DISCLAIMERThe opinions and analysis expressed in the Australia Afghanistan Community Resilience Scheme (AACRS) Midterm Review Report (‘the Report’) are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the official policy position of the Australian Government.

Key background information provided in the Report (pages 4-9 of the Report) were sourced from original design documents which were drafted before the AACRS commenced implementation in Afghanistan. This information is now out of date, but it provides a useful snapshot of the operating environment in Afghanistan at the time of the Scheme’s commencement in 2014.

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Mid Term Review of the Australia Afghanistan Community Resilience Scheme (AACRS)Final Report

7 July 2017

Executive SummaryThis document is the Final Report from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Mid Term Review (MTR) of the Australia Afghanistan Community Resilience Scheme (AACRS). The AACRS is an AUD25 million Australian Government funded rural development program in Afghanistan. A MTR was commissioned as a constructive process to understand progress to date, build on successes, help address challenges encountered and recommend measures to holistically improve program performance where appropriate. The MTR process has also been utilised to inform the potential scope for future phases of the AACRS.

As part of the reconstruction efforts, Australia has provided more than AUD1 billion to Afghanistan since 20011. Helping to stabilise Afghanistan remains a crucial priority for Australia as a partner in the strategic coalition against global terrorism, as mitigation against the push factors behind illegal people movement, and in the promotion of regional stability2. The AACRS is one of a suite of investments under Australia’s Aid Investment Plan which supports the Afghan’s comprehensive new reform agenda, Realising Self- Reliance. The AACRS is the DFAT’s flagship program delivered through off-budget support for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).

The AACRS aligns with the Memorandum of Understanding: Development Framework Agreement between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of Australia 2012- 17 3(the MoU), and is closely aligned with Afghanistan’s National Priority Programs (NPP) 1, 2 and 4 which relate to agricultural production, market development, water and natural resource development and strengthened local governance.

In collaboration with the Afghan Government and five NGOs4, AACRS aims to increase the resilience and livelihoods of rural Afghan communities over a four year period (2014-2018). The scheme has a particular focus on vulnerable populations – involving women, youth and people living with disabilities. AACRS NGOs are working with at least 95,000 men, women and children throughout ten provinces. Each AACRS NGO implements its own livelihood project, with a particular approach and set of outcomes that contribute to the intermediate and long-term outcomes of the Scheme as whole.

In May 2017, the DFAT engaged Coffey International Development to undertake an independent MTR of the Scheme.

Key FindingsHighly relevant objectives in the Afghan context

The overarching goal and objectives of the AACRS to increase resilience among rural communities and to foster sustainable livelihoods for men and women are highly relevant to DFAT and the Afghan context. The Program is particularly highly relevant to DFAT’s strategic priorities in: gender equality, disability and social inclusion (GEDSI); the agricultural sector; and in its cross cutting policy areas of working in partnership, working in fragile and conflict affected states and in engaging with civil society.

1 DFAT. “Overview of Australia’s Aid Program to Afghanistan” accessed online on 11 May 2017 athttp://df at.gov.au/geo/Afghanistan/development-as sistance/Pages /develop ment-assistance-in-Afghanistan.aspx 2 DFAT. “Aid Program Performance report 2015-16. Afghanistan.” Accessed online 12 May 2017 at http://dfat.gov.au/about- us/publications/Documents/afghanistan-appr-2015-16.pdf3 DFAT. “Development Framework Agreement between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and theGovernment of Australia 2012-17” Accessed online 11 May 2017 at http://df at.gov.au/geo/Afghanistan/development- assistanc e/Pages/Afghanistan-development-plan.aspx 4 ActionAid Australia, Aga Khan Foundation Afghanistan, CARE Australia, OXFAM Australia, and World Vision Australia.

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Relevance Driven by Context AdaptationThe AACRS was co-designed with delivery partners to assist in the difficult transition from recovery to market based livelihoods development as part of broader donor-supported reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The first phase of the program has had a strong focus on the adaptation of local VCD models to the specific characteristics of the poorest, so that this group can be effectively included into profitable markets. AACRS focuses on the poorest producers in the village who face significant barriers to market inclusion. The model provides practical, market-based development guidance for local NGO partners, and equips them to work directly with smallholders and local decision makers and influencers- including community development councils (CDCs) and district governments - to break down the local- level market barriers they face, while taking advantage of macro-level market transformations.

Market based approaches to livelihood development are being favoured by many governments, private sector and not for profit organisations5, as a way of including the poorest in profitable markets. Value chain development (VCD) is a family of market-based approaches, aimed to assist micro and small enterprises to participate in competitive value chains implemented at different scales to influence the structures, systems and relationships underpinning market forces. There is, however, a conceptual and methodological gap in how market-based approaches attend to the characteristics of the most vulnerable. This has implications on the extent of impact of VCD approaches and how the most vulnerable are effectively included into profitable markets and can stand to gain from larger scale VCD initiatives.

In 2015, Afghanistan recorded an estimated economic growth rate of 1.5 per cent, a marginal increase from the previous year but well below the ten year average (2004-14) of 10.2 per cent6. Weak economic growth and the deteriorating security situation resulted in increases to poverty, with the poverty rate increasing from 35.8 per cent in 2011-12 to 39.1 per cent in 2013-147. Limited employment opportunities also saw the unemployment rate reach over 22 per cent of the labour force in 20148. Although modest market transformations have occurred in Afghanistan, including under the AACRS, further efforts are needed to include the most vulnerable and leverage new market opportunities. The most vulnerable must be able to effectively overcome the local-level market barriers they face which the AACRS is positioned to influence.

Under the current program, the projects delivered mainly focused on training activities. Small infrastructure and agriculture activities were also implemented in some areas, however, for the remaining 12 months of the program NGOs need to improve and maximise their engagement with MAIL and DAIL and focus on value chains, market studies and market development.

There has also been significant shifts in vulnerability of the Afghan population with the return and resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees from neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. With increasing numbers of population movement, land ownership and access have the potential to be critical points of tension moving forward as will the re-establishment of productive assets for these individuals to ensure livelihood restoration and resilience to shocks. Under the current program logic these vulnerable population’s needs could be addressed. With only 12 months of implementation remaining, budget allocations set and beneficiaries already identified, inclusion of this emerging, vulnerable, population is, however, challenging. A subsequent phase of AACRS would need to consider how best to address the growing vulnerability in this population and the provision of services.

5 Gildea, A, Suthanthiraraj, A & J, Van Kooy. “Adaptation of Local Value Chain Development to Engage Necessity Entrepreneurs into Profitable Markets in Sri Lanka.” Journal of Practical Action. 2016. (Unpublished paper)6 The World Bank, “Afghanistan Development Update.” April 2016. Cited in the DFAT. “Aid Program Performance report 2015-16. Afghanistan.” Accessed online 12 May 2017 at http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/afghanistan-appr-2015- 16.pdf7 United Nations Development Programme, ‘2015 Human Development Report’, Percentage of the population living below the national poverty line, which is the poverty line deemed appropriate for a country by its authorities8 The World Bank, “Afghanistan Development Update.” April 2016. Cited in the DFAT. “Aid Program Performance report 2015-16. Afghanistan.” Accessed online 12 May 2017 at http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/afghanistan-appr-2015- 16.pdf

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Opportunities exist to strengthen relationships with all levels of government for greater impact and sustainabilityOverall, the majority of stakeholders reported strong relationships at both the organisational level and village/district/provincial level. The general perception of the Scheme from a national government level, however, was that the Scheme had not engaged adequately with government nor in some cases followed government policies and regulations in the conduct of activities, for example in the establishment and registration of associations.

This has had implications on:

• participation in technical debates and decision making; and

• shared understanding of stakeholder’s interests and information needs to inform programming.

The absence of a Scheme Coordinator has played a role in this communication gap. To improve the effectiveness of the Scheme a focus on strengthening the connection between local, district and provincial government efforts with the national government machinery is required.

Significant opportunity to streamline coordination and performance management of the scheme

To date, the Scheme and its implementing partners have exercised a high degree of flexibility and responsiveness in order to address uncertainty in the security of the operating environment. This degree of flexibility was facilitated through having a partnership platform through the Scheme architecture – working through local partners helped to ensure continuity of delivery.

Strategic leadership and coordination is critical in a Scheme such as this that seeks a step-change across a complex paradigm and seeks to deliver it through new, innovative partnership platforms. The Scheme Coordinator position has been managed in different ways during the investment period, but overall there has been great difficulty in finding a suitable person for the job, and appropriate management arrangements. Recent appointment of a new Scheme Coordinator holds great promise for progressing and proof of concept on the value of the role, however, this needs to be balanced with realistic expectations on what can be achieved in the remaining 12 months of the investment.

Personnel safety is one of the largest ongoing critical issue impacting program delivery

The threat environment in Afghanistan remains severe as a result of growing levels of militancy, the weakness of state institutions, and political instability. Militant groups currently operating in the country include the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaida. Such groups stage attacks throughout the country and control territory in eastern and southern provinces.

The Taliban poses the most significant threat, as it currently controls the largest amount of territory and possesses the greatest capabilities. It has declared its intent to target Afghan state and foreign assets and personnel, and to seize territory in western, southern and northern provinces. The security situation may also deteriorate further because of the worsening relations between the Taliban and Islamic State (IS), which are competing with each other to seize territory in various provinces9.

Over the life of the investment there has been a number of security incidences involving staff working in part on AACRS. The heightened level of insecurity creates concerns and political, ethical and legal risks for the Australian Commonwealth Government. Security of personnel and the ability of partners to manage and/or mitigate the risks to personnel safety of operating in Afghanistan is a key consideration that will determine whether a second phase of AACRS is approved by DFAT. AACRS can offer future potential benefits, however this needs to be balanced against the risks and constraints created by the high level of insecurity in Afghanistan.

9 Control Risk Report. June 2017. “Afghanistan Provincial Assessments.”

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Efficient delivery with potential to leverage better coordination through changes to the supporting architecture of the scheme

The AACRS model was intended to complement DFAT’s on budget support through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), contributions. AACRS activities were expected to be small scale, flexible, focused on specific needs and community-based. By working through the community market system, the AACRS model addresses market barriers and leverages the collective efforts of all producers in the community in a way which fits each producer’s capacity and risk appetite. Within this ecosystem local NGOs have had a significant role to play in creating and influencing inclusive markets through leveraging their relative strengths in building deeper and longer term relationships with both communities and governments. This comparative advantage enables strong customisation of VCD approaches through grounding of models where there are trusted local relationships, long term commitment and knowledge of how to mobilise men and women to help business graduation and the transition from aid to recovery toreconstruction.

Whilst there have been many successful initiatives conducted under the Scheme, there have also been some challenges which resulted in non-realisation of activities and/or non-achievement of objectives. Due to various reasons and delays some activities have not been implemented as intended, and some of the NGOs have received approval for no cost extensions, meaning activities will be implemented beyond their anticipated finish date and into 2018. Despite delays and failures the Scheme needs to be pragmatic about the baseline from which they are working and what can be achieved in an extremely challenging context.

As previously noted the absence of a Scheme Coordinator had significant implications on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Scheme and ultimately transferred the administrative burden to DFAT. This was made additionally complex through the reduced staffing arrangements at the Australian Embassy in Kabul and in Canberra.

Promising results for diversified livelihoods and resilience for rural communitiesAACRS is pursuing an ambitious, multi-component program in an unstable, uncertain environment that has affected implementation. The complexity of the Program and instability of the implementing environment reduce the likelihood of observing significant changes in a few years, particularly related to inclusive decision-making and institutional responsiveness. However, staff believe it is plausible to see some change at the local level and assert the importance of assessing changes in decision-making processes which reflects the way in which AACRS activities can be sustained after the end of the program period.

Findings from independent evaluations carried out of each Partner’s activities suggest that the Scheme has been positive at the community level and that there are areas where the Scheme is intervening where vulnerable populations are doing better in terms of improved economic opportunities than comparator regions. The improvement upon baseline values for intermediate and immediate outcomes– where cumulative, credible and consistent data is available - suggest that tangible progress within target communities is being made at the individual project level. There is less evidence to suggest that on the government institutional strengthening side there have been positive indications of progress.

Strong community development and environmental sustainability driven results

DFAT required strong, early interface with participants and implementation partners in order to strengthen relationships and drive more effective skills transfer in the field. A key theme of community- driven change guided program activities. Implementing partners leveraged established relationships with local NGOs and CSOs to attend participants’ communities/districts.

Capacity development focussed on the most basic elements of resilience at the ‘grassroots’ level. This involved a focus on agro-ecological, natural resource management and disaster risk management concepts, as well as coaching in the appropriate adaptation of technical skills in community settings. Knowledge transfer was facilitated by the establishment of close working relationships with key individuals and groups within the target communities and districts allowing for the future exchange of ideas and troubleshooting, as required.

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Delivery of specific workshops and training were aligned to the needs assessments undertaken with beneficiaries identified by NGOs. Individuals, households and community organisations were coached through participatory workshops. Participants became increasingly skilled and confident in driving income generating activities and in engaging and developing the wider organisation/association/community.

Potential to build on achievements to date in GEDSI for longer term transformative impact

One of the key components of the AACRS model is its focus on empowering people, especially farmers and rural communities and fostering sustainable livelihoods for men and women. Within this concept lies the potential for a strong commitment to gender equality and women’s empowerment and an opportunity to alleviate poverty for women who are at a disadvantage in the Afghan trade market due to attitudinal and structural barriers that impact on their ability to participate and benefit from income generating activities. The potential of the AACRS to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment in rural communities is highly relevant to DFAT and stakeholders.

To date, evidence of outcomes is very localised and based on low profile engagement with communities– working with men and boys and women and girls. Given the exceptionally difficult context, some individual partners are generating meaningful results, however, the Scheme needs to be pragmatic about what can be achieved. Acceptance and allowing women to leave their houses and work is a considerable achievement in the context.

Feelings of well-being and safety relating to gender based violence (GBV) have an effect on women’s participation in work and ability to participate in work and economic empowerment activities. One of the first things to be considered in increasing women’s leadership, decision making or participation is the safety of their environment. There is a large body of evidence that situates women being at higher risk of GBV in war zones. And whilst understanding that we ask these questions in a war zone, we also acknowledge that women are at increased risk of violence including sexual violence from men in times of war. There is an absence of monitoring and/or evaluation of violence, including gender based violence both within implementation and as articulated in the AACRS design document that warrants attention given the ‘do no harm’ principles underpinning the Scheme.

Greater attention at the Scheme level to M&E is particularly important for gender. If there is no sustained attention at the program level or if it is not properly resourced, there may be an incomplete understanding of the nature of the problem and its underlying causes and there will be an ongoing inability to report confidently on gains made, and to capture unintended consequences so that stakeholders are aware if the work being done is not creating harm. Leveraging the Annual Partnership Workshops to stimulate thinking on what is practical in the context on improving gender responsiveness to agree and inform realistic programming moving forward may be beneficial.

The current phase has been a preparatory phase for better disability mainstreaming, the next phase could be more ambitious

Despite an explicit disability lens to the AACRS design and clear target setting for participation of people with a disability/ies (PWD), the level of understanding of disability and the implications for allocation of resources and programming was variable amongst implementing partners. This resulted in insufficiently successful achievements in engaging with PWD and a strong focus on people living with a physical disability/ties. There is scope to pay more attention at the Scheme level on a comprehensive disability inclusion strategy. Given the specific context in Afghanistan of protracted war, there is an over representation of people living with disabilities and particularly in the poorest and most marginalised of community.

Following a number of months of focused awareness and knowledge raising amongst implementing partners by Handicap International, the partners and Scheme are both in a stronger position toachieve a higher level of disability mainstreaming going forward. With the remaining time and budget partners are in a position to operationalise these foundational gains.

At this late stage in the project cycle it is not expected that this level of investment will significantly alter the participation or outcomes for PWD, however, it has laid the foundational capacity and experience of field staff to meaningfully operationalise disability strategies in a subsequent phase. Where this current phase could be seen as a preparatory phase in building the knowledge and attitudes of

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implementing

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partners in disability mainstreaming, a phase two could be more ambitious in terms of the change and impact sought at the level of PWD and at the service level.

RecommendationsAn ongoing approach to maximising the probability of successful livelihood and resilience outcomesfor vulnerable communities should underpin the broader enabling approach to AACRS’ focus on systems change, collaboration, innovation and iterative learning in the remaining 12 months of program activity. With the Scheme Coordinator now in place, the communications and engagement management approach will need to consolidate and continue to foster effective partnerships in the target provinces, private sector and governance eco-systems that can contribute to community resilience and participation in income generating activities through their capacity to effectively plan, design, implement, monitor and govern in pursuit of the AACRS objectives.

In the time remaining a key focus for partners will be on consolidating existing achievements and completing implementation of any delayed or yet to be commenced activities in order to maximise benefits. A key variable on where efforts should be focused in the remaining time will also depend ultimately on the decision to proceed with a second phase or close out. The two disparate courses of action will require different activities and support.

The existing demand-driven approach to working with communities and grassroots agencies will need to continue to leverage collaborative partnerships to strengthen systems to improve economic growth and outcomes for beneficiaries. This is consistent with the design’s whole-of-system approach and inclusion principles. This will bring as many contributions as possible into solutions to drive results and sustainability in the final months.

Based on the success and challenges of this first phase of AACRS a potential second phase would need to consider the following key components to leverage the lessons and foundations built:

1. Consolidate and/or establish strong and trusted relationships with DFAT, the GIRoA – including Central and Provincial Governments, the private sector and service delivery partners to anticipate needs, determine emerging priorities and tailor responses to stakeholder requirements;

2. Establish robust monitoring, evaluation, research and learning systems to inform decision making in a complex and dynamic environment;

3. Continue to leverage local partner’s extensive local supplier and stakeholder networks at the community, district, provincial and national level to partner with other service providers;

4. Access and use technology, for example, mobile applications to support data collection so that information on activities can be rapidly fed back and connected to the Scheme’s M&E systems; and

5. Access to an Innovation Fund to allow for rapid deployment of specific technical expertise or support for prototyping and piloting interventions.

Strengthening the Afghan Government and provincial government systems is critical to sustainability and success of the AACRS and requires the development of a strategic, responsive and sustainable system of engagement at central and provincial levels to support government to government dialogue. By strengthening the Afghan Government and provincial governments’ systems the AACRS can support private sector contributions to employment and development by catalysing their engagement and competitive difference within a better enabled business environment.

Policy engagement can be a powerful tool for change and, in some cases, deserves to be a key change pathway within a DFAT Theory of Change. However, in order to be effective, policy dialogue needs to rigorously planned and conducted, with clearly defined areas of policy interest, policy outcomes sought, program entry points for policy dialogue, influential stakeholders and clear definition of responsibility for both execution and supervision. Within the context of the AACRS, policy dialogue may/could be a change pathway in its own right. Whether it is or is not, the Scheme – in the remaining 12 months of implementation and/or in any potential subsequent phase(s) needs to include a detailed policy dialogue and partnership engagement framework built on, and supporting the Theory of Change (ToC) and identified pathways of change.

Establishing effective governance for interventions, including integrating partners and formal processes (and owners) in Technical Working Groups (TWGs) to design them. This will build

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ownership among stakeholders, particularly senior management at the central government level, and help them

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and their employees to engage in the development process. TWGs, as part of the Scheme governance structure, can be a vehicle for institution building, replacing reliance on individuals. For this reason, looking forward to a new phase, DFAT would need to advocate for high-level officials to be sponsors of the TWGs. The potential of TWGs to create greater alignment with key strategic priorities of the Afghan Government such as investments into wheat and maize, rehabilitation of irrigation and other water conservation measures, together with a focus on dryland farming will better leverage collective resources, ownership and sustainability.

Consolidation and a continued focus on building strong working partnerships amongst partners, other DFAT programs and the broader donor community will be critical. These relationships will help coordinate common areas of interest and influence, information sharing and lessons and help to leverage broader coherence within the Australian Aid program at post.

Renewed commitment to the Partnership Framework through a Partnership Charter to establish understandings of shared accountabilities and responsibilities. The Charter could be renewed/developed at a workshop for AACRS partners at mobilisation and outline rules of engagement, collaboration, decision-making and problem resolution. Once the Charter is in place, partnership agreements with selected organisations can be renewed/developed to share understandings of objectives and information flows.

The Charter would need to link to a Scheme level Communications Strategy to ensure that contributions and collective efforts are acknowledged and celebrated, with the potential for the Scheme Coordinator to work with DFAT to deliver public diplomacy dividends.

The M&E framework will inform learning and quality improvement and the lessons and experiences captured will provide feedback on performance and suggest options to meet targets and improve service delivery. Performance data must influence decision-making by being accessible to decision makers and to inform policy. It must measure performance and accountability and there is a need to consider what options are available to verify information and set performance targets that reflect sector capacity and local demands.

The AACRS modality – through the appointment of an organisation in the role of Scheme Coordinator - provides the ability to develop an integrated M&E system that can report on aggregated results at the Scheme level and inform decisions about strategic options, alignment and resourcing. It will be imperative that key information and themes can be drawn out of the data and presented in a clear and coherent manner at specific points in time to inform decision making. For example on research, on activity designs, on partnership options, on testing and piloting, on options to scale-up (or scale-back non-performing projects).

The AACRS partnership will need to bring a practical and experienced approach to the achievement of end of program outcomes that is capable of rapid adaptation to changing circumstances. In a program where activity levels will increase and decrease depending on the stability and security of the operating context, the AACRS partnership will need to continue to recognise the importance of ensuring the support and operations function of the program remains solid to support the Scheme Coordinator and all partners to respond to changing levels of activity.

To support a scalable model, an Innovation Fund should also be included in the total budget envelope to enable rapid prototyping and scaling of models or surge support for specific technical interventions, for example, in support of engineering/adaptive work to improve accessibility for PWD.

ContentsExecutive Summary......................................................................................................................... i

Glossary........................................................................................................................................... 2

1. Introduction.............................................................................................................................. 4

2. Australia Afghanistan Aid Program........................................................................................4

3. Overview of AACRS.................................................................................................................6

3.1. Theory of Change............................................................................................................6

3.2. Implementation Arrangements.........................................................................................9

3.3. Governance................................................................................................................... 10

4. Purpose and Expectations of the Mid Term Review...........................................................10

4.1. Scope and focus of the MTR.........................................................................................10

4.2. Objectives of the MTR....................................................................................................11

4.3. Key Evaluation Questions..............................................................................................11

4.4. Cross Cutting Priorities..................................................................................................11

5. Methodology........................................................................................................................... 12

6. Key Findings..........................................................................................................................14

6.1. Relevance...................................................................................................................... 14

6.2. Effectiveness.................................................................................................................. 20

6.3. Efficiency.......................................................................................................................30

6.4. Impact............................................................................................................................ 31

6.5 Sustainability..................................................................................................................36

6.6 Gender........................................................................................................................... 38

6.7 Disability Inclusion.........................................................................................................42

7. Recommendations................................................................................................................. 44

Annexes.......................................................................................................................................... 49

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GlossaryAACES Australia Africa Community Engagement Scheme

AACRS Australia Afghanistan Community Resilience Scheme

ACIAR Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research

AKDN Aga Khan Development Network

AKF-A Aga Khan Foundation Afghanistan

AMENCA Australian Middle East NGO Cooperation Agreement

ANDSF National Defence and Security Forces

BDSP Business Development Service Providers

BNTU Badghis National Traders Union

CBNRM Community-based Natural Resource Management

CDC Community Development Council

CLDC Clusters of Community Development Council

CRSA Climate Resilient Sustainable Agriculture

CSO Civil Society Organisation

DAIL (District) Department of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock

DDA District Development Assemblies

DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

DLFS Dryland Farming Strategy

DoWA Department of Women’s Affairs

DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

DRRD (District) Department of Rehabilitation and Rural Development

EVAW Ending Violence Against Women

FFS Farmer Field School

FOCUS Focus Humanitarian Assistance

GEDSI Gender Equality, Disability and Social Inclusion

GBV Gender Based Violence

GIRoA Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

HRBA Human Rights Based Approach

IDP Internally Displaced Person

ISCO Invigorating Social Community Organisation

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KEQ Key Evaluation Questions

LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MAIL Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock

MEF Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

MIAD Multi-Input Area Development

MoEcon Ministry of Economy

MoF Ministry of Finance

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MRRD Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development

MTR Mid Term Review

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Afghan

NGO Non-Government Organisation

NPP National Priority Programs

ODA Official Development Assistance

OHW Organisation of Human Welfare

PAC People’s Action for Change

PAIL (Provincial) Department of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock

PRRD (Provincial) Department of Rehabilitation and Rural Development

PWD People with Disability

REALISE Resilient Agriculture and Livelihoods Initiative for Socio-Economic Empowerment

ToC Theory of Change

TRG Technical Reference Group

TWG Technical Working Group

UN United Nations

VCD Value Chain Development

WMG Water Management Groups

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1. IntroductionThis document is the Final Mid Term Review Report for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Australia Afghanistan Community Resilience Scheme (AACRS). This report outlines achievements of the Scheme from January 2014 through to May 2017 and the adequacy of that progress against the original program logic and annual plans, observed outcomes, a synthesis of factors affecting those achievements, where relevant, and any implications for the AACRS going forward. This report also outlines recommendations for a potential future phase.

This report is structures in terms of the following sections:

Part I: Background

(Chapters 1-5)

Provides an overview of the report’s purpose, the MTR methodology applied, the context for the MTR, and the AACRS.

Part II: Findings

(Chapters 6)

Addresses progress and outcomes.

Part III: Recommendations and Conclusions

(Chapters 7)

Considers the factors that influenced implementation, sustainability and opportunities for improvement.

Part IV: Appendices Presents the key evaluation questions, stakeholders consulted, country and provincial level context.

2. Australia Afghanistan Aid Program

.

Source10

10 AACRS Program Design Document 2013

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Source11

Widespread vulnerability to poverty, natural disasters and protracted conflict fuelled instability has hindered development and economic growth. Afghanistan is a food-deficit country and remains highly vulnerable to market shocks. The latest Afghanistan Living Condition Survey found that 33 per cent (11 million) of the total population are currently food insecure12. Low emergency response capabilities pose an additional challenge and in 2014, Afghanistan was ranked the most vulnerable country in terms of natural disaster coping capacities13.

The statistics reflect the impact of decades of war. In 2014, the Afghan Government released a comprehensive new reform agenda, Realizing Self-Reliance, which focuses on the need to strengthen governance, economic growth and livelihoods to achieve a more sustainable and secure Afghanistan. Australia has provided more than $1 billion in ODA to Afghanistan since 200114. Australia’s aid program in Afghanistan aligns with the government’s 2014 aid policy, Australian Aid: Promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability15, as well as the Afghan Government’s national development priorities as articulated in Afghanistan’s National Priority Programs (NPP)16.

11 AACRS Program Design Document 201312 Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Central Statistics Organisation, ‘Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2013- 14’.13 Ibid14 DFAT. “Overview of Australia’s Aid Program to Afghanistan” accessed online on 11 May 2017 athttp://df at.gov.au/geo/Afghanistan/development-as sistance/Pages /develop ment-assistance-in-Afghanistan.aspx 15 DFAT. “Australian Aid: promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability.” Accessed online 11 May 2017 at https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/australian-aid-development-policy.pdf16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. “Afghanistan’s National Priority Program (NEPPs).” Accessed online 11 May 2017 at http://mfa.gov.af/en/page/6547/Afghanistan-national-development-strategy/Afghanistans-national-priority- program-npps

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It focuses on three strategic objectives:

supporting the Afghan Government to achieve economic growth and institute more effective and accountable governance;

empowering women and girls by addressing barriers to their social, political and economic participation; and

building resilience and supporting at-risk populations.

A detailed overview of the Afghanistan country context is provided in Annex A.

3. Overview of AACRSThe AACRS is an Australian Government rural development program in Afghanistan with a budget of up to $25 million over four years. The AACRS aligns with the Memorandum of Understanding: Development Framework Agreement between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of Australia 2012-1717 (the MoU), and is closely aligned with NPPs18 1, 2 and 4 which relate to agricultural production, market development, water and natural resource development and strengthened local governance. AACRS began in May 2014 and is expected to conclude in early 2018. In collaboration with the Afghan Government and five NGOs, AACRS aims to increase the resilience and livelihoods of rural Afghan communities over a four year period (2014-2018). The scheme has a particular focus on vulnerable populations – involving women, youth and people living with disabilities. Figure 3 below outlines the geographic coverage of AACRS. Refer to Annex B for background to each of the provinces where the AACRS is operating, and Annex C for further details on the NGOs, their projects and funding received.

The aim of the AACRS is to increase the resilience and livelihoods of rural Afghan communities. This is done through supporting and facilitating more and better agricultural production and marketing; building and strengthening institutions that are more responsive to people’s needs and rights; and facilitating better access to off farm income. The scheme focuses on the most vulnerable, particularly women, youth and people living with disabilities19.

3.1. Theory of ChangeThe AACRS aim, improved resilience and livelihoods for Afghan rural communities, is based on the understanding that people living in poverty are particularly vulnerable to crises, challenges and shocks. Negative shocks can have effects along gender lines, and women and girls in poor households often bear the largest burden.

Resilience is the ability to resist, accommodate or recover from the effects of a shock. Improving community resilience is about building stronger social and economic foundations in local communities so that they can respond more effectively to shocks.

Food security and economic livelihoods are central to the notion of community resilience envisaged under the AACRS. The AACRS Theory of Change is provided in the schematic below in Figure 1, and the program logic is outlined in Figure 2 below.

17 DFAT. “Development Framework Agreement between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of Australia 2012-17” Accessed online 11 May 2017 at http://df at.gov.au/geo/Afghanistan/development- assistanc e/Pages/Afghanistan-development-plan.aspx 18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. “Afghanistan’s National Priority Program (NEPPs).” Accessed online 11 May 2017 at http://mfa.gov.af/en/page/6547/Afghanistan-national-development-strategy/Afghanistans-national-priority- program-npps19 AACRS Program Design Document 2013.

Figure 1: AACRS Theory of Change

Source20

20 Illustration adapted from Palmera Village2Markets Model Theory of Change

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Figure 2: AACRS Program Logic

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3.2. Implementation ArrangementsThe AACRS is implemented via a grant delivery mechanism with five funded implementing partners21

(INGOs) who in turn partner with a number of local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and local NGOs22. A sixth INGO, Handicap International, has been funded in 2017 to support improvements in disability inclusion mainstreaming across the Scheme and its implementing partners. The AACRS NGOs are working with at least 95,000 men, women and children throughout twelve provinces (plus Kabul) as highlighted in the AACRS coverage map below (refer to Figure 3). Each AACRS NGO implements its own livelihood project, with a particular approach and set of outcomes that contribute to the intermediate and long-term outcomes of the Scheme as whole.

A situational analysis on the operating environment within each of the AACRS provinces was undertaken by Control Risk and is provided in Section 6.2 and Annex B. This analysis includes the security trajectory in these locations and the factors, such as security and government infrastructure, Taliban presenceor ethnic considerations, which may impact the security environment. This information has been provided in two ways, first through maps showing political violence incidents in each province (refer to Figure 4) and secondly through supporting political and security analysis. This analysis has been provided to: (1) foster consideration on the links between program performance, relationships and how they impact the broader environment and the implications on insurgent activity; (2) the implications on performance to date; (3) expectations on performance over the remaining life of Phase 1 given the security situation in each province where AACRS operates, and (4) to inform the potential hybrid programming frame for a potential next phase ie. stabilisation/peacebuilding versus resilience/community engagement.

Figure 3: AACRS Coverage Map

21 ActionAid Australia, Aga Khan Foundation Afghanistan, CARE Australia, OXFAM Australia, and World Vision Australia

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22 FOCUS, Organisation for Humanitarian Welfare (OHW), People’s Action for Change (PAC), Invigorating Social Community Organisation (ISCO) and Voice of Women (VoW).

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3.3. GovernanceThe AACRS is overseen by a Scheme Oversight Committee responsible for direction setting and oversight of progress and results. The Committee is Co-Chaired by DFAT and a representative from the Afghan Government. Membership also includes a senior representative from each of the implementing NGOs, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Economy (MoEcon), the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL). Meetings have been held annually in Kabul since the commencement of the program.

Based on the mixed management model of the Scheme, it was also intended to be supported by a Scheme Coordinator. The Scheme Coordinator is independent of the implementing partners and provides leadership and strategic coordination across all Scheme level activities. Establishing the AACRS as an integrated program, rather than five separate stand alone projects, required an additional need for this level of coordination to ensure the partnership principles upon which the program was designed was effective in its pursuit of reflection, sharing and learning, and program level monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

A Technical Reference Group (TRG) was also established in 2014 to provide support to implementing partners during the intensive design phase of their projects prior to implementation. The TRG provided specialist technical advice in the areas of: design, M&E, rural development, and gender expertise.

4. Purpose and Expectations of the Mid Term Review

4.1. Scope and focus of the MTRThe AACRS MTR had a formative character with the aim to assess the progress, identify lessons learned and successful approaches and make recommendation(s) to improve the performance of the program as a whole. In addition the MTR examined the potential scope for a second phase of the AACRS. The MTR was commissioned as a portfolio-level assessment, designed to bring together information from individual projects to make an assessment of the funding mechanism itself.

The MTR has considered a number of key evaluation questions and analysed project processes and outcomes across the five NGO led livelihoods projects, together which contribute to the intermediate and long term outcomes of the Scheme as a whole. The review process engaged with key stakeholders to: assess progress towards intermediate and long term outcomes of the Scheme; identify barriers to increasing resilience and improving livelihoods and suggest strategies to overcome them; recommend practical improvements to program performance and provide clear guidance on the scope of future phases.

In light of the security risks associated with primary data collection and the timeframe within which the MTR occurred, the review process focussed on key industry stakeholders (agency and project governance bodies) and did not involve consultation with the broader community or beneficiaries. The key deliverables for this process have been: an evaluation plan, a draft and final MTR report (this document). It is anticipated that DFAT will conduct learning and dissemination activities as appropriate following delivery of these findings and that a summary may be published in Dari and Pashtu.

This review built on the outcomes of the individual reviews of the five NGO partners undertaken during the period August-November 2016. The evaluation questions have been guided by the OECD-DAC criteria for development assistance, with particular attention to relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability, gender equality, and disability inclusion.

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4.2. Objectives of the MTRThe objective of the MTR was to:

a) assess progress to date, including in the pursuit of gender equality, social and disability inclusion (GEDSI);

b) identify lessons learned;

c) identify factors contributing to success or failure;

d) assess the sustainability of the benefits generated; and

e) inform future programming, policy development and overall organisational learning.

4.3. Key Evaluation QuestionsThe key evaluation questions (KEQs) relate directly to the MTR’s objectives and are informed by the evaluability assessment, focus and scope of the evaluation. The questions the MTR has attempted to answer are listed below according to their relevant evaluation criterion. Annex D provides further detail on how each question was defined and the key considerations which guided how the questions were answered. For all questions, this report provides lessons learnt and recommendations to inform future practice.

4.4. Cross Cutting PrioritiesThere are a number of cross cutting issues of interest that underpin the MTR, namely: gender equality, disability and social inclusion (GEDSI), climate change, environmental sustainability, anti-corruption and fraud, ‘do no harm’ and child protection. The implications of these cross cutting issues for the MTR are outlined below.

The MTR considered to what extent the Scheme and project level designs lent themselves to fostering an awareness of and focus on the gender dynamics involved in agricultural value chains, off-farm income generating training and activities, and broader community-driven development, as well as the extent to which an awareness of these gender dynamics permeated project management processes and structures at all levels. As part of the evaluability assessment, special consideration was given to assessing the extent to which M&E frameworks and processes made provision for the articulation and measurement of program results and impacts for men and women.

The analysis considered the impact that the Scheme and individual projects has had and will have on environmental sustainability, child protection, and PWD. The MTR assessed project stakeholder’s awareness of environmental impact and sustainability, child protection and inclusion, as well as procedures and processes that are in place to ensure that activities funded under the program have no significant adverse impact on the environment, children and broader participants/beneficiaries.

A series of megaforces – such as ecosystem decline, population migration (resettlement and internally displaced populations in Afghanistan), and pressure on natural resources – are driving major changes. (Economic) Development projects and communities that anticipate these changes and turn them to their advantage are best positioned for sustainable growth, for example through responding to the challenges of water scarcity. The MTR sought to understand where targeted climate change adaptation has been successful in reducing the impacts and costs of climate risks to rural communities benefiting directly and/or indirectly from the Scheme and projects. A range of different types of adaptation activities were considered such as: spreading the risk; structural and technological; regulatory and institutional; avoidance; research and education and behavioural.

The MTR considered the suite of social challenges and the differentiated issues and impacts on children, together with a review of management system responses to children’s rights impacts related to the Scheme and project. The findings presented in this report are positioned to promote

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further

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understanding of the human and child rights dimensions of day to day management functions creating a platform for change in the event that different and new management responses are/were needed.

5. MethodologyThe evaluation combined a theory-based assessment to test the validity of the Program model, with a process evaluation which reviewed the implementation arrangements, capacity and coordination. The research methods used were predominantly qualitative supplemented by quantitative data where available.23 The theory-based evaluation was framed and guided by AACRS Theory of Change (ToC) and Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (MEF) and considered whether there was evidence that inputs to the Scheme have resulted in the expected outputs and outcomes. This helped to establish the extent to which individual activities (ie. projects implemented by the five NGOs) have contributed to higher level goals. The evaluation was undertaken in four phases from May 2017 to June 2017.

Annex E provides a detailed outline of each of the methods of information/data collection and analysis undertaken. There were six core methods of data collection and analysis that were used to inform the MTR, enabling the key evaluation questions to be answered and any outcomes of the Scheme to be assessed.

5.1 Methodological LimitationsFour methodological challenges and limitations for the MTR – including one specifically related to gender- were identified at the outset, included:

1. Difficulties in building evidence of outcomes: As with much of the data from Afghanistan, considerable caution has to be exercised with respect to reliability. Most of Afghanistan’s economy is informal (at least twice the size of that of the formal) and therefore its value is captured poorly and can only be estimated. Given the absence of clear national-level quantitative baseline data, the evaluation has relied on data from partners’ reports which is variable in its quality and which has not been verified by a third party in the field. Much of the outcome reporting is subjective and does not reference program achievements against baseline data.

2. Perceptions and definitions of ‘success’ in the Afghan context: The complexity and heterogeneity of Afghanistan and the significance of context with respect to the underlying agro- ecology and social order are critical to credible evidence building. The complexity and unevenness of the reconstruction process itself impacts the available evidence. The different levels and combinations of interventions in the different provinces, districts and villages make comparison of the effects of interventions challenging.

3. Consulting with all relevant stakeholders: This evaluation was undertaken in less than one month which created challenges given timeframes for conduct of the MTR.

4. Measuring the impact of the project on gender equality, gender based violence and economic empowerment of women and girls.

Ensuring that women and girl’s voices were included in the MTR was critical to understanding how the Scheme and projects have worked to remove barriers in market relationships involving women and promoted female economic participation and the distribution of benefits to women and girls in rural communities. There are many issues that are related to ensuring a gender nuanced approach in both developing contexts and the analytical work in evaluating outcomes.

All methodologies have strengths and weaknesses, and the challenge is to choose the appropriate methodology given both data constraints related to the availability of sex disaggregated data and the potential consumers of the estimates.

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23 This is also referred to as an ‘exploratory sequential’ mixed methods design. Qualitative studies are conducted and findings explored when considering individual programs being evaluated.

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The literature argues for the need to develop specific operational definitions such that research and monitoring can become more specific and have greater cross cultural applicability.24 Given thediversity of projects and activities implemented under the AACRS and the variations in the patterns and trends of gender mainstreaming, conducting a credible study at the Scheme level would require a common or flexible definition to be established as part of the M&E framework from the outset of the investment in order to ensure accurate and reliable data collection of the impacts and compare cross project/provincial data sets.

Furthermore, the extent, validity and reliability of the data available are critical in determining the magnitude of outcomes and in identifying priority areas for focus going forward. Access to women living in the impacted rural communities and/or directly involved or impacted by the project is paramount to a successful evaluation. The MTR considered the results presented in the independent MTRs of each of the NGO projects, however, key limitations of the MTR were the inability of the evaluation team to consult with female beneficiaries owing to security and time constraints and the lack of routine sex- disaggregated data collection able to inform the analysis and MTR findings. Thus the full extent to which women in communities are participating and benefiting is not fully known.

24 UNICEF. 2000. “Domestic Violence against women and girls”. Accessed online on 4 February at www.unicef- irc.org/publications/pdf/digest6e.pdf

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6. Key FindingsThis section presents the key findings and subsequent recommendations as a result of the MTR. The findings are structured in response to the key evaluation questions and a summary of findings and recommendations provided at the end of each section. These are highlighted using the following icons:

Finding

Recommendation for remaining 12 months

Recommendation for future phase(s)

6.1. RelevanceKey Evaluation Questions:Does the program logic, scheme-approach and governance of the AACRS remain valid or requires change(s)?

What is the potential scope of a second phase of the AACRS after 2018? What should a “phase two” look like?

Alignment with DFAT’s policy and priorities

The overarching goal and objectives of the AACRS to increase resilience among rural communities and to foster sustainable livelihoods for men and women are highly relevant to DFAT and the Afghan context. The Program is particularly relevant to DFAT’s strategic priorities in: gender equality, disability and social inclusion (GEDSI); the agricultural sector; and in its cross cutting policy areas of working in partnership, working in fragile and conflict affected states and in engaging with civil society.

The links between gender equality, poverty reduction and effective development are well documented and gender equality and women’s empowerment is a key policy priority for DFAT. The Afghan Government also have their own economic development, agricultural and gender policies in place.

At the core of the AACRS model is an inclusive approach to working with CSOs, the local private sector and the informal economy. This is in line with DFAT’s Effective Governance Thematic Strategy25, which commits Australia to support civil society programs as they ‘play a key role in ensuring transparency and accountability of government service delivery’.

The AACRS aligns with An Effective Aid Program for Australia’s commitment for the aid program to strengthen and work more closely with civil society so that the aid program can benefit from NGOs’ and CSOs’ grass-roots networks, niche areas of specialisation and presence on the ground.

The decision to partner with NGOs to work with Afghan CSOs as a key component of the AACRS model is appropriate in Afghanistan where the Afghan Government has limited absorptive capacity and is unable to undertake service delivery in all parts of the country, particularly in rural and remote locations. This model is also in line with DFAT’s Civil Society Engagement Framework26 and the Framework for Working in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, which recommends working at two levels when state

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25 AusAID (2015). Effective Governance: Thematic Strategy. Accessed online 31 May 2015 at http://dfat.gov.au/about- us/publications/Doc uments/effective-governance-strategy-for-australias-aid-investments.pdf 26 AusAID (2012) Civil Society Engagement Framework. Accessed online 11 May 2017 at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/civil-soc iet y-engagement-framework.pdf

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capacity is weak – both the state, and with civil society27. NGOs had long been key players in implementing development programs in Afghanistan, particularly in those areas where the government was not able to work.

Alignment with GIRoA’s policy and priorities

Off-budget support was not the preferred delivery mechanism from the perspective of Afghan Government Line Ministries involved in the governance of and as counterparts of the AACRS. In 2014 security and corruption concerns were critical considerations during the design process, however, it is important to note that since the original design of AACRS there have been a number of important strategic, policy, and regulatory changes at the Afghan government level, changes to their national development priorities as articulated in Afghanistan’s National Priority Programs (NPP) and to the national government’s capacity to deliver services. These changes require further consideration in the ongoing delivery of the AACRS over the next 12 months and beyond.

The GIRoA has re-structured the NPPs such that they aim to increase agricultural productivity and reduce dependency on food imports, and to improve the sector’s value add to the national economy. The strategy underpinning the new NPPs highlights the need for diversification away from basic staples towards higher value crops, such as wheat, maize, specialised crops, investments into dryland farming and livestock. In the near future, the government is planning to work through Community Development Councils (CDC) clusters rather than with individual CDCs. The government also would like to implement activities through regional Farmer Resource hubs rather than subcontract individual activities to NGOs or the private sector28.

There is a risk that broader reconstruction efforts to foster economic development and income gains in Afghanistan may not be sustainable if agricultural productivity does not improve and the sector does not modernise through diversification, commercialisation and value addition, therefore the focus of the program on improving livelihoods from the grass roots level is appropriate and relevant.

Extent to which the approach meets the needs of the most vulnerable

While large scale market-based approaches such as value chain development (VCD) aim to develop inclusive value chains29, in many cases the benefits of such programs do not ‘trickle down’ to the poorest producers. To effectively support the livelihoods of the poorest, development efforts are shifting from traditional charity and welfare-based models30 towards market-based approaches that foster greater economic inclusion. Market-based approaches are based on the rationale that the poor areentrenched in and highly reliant on markets, and are at the same time disadvantaged by the way that they operate31. Despite the dramatic potential for improvements in rural employment, food security and broader economic growth, integrating small-scale producers into markets remains challenging in most development contexts, due to a host of interconnected factors including remoteness, unstable demand and supply of products, inconsistent market information, and low on-farm productivity. The most

27 AusAID (2011). Framework for Working in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States Accessed online 11 May 2017 at https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/aid-fragile-conflict-affected-states-staff-guidanc e.pdf 28 Draft Minutes Australian-Afghanistan Community Resilience Scheme (AACRS) Fourth Oversight Committee Meeting Outcomes29 Stamm, A. and Drachenfels, C. (2011) Value chain development approaches and activities by seven UN agencies and opportunities for interagency cooperation, International Labour Office, Geneva, Switzerland.

30 Sahan, E. and Fischer-Mackey, J. (2011) Making Markets Empower the Poor: Programme perspectives on using markets to empower women and men living in poverty, Oxfam GB, Oxford.Accessed online 1 June 2017 at http://policy- practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/making-markets-empower-the-poor-programme-perspectives-on-using-markets-to-empo- 188950.

31 Humphrey, J. (2014) Market systems approaches: A literature review, Institute of Development Studies (IDS).

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vulnerable can only benefit from market systems development gains if their local-level market and personal barriers are overcome.

The Scheme model responds to the unique characteristics of the most vulnerable, and presents a practical framework where lessons and success can be shared, leveraged and implemented by local grassroots partners—a community who are critical to the long-term development and engagement of the poorest into markets. However, ongoing efforts are needed to include the most vulnerable, to help them effectively overcome the local-level market barriers they face and to enable them to leverage new market opportunities. For example, work undertaken by Oxfam on the dairy value chain—supported by AACRS, private companies and the provincial government—enabled early movers and people with productive assets to sell to new buyers, and benefit from investment into their “businesses”.

The Program also needs to adapt to the changing context in Afghanistan. There have been significant shifts in vulnerability of the Afghan population with the return and resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees from neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. With increasing numbers of population movement, land ownership and access have the potential to be critical points of tension moving forward as will the re-establishment of productive assets for these individuals to ensure livelihood restoration and resilience to shocks. Under the current program logic these vulnerable population’s needs could be addressed. With only 12 months of implementation remaining, budget allocations set and beneficiaries already identified, inclusion of this emerging, vulnerable, population is, however, challenging.

A subsequent phase of AACRS would need to consider how best to address the growing vulnerability in this population and the provision of services. The AACRS Program Logic remains highly relevant given the evolving profile of vulnerable persons in Afghanistan, however, revision of programming to include returnees and IDPs may be required for ongoing context adaptation.

Robustness of the program theory

DFAT, the GIRoA and all implementing partners recognise the importance of the AACRS investment in Afghanistan and duly seek to ensure the focus of the balance of the Scheme to 2018 is managed toward an agreed outcome based on lessons learned and observations to date. With this in mind it will be important to actively manage the balance of the assignment to mitigate the ambiguity that arises within such a mandate that seeks to change the paradigm across a diverse range of stakeholders/ expectations.

Both the Scheme-level and individual NGO theories of change demonstrate complex pathways through which change is expected to occur, and articulate assumptions underpinning these relationships. These documents cover multiple key dimensions that have enabled AACRS to assess change among different groups and in the nature of relationships among them over time.

The original AACRS scheme-wide program logic illustrated four core streams of work, intended to achieve the following impacts:

1. Households are better able to address their own needs, with subcomponents addressing agricultural production, non-farm livelihoods and market access and sales.

2. Community decision-making structures are more responsive and inclusive.3. Institutions are more responsive and inclusive.4. Strong basis for future rural partnerships (internally-oriented).

Whilst NGO partners project level theories of change have been aligned to a number or all of the four streams outlined above, the original program logic has not provided adequate detail on the theory of action to enable partners to use it to guide their implementation in cross cutting areas such as disability inclusion, nor have the Scheme level indicators and units of measurement been developed or applied consistently across NGO partners. This is further explored in Section 6.2, 6.4 and 6.7 of this evaluation report.

Appropriateness of governance mechanismsThe partnership principles upon which the Scheme is based are sound and the brokering approach at

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the outset of the Scheme was reported to have been adequate. To improve the effectiveness of the

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Scheme a focus on strengthening the connection between local, district and provincial government efforts with the national government machinery is required. Other approaches to supporting local and district level government service delivery to meet DFAT objectives in the context of delivering on the national Afghan reform agenda may need to be considered. Careful discussion between DFAT and Afghan Government partners is required to define a practical way forward that will achieve tangible outcomes for the investment. Looking forward to a potential subsequent phase this may involve consideration on the potential of a blend of direct support to Ministries and other delivery modalities (such as grants), in addition to considering an appropriate and more active role for government within the design, governance and potentially implementation of the Scheme.

The role of the Scheme Coordinator is pivotal to the success of the model and whilst it presents large untapped potential also creates significant key person risk to the success of the model. The impact of the role of the Scheme Coordinator has been insufficiently successful over the life of the investment despite some opportunities being provided for shared lessons and learnings and exposure visits across the investment. Whilst each of the NGO projects has continued to drive outcomes in their individual areas of operation and activity, the potential impact of the Scheme approach itself remains largely untested due to gaps in the recruitment of a Scheme Coordinator and the implications of this on coordination, learning, sharing and effective partnerships.

The role of the Scheme Coordinator was envisaged as and going forward will need to act as an interlocutor between partners and government at all levels in order to: broker adaptations where necessary; improve communication; and avoid contradiction or duplication with the direction of the relevant line ministries. Investment into recruiting an organisation with three individuals has the potential to minimise key person risk linked to the Scheme Coordinator and holds promise in comprehensively fulfilling the varied responsibilities of the role.

For the remainder of the current phase, in addition to in any potential future phase, consideration needs to be given to establishing and consolidating the right platforms for collaboration and communication with national ministries, implementing partners and the broader donor community. The AACRS – primarily through the newly appointed Scheme Coordinator and via government to government dialogue– needs to ensure that efforts are made to link work at the grassroots level with activities that are expected to improve national systems more broadly, and address local capacity to deliver services and report on district and provincial requirements. There is scope for the AACRS to be the engine driving this dialogue, with the DFAT mission in Kabul playing a role in disseminating and amplifying the story.

Policy engagement can be a powerful tool for change and, in some cases, deserves to be a key change pathway within a DFAT Theory of Change. However, in order to be effective, policy dialogue needs to rigorously planned and conducted, with clearly defined areas of policy interest, policy outcomes sought, program entry points for policy dialogue, influential stakeholders and clear definition of responsibility for both execution and supervision. Within the context of the AACRS, policy dialogue may/could be a change pathway in its own right. Whether it is or is not, the Scheme – in the remaining 12 months of implementation and/or in any potential subsequent phase(s) needs to include a detailed policy dialogue and partnership engagement framework built on, and supporting the ToC and identified pathways of change. Annex G provides an example of a policy dialogue framework.

Performance monitoring and evaluation

A Scheme-level M&E framework was originally developed to frame the activities of implementing partners and provide an overarching structure for collaboration and decision making. There have, however, been issues in the implementation of this framework, which has meant that there has been inconsistent reporting against key indicators at the program-level.

The result of this is that:

M&E activities have been largely operationally focussed; the quality of data provided by implementing partners is variable and the credibility of information

cannot always be relied upon; it is difficult to aggregate the results of all programs to assess and report on the impact of the

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program as a whole;

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the data generated and reported on an ongoing basis is not adequate to inform management decisions and resource allocation; and

the variable quality of data can result on the over-emphasis of certain activities and outcomes, while not giving enough attention to others. This in turn, can result in insufficient achievements across the scope of services, and a compromise of value for money.

The evaluability assessment undertaken in 2014 provides further detail of these issues and recommendations for a way forward.

The appointment of a Scheme Coordinator has the potential to improve portfolio level monitoring and evaluation by supporting implementing partners to generate and report objective, evidence-based information in a format which can then be synthesised to assess program performance. Provided there is engagement and support from the Oversight Committee, improvements in coordination and performance monitoring at the Scheme level may enhance the flexibility and adaptability of the investment to respond to emergent needs and priorities through tighter feedback loops and information for decision making.

It will be important to ensure that the Scheme Coordinator has access to appropriate expertise to provide oversight, direction and advice on how to develop and manage strategic performance information across such a diverse portfolio. This type of expertise is not always found in program level M&E practitioners. It requires a high level of capability in program theory and design (portfolio, program, and activity levels) in dynamic and complex settings; and the ability to provide constructive and collegiate advice to program level M&E practitioners working across the portfolio. Exploring the potential of third party or remote monitoring systems may provide insights into potential models and approaches to strengthening the M&E products from the Scheme. This would require further investigation into the feasibility of such an arrangement within the existing security environment and Workplace Health and Safety Act.

Donors are increasingly commissioning ‘Evaluation Managers’ to operate alongside fund managers or program coordinators. The role of the Evaluation Manager is generally to design and implement a framework for: 1) assessing the overall impact of a portfolio of programs; 2) assessing the effectiveness of the delivery mechanism itself; and 3) reviewing how program delivery contributes to results achieved. The Evaluation Manager then collaborates with the Fund Manager/Scheme Coordinator to support implementing partners to develop M&E systems to provide consistent, high quality data to inform ongoing performance management and enable an assessment of program impact. This approach provides objectivity and transparency, and helps donors to better understand how the success or failure of interventions is related to their design or to their delivery.

Innovation fund

The AACRS model requires different approaches to co-creating place-based solutions in local value chain development, which require different competencies of local partners, in its value-adding activities and adaptations to including poor producers with profitable markets. The use of the Innovation Fund mechanism within the Scheme was contingent upon the findings of this MTR and as such these funds have yet to have been drawn down nor a process yet established for how to most effectively apply them. Given the time remaining for implementation consideration on the utility of an Innovation Fund in a subsequent phase would be a more appropriate use of time and respond to the needs for greater flexibility and adaptability identified above.

There is potential in a second phase for a more explicit focus on connecting to innovations and demonstration and replication of successful activities at scale - a fusion of ‘design thinking’ and ‘lean start up’ methodologies to establish minimum viable products that could be locally driven by grassroots partners could be considered together with the platform and coordination at the Scheme level to undertake this sensibly and rigorously. This requires comfort with ambiguity, a discipline of prototyping, and tolerance for failure which are counter-cultural to most NGOs operating in the field. It also requires the Scheme Coordinator role to play an active role in managing these responsibilities together with active engagement in decision making at the Oversight Committee and DFAT level.

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Considerations for a potential second phase of the program

Key questions moving forward into a potential second phase that will require careful consideration are related to the selection processes and membership of implementing partners to the Scheme. This is contingent upon the coordination requirements to manage potential expansion or decrease of the implementing group based on: key elements and requirements of the design moving forward; the competitive advantage differentiating the technical expertise of implementing partners, experience in the operating environment and geographical coverage, and relationships with local Afghan communities.

Strategic decisions based on ongoing evidence and discussions with partners is required to understand the benefits of consolidation or expansion of the current activities into a second phase within the total prospective budget envelope for off budget support. This should be explored together with opportunities to create more explicit links to and integrate with other investments across the Australian Aid portfolio – such as the on budget dryland farming strategy (DLFS), ICARDA, CYMMIT and the outputs of the ACIAR research. There is also merit in leveraging the experience, expertise and innovation of partners through their work delivering other bilateral investments (for both DFAT and other donors) and promoting greater cross program learning across the aid portfolio.

Key Findings and Recommendations:

Highly Relevant Objectives in the Afghan Context

The AACRS Program Logic remains highly relevant given the evolving context and profile of vulnerable persons in Afghanistan

In the absence of a Scheme Coordinator the level of emphasis of learning, and M&E activities maintained an operational focus

Insufficiently successful Scheme mechanisms to support optimal consultation, harmonisation, collaboration and communication between stakeholders

Greater clarity and agreement across stakeholders about the design of the Scheme activities is required moving forward

Revision of programming to include returnees and IDPs may be required for ongoing context adaptation in the next 12 months but certainly in any subsequent phase

To improve strategic level performance information investment into resources and/or expertise for generating credible information at the Scheme level is required

Careful discussion on an appropriate and meaningful role for government going forward is required

There is potential for a hybrid approach of delivering direct support to Ministries in addition to other delivery modalities (such as grants) in a subsequent phase

Potential to Exploit Synergies with other DFAT Investments eg. the DLFS

The comparative advantage, number of partners and processes for selection will need to be considered in the design of a subsequent phase vis-à-vis strategic and emergent priorities and the potential of an innovation fund to support greater flexibility and adaptation

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6.2. EffectivenessWhat is the level and added value of collaboration a) between NGO projects; and b) between NGO projects and government agencies and/or other development actors; and what can be done to improve a) and b)?

What are lessons learned at the scheme level (i.e. scheme approaches and governance, project intervention, cross-cutting approaches such as gender equality and disability inclusion); and how best can those be integrated in the remaining implementation, or in a potential second phase?

Added value of collaboration

The AACRS partnership continues to recognise that strong relationships and engagement with key stakeholders - underpinned by trust and transparency - are required to ensure their ability to operate and to engage with communities is maintained. The Scheme approach looks at community acceptance and this has been helpful in establishing trust first and foremost, that has leant itself to protecting staff and partners.

These relationships are underscored by dynamic conversations that are rich with diverse opinions and active opposition in some cases. Against a backdrop of uncertainty, insecurity and a harsh natural environment, it is critical that AACRS inform and engage in discussions with a range of stakeholders on how the Scheme can work in concert to pursue opportunities while balancing societal, economic and environmental impacts.

As the first phase of AACRS draws to a close and begins to consider the future, it has sought to understand the views and perceptions of key stakeholders within the Partnership Framework. Managing key risks around sustainability (social, environmental and governance) performance are critical to building and enhancing AACRS’ reputation with stakeholders and ultimately Australia’s interests in Afghanistan.

Overall the majority of stakeholders reported strong relationships at both the organisational level and village/district/provincial level. The overall perception of the Scheme from a national government level, however, was that the Scheme had not engaged adequately with government nor in some cases followed government policies and regulations in the conduct of activities, for example in the establishment and registration of associations.

This has had implications on:

• participation in technical debates and decision making; and

• shared understanding of stakeholder’s interests and information needs to inform

programming. The absence of a Scheme Coordinator has played a role in this communication

gap.

This section presents the views and opinions of the stakeholders with regards to the level and added value of relationships between: (1) NGOs and CSOs; and (2) NGOs. Characteristics of the relationship, including identification of any specific issues of concern or trust that exist within the relationships are also presented.

Key findings by stakeholder group are presented in Table 2 and 3 below.

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Table 2: Relationships between NGOs and CSOs

Domains of Relationshi

Drivers NGOs CSOs

Communication Directness – Increasing presence by reducing mediation or filtering

92% 63%

Story Continuity – Managing the gaps (in time) between interactions

88% 58%

Knowledge Multiplexity – Improving the breadth and quality of information

86% 49%

Power Parity – The fair use of power 88% 57%

Purpose Commonality – Building shared purpose 91% 58%

Key*

Effective ≥65%

Functional 50-64%

Deficient <50%

Almost all Index scores fall within the boundary for an “effective” relationship from the NGOs perspective. However, from CSOs perspective relationships are generally functional. The scores indicate that there is a significant opportunity to move towards a much more effective and optimum relationship.

The most important issue to explore is the low Multiplexity score given by CSOs, particularly compared to NGOs. Looking deeper, CSOs feels particularly that a lack of knowledge of what the other group do, how they work and the issues they face, is limiting the effectiveness of the relationship. This has particular implications given the uncertainty in the environment and understanding of the operating procedures to address issues.

CSO’s scores are considerably lower across almost all aspects, indicating a desire amongst CSO’s staff to improve the relationship and/or an expectation that the relationship could be better. The challenge will be to seek ways of improving relationships towards CSO’s expectations without moving away from the other stakeholders desired aspects of the relationship. This can often be done through mutual consent.

Table 3: Relationships between NGOs

Domains of Relationshi

Drivers NGOs

Communication Directness – Increasing presence by reducing mediation or filtering 74%

Story Continuity – Managing the gaps (in time) between interactions 71%

Knowledge Multiplexity – Improving the breadth and quality of information 67%

Power Parity – The fair use of power 73%

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Purpose Commonality – Building shared purpose 78%

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Key*

Effective ≥65%

Functional 50-64%

Deficient <50%

All Index scores fall within the boundary for an “effective” relationship. This indicates that NGOs feel that the relationship is effective in terms of the Partnership Agreement. However, the scores themselves still indicate that there is a significant opportunity to move towards a much more effective and optimum relationship.

The most important issue to explore is the low Multiplexity score indicating that there is a lack of knowledge of what the other group do, how they work and the issues they face, that is limiting the effectiveness of the relationship. Looking deeper it also appears that there is also a limited understanding of each other’s cultures that is also limiting the effectiveness of the relationship.

The scores for Parity are variable amongst the partners which indicates that all parties feel particularly strongly that the way in which power is used, benefits shared and the organisations participate in the relationship is uneven across partners and has a minor impact on the effectiveness of the relationships at the Scheme level.

It was reported, however, that the design process removed competition between NGOs. It fostered better partnerships and encouraged NGOs to work together on design processes. The Scheme architecture has also changed the way they interact during implementation, learning from each other and providing a platform to share lessons.

Despite the challenges of not having a Scheme Coordinator, learning and sharing successes and issues at the project intervention level between partners still occurred. This is in part attributed to the overarching partnership framework of the Scheme in addition to the investment and leadership by DFAT. The Annual Partnerships Workshops provided opportunities for collaboration and sharing. A small number of exposure visits were undertaken by ActionAid, Aga Khan Foundation and World Vision staff. As a direct result of this World Vision reported learning and applying lessons from these exposure visits to subsequent program activities such as establishing women’s savings groups, in the construction of storage facilities for surplus vegetables and in pistachio grafting and irrigation.

Despite positive anecdotal evidence of benefits from the Scheme approach a lack of communication and coordination was also reported as presenting significant challenges to greater learning and sharing, for example, in coordinating with other DFAT investments focusing on wheat varieties and watershed management.

The costs associated with a high level of collaboration were also not anticipated nor coordinated in all partner’s initial project level budgeting processes. A key learning from this experience will be to place a stronger emphasis on this going forward in order to enhance resources and opportunities for collaborative learning.

The appointment of the Scheme Coordinator provides an opportunity for more focused and more intensive collaboration and sharing across the Scheme over the remaining 12 months – this will also be influenced by whether a second phase proceeds – in which case future Partnership Workshops could be used to go beyond the sharing of successful models and hone in on certain technical approaches. Alternatively if the Scheme moves to close the programs – collaboration and communication can focus intensively on supporting implementing partners to execute on their exit strategies.

DFAT are building a library of experience in delivering investments through management consortia from which lessons and guidance can also be taken to enhance the effectiveness of the AACRS partnership in the remaining 12 months ie. improving the forums as a mechanism for sharing, learning and troubleshooting on technical issues; and in consideration of the design of the partnership platform

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in any potential subsequent phase ie. a platform for discussion, learning and accountability around project and

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scheme level performance. The two case studies below provide two alternative models, components of which may be considered in the design of any future phase(s).

Lessons on partnerships AAECS

The Australia Africa Community Engagement Scheme (AACES) 2011-2016 was an AUD83 million partnership program with ten Australian NGOs and their Africa-based partners. It contributes to poverty reduction in Africa through community-based programs in food security, maternal and child health, water supply and hygiene and sanitation. AACES targeted marginalised communities in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with particular attention to women, children, people with disability and people vulnerable to disaster.

As a partnership mechanism the AAECS was seen to be highly successful and the platforms for communication and engagement with the partnership very effective.

Relevant lessons for AACRS consideration:

1. AACES had a joint program design process overseen by a steering committee with NGO representatives and DFAT.

2. AACES worked within a partnership agreement which outlined the principles for engagement and how partners would behave and how the partnership would work.

3. The steering committee met every 6 months with joint Australian/African representation and local NGOs taking leadership on the program. Decision making was by consensus or through avote.

4. The steering committee invested time discussing contentious and strategic issues such as disability and women’s empowerment to inform the design and implementation. And through this mechanism were able to champion disability for instance. However, it was also recognised in the final evaluation that this level of policy influence was resource intensive.

Lessons on partnerships AMENCA

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The Australian Middle East NGO Cooperation Agreement (AMENCA) program is in its third phase and addresses the strategic targets in the Australian aid policy, regarding poverty, agriculture, empowering women and girls, effective partnerships and the private sector in the Palestinian Territories.

Relevant lessons for AACRS:

1. The AMENCA program runs on similar partnership principles as AACRS whereby consortia of Australian NGOs and local CSOs (up to four) share learning and work through formalised joint approaches at the program level.

2. Technical Working Groups (TWG) have been established and are supported by independent technical advisors on an ongoing basis to ensure adaptation and learning. Anecdotal reports indicate that whilst these TWG provide rigour and robust processes for decision making, it has added an additional layer of bureaucracy to program governance at the expense of flexibility and autonomy for NGOs and CSOs. Whilst greater technical rigour to activities and M&E would benefit the AACRS program – say through TWG – the learnings from AMENCA are important to ensure effectiveness and buy in by AACRS partners.

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The establishment of alternative M&E arrangements, will be able to assist with ensuring that the AACRS and its performance is:

independently validated against its Program Logic, Annual Implementation Plans and the wider key objectives;

able to build its library of robust evidence of impact and as a means of more effectively meeting political priorities, including the provision of well-informed advice and efficient, effective programs; and

ensure that assessments will provide the Scheme, DFAT and partners with an independent analysis and validation of their performance, and recommendations to improve future performance.

Design of a new coherent Scheme strategy and MEF will ensure that AACRS investments (current and planned) for shared objectives are coordinated under a single, overarching set of strategic objectives, underpinned by a coherent theory of how changes are expected to occur. This will be based on a thorough understanding of operational experience to date of what is, or can be, delivered by partners and/or other agencies (or government), and on how to leverage the comparative advantage of all.

With the new MEF, DFAT would have an opportunity to clearly articulate their performance management expectations with all partners and implementing agencies. It will also ensure that partners have a sound strategic framework to report outcomes against. Establishing and implementing a strategic M&E framework allows DFAT to aggregate findings from the activity level and tell a coherent story at the whole-of-scheme level, particularly at the outcome level.

Lessons learned and issues to be addressed

The individual project MTRs identified many promising approaches and methods, that have potential for scale up and replication including: 1) an integrated approach to agricultural production and marketing, cross-cutting themes and multi-sector interventions; 2) improved agricultural/irrigation techniques, such as pure seed production and solar pumps; 3) contextualisation of methodologies, promoting principles and rationales for promoting inclusive and mutual care values within families and communities; and 4) the establishment of the women’s savings groups, farmers associations – such as beekeeping associations - and a Traders Union (BNTU) that aims to support the ongoing development of market linkages and help strengthen overall private sector development in the province.

However, it is widely acknowledged the economic development in Afghanistan cannot occur without further investment into the agricultural sector. There are a number of recommendations from each of the individual project MTRs and ongoing challenges that looking ahead would need to be considered in any future design.

Key technical recommendations were:

Whilst growth in food processing is very high, the growth in is a lot slower proportional to the growth in food preservation, whilst mean income in food processing has actually declined. This suggests that market linkages to processing firms is still an area that the project needs to focus on in the remaining years.

Phased reduction in free seed distribution should take place as well as stimulating private sector development in agricultural inputs.

Techniques in water conservation management alongside the implementation of expensive water infrastructure systems should be adopted as the solution to water management in drought and flood- prone environments.

In order to improve women’s participation, projects should explore the potential for establishing female-only markets for women who are members of the female producer groups in future projects.

Projects need to recognise the trend worldwide in the gradual decline in access to government extensions services and equip farmers to enable the shift from a sole focus of farmer handouts to

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fee-based services. Pro-poor inclusive development often requires attitudinal and behaviour change so that women

can benefit equally form development outcomes. Working with community leaders, because of their

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strong influence over communities, is essential to ensure their acceptance, support and to create a critical mass to support behaviour change.

Broader cross cutting challenges involve:

environmental sustainability and climate variability eg. unproductive soil and water resource management;

child protection; and safety and risk management.

Environmental sustainability

The AACRS supports the basic pre-conditions that are needed to implement climate change adaptation measures such as: organizational development, environmental sustainability, financial stability, investment possibilities, and greater autonomy. The AACRS promotes sustainable development through best agricultural practices, which not only guide producers to adapt to climate change, but also encourage them to mitigate their impact. The environmental standards include the following practices: integrated pest management, prevention of soil erosion, improvement of soil fertility, sustainable use of water sources, sustainable waste management, and use of renewable energy.

However, the current benefits are insufficient to help all producers across the Scheme confront the effects of climate change and mainstream/integrate DRR. A climate change strategy that defines the scope, establishes AACRS priorities and provides a framework for action is required.

Scheme and project level work plans for climate change should be developed, focusing on farmer services (i.e. climate change standards), farmer support for climate change adaptation (creating partnerships for adaptation projects), and producer-driven advocacy. The overall mission is to enable vulnerable Afghan farmers to adapt to climate change and support them to mitigate the impacts, while promoting further sustainable development practices. Implementing partners could also introduce carbon reduction plans to reduce their operational impact on climate change.

Vulnerability

There has also been a notable absence of focus within the program design on the added vulnerability young girls and boys experience in a community overrun with conflict and war. These issues may have fallen outside intended activities within the Scheme, however, monitoring how they are faring would not be out of scope given the interconnectedness of the three DFAT GEDSI policy areas. Anecdotally there are ad hoc community awareness raising sessions on positive parenting, early marriage and violence against children/child protection being run in a number of projects32. There has also been anecdotal evidence through the program that there has been a reduction in child brides due to higher household incomes creating greater financial resilience and decreasing the need to sell young girls to provide income. The issues of child protection warrant further consideration and inclusion in Scheme and project level M&E frameworks.

Safety and risk management

The threat environment in Afghanistan remains severe as a result of growing levels of militancy, the weakness of state institutions, and political instability. Militant groups currently operating in the country include the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaida. Such groups stage attacks throughout the country and control territory in eastern and southern provinces.

32 Trainings on Child Protection, Gender Awareness and Conflict Resolution were provided to 148 office bearers as part of CARE’s solidarity group formation. (CARE AACRS MTR Report 2016)

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The Taliban poses the most significant threat, as it currently controls the largest amount of territory and possesses the greatest capabilities. It has declared its intent to target Afghan state and foreign assets and personnel, and to seize territory in western, southern and northern provinces.

Within this context, personnel safety is one of the most significant ongoing critical issues impacting program delivery. Over the life of the investment there has been a number of security incidences involving staff working in part on AACRS. For example, in Balkh province, financial literacy training was initially provided in the community for women, however, activities were suspended after one month following threats from the Taliban and community elders. Ongoing stringent application of a security and risk management framework should continue over the remaining months of implementation and this lens applied in any subsequent phase to ongoing selection of communities within which AACRS operates. The analysis of the security trajectory in Annex B and the heat mapping of security incidences in Figure 4 in each of the AACRS provinces provides some information to support discussions on geographic locations of activity and the ability to operate in the environment and the associated levels of risk.

Program outcomes and levels of insurgency

The MTR conducted by World Vision points to a link between positive program outcomes and lower levels of insurgency. The heat mapping of incidences of insurgency in Figure 4 shows a volatile trend with fewer instances of insurgency in 2017 than 2012 across the 12 program provinces33. Without further research and analysis, it is not possible to assess how or to what extent program activity has influenced levels of insurgency or to control for the effect of political changes, military activity or other development programs.

There are several options for further research that could be undertaken to substantiate the causal link between the program activity and levels of violence:

Literature review: There has been substantial research conducted in Afghanistan to test the relationships between development programs and regional stability – including in the provinces where AACRS operates. For example, between 2012 and 2014, Coffey conducted a rigorous evaluation of USAID stability and resilience building programs. The research mapped perception indicators from interviews of 190,264 people conducted in 5,093 villages across 130 districts and 23 provinces in Afghanistan against multiple other data sources to assess the impact ofthe programs. These studies provide evidence of linkages between factors including income levels and community cohesion and violence and instability. Where relevant, findings from these studies could be used to infer connections between some AACRS program outcomes and levels of insurgency, however this evidence would be relatively weak.

33 Note that the heat mapping for 2017 only represents 6 months of data

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Contribution analysis: Contribution analysis is a theory-based method for assessing the contribution a program makes to observed results. It involves: defining an ‘attribution problem’ (in this case the link between program outcomes and levels of insurgency); developing a theory of change which explicitly addresses the influence of external factors and alternate theories; testing the theory with quantitative and qualitative data and then iteratively assembling and refining the contribution story which establishes a causal link between activities and results. It may be feasible to retrospectively apply contribution analysis to better understand the impact of AACRS program on levels of insurgency, however there would be resource implications associated with this.

It would be possible to design a research methodology to scientifically test the hypothesis that improved resilience and livelihoods contribute to preventing insurgent activity. Coffey has led experimental research projects for DFID and DFAT in Helmand and Uruzgan Provinces which proved that positive perceptions of government service delivery and effectiveness improved views of government legitimacy. This research took into account military activity and incidences of violence and was used to help shape program design and delivery in the region. However, this research is extremely resource intensive and needs to be designed and implemented at program inception.

Given the insecurity, a key focus in the remaining 12 months will be to enhance the effectiveness of outstanding activities and to provide certainty about the future and a way forward for the investment – whether that is closure or re-investment.

Figure 4: Incidences of insurgency 2012-2017*

*Note that reported incidences for 2017 is incomplete and only represent data from January to May 2017 and not a full year.

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Key Findings and Recommendations:

Learning, sharing and collaboration still occurred at the Scheme level in the absence of a Scheme Coordinator, however, this was suboptimal

A limited number of exposure visits has resulted in cross program adoption of a small number of successful activities

The appointment of the Scheme Coordinator provides an opportunity for more focused and more intensive collaboration and sharing across the Scheme over the remaining 12 months

The AACRS supports the basic pre-conditions that are needed to implement climate change adaptation measures

There was a notable absence of a focus in the program design on the added vulnerability of boys and girls in conflict zones

Personnel safety is the single largest ongoing critical issue impacting program delivery

The analysis indicates that there is a significant opportunity to move towards a much more effective and optimum relationship between CSOs and NGOs

Managing key risks around sustainability and performance are critical to building and enhancing AACRS’ reputation with stakeholders and ultimately Australia’s interests in Afghanistan

Future partnership workshops could be used to go beyond successful models and hone in on certain technical approaches

DFAT has experience and learnings from other partnership models that can be further explored to shape AACRS such as AACES, AMENCA and Aus4Equality

Review and reinforcement of the M&E arrangements at the Scheme level will support independent validation of performance and is the basis for DFAT to report credibly

A climate change strategy that defines the scope, establishes AACRS priorities and provides a framework for action is required

The issue of child protection warrants further consideration and inclusion in Scheme and project level MEFs

A key focus in the remaining 12 months will be to enhance the effectiveness of outstanding activities and to provide certainty about the future of the investment

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6.3. EfficiencyKey Evaluation Question:Has the scheme demonstrated an efficient use of resources in delivering quality products and services?

The AACRS model was intended to complement DFAT’s on-budget support through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), contributions. AACRS activities were expected to be small scale, flexible, focused on specific needs and community based. Thus, DFAT saw great value in increasing the early interface with beneficiaries of the services in order to strengthen relationships and drive stronger skills transfer in support of strengthening rural livelihoods and community resilience.

The model recognises that in rural environments, the community is the place where producers plant, harvest and sell. The community is therefore the focus for people’s lives and is the natural starting point if no one is to be left out. People in the community share many of the same challenges and opportunities because they share the same soil, rainfall, road and pests, and usually the same buyer, supplier, lender and government extension officer. People in the community all have dreams and hopes for their family and a positive future, yet have different skills, capacities, land size and volumes of production.

By working through the community market system, the AACRS model addresses market barriers that leverages the collective efforts of all producers in the community in a way which fits each producer’s capacity and risk appetite. By bringing together all producers in a way which includes people with larger farms, government, community leaders, subsistence farmers and people who are usually left out, the different skills and capacities work in synergy to help break down and address the barriers.

Within this ecosystem local NGOs have had a significant role to play in creating and influencing inclusive markets through leveraging their relative strengths in building deeper and longer term relationships with both communities and governments. This comparative advantage enables strong customisation of VCD approaches through grounding of models where there are trusted local relationships, long term commitment and knowledge of how to mobilise men and women to help business graduation and the transition from aid to recovery to reconstruction.

Whilst there have been many successful initiatives conducted under the Scheme, there has also been some challenges which resulted in significant losses. Notably the delays in transporting goats from Pakistan for livestock distribution led to the goats arriving in the deep winter rendering them susceptible to disease which ultimately resulted in a high mortality rate and dissension in the community.

A number of the implementing partners experienced multiple disruptions and delays causing lag time in project implementation. This was further confounded by high staff turnover in a number of organisations. These delays and staff turnover have resulted in insufficiently successful results as some activities have not been implemented as intended or at all. A number of the NGOs have received approval for no cost extensions, meaning activities will be implemented beyond their anticipated finish date and into 2018.

As previously noted the absence of a Scheme Coordinator had significant implications on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Scheme and ultimately transferred the administrative burden to DFAT. This was made additionally complex through the reduced staffing arrangements at the Australian Embassy in Kabul and in Canberra.

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Key Findings and Recommendations:

AACRS activities were expected to be small scale, flexible, focused on specific needs and community based

By working through the community market system, the AACRS model addresses market barriers that leverages the collective efforts of all producers in the community

Local NGOs have had a significant role in creating and influencing inclusive markets through relationships with both communities and governments

Despite successes, there are many challenges in the environment which have delayed implementation

The absence of the Scheme Coordinator created a significant administrative burden for DFAT

Appointment of the Scheme Coordinator will enable greater oversight, monitoring, coordination and support for implementation to ensure value for money

6.4. ImpactKey Evaluation Question:Are the current NGO projects on track to achieve the intermediate and long term outcomes of the AACRS?

AACRS is pursuing an ambitious, multi-component program in an unstable, uncertain environment that has affected implementation. The complexity of the program and instability of the implementing environment reduce the plausibility of observing significant changes in a few years, particularly related to inclusive decision-making and institutional responsiveness. However, staff believe it is plausible to see some change at the local level and assert the importance of assessing changes in decision-making processes which reflects the way in which AACRS activities can be sustained after the end of the program period.

Indications are that the Scheme has been positive at the community level and that there are areas where the Scheme is intervening where vulnerable populations are doing better in terms of improved economic opportunities than comparator regions. There is less evidence to suggest that on the government institutional strengthening side there have been positive indications of progress. Table 4 belowoutlines the number of beneficiaries that the program has been reaching.

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Table 4: Scheme level reach34

NGO No.Provinces

No.Communities

Beneficiaries BeneficiariesDirect Indirect Female Male

ActionAid 5 97 5,499 121,525 2,371 3,078

Aga Khan Foundation 5 No data available in this format

45,937 452,599 29,737 16,200

CARE 1 No data available in this format

No data available in this format

No data available in this format

OXFAM 1 20 9,906 46,750 3,508 6,398

World Vision 1 104 2,600 9,950 No data available in this format

TOTAL 13 221* 82,662* 630,824* 5,879* 9,476*

*Incomplete data – data not available in a consistent format from all partners

At the community level, interventions targeting food security (improved water infrastructure, improved productivity, knowledge, skills and access to new technologies, including preservation and processing techniques) have been deemed as highly relevant by community level beneficiaries and water management groups (WMGs), for example35. The improvement upon baseline values for intermediate and immediate outcomes – where cumulative, credible and consistent data is available - suggest that tangible progress within target communities is being made at the individual project level.

The Scheme and each individual project has intentionally sought to build household and community resilience to economic shocks, financial viability, reduced household vulnerability and increased capacity to cope with risk/shocks, such as floods and drought and market volatility. Improved agricultural and irrigation practices and flood protection walls have helped build protection to floods and drought.

The projects are beginning to address structural change and the key dimensions of poverty in the provinces by empowering vulnerable and marginalised rural households to overcome poverty. With encouraging results in terms of vulnerable groups beginning to equally benefit from project interventions, the projects are building a sustainable, pro-poor, market-driven agricultural foundation – from which the vulnerable can respond to profitable business opportunities. Progress is being made towards improving attitudes towards women and making processes more inclusive and participatory. Due to their strong influence in the community, Shuras, CDCs and local religious leaders are playing a critical role in the selection of beneficiaries and changing community attitudes towards inclusion.

Farmers reported to CSO/NGOs positive average net household income effects from higher yields, and savings from fertiliser use have enabled them to devote relatively more of their expenditure on long term investments in improved food security, household durables, and particularly education for their children. Income in targeted agricultural products for non-vulnerable households has increased, of concern, however is that some vulnerable groups are still falling behind with respect to income levels. All vulnerable groups were found to employ processing and preservation technologies at similar rates to non-vulnerable groups, adopted improved agricultural and water conserving irrigation practices at similar levels, as well as being equal recipients of agricultural inputs. Similarly, they also were equally involved in producer groups, had similar understanding on how to market their produce and their degree of market connections. Landless families are now reportedly benefiting from crop sharing practices between the land owner and the landless. It was noted that before AACRS, the involvement of landless in crop sharing was not as common as it is today36.

34 Data sourced from NGOs design documents, 6 month and annual reports and the MTR reports35 World Vision AACRS Mid Term Report 2016

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36 World Vision MTR Report 2016

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Key positive social, economic and environmental benefits reported by CSOs/NGOs involve:

Training and coaching in sustainable environmental practices has improved the quality and volume of production and will provide a good foundation for further work in adaptation to changing climatic conditions.

Seed distribution and replanting programs have improved crop husbandry practices and revitalised crops improving the quality of produce.

Animal farming practices improved through training on animal husbandry and technical advice on veterinary related topics including significant improvements in vaccination practices of livestock.

The number of participant households using at least one improved agricultural practice has increased (planting in lines, weeding, pest and disease management, pesticides, fertilisers, cleaning and sorting seeds, bagging seeds, storing seeds in special containers).

Households that participated in the projects are significantly less food insecure than they were at the start of the projects through establishment of kitchen gardens and higher crop yields resulting in more food for consumption, higher household incomes and access to loans.

Income diversification projects have encouraged and created the potential for greater income and localised economic benefits for farmers, for example, through establishment of bakeries and small shops run by women.

Increased access to new markets, as in the case of value chains in bee keeping/honey and businesses such as bakeries and confectionary shops.

Improved economic stability through consistent sales via establishment of market linkages.

Improved access to credit (loans) through women’s savings groups, with project participants able to purchase calf, sheep or chickens, open small businesses, and start handicraft businesses as a result of taking loans.

Strengthening solidarity, financial literacy and building women’s skills, confidence and capacity by working with other women through the women’s savings groups, which ultimately contributes to building agency and leadership of women.

The financial contribution of women to households has resulted in greater support from husbands and families for women’s further participation in project level activities. Acceptance (within defined limits and controls) of this new role for women is nascent and being used carefully as an entry point for conversation on gender relations and gender norms.

Diversification of income sources, improvement in food security and vulnerability reduction through intercropping and small stock animal production.

Rehabilitation of ancient aquaducts and irrigation systems has contributed to greater self- sustaining water security in previously rain fed areas.

There continue to be real challenges faced in expanding the scope and scale of market opportunities for farmers. The formation and support provided to producer groups has helped create opportunities for larger scale markets, which has been supported by market facilitators, business training and the formation of savings and credit groups, and access to loan facilities. It remains particularly difficult for female farmers to expand their access to new markets due to constraints in traveling outside their communities to register their business associations and to seek new markets. More work is needed in exploring the demand side for certain products and in developing added value to the market chain to improve the rate of return for farmers37.

Data from each of the individual NGO projects has been challenging to aggregate at the Scheme level. Annex H provides an overview by NGO of key achievements against both Scheme and project level indicators. At a strategic level this is due to the lack of consistent alignment and structured reporting of

37 AACRS Outcomes Report – Workshop 8-9 March 2017

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Changes in structural barriers for women38

Scheme level indicators in each of the NGO’s 6 month, annual reports and MTRs. Whilst consultation was undertaken to align the project level MEFs with the Scheme level indicators at the outset, the deconstruction of end of program level outcomes to proxy indicators at the program level has not facilitated ease of reporting. Going forward this could be streamlined and templates for reporting provided such that indicators are reported using common definitions, common measures (ie. percentage increase or kilograms etc) and so that performance expectations are clear.

The focus on the design of the M&E system at the outset has been an important starting point. However, it is now evident that more work needs to be done to have confidence that performance assessment frameworks and exploratory evaluations will actually generate credible information as expected. Issues around the extent to which indicators and evaluations have been fully operationalised (all methods for data collection and analysis defined), and the quality of data expected from other sources. This requires a high level of expertise and is the foundation of DFATs ability to report confidently.

There is also a need to ensure there is a reasonable strategic M&E framework for them to report outcomes against. The latter allows you to aggregate findings from the activity level and tell a coherent story at the whole-of-Scheme level, particularly at the outcome level. This is challenging in a scheme, but DFAT has experience in dealing with issues relating to the design and M&E of schemes, programs and facilities which could inform performance management of AACRS.

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38 World Vision AACRS MTR Report 2016

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Key Findings and Recommendations:

Indications are that the Scheme has been positive at the community level and that vulnerable populations are doing better in terms of improved economic opportunities (positive average net household income effects from higher yields)

There is less evidence to suggest that on the government institutional strengthening side there have been positive indications of progress

It is unlikely that governmental departments, such as DAIL and DRRD, will be able to maintain project benefits due to capacity constraints

Income in targeted agricultural products for non-vulnerable households has increased, however it is concerning that some vulnerable groups are still falling behind with respect to income levels

Landless families are benefiting from crop sharing practices between the land owner and the landless

The projects are beginning to address structural change and the key dimensions of poverty

Progress is being made towards improving attitudes towards women and making processes more inclusive and participatory

There continues to be real challenges faced in expanding the scope and scale of market opportunities for farmers

The individual project MTRs identified many promising approaches and methods, that have potential for scale up and replication

There is a lack of consistent alignment and structured reporting of Scheme level indicators in each of the NGO’s M&E products that makes Scheme level reporting challenging

Individual project level MTRs outlined a number of specific technical recommendations that warrant consideration in the final months of implementation, together with the potential design of a subsequent phase

There is a need to ensure there is a reasonable strategic M&E framework for Scheme partners to report outcomes against

MEFs could be streamlined and templates for reporting provided such that indicators are reported using common definitions and so that performance expectations are clear

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6.5 SustainabilityKey Evaluation Question:What is the level of sustainability in the current NGO projects; how can the AACRS strengthen the sustainability of the outcomes by the end of the NGO projects?

Australia has reported39 that it has realistic expectations for development sustainability in the fragile Afghan context and this will continue to shift as the political and security context evolves. Donors expect that the Afghan Government will continue to be dependent on international support which currently totals around two-thirds of the Afghan national budget. The drawdown of international security forces and continuing political uncertainties has resulted in a significant deceleration to economic growth over the same time horizon during which the AACRS is/has been implemented. This context and environment has direct implications for the expectations on the sustainability of benefits derived from AACRS activities.

In order to promote sustainability in a market-led or value-chain approach to agricultural development, market infrastructure ideally should be developed in the same location in which improved varieties will be grown and sold to participants. All implementing partners reported a strong focus on working closely with local government structures and village based decision makers such as Shuras, CDCs and district and provincial departments such as DAIL, PAIL, DRRD, and PRRD. In all projects staff from DAIL are included in the training provided and efforts are made to work cooperatively with government and facilitate and support links between community groups. These concerted efforts at working with CDCs, Village Shuras and Religious Leaders in developing skills, have enabled vulnerable groups to actively and meaningfully participate in producer groups, WMGs and CDCs.

In terms of institutional sustainability, the projects have successfully established and built the capacity of community-based institutions, including water management associations (WMAs), WMGs and producer groups, women’s savings and loans groups. CDCs and Shuras have being trained in governance practices, and by engaging relevant government departments and ensuring their monitoring, supervisory and coordinating role, government commitment and ownership has been promoted. However, it is unlikely that governmental departments, such as DAIL and DRRD, will be able to maintain project benefits by serving as technical and financial resources to community groups, due to capacity constraints40.

Pro-poor inclusive development often requires attitudinal and behaviour change so that women can benefit equally from development outcomes. Working with community leaders, because of their strong influence over communities, is essential to ensure their acceptance, support and to create a critical mass to support behaviour change41. The extent to which this is happening successfully and effectively varies and is dependent on capacity and commitment of DAIL staff, which overall remains quite low, and is further constrained by high turnover of staff. Key elements of a sustainability strategy should be introduced early in the project design phase. These include, but are not limited to: a thorough analysis of both governmental and non-governmental institutions involved in project implementation, appropriate risk analysis, and formulation of exit strategies.

39 DFAT. “Aid Program Performance report 2015-16. Afghanistan.” Accessed online 12 May 2017 at http://dfat.gov.au/about- us/publications/Documents/afghanistan-appr-2015-16.pdf40 ibid41 World Vision ACRS MTR Report 2016

Water Management Groups44

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Government stakeholders have reinforced the importance of alignment and coordination with government at all levels to ensure consistency in approach with government policies, particularly in relation to: the new Citizens Charter42; the coordination of CDCs at district level (cluster groups) for infrastructure management; priorities and strategies in markets and value chains. The Afghan government has also stressed the importance of engaging with other ministries and departments such as: the Departments of Women’s Affairs, Education, Home Affairs and Labour and Social Affairs. This is especially relevant when coordinating activities on vocational training, gender and disability. Identification of government resources and capacity was emphasised with a view that stronger links with government would support ownership and sustainability of interventions. Consistent engagement and coordination with government is critical to support projects current implementation and future sustainability of activities and outcomes43. GIRoA have reported that MAIL would be able to adopt some program components if the AACRS were to conclude in 2018, however, taking over the whole program would likely prove difficult.

If it is decided that the Scheme will conclude in 12 months, support will be required for the implementing partners to enact their exit strategies. This will involve two main activities: provision of short term security measures; and support to help NGOs and local delivery partners to secure funding from other sources and help them to ensure where they have to pull out partially or fully that the behavioural and institutional change and technical changes last beyond their presence. This will involve building awareness within the government system of what the AACRS has been trying to do and assisting government to consider their own constraints in continuing to support communities that are in their control, for example, activities linked to the national seed market.

42 The objective of the Citizens’ Charter is to improve the delivery of core infrastructure and social services to participating communities through CDCs, with MRRD, MoE, MoPH and MAIL all collaborating on implementation. A number of the AACRS partners are also partners to the Citizens’ Charter (AKF, Oxfam, CARE).43 AACRS Outcomes Report – Workshop 8-9 March 201744 CARE AACRS MTR Report 2016

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Integrated Community Development and Disaster Risk Reduction

Through community centric approaches, AACRS partners are working directly with CDCs and Village Elders to discuss, plan and build capacity in disaster risk reduction (DRR). Through the use of the participatory appraisal method and household surveys, community awareness has been built together with a comprehensive risk profile for communities.

FOCUS have gone on to engage individuals from CDCs in specific training on disaster management, risk reduction and skills in search and rescue. To date they have reportedly developed more than 500 community response teams – a number of which have been formed under the auspices of the AACRS. On average 25 community members – both men and women - are selected together with the CDCs to become the village emergency first responders. As part of the Community Development Plans (CMP), the Disaster Management Plan (DMP) is being included together with a register of the community members trained and identified as first responders. Some communities have not been willing to put the names of certified ladies in the register of members. As a result a number of different suggestions have been implemented – for example registering certified males and females as a family unit under the family name - to so that people reading the DMP can understand who in the community has capacity to assist in a disaster.

Furthermore, among specific DRR activities, terracing and trenching activity is expected to contribute to reducing negative effects of natural disasters in target communities, via a reduction in the flow of water and snow. As such the occurrence and impacts of floods and avalanches is expected to reduce. Similarly, construction of a number of irrigation projects will improve the water flow to agricultural lands, reducing impact of prevailing drought in the province45.

Key Findings and Recommendations:

Implementing partners reported a strong focus on working closely with local government structures and village based decision makers

The extent to which working with community leaders is happening successfully and effectively varies and is dependent on capacity and commitment of DAIL staff, which overall remains quite low, and is further constrained by high turnover of staff

MAIL would be able to adopt some program components if the AACRS were to conclude in 2018. Taking over the whole program would likely prove difficult

Key elements of a sustainability strategy should be introduced early in the project design phase

Consistent engagement and coordination with government is critical to support projects current implementation and future sustainability of activities and outcomes

To enhance the sustainability of efforts in the remaining months, greater involvement of Afghan government extension workers and linkages with other donor funded programs working in adjacent areas will be key

45 OXFAM AACRS MTR Report 2016

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If the Scheme concludes in 2018 support will be required for the implementing partners to enact their exit strategies

6.6 GenderKey Evaluation Question:How effective are the NGO projects in improving the economic and social position of women? What are the factors that contribute and / or hinder successful approaches?

One of the key components of the AACRS model is its ability to empower people, especially farmers and rural communities and to foster sustainable livelihoods for men and women. Within this concept lies the potential for a strong commitment to gender equality and women’s empowerment and an opportunity to alleviate poverty for women who are at a disadvantage in the Afghan trade market due to attitudinal and structural barriers that impact on their ability to participate and benefit from income generating activities. The potential of the AACRS to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment in rural communities is highly relevant to DFAT and stakeholders and is well aligned to DFAT’s Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Strategy47.

Empowerment is therefore defined as the processes of change through which women gain the capacity for strategic forms of agency in the different spheres of their lives. Since such changes relate to the intersecting constraints which have disempowered women in a particular context, empowerment too is likely to encompass cognitive, social and material changes. These include women’s sense of identity and self-worth; their willingness and ability to question their subordinate status; their ability to make strategic life choices, including the renegotiation or rejection of inequality in their personal relationships and finally, their ability to participate on equal terms with men in reshaping the society in which they live48.

It is well documented that violence against women undermines a community’s social fabric and prevents women from achieving social and economic equality. Given the AACRS aims to build community resilience, it has the potential to address the DFAT’s policy priorities through a more explicit focus in its design on activities targeting ending violence against women and measuring any unintended impacts of participation in project activities related to violence against women.

To date, evidence of outcomes is very localised and based on low profile engagement with communities– working with men and boys and women and girls. Given the exceptionally difficult context, some individual partners are generating meaningful results, however, the Scheme needs to be pragmatic about what can be achieved. Acceptance and allowing women to leave their houses and work is a considerable achievement in the context.

Gender mainstreaming has presented a formidable challenge to policy makers and development practitioners since the Beijing Platform for Action was established. The AACRS is an approach that is both ambitious and pragmatic, recognizing that what the Scheme seeks to achieve is the greatest possible change, without pushing so hard that we create resistance. The projects have some way to go in breaking down barriers for women to directly access markets, but nevertheless projects should be credited with progress made to date. Current quantitative findings with respect to market access and

47 DFAT. February 2016. “Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Strategy” accessed online 7 July 2017 at http://df at.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment-strategy.pdf 48 Kabeer, N, A Khan and N, Adlparvar. 2011. “Afghan Values or Women’s Rights? Gendered Narratives about Continuity and Change in Urban Afghanistan.” IDS Working Paper. vol 2011. no. 387. Accessed online 31 May 2017 at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2040-0209.2011.00387_2.x/pdf

The Hazara Women of Daykundi

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market connections suggest that women have an available market for their product with a male relative selling on their behalf, even if the majority of women do not access the market directly.

Partners report that women have participated in Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and adopted new technology that has helped them to increase and diversify their production. Specific activities targeting women have involved: groups for livelihood development, market access, and savings groups. These activities have reportedly assisted women economically, which in turn has had wider benefits in strengthening women’s self-confidence. Holding discussions on gender with men in the community - particularly community and religious leaders - has assisted women to be more visible and active in the community and to take part in household decision-making.

In line with DFAT’s Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) program there is anecdotal evidence of a reduction in gender based domestic violence. There are communities where less progress on gender equality has been achieved, particularly more religiously conservative communities. Due to prevailing family and community attitudes, mobility for women is limited making it difficult for them to reach markets outside their own communities and to be part of advocacy efforts targeting government over access to services, infrastructure and assets.

Feelings of well-being and safety relating to gender based violence (GBV) have an effect on women’s participation in work and ability to participate in work and economic empowerment activities. One of the first things to be considered in increasing women’s leadership, decision making or participation is the safety of their environment. There is a large body of evidence that situates women being at higher risk of GBV in war zones. And whilst understanding that we ask these questions in a war zone, we also acknowledge that women are at increased risk of violence including sexual violence from men in times of war. There is an absence of monitoring and/or evaluation of violence, including gender based violence both within implementation and as articulated in the AACRS design document that warrants attention given the ‘do no harm’ principles underpinning the Scheme.

Greater attention at the Scheme level to M&E is particularly important for gender. If there is no sustained attention at the program level or if it is not properly resourced, there will be an ongoing inability to report confidently on gains made, and to capture unintended consequences so that stakeholders are aware if the work being done is not creating harm. Leveraging the Annual Partnership Workshops to stimulate thinking on what is practical in the context on improving gender responsiveness to agree and inform realistic programming moving forward may be beneficial.

Moving into the final 12 months of implementation it will be important that AACRS continues its focus on gender equality and women’s economic empowerment investments in line with government aid policy, it is important that policy makers, gender advisors and aid program managers have clear and accessible evidence of the effectiveness of existing programs and how investments can be best targeted in line with ‘what works’ and international good practice.

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Key Findings and Recommendations:

The potential of the AACRS to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment in rural communities is high

Evidence of outcomes is very localised and based on low profile engagement with communities

Projects have some way to go in breaking down barriers for women to directly access markets

Given the exceptionally difficult context, some individual partners are generating meaningful results - the Scheme needs to be pragmatic about what can be achieved

There is an absence of M&E of violence, including gender based violence both within implementation and as articulated in the AACRS design document that warrants attention given the ‘do no harm’ principles underpinning the Scheme

Greater attention at the Scheme level to M&E is particularly important for gender

Leveraging the Annual Partnership Workshops to stimulate thinking on what is practical in the context on improving gender responsiveness to agree and inform realistic programming moving forward may be beneficial

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6.7 Disability InclusionKey Evaluation Question:How effective are the NGO projects in improving the economic and social position of people living with a disability? What are the factors that contribute and / or hinder successful approaches?

Despite a clear disability lens to the AACRS design together with a specific target setting for participation of PWD, the level of understanding of disability and the implications on allocation of resources and programming was variable amongst implementing partners. This resulted in insufficiently successful achievements in engaging with PWD and a strong focus on people living with a physical disability/ties.

There is scope to pay more attention at the Scheme level on a comprehensive disability inclusion strategy. Given the specific context in Afghanistan of protracted war, there is an over representation of people living with disabilities and particularly in the poorest and most marginalised of community. To deliver on the AACRS objectives to target the most vulnerable, strategic and targeted efforts to engage this group – and not simply their family members is required. Experience has demonstrated that when only the family is engaged, (usually) female care givers are burdened with additional activities. Working directly with Disabled People’s Organisations (DPOs) and adults (and children) with disabilities to improve their functional autonomy enables their participation and engagement in some project activities, for example, participating or leading activities to improve their own livelihoods at the household level. If there is no improvement at the level of the individual they will still struggle despite efforts at the household level.

In identifying an appropriate package of support to partners to improve their knowledge, understanding and available resources to strengthen inclusion in this area there were challenges in: (1) adequately identifying the extent to which PWD have been able to be supported; (2) to what level individual PWD were being engaged versus family members at the household level; (3) the broader landscape of support and referral pathways in order to better customise supports and program adaptation; and (4) the time and budget remaining to meaningfully engage PWD in program activities in the next 12 months.

Despite delays in securing funding for technical inputs from Handicap International, strong and sustained donor support has seen meaningful engagement and delivery at the field level. There is also reportedly clear value recognised to the approach by all implementing partners and by extension a strong level of commitment and momentum amongst partners to take positive action. This is a clear demonstration of the effectiveness of the Scheme platform to share technical insights, lessons learned and provide surge support in technical areas for application in project delivery by implementing partners. This initiative is also an example of where the Innovation Fund could have potentially been used to support innovation in disability mainstreaming. It is an area for further exploration, for example, if particular technical expertise is identified to support adaptation/engineering for improved accessibility for PWD.

Following a number of months of focused awareness and knowledge raising amongst implementing partners by Handicap International, the partners and Scheme are both in a stronger position toachieve a higher level of disability mainstreaming going forward. With the remaining time and budget partners are in a position to operationalise these foundational gains.

At this late stage in the project cycle it is not expected that this level of investment will significantly alter the participation or outcomes for PWD, however, it has laid the foundational capacity and experience of field staff to meaningfully operationalise disability strategies in a subsequent phase. Where this current phase could be seen as a preparatory phase in building the knowledge and attitudes of implementing partners in disability mainstreaming. A phase two could be more ambitious in terms of

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the change and impact sought at the level of PWD and at the service level.

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To move forward into a subsequent phase will require a review of the disability strategy for the Scheme and at the time of Scheme and project design, targeted technical design support and guidance would be required to ensure that implementing partners have the capacity – both allocated resources and budget – to implement the strategy.

Frontloaded technical support in the design period of a potential second phase would reap: (1) achievable targets for participation by PWD; (2) a focussed assessment on disability in the operating context to inform potential adaptations to existing value chain analysis and programmed activities; (3) definition of realistic staff, resources and supports required for project delivery; and (4) an estimationof any ongoing sustained, technical, support requirements throughout the duration of implementation for partners.

Ongoing technical support to increase the in house expertise of implementing partners could potentially be provide via remote mentoring and “hotline” support or through increasingly intensive coaching and training on the job. Success with this focus demands a grounded approach to capacity building that appreciates the technical, conceptual and practical challenges faced by partners in attempting to mainstream disability in the field. Staff capacity development should focus on integrated activities and support at the central level whereby representatives from all major stakeholders are involved with the process. However, the primary focus of staff capacity development will remain the development of increased skills at the primary or service delivery point level, as these staff are considered to present the greatest opportunities for significant gains in capacity.

Key Findings and Recommendations:

Clear disability strategy underpinned the original design

The AACRS Program Logic provided insufficient detail on the theory of action to enable partners to use it to guide implementation in engaging PWD

There is variable knowledge and understanding of disability mainstreaming of implementing partners

There has been strong and sustained donor support to strengthen capacity of implementing partners in disability inclusion

The current level of investment will not significantly alter the participation or outcomes for PWD - it has laid the foundational capacity and experience of field staff to meaningfully operationalise disability strategies in a subsequent phase

A subsequent phase could be more ambitious in terms of the change and impact sought at the level of PWD and at the service level

Frontloaded technical support in the design period of a potential second phase would build on success to date and set the framework for greater disability inclusion

A mechanism for ongoing technical support to increase in house capacity of implementing partners needs careful consideration within a defined minimum budget envelope, for example, through a grant or drawing on an innovation fund mechanism

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7. Recommendations7.1 The immediate 12 monthsIn line with current activities, an ongoing focus on solutions to problems of: (1) access to assets and productive resources, markets, training and formal employment by women; (2) strengthening networks within the wider labour market; and (3) improving inclusive performance of programmed activities will be important. Simultaneously, but more slowly, addressing the institutional implications of immediate success by looking at potential for stronger engagement with and reforms in governance, policy, planning and decision making in the longer term/subsequent phase. This approach means simultaneously building the capacity of businesses, provincial governments and their communities to demand, appraise and contribute to the improved business enabling environment and gender transformative solutions to empowering women and maximising communities’ resilience and potential livelihood outcomes.

An ongoing approach to maximising the probability of successful livelihood and resilience outcomesfor vulnerable communities should underpin the broader enabling approach to AACRS’ focus on systems change, collaboration, innovation and iterative learning in the remaining 12 months of program activity. With the Scheme Coordinator now in place, the communications and engagement management approach will need to consolidate and continue to foster effective partnerships in the target provinces, private sector and governance eco-systems that can contribute to community resilience and participation in income generating activities through their capacity to effectively plan, design, implement, monitor and govern in pursuit of the AACRS objectives.

In the time remaining a key focus for partners will be on consolidating existing achievements and completing implementation of any delayed or yet to be commenced activities in order to maximise benefits. A key variable on where efforts should be focused in the remaining time will also depend ultimately on the decision to proceed with a second phase or close out. The two disparate courses of action will require different activities and support.

The existing demand-driven approach to working with communities and grassroots agencies will need to continue to leverage collaborative partnerships to strengthen systems to improve economic growth and outcomes for beneficiaries. This is consistent with the design’s whole-of-system approach and inclusion principles. This will bring as many contributions as possible into solutions to drive results and sustainability in the final months.

DFAT and the AACRS implementing partners have a significant opportunity to leverage the AACRS’s strong national and local reputation and tackle a new phase of initiatives in an open and transparent manner, through consideration of the following elements:

• Conduct itself with renewed rigour and self-awareness. A commitment to robust relationships, transparency and consistency in consultation, active listening to stakeholder’s concerns and a willingness to modify products and services as required. Ultimately this is an action of leadership, culture and conduct.

• Continue to apply unparalleled perspective and skill to and for Afghanistan’s social, economic and environmental issues and benefit, by bringing ideas and products to rural communities and to the market that yield benefit, while ensuring the government and public sees the connection between new developments and societal benefit.

• Adopting a new Scheme framework rooted in facilitating dialogue, sharing, information and fostering collaboration. Realising that successes do not speak for themselves, active coordination and engagement of a broad range of stakeholders may facilitate greater understanding through stories that reach and touch audiences.

Simply put, in order for AACRS to advance key initiatives it must consider this ecosystem of trust and adapt its engagement styles and keep moving forward.

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7.2 A potential next phaseBased on the success and challenges of this first phase of AACRS a potential second phase would need to consider the following key components to leverage the lessons and foundations built:

1. Consolidate and/or establish strong and trusted relationships with DFAT, the GIRoA– including Central and Provincial Governments, the private sector and service delivery partners to anticipate needs, determine emerging priorities and tailor responses to stakeholder requirements;

2. Establish robust monitoring, evaluation, research and learning systems to inform decision making in a complex and dynamic environment;

3. Continue to leverage local partners’ extensive local supplier and stakeholder networks at the community, district, provincial and national level to partner with other service providers;

4. Access and use technology, for example, mobile applications to support data collection so that information on activities can be rapidly fed back and connected to the Scheme’s M&E systems; and

5. Access to an Innovation Fund to allow for rapid deployment of specific technical expertise or support for prototyping and piloting interventions.

Strengthening the Afghan Government and provincial government systems is critical to sustainability and success of the AACRS and requires the development of a strategic, responsive and sustainable system of engagement at central and provincial levels to support government to government dialogue. By strengthening the Afghan Government and provincial governments’ systems the AACRS can support private sector contributions to employment and development by catalysing their engagement and competitive difference within a better enabled business environment.

In order to achieve the ambitious and transformative objectives. The design of the next phase would need to recognise the importance of not duplicating efforts and utilising current operations within the broader community to achieve long term sustainable ownership and results. Key individuals within local Afghan organisations, passionate about promoting women’s economic empowerment within business and bringing it to the attention of the broader business community and government, will be the ultimate drivers of change. Success is also predicated on strong Afghan Government involvement and ownership (as described above).

Due to the operational presence and combined team experience of existing partners, they are in a position to immediately build on their strong and expansive existing networks in Afghanistan. The approach in a second phase will need to cement authentic and trusted relationships with the DFAT, Government of Afghanistan and other partners to anticipate needs, determine emerging priorities and tailor responses to different stakeholder requirements. A nuanced approach in each province/district to reflect local context, conditions and priorities will be fundamental to achieving this.

The Scheme needs to consider how it will manage 3 levels of partnerships: local, provincial and central Government; local civil society and NGOs; and the Private sector. Each of these partners require a different approach to relationship development and management owing to their unique position and strengths in the landscape, resulting in a differentiated set of engagement strategies. The breadth of AACRS means that managing each distinctive partnership requires a considered, participatory and prioritised approach.

One approach to building strong partnerships critical to the successful delivery could be built around:

working with potential partners during the development of the design and strategies to build common understandings of how AACRS will be of benefit the broader community, ensuring there is a refined and tailored the ‘what’s in it for me’ response;

using well informed and targeted criteria to select partnerships that will strengthen the broader value chain and who are committed to women’s economic empowerment;

leveraging and assessing viable partnerships through the Scheme governance mechanisms and TWGs;

providing on the ground project managers who can support partners in delivery and more closely monitor success and / or failure; and

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a robust monitoring and evaluation system to manage and monitor progress to determine if activities should be withdrawn or scaled up, partners should be withdrawn and/or new partners enter the Scheme.

The success of AACRS, and its ability to comply with the target schedule, depends to a great extent on political support from various stakeholders. There will be a number of occasions when formal political government approval is required given the increasingly progressive policy and regulatory environment. Any delay in obtaining approval will have direct consequences on program implementation. Stakeholder engagement will be necessary to:

ensure fast formal approval of the programs ability to implement; encourage engagement during the design implementation plan development process; encourage sharing of information relevant to all aspects of the project; and overcome inertia and resistance to the implementation of agreed policies strategies, and

procedures within the project.

A number of strategies and methods may be appropriate to achieve the required level of engagement and motivation:

High level political and management engagement: clear messaging, and an ability to embrace project policies, principles and processes with high level Afghan government bodies that expect to be involved in program delivery. It will be vital for the objectives of the high level policy dialogue between women leaders (for example the female governor of Daykundi), donors and policy makers to direct attention toward the critical issues identified by female leaders and be facilitated in a manner that fosters the realisation of specific and achievable policy measures.

Awareness raising: The program will engage in awareness raising activities throughout program delivery to ensure that those with roles and responsibilities, especially in Provincial government departments, understand that this is of benefit to them and fits within their current agenda. Once again high level political and management support will be important in this instance.

Communication of benefits: This DFAT funded program will not only continue to deliver direct benefits to women and their families, government and the Afghan economy but, will also increase the ability of the provinces to attract future funding in agriculture. This ‘benefits’ message will need to be communicated to provincial government during design and numerous times throughout delivery.

Clear expectations and appropriate capacity building: It will be important that expectations associated with different functions are clearly defined, and that those charged with specific responsibilities receive the training, resources and support necessary to enable them tosucceed.

Monitoring (part of M&E process): part of the monitoring function will be to gauge the level of support required for project goals, objectives and procedures. It will be important that this does not evolve into a policing function, but provides a conduit for suggestions from project participants (at every level) and is seen to result in positive changes when appropriate. It cannot be emphasized further that the monitoring function is an essential part of the participatory approach in order to ensure program interventions are culturally, economically, and technically appropriate.

Establishing effective governance for interventions, including integrating partners and formal processes (and owners) in Technical Working Groups (TWGs) to design them. This will build ownership among stakeholders, particularly senior management at the central government level, for their and their employees’ engagement in the development process. TWGs, as part of the Scheme governance structure, can be a vehicle for institution building, replacing reliance on individuals. For this reason, looking forward to a new phase, DFAT would need to advocate for high-level officials to be sponsors of the TWGs. The potential of TWGs to create greater alignment with key strategic priorities of the Afghan Government such as investments into wheat and maize, rehabilitation of irrigation and other water conservation measures, together with a focus on dryland farming will better leverage collective resources, ownership and sustainability.

Consolidation and a continued focus on building strong working partnerships amongst partners, other DFAT programs and the broader donor community will be critical. These relationships

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will help

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coordinate common areas of interest and influence, information sharing and lessons and help to leverage broader coherence within the Australian Aid program at post.

Renewed commitment to the Partnership Framework through a Partnership Charter to establish understandings of shared accountabilities and responsibilities. The Charter could be renewed/developed at a workshop for AACRS partners at mobilisation and outline rules of engagement, collaboration, decision-making and problem resolution. Once the Charter is in place, partnership agreements with selected organisations can be renewed/developed to share understandings of objectives and information flows.

The Charter would need to link to a Scheme level Communications Strategy to ensure that contributions and collective efforts are acknowledged and celebrated, with the potential for the Scheme Coordinator to work with DFAT to deliver public diplomacy dividends.

The M&E framework will inform learning and quality improvement and the lessons and experiences captured will provide feedback on performance and suggest options to meet targets and improve service delivery. Performance data must influence decision-making by being accessible to decision makers and to inform policy. It must measure performance and accountability and there is a need to consider what options are available to verify information and set performance targets that reflect sector capacity and local demands.

The AACRS modality – through the appointment of an organisation in the role of Scheme Coordinator- provides the ability to develop an integrated M&E system that can report on aggregated results at the Scheme level and inform decisions about strategic options, alignment and resourcing. It will be imperative that key information and themes can be drawn out of the data and presented in a clear and coherent manner at specific points in time to inform decision making. For example on research, on activity designs, on partnership options, on testing and piloting, on options to scale-up (or scale-back non-performing projects).

Flexibility and responsiveness to changing partner government needs ultimately increases the value of the Government to Government relationships. Development priorities as agreed by DFAT and the Afghan government should be included in the Scheme’s annual plans prepared by the partners and Scheme Coordinator. There will be a need to respond to emerging priorities and unanticipated tasks to take advantage of opportunities, address barriers, or strengthen intended outcomes.

The complex environment in Afghanistan requires an approach that is well informed, evidence-based and respects the context. Establishing comprehensive M&E systems to inform decision making at the operational, tactical and strategic levels is critical to understanding the impacts of changing priorities and evolving opportunities for capitalise and respond to leverage quick wins and to lay the foundations for longer term transformational changes. The AACRS M&E system will need to be better integrated with risk management processes to ensure a clear understanding of impacts to planned outputs and outcomes as a result of reallocating resources.

Leveraging existing projects in the target provinces and sectors. Existing relationships with stakeholders will be key to forming an effective second phase governance mechanism and using the lessons and successes from phase one to guide decision making on existing projects to scale up, for example.

At a tactical level, this will result in enhanced program delivery to meet DFAT strategic priorities including delivering greater efficiencies and identifying opportunities for Government of Australia to Government of Afghanistan engagement.

Designing new projects. The TRG can lead and co-facilitate designs with the TWG for new activities to be delivered through the Partnership Agreements and provide ongoing technical support to new and existing projects during implementation. Designs will need to identify entry points, opportunities, risks and agreed structures that satisfy DFAT needs. This Scheme level governance structures will need to be structured to respond flexibly to emerging priorities, with inputs which are scalable and phased into the Scheme.

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Responding to new opportunities and scaling back. Effective, trusted relationships and adaptive management are the key to successful responses to changing circumstances and unlocking investment potential. The scaling back of project activities would need to be successfully managed, based on an understanding of the external factors (including budget reduction), the need to engage with partners in a positive way, and the importance of communication to be clear, concise and positive on how any reductions can be identified and managed. It is critical that M&E systems are designed to support the potential to respond to new opportunities or scaling back initiatives. This includes understanding the contributions project activities, partnerships and outputs make to intended outcomes, the impacts reprioritisation can have, and redefining priorities in ways that can meet targets.

Communication and protection of reputations and relationships are paramount during periods of significant change. Providing early, workable options to DFAT on how best to approach any reduction or reallocation of budget across the Scheme would be a priority.

The AACRS partnership will need to bring a practical and experienced approach to the achievement of end of program outcomes that is capable of rapid adaptation to changing circumstances. In a program where activity levels will increase and decrease depending on the stability and security of the operating context, the AACRS partnership will need to continue to recognise the importance of ensuring the support and operations function of the program remains solid to support the Scheme Coordinator and all partners to respond to changing levels of activity.

To support a scalable model, an Innovation Fund should also be included in the total budget envelope to enable rapid prototyping and scaling of models or surge support for specific technical interventions, for example, in support of engineering/adaptive work to improve accessibility for people living with disability (PWD).

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Annexes

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Annex A - Afghanistan Country Context49

Decades of conflict have left Afghanistan among the poorest and least stable countries in the world. The country’s deep-rooted and interconnected issues of insurgency, crime, and corruption pose steep barriers to economic and political progress. The business environment is further undermined by the weak rule of law and the absence of effective investor protections due to the outdated and inconsistent legal code.

The Taliban and other militant groups, however, have recovered from the invasion of foreign forces in October 2001 to form a resilient insurgency network that undermines the central government’s ability to provide security and basic services. Based predominantly in the Pashtun-dominated south, the Taliban has the strength, tactical ability, and resources to launch assaults nationwide, including in highly secured areas of Kabul. It controls close to 30 percent of Afghanistan’s land area.

Foreign personnel and facilities, such as diplomatic quarters, office buildings and restaurants, are frequently targeted across Afghanistan’s major cities. The Islamic State militant group expanded into Afghanistan in 2015, and continues to develop its ability to stage attacks. The Afghan security forces are plagued with longstanding issues including equipment shortfalls, high turnover, corruption, and incompetence.

In 2015, the conflict in Afghanistan witnessed the highest number of civilian casualties since 2009. The number of civilians killed declined four per cent but the overall number of civilians injured was up by nine per cent. Attacks by the Taliban and other insurgent groups contributed to over 3,000 civilian deaths and more than 7,000 injured50.

The abundant supply of opium is also a major factor in Afghanistan’s high rates of drug abuse and addiction, which fuel petty crime in urban areas. Criminal groups also derive extensive income from kidnappings for ransom. Local businesspeople and foreign workers are among the most popular targets due to their assumed wealth, with tens of abductions occurring across the country each year.

Corruption is pervasive across all levels of government. There is little oversight and accountability of political institutions and the payment of bribes is often considered a normal part of doing business in the country. Repeated pledges to combat corruption as part of Afghanistan’s foreign aid obligations have done little to address the problem. Any arrests and convictions are confined to low-ranking officials.

Conflict and political upheaval have left Afghanistan ill-prepared for attracting and retaining investment. The road network is in a state of severe disrepair due to a lack of maintenance and militant attacks, while the provision of basic services such as water and electricity is inconsistent across the country. In addition, Afghanistan’s extensive red tape and parallel administrative systems of state and tribal law create a high degree of regulatory inefficiency and uncertainty. Land ownership is a particular source of dispute, with the lack of formal land deeds making landowners vulnerable to competing claims on their property.

International Relations

Afghanistan’s international relations have been shaped by the Washington-led invasion following the September 2001 attacks in the US. Since then, the country has seen sustained a foreign military presence in an attempt to dismantle al-Qaeda-affiliated extremist networks. Over 15 years of war have left the country excessively dependent on international economic aid, while relations with neighbours such as Pakistan and Iran have been volatile. Relations with India and China, which have invested in

49 Adapted from the PGI Intelligence Country Profile. “Afghanistan”. 30 May 2017.50 United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), ‘UNAMA Annual Report 2015: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, February 2016. UNAMA documented 11,002 civilian casualties (3,545 civilian deaths and 7,457 injured). Cited in the DFAT. “Aid Program Performance report 2015-16. Afghanistan.” Accessed online 12 May 2017 at

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http://dfat.gov.au/about- us/publications/Documents/afghanistan-appr-2015-16.pdf

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Afghanistan, are largely stable, while ties with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are dominated by concerns of the spread of militancy.

Kabul is heavily dependent on international financial aid, and a lack of progress in key socio-economic areas has drawn criticism from donors. The international community, led by the US, is estimated to have given Afghanistan over USD 100 billion to aid economic development. However, these funds have failed to translate into tangible improvements in factors such as poverty and education, with pervasive corruption compounding the problem. In December 2015, foreign donors threatened to stop funding Afghanistan’s anti-corruption watchdog, alleging that it was spending aid money irresponsibly.In September 2014, Afghanistan witnessed its first democratic transition of political power with the inauguration of President Ashraf Ghani and the National Unity Government. Following this, at the end of 2014, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force transferred security responsibility to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF). The Afghan Government’s ability to provide security and services is critical in order to protect the gains of the last decade and to ensure lasting peace and prosperity. The international community is committed to supporting Afghanistan to achieve this goal51.

Inclusive Economic Growth Outlook

In 2015, Afghanistan recorded an estimated economic growth rate of 1.5 per cent, a marginal increase from the previous year but well below the ten year average (2004-14) of 10.2 per cent52. Weak economic growth and the deteriorating security situation resulted in increases to poverty, with the poverty rate increasing from 35.8 per cent in 2011-12 to 39.1 per cent in 2013-1453. Limited employment opportunities also saw the unemployment rate reach over 22 per cent of the labour force in 201454.

Progress Against Development Indicators

Afghanistan is estimated to be experiencing one of the fastest population growth rates in the world, growing at three per cent annually55. Nearly two thirds of the country’s 34 million people are aged 25 or under56 and life expectancy at birth is 60.4 years. Literacy rates in Afghanistan remain amongst the lowest in the world, estimated at 31 per cent of the adult population57. Female literacy rates average only 17 per cent, but have been reported as low as 1.6 per cent in rural southern provinces 58. Despite these statistics, progress has been made against key development indicators. Youth literacy rates have increased from 30 per cent in 2005 to 46 per cent in 201259. Nearly nine million students now attend primary school, with girls comprising one third of the total60, compared to just one million students in 2002, all of who were boys. The number of grade 12 school graduates is expected to double from 225,000 in 2014 to 451,000 in 201961.

51 DFAT. “Aid Program Performance report 2014-15. Afghanistan.” Accessed online 12 May 2017 at http://dfat.gov.au/about- us/publications/Documents/afghanistan-appr-2014-15.pdf52 The World Bank, “Afghanistan Development Update.” April 2016. Cited in the DFAT. “Aid Program Performance report 2015-16. Afghanistan.” Accessed online 12 May 2017 at http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/afghanistan-appr-2015- 16.pdf53 United Nations Development Programme, ‘2015 Human Development Report’, Percentage of the population living below the national poverty line, which is the poverty line deemed appropriate for a country by its authorities54 The World Bank, “Afghanistan Development Update.” April 2016. Cited in the DFAT. “Aid Program Performance report 2015-16. Afghanistan.” Accessed online 12 May 2017 at http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/afghanistan-appr-2015- 16.pdf55 Ibid56 Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Ministry of Information and Culture, Office of the Deputy Ministry of Youth Affairs,‘Afghanistan National Youth Policy’, 25 August 201457 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), ‘Enhancement of Literacy in Afghanistan (ELA)’ program58 Ibid59 UNESCO, ‘Afghanistan Education for All 2015 National Review Report

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60 Ibid61 Ibid

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Regulatory Environment

Afghanistan’s under-developed political and regulatory institutions have undermined effective governance and economic development. Red tape as well as unfair competition further deter foreign entry. Most of the population continues to adhere to parallel systems of Islamic or traditional law, compounding regulatory uncertainty. The judiciary is notorious for long delays in dispute resolution, which are frequently biased in favour of the influential business groups that dominate the national economy.

Fraud and Corruption

Afghanistan’s pervasive corruption erodes its economic development, provision of public services and the government’s legitimacy. In 2015 Afghanistan ranked 166 of 168 assessed countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, making it the third-most corrupt country in the world. Corruption permeates all levels of the government. Although President Ashraf Ghani has made tackling corruption a priority amid sustained international pressure, Afghanistan continues to lack effective anti-corruption mechanisms.

Political Violence

Afghanistan has experienced nearly continuous conflict since the Soviet Union’s invasion in 1979, with militants combating foreign forces as well as internal struggles along ethnic, religious, tribal and political lines. The post-2001 conflict broadly pits foreign forces and the Afghan government against a coalition of Pashtun Islamist groups, most notably the Taliban, which are ideologically aligned with al-Qaeda. In addition, Islamic State extended its operations into southern Afghanistan throughout 2015 and has developed a capability to carry out attacks against both civilians, government targets and security forces. At least 11,000 civilians were killed or wounded in Afghanistan in 2015, making it the worst year for civilian casualties since the UN began keeping records in 2009.

Crime

Afghanistan is a leading source of opium and cannabis. Organised criminal groups are known to work closely with militants and corrupt officials to provide protection for their crops, while some insurgents and officials themselves participate in drug production and distribution. The country’s lawlessness and geography are conducive for narcotics production. The easy availability of drugs in Afghanistan contributes to high rates of addiction and petty crime. All of Afghanistan’s major cities pose serious risks of theft, robbery, assault and kidnap, and foreigners have previously been targeted for their perceived wealth. Police possess little capacity to prevent or respond to crimes.

Kidnap is a major threat in Afghanistan and a key source of income for insurgent and criminal groups. Several foreign journalists and aid workers have been abducted in the country, although kidnapping presents a greater threat for locals. The failure to pay ransoms could result in the execution of victims, but several foreigners have been detained for months or years before a ransom is successfully negotiated. Foreign governments strongly advise citizens living or working in Afghanistan to travel with security guards to deter kidnapping attempts.

Locals are at a far greater risk of kidnap, particularly traders and wealthy Afghans. In August 2016, the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry said that 35 Afghan traders had been kidnapped over the previous month across five provinces in the country. Kidnappings are particularly concentrated along major highways and in commercial centres such as Herat and Kabul. In May 2016, suspected Taliban militants abducted 200 bus and car passengers after setting up a checkpoint on a road near Kunduz city. Although 150 were released after a short while, the remaining were detained for ransom purposes. Minorities and security forces have also fallen victim to kidnapping. In March 2015, 14 ethnic Shi’a Hazaras were kidnapped in Farah and Ghazni provinces in two separate incidents. May 2014, Taliban militants took 27 Afghan army soldiers hostage in Badakhshan province.

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Environment

Afghanistan is vulnerable to numerous environmental hazards. The mountainous provinces of the north and northeast are at particularly high risk from extensive tectonic activity and flooding. Large earthquakes have caused widespread death and destruction to property. Rural areas consist almost entirely of mud structures, offering little protection against a quake Landslides and avalanches occur frequently, triggered by earthquakes or heavy rainfall. Lowland regions face erratic weather patterns, causing droughts as well as floods.

The country is most vulnerable to flash floods in springtime, when heavy rainfall combines with snowmelt, with the mountainous northern areas particularly at risk. Flash flooding has intensified in recent years. Climate change is increasing the rate of snowmelt as well as the volume of rainfall, while land clearing by residents along the mountain slopes has removed natural barriers to flash floods.

Landslides and avalanches are triggered by earthquakes or flooding in the mountains. These events are regarded as foreseeable and preventable, but Afghanistan lacks the ability to map areas deemed at high risk of landslides or avalanche. Snowfall and cold are nationwide hazards during wintertime, with average temperatures of minus-six degrees Celsius in February. Tens of people die annually from exposure, particularly in poorer areas and refugee camps where residents have little access to shelter. The road network becomes virtually impassable, and power outages frequently occur.

The interconnected problems of insecurity and limited official capacity hinder the government’s ability to manage and mitigate natural disasters effectively. Continuing conflict with the Taliban has isolated many at risk communities from government or international assistance, particularly in the south and east. In addition, the government lacks the authority and effectiveness to reduce environmental hazards such as deforestation and overgrazing, which have worsened the effects of flash flooding and droughts.

Health

Poverty, poor infrastructure, and conflict have deprived large swathes of Afghanistan of basic medical coverage. There are few medical facilities in Afghanistan with basic medical supplies, and the quality of care declines precipitously outside Kabul. Locally available medicines are known to be expensive and of unreliable quality. More than half of Afghans now live within 30 minutes of a clinic or hospital62

and the infant mortality rate has dropped from 165 per 1,000 births in 2002 to 77 in 201263.

Clean drinking water, sanitation and electricity remain unavailable to the majority of the Afghan population despite more than a decade of international aid initiatives costing billions of dollars. According to World Vision Afghanistan, 73 percent of households still lack access to safe drinking water, and 95 percent do not have access to improved sanitation.

Gender Equality

Despite considerable gains, Afghanistan remains an extremely challenging environment for gender equality. Violence against women is severe, systemic and deeply ingrained in Afghan society and occurs within the context of historical and pervasive gender inequality. Close to 30 per cent of seats in Parliament are now held by women64 and in 2009 a new Eliminating Violence Against Women law was passed by Presidential decree. Afghanistan continues to rank near the bottom of the UNDP’s Gender

62 The Asia Foundation, ‘Survey of the Afghan People 2014’, The Asia Foundation AINA Afghan Media and Culture Centre, Kabul.63 United Nations Development Programme, ‘2014 Human Development Report’, UNDP, Table 4 Gender Inequality

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Index. (‘UNDP Human Development Report, 2014’).64 Ibid

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Inequality Index65. Girls attend school for less than half the number of years of Afghan boys, and despite improvements in recent years, the maternal death rate is one of the highest in the world66.

Infrastructure

Decades of conflict, poverty and natural disasters have undermined Afghanistan’s infrastructure, leaving it ill-equipped to promote economic development or provide for the basic needs of its citizens. Large swathes of the population have little access to basic sanitation or power, while the roads are overwhelmingly unpaved. There is an additional risk of IEDs along roadways in insurgent-held areas, with militant groups frequently targeting power infrastructure. Declining international assistance and persistent conflict make significant infrastructure improvements unlikely in the future unless the security environment significantly improves.

Afghanistan continues to rank among the worst in the world in electricity output per capita. Only about 40 percent of the population is estimated to have regular access to electricity, with the frequency and duration of power outages limiting industrial productivity. Power and energy infrastructure is also frequently targeted by militant groups in restive provinces such as Baghlan, Nangarhar, Helmand and Kandahar.

Afghanistan’s road network is predominantly unpaved and increasingly decrepit. Road travel throughout southern and eastern Afghanistan is especially hazardous due to the prevalence of IEDs placed under and alongside roadways.

65 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Table 5, Gender Inequality Index 2015’. Cited in the DFAT. “Aid Program Performance report 2015-16. Afghanistan.” Accessed online 12 May 2017 at http://dfat.gov.au/about- us/publications/Documents/afghanistan-appr-2015-16.pdf66 Ibid.

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Annex B – Provincial SnapshotB.1 BadghisBadghis Province is one of 34 provinces in Afghanistan, and is located in the North-West of the country. It shares its borders with Herat, Ghor, and Faryab provinces to the west, south and east, as well as with Turkmenistan to the north. It is composed of six districts and has as its provincial centre the town of Qala-I-Naw, situated 170Km (3 hours) by road from Herat City, and accessible to NGO staff by a twice- weekly flight operated by the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service.

The security environment in the north-western province remains fragile. This reflects Baghdis’s ethnically diverse population and the tensions between different communities, its position as a transit point for crossborder drugs smuggling, the presence of militias affiliated with specific ethnic groups and the weakness of local government in the province.

However, instability is more prevalent in the north-east of Badghis, and particularly in the districts of Ghormach, Murghab and, to some extent, Jawand, which borders Faryab province. Most of the people in the north-east of Badghis are Pashtuns. The Taliban presence results in the temporary closure of the highway connecting Baghdis to Faryab, which runs through Murghab.

Security trends there include harassment attacks and small-scale roadside devices aimed at reducing the Afghan security forces’ freedom of movement. Following the withdrawal of foreign combat troops in 2014 Taliban militants launched offensives to take control of the district centres in Ghormach and Murghab. Militant attacks also continue to take place in central and western districts, but are small-scale and largely opportunist in nature.

Further north, the border with Turkmenistan remains exposed to sporadic violence linked to drug smuggling. The security risks are currently heightened in Bala Murghab, following tribal clashes and the targeting killings of senior security personnel in the district. The economy in Bala Murghab continues to be dominated by the opium trade and the Taliban continues to profit from this.

Pashtuns are effectively disenfranchised in Badghis, and this has contributed to weak local government in the province. However, Pashtuns retain influence in the north-eastern districts, including Murghab, where Taliban militants have a significant presence. Local militias affiliated to the Tajik, Pashtun and Uzbek communities remain involved in organised crime.

Badghis has experienced ongoing conflict, drought and economic instability for almost thirty years. This has resulted in the breakdown of many social institutions, limited employment opportunities, increased poverty, as well as environmental degradation due to over use of resources. Badghis has a population of almost half a million people, comprised of 84,909 households with an average of seven members. Approximately 97% of households are rural. Most of the province is mountainous, creating significant isolation between communities within the province and from the rest of Afghanistan.

Agriculture remains the dominant source of livelihoods in Badghis, providing income for 59 percent of households and over 52 percent of rural households own or manage agricultural land or garden plots. Over 50 percent of households report income from livestock (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2005). Nevertheless, more than 80 percent (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2005) of adults are under-employed, driving migration for work. Farmers in Badghis are typically involved in wheat production and animal husbandry using traditional practices - grain production is largely rain-fed and animals are rarely vaccinated and rely on grazing for sustenance. Herding is commonly the responsibility of boys and can often prohibit school attendance. Nearly 40 percent of children aged 6-15 are engaged in work (World Vision Afghanistan, 2013).

Access to water, drought and poor education present significant barriers to improving livelihoods for farmers in Badghis. The Province is one of Afghanistan’s most drought prone areas, but lacks irrigation infrastructure; leaving 80 percent of the population reliant on rain water (World Vision Afghanistan, 2013). This severely limits agricultural production and creates vulnerability. Drought has driven crop failures, leading to malnutrition and chronic health problems. In turn, poor health creates a further barrier to sustained livelihoods, as reduced work days and income lead to families struggling to meet the costs of health care and education. Drought has also driven poor nutrition outcomes.

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Badghis suffers from exceptionally low levels of literacy and education – only 11 percent of the population is literate, including only three percent of women (World Vision Afghanistan, 2013). Women also have a diminished role in decision making. Poor literacy and education, geographic isolation and a weak economy contributes to a conservative mindset and fear of change in Badghis. Afghanistan has a poorly developed market economy, particularly in remote areas like Badghis where a lack of general awareness of broader market forces results in local farmers achieving only ‘farm gate’ prices for produce. While local markets exist for the major forms of agricultural production in the province, prices are kept low due to a shortage of storage facilities, meaning producers sell at whatever price is available and determined by the buyer at harvest.

The conservative and remote nature of Badghis also contributes to the province having one of Afghanistan’s least developed civil societies (Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development, 2011). This includes low levels of equity and inclusion, poor community participation in decision-making and significant constraints in the ability of government and citizens to uphold good governance. This is demonstrated through an almost complete absence of NGOs, creating limitations in the ability to work with local organisations and build the civil society in the province.

B.2 BaghlanBaghlan has a multi-ethnic make-up, but Tajiks affiliated with the Northern Alliance andJamiat-e-Islami play an important role in local politics. The province lies to the north of Kabul and the route to northern Afghanistan passes through it. This makes Baghlan it a strategic transit route. The Taliban had a limited presence in Baghlan ahead of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. However, given its strategic location, Taliban militants over the past two years have been able to establish an entrenchedpresence along the Highway (Ring Road) that passes through the Tala Wa Barfak, Dand-e-Ghori and Baghlan-e- Jadid districts, as well as on the outskirts of the provincial capital Pul-e-Khumri.

The Taliban has an established presence in Dand-e-Ghori. The local government in September 2015 even had to reach an agreement with Taliban whereby its fighters and a reduced number of Afghan troops would remain on the outskirts of Dand-e-Ghori in order to defuse tensions in the district. The government in January 2016 launched an operation involving 2,000 Afghan troops to take back control of the district. The Taliban in response cut power lines there that supplied electricity from Turkmenistan to Kabul. It also strengthened its positions by digging underground canals. Afghan troops managed to recapture the area, but only for a short period. They have been unable to establish a permanent presence there because of the harsh and inaccessible terrain.

The Taliban appears to want to use its control of Dand-e-Ghor as leverage by threatening to cut Kabul’s electricity should the security forces launch further operations against it. It also wishes to prevent the security forces from receiving reinforcements and to prevent resources from reaching northern Afghanistan – and particularly Kunduz and Faryab – in the event of a large-scale Taliban offensive to expand its control of territory there. Although the Highway North is currently controlled by Afghan forces, Taliban militants have the capacity to control the road for a short period until local and international forces are able to conduct airstrikes against its positions.

Baghlan’s location makes the province a transit route for the smuggling of drugs from southern Afghanistan and to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Taliban militants continue to conduct attacks on the security forces’ checkpoints, patrols and other assets throughout Baghlan, and are planning a new offensive to recapture Pul-e-Khumri. However, the removal of the group’s ‘shadow governor’ in the province, and multiple commanders, in an April 2017 airstrike resulted in a leadership struggle and a delayed large-scale militant operation.

Criminal activities remain a serious concern, though the principal targets are wealthy Afghan nationals. Nevertheless, foreigners may well provide high-value targets for criminal groups.

B.3 BalkhThe northern province, until late 2014, had a relatively benign security environment and a degree of economic prosperity. The relative degree of security reflected the province’s ethnic homogeneity – its population is mainly Tajik – and the presence there of Afghan armed forces and residual NATO

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troops.

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It has also reflected the policies of provincial governor Atta Mohammad Noor. This key Tajik politician has links with the Northern Alliance, which fought to unseat the Taliban government following the US- led invasion of 2001. He has a record of challenging the central government over specific matters, though his relations with Ghani stabilised after the president reinstated him as Balkh governor. Noor dominates politics in Balkh, and undertakes a stronger position on behalf of Tajiks in debate with central government over strategic issues. There has been a longstanding political rivalry between Noor and General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Afghanistan’s vice-president and a prominent Uzbek politician. Noor's Jamiat-e-Islami party and Dostum's Junbish-e Milli party have a history of mutual hostility, which has led to both peaceful protests and fatal clashes and to political stalemate in Balkh over the past years. Noor has mobilised militias to supplement the Afghan security forces in their fight against Taliban militants.

The Taliban until late 2014 had little support in Balkh. However, large-scale attacks against a police headquarters (October 2014), a foreign NGO compound (June 2015), the consulates of India (January 2016) and Germany (November 2016) and an Afghan army barracks (April 2017) suggest that the situation is changing. The Taliban is known to operate in the west and northwest of the province, and to have a significant presence in the district of Chimtal, somewhat less of a presence in the districts of Dawlatabad and Sholgara, and a limited presence in Shotepa district. Taliban militants retain the capacity to conduct operations in Balkh, including in the provincial capital Mazar-e-Sharif. This has been evidenced by the multiple attacks that have taken place in the province, including coordinated operations against well-defended targets. Militants typically use roadside bombs, small-arms fire and occasional suicide bombings. In line with the Taliban’s seasonal levels of activity, militant attacks begin to increase shortly after April and continue through the summer and autumn months until the onset of winter in December.

B.4 BamyanThe central province has always been hailed as one of the more peaceful ones, largely because of its relative isolation and ethnic make-up. The population is predominantly Hazara, a mostly Shia ethnic group that has opposed the Taliban because of the movement’s Sunni Islamist ideology. The Hazara are generally peaceful and reputedly dislike the Pashtun ethnic group, from which the Taliban draws much of its support. The Taliban has little influence in Bamyan, though armed groups sympathetic to it reportedly operate in the districts of Sayghan, Khamard, Sheber. However, these groups are largely involved in criminal activities for personal gain rather than militancy.

Bamyan’s relative stability is reflected in the fairly light security presence there (there almost 1,000 police officers and a limited army garrisoned there). However, developments over the past two years in the neighbouring provinces of Wardak, Parwan, Baghlan and Sar-e-Pul have had a detrimental impact on the local security environment, and there is a continued threat of militancy spilling over.

The Taliban retains a negligible presence to the north of Bamyan, but it is mainly involved in criminal activities rather than actively targeting assets and personnel associated with state in this area. Most of the incidents in Bamyan in recent years have been small-scale and opportunist in nature. Criminal groups on 20 August 2013 kidnapped two foreign aid workers in Bamyan.

Many residents harbour resentment towards the national unity government. This is reflected in the frequent demonstrations over lack of electricity supplies and perceived prejudice by the authorities against the Hazara. A Hazara-dominated political party, the Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami Afghanistan (‘Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan’), was led by local Hazara politicians who retain significant influence in Bamyan politics. These included former vice-president Karim Khalili and current deputy chief executive officer (de-facto deputy prime minister) Haji Mohammad Mohqaq. However, the party has split, resulting in a power struggle between Mohqaq and Khalili.

In May 2015, President Ashraf Ghani appointed Tahir Zahir, his former election aide, as governor of Bamyan. Zahir is politically affiliated with Khalili, who had endorsed Ghani in the 2014 presidential election. Mohqaq opposed Zahir’s appointment, leading to sustained protests in Bamyan in June and July of 2015.

Overall, Bamyan has politically been stable. However its residents remain frustrated with central government and with foreign donors over the lack of specific economic and social development

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projects in the province.

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B.5 DaykundiThe central province in recent years has had a stable security environment, notwithstanding the lack of economic development there. The Taliban maintains a limited presence in Daikundi (in the Gizab and Kajran districts to the south of the provincial capital Nili). Militant activity is minimal: there have been small-scale attacks in Gizab and Kajran, which have a shared and porous border with Helmand and Uruzgan (much of the militancy in Daikundi is spill-over activity from these two provinces). Persistent unemployment and under-developments have led to prevalent criminal activity. The Hazara make up around 90% of the population, a factor largely believed to have aided the current stability. The Afghan security forces have a lower presence than in many other provinces.

The central government also has a low presence in Daikundi, and many residents are outspoken critics of the Kabul administration because of the limited amounts of funding and economic development that they believe the province has received. Many government institutions in the province are under- resourced.

In 2015 there were a series of mass abductions of Hazara residents (a significant increase in kidnapping when compared with the single case abduction reported in each of 2013 and 2014). Most of these kidnappings took place in Kajran district. The incidents appeared to be coordinated and conducted by criminals affiliated with the Taliban. However, many of the victims were released following interventions by local tribal elders.

B.6 FaryabThe security environment has been precarious in recent years, and particularly following the withdrawal of NATO troops. The Jawzjan-Faryab Highway continues to face occasional threats owing to the lack of security provision there. The Taliban has a strong presence in the Qaysar, Almar and Dawlatabad districts. It has also operated freely over the past three years in the Khwaja Sabzposh and Shirin Tagab districts on the outskirts of the provincial capital Maimana. Control of urban centres in Khwaja Sabzposh and Shirin Tagab has shifted over the past two years between the Taliban and the Afghan security forces.

Faryab’s strategic and economic importance has led to an influx of militants from neighbouring provinces, including members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (an ethnic Uzbek insurgent group, previously based in northern Afghanistan, that has pledged its allegiance to IS). Uzbeks and Tajiks both play key roles in local politics. However, there are longstanding tensions between the two communities, which often lead to armed clashes relating to local power struggles between Jamiat-e-Islami and Dostum’s Jumbesh party. Following the drawdown of NATO forces in Afghanistan, the creation of a local police unit in Faryab has fuelled disputes between Jamiat-e-Islami and Jumbesh.

Dostum has sidelined Pashtuns from politics and power in Faryab, evidently in revenge for atrocities against ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks during the Taliban’s time in power (1996-2001). Over the past three years, he has supplemented the Afghan security forces deployed locally with his own militia to fight Taliban militants, who in turn are supported by ethnic Pashtuns in the province.

Government- and NATO-led efforts have largely failed to curb the influence of local powerbrokers, who continue to be involved in corruption and criminal activity, including the farming of opium poppies and drug trafficking.

B.7 Ghazni ProvinceThe southern province of Ghazni is strategically located on the route between Kabul and Kandahar. It is one of the more densely populated provinces of Afghanistan. Although not as volatile as neighboring provinces, Ghazni’s development has been hindered by political instability and the presence of the Taliban. This mountainous province has also seen a number of natural disasters in recent years, including both severe drought and flooding.

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It is assessed as ‘severe’ by the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) in terms of its criteria which is based on the number of security related incidents. It is envisaged that programming in Ghazni Province is going to become increasing challenging in the coming years.

The local security environment, like those in other eastern provinces, has been relatively precarious over the past years. Clashes often break out between members of Ghazni’s two main ethnic groups the Hazaras and Pashtuns, and particularly over land disputes. Hizb-i Wahdat, led by Karim Khalili, is the most influential political party in Hazara-dominated areas. Poor governance, political disputes, high levels of unemployment also contribute to high militancy in Ghazni.

Insurgents have conducted harassing attacks and used various types of explosive devices. These included suicide bombings and complex, coordinated attacks, primarily directed against NATO troops before their drawdown in the province in April 2014 and then against the Afghan securityforces.

The Taliban reportedly controls most of the rural areas outside of the provincial capital and is heavily involved in attacks on Afghan security force and local government targets.

The strengthening of the insurgency in Ghazni is also probably as a consequence, at least in part, of the operations by domestic and international security forces that pushed the Taliban out of their traditional strongholds in Helmand and Kandahar, which have historically been the most dangerous areas in Afghanistan. The Taliban retains a strong presence in Ghazni’s Pashtun-dominated southeastern districts, such as Andar, Khogyani, Muqur and Qarabagh, where the security situation remains particularly unstable. However, the Hazaras form a majority in Jaghori, Malistan and Nawur, and the security environments in these western districts is therefore more stable than elsewhere in the province.

Road travel between Kabul & Ghazni may become almost impossible and air travel/air charter at >$10 000 per return trip (2014 price) will be the only alternative if United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flights are not available. Ghazni has an international airport and main highway. The city sits next to Afghanistan's main highway that runs between Kabul and Kandahar in the south. There are roads leading to Gardez and in the east and other nearby villages as well as to towns in Hazarajat in the northwest. Ghazni City is in an area of extreme drought. In 2007, one of the gates on a 50-year-old dam on the Jikhai River broke, bringing up concerns among the inhabitants of Ghazni city about the water supply. The dam serves as a good source of irrigation water to Ghazni City and the surrounding agricultural areas. Nearby rivers also have a history of flooding and causing severe damage.

The city has a number of public schools. Jahan Maleeka School is an all-girls school with over 5,000 students and 150 teachers. Naswan Shaher Kohna School is another all-girls school and has over 3000 students. In May 2010, the U.S. government established the Lincoln Learning Center which, like U.S. public libraries, which provides free access to information about the United States via multimedia, book collections, the Internet and programming for the general public.

The percentage of households with clean drinking water fell from 35% in 2005 to 18% in 2011. The percentage of births attended to by a skilled birth attendant increased from 7% in 2005 to 11% in 2011. The overall literacy rate (6+ years of age) fell from 35% in 2005 to 31% in 2011. The overall net enrolment rate (6–13 years of age) increased from 39% in 2005 to 54% in 2011.

In Charkint and the mountainous Ghazni districts the men were prompting for opportunities to benefit their female family members, which contrasted with men interviewed in Shakardara, Bagrami and Khulm who made little mention of women’s needs. Women were very clear income derived from selling his top quality apples for a higher price, and possibly producing jams or other processed goods out of the lower quality ones.

USAID’s work in Ghazni, prepares farmers to participate in a modern agricultural economy through improved agricultural opportunities, road rehabilitation, and training. Supports democracy and governance in Ghazni Province through activities including legislative strengthening, electoral support, justice sector reform, media, and civil-society development. USAID’s economic growth program helps the Afghan government develop sound economic governance and works with the private sector to stimulate investment and business opportunities. USAID partners with Afghans and the Afghan government to attract investment, generate sustainable employment, and expand market linkages.

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USAID promotes economic development in Ghazni Province through micro-lending, expanding access to telecommunications, and automating banking services. The infrastructure program in Ghazni Province focuses on the improvement of roads and water facilities while building the capacity of local institutions and workers, and supporting the provincial economy using locally available materials. USAID creates linkages and builds confidence between communities and the local government through small- scale infrastructure, training, and community development projects.

B.8 JawzjanJawzjan in northern Afghanistan is Dostum’s home province. Members of the local Uzbek and Turkmen communities are affiliated with his Jumbesh party, and their reputed dislike of Pashtuns plays an important in local ethnic dynamics and politics. The demographic composition has helped the relative security in Jawzjan. Dostum’s marginalisation from politics in Kabul has meant that the central government has not given the province significant attention, which may well undermine local governance. Opportunistic crime and lawlessness have increased in Jawzjan.

NATO troops in January 2012 gradually began handing over security responsibilities to the Afghan security forces in Jawzjan because of the relative calm in the northern province. Meanwhile, Taliban militants had begun coordinating operations to disrupt the Afghan security forces’ command and control networks. The aim was to enable the Taliban to carry out further operations in Jawjzan, and particularly in Darzab, Qushtepa, Khawja Du Koh, in areas to the north and south of Sheberghan, and in Aqcha (to the east of Sheberghan).

The Taliban currently has a strong presence in Qushtepa, where the mountainous terrain makes it hard for the Afghan security force to conduct sustained operations. Even a major counter-Taliban offensive by Dostum’s forces in 2016 failed to produce a tangible result in the district.

The Taliban in late 2016 was able to seize parts of Khawja Du Koh, though these were retaken by the Afghan security forces. Its presence to the east of Sheberghan near Aqcha is limited, but it has the capacity to launch coordinated attacks on security checkpoints.

IS has a presence in Darzab, as evidenced by killing of at least two militants who were known to be affiliated with it (both of whom were disaffected former Taliban commanders). The group’s presence in the district has been further evidenced in recent months by its clashes with Taliban militants. IS-affiliated militants in Darzab are mainly involved in low-level activities. Militants affiliated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan may attempt to re-establish a presence in northern provinces, including Jawzjan, under the IS banner.

B.9 KabulAround 20 per cent, or one million, of those Kabulis live in the vertiginous hills surrounding the city. Perhaps tellingly, the same percentage (23 per cent) of the capital's residents live below the poverty line. Low-income housing spreads into the hills surrounding the Afghan capital Kabul. Many are merely mud houses, without running water or electricity - and with open sewers running downhill.

Transportation in Kabul is improving as the numbers of new vehicles and experienced drivers are increasing. There is public transportation service in the Kabul vicinity, but many roads are in disrepair. Drivers are also impeded by the large number of cyclists. More vehicles are seen in the city because people are purchasing cars. Taxi cabs are found everywhere in the city, also in most of the districts of Kabul.

Kabul's Milli Bus (National Bus) system, which has about 800 buses, provides service to the city and nearby areas. There are several new highways in the province, and the government has scheduled to rebuild most of the smaller roads. Funding for the roads comes from current drivers who must pay toll charges for driving on highways and major roads. The money is collected by the government through issuing motorists monthly, quarterly or annual inspection certificates that are affixed to the windshield of their vehicles.

Trucks are used to transport goods from one district to another, or to other cities of the country. The Afghan government, with the help of foreign companies or organizations, have begun work on many of

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Kabul's roads. Auto companies like Honda, Toyota, Ford Motor Company, and Chevrolet have also been reintroduced in Kabul.

Kabul is Afghanistan's centre for education. People from all the provinces of the country come toKabul for education. There are many schools and universities that have opened doors for men and women. In the 1970s, about 55% of Kabul's population was educated without materials or proper learning resources to get a proper education, but nowadays most of the young children are sent to work by their parents to support their living costs. The education rate has declined dramatically during the last 20 years. Most of the schools in Kabul were set as battle points during the wars and have been demolished.

Kabul's population has exploded in the past ten years, from one million to more than five million, as rural Afghans flooded into the capital in search of work.

Affordable housing became virtually impossible - illegal dwellings sprang up on government land and tens of thousands of mud houses were built precariously on the surrounding slopes. The most disadvantaged sought shelter in slums and makeshift camps, where there is little water or electricity.

Apart from the men involved in the building industry, the outlying Kabulis never benefited from the city's construction boom Even as the rich residents depart their opulent properties today, landlords are still looking for rents and prices well above the reach of ordinary residents.

After the coalition's withdrawal in 2014, things will get remarkably worse. The International Monetary Fund estimates that foreign aid accounted for 97 per cent of Afghanistan's entire gross domestic product in 2010.

B.10 KunduzThe Taliban enjoys support among significant portions of the local Pashtun population, many of whom feel sidelined by Tajik and Uzbek powerbrokers in the northern province. Kunduz was in a precarious position even before the responsibilities for security provision there were transferred from NATO to Afghan troops in July 2012 (though international forces maintained a limited presence in Khanabad, a district to the south-east of Kunduz’s eponymous provincial capital). The conflict began to escalate in several districts until NATO officially ended its combat mission in Afghanistan – a development which hasplaced operational constraints on the Afghan security forces efforts to contain the escalation of activity. The Taliban has made significant territorial gains throughout Kunduz over the past two years. In late September 2015, hundreds of Taliban militants took part in a coordinated offensive on Afghan security force checkpoints before briefly taking control of Kunduz city. This was the first time the Taliban had captured a provincial capital since it was ousted from power in 2001.

There has been significant fighting in Kunduz province since late April, with an estimated 2,000 militants co-ordinating a series of attacks on security force checkpoints in the districts of Aliabad, Chardara, Imam Sahib and Qala-e Zal. Local reports indicate that the Dasht-e Archi, Chardara, Aliabad, Imam Sahib, Qala-e Zal and Khanabad districts are largely under Taliban control; sporadic fighting between militants and the security forces continues to take place in these districts.

There has been a slight increase in overall Taliban activity in recent weeks, mainly in response to the Afghan security forces’ clearance operations. The province is likely to remain a hotspot for Taliban militants this year, but its capital is unlikely fall to the group because of the frequent airstrikes and the local security forces’ improved capacity. In February and April 2017, the Taliban’s ‘shadow governors’ in Kunduz were killed by airstrikes in Archi district. The removal of the group’s key figures in the province could cause significant disruption to its activities there, particularly given that its fighters may attempt to overrun the city over the coming months. Following the Taliban’s takeover of Qala-e-Zal district, to the west of Kunduz city, in early May, reporting indicated sporadic fighting on the outskirts of the provincial capital.

B.11 ParwanThe province – which lies to the north of Kabul and south of Baghlan – is multi-ethnic. The largest ethnic group there is the Tajik community, and Jamiat-e-Islami has emerged as the main political

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force. The next most powerful group are the Pashtuns affiliated with Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), though they

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exert significantly less influence than do the Tajiks. A controversial NATO raid in June 2015 targeted a personal weapons cache belonging to a key Jamiat-e-Islami commander in the district of Charikar. This resulted in a period of protests against Bagram Airfield, which is the largest US military base in Afghanistan. Such incidents underline the potential for tensions between the US military and local communities.

Before NATO’s drawdown in 2014, militancy in Parwan would follow the seasonal trends seen elsewhere in Afghanistan and peak between May and December. However, while the number of attacks targeting NATO troops elsewhere in the country has generally fallen since then, militants in Parwan have continued to target international forces; this reflects the presence of Bagram Airfield in the province. The Taliban has conducted numerous attacks, including suicide bombings, targeting the base and along the road leading up to it. Bagram Airfield has remained a frequent target of rocket attacks, which attract widespread media coverage and have symbolic value in terms of expressing insurgents’ opposition to the international military presence. The facility also draws on much of the Afghan security forces’ resources for the province, potentially affecting their ability to counter militancy activity elsewhere in Parwan.

The bulk of insurgency in Parwan has continued to take place in the districts of Ghorband, Siagard and Kohi Safi. There appears to be spillover of insurgency from neighbouring Baghlan, where the Taliban in the past years has made territorial gains. However, the overall conflict activity in other parts of Parwan is limited.

The province is likely to remain a key area for the Taliban given its proximity to Kabul and the presence there of Bagram Airfield. Intelligence reporting indicates that the Taliban maintains a training base in Parwan, from where it coordinates suicide attacks on Kabul and NATO troops stationed at Bagram.

Parwan also remains a hotspot for criminal activities, including kidnapping of wealthy Afghan businesspeople. There is also the potential for foreign nationals to be targeted for abduction there, given the ease with which criminal organisations based in the area can transfer their victims to Taliban and Haqqani Network strongholds in eastern Afghanistan.

B.12 SamanganThe central province is ethnically diverse. Three factions affiliated respectively to the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities shape the local politics (albeit in a broadly peaceful manner, unlike in Faryab). Each faction’s support base relates to the demography of a particular district. Hizb Wahdat (the Hazara faction led by Haji Mohammad Mahqaq) is based in Dara-e-Suf. Jamiat-e-Islami has emerged as a key player in the province’s politics.

Samangan in recent years has been more peaceful than many of its neighbouring provinces. Taliban activities have historically been at a low level with only a few harassing attacks on the Afghan security forces recorded during each quarter. There is unlikely to be a significant increase in violence though militant activities will continue to increase in during the spring and summer ‘fighting seasons’ between the months of April and October.

Taliban members in Samangan continue to offer safe havens for their fellow militants from Balkh, Kunduz and Baghlan provinces, particularly when they are fleeing the Afghan security forces. Nevertheless, Taliban militants have only a limited presence in small parts of Dara-e-Suf, to the further west of the capital Aybak, and to the further north of Hazrati Sultan districts. Taliban militants in Samangan tend to be involved in criminal activities rather than attacks on the local Afghan security forces. It appears that Taliban militants in Samangan do not have the intent or the capability toconduct any major attacks or sustained operations against the security forces.

B.13 TakharMost of the north-eastern province’s residents are Tajiks, who are staunchly anti-Taliban. This has remained a pivotal factor in keeping Takhar relatively secure when compared with other provinces in Afghanistan. There is a sufficient Afghan security force presence in Takhar, but the province remains

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susceptible to Taliban. This reflects increased cross-provincial operations by the insurgent group,

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political disputes between rival parties affiliated with the province’s various ethnic communities, insufficient attention from central government, and the lack of a comprehensive security policy. The most notable development in recent years in Takhar took place in late May 2017 was Yasin Zai’sresignation as provincial governor. An ethnic Tajik from Parwan and former jihadi commander, Zai was appointed last year and enjoys wide support in the province. He has personally led anti-insurgent operations in Takhar and Kunduz. He cited personal reasons for his resignation, though media reports suggest that his difficult relationships with the country’s interior and defence ministers played a role. He reportedly took issue with the lack of support they provided during the clashes in Khwaja Bahuddin in April and early May. It is difficult to say how his resignation will affect the security situation, though there is unlikely to be any significant change in the short term.

There was only limited Taliban activity in the province before 2014. However, after NATO ended its combat mission the group stepped up its activities from harassing attacks to large-scale offensives aimed at seizing territory. In August 2016, the Taliban temporarily overran Khwaja Ghar district, and launched a further offensive to take Yangi Qala before the district was retaken by the Afghan security forces. It currently has a significant presence in the Darqad, Khwaja Ghar and Ishkamish districts in the northwest of the province, and has the capacity to strike various parts of Takhar. Afghan security forces and pro-government militias affiliated to local powerbrokers retain control over most of the province. The Taliban is likely to intensify its assaults in key districts where the Afghan security forces lack international support in an effort to make further territorial gains before the conclusion of the fighting season.

The Taliban’s overall level of activity in Takhar in recent months has been relatively insignificant province over the past few months. However, the rapid takeover of Khwaja Ghar was an indication of the group’s capabilities. The apparent lack of coordination between the various branches of the Afghan security forces is among the principle causes of the Taliban’s increasing ability to seize territory. The incremental loss of Kunduz province borders to Takhar to the Taliban over the past two years resulted in turmoil in its capital city.

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Annex C. NGO Project Overview

C.1 ActionAid67

The Goal of the REALISE project is for: Rural communities in Jawzjan, Balkh and Bamyan Provinces of Afghanistan to participate meaningfully to increase their resilience to shocks and seasonal constraints to their food and livelihood security. Project activities are designed to address the challenges of low agricultural productivity, low capacity to generate income and weak community participation, particularly of women. REALISE utilises ActionAid’s well-established climate resilient sustainable agriculture (CRSA) approach which is grounded in the human rights based approach (HRBA) and promotes local solutions for food and livelihood security that are combined with modern technologies and scientific knowledge.

ActionAid has chosen to work in six districts, where initial gains are being made by existing programs that have strong potential for scale-up and expansion. It aims to ensure the meaningful participation of 97 rural communities in three provinces in developing their resilience to shocks and seasonal fluctuations in food and livelihood security.

Project Summary – ActionAid Australia

Project Name Resilient Agriculture and Livelihoods Initiative for Socio-Economic Empowerment (REALISE)

Province(s) (3) Balkh, Bamiyan, and Jawzjan

Budget (DFAT only, excluding other funding sources)DFAT: $5,883,430

Target beneficiaries 12,269 households with 121,525 men and women

Life of Program31 May 2014 – 31 May 2018*

Implementation Partners ActionAid Afghanistan Organisation of Human Welfare (OHW) People’s Action for Change (PAC) International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA)

End of Project Outcome Rural communities in targeted areas to participate meaningfully to increase their resilience to shocks

and seasonal constraints to their food and livelihood security.

Intermediate Outcomes Increased food & nutritional security for vulnerable men, women and children in participating

households. An increased economic asset base for vulnerable men and women in participating households. Participating groups of vulnerable men and women influencing decision-making, service provision

and policies affecting their food and livelihood security.

*Subject to seven month extension to 31 December 2018

67 From the ActionAid REALISE Design Document 2014.

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C.2 Aga Khan Foundation68

The Goal of the AKF-A project is to: improved household livelihoods and coping mechanisms in targeted communities in Takhar, Baghlan, Bamyan, Parwan, Samangan and Kunduz Provinces. Project strategies are based around AKF-A’s Multi-Input Area Development (MIAD) approach which adopts multi-sectoral interventions in concentrated areas, capitalizing on the strengths of several AKDN agencies. Key results were anticipated in the project’s four Immediate Outcomes:

1. Male and female farmers experiencing increased agriculture production in crops and livestock by using improved technology and methods for integrated dry-land farming.

2. Male and female community members will also be better placed to respond to natural disasters and the effects of climate change, through participatory trainings in improved community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) and disaster preparedness.

3. Members of CDCs, schools, and community based groups will learn to integrate disaster risk mitigation plans into their existing systems, particularly their village development plans.

4. Finally, investments in market systems will foster alternative livelihoods opportunities for farmers and young people and vulnerable households – through improved access to markets, diversified income opportunities through vocational training and increased possibilities of credit and savings.

Project Summary – Aga Khan Foundation Afghanistan (AKF-A)

Project Name Multi-Input, Multi-Agency Approach to Building Community Resilience and Livelihoods in Central

and Northern Afghanistan

Province(s) (6) Baghlan, Bamyan, Kunduz, Parwan, Samangan, and Takhar

Budget (DFAT only, excluding other funding sources) DFAT: $7,317,414

Target beneficiaries 3,200 households with 45,937 men and women (386 villages)

Life of Program 31 July 2014 – 31 May 2018

Implementation Partners Aga Khan Agency for Habitat

End of Project Outcome Improved household livelihoods and coping mechanisms in targeted communities

Intermediate Outcomes Improved agricultural and livestock productivity for male and female farmers. Increased income for male and female farmers and agricultural service providers. Diversified sources of income for vulnerable households. Increased preparedness of vulnerable communities to mitigate the effects of and respond to natural

disasters.

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68 From the AKF-A Design Document 2014.

69 From the CARE Design Document 6

C.3 CARE69

CARE’s ‘Resilient Livelihoods Project’ aims to contribute to access to sustainable livelihoods for, and strengthened resilience of, vulnerable rural communities in Balkh Province. The project will reach beneficiaries in two disadvantaged Balkh rural districts of Charkint and Khulm. The two target districts vary greatly in geography – Charkint is mountainous, while Khulm is located on a fertile river plain.

Within these communities, the project will specifically target asset poor and vulnerable households including women-headed households, people with disability, landless and sharecroppers, households in remote areas, internally displaced people and returnees, disaster prone and affected households, and at-risk youth (18-24 year-olds).

Project Summary – CARE Australia

Project Name Resilient Livelihoods Project for Vulnerable Rural Communities in Balkh Province, Afghanistan.

Province(s) (1) Balkh

Budget (DFAT only, excluding other funding sources) DFAT: $2,500,000

Target beneficiaries Direct: 1,450 households (11,600 people). Indirect: 2,719 households (21,752 people).

Life of Program 1 January 2015 – 31 May 2018*

Implementation Partners CARE International in Afghanistan

End of Project Outcome End-of-Project Outcome 1: Poor wheat farming households have improved food security, income

and resilience. End-of-Project Outcome 2: Landless and labour-constrained households are more resilient to food

insecurity and have greater access to social and economic opportunities. End-of-Project Outcome 3: Vulnerable groups are able to influence decision making processes

relating to their livelihoods and their needs will be addressed in decision-making fora.

Intermediate Outcomes Improved agricultural practices and production. HHs are accessing agricultural related information and networks. Landless and labour-constrained HHs have skills and resources that make them more resilient to

shocks. Landless and labour-constrained HHs able to supplement diet with nutritious food and sell excess. The needs of vulnerable groups are addressed in decision making.

*Subject to seven month extension to 31 July 2018

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C.4 OXFAM70

The goal of the resilient livelihoods project in Daikundi province is to reduce household vulnerability to livelihood and food insecurity. Oxfam’s program addresses livelihood and food insecurity through targeted interventions to improve the production of dairy and almond producers. This is to occur through organisation into more profitable producer enterprises and cooperatives, facilitated linkages with markets to access better prices and increased household income. Post-harvest losses are anticipated to decrease through more effective processing, packing and storage mechanisms to increase the value add.

By the end of the four-year project, Oxfam’s intervention will have achieved stronger and more inclusive community leadership structures, improved linkage between communities and local government, increased market access, increased agricultural production capacity and improved food security.Households in target communities will have moved beyond subsistence level through their engagement with markets and increased income generation opportunities. Households will have accumulated assets enabling them to better cope with shocks and stresses. Women in particular will be empowered through improved knowledge, awareness and skills that will enable them to play a more active role in their own development.

The project is implemented in 20 villages within Sharistan and Nili districts in Daikundi. Ten villages in each district have been targeted.

Project Summary – OXFAM

Project Name Resilient Livelihoods in Daikundi Province, Afghanistan

Province(s) (1) Daikundi

Budget (DFAT only, excluding other funding sources) $2,500,000

Target beneficiaries 14,987 men and women

Life of Program 1 January 2015 – 28 June 2018*

Implementation Partners Organisation of Human Welfare (OHW) Oxfam Novib

End of Project Outcome Reduced household vulnerability to livelihood and food insecurity.

Intermediate Outcomes Improved access to markets for dairy and almond producer groups and enterprises. Increased food production for small-scale dairy and almond producers. Increased inclusiveness and equity in village development initiatives.

*Subject to four month extension to 30 September 2018

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70 From the OXFAM Design Document 2014

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C.5 World Vision71

The goal of the Strengthening Communities to Build Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Project is for communities and families in Badghis to have livelihoods that are sustainable and inclusive of vulnerable groups. The project Theory of Change (ToC) recognises that these will be achieved through three key strategies – community mobilisation, building on existing structures and capacity building/institutional strengthening. Targeting four districts of Badghis Province - Qadis, Ab Kamary, Qal-I-Naw and Moqur - in Western Afghanistan.

The project seeks to address sustainable livelihoods at four different levels of intervention: (1) Household/community level: strategies at this level are aimed at equipping producer group members with improved agriculture skills and provision of agriculture inputs. (2) Agriculture Institution level: The project is supporting DAIL and the community to develop an extension service mechanism to address agriculture issues more effectively and efficiently. (3) Market Systems level: strategies at this level are enabling producer groups to improve access to the market. The project is linking PGs to larger markets in Herat and other provinces. (4) Community Based Organisation level: community Shuras and CDC play important roles in rural development in Afghanistan. The project is currently working with these CBOs in better understanding the needs of the vulnerable (female-headed households, people living with disabilities and landless families) and to create the knowledge and skills to help involve vulnerable groups to identify their challenges and initiate activities aimed at addressing immediate and long term needs.

Project Summary – World Vision Australia and World Vision Afghanistan

Project NameStrengthening Communities to Build Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods in Badghis

Province(s) (1) Badghis

Budget (DFAT only, excluding other funding sources)DFAT: $5,576,353

Target beneficiaries 115,000 individuals

Life of Program31 May 2014 – 31 May 2018

Implementation Partners Voice of Women Organisation

End of Project Outcome Communities and families in Badghis have livelihoods that are more sustainable and inclusive of

vulnerable groups.

Intermediate Outcomes Families are more food secure. Producers sell more products in existing and new markets. The vulnerable, including women headed households are benefiting from project initiatives.

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71 From the W orld Vision AACRS MTR Report 2016

Annex D - Key Evaluation QuestionsOECD DACCriteria

Key Evaluation Question Sub question Data Collection Method

Relevance Does the program logic, scheme- approach and governance of the AACRS remain valid or requires change(s)?

To what extent do the program objectives still align with DFAT’s policy objectives?

How does AACRS complement DFAT’s broader portfolio of work? Is there any overlap with other programs?

To what extent do the program objectives still align with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s policy objectives?

What are the major strengths of the program and how might these be leveraged?

What opportunities are there to improve the program design and implementation?

To what extent have the resilience and livelihood needs and aspirations of participating communities and key stakeholders been incorporated into and supported by the Scheme?’

To what extent does the original program logic provide adequate detail on the theory of action to enable partners to use it to guide their implementation?

Document review

Interviews

What is the potential scope of a second phase of the AACRS after 2018? What should a “phase two” look like?

Are the assumptions and risk assessments in the original program logic still valid in the current environment?

What value has been derived from a scheme-approach to delivery? Is there any evidence to suggest that the outcome of the program is greater than the sum of its parts?

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How have governance arrangements influenced how partners relate with each other or deliver their projects?

How could the program structure be amended to enhance the effectiveness of individual projects?

How best could this level of funding (approx. AUD6m annually over 4 years) in this sector achieve the

Efficiency Has the scheme demonstrated an efficient use of resources in delivering quality products and services?

Is the AACRS being implemented as intended?

Is the AACRS approach in Afghanistan the most efficient way to support the development of community resilience?

Document review

Literature scan

Interviews

Survey

Secondary data analysis

Effectiveness What is the level and added value of collaboration a) between NGO projects; and b) between NGO projects and government agencies and/or other development actors; and what can be done to improve a) and b)?

To what extent does the Scheme contribute to establishing effective and sustainable partnerships –at the delivery, management and governance levels?

To what extent and in what ways have NGOs collaborated with each other to deliver their projects? What have been the resource implications of this?

To what extent has collaboration between NGOs changed the way they deliver their projects? What effect has this had on beneficiaries?

To what extent and in what ways have NGOs worked with other government agencies or development actors?

To what extent has collaboration between NGOs and other development actors changed the way they deliver their projects? What effect has this had on beneficiaries?

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What factors have enabled or inhibited collaboration between actors?

What are lessons learned at the scheme level (i.e. scheme approaches and governance, project intervention, cross-cutting approaches such as gender equality and disability inclusion); and how best can those be integrated in the remaining implementation, or in a potential second phase?

What data is available to assess the effectiveness of the scheme-approach to delivering program outcomes?

What mechanisms are in place to generate and share learning at the scheme level, and to what extent are these effective?

To what extent have lessons learned at the scheme level influenced the practice of implementing partners? What factors have influenced the uptake of lessons learned?

To what extent do lessons learned validate or challenge the program logic and underpinning rationale for the scheme approach?

Is the AACRS approach an effective way of promoting resilience and livelihood development among rural communities? If so why and under what conditions does it work best?

To what extent has the project strengthened the capacity of CSOs?

Is the AACRS approach an effective way of promoting gender equality and women’s economic empowerment in the Afghan context? If so why and under what conditions does it work best?

Document review

Literature scan

Interviews

Survey

Secondary data analysis

Case studies

Impact Are the current NGO projects on track to achieve the intermediate and long term outcomes of the AACRS?

To what extent has the Scheme contributed towards community resilience and livelihood development goals?

Have the projects improved reach, diversification and capacity to deliver improved products and services?

To what extent have the resilience and livelihood needs and aspirations of participating communities and

Document review

Interviews

Secondary data analysis

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stakeholders been realised as a consequence of the project?

Were there any unintended consequences of the project?

Sustainability What is the level of sustainability in the current NGO projects; how can the AACRS strengthen the sustainability of the outcomes by the end of the NGO projects?

Do partners have clear sustainability and exit strategies? To what extent are they being implemented?

To what extent are local CSOs reliant on program funding?

How has the government been engaged to promote project sustainability?

What measures have been taken to ensure community ownership of programs?

What consideration been given to alternate project designs or implementation mechanisms that are less reliant on donor funding?

Document review

Interviews

Survey

Secondary data analysis

Gender Equality

How effective are the NGO projects in improving the economic and social position of women? What are the factors that contribute and / or hinder successful approaches?

To what extent are AACRS’s investments promoting women’s economic empowerment?

To what extent are AACRS’s investments supporting national and regional efforts to end violence against women and girls?

To what extent has the project impacted on GBV and the safety of women in both public and private spaces?

To what extent are AACRS’s investments promoting women’s leadership and participation in decision- making?

Has the Scheme helped to develop capacity, including of CSOs, and other project stakeholders, to understand and promote gender equality in AACRS activities? If so how?

Document review

Literature scan

Interviews

Survey

Secondary data analysis

Case studies

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What access have women had to project resources compared with men? (for example access to project funding, market information, supply chains etc.)

What practical benefits have been received by women compared with men? (for example increased income, better access to services in their community)

Is there any evidence of changes in gender relations due to project activities? (E.g. differences in the way women are viewed or treated within the household, farming groups and in the community?)

What processes have been used to integrate gender equality into the project? (For example to what extent have investments drawn on quality gender analysis to set priorities for assistance, and integrated gender equality effectively in their designs?)

To what extent have AACRS’s investments integrated measurement of GBV and gender equality in their monitoring and evaluation frameworks, and is this information being used to improve the project’s performance in these areas and to ensure they are not putting women at risk?

How have women participated in the project compared with men?

Disability Inclusion

How effective are the NGO projects in improving the economic and social position of people living with a disability? What are the factors that contribute and / or hinder successful approaches?

Has the project helped to develop capacity, including of CSOs and other project stakeholders, to understand and promote disability inclusion in AACRS activities? If so how?

What access have people living with a disability had to project resources? (for example access to project funding, market information, supply chains etc.)

Document review

Literature scan

Interviews

Survey

Secondary data analysis

Case studies

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What practical benefits have been received by people living with a disability? (for example increased income, better access to services in their community)

Is there any evidence of changes in inclusion due to project activities? (E.g. differences in the way people living with a disability are viewed or treated within the household, farming groups and in the community?)

What processes have been used to mainstream disability inclusion into the project? (For example to what extent have investments drawn on quality analysis to set priorities for assistance, and integrated disability mainstreaming effectively in their designs?)

To what extent have AACRS’s investments integrated disability inclusion measures in their monitoring and evaluation frameworks, and is this information being used to improve the project’s performance on disability inclusion?

Annex E - MethodsThis annex provides an outline of each of the methods of information/data collection and analysis that were used to inform the MTR, enabling the key evaluation questions to be answered and outcomes of the Scheme to be assessed. There were six core methods of data collection and analysis used to answer the evaluation questions. These are discussed below.

Document review: This was one of the major data collection activities. The evaluation team collated, codified and analyzed the data collected to produce an initial register of issues and impacts related to the evaluation questions and OECD-DAC criteria. This included analysis of Scheme and project outputs and outcomes; thematic analysis of activity and outcomes; and analysis of the organizational structures and processes, which was validated in the later stakeholder consultation.

Secondary analysis of data: This involved an analysis of the project activity and outcomes data where available and reliable (including the individual mid term reviews from each NGO), held by the NGOs. The M&E frameworks designed for each of the programs in addition to the overarching Scheme MELF.

Data was also compiled from AIM (Analysis Incident Mapping), Control Risks’ proprietary incident database, for terrorism incidents in 12 Afghan provinces (Baghlan, Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Baghdis, Bamyan, Daykundi, Parwan, Takhar, Kunduz and Ghazni) over the period 2012-2017. Control Risks define terrorism as any activity that is committed for political, religious, ideological or similar purposes, involving a violent act or the unlawful use of force or an unlawful act dangerous to human life or tangible property. Its intent is to intimidate/coerce a local population; to disrupt any segment of the economy; to overthrow, influence, affect a government’s conduct by intimidation, coercion; affect a government’s conduct by mass destruction, assassination, hostage taking, kidnapping.

Analysis involved mapping trends and the security trajectory in these locations and the factors, such as security and government infrastructure, Taliban presence or ethnic considerations, which may impact the security environment.

Literature scan of promising practice: The document review provided preliminary indications of the key strengths and weaknesses of the program. In order to contextualize the assessment of program effectiveness and to inform recommendations to leverage strengths and address weaknesses, literature on key areas including rural enterprise and livelihoods development interventions, including business education strategies and graduation supply chain development, off farm income generation and income diversification strategies; and strategies to promote women’s economic empowerment and leadership were reviewed. This involved a search of Australian and international journals and online databases such as Cochrane, CINAHL Plus, DARE (Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects), and Science Direct. Emerging findings from the review were explored with key stakeholders and helped to inform the consideration of options for the future (the relevance/policy alignment/sustainability assessment) as well as the assessment of project impact and outcomes.

In-depth interviews/Stakeholder consultation: The evaluation team conducted 21 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders to gain qualitative insights on the operation of the project and outcomes achieved (please refer to Annex F for the list of stakeholders consulted). The interviews were conducted via telephone or skype call. Interview guides were developed for each of the stakeholder groups. These interviews were intended to obtain detailed qualitative information and insights on the experiences of all actors with the Scheme. This information provided valuable triangulation of the quantitative secondary data, and the document review data. Views were sought on:

their experience with the project;

the extent to which they found the organizational learning and development constructive;

the current and future benefits of the project and activities;

the degree to which they consider that the project has had an impact on resilience and livelihoods in their community; and

overall satisfaction with the project.

Survey: Given the centrality of the partnership approach in the design and expected success for implementation of the AACRS in the context of CSOs in Afghanistan, assessing the extent to which

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partnerships have been effective was a key outcome of the MTR. The Relational ProximityTM

Framework was a tool that was adapted and used to measure the effectiveness of the relationship between two entities to determine how well each understands the thinking and behaviour of the other.

The tool is based on a survey approach and was administered verbally through coupling with existing consultation process as outlined above. The survey provided a baseline scorecard of the quality of relationships between the various partnerships within the AACRS and as understood from both sides of therelationship.

Case studies: The purpose of the case studies was to gather in-depth information about actors’ experiences of participating or interfacing with the project and the benefits and outcomes of the scheme.

This assisted the MTR to understand:

what has/hasn’t worked and what factors have influenced the effectiveness of the activities;

how the project has contributed to outcomes for rural communities; and

what improvements could be made to project to improve outcomes for rural communities – including women and girls.

The case studies combined qualitative information, gathered primarily through the consultations and the secondary data available.

Annex F – Stakeholders ConsultedPosition Organisation

Director, Afghanistan Development Section DFAT

AACRS Program Manager DFAT

Gender and performance Specialist DFAT

Counsellor (Development) Australian Embassy, Kabul

Senior Program Manager Australian Embassy, Kabul

Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Grants Advisor - Middle East, Program Management World Vision

Portfolio Manager – Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East

Oxfam Australia

Program Manager Economic Development, Justice and Women’s Rights

ActionAid Australia

Senior Program Officer, Afghanistan, Jordan, Bangladesh

CARE Australia

National Program Coordinator for Market Sector Development

Aga-Khan Foundation Afghanistan

Project Coordinator Voice of Women

M&E Officer Voice of Women

Program Manager OHW

Zone Manager World Vision Afghanistan

Senior Project Manager FOCUS

M&E Manger FOCUS

National Program Manager FOCUS

Program Officer FOCUS

Team Leader Implementation FOCUS

Livelihood Advisor for Asia programs Handicap International

Handicap International Handicap International

Annex G – Example Policy Dialogue Framework

Related strategic pathway

Area of policy interest

Policy outcome sought Program entry points for policy

dialogue

Influential stakeholders

Resources required

Policy dialogue lead for DFAT

Management responsibility

Strengthening regional architecture to develop and implement effective regional economic development policies and services

Regional policy and governance

Development of legitimate, effective regional economic development architecture.

Development of a Regional Economic Development Framework

Development of regional norms and standards

Focus on the needs of the poor and marginalised.

Inclusion of gender equality and disability-inclusive targets and activities.

Annual meetings of donor partners/ Directors of MRRD and MAIL.

? Entry points between meetings.

DFID, USAID,World Bank, UN agencies

Providing specialised services in selected areas

Disease/Pest surveillance and response

Common national approaches to national data collection and analysis

Coordination and division of labour between MRRD and MAIL.

Alignment of donor partner efforts to strengthen national market information systems, disease surveillance and response systems.

Partnership for Development discussions.

Funding negotiations

? other opportunities

DFID, USAID,World Bank, UN agencies

Technical cooperation

Country level technical cooperation which is part of a joint work program, costed, linked to national policies/plans, avoids duplication and grounded in capacity building framework.

Performance discussions based upon the reports of independent monitoring group. (When?, where?)

UN agencies, DFID, USAID,World Bank, Australian institutions.

63

Annex H – Scheme and Project Level Achievements by NGOH.1 World Vision72

Scheme Level Achievements Against Scheme MEFBroad Themes Scheme Level Indicators Related Project Indicators Baseline Value Mid-Term Value

Resilience Change in household agricultural production

% increase in crops yield compared to baseline

Wheat 2230.8 kg

Potatoes 526.9 kg

Vegetables 433.7 kg

Wheat 3379.8 kg

Potatoes 893.6 kg

Vegetables 760.9 Kg

% increase in sales value of the agriculture products compared to baseline

496 Kgs 2,660 Kgs

Increase in the % of producers applying agriculture inputs

Pesticides 18.8%

Fertilisers 18.0%

WV Seeds 1.1%

Pesticides 88.7%

Fertilisers 88.0%

WV Seeds 98.9%Increase in collective action through thematic groups of community members

Increase in the number of market connections created from producer groups

Data not available for report Data not available for report

# of producer groups formed 0 groups 95 groups

Partnership Increase in private agricultural sector service providers

N/A

72 WVA. 2016. “AACRS Mid Term Evaluation Report”

Broad Themes Scheme Level Indicators Related Project Indicators Baseline Value Mid-Term Value

established and active in the communityIncrease in the number of partnerships established in AACRS catchment areas

Inclusive Decision- making

Change in the number of women who participate in income generating activities (separate agriculture and non-agriculture)

% increase in sales volume and values of agriculture products compared to baseline for women producers targeted from the project

mean sales volume - 530 Kgs

mean sales income -9408 Afs

mean sales volume - 2,764 Kgs

mean sales income - 34,860 Afs

Increase in the % of women, landless people and people with disability who report to be active members of community groups

Disabled: 1.5%

Female: 1.0%

Landless: 0.5%

Disabled: 62.5%

Female: 65.4%

Landless: 50.0%

Women Empowermen t

Increase in women in management positions in community structures

N/A

Project Level Achievements Against Project MEFReference Indicators Indicator Definition Baseline

ValueMidterm

ValueTarget Status

OUTCOME 1 - FAMILIES ARE MORE FOOD SECURE

1.0.1 Decrease in the average number of months of food shortages

Average number of months of food shortage in the household in the past 12 months based on information from households where food was scarce or unavailable and caregivers were unable to purchase adequate amounts of food

7.5 months 1.0 months 3.0 months

1.0.2 Increase in the % of households that have an acceptable food consumption score (FAO Food Security Index)

Three categories of food consumption score according to FAO Food Consumption Score (FCS) Index are: poor food consumption, borderline food consumption and acceptable food consumption

22.4% 80.8% 25%

1.0.3 Increase in the % of HH that are food secure (FAO Food Security Index)

Three categories of food security according to FAO Food Security Index are: food insecure, borderline and food secure.

17.1% 96.0% 20%

1.1.1 % of HHs selling preserved and processed food

Processing and preservation technologies: drying fruit and vegetables, storage methods (underground storage), sorting

4.5% 70.1% 20%

1.1.2 Increase in the % of households applying food processing and preservation technology

Processing and preservation technologies: drying fruit and vegetables, storage methods (underground storage), sorting

41.4% 99.5% 60%

1.2.1 Increase in the % of HHs using at least one improved agricultural practices

Improved agriculture practices: producers are planting in lines, weeding, pest and disease management, harvest and post-harvest processes

71.4% 99.7% 95%

1.2.2 % increase in crops yield compared to baseline

Crops promoted by the project (soybeans, wheat, potatoes, fruit, vegetables, honey, chickens and pistachios). Mean yields (kgs) calculated at household level in Jerib.

Wheat2230.8 kg Potatoes526.9 kg

Wheat3379.8 kg Potatoes893.6 kg

Wheat 3,200 kgPotatoe s 580

Reference Indicators Indicator Definition Baseline Value

Midterm Value

Target Status

OUTCOME 1 - FAMILIES ARE MORE FOOD SECURE

Vegetables433.7 kg

Vegetables760.9 Kg760.9 kg

Vegetable s 500Kg

1.3.1 Increase in the % of producers applying agriculture inputs (fertilizer, and improved seeds)

Agriculture inputs refer toa) seeds and plant material, water, fertilisers and pesticidesb) poultry and bee-keeping activities inputsc) processing and preservation training# of producers that planted seeds given by the project and are cultivating the crops promoted by the project. Number of producers who are using the fertilizers, pesticides and water for irrigation

Pesticide s 18.8%Fertilisers 18.0%WV Seeds 1.1%

Pesticide s 88.7%Fertiliser s 88.0%WV Seeds 98.9%

Fertilisers 25%WV Seeds 30%

1.4.1 Increase in number of hectares irrigated

This would assist in the measurement of effectiveness. Contributing to this indicator would be the level of production for a certain area of land over time, and the total amount of land now irrigated

4,265.4Jerib

1,689.6Jerib

7000 Jerib

1.4.2 Number of hectares irrigated using water conserving methods

Conserving method includes locally made drip irrigation (plastic bottle), water harvesting, basin irrigation system, furrow irrigation system

306.2 Jerib 2990.7Jerib

500 Jerib

1.4.3 % of farmers who are able to identify at least 3 things/ ways for irrigation effectiveness

% of farmers who are able to identify 3 things/ ways for irrigation effectiveness

4.4% 85.4% 10%

Reference Indicators Indicator Definition Baseline Value

Midterm Value

Target Status

OUTCOME 2 - PRODUCERS SELL MORE PRODUCTS IN EXISTING AND NEW MARKETS2.0.1 % increase in sales value

of the agriculture products compared to baseline

Producers: including farmers or individuals engaged in 'agricultural enterprises' including fruit, vegetable farming, bee- keeping, and chicken hatcheries'. Selling refer to sales in the market- local district level and Provincial level (Badghis Province centre market). Selling refer to money value

10,262 Afs 49.917Afs

15,000Afs

Reference Indicators Indicator Definition Baseline Value

Midterm Value

Target Status

OUTCOME 2 - PRODUCERS SELL MORE PRODUCTS IN EXISTING AND NEW MARKETS2.0.2 % increase in sales volume

of agriculture products compared to baseline

Volume refers to KGs sold of main agricultural products – soybeans, wheat, potatoes, fruit, vegetables, honey, chickens and pistachios. Average is the means amount sold per household in kgs multiplied by total number of PGs sampled.

496 Kgs 2,660 Kgs 700Kgs

2.1.1 Increase in the number of market connections created from producer groups

Market connections refers to quality of market connections, the diversity of these connections and the number of targeted products produced and marketed by the local producer group.

.24 points 5.08points

N/A

2.1.2 Increase in the number and percentage of producer group members that demonstrate a good understanding of key marketing skills

Good understanding of key marketing skills refers to whether households feel that they know how to market their products

4.2% 98.0% 40%

2.2.1 # of producer groups formed Households who are members of local producer groups 0 groups 95 groups 80groups

2.2.2 # of men and # of women members of producer’s groups trained on marketing skills

Men and women that understanding the impact of trainings in terms of sustainable knowledge on marketing. Sustainable knowledge includes self-assessment of marketing skills, financial management skills, and the degree of women members of the household integrating into economic production activities.

0 points 7.45 points N/A

Reference Indicators Indicator Definition Baseline Value

Midterm Value

Target Status

OUTCOME 3 - THE VULNERABLE, INCLUDING WOMEN HEADED HOUSEHOLDS ARE BENEFITING FROM PROJECT INITIATIVES3.0.1 % increase in sales volume

and values of agriculture products compared to baseline for women producers targeted from the project

Sales volume and sales value of eight agricultural products, including soybeans, wheat, potato, fruit, vegetables, honey, chicken hatcheries and pistachios for women producers.

530 Kgs9,408 Afs

2,764 Kgs34,860 Afs

700 Kgs11,000 Afs

Reference Indicators Indicator Definition Baseline Value

Midterm Value

Target Status

OUTCOME 3 - THE VULNERABLE, INCLUDING WOMEN HEADED HOUSEHOLDS ARE BENEFITING FROM PROJECT INITIATIVES3.0.2 Marginalised and

vulnerable community members report to feeling valued and respected from community groups and leaders

Marginalised and vulnerable include female-headed household, landless family, disabled-head of household

38.3% 52.2% 60%

3.1.1 Increase in the average # of groups that are fulfilling their management plans and responsibilities

CDCs have consistent membership, shared vision, shared rules and responsibilities and management plans in place

8.65 points 17.46points

14 points

3.1.2 Increase in the % of women, landless people and people with disability who report to be active members of community groups

Active participation means that the most vulnerable take part regularly in CDCs meeting and are part of the decision- making processes

Disabled: 1.5%Female: 1.0%Landless: 0.5%

Disabled: 62.5%Female: 65.4%Landless: 50.0%

Disabled: 5%Female: 10%Landless: 20%

3.1.3 Increase in the average # of development initiatives pursued that target the vulnerable and marginalised groups

Initiatives that are undertaken from CDCs.Pursued - initiatives that are designed, applied for, concepts generated, discussions begun between CDC and community groups.

3.0initiatives

4.2initiatives

6initiatives

3.2.1 Trained community leaders and group members can articulate the benefits of including women, people leaving with disability, female head of households and landless households in community development initiatives

Community leaders are: Village Shura, religious leadersGroup members are CDCs members

Household Perception:5.35 points CDC Perception:5.11 points

Household Perception:14.6 points CDC Perception: 14.78 points

Household Perception: 8 points CDCPerception: 10 points

3.2.2 # of Shura and Mullahs trained in the celebrating families’ curriculum and curricula on inclusiveness

MoU signed with village Shuras for the celebrating family curriculum and training curriculum on inclusiveness

0 trained 884 trained 300 trained

73 ActionAid. 2016. “AACRS Mid Term Evaluation

Reference Indicators Indicator Definition Baseline Value

Midterm Value

Target Status

OUTCOME 4 - PARTNERS AND WV STAFF HAVE THE SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE TO IMPLEMENT AND SUPPORT THE PROGRAM AND ENGAGE IN CONTINUOUS LEARNING4.1.1 Increase in the # of

government extension worker visits to the community

# visits to farms and producer groups by DAIL and other relevant departments

.29 visits 4.61 visits 12visits

H.2 Action Aid73

Scheme Level Achievements Against Scheme MEFThe Mid Term Review conducted on the ActionAid project reported that there was no quantitative routine data to work on except from the baseline survey. It is, therefore, difficult to ascertain the extent to which the project has made progress in contributing to overall improved resilience to shocks and seasonal food insecurity. It is also not possible to report against the project logical framework.

Project Level Achievements Against Project MEFReference Indicators Baseline Value Midterm

ValueTarget Status

EoP Outcome 1: Increased food & nutritional security for community vulnerable men, women and children in participating households.

% of participating communities report that their food security situation has improved

% of participating households reporting use of less severe coping mechanisms

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

Unable to determin e

74 Aga Khan Foundation Afghanistan. 2016. “AACRS Mid Term Evaluation

EoP Outcome 2: Increased economic asset base for vulnerable men and women in participating households.

Expenditure patterns (for instance decreased health and reduced spending on food)

% of households report increased investment (money or labour) in livestock, trees, savings and land.

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

Unable to determine

EoP Outcome 3: Participating groups of vulnerable men and

# of Food and Livelihood Security issues raised with government

% of participating communities

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

Unable to determine

H.3 Aga Khan Foundation Afghanistan74

Scheme Level Achievements Against Scheme MEFBroad Themes Scheme Level Indicators Related Project Indicators Baseline Value Mid-Term Value

Resilience Households better able to address their own needs

Average yield for each HH for each key agricultural product (compared to baseline)

Refer to table below Refer to table below

Average HH income from non-farm livelihoods (compared to baseline)

Refer to table below Refer to table below

Average HH income from farm livelihoods

(compared to baseline)

Refer to table below Refer to table below

Inclusive and Responsive Governance

More inclusive community governance To what extent are vulnerable people represented in decision-making groups

Qualitative indicator – refer to body of report

Qualitative indicator – refer to body of report

To what extent have community decision- making bodies improved their processes,

Qualitative indicator – refer to body of report

Qualitative indicator – refer to body of report

Broad Themes Scheme Level Indicators Related Project Indicators Baseline Value Mid-Term Value

and become more inclusive and responsive during AACRS?% increase in access to productive land and water by vulnerable HHs

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

More responsive institutions (government, community institutions and business)

To what extent have relationship between the communities/ HHs and institutions lead to:

- a better understanding of the needs of the communities and HHs

- increased trust

- increase reciprocity

Qualitative indicator – refer to body of report

Qualitative indicator – refer to body of report

Project Level Achievements Against Project MEFReference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

1. Male and female farmers have increased their agricultural and livestock productivity

1.1 Average productivity for selected agricultural crops per hectare, in the project target areas.

Baghlan&Bamyan:

Wheat, 3.1mt/ha;Tomatoes 16mt/ha;

Onions 31mt/ha;

Potatoes 25mt/ha;

Apple 14mt/ha;

Apricot 14mt/ha

Baghlan & Bamyan

Wheat, 4mt/ha

Tomatoes

32mt/ha Onions

33mt/ha Potatoes

34mt/ha Apple

19mt/ha Apricot

18mt/ha

Baghlan & Bamyan

Wheat, 4mt/ha

Tomatoes 35mt/ha

Onions 33mt/ha

Potatoes 35mt/ha

Apple 21mt/ha

Apricot 21mt/ha

Reference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

Takhar:

Flax 0.5 mt/ha

Chickpea 0.8 mt/ha

Watermelon 9 mt/ha

Takhar

Flax 0.8mt/ha

Chickpea 0.9mt/ha

Watermelon

1.0mt/ha

Takhar

Flax 0.9mt/ha

Chickpea 1mt/ha

Watermelon

12mt/ha1.2 Average productivity for selected livestock production in project target areas

Milk:

3.4 liters/day/ local breed cow;

8.3 liters/day/ improved breed cow

Meat: 75.5/kg/calf

Eggs: 155/tear/

chicken.

Milk:

4.67 liters/day/ local breed cow;

17.17 liters/day/ improved breed cow

Meat: 72.50 /kg/calf Local breed 100 /kg/calf improved breed

Eggs: 200/tear/ chicken

40% increase

2. Male and female farmers and agricultural service providers’ have increased income

2.1. Average income per day of agricultural crop service providers (male and female)

3$ per day 14% Per Day 7 % per day

2.2. Average income per day of livestock service providers (male and female)

10$ per day 17% Per day 18% per day

2.3. % increase in income per year of agricultural crop farmers (male and female)

21% 11% increase 35%

Reference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

2.4. % increase in income per year of livestock farmers (male and female)

13% 13% increase 35%

3. Vulnerable HHs have diversified their income sources

3.1 # of vulnerable households (m/f headed) with diversified sources of income (more than one income source)

0 Total: 248

Male: 81

Female: 167

Total:581

Male: 232

Female: 249

4. m/f members of vulnerable HHs (especially youth) gain employment in at least one additional area, including but not limited to starting their own business

4.1 % of male and female youth of vulnerable HHs trained who found employment in or started own business

0 Average: 68% (59%m/77%f) Average: 71% (73%m/68%f)

5. Businesses and vulnerable HH members are accessing high quality services provided by BDSPs and BMOs, and credit from CBSGs

5.1 # of vulnerable HHs (m/f headed) linked to and receiving services from BDSPs and BMOs

0 Total: 2864 (1555m/1309f) Total: 7300 (4107m/3193f)

H.4 CARE75

Scheme Level Achievements Against Scheme MEFBroad Themes Scheme Level Indicators Related Project Indicators Baseline Value Mid-Term Value

Subsistenc e Livelihood Security

Agricultural livelihood productivity

1. Improved agriculture, livestock production and Natural Resource Management

1.1 % of families with increased income from livestock and agriculture products

Data not available for report Data not available for report

1.2 % of families with a 20% increase in income

Data not available for report Data not available for report

1.3 50% of target communities are managing their natural resources by applying improve NRM practices and reduced degree of soil erosion.

Data not available for report Data not available for report

1.4 % of families adopting improved conservation agricultural practices in the most recent agricultural cycle

Data not available for report Data not available for report

1.5 % of farmers groups reporting increased capacity in agricultural skills

Data not available for report Data not available for report

1.6 % of farmers adopting improved storage practices

Data not available for report Data not available for report

75 CARE. 2016. “AACRS Mid Term Evaluation Report”

Broad Themes Scheme Level Indicators Related Project Indicators Baseline Value Mid-Term Value

1.7 % of farmers using improved livestock practices in most recent agricultural cycle

Data not available for report Data not available for report

1.8 % of households using strategies to protect livelihood assets from hazards

Data not available for report Data not available for report

1.9 % decrease in HH adopting irreversible coping strategies during winter & external shocks

Data not available for report Data not available for report

2. Strengthened off-farm production responding to market needs

2.1 50 % of families have diversified livelihoods, including non-agricultural strategies

Data not available for report Data not available for report

2.2 50% of target communities have improved vocational and business skills at district level

Data not available for report Data not available for report

2.3 70% of target families are engaged in saving and loans

Data not available for report Data not available for report

Agricultural Livelihood Services

3. Improved access to markets and other essential services

3.1 30 % of target communities access the market on a regular basis to buy agricultural inputs and sell products

Data not available for report Data not available for report

3.2 70% of target communities access agricultural and veterinary services

Data not available for report Data not available for report

4. Improved Social Inclusion of Vulnerable Groups (governance, access to rights)

4.1 70% of identified vulnerable groups are engaged in decision making at community level

Data not available for report Data not available for report

4.2 Evidence of local leaders demonstrating accountability &

Data not available for report Data not available for report

Broad Themes Scheme Level Indicators Related Project Indicators Baseline Value Mid-Term Value

responsiveness to vulnerable groups priorities including # community leaders (e.g., political, traditional, religious) at the local level sensitized and engaged in basic rights

Project Level Achievements Against Project MEFReference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

1. Increased on-farm production capacity in targeted households

1.1 % Target families report increased agricultural productivity of key project promoted crops

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

70% Unable to determin e

1.2 % Target families report increased horticulture productivity through small- scale kitchen gardens

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

70% Unable to determin e

1.3 % Target families report increased livestock productivity

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

70% Unable to determin e1.4 % Target farmers have

adopted and are practicing a minimum of 2 improved agricultural practices

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

75% Unable to determin e

1.5 % Target farmers have adopted and are practicing a

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

75% Unable to determin

Reference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

minimum of 2 improved horticulture practices

1.6 % Livestock owners have adopted and are practicing a minimum of 2 improved livestock practices

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

75% Unable to determin e

1.7 % Target families are part of a farmer cooperative or a processing or producer group

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

20% Unable to determin

1.8 % Target families that are saving seeds/grain properly, using adequate equipment

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

30% Unable to determin

1.9 % Target families experience reductions in post- harvest losses

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

30% Unable to determin

2. Improved Natural Resource Management and Asset Management

2.1 % Water resource management committees are functioning well through applying skills and knowledge

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

60% Unable to determin e

2.2 % Target pastures and forests have improved in quality through grass seed distribution

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

50% Unable to determin e

2.3 % Target families sustainably manage their water, forest and pastures

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

50% Unable to determin e2.4 % Target families

facilities, houses, assets, pastures and agricultural land protected by

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

30% Unable to determin e

Reference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

small risk mitigation infrastructures

3. Strengthened off-farm production responding to market needs.

3.1 % of collection and processing centres being utilised and meeting hygiene and safety standards

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

75% Unable to determin e

3.2 % of trainees reporting improved skills and confidence in, marketing and processing

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

75% Unable to determin

3.3 % of trainees applying knowledge to produce off-farm products according to identified market demand

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

40% Unable to determin e

3.4 % of target families with non-agricultural income sources

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

15% Unable to determin

3.5 % of target families with three or more income sources

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

40% Unable to determin

4. Improved skills applied to (new) market needs in community.

4.1 % trainees using business/vocational skills to generate income on regular basis

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

50% Unable to determin e

4.2 % of trainees with improved literacy skills

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

70% Unable to determin

4.3 % of trainees with improved numeracy skills

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

70% Unable to determin

Reference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

5. Increased access to and protection of capital, reserves and assets.

5.1 % of VSLAs active in the community

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

75% Unable to determin

5.2 % of target families survive winter without losing their animals and subsistence

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

70% Unable to determin

6. Strengthened linkages between farmer groups and district markets

5.1 % of trainees reporting improved understanding of markets and market needs

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

60% Unable to determin

5.2 % of producer groups have experience in identifying key products for market

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

60% Unable to determin

5.3 % of farmer cooperatives and producer groups reporting improved linkages with local traders through meeting on a regular basis

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

60% Unable to determin e

5.4 % of farmer cooperatives and producer groups satisfied with their relationship with local traders

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

60% Unable to determin e

7. Increased access by farmers and livestock keepers to better agricultural and veterinary services in the target districts

7.1 % farmers & livestock keepers reporting increased access to agriculture extension and veterinary services

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

60% Unable to determin e

7.2 % of target farmers and livestock keepers reporting extension/veterinary services are responsive to their needs

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

60% Unable to determin e

Reference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

7.3 % of farmers that have accessed agricultural extension services in most recent agricultural cycle

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

60% Unable to determin e

7.4 % of livestock keepers that have accessed veterinary services in most recent agricultural cycle

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

60% Unable to determin e

7.5 % of farmers satisfied with selected list of services (e.g., agricultural extension, veterinary services)

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

60% Unable to determin e

8. Community level decision making structures and government processes are more inclusive

8.1 % increase in number of decisions at community level that adequately reflect the concerns and interests of vulnerable groups.

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

30% Unable to determin e

8.2 % of men and women reporting meaningful participation in local level planning and decision-making.

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

60% Unable to determin e

8.3 # of the community leaders trained recognise the basic rights of vulnerable groups and ensure their participation in decision-making processes.

Data not available for report

248 300

8.4 % male and female farmers at the local level

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

50% Unable to determin

Reference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

sensitized and engaged on basic rights

9. Social barriers at community level are reduced

9.1 % decrease in gender discrimination reported by community members

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

30% Unable to determin e

9.2 % of individuals trained in new methods and practice of joint decision making, conflict resolution, gender equity and better NRM.

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

30% Unable to determin e

9.3 Evidence of local leaders demonstrating accountability & responsiveness to vulnerable groups priorities including # community leaders (e.g., political, traditional, religious) at the local level sensitized and engaged in basic rights

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

- Unable to determin e

10. Targeted communities are participating in economic and social activities by being better organized and trained in social groups such as CBDRMCs, farmer cooperatives, youth associations, women groups and solidarity groups.

10.1 % of social groups participating in social and economic activities

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

70% Unable to determin e

10.2 Disaster prone communities have improved awareness of how to manage key hazards and

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

75 Unable to determine

76 OXFAM. 2016. “AACRS Mid Term Evaluation

Reference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

environmental change, and benefit from community based disaster risk reduction activities

10.3 Self-help Groups are advocating for the rights of their members within the community

Data not available for report

Data not available for report

18 Unable to determin e

H.5 OXFAM76

Scheme Level Achievements Against Scheme MEFBroad Themes Scheme Level Indicators Related Project Indicators Baseline Value Mid-Term Value

Resilience Reduced household vulnerability to livelihood and food insecurity

1.1 % or # of HHs who elevates Coping Strategy Index (CSI ) over the period of time -(by Female headed and male headed HHs)

Data not available for report. Data not available for report.

1.2 - % or # of HHs in poor, borderline or acceptable thresholds in Food Consumption Score (FCS)- (by F and M headed households)

Data not available for report. Data not available for report.

Broad Themes Scheme Level Indicators Related Project Indicators Baseline Value Mid-Term Value

1.3 - % or # of women and Under 5 children who get sufficient food with at least three meals per day for a period of at least one month.

Data not available for report. Data not available for report.

1.4 –a. % or # of households below the poverty line (by Female headed and Male headed households)

Data not available for report. Data not available for report.

1.5 - Annual net incremental income per household of project farmers compared to previous year income(by gender, PWD and age groups)

Data not available for report. Data not available for report.

1.6 - Annual net incremental income (only from sales of food produce in markets or within the village) per household of project farmers compared to previous year income(by gender, PWD and age groups)

Data not available for report. Data not available for report.

77 Note the reference objectives are from the design document and they do not align exactly with the specific objectives reported on in the mid term

Project Level Achievements Against Project MEF77

Reference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

1. Improved access to markets for dairy, almond, grape and wheat producer enterprises and cooperatives

1.1 - % or # of producers produce range of quality products (high quality, medium quality and poor quality) – (by gender, PWD and age groups)

Data not available for report.

120 households have increased their production of vegetables by 50% as a result of using greenhouse technologies

37% respondents who received goats reported increase in number of their goats

Data not available for report.

1.2 - % or # of targeted people who are doing business with producer enterprises and cooperatives- (by gender, PWD, age groups)

0% 0% 4 enterprises

1.3 - % and # of people have perceived improvements in their engagement with markets (by gender, PWD and age group)

0% 0% 4 enterprises

2. Increased food production of men and women small-

2.1 - # and % of producers with increased annual crop yield compared to last year

Data not available for report.

11% of almond producers reported an increase in annual almond yield

Data not available for report.

Reference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

scale dairy, almond, grape and wheat producers

production- (by gender, PWD and age group)

2.2 - # and % of producers with increased annual dairy and meat production compared to last year production- (by gender, PWD and age group)

Data not available for report.

6% increase in dairy production

Data not available for report.

2.3 - % of farmers that are engaged in the planting season with improved wheat seed- (by gender, PWD, age group)

Data not available for report.

Wheat value chain not continued/reported on in MTR.

Data not available for report.

2.4 - % of farmers that engage in the planting season with improved grape and almond varieties- - (by gender, PWD, age group)

Data not available for report.

100% almond producers in target communities and surroundings have access to higher yield, drought tolerant almond saplings

Data not available for report.

2.5 - % of farmers that demonstrate use of improved farming techniques - (by gender, PWD, age group)

Data not available for report.

80% of targeted almondand dairy producers are applying new technologies, knowledge and skills to agricultural practices

Data not available for report.

2.6 - % of farmers that have access to sufficient amounts of water for food production- (by gender, PWD, age group)

Data not available for report.

73% reported increase in amount of water available for irrigational purposes

Data not available for report.

Reference Indicator Baseline Value Midterm Value Target Status

2.7 -% of farmers demonstrating use of improved soil and water management practices- (by gender, PWD, age group)

Data not available for report.

50% of targeted almond producers are practicing better water management techniques

Data not available for report.

3. Increased inclusiveness and equity in village development initiatives

3.1 - % and # of targeted people who perceive positive change in the way they participate in village development activities- (by gender, PWD, age group)

Data not available for report.

24% increase recorded in people's approval of women's role in livelihood activities

Data not available for report.

3.2 - # of targeted people involve in decision making process in village development activities- (by gender, PWD and age group)

Data not available for report.

Data not available for report.

Data not available for report.

3.3 - % and # of targeted people who perceive positive change in the sustainability of village organizations- (by gender, PWD and age group)

Data not available for report.

Data not available for report.

Data not available for report.

3.4 - % and # of targeted people who perceive positive change in the role and engagement of the CDC in their village- (by gender, PWD and age group)

Data not available for report.

Data not available for report.

Data not available for report.