executive department (new)

8/12/2019 Executive Department (New)

1/64

Article VII: Executive Department

Section 1. Executive Power; Privileges; ImmunitiesSection 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 1989; MR, 178 SCRA, 1989

Facts: Petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin

the implementation of the President Aquinos decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitionerscontend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their libertyof abode. Nor, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

Issue: Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

Ruling: YES. It is part of the RESIDUAL POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT.

The President has the obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance nationalinterest.

The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked withday-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when noforeign foe appears on the horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the countrybolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violencedirected against the state and instigate more chaos.

Hence, the order given by the President is justified.

Laurel v. Garcia 187 SCRA 797, 1990

FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to benefitfrom capital goods or services in the event of sales, lease or disposition of Philippine Government-ownedproperties in Japan. However, petitioners challenged the order as unconstitutional since there was noexplicit enactment from the Congress as to the sales, lease or disposition of the properties.

ISSUE: Whether the Chief Executive, her officers and agents have the authority, and jurisdiction to sell

the properties.RULING: NO. Any such conveyances must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by theCongress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. Also, the nature of the Roppongi lot asproperty for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the ReparationsAgreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine governmentand the Japanese government. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside thecommerce of man. And the property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for privateappropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw itfrom being such (Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil 335). It is not for the President to conveyvaluable real property of the government on his or her own sole will.

Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356 SCRA 108, 2001

Facts: During the impeachment trial for then President Estrada spearheaded by his alleged receipt of

millions of pesos of jueteng money, he issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palacefor the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on thesame day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercisethe powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-Presidentshall be the Acting President. However, filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer of writ ofpreliminary injunction to enjoin the ombudsman from conducting further proceedings filed against himuntil his term as president expires.

Issues: Whether the petitioner resigned as President which would result to his inability to invoke


2/64

immunity from suit.

Held: Petitioner has resigned. Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, theremust be an intent to resignand the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. Whether or notpetitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20,2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidencebearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be

doubted through the actions he had taken as well as the statements he made. Hence, he cannot invokeimmunity from suit because he is no longer the president.

Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 186450, December 13, 2011

FACTS: James Balao was abducted by unidentified men allegedly on account of his being anactivist/political leanings. Contending that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy for them to

protect Jamess life, liberty and security, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo orderingthe respondents to disclose where James is detained or confined, to release James, and to cease and desistfrom further inflicting harm upon his person. Respondents countered that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is immune from suit and should thus be dropped as party-respondent. RTC denied respondentscounter stating that a petition for a writ of amparo is not by any stretch of imagination a niggling[,]vexing or annoying court case from which she should be shielded.

ISSUE: Whether the presidents immunity from suit is applicable to petitions for writ of amparo.

RULING: YES. The Court held that the trial court clearly erred in holding that presidentialimmunity cannot be properly invoked in an amparoproceeding. As president, then PresidentArroyo was enjoying immunity from suit when the petition for a writ ofamparowas filed.Moreover, the petition is bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omissionviolated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights. There is no law or sound factual

basis for the RTC to deprive the President of her Constitutionally-enshrined Immunity from suit.Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 191805, November 15, 2011

FACTS: Petitioner was a victim of torture and abduction by the military. After his release, he was stillunder surveillance by suspicious men. Fearing for his life, he filed a petition for the issuance of the writ ofamparo and habeas data which were granted. Among the respondents was then pres. GMA. The CAdropped GMA as respondent reasoning that she is immune from suit. The CA further contended that

GMA had no command responsibility hence, she cannot be held accountable.ISSUE: Whether PGMA is immune from suit and whether she has command responsibility over the actsof her subordinate, hence, making her accountable for the injuries sustained by herein petitioner.

RULING: GMA is immune from suit. Well-settled in this jurisdiction is that immunity from suit can beinvoked in petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

On the issue of command responsibility, the Court found that The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superiorwithin the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. However, the Court ruled that petitioner

failed to prove that GMA is accountable. Aside from Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece ofevidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there evena clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or

security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393, 1988

FACTS: Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by thepresident. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. He averred that Cory cannotfile a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contentionon the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president

would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting tobe sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear incourt to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.


3/64

ISSUE: Is the filing of a complaint by the President tantamount to waiving her presidential immunityfrom suit so that another person, like Beltran in this case, may raise as a defense the said immunity toprevent the case from proceeding against him?

RULING: NO. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is toassure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, consideringthat being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-

holders time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may beinvoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, anaccused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise thepresidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,

if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courtsjurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidentsprerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

Senate v. Ermita, G.R. 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS: The Committee of the Senate invited various officials of the Executive Department to appear as

resource speakers in a public hearing on issues pertaining the railway project (North Rail Project),massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of the military in so-calledGloria Gate Scandal.

President issued E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence tothe Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative

Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Section 3 of said law

requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the

President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated inSection 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress,valid and constitutional?

HELD: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executiveprivilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as amatter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, bydefinition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, thenecessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in aparticular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid oflegislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must

so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requestsfor information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. Bythe mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid oflegislation is frustrated.

Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. 170516, July 16 2008

FACTS: JPEPA, a mega treaty, is a comprehensive plan for opening of markets in goods and services as


4/64

well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. The Committee on Trade and Commerce,chaired by Sen. Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committeeheard Governments rosy projection on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on theother hand the viewsof environmental and trade activists who raised their very serious concerns about the country being turned

into Japans toxic waste basket.

Petitioners, as congress persons, citizens and taxpayers, requested Respondents to submit to them the fulltext of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA). They emphasizes that therefusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates their right to information on matters ofpublic concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines theirright to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decisionmaking.

Respondent herein invoke executive privilege, that diplomatic negotiation are covered by the doctrine ofexecutive privilege.

ISSUE: Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered bythe doctrine of executive privilege?

HELD: An essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. Further, the President is the sole

organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries. Into the field of negotiations the Senatecannot intrude; and Congress is in itself powerless to invade it.

Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPAnegotiations constituting no exceptions. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representativessubmitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same.Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with

other foreign governments in future negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treatynegotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grantconcessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greaternational interest.

The Court denied the petition, stressing that secrecy of negotiations with fore ign countries is notviolative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of accessto information. The Court, however, in its endeavor to guard against the abuse of executive privilege,should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down asinvalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.

Neri v. Senate, G.R. 180643, March 25, 2008; MR, Sept. 4, 2008

Facts: Romulo Neri disclosed that he was offered P200 Million Pesos in Bribe by a certain BenjaminAbalos, when he was invited by the Respondent Committee of the Senate to shed light on the issuepertaining the National Broadband Project, which was awarded to ZTE, a Chinese company. He referredthe matter to the President, where he was instructed not to accept the bribe. When he was later probed onthe issue, he refused to answer and invoked principle of executive privilege. The three questions are: (1)Whether the President followed up the NBN Project? (2) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? And

(3) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project the project after being told about thealleged bribe?

The Senate Committees issued a Subpeona Ad Testificandum to Neri to compel him to attend to anotherhearing which the latter refused to attend on the belief that the questions to be asked were already covered

by the executive privilege. Neris testimony that his communication with the President is information thatmight impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with China. Neri still did not appear before theCommittee which prompted the latter to a cause of action to order his arrest and detention until such time


5/64

petitioner is compelled to appear and give his testimony.

Issue: Whether executive privilege clearly covers the three questions being asked by the Senate?

Held: Executive privilege clearly covers the three questions being contested by Senate because it clearlydenotes information or communication discussed about between petitioner and the President. The headsof the different departments may, in their own capacity, appear before any committee only with theconsent of the President because each department is an extension of the President in exercising her policy

making power and power to enter into executive agreements.

The type of executive privilege claimed here was presidential communication privilege. Presidentialcommunication is presumptively privileged; but the presumption is subject to rebuttal. Thus, whoeverchallenges it, must show good and valid reasons related to the public welfare. The Court ruled that theSenate failed to controvert the presumption. Thus the Chief Justice commented that executive privilegewas established by guesswork.

Valid Exercise

Pontejos v. Ombudsman -483 SCRA 83 [2006]

Facts:

Sometime in 1998, Restituto P. Aquino filed an Affidavit/Complaint before the Ombudsmanagainst Emmanuel T. Pontejos (arbiter), Wilfredo I. Imperial (regional director) and Carmencita R. Atos

(legal staff), all of them officials of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), and RoderickNgo, a private individual.

Aquino accused Pontejos and Atos of conspiring to exact money in exchange for a favorabledecision of a case against Roderick Ngo then pending in the HLURB. He further averred that Pontejosacted as his counsel during the time when the latter was the hearing officer of the case. Moreover, Atosallegedly received P10,000 in check, which was part of the consideration for a favorable decision.

The Overall Deputy Ombudsman found probable cause against Pontejos for the crimes of estafa,direct bribery and illegal practice of profession in violation of RA 6713. He then, recommended the filingof criminal cases for estafa and direct bribery with the RTC.

Then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto issued a Resolution extending immunity to Atos on the

condition that she would appear and testify against Pontejos in accordance with the Affidavits shesubmitted during the preliminary investigation. The Resolution noted that Atos testimony was extremelynecessary to prove the offenses charged against Pontejos and that the available evidence showed that,being a mere clerk, she did not appear to be the most guilty.

Issue:Whether the power to grant immunity from prosecution is executive or judicial in nature.

Ruling:The decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in character. It is the

prosecution that could essentially determine the strength of pursuing a case against an accused. Theprosecutorial powers include the discretion of granting immunity to an accused in exchange for testimonyagainst another.

As stated earlier, the power to choose who to discharge as state witness is an executive function.Essentially, it is not a judicial prerogative. The fact that an individual had not been previously charged orincluded in an information does not prevent the prosecution from utilizing said person as a witness.

(Not part of the decision: this was taken from the footnotes)In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose

principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component


6/64

of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests theprosecutor with a wide range of discretionthe discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, theexercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.

Banda v. Ermita618 SCRA 499 [2012]

Facts:

The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino(President Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 285 1which provided, among others, the creation ofthe NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of thePhilippine Information Agency (PIA). Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 reads:

SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. There is hereby created a National PrintingOffice out of the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the

Philippine Information Agency. The Office shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction over the following:

a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms of national, provincial, cityand municipal governments, including government corporations;

b. Printing of officials ballots;c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act, Philippine

Reports, and development information materials of the Philippine Information Agency.

President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 ofExecutive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printingservices requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. The pertinent portions of ExecutiveOrder No. 378, in turn, provide:

SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide printing services to government agenciesand instrumentalities as mandated by law. However, it shall no longer enjoy exclusivejurisdiction over the printing services requirements of the government over standard andaccountable forms. It shall have to compete with the private sector, except in the printingof election paraphernalia which could be shared with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,upon the discretion of the Commission on Elections consistent with the provisions of the

Election Code of 1987.

Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of theNPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executivepowers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former PresidentAquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates

petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.

Issue: Whether there was a valid exercise of executive power.

Ruling:It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the

offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally grantedpower of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to

reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

Clearly, Executive Order No. 378 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue.The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 378. It is an

exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported bythe provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by thisCourt.

Invalid Exercise


7/64

Review Center v. Ermita583 SCRA 42 [2009]

Facts:On 11 and 12 June 2006, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the Nursing

Board Examinations nationwide. In June 2006, licensure applicants wrote the PRC to report thathandwritten copies of two sets of examinations were circulated during the examination period among theexaminees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center.

Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all the members of the

PRCs Board of Nursing. President Arroyo also ordered the examinees to re-take the Nursing BoardExaminations.

On 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervisethe establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.

On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno (Chairman Puno),approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR).

In a letter dated 24 November 2006, the Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner),

an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to amend, if not withdraw the IRRarguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher EducationInstitutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolishindependent review centers.

Issues: 1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislativepower as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.

Ruling:1st issue: The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA

7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited topublic and private institutions of higher

education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educationalinstitutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centersand similar entities.

The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers a program

or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skillsof reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC. It also covers the operation or conduct of review classes or courses provided byindividuals whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC.

A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does notoffer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A review course

is only intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees. Areviewee is not even required to enroll in a review center or to take a review course prior to taking anexamination given by the PRC. Even if a reviewee enrolls in a review center, attendance in a reviewcourse is not mandatory. The reviewee is not required to attend each review class. He is not required totake or pass an examination, and neither is he given a grade. He is also not required to submit any thesisor dissertation. Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered programs x x x ofhigher learning that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED.

2ndissue: Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through


8/64

the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power withinthe confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entitieswhich are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.

Biraogo v. Truth Commission -637 SCRA 78 [2010]

Facts:

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body

to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previousadministration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed ExecutiveOrder No. 1 establishing thePhilippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC)isa mere ad hocbody formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reportsof graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding andrecommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it

cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. Allit can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. Itmay have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as towarrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civilor administrative penalties or sanctions.

Issue: Whether there was a valid exercise of executive power in the creation of the Phil. TruthCommission

Ruling:

There was a valid exercise of executive power, however EO 1 violated the equal protection

clause.

The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution oflaws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the

Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigationsand to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutesdoes not mean that he is bereft of such authority.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. Asstated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty isthe power to create ad hoccommittees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determineif laws have been faithfully executed.

However, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protectionclause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the

truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration

only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of

it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it mustinclude or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. Such a classification must not be based


9/64

on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within aclass, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstancesand conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to thediscriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be

brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class.

Prov. Of North Cotabato v. Government, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008

Facts: The Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Peace Panel werescheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement onthe Ancestral Domain which pertains to the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 regarding tohave a Bangsamoro Homeland. Before the signing, Province of North Cotabato sought to compel therespondents to disclose and furnish it with completer and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as tohold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. Asubsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court issued aTRO, directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing theMOA-AD. The BJE seeks to grant the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestrallands of the Bangsamoro

Issue: Whether the guarantee made by the President regarding the statehood and independence of theterritories under BJE is under executive power?

Held: The President has executive power regarding issues on the peace of process with the MILF but theguarantying of the statehood and independence of territories under the BJE thru the signing of the MOAAD shall only be authorized by the Constituent Power vested only in Congress, ConstitutionalConvention or the people themselves.

Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholdingsuch an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress,a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only waythat the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence orinterference with that process.While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding onthe Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already

a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506

Facts: This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the Presidentinvolving the GAA of 1994. After the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA, neitherhouse of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Tanada and Romulo sought theissuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners now contestthe constitutionality of the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA for AFP and DPWHand the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the

CAFGUs, DPWH and NHA.

Issue: Whether the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid?

Ruling: Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by thePresident without vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to &

have direct relation with debt service.They are appropriate provisions and cannot be vetoed withoutvetoing the entire item/appropriation; VETO VOID.

Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of income &creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Collegesvetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted inpursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.


10/64

Special Provision on Road MaintenanceCongress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance ofroads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. without vetoingthe entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subject of roadmaintenance& cannot be vetoed without vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.

Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equipment AFP modernization, prior approval of

Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto . Anyprovision blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must besubject of a separate law. VETO VALID.

Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to augment pensionfunds through the use of savings. According to the Constitution, only the Pres. may exercise such powerpursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.

Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUsuse of special fund for thecompensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment toexisting law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used torepeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.

Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652

FACTS: The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging Petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano and 6 other personswith the crime of Rape with Homicide. The DOJ issued a Resolution finding probable cause to holdrespondents for trial and recommending that an Information be filed against Petitioners and their co-respondents. Petitioners contend that the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when itfailed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.

ISSUE: W/N the DOJ intruded judicial prerogative in excluding Jessica Alfaro as an accused.

HELD: The court held that it is within the executive powers that the DOJ can exclude certain people frombeing prosecuted in cases, in this situation as part of the plea bargain Jessica Alfaro in exchange of hertestimony she was excluded from being tried on the case.

Senate v. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate, through its various Senate Committees, conductedinquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials andemployees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in GovernmentOwned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the PhilippineNational Police (PNP). The invitation was sent for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearingon the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on ExecutivePrivilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of

Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes, Section 3 which requires all the publicofficials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before

either house of Congress.

ISSUES: Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated inSection 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, isvalid and constitutional

HELD: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executiveprivilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a


11/64

matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, bydefinition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, thenecessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in aparticular case.Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid oflegislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must

so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requestsfor information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefore.By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid oflegislation is frustrated.It is the power of the President to withhold certain types of information from the courts, the Congressmanand ultimately the public. Types of information include those which are of a nature that disclosure wouldsubvert military or diplomatic objectives, or information about the identity of persons who furnishinformation of violations of law, or information about internal deliberations comprising the process bywhich government decisions are reached.

Neri v. Senate, GR No. 180643, March 25, 2008, September 4, 2008

Facts: On 21 April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment

(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project inthe amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by thePRC. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, De Veneciaissued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence topush the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testifybefore the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs andduring which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for hisapproval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the briberyattempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused toanswer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refusedto answer the questions on (a) whether or

not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings andErmita sent a letter to the SRBC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privilegedand that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SRBC cited Neri for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SRBC to be answered falls under executiveprivilege.

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extentthat it is performed in pursuit of legislation.The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communicationsprivilege.

1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable powerof the President, i.e. the

power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enterinto executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized inPhilippine jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational

proximity test,petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyoscabinet. And


12/64

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilegeand of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Section 2. QualificationsSection 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able toread and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten yearsimmediately preceding such election.

Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004Fornier petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course orto cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in hiscertificate of candidacyby claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according toFornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitionerasseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenshipto FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of theillegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to acertain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriagehad existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen?

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registeredvoter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of thePhilippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines frombirth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.

It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, inturn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been aFilipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents himfrom taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship

of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule,and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of anyother evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou wouldhave benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That

citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired through the Philippine Bill, would thereby extend to hisson, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondentFPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless ofwhether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-borncitizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that

he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy inviolation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

Section 3. Vice PresidentSection 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and inthe same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.

Section 4. Election and CanvassSection 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shallbegin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years


13/64

thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served assuch for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of timeshall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of

May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city,

shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, thePresident of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of theSenate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity anddue execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal andhighest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of theCongress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of

the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003

In a taxpayers suit, Atty. Macalintal questioned the constitutionality of the Overseas Absentee VotingAct .

Issue: Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidatesfor national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President violatethe constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates forPresident and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?

Ruling: Yes, it does. Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No.9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for thepresidency and the vice-presidency.

Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitutiononly insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution

to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-president.

In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law which obligates the Board of Canvassers totransmit to the Commission the Certificates of Canvass clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII ofthe Constitution which provides that the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shallbe certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or,as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president andvice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions." The provisions of the

Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee VotingAct of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates forpresident and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authoritygiven to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representativesbut not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

Lopez v. Senate and House, GR No. 163556, June 8, 2004


14/64

Facts: The case is a petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify Section 13, Rule VIII of theRules of the Joint Public Session of Congress. It created a Joint Committee that would preliminarycanvass the votes of the candidates for president and vice-president in the May 2004 election.

Issue: W/N the Congress committed grave abuse of discretion

Ruling: NO, IT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

COURT JURISDICTION. The court has jurisdiction following the principle that jurisdiction isdetermined by the allegations of the initiatory proceedings, like the complaint or petition. The courtdeemed that the petition provide sufficient allegations of violation of the Constitution.

SECTION 4, ARTICLE VII expressly provides that Congress has the power to promulgate itsrules for canvassing the certificates. (Congressional prerogative)

Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee, June 22, 2004

FACTS: petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void thecontinued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the authenticityand due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidentialand Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections.

Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its lastregular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress servingthe term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending mattersand proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress."

ISSUE: Whether the "the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress are invalid, sincethe final adjournment of its sessions was on June 11,2004

RULING :No. Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he term of officeof the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on thethirtieth day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that"[t]he Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a termof three years which shallbegin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following theirelection." Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth

Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence."

The legislativefunctions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournmentof its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislativefunctions, such as thatof being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congressconvened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and toproclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it hasaccomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed itsfunctions is it renderedfunctus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a boarduntil it has accomplished its purposes.

Macalintal v. PET, GR No. 191618, November 23, 2010

FACTS Atty. Macalintal , questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an

illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,[2] Article VII of the Constitution:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose,he chafes at the creation of a purportedly separate tribunal complemented by a budget allocation, a seal,a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate. Petitioners averment


15/64

is supposedly supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005PET Rules),[3] specifically:(1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and the Associate

Justices are designated as Chairman and Members, respectively;

ISSUE: Whether the creation of the presidential electoral tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violationof paragraph 7, section 4 of article vii of the 1987 constitution.

RULING: No The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is no other than the Supreme Court itself.

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to theSupreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Courtexercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain anylimitation on the Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Courtsmethod of deciding presidentialand vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of theprerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in theprovision for the Supreme Court to promulgate its rules for the purpose.

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authorityconferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate

Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we haveaffirmed on numerous occasions.

By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it hasfunctions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation ofSection 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies theconstitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of theChief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, wasdesigned simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal s functions as a specialelectoral court.

We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the

Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be aninstitution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.

Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005

FACTS: on June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and acting as theNational Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria MacapagalArroyo (GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal on July23, 2004. Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. Ascounsels for the parties exchanged lively motions to rush the presentation of their respective positions onthe controversy, an act of God intervened. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of hismedical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital.

As movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and inrepresentation not only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of theFilipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in theelection protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004elections.

In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA, asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not theproper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that


16/64

passes on to the heirs. She points out that the widow has no legal right to substitute for her husband in anelection protest, since no such right survives the husband, considering that the right to file an electionprotest is personal and non-transmissible.

ISSUE: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of thelatters protest case?

RULING: NO. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET

Rules. It provides,

Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of thePhilippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the

President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of thePresidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this expressenumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-goingelection contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon bythe electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be thelegitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.

Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court.[8] This rule allows substitution by alegal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appearbefore this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section16. However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled that a publicoffice is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death.[9] Thus,we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestantdies during the pendency of the protest

Legarda v. De Castro, PET Case No. 003, March 31, 2005

FACTS: In a Resolution the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) confirmed the jurisdiction over theprotest of Loren B. Legarda and denied the motion of protestee Noli L. de Castro for its outrightdismissal. The Tribunal further ordered concerned officials to undertake measures for the protection and

preservation of the ballot boxes and election documents subject of the protest.

Protestee contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements of votes (SOV)and certificates of canvass (COC).

ISSUE: Whether or not the tribunal has the power to correct manifest errors in the election returns orcertificates of canvass.

RULING: Yes. The validity, authenticity and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are outside theTribunalsjurisdiction. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judgeof all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President isexpressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty tocorrect manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.[12]There is no necessity, in our view, to amend the PETRules to perform this function within the ambit of its constitutional function.

Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again stressthat nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only sufficientfor the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61of the PET Rules.[17] Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the

Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, PET Case No. 001, February 13, 1996
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/pet_003.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/pet_003.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/pet_003.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/pet_003.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/pet_003.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/pet_003.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/pet_003.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/pet_003.htm#_ftn12


17/64

FACTS: After Fidel Ramos was declared elected President, defeated candidate Miriam Defensor Santiagofiled an election protest with the Supreme Court. Subsequently however, while the case was pending, sheran for office of Senator and, having been declared elected, assumed office as Senator.

In her motion of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant MiriamDefensor-Santiago prayed that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be

dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed completed.

We deferred action on that motion and required the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respectivememoranda on the issue of whether this case had been rendered moot by the election of the Protestant as aSenator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995.The Protestantanswers this issue in the negative. she asserts that an election case may be rendered moot only if the termof the contested office has expired]thus her election as Senator and assumption of office as such cannot,

under the rule laid down inMoraleja vs. Relova,[5]

be construed as an abandonment of the instant protest.

ISSUE: Whether the election protest continues or is declared moot?

RULING: ProtestantsCandidacy for senator in the May 1995 elections, her election to said office e andher actual assumption and discharge of the office combined to constitute a supervening fact that renderedmoot and academic her present protest.

IN ASSUMING THE OFFICE OF SENATOR, THE PROTESTANT HAS EFFECTIVELY

ABAN-DONED OR WITHDRAWN HER ELECTION PROTEST, THEREBY MAKING IT

MOOT.

In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest,or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her determination to protect and pursue thepublic interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Such abandonment orwithdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. It must also be stressed that under the Rules of thePresidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the publicpolicy and public interest implications In sum, if an election be dismissed on technical grounds, then itmust be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.

She knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six years, tocommence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election [16]and to end at noon of 30June 2001. Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that during her campaign,she promised to serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this protest. In short, she filedher certificate of candidacy for the Senate without any qualification, condition, or reservation.

In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate that if elected, she would assume theoffice of Senator, discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such for the term for which shewas elected.

Section 5. OathSection 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall takethe following oath or affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President orActing President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, andconsecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)

Section 6. Official Residence; SalarySection 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined bylaw and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration ofthe term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any otheremolument from the Government or any other source.

Section 7. Vacancy at the Beginning of the Term of the PresidencySection 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/pet_001.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/pet_001.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/pet_001.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/pet_001.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/pet_001.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/pet_001.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/pet_001.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/pet_001.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/pet_001.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/pet_001.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/feb1996/pet_001.htm#_edn4


18/64

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosenand qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled,

the Vice President-elect shall become President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become

permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shallact as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or

a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the nextpreceding paragraph.

Section 8. Vacancy During the Term of the PresidencySection 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shallbecome the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation ofboth the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of theActing President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject tothe same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356 SCRA 108, 2001

FACTS: In 1998 elections Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyowas elected Vice president. In 2000, longtime friend of petitioner, ChavitSingson, went on air andaccused petitioner of receiving millions from jueteng lords. Many more accusations revolving around thisissue were echoed which brought about the resignation of several advisers and the later defect from theruling coalition (LapianngMasang Pilipino) of the Senate president, house speaker and 47 representatives.In Nov. 13, 2000 Articles of Impeachment were transmitted to the Senate; Impeachment process began onNov. 20, 2000. In January 16, by a vote of 11-10, the senator judges ruled against the opening of thesecond envelope containing evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 Billion in a secret bank account.

On the same day, public prosecutors resigned. On Jan. 18, EDSA II began calling for petitionersresignation, rallies calling for the same exploded in various parts of the country. Petitioner agreed toholding a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. He called up Secretary Angaraand requested him to cooperate to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. On Jan. 20, 2000,negotiations began for the petitioners resignation, he the released a statement acknowledging ArroyosOath-taking as President and saying he will be leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order tobegin the healing process of our nation. On the same day he sent a letter to both the House Speaker andthe Senate President saying he is unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office. GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo is sworn in as President. Both Houses of Congress then issue separate resolutionsrecognizing her presidency. Sen. TeofistoGuingona is nominated by Pres. Arroyo as her Vice-president.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Estrada has not resigned and is a president on leave while Arroyo isActing President

RULING: To resolve the issue we look at the element necessary to prove resignation: that there must bean intent to resign and it must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The proposal for a snap elections forPresident in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give upthe presidency at that time. When he called up Sec. Angara he requested for help for a peaceful andorderly transfer of power; resignation is implied by such an act. Another indication was his finalstatement before leaving Malacanang, here he acknowledged Arroyos oath-taking as president. Angarasdiary shows reaction of petitioner that he only wanted a five-day transition period and after he clears hisname he was to go since he was tired. In the diary Ang ara noted he used the words ayoko na, words ofresignation. In sum, the court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was


19/64

confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. (therefore the office of the President was vacant and GMAs

assumption into office was justified)

The judgment that Estrada resigned was based on two statements (saying he will be leaving the

Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation and the letter sayinghe is unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office) of Estrada just before he left Malacanang and

on the diary of Angara Published in the Inquirer.

On MR the same was denied for the following reason: We did not stop with the contemporaneousevents but proceeded to examine some events posterior to the oath-taking of respondentArroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all important press release of the petitioner containing hisfinal statementwhich was issued after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After

analyzing its content, we ruled that petitioners issuance of the press release and his abandonmentof Malacaang Palace confirmed his resignation. These are overt actswhich leave no doubt tothe Court that the petitioner has resigned.

In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 oclock noon of Janaury 20, 2001, theclaim that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath of office at

half past noon of the same day has no leg to stand on.

Lozano, et al v. Macapagal-Arroyo, February 6, 2001

Note: Lozano vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146631 is consoli dated herein.

READ Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, and April 3, 2001 for FACTS. In GR No. 146528, the Petition asks the SC to enjoin ESTRADA from exercising the powers andauthority of the President under the Constitution and to yield the Presidency to his constitutionalsuccessor, ARROYO. In GR No. 146549, Petitioner prays that the SC declare that the occupation of the Office of thePresident of the Philippines by VP ARROYO is constitutional and legal with the full support of theFilipino people and other foreign countries.

In GR No. 146579 the Petition asks the Court to issue a definitive ruling on whether or not ESTRADAis still the President and, hence exempt from all criminal suits. In GR No. 146631, the Petition prays that the proclamation and oath-taking of ARROYO be declarednull and void or that she be declared acting President and President ESTRADA, President-on-leave.

ISSUE: Whether the Petitions have merit

HELD: NONE. Petitioners prayed for and all the petitions are for Declaratory Relief which the SC doesnot have Original Jurisdiction. Aside from the lack of jurisdiction, Petitioners did not sufficiently allege,much less shown, that respondent or anyone else "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act whichthe law specifically enjoins as a duty," to entitle them to the writ of mandamus.

Petitioners have no legal standing to file the suits. They have now shown any direct and personal injury asa result of President Arroyos oath-taking. Specifically, Petitioner Lozanos alleged interest as a taxpayer

is far too detached from the ultimate objective of his Petition: nullify the oath-taking of Arroyo anddeclare Estrada as "President-on-leave."

Section 9. Vacancy in the Vice PresidencySection 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President

shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume

office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

Section 10. Vacancies in Both the Presidency and the Vice PresidencySection 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President andVice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling fora special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days


20/64

from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, ArticleV1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special

election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No

special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

Section 11. Incapacity of the PresidentSection 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his

written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a writtendeclaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-

President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives hiswritten declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of

all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, theCongress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, inaccordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is

required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to dischargethe powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercisingthe powers and duties of his office.Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356, SCRA 108, 2001

FACTS: During the postponement of the Impeachment Court, ESTRADA's Cabinet members andpolitical allies resigned, EDSA II occurred, and the people demanded ESTRADA's resignation.

On the morning of 20 January 2001, ESTRADA sent the Senate President and the House Speaker

signed letters which states: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution,I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of myoffice. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.

Senate President and House Speaker Drafted and Signed a Joint Statement of Support favoringMacapagal-Arroyo.

At 12 noon of 20 January 2001, Chief Justice Davide administered the Oath to VP Macapagal-Arroyoas President.

The SC Resolution dated 22 January 2001: SC confirmed Chief Justice Davide's administration of theOath of Office to VP Macapagal-Arroyo.

House Resolution dated 24 January 2001: the House of Rep supported Macapagal-Arroyo's asPresident and her Assumption into office.

Both Houses of the Congress issued their respective Resolutions: Confirming Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo's Nomination of Guingona as VP.

In a Senate Resolution: Impeachment Court isFunctus Officioand has been terminated.

Both Houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by Macapagal-Arroyo asPresident.

Several complaints were filed against ESTRADA before the Ombudsman DESIERTO.

ESTRADA's counsels filed with SC for Writ of Quo Warrantoagainst Macapagal-Arroyo.ARGUMENT OF ESTRADA'S COUNSEL: The Macapagal-Arroyo has no power to adjudge theinability of ESTRADA to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency because it is Congress hasthe ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable ofperforming his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII

ISSUE 1: Whether the Congress determined that the President is incapable of his functions in the mannerprovided for in section 11 of Article VII.ISSUE 2: Whether the SC has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of Petitioner Estrada


21/64

and thereafter revise the decision Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.

HELD: (1) Congress IMPLICITLY BUT CLEARLY determined the President's inability. Withrespect to Sec. 11, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, the irrefutable facts show both houses of Congresshave recognized respondent Arroyo as the de jure President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is thepremise that the inability of ESTRADA is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejectedESTRADAs claim of temporary inability.

(2) NO, because of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers.The Court cannot pass upon ESTRADAsclaim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in natureand addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided bythis Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. PETITION DISMISSED.

Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, April 3, 2001 (MR)

ARGUMENT OF ESTRADA'S COUNSEL: The SC misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, ArticleVII, of the Constitution in that Congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance ofopinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the President. The situation presents itself when majorityof the Cabinet determines that the President is unable to govern; later, the President informs Congress thathis inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the members of the Cabinet.

ISSUE: Whether the Congress complied with Sec. 11, Art. VII of the Constitution.

HELD: There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states that thedeclaration by Congress of the Presidents inability must always be a priori or before the Vice-

President assumes the presidency. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable

opportunity to act a priori on petitioners letter claiming inability to govern. Nevertheless, It cannot

be strictly maintain that the Senate President and House Speaker recognized Arroyo as the

constitutional successor to the presidency post facto.

The letters sent to them in the morning and before the Administration of the oath to the Macapagal-Arroyo. Before the Administration of the Oath, the Senate President and the House Speaker drafted andsigned a joint statement supporting Macapagal-Arroyo. THIS A PRIORI RECOGNITION. Then, it wasfollowed post facto by various resolutions of the Senate and the House, in effect, confirming thisrecognition. These acts of Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be dismissed as merely implied

recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the Republic.

Sec. 11 of Art. VII covers the case where the President transmits to the President of the Senate and theSpeaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powersand duties of his office. In case of inability to govern, sec. of Art. VII gives the Congress the power toadjudge the issue and petitioner himself submitted this thesis which was shared by this Court.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED.

Section 12. Serious Illness of the PresidentSection 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of theCabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall

not be denied access to the President during such illness.

Section 13. Prohibitions

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unlessotherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office

executive department (new)

Documents