingly,
our review of the denial of the motion to dismiss this
malicious-prosecution action is based upon the principle of
lex loci delicti.
The parties agree that under the principle of lex loci
delicti the governing law is the law of the jurisdiction where
the injury occurred. The parties disagree, however, as to
where an injury occurs for purposes of a malicious-prosecution
claim. U.S. Bank argues that the injury in a malicious-
prosecution action occurs in the state where the defense of
the allegedly malicious prosecution occurred. It reasons that
because "injury" is the last element of a cause of action for
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any tort, including malicious prosecution, the injury
resulting from malicious prosecution occurs where the last
event necessary to make the actor liable for the alleged tort
takes place. In this case, it argues, the last event
necessary occurred in Washington when the securities action
was terminated in favor of Sterne Agee. Sterne Agee argues
that because the injury suffered in a malicious-prosecution
action is financial, the injury occurs where the financial
harm was felt. In this case, it argues, the financial harm
was felt, and thus the injury occurred, at its corporate
headquarters in Alabama.
Unlike Alabama, Washington follows the "English rule" for
malicious-prosecution claims, which requires a plaintiff to
plead arrest or seizure of property. See Clark v. Baines, 150
Wash. 2d 905, 84 P.3d 245 (2004). Because no arrest or
seizure has occurred in this situation, U.S. Bank argues that,
under Washington law, Sterne Agee cannot state a malicious-
prosecution claim.
For the reasons below, we find that injury in a
malicious-prosecution action occurs in the state where the
allegedly malicious lawsuit was terminated in favor of the
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complaining party. Therefore, the principle of lex loci
delicti requires that the law of the state in which the
antecedent lawsuit was litigated governs a claim of malicious
prosecution.
Alabama continues to follow the traditional view of the
Restatement (First) of Conflicts of Law, as discussed in Fitts
v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., supra, which looks to the lex
loci delicti in tort claims, "in the state where the last
event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort
takes place." Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 377
(1934). This interpretation adheres to the holding of the
seminal lex loci delicti case in Alabama, Alabama Great S.
R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892). In Carroll,
the plaintiff resided in Alabama and was employed by an
Alabama corporation as a brakeman on the corporation's
railroad. The plaintiff was injured when a link between two
freight cars broke in Mississippi. However, two employees in
Alabama had failed to inspect the link before the train left
for Mississippi. Although Alabama law recognized a cause of
action for injuries caused by the negligence of fellow
employees, Mississippi law did not. Following the traditional
24
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rule, the Alabama Supreme Court applied the law of the place
of the injury (Mississippi), despite the facts that the acts
giving rise to the plaintiff's injuries occurred in Alabama
and that the plaintiff was employed in Alabama. The Court
stated that negligence without injury will not support
recovery.
"Up to the time [this] train passed out of Alabamano injury had resulted. For all that occurred inAlabama, therefore, no cause of action whateverarose. The fact which created the right to sue, theinjury without which confessedly no action would lieanywhere, transpired in the State of Mississippi. Itwas in that State, therefore, necessarily that thecause of action, if any, arose; and whether a causeof action arose and existed at all or not must inall reason be determined by the law which obtainedat the time and place when and where the fact whichis relied upon to justify a recovery transpired."
Carroll, 97 Ala. at 134, 11 So. at 806. Therefore, the place
of injury is in the state where the "fact which created the
right to sue" occurs.
In the present case, the "fact which created the right to
sue" was the termination of the allegedly malicious lawsuit in
favor of Sterne Agee, which occurred in Washington. Thus, the
principle of lex loci delicti requires that Washington law
govern Sterne Agee's malicious-prosecution claim.
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We note that in support of its "feel the financial harm"
argument for malicious-prosecution claims, Sterne Agee cites
several decisions from federal district courts, sitting in
Alabama, holding that where the alleged injury is financial,
the location where the financial injury was felt is
determinative. Glass v. Southern Wrecker Sales, 990 F. Supp.
1344 (M.D. Ala. 1998), appears to be the first time a federal
court sitting in Alabama applied the "place where the
financial injury was felt" analysis. In Glass, the purchaser
of a tow truck, who was a resident of Alabama, sued a Georgia
truck dealer alleging fraud after the frame of the tow truck
purchased in Georgia broke while it was being driven in
Alabama. The truck dealer argued that because the alleged
misrepresentations occurred in Georgia, then Georgia law
should apply. The federal court, sitting in diversity,
applied the choice-of-law rules of Alabama, and, because
Alabama applies the rule of lex loci delicti, "it is not the
site of the alleged tortious act that is relevant, but the
site of the injury, or the site of the event that created the
right to sue." 990 F. Supp. at 1347. The court stated:
"In examining other courts' application of thelex loci delicti rule to fraud claims, the court has
26
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found that courts consistently conclude that thestate where the injury occurred in a fraud claim isthe state in which the plaintiff suffered theeconomic impact. See Management Science America,Inc. v. NCR Corp., 765 F. Supp. 738, 740 (N.D. Ga.1991)(examining cases from Indiana and Tennessee indetermining that '[f]ederal courts ... consistentlyhave considered [fraud] to have been committed inthe state where the economic loss occurred and notwhere the fraudulent misrepresentations weremade.'); Steele v. Ellis, 961 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Kan.1997); Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934).Therefore, the court will look to see in which stateany alleged economic impact was felt."
990 F. Supp. at 1348. The Glass court's holding was limited
to fraud claims, and that court recognized that it was not
relying on Alabama caselaw in concluding that courts applying
the principle of lex loci delicti in fraud claims look to the
state in which the plaintiff suffered the economic impact.
The other decisions cited by Sterne Agee in which federal
courts sitting in Alabama applied the financial-harm analysis
did not concern malicious prosecution and, likewise, did not
rely on Alabama caselaw. See, e.g., Alabama Aircraft Indus.,
Inc. v. Boeing Co., Inc.,(No. 2:11-CV-3577-RDP, March 20,
2013)(N.D. Ala. 2013)(not reported in F. Supp. 2d)(fraud
claim); Chambers v. Cooney, (No. 07-0373-WS-B, Aug. 29,
2007)(S.D. Ala. 2007)(not reported in F. Supp. 2d)(tortious
interference); APR, LLC v American Aircraft Sales, Inc., (No.
27
1120904
3:12cv1019-MHT, Feb. 19, 2013)(M.D. Ala. 2013)(not reported in
F. Supp. 2d)(fraud and negligence); Reibling v. Themo Credit,
L.L.C. (In re Trinsic, Inc.), (Bankr. No. 07-10324, May 19,
2008)(Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2008)(not reported in B.R.)(fraud and
tortious interference); Renasant Bank v. Park Nat'l Corp.,
(No. 12-0689-WS-C, April 10, 2013)(S.D. Ala. 2013)(not
reported in F. Supp. 2d)(fraud and tortious
interference). These cases are distinguishable from the
present case.
For a malicious-prosecution claim, the event creating the
right to sue is not the expenditure of financial resources in
order to defend a lawsuit. Such expenses would be made even if
the antecedent lawsuit was ultimately terminated in favor of
the defendant. It is the determination that such expenses
were required to defend an allegedly malicious prosecution (by
termination in favor of the complaining party) that creates
the right to sue. See Barrett Mobile Home Transp., Inc. v.
McGugin, 530 So. 2d 730, 733 (Ala. 1988)(identifying
"termination favorable to the plaintiff" as the last element
required for a cause of action for malicious prosecution to
accrue).
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Alabama courts' application of the principle of lex loci
delicti to cases involving the tort of bad-faith failure to
defend a lawsuit are more on point with the present case.
Like malicious prosecution, bad-faith failure to defend is
based on injury resulting from an antecedent lawsuit, and the
injury often involves more than mere financial harm. In
Lifestar Response of Alabama, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Co.,
17 So. 3d 200 (Ala. 2009), this Court applied Alabama law to
a claim for bad-faith failure to defend a lawsuit filed in
Alabama. In that case, Lifestar, an Alabama corporation with
headquarters in New York, sued its insurer alleging negligence
and bad faith based on the insurer’s failure to defend
Lifestar in a lawsuit filed in Alabama that resulted in a $5
million default judgment against it. Although Lifestar
undoubtedly "felt the financial harm" of the alleged failure
to defend in New York, where its headquarters were located and
the state from which it paid the judgment, this Court applied
the principle of lex loci delicti and held that Alabama law
applied because the alleged injury occurred in Alabama.
Similarly, in Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Colonial
Life & Accident Insurance Co., 124 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (M.D. Ala.
29
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2000), Colonial Life, a corporation headquartered in South
Carolina, sued its insurer for bad-faith failure to defend a
lawsuit filed in an Alabama state court by one of its
employees, which resulted in Colonial Life's having to pay a
costly settlement. Although Colonial Life surely "felt the
financial harm" at its headquarters in South Carolina, the
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama held that
under the principle of lex loci delicti Alabama law governed:
"Colonial allegedly suffered injury because Defendants failed
to defend Colonial against [the employee’s] claim in
Alabama. Therefore, the court finds that Colonial suffered
injury in Alabama. As a result, Alabama law governs Colonial’s
tort claims." 124 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
In short, Sterne Agee's reliance on cases involving fraud
and tortious interference in support of its argument is
misplaced, and we decline to apply the "feel the financial
harm" analysis to a malicious-prosecution claim. Like Lifestar
and Twin City Fire Insurance Co., Sterne Agee’s malicious-
prosecution claim is based on injury allegedly resulting from
an antecedent lawsuit. Accordingly, the principle of lex loci
30
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delicti likewise requires that the governing law come from
Washington, the state of the antecedent lawsuit.
Conclusion
The principle of lex loci delicti requires that the law
of the state in which the antecedent lawsuit was terminated in
favor of the complaining party governs a malicious-prosecution
claim. Thus, Washington law governs Sterne Agee's claim of
malicious prosecution. Accordingly, U.S. Bank's petition for
writ for mandamus is granted, and the circuit court is ordered
to dismiss Sterne Agee's malicious-prosecution case.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur specially.
Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
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SHAW, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion. I write specially to note
the following.
It is undisputed that this Court has the authority, based
on the Alabama Constitution and statute, to issue any writs
necessary to give general superintendence and control of lower
courts. Ala. Const. 1901, Art. VI, § 140; Ala. Code 1975, §
12-2-7(3). As noted in the main opinion, there are numerous
situations in which this Court exercises authority by mandamus
to review interlocutory decisions that, if properly set aside,
would terminate an action so as to avoid the waste and expense
of further litigation.
The appellate courts of this State have, in the past,
issued writs of mandamus to correct trial courts' decisions on
issues relating to the conflict of laws. Ex parte Exxon
Corp., 725 So. 2d 930 (Ala. 1998), and Batey & Sanders, Inc.
v. Dodd, 755 So. 2d 581 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999). Thus, the
issuance of the writ in the instant case to direct the trial
court on this conflict-of-laws issue treads no new ground.
Here, the correct application of conflict-of-laws
principles requires the utilization of the law of the State of
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Washington. That law undisputedly results in the termination
of this litigation. See respondent's answer, at 29-30 (noting
that Washington law "would bar a remedy" in this case). Given
that our determination terminates the litigation in this
action, that this Court has the power to issue writs of
mandamus to supervise the trial courts, and that decisions on
conflict-of-laws issues have been previously decided on
mandamus review, I concur to issue the writ.
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BRYAN, Justice (concurring specially).
I write specially to emphasize my belief that mandamus is
appropriate where, as here, "there is an obvious conflict-of-
laws issue," ___ So. 3d at ___, and the application of one
state's laws would completely bar the action. It would be an
inexcusable waste of scarce judicial resources and of the
parties' resources to require a trial and possibly an appeal
when it is clear that, under the doctrine of lex loci delicti,
Washington law applies to bar the malicious-prosecution action
filed by Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc. See Fitts v. Minnesota
Min. & Mfg. Co., 581 So. 2d 819, 820 (Ala. 1991) ("Under th[e]
principle [of lex loci delicti], an Alabama court will
determine the substantive rights of an injured party according
to the law of the state where the injury occurred.").
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1120904
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because I do not believe that U.S.
Bank National Association and U.S. Bancorp have demonstrated
a clear legal right to mandamus relief. I do not see how a
party could have a clear legal right to relief when the issue
presented is one of first impression. Making the alleged legal
right even less clear is the fact that federal courts in
Alabama have held that where, as here, the alleged injury is
financial, jurisdiction is proper where the injury is felt.
Glass v. Southern Wrecker Sales, 990 F. Supp. 1344, 1348 (M.D.
Ala. 1998); APR, LLC v. American Aircraft Sales, Inc., (No.
3:12cv1019-MHT, Feb. 19, 2013)(M.D. Ala. 2013)(not reported in
F. Supp. 2d); Renasant Bank v. Park Nat'l Corp., (No. 12-0689-
WS-C, April 10, 2013)(S.D. Ala. 2013)(not reported in F. Supp.
2d). The injury here was certainly felt in Alabama. Although
these federal court decisions do not cite Alabama law and are
not binding on this Court, they are evidence indicating that
the legal right to relief in this case is less than clear.
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MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
Although I fully concur with what I consider to be an
important part of the analysis offered by the main opinion,
for the reasons described below I disagree with other parts of
that analysis and, as a result, respectfully must disagree
with the result reached.
This case addresses a petition for a writ of mandamus
filed by U.S. Bank National Association and U.S. Bancorp
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "U.S. Bank"). In the
portion of the main opinion that discusses the "Standard of
Review," the majority observes:
"In choosing to address U.S. Bank's mandamuspetition seeking review of the circuit court'sruling on its motion to dismiss, we are cognizantthat in order for a writ of mandamus to issue, U.S.Bank must have a 'clear legal right' to the order ofdismissal. Although the legal issue before us hasnot been definitively settled, this does not meanthat mandamus relief is unavailable. In otherwords, the mere fact that a legal issue is debatabledoes not change the responsibility of this Court, asa 'court of law,' to decide the law and provides nobasis for denying relief."
___ So. 3d at ___.
I fully agree with the foregoing statement and the
analysis that follows it. If the issue described in the
above-quoted portion of the main opinion was the only
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potential obstacle to the issuance of the writ of mandamus, I
would fully concur in issuing the writ.
In this case, however, there exists a second obstacle to
granting the petition for a writ of mandamus: this is not one
of the types of cases in which this Court allows mandamus
review of an interlocutory trial court decision refusing to
dismiss an action. As this Court has stated:
"'Subject to certain narrow exceptions..., we have held that, because an"adequate remedy" exists by way of anappeal, the denial of a motion to dismissor a motion for a summary judgment is notreviewable by petition for writ ofmandamus.'"
Ex parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 78 So. 3d 959, 966
(Ala. 2011) (quoting Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 825
So. 2d 758, 761–62 (Ala. 2002)). The "certain narrow
exceptions" to this general rule include cases in which a
trial court has failed to dismiss a claim or to enter a
summary judgment where the issue is one of subject-matter
jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction, immunity, proper venue
(whether venue per se or forum non conveniens under our rules
of procedure or a "private" agreement as to venue in the form
of a forum-selection clause), and a failure to substitute a
37
1120904
named party for a fictitiously named party in a timely manner
following the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations. As we explained in Ex parte DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 952 So. 2d 1082, 1089 n.1 (Ala. 2006):
"Th[e] general rule is not without exceptions.See, e.g., Ex parte Alloy Wheels[ Int'l, Ltd.], 882So. 2d [819,] 822 [(Ala. 2003)] ('One of theexceptions is the denial of a motion grounded on aclaim of lack of personal jurisdiction....'); Exparte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000) ('Whilethe general rule is that the denial of a motion forsummary judgment is not reviewable, the exception isthat the denial of a motion for summary judgmentgrounded on a claim of immunity is reviewable bypetition for writ of mandamus.'); and Ex parte Snow,764 So. 2d 531, 537 (Ala. 1999) (noting that thedenial of a summary-judgment motion is reviewable bya petition for a writ of mandamus when theundisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff failedto act with due diligence in identifyingfictitiously named defendants). See also [Ex parte]Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d [497,] 499 [(Ala. 1995)](holding that a petition for a writ of mandamus isthe proper method for challenging a forum nonconveniens ruling)."
See also Ex parte Alamo Title Co., [Ms. 1111541, March 15,
2013] __ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2013) (Murdock J., concurring
specially) (emphasis omitted) (noting the exceptions for
"immunity, subject-matter jurisdiction, in personam
jurisdiction, venue, and some statute-of-limitations
defenses"); Ex parte Flint Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 805, 808
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1120904
(Ala. 2000) (noting that the "question of subject-matter
jurisdiction is reviewable by a petition for a writ of
mandamus"); Ex parte Jackson, 780 So. 2d 681, 684 (observing
that "'[t]he fact that a statute of limitations defense is
applicable is not a proper basis for issuing a writ of
mandamus, due to the availability of a remedy by appeal.' [Ex
parte Southland Bank,] 514 So. 2d [954,] 955 [(Ala. 1987)].
... In a narrow class of cases involving fictitious parties
and the relation-back doctrine, this Court has reviewed the
merits of a trial court's denial of a summary-judgment motion
in which a defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim was
barred by the applicable statute of limitations."); and Ex
parte Kia Motors America, Inc., 881 So. 2d 396 (Ala. 2003)
(involving a motion to dismiss based on an outbound forum-
selection clause). 1
In a few cases, we also have permitted mandamus petitions1
from a denial of a motion to dismiss or a motion for a summaryjudgment where a movant has sought to avoid a multiplicity oflitigation.
"The supreme court also has considered petitions fora writ of mandamus to review orders denying motionsto dismiss based on the compulsory-counterclaimrule, see Ex parte Cincinnati Ins. Co., 806 So. 2d376 (Ala. 2001), and on Ala. Code 1975, § 6–5–440,the abatement statute, see Ex parte J.E. Estes Wood
39
1120904
The present case does not fall within any of the
foregoing exceptions to the general rule; instead, it involves
a "choice-of-law" issue. Nonetheless, the main opinion
arrives at the conclusion that mandamus review is, or should
be, available. I disagree.2
Co., 42 So. 3d 104 (Ala. 2010), both of which areintended to avoid multiplicity of litigation."
Ex parte Ocean Reef Developers II, LLC, 84 So. 3d 900, 905(Ala. Civ. App. 2011). See also Ex parte LCS Inc., 12 So. 3d55, 56 (Ala. 2008) ("[A] petition for a writ of mandamus is anappropriate method by which to seek this Court's review of thedenial of a motion to dismiss predicated on the doctrine ofres judicata."). But see Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins.Co., 720 So. 2d 893 (Ala. 1998) (holding that an appeal froma final judgment would be an adequate remedy for the trialcourt's erroneous denial of a motion to dismiss a counterclaimthat should have been brought as a compulsory claim in anearlier action).
In its discussion of the standard of review, the mainopinion also notes several other categories of cases in whichthis Court has permitted mandamus relief; however, the casescited do not address the denial by the trial court of a motionto dismiss a claim or for a summary judgment and do notrecognize additional exceptions to the general rule thatinterlocutory appellate review of such rulings by an appellatecourt by way of a petition for a write of mandamus is notavailable.
As a preliminary matter, I note the main opinion's2
observance of the fact that U.S. Bank did elect in this caseto seek a certification by the trial court of a question fora permissive appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., butthat the trial court denied this request. I do not read thisobservation or any other reference to the trial court's denial
40
1120904
The present case involves a question as to which of two
states' law is applicable to the plaintiff's claim. This
Court has never recognized an exception to the general rule
that would permit interlocutory review of a trial court's
denial of a motion to dismiss or for a summary judgment for
cases that turn on the resolution of such a "choice-of-law"
issue. (Clearly, Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
720 So. 2d 893 (Ala. 1998), was not such a case.) In its
discussion of the standard of review, the main opinion cites
one decision from this Court that it contends provides a basis
for such an exception to the general rule: Ex parte Exxon
Corp., 725 So. 2d 930 (Ala. 1998). For the reasons explained
below, I do not agree that Ex parte Exxon stands for this
proposition; in fact, it is clearly distinguishable from the
present case.
of U.S. Bank's attempt to obtain Rule 5 review as suggestingthat, had U.S. Bank elected not to seek a Rule 5certification, this fact would have barred it from mandamusreview of an issue that otherwise would be appropriate forsuch review. This Court has never suggested that theavailability of mandamus review of an issue otherwiseappropriately reviewable by mandamus turns on whether a partyfirst seeks a discretionary certification of that issue for apermissive appeal. See Ex parte Alamo Title Co., __ So. 3d at__ (Murdock, J., concurring specially and joined by Main, J.,the author of the main opinion).
41
1120904
Put simply, Ex parte Exxon did not involve a trial
court's denial of a motion to dismiss or the denial of a
motion for a summary judgment. It concerned a trial court's
certification of a class action. As the Ex parte Exxon Court
noted: "A mandamus petition is the proper procedural tool to
challenge the certification of a class action." 725 So. 2d at
931. A question of class certification is not before us in
the present case.
Although the main opinion couples its citation to Ex
parte Exxon with a citation to a second case, Batey & Sanders,
Inc. v. Dodd, 755 So. 2d 581 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991), this
latter case was decided by the Court of Civil Appeals, not
this Court. As such, of course, Batey & Sanders is not binding
on this Court. Neither is it persuasive.
Batey & Sanders was a workers' compensation case. The
opinion issued by the Court of Civil Appeals contains no
acknowledgment of the general rule against mandamus review of
the denial of a motion to dismiss or for a summary judgment,
nor did the Court of Civil Appeals provide any explanation as
to why or how it was able to circumvent the general rule in
deciding Batey & Sanders as it did. I suggest that the Court
42
1120904
of Civil Appeals simply overlooked the general rule and that,
accordingly, Batey & Sanders provides no persuasive support
for the result reached in the present case.
A closer look at the exceptions to the general rule
against interlocutory mandamus review of the denial of a
motion to dismiss or for a summary judgment appears to reveal
that they involve questions as to whether the trial court that
has declined to dismiss the action or to enter a summary
judgment is a, or the, proper tribunal to decide the merits of
the claims that will remain for adjudication in the wake of
its decision. Where no court properly can adjudicate the
merits of a claim, or where a claim ought to be, or ought to
have been, tried on its merits in some different tribunal,
mandamus review of the trial court's decision to insist on
adjudicating the merits of the claim has been granted by this
Court. I see no reason to conclude that the time has come to
recognize some additional exception that is not of the same
character.
The question in the present case is, in essence, simply
whether applicable law recognizes the cause of action at
issue. The trial court may err in deciding this question,
43
1120904
just as it may err in deciding an innumerable number of other
legal questions that determine whether an action in a given
case is cognizable or not. By answering the question here, we
place ourselves on a slippery slope. On what principled
basis, for example, do we distinguish between this case and a
case in which a trial court must choose which of two Alabama
statutes is applicable: one of which establishes a cause of
action and one of which does not? On what basis do we grant
mandamus review in this case, but deny mandamus review in a
case in which the manner in which the interpretation of a
single statute, or even a prior case, is dispositive of
whether the plaintiff has a cognizable cause of action? In
all of these circumstances can it not be said that the
defendant is put to the effort and expense of a trial when it
ought not to be? I see no principled distinction between the
present case and any of these examples insofar as the adequacy
of the remedy provided by an appeal following a trial and a
final judgment. If "adequacy" is to be based solely on the
fact that the defendant may have to endure the effort and
expense of a trial when a particular ruling of the trial court
could have ended the litigation, I would submit that we
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1120904
effectively will have abandoned the general rule against
interlocutory appellate review of orders denying motions to
dismiss or for a summary judgment. In so doing, we will have
abandoned the virtues of a general rule that allows cases to
"develop" before one of the many able trial judges of this
State, with the ensuing possibility of a settlement or other
final disposition in the trial court and instead permit
litigants to appropriate prematurely the limited resources of
this Court and the Court of Civil Appeals in cases where
appellate review might otherwise become unnecessary.
This Court recently made the following statement
regarding the prospect of expanding the number or type of
cases in which we will conduct mandamus review of trial court
decisions regarding discovery:
"'Generally, an appeal of a discoveryorder is an adequate remedy,notwithstanding the fact that thatprocedure may delay an appellate court'sreview of a petitioner's grievance orimpose on the petitioner additionalexpense; our judicial system cannot affordimmediate mandamus review of everydiscovery order.'"
Ex parte Guaranty Pest Control, Inc., 21 So. 3d 1222, 1226
(Ala. 2009) (quoting Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d
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810, 813 (Ala. 2003) (footnote omitted)). Nor can our
judicial system afford immediate appellate review of the
multitude of trial court orders denying motions to dismiss or
for a summary judgment founded on an assertion of the failure
of the plaintiff to have alleged a cognizable claim. We must
let the trial courts be the trial courts and review their
decisions as to the merits of cases only in due course.
Based on the foregoing, I respectfully must dissent.
46