FERDINAND E. MARCOS, et al. and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

Facts: 

Through the People Power revolution, Ferdinand E. Marcos’ dictatorship ended and he was ousted from the Presidency. This followed his exile from the country along with his family. Corazon Aquino’s pronouncement to Presidency aroused coup attempts challenging her office.

Ferdinand Marcos on the other hand in his deathbed, signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Petitioners contend however that there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.

Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R., Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.

Issue: 

1. Whether or not the President in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution has the power to prohibit the return of Marcos to the Philippines.

2. Assuming that she has the power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a clear and present danger to the public due to the return? And have the requirements of due process been complied with in the making of the finding? 

Ruling: 

In the case at bar, the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. Thus, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. 

The Court expressed that they cannot lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.

Wherefore, petition is dismissed.

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOILI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners, vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA AND PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.

Facts:

Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit, what are the repercussions of such initiation to her executive immunity?

2. Can Beltran invoke the executive immunity of the president as a defense?

Ruling:

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

3. review Center Association of the Philippines v Eduardo-Ermita

Facts:

There has been a reported cheating controversy during the 2006 Nursing Board examination among takers reviewing at the R.A Gapuz and Inress Review centers. Handwritten copies of two sets of the Board examination were circulated containing lists of questions along with answers.

Traced from two of the Board’s members, PRC admitted the leakage just when results came out but the Court of Appeals enjoined the oath-taking of the successful examinees.

This was followed by the issuance of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of EO 566 which authorized CHED to supervise establishment and operations of review centers in the country (Memorandum Order no. 49 of 2006) which was approved by CHED Chairman Puno.

Herein petitioner asked CHED to amend, or withdraw the Implementation of Rules and Regulations for issuance of permits will technically abolish independent review centers. Suspension of IRR however will be inconsistent with the order (EO 566) issued by the President. After a dialogue between RCA and CHED Chairman Puno, a revised IRR was approved.

Petitioner again prayed for exclusion of independent review centers from CHED’s coverage. However CHED stood up with its justification that the exclusion asked will contradict the purpose of EO 566. RCA then filed for petition for Prohibition and Mandamus praying for the

annulment of the revised IRR, the declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO 566, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR.

Issue/s:

1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands the CHED's jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive's rulemaking power.

Ruling:

EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the president of her legislative power. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED's coverage under RA 7722. When CHED's coverage under the aid provision is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.

Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.

The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers "a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations" given by the PRC.

Moreover, there has been no law passed by Congress granting the president the power to amend the functions of CHED. The exercise of the President’s residual powers requires legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the President’s other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law."

In October 1987, Dionisio A. Caoili, conducted a preliminary investigation of the charge against the petitioner, Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC), his family corporation, which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).

An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted. Doromal then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.

RULE:

Provided in Article VII, Section 13 paragraph 1 of the Constitution

“The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. “

The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."

That admission allegedly belies the averment in the information that the petitioner "participated' in the business of the DITC in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by law from having any interest. (Sec. 3-h, RA No. 3019).

The Sandiganbayan in its order of August 19, 1988 correctly observed that "the

presence of a signed document bearing the signature of accused Doromal as part of the application to bid ... is not a sine qua non" (Annex O, p. 179. Rollo), for, the Ombudsman indicated in his Memorandum/Clearance to the Special Prosecutor, that the petitioner "can rightfully be charged ...with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest." (pp. 107-108, Rollo).

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business." The constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD No. 807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that "Pursuit of private business ... without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary action against any officer or employee in the civil service.

CONCLUSION:

Yes, the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution specifically of Section 13 of Article VII.

4. Civil liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 5. Dennis Funa v Executive Secretary 6. Aytona v Castillo 7. In re Appointments 8. Arturo de Castro v JBC and Gloria Macapagal Arrroyo 9. Binamira v Garucho 10. Sarmiento v. Mison 11. Bautista v Salonga 12. Quintos-Deles v Commission on Appointments 13. Calderon v Carale 14. Tarrosa v Singson 15. Flores v Drilon 16. Luego v Civil Service Commission 17. Pobre v Mendieta 18. Arturo de Castro v JBC