ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 27, 28, 78~95 (1981)

Exchange Variables as Predictors of Job Satisfaction, Job Commitment, and Turnover: The

Impact of Rewards, Costs, Alternatives, and Investments 1

DANIEL FARRELL AND CARYL E . RUSBULT

Franklin and Marshall College

Two studies were designed to explore the ability of the investment model to predict job satisfaction, job commitment, and job turnover. The first study was a controlled laboratory analog of a work setting, and the second study was a cross-sectional survey of industrial workers. The results of the two studies were consistent. Job satisfaction was best predicted by the reward and cost values of the job, and job commitment was best predicted by a combination of reward and cost values, alternative value, and investment size. Both satisfac- tion and commitment were correlated with job turnover, but job commitment was more strongly related to turnover than was satisfaction. These results are in complete agreement with the investment model.

Social scientists concerned with organizational behavior have made numerous attempts to identify the determinants of employee withdrawal, especially in the form of job turnover. Most explorations of the causes of job turnover have focused on job satisfaction as a primary predictor vari- able (Lawler, 1973; Locke, 1976; Porter & Steers, 1973; Vroom, 1964). However, employee turnover has consistently been shown to be only moderately related to a variety of job satisfaction measures (Koch & Steers, 1978; Porter, Crampon, & Smith, 1976; Porter & Steers, 1973; Porter, Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974). As noted in a recent review of this literature, "the satisfaction-turnover relationship, although consis- tent, usually accounts for less than 16 percent of the variance in turnover" (Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Meglino, 1979).

A number of researchers have recently turned to the study of commit- ment as an alternative predictor of employee turnover. For example,

i The authors wish to express their sincere gratitude to Frank DiNapoli, Don Robb, and Mark Schultze, who helped conduct Experiment 1, and to the labor unions, whose leaders' and members' cooperation made Experiment 2 possible. The authors also thank James Price and Michael Hubbard for critical comments on an earlier version of this paper. The research was supported by grants from Franklin and Marshall College and the University of Ken- tucky Research Foundation.

Requests for reprints should be addressed to Dr. Daniel Farrell, Department of Manage- ment, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008. The second author is now at the Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky 40506.

78 0030-5073/81/040078-18502.00/0 Copyright © 1981 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

C O M M I T M E N T A N D T U R N O V E R 79

Porter and his associates (Porter, Crampon, & Smith, 1976; Porter, Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974) found that organizational commitment predicted turnover better than did job satisfaction. These authors defined organizational commitment as "the strength of an individual's identifica- tion with and involvement in a particular organization" (Porter, Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974, p. 604). Similarly, Koch and Steers (1978) found that job attachment was more strongly predictive of job turnover than was satisfaction. In this context, job attachment refers to "an attitu- dinal response to one's job that is characterized by a congruence between one's real and ideal jobs, an identification with one's chosen occupation, and a reluctance to seek alternate employment" (Koch & Steers, 1978, p. 120).

In light of this evidence that commitment exerts a reasonably powerful impact on job turnover, it becomes important that the causes of job com- mitment be identified. However, most research on organizational com- mitment has either: (a) explored the relationships among a variety of highly specific predictors and commitment (e.g., salary, social interaction with peers and supervisors, age, education); or (b)studied the impact on organizational commitment of one or two more abstract theoretical con- structs (e.g., side bets, quality of exchange relationship) without devel- oping a general theory concerning the causes of satisfaction and commit- ment (c.f., Alutto, Hrebiniak, & Alonso, 1973; Aranya & Jacobson, 1975; Buchanan, 1974; Hrebiniak & Alutto, 1972; Pfeffer & Lawler, 1980). What is needed is a clear conceptual model capable of predicting a variety of organizational behaviors. The primary goals of the present paper are: (a) to outline a theoretical model of the causes of, and interrelationships among, job satisfaction, commitment, and turnover; and (b) to report the results of two initial studies designed to assess the predictive validity of this theory, termed the investment model.

Although most researchers define job satisfaction in terms of positivity of affect (refer to Price, 1977; and Wanous & Lawler, 1972), commitment has been defined in a variety of fashions. Commitment-like constructs have been defined in terms of identification with and involvement in a particular organization (Porter, Crampon, & Smith, 1976; Porter, Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974), behavioral intentions (Mobley, 1977), a con- gruence between one's real and ideal jobs (Koch & Steers, 1978), entrap- ment (Rubin & Brockner, 1975), or constraint (Johnson, 1973). The defi- nition of commitment employed in this research follows that advanced by Kiesler--"commitment is the binding of the individual to behavioral acts" (Kiesler & Sakumura, 1966, p. 349). Thus, job commitment is re- lated to the probability that an employee will leave his job, and involves feelings of psychological attachment, independent of affect. Job commit- ment reflects behavioral intention, primarily (but not solely) degree of intention to stay with a job. Job commitment exists to the extent that the

80 FARRELL AND RUSBULT

employee perceives that he/she is "connected" to a job. This definition is similar to those proffered by Hrebiniak and Alutto (1972), Salancik (1977), and Johnson (1973), in his discussion of "behavioral commitment".

The investment model was originally developed as a means of describ- ing satisfaction and commitment in romantic involvements (Rusbult, 1980). The model is in the general tradition of exchange theory (c.f., Homans, 1961) and is an expansion and formalization of selected aspects of interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Briefly, the model asserts that job satisfaction, or positivity of affect toward one's job, is primarily a simple function of the rewards and costs associated with the job. Job commitment, however, is said to be a function of rewards, costs, investments, and alternatives. In turn, job turnover is asserted to be predicted directly by job commitment. Each of these model parameters will be discussed below in greater detail.

The individual's evaluation of an association, or satisfaction with the association, consists of a subjective reward-cost analysis and a compari- son of this judgment to a general standard for evaluating such associa- tions, called a comparison level (CL) (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). The re- ward value of an association (Rx) is defined as:

Rx = ~(wiri) (1)

where ri represents the individual's subjective estimation of the reward value of attribute i available from association X, and wi represents its subjective importance. Pay, opportunity for promotion, autonomy, vari- ety, and task identity are examples of job rewards. The cost value of association X (Cx) is defined as:

Cx = E(wjcj) (2)

where cj is the magnitude of the subjective costs of association X with regard to attribute j, and wj represents the importance of j in the associa- tion. Inadequate resources, lengthy travel to work, unfair promotion practices, and undesirable shifts are examples of possible job costs. Satisfaction with an employment association should increase as the re- wards of the association increase and costs decrease.

The comparison level represents the average quality of outcomes that the individual has come to expect from associations, in this case, employment. The individual compares the value of the current association to his CL in order to assess degree of satisfaction with the association. Satisfaction (SATx) can be represented as follows:

SATx = (Rx - Cx) - CL (3)

The combination of rewards and costs in this formula (Rx less Cx) is referred to as the "association outcome value" (Ox). Since the presence of costs generally implies the absence of reward, it may be useful to view

COMMITMENT AND TURNOVER 81

job satisfaction as a simple function of outcome value and comparison level. This approach corresponds to that adopted in Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) interdependence theory, and is similar to the notions of satisfaction described by Lawler (1973) and Porter and Steers (1973). Research has repeatedly demonstrated that job rewards and costs such as salary, job variety, prestige, and participation exert the predicted effects on employee satisfaction (c.f., Bartol, 1979; Hackman & Lawler, 1971; Locke, 1976).

According to the investment model, job commitment is a function of several factors: the rewards and costs (satisfaction) derived from the job, the quality of the individual's job alternatives, and the magnitude of the individual's investment in the job. There exists abundant empirical sup- port for the prediction that increases in job rewards and decreases in costs (i.e., increases in satisfaction) lead to stronger job commitment. Increases in salary have been shown to be associated with increased commitment to the organization (Aranya & Jacobson, 1975), and greater intent to remain in one's position (Pfeffer & Lawler, 1980). Schoenherr and Greeley (1974) demonstrated that the requirement of celibacy (presumed to be a job cost) served to reduce commitment among American Catholic priests. Addi- tional support for the prediction that rewards and satisfaction are posi- tively related to commitment, and costs negatively related to commit- ment, is to be found in Buchanan (1974), Dubin, Champoux, and Porter (1975), and Hrebiniak and Alutto (1972).

Alternative value is defined as the quality of the best available alterna- tive to relationship X, whether unemployment or an alternative job. Al- ternative value (Ay) is defined in the same fashion as is satisfaction with the current association:

Ay = (Ry - Cy) - CL (4)

This use of the concept of alternative value corresponds to that employed in interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978, use the term CLalt) and in Mobley's (1977) suggestions concerning the study of organizational commitment. The investment model predicts that job alternatives ought to be negatively related to job commitment. If an individual's job alterna- tives are poor, (e.g., oversupply of similarly qualified workers), commit- ment to his current job should become greater. Job alternatives have been demonstrated to be negatively related to intent to remain in one' s position (Pfeffer & Lawler, 1980), and to career commitment (McLaughlin & But- ler, 1974). Indirect support for this proposed negative relationship be- tween alternatives and commitment may be found elsewhere (March & Simon, 1958; Marsh & Mannari, 1977; Price, 1977).

The investment model specifies that the final determinant of commit- ment is investment size. Investments refer to the resources that are "put

82 FARRELL AND RUSBULT

into" an association, usually, but not necessarily, with the intent to im- prove the long-term value of the relationship. Length of service, acquisi- tion of non-portable skills, and retirement programs are common job in- vestments. Such investments serve to increase commitment by increasing the costs of leaving the association. The investment of resources does not necessarily alter the value of the association, although it may occasionally serve to change its immediate reward or cost value. Invested resources may be material or psychological, intrinsic or extrinsic. Investment size (Ix) is defined as:

Ix = ~(wkik) (5)

where ik refers to the size of the investment of resource k in relationship X, and wk refers to the importance of resource k. Similar concepts have been introduced by other authors. One of the most commonly cited refer- ences is Becker's (1960) discussion of "side bets", although many other authors have recently introduced similar concepts (Alutto, Hrebiniak, & Alonso, 1973; Johnson, 1973; Salancik, 1977; Sheldon, 1971). Evidence abounds in support of the hypothesized positive relationship between commitment and investments such as time in organization, tenure, and age (Alutto, Hrebiniak, & Alonso, 1973; Aranya & Jacobson, 1975; Buchanan, 1974; Hrebiniak & Alutto, 1972; Koch & Steers, 1978; Pfeffer & Lawler, 1980; Sheldon, 1971). Indirect support for this prediction is to be found in research on the effects of investments on the phenomenon of entrapment (Rubin & Brockner, 1975; Tropper, 1972), and in the work of Staw and his associates on the process of escalating commitment to a chosen course of action (Staw, 1976; Staw & Fox, 1977).

Commitment (COMx) may now be defined as:

COMx = (Rx - Cx) + Ix - Oy (6)

This equation may alternatively be expressed in terms of satisfaction:

COMx = SATx + Ix - Ay (7)

It should be clear that Equations 6 and 7 are roughly interchangeable. Commitment should increase as the value of the relationship increases, as the magnitude of the individual's investment in the relationship increases, and as alternative value decreases. It is important to note that satisfaction with a job and commitment to that association need not necessarily be strongly correlated. Since high commitment may be caused by poor alter- natives or large investments as well as by high satisfaction, it is possible that a worker may be dissatisfied with his/her job but still remain highly committed to it.

The final link in the investment model is that between previously de- fined terms and job turnover. The investment model proposes that job

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commitment should be directly (negatively) predictive of job turnover. Thus, turnover should be negatively related to job rewards, satisfaction, and investments, and positively related to job costs and alternative value.

Although the investment model is a new means of formally distinguish- ing between the notions of job satisfaction and commitment, it is apparent from the foregoing discussion of each model parameter that similar con- cepts have been introduced by other social scientists. The hypothesized relations among rewards, costs, comparison level, and alternative value are borrowed directly from interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Becker describes an investment-like phe- nomenon in his argument that commitment is increased by "prior actions of the person staking some originally extraneous interest on his following a consistent line of activity" (Becker, 1960, p. 36). Similarly, Rubin dis- cusses the means by which entrapment develops---the individual invests greater resources in a line of action than that exchange objectively war- rants (Rubin & Brockner, 1975). Blau (1964) captures much of the flavor of the investment model in his statement that:

" . . . Alternative opportunities foregone strengthen commitments, and together with the investments made sometimes produce firm attachments." (Blau, 1964, p. 160)

Finally, in a summary of the results of their research on organizational commitment, Hrebiniak & Alutto (1972) note that:

" . . . commitment is an exchange and accrual phenomenon, dependent on the employee's perception of the ratio of inducements to contributions and the ac- cumulation of the side bets or investments in the employing system." (Hrebiniak & Alutto, 1972, p. 555)

Thus, although the investment model constitutes a new means of studying job satisfaction, commitment, and turnover, its theoretical constructs are firmly rooted in traditional psychological and sociological literature.

Two studies were designed to test the investment model predictions concerning the effects of job reward and cost values, alternative value, and investment size on job satisfaction and commitment, and to assess the relationships among these variables and job turnover. The contributions of the weighting factors in the reward, cost, and investment size parame- ters (wi, wj, and wk), and the impact of comparison level on these predic- tions were not explored in the present research. Study 1 is a laboratory analog of a business setting. Job rewards, costs, alternatives, and invest- ments were experimentally manipulated, and satisfaction, commitment, and turnover were measured. Study 2 is a cross-sectional survey of in- dustrial workers which obtained measures of job-related rewards, costs, alternatives, investments, satisfaction, and commitment. Since it employs experimental methods, the first study more effectively assesses the causal relations among the model parameters. The second study possesses

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greater external validity, as it explores actual worker perceptions in real work organizations.

The hypotheses advanced for the two pieces of research are identical. It was predicted that job satisfaction would be influenced by variations in job rewards and costs, but not by alternative value or investment size (refer to Equation 3). It was also hypothesized that job commitment would increase with increases in job rewards and investments, and de- creases in job costs and alternative value (see Equation 6). (One might also posit a relationship between job commitment and job satisfaction, investments, and alternatives, as in Equation 7.) Job turnover should be a direct function of job commitment, decreases in commitment producing increases in the probability of turnover. Job satisfaction should not pre- dict turnover as well as job commitment.

STUDY 1

Method

Participants. Sixty-four males and 64 females participated in the ex- periment in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an introductory business management course at Franklin and Marshall Co!lege. Twelve same-sex subjects were recruited for each experimental session. Within each session subjects were randomly assigned to one of 16 conditions. The ratio of males to females was equal across experimental conditions.

Procedure. At the start of each session subjects were seated in a com- mon room while the experimenter explained the study. Subjects were told that they would first be given some training materials to read, and that after reading these materials they would be randomly assigned one of several alternative tasks. They would be allowed the opportunity to choose among a number of different tasks during later stages of the ex- periment, and would be paid in accordance to the amount and quality of their performance. Subjects were then assigned to individual cubicles which adjoined the common room.

Subjects were allowed 20 minutes to read and study their job training materials, at which time they were assigned their first task. In reality, all subjects were assigned the same task--transcribing into longhand news stories written in "Reporters ' Speed Writing". Subjects were informed of the approximate difficulty and pay rate of the task. At the end of a 15 minute work period subjects were presented with an alternative task which required decoding news reports "written by telephone transmis- sion". The reports were without punctuation or capitalization, and selected letters were systematically replaced by numbers and symbols. Subjects were left alone to examine these materials for a brief period of time.

Four independent variables were manipulated in the experiment: job

COMMITMENT AND TURNOVER 85

reward value (high or low), job cost value (high or low), alternative value (high or low), and investment size (large or small). Job rewards were manipulated through variations in estimated pay ($4 for high rewards, $2 for low rewards). Changes in task demands served to vary costs. High cost subjects were told that they would receive credit for a transcribed sentence only if 100 per cent of the words were correct, and low cost subjects were given a 60 percent accuracy criterion. Alternative value was manipulated through changes in the payment for the second task (an estimated $4 for high alternative value and $2 for low alternative value). The type of training provided subjects served to manipulate investment size. In the high investment condition subjects read training materials specific to the first task (essays about reporter's speed writing), and in the low investment condition subjects read essays that were general and only tangentially related to the first task (essays about the field of journalism). Training that is specific to a particular task serves as an investment in that task (i.e., it is less transferable to other tasks), whereas general training does not. This manipulation corresponds to a distinction drawn by Becker (1975) in his analysis of lifetime earnings of American workers.

After examining the materials for the second task, subjects completed a questionnaire which contained a series of seven-point Likert-type items. This instrument assessed the effectiveness of the manipulations of job rewards (payment is good, first task has positive qualities), job costs (task is difficult, has negative qualities), alternative value (payment is good, second task has positive qualities, has few negative qualities, expected satisfaction with and liking for the second task), and investment size (training was useful, relevant to the first task, helped performance on first task). Two items were designed to measure job satisfaction: to what ex- tent are you satisfied with your first task (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) and how much do you like your first task (1 = not at all, 7 -- extremely). Three additional items served as measures of job commitment: how likely is it that you will continue to work on your first task (1 = not at all likely, 7 = extremely likely), how likely is it that you will switch to work on the second task (1 -- extremely likely, 7 = not at all likely), and how commit- ted are you to continuing work on the first task (1 = not at all, 7 = entirely). A final item served as a measure of job turnover, and required that subjects elect to work on either the first or second task during the second work period. After completing the questionniare subjects were paid $3 and thoroughly debriefed.

Results

Manipulation checks. The effectiveness of each of the four experimen- tal manipulations was assessed by performing four four-factor multi- variate analyses of variance--one for each set of manipulation checks.

86 FARRELL AND RUSBULT

These analyses revealed significant effects on the appropriate manipula- tion check measures for reward value (Mult. F(2,110) = 7.72, p < .001), cost value (Mult. F(2,111) = 18.06, p < .001), alternative value (Mult. F(5,104) = 2.71,p < .02), and investment size (Mult. F(3,110) = 123.71, p < .001). The manipulations were therefore judged to have been suc- cessful.

Satisfaction, Commitment, and Turnover. A four-factor multivariate analysis of variance was performed on the task satisfaction measures. Mean satisfaction scores are displayed in Table 1. Consistent with the experimental hypotheses, subjects in the high reward condition reported greater satisfaction with their task than did those in the low reward condi- tion (Mult. F(2,112) -- 2.95, p < .06 - marginal), high cost condition subjects were less satisfied with their task than were low cost condition subjects (Mult. F(2,112) = 12.27, p < .001), and investment size had no significant effect on satisfaction (Mult. F(2,112) = 0.67, p < .51 - ns). An unexpected finding was that variations in alternative value significantly affected satisfaction, low alternative value subjects experiencing greater satisfaction than their high alternative value counterparts (Mult. F (2,112) = 4.14, p < .02).

The exper imenta l quest ionnaire conta ined three measures of task commitment and one measure of turnover. An initial step in the analysis o f these data was to assess the strength of the relationship between turn- over and the measures of commitment. Turnover was significantly cor- related with reported desire to continue with the current task (r = - .73) , aversion to changing to the alternative task (r = - .73) , and commitment to the current task (r = - .45) . A four-factor multivariate analysis of variance was performed on the three commitment measures and the turn-

TABLE 1 MEAN TASK SATISFACTION AS A FUNCTION OF CURRENT TASK REWARD AND

COST VALUES AND ALTERNATIVE VALUE

High Low

Reward Value-- Satisfaction with current task Attraction to current task

Cost Value-- Satisfaction with current task Attraction to current task

Alternative Value-- Satisfaction with current task Attraction to current task

3.09 2.62 3.39 2.95

2.33 3.38 2.84 3.50

2.62 3.09 2.87 3.47

Both measures were seven-point Likert-type scales. Higher numbers indicate greater satisfaction and attraction.

COMMITMENT AND TURNOVER 87

over measure. Mean values of each measure are shown in Table 2. As predicted, significant effects were obtained for current task reward value (Mult. F (4,109) = 3.21, p < .02), current task cost value (Mult. F(4,109) = 2.73, p < .03), alternative value (Mult. F(4,109) = 5.06, p < .001), and investment size (Mult. F(4,109) = 2.87, p < .03). All mean values were in the predicted direction, greater commitment and fewer turnovers result- ing from high reward value, low cost value, low alternative value, and large investment size. Univariate analyses of the turnover measure re- vealed a similar pattern. Turnover was less probable under conditions of high current task reward~value (F(1,113) = 10.42, p < .002), low current task cost value (F (1,113) = 4.13, p < . 04), low alternative value (F (1,113) = 14.73, p < .001), and large investment size (F(1,113) = 2.82, p < .06 -marginal).

A final set of analyses assessed the relationships among the measures of job satisfaction, commitment, and turnover. Reported attraction to the first task was significantly correlated with the three measures of commit- ment (the r's were .34, .33, and .30) and the measure of turnover (r =

TABLE 2 MEAN JOB COMMITMENT AND TURNOVER AS A FUNCTION OF CURRENT TASK REWARD

AND COST VALUES, ALTERNATIVE VALUE r AND INVESTMENT SIZE

High Low

Reward Value-- Desire to continue with current task Avers ion to changing to alternative Commitment to current task Turnover

Cost Value-- Desire to continue with current task Avers ion to changing to alternative Commitment to current task Turnover

Alternative Value-- Desire to continue with current task Avers ion to changing to alternative Commitment to current task Turnover

Investment Size-- Desire to continue with current task Avers ion to changing to alternative Commitment to current task Turnover

4.09 3.03 4.35 3.85 3.71 2.89

.47 .73

3.09 4.02 3.33 4.30 3.05 3.55

.69 .52

2.82 4.30 3.18 4.45 2.79 3.81

.76 .46

4.06 3.06 4.24 3.37 3.73 2.88

.32 .60

The commitment measures were seven-point Likert-type scales and the turnover mea- sure was a dichotomous choice of current or alternative task. Higher numbers indicate greater commitment and percent turnover.

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-.28), and a similar pattern of results emerged for reported satisfaction with the first task (for the three commitment measures the r ' s were .38, .39, and .41; for the turnover measure, r = -.28). Thus, satisfaction was significantly correlated with both commitment and turnover, but these relationships were not strong. The finding that job commitment was more strongly correlated with turnover than was job satisfaction is in complete agreement with the investment model.

STUDY 2

Method

Respondents. One hundred seven male and 56 female industrial work- ers completed questionnaires forwarded through the cooperation of the "locals" of three major labor unions. Out of a total of 295 mailed, these returns represented a usable response rate of 55 percent. The overall response rate was 60 percent, but several questionnaires were returned partially or wholly incomplete.

Procedure. A subject list was prepared by taking a random sample of the membership of each union. Union staff members attached mailing labels to pre-packaged, pre-stamped mailings identified by subject num- bers. Each packet contained a cover letter, a questionnaire, and a Stamped return envelope addressed to the researchers. Follow-up mail- ings for respondents were prepared in a similar manner. Cover letters assured respondents of the anonymity of their responses, stated the fact of the unions' cooperation and approval, and summarized the purpose of the research. The questionnaires required approximately 30 minutes to complete.

Questionnaire. The questionnaire contained items designed to measure all of the elements of the investment model. Since it was anticipated that respondents would not easily be able to answer questions such as "what rewards does your job possess", the abstract concepts of the model were "translated" into everyday language in the following manner: (a) each abstract concept was briefly defined; (b) a series of questions representing concrete operationalizations of each abstract concept was answered; and (c) several global measures of each abstract concept were obtained. Val- ues on individual global measures were summed to form a single measure of each investment model parameter. Unless otherwise indicated, ques- tionnaire items were nine-point Likert-type items.

In everyday work situations the absence of a specific job reward gener- ally implies the presence of a cost (e.g., lack of monetary rewards implies a cost , low pay). Therefore , a single set of job outcome value operationalization measures was used to teach respondents the meaning of reward and cost value. Twenty-eight items assessed a variety of as- pects of jobs, including pay (10 categories), opportunity for promotion,

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perce ived fairness of promotions, routinization, autonomy, task identity, f e e d b a c k , c o w o r k e r re la t ions , r e s o u r c e a d e q u a c y , job cha l lenge , mechanizat ion, work schedules, travel to work, vacations, physical sur- roundings, and formalization. Three global measures concerned the ex- tent to which jobs were rewarding (1 = no good things, 9 = many good things, 1 = not at all rewarding, 9 = extremely rewarding) and compared favorably to ideal jobs (1 = job is worse than most, 9 = job is bet ter than most), and three global measures assessed costs (1 --- many negative things, 9 = no negative things; 1 = many costs, 9 = no costs) and unfavor- able comparisons to ideals (1 = more negative aspects, 9 = fewer negative aspects).

The value of alternative associations was assessed by four concrete and three global values. The concrete measures assessed the difficulty of finding similar employment , availability of workers in their geographical area, market value of workers ' skills, and the aversiveness of unemploy- ment. The global measures concerned the expected satisfaction of alter- native jobs (1 = excellent, 9 = terrible), alternative as compared to the current job (1 = alternatives are much better, 9 = alternatives are much worse), and alternative as compared to the ideal job (1 = alternatives are much better, 9 = alternatives are much worse).

Investments were defined as activities, events, or persons uniquely associated with the job, and as things "pu t into" the current job. Sixteen concrete measures assessed length o f service, job tenure, vested and non -ve s t e d r e t i r emen t p rograms , specif ic or non-por tab le training, spousal employment , homeownership, and community ties. Three global measures assessed the extent to which investments had been made: in general, how much have you invested in this job (1 = nothing, 9 = a great deal), to what extent are there activit ies/events/persons/objects/behaviors uniquely associated with the job that you would lose if you were to leave this job (1 = none, 9 = a great many), and how does your investment in this job compare to what you think most people have invested in their jobs (1 = I 've invested less than most people, 9 = I 've invested more than most).

Only global measures of the criterion measures of job satisfaction and commitment were obtained. Job satisfaction was measured by a combi- nation of two direct inquiries (repeated from exper iment one- -1 = not at all satisfied, 9 = ext remely satisfied; 1 = don ' t like at all, 9 = like very much) and four indirect inquiries (would you recommend similar job to friend, 1 = advise against it, 9 = strongly recommend it; closeness to ideal job, 1 = not at all, 9 = extremely; met expectations, 1 = not at all, 9 = definitely; possible regrets, 1 = none at all, 9 = a great many). The resultant scale of job satisfaction resembles the general job satisfaction scale employed by Quinn and Shepard (1974). Five items measured the

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commitment cr i ter ion-- l ikel ihood of quitting job in near future (1 = ex- t remely likely, 9 = not at all likely), commitment to current job (1 = not at all, 9 = extremely), a t tachment to current job (1 = not at all, 9 = ex- tremely), desired length of staying (1 = short period of time, 9 = long period of time), and time spent searching for a different job ( _ _ hours on the average). This scale was adapted for the study of job commitment from Rusbult 's (1980) research on commitment to romantic involvements. This study did not make use of existing scales of job commitment (c.f., Mowday, Steers, and Porter , 1979) because of theoretical differences in definitions of this concept.

Results

Reliability and Validity o f Measures. In order to assess the reliability of the summed indices of each model parameter , reliability estimates (coeffi- cient alpha) were computed for the set of single measures which were summed to form the measure for each parameter. The coefficients ex- ceeded lowest acceptable levels (Nunnally, 1967) for measures of job reward value (.82), job cost value (.77), alternative value (.74), investment size (.78), satisfaction (.94), and commitment (.86). Therefore , these summed "g loba l" measures were employed in the remaining analyses.

The use of operationalizations to translate investment model parame- ters into everyday language allowed for the assessment of construct va- lidity by regressing associated concrete measures onto global measures. The multiple correlation coefficients were significant for job reward value (R = .82), job cost value (R = .73), alternative value (R --- .39), and invest- ment size (R -- .55), so the global measures were judged to be valid.

Job Satisfaction. Cramer 's (1972) model comparison procedures were employed to assess the ability of the investment model parameters to predict job satisfaction and commitment. Both reward value (r = .76) and cost value (r = - .56) were significantly correlated with job satisfaction. The multiple correlation of satisfaction with rewards and costs was supe- rior to the prediction provided by either of these predictors considered individually (R = .78). The two factor prediction (R 2 --- .61) was compared to the two individual correlations and was found to predict satisfaction significantly bet ter than did either reward value (r 2 = .58) (F (1,149) -- 10.74,p < .01)or cost value (r 2 = .31)(F(1,149) = 64.78, p < .001)alone. As expected, satisfaction was not significantly correlated with alternative value or investment size. These results are consistent with the investment model predictions (refer to Equation 3).

Job Commitment. The investment model states that job commitment should be predicted by a combination of satisfaction, investments, and alternatives (refer to Equat ion 7). As expected, job commitment was sig- nificantly correlated with satisfaction (r = .67), investments (r = .27), and

C O M M I T M E N T A N D T U R N O V E R 91

alternatives (r = -.21). Cramer's (1972) procedures were employed to compare the multiple correlation of the three predictor model (R2 = .51) to the prediction from satisfaction alone (r 2 = .44). This comparison was significant (F (2,148) = 9.25, p < .01), so the three-factor model (satisfac- tion, alternatives, investments) appears to predict job commitment sig- nificantly better than does satisfaction alone. In order to explore the individual contributions of alternatives and investments to the prediction of job commitment, increment in r 2 tests were performed. First, a model based on satisfaction alone (r 2 = .44) was compared to a model including both satisfaction and alternatives (R 2 = .47). The inclusion of alternatives significantly improved the prediction of job commitment (F(1,149) = 7.98, p < .01). A model based on satisfaction and alternatives (R 2 = .47) was then compared to the full model of satisfaction, alternatives, and investments (R ~ = .51). This comparison also proved significant (F(1,148) = 11.17, p < .01). These findings provide strong support for the invest- ment model. Satisfaction, alternative value, and investment size all pro- duce significant and (somewhat) independent effects on job commitment. Collectively, these variables account for 51 percent of the variation in job commitment.

Equation 6 of the investment model presents a model of job commit- ment which is roughly equivalent to the one described above (Equation 7). This model includes four predictors--job rewards and costs (substituted for job satisfaction), alternative outcome value, and investment size. Job commitment was significantly predicted by this four variable model (R = .60). Reduced models were compared to the full model (as described above), and were found to result in significant reductions in predictive power. Again, these results are in complete agreement with the invest- ment model.

Correlations among all investment model parameters are presented in Table 3. It should be clear that this pattern of correlations provides strong support for the investment model. Satisfaction was significantly corre-

T A B L E 3

CORRELATIONS AMONG INVESTMENT MODEL PARAMETERS

S A T R C A I

COM .67 a .51 a - . 4 0 a - . 2 1 b .27"

S A T .76 a - . 5 6 " - . 1 1 .09

R - . 5 5 ~ - . 0 7 .13 ¢

C - . 0 8 - . 1 2

A .07

C O M = j o b c o m m i t m e n t , S A T = j o b s a t i s f a c t i o n , R = r e w a r d v a l u e , C = c o s t v a l u e , A

= a l t e r n a t i v e v a l u e , I = i n v e s t m e n t s ize . p < .001; ~ p < . 0 1 ; C p < .05

92 FARRELL AND RUSBULT

TABLE 4 CORRELATIONS AMONG COMMITMENT MEASURES

Attached Want to Stay Won't Quit Search Time

Committed .50 .54 .60 .16 Attached .60 .50 .38 Want to Stay .82 .28 Won't Quit .20

The "search time" measure was scored as 10 minus the reported number of hours spent searching for a different job, so larger numbers represented fewer hours search, greater commitment, and less likelihood of turnover. All other measures were seven-point Likert- type scales, high numbers indicating greater commitment.

lated with reward and cost values, but not alternative value or investment size. Measures of job commitment were significantly correlated with job satisfaction, reward and cost values, alternative value, and investment size.

Since this survey was based on single-contact questionnaires, it was impossible to obtain actual measures of job turnover. However, the job commitment measures ranged in specificity from abstract notions of psychological attachment (I am committed to this job, attached to this job), to down-to-earth assessments of intent to turnover (how long would you like to stay at this job, how likely is it that you will quit this job in the near future, how many hours per month on the average have you spent attempting to find a different job). The correlations among these measures are displayed in Table 4. As in Experiment 1, the specific measures of intent to turnover were significantly correlated with the more abstract measures of psychological job commitment.

DISCUSSION

The goal of the research reported in this paper was to identify a model capable of predicting job satisfaction, job commitment, and job turnover. The consistency of the results of the two experiments suggests that the investment model may be a reasonable means of describing these phenomena. Job satisfaction was best predicted by job reward and cost values. Job commitment was predicted by a combination of reward and cost values, alternative value, and investment size. Thus, while job satis- faction concerns the employee's affective response to the job, and is related to the positive and negative characteristics of the job, job com- mitment is additionally influenced by the quality of job alternatives and the magnitude of the employee's direct and indirect investment in his/her job. The business analog experiment (Study 1) demonstrated that job commitment and actual turnover are related, and the survey of union

C O M M I T M E N T A N D T U R N O V E R 93

members (Study 2) indicated that abstract measures of psychological commitment are correlated with down-to-earth assessments of intent to turnover. Job commitment was more closely related to turnover than was job satisfaction. These findings are in complete agreement with the in- vestment model.

These results highlight the investment model assertion that job com- mitment is a much more complex phenomenon than is job satisfaction. While satisfaction with a job is primarily a function of the good and bad qualities.of that job, commitment to a job is additionally influenced by the quality of the worker's job alternatives and the magnitude of his/her job investments. These results become especially important in light of evi- dence that one important job-related behavior--employee turnover--is more strongly related to commitment than it is to job satisfaction. It might be fruitful to explore the relationships between the investment model variables and additional organizational behaviors (e.g., absenteeism, late- ness, union participation).

The first study revealed one unexpected finding. Alternative value sig- nificantly affected satisfaction, while according to the investment model it should not. It is possible that changes in alternative value affected satis- faction through their impact on comparison level. Perhaps subjects in an unfamiliar setting base their expectations (comparison level) primarily on the alternatives available to them in that setting. Under normal cir- cumstances, however, comparison level should be more stable and satis- faction should not be influenced by a single alternative. Indeed, this is what was found in Study 2, where satisfaction and alternative value were not significantly correlated.

These experiments provide useful information that can be applied in everyday work situations. In the Study of job commitment and turnover, two variables unrelated to the quality of the work experience, investment size and alternative value, must be considered in addition to job satisfac- tion. Fortunately, these variables can be monitored through the observa- tion of tenure patterns and the quality of the general labor market, and may be manipulated by managers through programs that encourage tenure (e.g., retirement programs) and by encouraging investments (e.g., supplemented home mortgages). As Salincik (1977) notes, employee commitment may help to sustain action in the face of difficulty and the temporary decline of reinforcements and rewards.

These findings add much to a literature that has relied primarily on job satisfaction as a predictor of turnover. The investment model extends our knowledge of organizational behavior by identifying abstract theoretical determinants of satisfaction, commitment, and turnover. In addition, the model is a simple logical approach that organizes previous concrete find-

94 FARRELL AND RUSBULT

ings and ex tends and formal izes some basic concep t s of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e theory (Kel ley and Th ibau t , 1978), a theory which has b e e n show n to have

heur is t ic va lue across a wide range of social exchange re la t ionships . It is in ag r eemen t wi th exis t ing resea rch c o n c e r n e d wi th job sa t is fact ion and

c o m m i t m e n t , and has b e e n shown to predic t sa t is fact ion and c o m m i t m e n t

in roman t i c re la t ionsh ips (Rusbul t , 1980) and f r i endsh ips (Rusbul t , N o t e 1) as well as bus ine s s assoc ia t ions . The re exis ts a c lear po ten t ia l for

apply ing the mode l to other i ssues in the s tudy of o rgan iza t iona l behav io r , bo th theore t ica l and appl ied.

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