IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDAFIFTH DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

vs.

WADE F. LILES,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

CASE NO. 5D14-1654

RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

The Appellee/Cross-Appellant, WADE F. LILES, by and through

undersigned counsel, hereby responds to the Order to Show Cause

entered by the Court on October 13, 2014. Mr. Lues asserts that

his cross appeal should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution,

and as grounds therefore, states the following:

1. On February 5, 2014, Mr. Liles filed a Motion to Exclude

Results of Testing Conducted on Blood Drawn from the Defendant in

the circuit court. A copy of that motion is attached as Exhibit A,

2. In that motion, Mr. Liles argued that the results of

testing conducting on blood drawn from him should be suppressed from

being introduced into evidence at trial because (1) the State failed

to establish the statutory requirements for blood draws under Fla.

Stat. § 316.1932 and 316.1933; and (2) law enforcement did not have

a search warrant providing them with authority to draw blood.

3. On April 29, 2014, following a hearing on Mr. Liles'

motion, the circuit court entered an Order on Defendant's Motion to

Exclude Results of Testing Conducted on Blood Drawn from the

E-Copy Received Oct 23, 2014 7:48 PM

Defendant. A copy of that Order is attached as Exhibit B.

4. In that Order, the circuit court granted Mr, Liles'

motion. In doing so, however, the circuit court only addressed the

argument that law enforcement lacked a search warrant. The circuit

court did not address Mr, Liles' contention that the State failed

to establish compliance with Fla. Stat. § 316.1932 and 316.1933.

5. In footnote 4 of that Order, the circuit court

acknowledged that its Order did not address Nr. Mies' argument

regarding statutory compliance and indicated it would do so if its

decision on the search warrant issue was reversed on appeal.

6. On May 5, 2014, the State filed a Notice of Appeal from

the circuit court's Order. A copy of the State's Notice of Appeal

is attached as Exhibit C.

7. On or about July 25, 2014, undersigned counsel, William R.

Ponall, and Assistant Attorney General Kristen Davenport talked by

telephone and agreed that it would make more sense and be in the

interest of judicial economy for both of the issues contained in

Mr. Liles' motion to be addressed in one appeal before this Court.

As such, they agreed that they would seek to have this Court

relinquish jurisdiction to the circuit court to rule on the

outstanding issue in Mr, Liles' motion.

8. Based on the aforementioned telephone conversation, on

July 25, 2014, the State, through Assistant Attorney General

Kristen Davenport, filed a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction to the

circuit court. The stated purpose of relinquishing jurisdiction

was for the circuit court to issue a decision on whether the State

established probable cause as required by Fia. Stat. § 316.1933, so

that both issues raised in Mr. Lues' motion could be addressed in

the same appeal. A copy of that motion is attached as Exhibit D.

9. On August 6, 2014, this Court granted the Motion to

Relinquish Jurisdiction to the circuit court for a period of 45

days. A copy of that Order is attached as Exhibit E.

10. On August 20, 2014, the circuit court entered an Order on

the Remainder of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress After the Fifth

DCA's Relinquishment of Jurisdiction. In that Order, the circuit

court concluded that the State established that it had authority to

draw blood pursuant to Fia. Stat. § 316.1933. A copy of that Order

is attached as Exhibit F.

11. On September 18, 2014, Mr. Lues' filed a Notice of

Cross-Appeal indicating his intent to appeal the circuit court's

Order on the Remainder of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress After

the Fifth DCA's Relinquishment of Jurisdiction. A copy of the

Notice of Cross Appeal is attached as Exhibit G.

12. On that same date, the State filed a Status Report noting

that the circuit court had entered a second Order and that Mr.

Lues would be pursuing a cross-appeal so that all legal issues

could be resolved in one appeal. A copy of the Status Report is

attached as Exhibit H.

3

13. Mr. Lues' Notice of Cross-Appeal is timely filed because

it was filed within 30 days of the trial court's Order on the

Remainder of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress After the Fifth

DCA's Relinquishment of Jurisdiction. It was also filed during the

period of time when jurisdiction had been relinquished to the

circuit court for the sole purpose of the circuit court determining

the remaining issue in Mr. Lues' motion so that both issues could

be considered in this appeal.

14. Nr. Lues' filing of the Notice of Cross-Appeal at this

time was consistent with the purpose of jurisdiction being

relinquished to the circuit court and in accordance with the plan

of action jointly agreed upon between undersigned counsel, William

R, Ponall, and Assistant Attorney General Kristen Davenport.

15. Mr. Lues could not have filed his Notice of Crass-Appeal

within 10 days of the State filing its Notice of Appeal on May 5,

2014, because the Order which Mr. Liles is appealing was not

entered by the circuit court until August 20, 2014.

16. The State filed its Initial Brief in this matter on

October 10, 2014,

17. Pursuant to Fla. R. App. p, 9.210, Mr. Liles' Answer

Brief, containing both his Response to the State's Answer Brief and

argument in support of his cross-appeal, is currently due to be

filed on October 30, 2014.

18. Throughout this proceedings, Nr. Lues, through

undersigned counsel, has diligently cooperated with the State and

coordinated matters with the circuit court to ensure that this

matter is handled in the most efficient manner possible.

19, There has been no lack of prosecution by Nr. Lues or

undersigned counsel.

20. Accordingly, this Court should discharge the Order to

Show Cause and permit this case to proceed on the briefing

scheduled established by Rule 9.210.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was

furnished by email delivery to Assistant Attorney General Kristen

Davenport, crimappdab@myfloridalecxal.com, on this 23rd day of

October, 2014.

/s/ william R. PonallWILLIAM R. PONALLSNURE & PONALL, P.A.425 W. New England Ave., Suite 200winter Park, FL 32789Telephone: (407) 469-6200Florida Bar No, 421634pQallb@crìminaldefenselaw. corn

ATTORNEYS FOR THE APPELLEE/CROSS-AP PE LLAN T

5

Filins #9945010 Electronically Filed 02/0512014 03:44:44 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTHJUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR ORANGECOUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO. 2011-CF-13421-A-OSTATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WADE F. LILES,

Defendant.

MOTION TO EXCLUDE RESULTS OF TESTING CONDUCTEDON BLOOD DRAWN FROM DEFENDANT

The Defendant, WADE F. LILES, by and through his undersigned attorney, hereby

respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter an Order excluding the results of

testing conducted on blood drawn from the Defendant, and as grounds therefore, asserts

the following:

1. The Defendant is charged with DUI Manslaughter, Leaving the Scene of an

Accidenl with Death and Vehicular Homicide based on his alleged involvement in an

automobile crash on October 1, 2011.

2. Lieutenant Channing Tayloroíthe Florida Highway Patrol responded lo the scene

of the accident and made contact with the Defendant,

3. Lieutenant Taylor asked the Defendant if he would consent to a blood draw and

the Defendant refused.

4. After the Defendant refused to consent to a blood draw, Lieutenant Taylor

informed the Defendant that a forcible blood draw would be conducted due to the

seriousness of the crash.

VAI

5. The Defendant's blood was drawn at the request of law enforcement and was

subsequently tested for its alcohol content,

6. Law enforcement lacked the authority to compel the Defendant to submit to a

blood draw without a search warrant or pursuant to the provisions of Florida's implied

consent statutes.

7. The taking of blood from the Defendant constituted a search under the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the

Florida Constitution. See Missouri y. Mc/Veo/y, 185 S.Ct. 1552, 1558 (U.S. 2013).

8. In DUt cases where police officers can reasonably obtain a search warrant before

significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that

they do so. Id. at 1561.

9. The facts of this case do not establish sufficient exigent circumstances justifying

the withdrawal of a blood sample from the Defendant without a search warrant. As such,

the warrantless blood draw in this caso violated the Fourth Amendment and the

corresponding provision of the Florida Constitution.

10. Additionally, law enforcement also lacked the authority to compel the Defendant

to submit to a blood draw under Florida's Implied Consent Law.

11. Section 316.1932(1)(c), Florida Statutes, permits the withdrawal of a blood

sample from a DUI suspect only if law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe

the suspect has committed DUI, the suspect appears for treatment at a hospital, clinic, or

other medical facility, and the administration of a breath or urine test is impractical or

impossible.

12. Here, at the time of the blood draw, law enforcement lacked probable cause to

believe the Defendant committed DUI, the Defendant did not appear for treatment at a

hospital, clinic, or other medical facility for treatment, and the administration of a breath or

urine test was not impossible or impractical.

13. Section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, permits the withdrawal of a blood sample

from a DUI suspect only if law enforcement has probable cause to believe the person was

driving under the influence and has causod the death or serious bodily injury to a human

being. FIa. Stat. 316.I933(1)(a).

14, Here, at the time of the blood draw, law enforcement lacked probable to believe

that the Defendant committed DUI or that he had caused serious bodily injury or death.

15, Accordingly, law enforcement lacked the authority to withdraw a blood sample

from the Defendant.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant, WADE F. LILES, respectfully requests that this

Honorable Court enter an Order precluding the State from introducing into evidence at trial

all evidence/testimony regarding testing conducted on the blood drawn from the Defendant

in this matter.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy hereof has been furnished by

oservice delivery to the Office of the State Attorney at Division12sao9.org, this 5' day of

February, 2014.

Is/ MICHAEL J. SNURESNURE & PONALL, P.A.425 West New England AvenueSuite 200Winter Park, FL 32789Telephone: (407) 469-6200snurem@criminaldefenselaw.comFlorida Bar No. 363235

Attorneys for Defendant

4/29/2014 12:39 PM FILED IN OFFICE EDDIE FERNANDEZ CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT ORANGE CO FL

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDAPlaintiff

y. Case Number: 48-2011-CF-13421-A-O

WADE LILESDefendant.

THIS CAUSE having come on to be heard on the DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO

EXCLUDE RESULTS OF TESTING CONDUCTED ON BLOOD DRAWN FROM

THE DEFENDANT and the Court being fUlly advised on the premises, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

Absent a warrant, blood can only be obtained bythe Government from a person,

including the Defendant, ifthere is an exception to the search warrant requirement. In

the instant case the only possible exceptions would be exigency, consent and FIa. Stat.

3 1 6. 1 933 ,

With regard to exigency, the case ofMissouri y, McNcelv, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013),

makes it clear that Schmerber y. California, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966) did not authorize a

warrantless searches ofa person's blood simply because a blood alcohol level declines

over time. Instead, under Schmerber, each case is looked at on an individual basis to

determine if an exigency requires the taking of the blood. In the instant case, the

evidence failed to establish an exigency existed to take the Defendant's blood without his

consent.

With regard to consent, the record is clear the Defendant did not expressly

consent. However, implied consent may1 be a recognized exceptiÇn to the warrant

requirement to obtain a defendant's blood. MeNeely at 1566. FIa. Stat.

316.1932(l)(e), a part of implied consent, provides for when a driver has impliedly

Cf. Frost y. Railroad Commission, 271 US 583 (1926), cited with approval in Kooniz y. St. Johns RiverWater Management District, 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2596 (2013) (for invalidating regulation that required thepetitioner to give up a constitutional right "as a condition precedent to the enjoyment of a privilege.")

L

consented to a blood draw. However, the facts as testified to at the hearing failed to

establish that this subsection applied and the State indicated that the State was not

proceeding under this subsection.

Instead, the State indicated that the State was relying on Fia, Stat. 316.1933 to

justi' the warrantless search ofthe Defendant's blood. However, FIa. Stat. 316.1933 is

not part of the implied consent law,2 Fia. Stats. 3 16.1932(1)(a)ia, 316. 1932(1)(a)lb,

3i6.1932(1)(c), and 316.1932(0(e) clearly set forth what is covered by Florida's implied

consent law. While previous versions of Fia. Stat. 316.1933 were part of implied consent

and in fact contained the word "consent," the statute covering the time frame when the

instant blood was withdrawn does not, Prior to July 1, 2002 FIa. Stat, 316.1933(1)

required that a person "shall submit, upon the request of a law enforcement officer, to a

test of the person's blood ..."if the officer had probable cause to believe that the

defendant liad driven a vehicle 'hi1e under the influence of alcohol or drugs and caused

the death or serious bodily injury of a human being. However, Laws of Florida Chapter

2002-263 (the result of the passage of the C.S.C.S.H.B. 1057) altered the state of affairs

and now no longer directs that a person shall submit to a blood test. The amended statute

now directs the law enforcement officer to require a persOn to submit to a test by

reasonable force if necessary, In amending the statute, the legislature appears to have

misinterpreted Schmerber y. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). This finding is based upon

the staff analysis for CSCSHB 1057 under the section titled "Constitutional Issues"

which states:

The United States Supreme Court has held that requiring someone to

submit to breath or blood testing in DUI cases does not violate the Fourth

Amendment' s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures or

the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See Schmerber y.

California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).

Intellectual honesty requires this Court to find that this modification of the law was the

legislature's adoption of the Schmerber exigency standard and removal of FIa. Stat.

2 ThIs fact seems tobe ignored due to older case law interpreting the pre 2002 amended version ofFia. Stat. 3t6.1933.

316.1933 out of the implied consent law3 Unfortunately for the State, as discussed

above, the evidence at the hearing failed to establish that an exigency existed to authorize

the blood withdraw, Without an established exigency, Schmerber did not authorize a

warrantless blood withdrawal. See McNeely.

If the legislature's amendment was not an attempt to adopt the Schmerber

standard by amending FIa. Stat. 316.1933, the statute would be unconstitutional by failing

to require the existence of an exigency before directing the officer to obtain blood.

MoNeely. The next issue is whether or not, under the circumstances, the officer was

allowed to rely upon a statute that has not be declared invalid.4 In Montgomery y, Stat;

69 So,3d 1023 (FIa. 5Ih DCA2O1 I), the Fifth DCA laid out the general good faith

exception to the exclusionary rule, However, with all general rules there are recognized

exceptions. In Illinois y. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-350, 355, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 1167,94

L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987) the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the good faith

exception could be applied to a clearly unconstitutional statute:

Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected

to question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law.... A statute

cannot support objectively reasonable reliance if, in passing the statute, the

legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional

laws, Nor can a law enforcement officer be said to have acted in good-

faith reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such that a reasonable

officer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional .... As we

emphasized in Leon, the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an

objective one; the standard does not turn on the subjective good faith of

individual officers.

Pursuant to Munoz y. State, 629 So,2d 90, 98 (FIa. 1993) "the legislature cannot enact a

statute that overrules ajudicially established legal principle enforcing or protecting a

federal or Florida constitutional right." In the instant case, the Florida Legislature's 2002

amendment of FIa, Stat, 316.1933 directed law enforcement to conduct a warrantless

Even if this Court \vere to find that the legislature was not attempting to adopt Schmerber, theamended Fia. Stat. 316.1933 clearly is no longer Included in implied consent,

The Defense argues that the State failed to lay the predicate to allow the blood to be withdrawnunder Fia. Stat. 316.1933; however, that determination is not is not necessary at this time. However, if thisOpinion is reversed on appeal, this Court will be prepared to issue a separate Order on that issue.

noncönsensual non-exigent search ofa non-arrested person's blood. Such a statute, as

written, clearly violates the Federal and State constitution as much as statute that directs a

police officer to take a warrantless nonconsensual non exigent DNA or blood sample of

any non-arrested person the officer has probable cause to believe committed a sexual

battery,

Under Krull and Munoz, even assuming the facts of the instant case met FIa. Stat.

316.1933, unless the statute adopted the Schmerber standard, the statute is clearly

unconstitutional without an exigency requirement and where the statute is no longer part

of implied consent. By failing to include an exigency requirement in the statute the

legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional laws and under

Kmh the State cannot rely upon a good faith reliance on a statute in the instant case

which purports to trump the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In conclusion, the warrantless, nonconsensual, nonexigent blood draw of the

Defendant violates the State and Federal Constitutions and therefore the Defendant's

Motion to Exclude is Granted.

DON AND RDERED in Chambers in Ori o, Oranp County, Florida this

jjthdayof___________ 2014.

MIKE MURPHYCircuit Judge

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished tothe Office of the State Attorney, Division 12 (Division12sao9.org); and Michael Snure,425 W. New England Avenue, Suite 200, Winter Park, FL 32789(snurem@criminaldefenselaw.com) by email and US mail,

B7LUa-. kÇt 2Sud ici&A s s istant

ni

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THENINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FORORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA CASE NO: 48-201 1-CF-01 3421-OPlaintiff/Appellant,

vs. DIVISION: 12

WADE F. LILESDefendant/Appellee.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOTICE IS GIVEN that the Plaintiff/Appellant, State of Florida, appeals to the Fifth

District Court of Appeal an Order of this Court rendered on the 29April2014. The nature of the

Order(s) is:

An Order titled ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION TO EXCLUDE

RESULTS OF TESTING CONDUCTED ON BLOOD DRAWN FROM TI-lE

DEFENDANT rendered on 29April 2014.

I DO CERTIFY that a copy (copies) hereof (has) (have) been fürnished to James C.

Dauksch, III, C/O Inventory Attorney, 636 W. Yale Street, Orlando, FL 32801; and Michael

Snure, 425 W. New England Avenue, Suite 200, Winter Park, FL 32789 by (de1iveyØ (mail)

(fax) (e-mail) on this 5th day of May, 2014.

JEFFREY L.Ninth Judith

COURT4ange co,1 FLFILED IN oPEsClerk, C r,

By

D.C.

Assistant State AttorneyFlorida Bar # 0602205Divisioni 2®sao9.orgPO Box 1673, 415 N Orange AveSuite 400Orlando, FL 32802-1673(407)836-2190COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

E-Copy Received Jul 25, 2014 11,33 AM

P11TH14' I) lSflICT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORID2

FIFTH DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

V. CASE NO. 5D14'-1654

WADE F. LILES,

Appellee.

MOTION TO RELINQUISH JURISDICTION

Appellant, State of Florida, pursuant to Florida Rule of

Appellate Procedure 9.300, requests this Honorable Court permit

relinquishment of jurisdiction in this matter to the circuit

court for thirty (30) days to allow the circuit court to enter

an additional order on the Appellee's motion to exclude blood

test results, and as grounds therefore states as follows:

1. The State appeals from the trial court's order granting

the Appellee's motion to exclude the results of testing

conducted on blood drawn from him after a fatal traffic

accident. (R. 360-63) . In its order, the court found that

section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional. That

statute requires a law enforcement officer to order a blood draw

if the officer has probable cause to believe that a motor

vehicle driven by a person under the influence of alcohol has

caused a death or serious bodily injury.

Ii

2. In his motion to exclude, the Appellee argued that the

statute permitting such a blood draw was unconstitutional and

that the officer in the instant case lacked probable cause under

the statute. (R. 235-37, 351-56). The trial court's order was

entered after a full evidentiary hearing. (R. 375-453)

However, the court specifically did not reach the issue of

whether the trooper had probable cause for the blood draw, as

required by the statute, as that determination was unnecessary

in light of its legal conclusion that the statute is

unconstitutional. (R. 362 n.4)

3. Should this Court ultimately agree with the State that

the statute is constitutional, or that the trooper relied on the

statute in good faith, a remand would be necessary to resolve

the factual issue of whether there was probable cause under the

statute. Such a remand would presumably take place months from

now, well after the evidentiary hearing, and the lower court's

decision on this matter would be subject to another appeal.

4. In the interest of judicial economy and fairness to the

parties, it would make more sense for the trial court to rule on

the factual issue of probable cause now, so both issues can be

litigated in the same appeal. At a pretrial conference, the

trial judge indicated that he would be glad to rule on this

issue to make it part of the same appeal.

5. Undersigned counsel is authorized to state that William

R. Ponall, counsel for Appellee, agrees that relinquishment

would be appropriate here.

WHEREFORE, the Appellee respectfully requests this Court

enter an order relinquishing jurisdiction to the circuit court

for a period of thirty (30) days, to allow the court to enter an

order on the remaining issue.

Respectfully submitted,

PAMELA JO BONDI

ATTORNEY GENERAL

¡si Kristen L. Davenport

KRISTEN L. DAVENPORTASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERALFla. Bar #909130444 Seabreeze Blvd.

Fifth FloorDaytona Beach, FL 32118(386) 238-4990

crimappdab@myfloridalegal.com

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

DESIGNATION OF EMAIL ADDRESS

Undersigned counsel can be served at the following email

address: crimappdab@myfloridalegal.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above

Motion has been furnished to William R. Ponall, counsel for

Appellee, 425 West New England Avenue, Suite 200, Winter Park,

Florida 32789, by email to ponallb@criminaldefenselaw.com, this

25th day of July, 2014.

/5/ Kristen L. DavenportKristen L. DavenportCounsel for Appellee

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDAFIFTH DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

V,

WADE F. LILES,

Appellee./

DATE: August 06, 2014

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

CASE NO. 5D14-1654

ORDERED that Appellant's Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, filed July 25,

2014, is granted. Accordingly, jurisdiction is hereby relinquished to the circuit court for

45 days. Appellant shall file a report on the status of the proceedings below before the

relinquishment period expires.

/ hereby certify that the foregoing is(a true copy of) the original Court order.

C.O Uk?

t.NUfl-,

'?.

PAMELA R. MASTERS, CLERK

cc:

Office Of Attorney GeneralOrange Co. Circuit Ct.Clerk (2011-CF-13421)

Michael J. Snure Kristen L. DavenportHon. Michael Murphy

8120/2014 4:24 PM FILED IN THE OFFICE OF EDDIE FERNANDEZ CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT ORANGE CO FL

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THENINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN ANDFOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NUMBER: 2011-0E-013421-A-O

DIV 12

STATE OF FLORIDA

Plaintiff,

vs.

WADE F LILES

Defendant.

ORDER ON THE REMAINDER OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESSAFTER THE FIFTH DCA'S RELINQUISHMENT OF JURISDICTION

THIS CAUSE, having como onto be heard before the Court upon the THE FIFTH DCA'SRELINQUISHMENT OF JURISDICTION and the Court having reviewed the pleading and beingotherwise duty advised in the premises, hereby

ORDERS AND ADJUDGES as follows:

On April 29, 2014 this Court entered an Order on Defendant's Motion to Exclude Resultsof Testing Conducted on Blood Drawn from the Defendant. In that Order, this Court declined toRule on the issue of whether the State laid the predicate to allow the blood to be withdrawn underFIa. Stat. 316.1933 because that determination was unnecessajy due to the remainder of theopinion.

The Fifth DCA has now relinquished Jurisdiction for this Court to address the FIa. Stat.316.1933 predicate issue to allow for the parties to brief that issue if necessary to avoid apotential second appeal. This Court finds that despite the Defendant's arguments to the contrary,includïng any hearsay, State y. Bowers, 87 So. 3d 704 (FIa. 2012) or accident report privilegeobjections, and law enforcement's Initial belief of the Defendant's direction of travel, that In theevent that the DCA reverses this Couds original Order, the evidence established the statutorypredicate to obtain blood pursuant to FIa. Stat. 316.1933.

DONE AND ORDERED In chambers, at Orlando, Orange County, Florida this¿Sdayof - 20

Honorable Milce MurCircuit Coud Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the forooing was furnished tothe Office of State Attorney, 415 North Orange Avenue, Orlando, Florida, 3801, aeI James

ter Park Fl 32789 on this day ofSquip. 425 Wjew England Ave Ste 200 Win

Judictjssistant

t'

Filing # 18417952 Electronically Filed 09/18/2014 07:35:45 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THENINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN ANDFOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO. 2011-CF-13421-A-O

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff/Appellant,Cross -Appellee

vs.

WADE F, LIJJiS,

De fendant/Appellee,Cross-Appellant

NOTICEI OF..CROSS -APflAZ

NOTICE IS HEREBY given that the Defendant/Appoi.lee/Cross-

Appellant, WADE F. LILES, appeals Lo the Fifth District Court of

Appeal, the attached Order on the Remainder of the Defendant's

Motion to Suppress After the Fifth DCA's Relinquishment of

Jurisdiction, rendered on August 20, 2014.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing çws provided by

mail, delivery to the Office of the State Attorney,

Qjvisioni2Øsaoog and Assistant Attorney General Kristin

Davenport, on this 18th day

of September, 2014.

Is! Wi1liam_ß PonallWILLIAM R, PONALLSNURE & PONALL, P,A,425 W. New England Ave., Ste. 200Winter Park, FL 32789Telephone: (407) 469-6200Facsimile: (407) 645-0805Florida Bar No, 421634pgyiallb@criminaldefensei.aw.com

r'

6/2012014 4:24 PM FILED IN THE OFF10E OF EDDIE FERNANDEZ CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT ORANGE CO FL

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT CF THENINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN ANDFOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORLDA

CASE NUMBER; 201i-CF0l3421-AO

DIV 12

STATE OF FLORIDA

Plaintiff,

vs.

WADE F LILES

Defendant.

ORDER ON THE REMAINDER OF ThEpifENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESSAFTER THE FIFTH DOA'S IThLINQUISHMENT OF JURISDICTION

THIS CAUSE, having come on to be heard before the Court upon the THE FIFTH DCA'SRE1INQUISIIMENT CF JURISDICTION and the Court having reviewed the pleading and beingotherwIse duly advised In the premises, hereby

ORDERS AND ADJUDGES as follows:

On April 20 2014 thIs Coud entered an Order on Defendant's Motion to Exclude Resultsof Testing Conducted ori Blood Drawn from the Defendant. in that Order, this Court declined toRule on the Issue of whether the Stete laid the predicate to allow the blood to be withdrawn underFia Stat, alô,1g33 because that determination was unnecessary due to the remainder of theopinion.

The Fifth OCA has now relinquIshed Jurlsdiclion for this Court to address the Fia, Slat.316.1933 predicate issue to allow for the parties to brief that issue if necessary to avoid apotential second appeal. This Court finds that despite the Defendant's arguments to iho contrary,including any hearsay, State y, Bowers, 87 So. 3d 704 (FIa. 2012) or accident report privilegeobjections, and law enforcement's Initiai belief of the Defendant's direoflon of travel, that in theevent that the DCA reverses this Court's original Order, the evidence established the statutorypredicate te obtain blood pursuant to Fia. Slat, 316.1933.

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers, at Orlando, Orange County, Florida thisday 20 j ti'.

Honorable tlike Murçi$1'Circuit Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

i HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the forgoing was furnished tothe Office of State AtIorney, 415 North Orange Avenue Ociando, Fiorida, 3280t, Micbaei JamesSn re, Es u! 426 W P4ew England Ave Ste 200 wùiter Park Fl 32789 on this C) day of

20J4.

Judic9ssistant

E-Copy Received sep 18, 2014 4:07 PM

í4í&jii-i \v,\

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDJ\.Çop

FIFTH DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

V. CASE NO. 5Dl4-1654

WADE F. LILES,

Appellee.

STATUS REPORT

Appellant, State of Florida, pursuant to this Court's August

6, 2014, order, files this Status Report, as follows:

1. On August 6, 2014, this Court entered an order granting

the State's motion to relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court

for 45 days to allow the trial court to enter a supplemental

order addressing factual issues not addressed in the original

order.

2. The trial court has now entered an order finding that

the trooper had probable cause for the blood draw, as required

by the applicable Florida statute. The Appellee intends to

cross-appeal from this order, allowing all legal issues to be

resolved in this proceeding.

Respectfully submitted,

PAMELA JO BONDI

ATTORNEY GENERAL

¡s! Kristen L. Davenport

KRISTEN L. DAVENPORTASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERALFla. Bar #909130444 Seabreeze Blvd.

Fifth FloorDaytona Beach, FL 32118(386) 238-4990

crimappdab@myf1oridalegal.com

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above

Status Report has been furnished to William R. Ponall, counsel

for Appellee, 425 West New England Avenue, Suite 200, Winter

Park, Florida 32789, by email to ponallb@criminaldefenselaw.com,

this 18th day of September, 2014.

/s/ Kristen L. DavenportKristen L. DavenportCounsel for Appellee