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j4DMISSIBH3ItVASSESSMENT 34(IXd))

FROM; TRAISI 2057/B ILODEAU

TO: AnlcaralM-C5Pascal Laurin — CSMichelle Raty — CS

DATE: 073UN2013

CIC PILE: W300457930 I UCI 40158281

CESA FILE: CA2013.4049389 /4015-8281

SUBJECT: Ramin FALLA1 / DOE: 01 DEC1965 I Male / COB: Iran / CIT: Iran

Ecvntive Suniarnrv

1. Mr. Ramin FALLAFI applied for a Temporary Resident Visa (TRy) hi Ankara on March 19,2013, for

the purposes of working on his newly created business thr the ccitt three years, Canadian Plasma

Resources / Exaphartna Inc. (B)

2. Mr. FALIAJ-I has been the Managing Director of Fanavari Azmayeshgabi since October2001.

this company has been involved with procurement connected to e

Iranian nuclear program. (S)

3. The National Security Screening Division (NSSD) has completed the final assessment of the temporary

resident application for the primary applicant named above, It is assessed that there are reasonable

grounds to believe that Mr. FALLAH is inadmissible to Canada pursuant to paragraph 34(1 )(d) of the

haraigration wJdRe[Mgee Protection Act (IRPA) for bcing a danger in the security of Canada. (13 )

The information throughout this report will be labeled in accordance with the following:

(S) Refers to “Secret” information

(B) Refers to “Protected B” information

(U) Refers to “Unclassified” infbzmation

Law

Pursuant to section 33 of the IRPA, “the facts that constitute inadmissibility under sectiont 34 to 37 include

facts arising from omissions and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which there are reasonable

grounds to believe that they have occurred, arc occurring or may occiW’. The threshold of reasonable grounds

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“34. (1) A pemianerit resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for...

(d) being a danger to the security of Canada...

Applicant-SiecificJ*formaiion

On April 12, 2013, TR.AIS received a referral from the Canadian Mission in Ankara for Ramin FALLAH(hereafter refened to as the applicant) who has applied for a Temporary Resident Visa (TRV) for the purposesof working on his newly created business for the next three years, Canadian Plasma Resources / ExaphartnaInc. The business address for these entities am indicated as 508 Spadina Avenue in Toronto. Ontario. (B)

According to the information provided, the applIcant has been the Managing Director of FanavariAzmayeshgabi since October 2001. Prior to that, he was the Marketing Director of the same company from1996 to 2001. From 1991 to 1996 he was a sales manager for Technology Azmaycshgahi and a salesman forthat same company from 19811 to 1991. (B)

As Managing Director of Panavari Azmayeshgahi, the applicant indicates in his C.V. being in charge of! 80employees. As part of his duties, he indicates “perfbrm duties as managing director for a leading importingcompany in the field of medical and laboratories equipment, and one of the biggest medical and laboratoriescompanies at Iran”. (B)

According to FOSS, the applicant was previously issued TRVs in August 2001, July 2003, and August 2005.(B)

Topic-Specific Information

gctions awsiiinn

Since 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has imposed four rounds of sanctions (Resolutions1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010)] against Iran in response to the proliferation riskspresented by its nuclear program in tight of Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to comply with the provisions of earlier UNSC Resolutionsto suspend aft uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. (U)

The UNSC Resolutions provide for the following: impose an embargo on certain goods and services thatcould contribute to iran’s activities linked to enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water or the development ofnuclear wenpons delivery systems; prohibit the provision of technical or financial assistance on products

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to believe has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mugcyera v. Canada (Minister ofCftizenshlp and ImmiRration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, at paragraph 114. (U)

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under the export ban; impose a travel ban for designated Iranian officials; and implement a freeze of nets ofdesignated Iranian companies and officials. (U)

On July 22, 2010, Canada implemented the IJNSC Resolutions with the Special Economic Measur (Jraa)Regulations, under the Special Economic Measures 4cr (SEMA).2 On November 21.2011. Can daxdposednew sanctions against fran to prohibit financial transactions with Iran, expand the list of prohibited goods toinclude all goods used in the petrochemical, oil and gas industry In iran, amend the list of prohibited goods toinclude additional hems that could be used in Itan’s nuclear program, and add new individuals and entities tothe list ofdesignated persons found in Schedule I of the SEMA Regulations. (U)

According to its website4:

Our company was formed in 1985 with the ann to supply medical and laboralaiy instruments. Our missionis to furnish our clients with a solution and not a simple sale of instrument. Installation, Training and 10years after sales services are guaranteed by us.. Fanevari succeeded to become a reliable institution for theheatthesre sector; thanks to a continuous growth period resulted from investments made for lorigdermplanning and development and based on safeguarding our national imerests. Weve attempted to obtain ourcustomers’ satisthction using 25 years of our management teams’ experience and selected set of the bestmedical products, in folbwmg area:

‘Providing high quality equipments and superior technology proportionate to necessities of medical centers.‘Designing, consulting and providing engineering services before choosing the required equipments.‘Obtaining our customers’ relief using our experienced technical team who are responsible to provideguarantee and after sales service which can optimia medical centers investments with superiorperformance.

Fanavail Azmayeshgahl reprnscnts well known brands and sophisticated products:

‘Siemens: Ultrasound systems, C-Ami, Mobile X-Ray, Mammography, Lithotripsor System, Radiology.Fluoroecopy system, Angiogrephy and MRI•Olynspus: Wkle range of Endoscopic Products in 01, Rcspiratory and surgery‘Covidien: Surgical Staplers. Advanced Laparoscpic Instruments, Oenersl and Specialty Sutures,Biosurgexy and 1VS‘Getinge. Hospital Sterilizers and Washer Dsmfnctora•Maquec Ventilators, Ceiling Pendants, Surgical Lights•Daincca: Ancstiwsla machines

Accoithng to classified infonnation ol,taiiwd on June 3,2013:

‘Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations, SORI2OIO-165 July22, 2010, escusred 02 October2012,g:llcanadzettc.ec.ca’rn-Io2r2Ol0flO lO.flS.O4Ihunl!sor-dorsl 6.ej1gJfl5J.

Special Economic Measures (iran) Regulations, SORI2OIO-165 July22, 2010, accessed 02 October2012,flip:lirsriadaneac.cWv-eWe220i 0f4mj(sor.dosi65-eiiajiiip1,

Sanctions against han, accessed 02 October2012,Fanavari Azmayeehgahi, About Us, ht ,iwwwfa.,avariwm!httniiaboutus.htui1 {acceed lune 7,20131

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The company Fanavari Aznrnyeshgahl is listed on the U.K.’s Department of Business innovation and Skills

(BIS) as Fanavan Azn’iayeshgahi eke Eghlim Sanaate Sabz Co. which states that5:

The entities in chided on the list are mainly based on the Export Control Organisation (ECO) experience of

either invoking the WML) End-Use Control or refusing ticences due to unacceptable risks of diversion to a

WMD programme of concern,

Entities anti organistitions are also included where they have beco named in licence applications that have

been refused in line with the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) 96112010 of 25th October 2G10, or in

line with the United Kingdom Written Ministerial Stajemerg issued on 9th November 2,010 by Mark Prisk,

Minister of State for Business and Enterprise.

Lu addition, (here are adier entities included in the list, for whom we may not have received applicahons or

enquiries in which to invoke the End-Use Controls or refuse a Iicences but for whom there is publicly

available information indicating their involvement in WMD programmes of concern.

According to this document, Fanavari Azrnayeshgalti has had liccnses both granted and denied. (U>

Fanavari Azmayesbgalii is also llswd on a docurnenl1rnduced by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade

and Industry as an entity ofpotential WMI) concern.

pharmna& Canadian Plasma Resources

According to the mission statement found on Exnphanna’s websile, its mission is’:

To provide a reliable supply of Ike highest quality sowno plasma and plasma derived therapies in order to

make Canada self-sufficient.

According to its vblon’

To be recognized as the leading source plasma manufacturer in Canada and tobe internationally renowned

for our excellence, innovative proiucts and services,

According to the mission statement for Canadian Plasma

‘pJ/ww.lranwauth.orsJjtotemrneni1UKIuk-dbit-lranIIst-0tl.5Jia4acccssed June 6, 2013)

‘Ministry of Economy, Trade ant Industry, June?, 2013)

E,tapbarma. About Exaphamie. bttp:’fwww.exmiinn’coracrate.s1atement5 taceemsed Jane 7.20131

‘Tbid9Canadlan Plasuta Resources, About Us, htlçIJwww vcoIasnIe.caIcoIpolanaLefnis (accessed June 7, 2013]

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Canadian Plasma Resources will supply plasma ot’ the highest quality and reliability for creating treatments

that improve and savC Hves itt Canada and around the world

According to lb vision:

The goal is to provide a safe and reliable supply of plasma to ensure Canada will be self4uffic lent in

human plasma and therapeutics detived from ft.

Canadian Plasma Rasournas strives to

* Significantly dec,eae and eventually eliminate the need fbr importing of plasma derived therapies fermi

other plasma producing countrieç

2. Have the capability to produce plasma derived therapeutics locally.

Rarnin FaLIah

According to an Interview with the applicant posted in The Business Year website the applicant is identified

as the Managing Director of Funavasi Azrnayeshgahi. Among some of the questions posed to the applicant’ :

TflY What sort of products and aervica. dou ynar company provide to the medical ludnatry’?

R.AMIN FALLAN We mainly supply Siemens imaging products to hospitals and imaging centers,

Including systems such as MRI, X-ray, and ultra-sound. In addition, we provide raaduines nocssary for

endoecopy, though these are supplied by Olympus, a Japanese company. Also, we supply surgical products

like staples and suturos for open and laparoscopic surgery, and we source those from different parts of the

world. These arc examples of smite of the advanced surgical products that we supply to hospitals—both

private and state, We also supply products from Gchnge and Maquet, their products cover CSR, oparuting

room equipment, and ventilators.

Do you capetiesee tiny problems with shipments?

Fortunately, nothIng very serious. The custonis in Iran are very bureaucratic for airy product that you want

to release from the customs house, You have to have the permission of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry

of Cornnicrcc and then go to customs to obtain its release. In other puts of the world, for example in

Armenia, die products are shipped to companies via OHL, and then the day after that you receive it at your

office, not In the customs house. Siemens has established a huge warehouse in FrankItnl and they told us

that we would not need mie in Tehrun because of this huge investment Yet, due to problems at customs we

have to have a warehouse in Tebran. We aim to get rid of It, because it’s an unnecessary cost for us, though

we cannot do that at the moment.

‘ Ibid.“The BusIness Year, Interview Raisin Fdlah. uFeom the InsIde”, hcipi wdrtbu5iresstrsiiuu u1yL,I.1cI juiiiz

2QJ tffrom.the4nside taccasredwie 6, 20t31

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Pursuant to paragraph 34(IX4) of 1I&PA, an applicant may be found inadmissible for being a “danger to thesccwity of Canada”; therefore, an individual who has engaged, engages, or will eagage in proLifemtlon ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD) may be found inadmissible to Canada. The Supreme Comnt of Canadaheld in Surek v. Cara4a (Minister of Citizenship and Immigraaion), L2002] I S.C.R. 3, ai paragraph 5, that:

“. a fair, large and liberal Interpretation In accordance with International norms must be accordedLa “danger to the security of Canada” in deportation legislation. We recognize that “danger to thesecurity of Canada” is difficult to defoe We also accept dint the determination of what constitutes a“danger to the security ofCanada” Is highly fhet-based and political in a general sense. All this suggestsa bread aid flexible approach to national security and..a deferential standard of judicial review”tEawhasLc arkied.) (U)

The Court also held, at paragraph RE, that “[ijntcrnational conventions must be interpreted in light ofcanantconditions”:

“1110 insist on direct proofof a specitlc threat to Canada as the test for “dauger lathe security of Canada”Is to Sat the bar too high. There must be a real and serious possibility of adverse effect to Canada. Butthe threat need not be direct naiher it may be grounded ii, distant events that indirectly have a realpossibility ciharming Canadian security.” tEmphasis oddert I (U)

The Court concluded, at paragraph 90, that

“IAI peraoa canstitutca a “danger to the security nt Canada” if ha or she poses a serious threat tothe secmity of Canada, whether direct an’ Indirect, and bearing In mind the fact that the security ofone coutry Is often dependent on the security of other nations. The threat rnu be “serious”, in thesense that ii must be grounded art objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and in the sensethat the threatened harm must be substantial rather than negligible.” Emphasir added.) (U>

In addition, the Federal Court of Appeal held in Suresh i Canada (M.C.L), (2000) 2 FC 592 (CA), atparagraph 6!. that:

“ITJtbe “security of Canada” cannot be limited en Instances where the personal safety of CanadiansIi concerned. It should logically extend to instances where the integrity of Canada’s Intenritiondrelations and obligations are aUected. It must be adcnowledged that only through lbs collective effortsof nations will the threat of terrorism be diminished. The efficacy of those collective efforts isundermined each time a natioO ptvvides terrorist organizations with a window of opportunity to openateoff-shore arid achieve indirectly what cannot be done as efficiently and efl’ectively ifl the country targetedfor tcrrcristattocks” (Emphasis adde€Lj(U)

Although the Snresh case dealt with terrorism, the National Security Screening Division (NSSD) is of theview that the arguments regarding what constitutes “a danger to the security of Canada” are applicable tosituations dealing with nuclear proliferation or proliferation of WMi) which constitutes a serious threat ordanger to the security of Canada. Nucicar proliferation constitutes a worldwide threat, hence the impvsdtaflof economic sanctions on Iran. To note, as part of its non-proliferation policy, Canada is a signatory to the

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intertiatianal Treaty On the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which establishes a safeguard

system under the responsibility ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Although han is a party

to the NFl, as nientioned above, it has been found in non-compliance by the IAEA and international

sanctions have been imposed against Iran. (U)

In addition, the interpretation of the courts as to what constitutes a danger to the security of Canada is

conrirmed in the objectives of IRPA, specifically in subpnragraphs 3(1)(h) and (0:

“3. (1) The objectives of this Act with respect to Immigration are.

(Ii) to protect the health and safety ofCanadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society;

(1) to promote ernatlaisi justiad end security by fostering resperS for human rights and by denying

acceas to Canadian territory to persons who are criminals or security risks....” (U)

In regards to section 3 of IAPA, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Medovarski it Canada (Mtncter of

Ci&eisrhip andImmigrcuios), 12005)2 S.C.R. 539, at paragraph 10, that

“The otijectives as expressed in the 11W4 indicate an interd to prioritize security. This objective is given

effct by praveasing the entry of applicants with criminal records, by removing applicants with such

records from Canada, and by emphasizing the obligation of permanent residents to behave lawfully while

in Canada. lids marks a change from the focus in the predecessor atsiute, which emphasized the

successful Integration ofapplicants more than security e.g., see s. 3(IXI) of the IRPA versus s. 3(j) of the

former Act a. 3(lXe) of the JRP4 versus s. 3(d) of the f&nier Act s. 3(lXh) ofthe IRP.4 versus s. 3(i)f

the former Act. Viewed collectively, the objectives of the IRPA and its provisions concerning permanent

residents, communicate a strong desire to treat criminals and security threats less [aniendy than under the

former Act” (U)

There is no requ.irement that an individual who is inadmissible to Canada on security grounds be personally

involved in acts ofviolence. There is, therefore, norequirement that criminality be determined in order for an

individual to be considered a danger to the security of Canada. (U)

Considering the above case law, legislation arid Canadian policy, NSSD is of the view that individuals who

are linked, directly or indirectly, to nuclear proliferation or preliferation of WMD may be found inadmissible

as there are reasonable grounds to believe that they present a danger to the security of Canada. Furthermore.

NSSD is also of the view that individuals who are linked, directly or indirectly, to the individuals or

organizations listed in the SEMA sanctions against iran may ho found inadmissible as there are reasonable

grounds to believe that they constitute a danger to the security of Canada. (B)

Fasiavari Azmayethgalii Company has also been identified in opon sources and by allied governments as

being an entity of WMD concern. For example, it was identified by the U.K.’s Department of Business

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CBSA 4SFCSECIUlInnovation and Skills (RIS) as entity that poses “unacceptable risks of diversion to a WMD programme ofconcern”. It was also identified by the Japanese government as an entity of potential WMD COflCCtTh Funher,according to its website, Fanavari Azmayeshgahi rcpresents well-known brands and pruducts that havepotential dual-use application. For example, several products under the Siemens brand have potential dual useapplication, such as Xray equipment, which is highlighted in the U.S’s 2010 TechnolOgy Alert List (TAL)as critical technologies for the production of WMDs. X-ray equipment / technologies highlighted in the TALinclude: FLASH DISCHARGE TYPE X-RAY SYSTEMS, FLASII X-RAY, iMAGiNG SYSTEMS’ and XAW I. Y.RAy1’u’’ TJCH AS

When considering the above, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the appliCaflt by virtue of hisposition as Nanaging Director of Fanavari Azmayeshgahi Company, and by virtue 0f this carnpaay’s reportedInvolvement with procurement connected to the Iranian nuclear program, presents a danger to the security ofCanada and its allies and is inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 34(1 )(d) of IRPA (B).

Recommendation

The National Security Division (NSSD) recommends that there are reasonable grotifld ifl believe that theapplicant is inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 34(I)(d) of IRPA, at this time. The dcCiSi0fl of whether thesubject is inadmissible rests solely with the decisionmakcr. We trust that the infnmiatio° provided will be ofassistance in your decision-making process. (B)

Temporary Resident Assessments and Intelligence Section (TRAIS)Outlook: CBSA-ASFCjnteIl_TempResScreenjRMS-RensJflt_Res IcmpfilthRTSMTP: lS-SRERT(Thcbsa-asfc,p,c.ca

This documeat casnwtes a record which may be e.’cempt from disclosure under the 4ccB 10 JJj.flJCJIIWi 4cr orthe Privacy 4cr. The information or intelligence may also be protected by the provisions of the Canada EvidenceAct. The information or intelligence must not be disclosed or used as evidence without prior consultahbotl With theCanada Border Services Agency (CIISA). Classified information coataitied within this document Ca000( bedisclosed to outside parties

This document is the property of the CBSA lt is loaned to your agency / department in cønfidCflCC br internal USConly. It must not be reclassified or disseminated, in whole or in pan, without the consent of the originBt

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