experience and learned lessons in developing safety culture · pdf file ·...
TRANSCRIPT
Experience and learned lessons in
developing safety culture in NPP
Owner/Operator organizations
TECHNICAL MEETING ON
INFORMATION EXCHANGE
AMONG EXPERIENCED AND
FUTURE OPERATORS
IAEA, Vienna, Austria
16 – 18 October 2012
Eduard Volkov
Central Institute for Continuing Education and Training
Science Research Center “Prognoz”,
director
2
Lesson learned
SC concept and improvement must be
integrated in all stages of nuclear facility
life cycle
3
Org Culture
Safety
state of ergatic system
(NPP, for example)
external factors
HF Org F
Politic situation
Economic situation
Regulator
Contractors
depends on impact of
is
Basic assumptions
Visible Behavior
Attitudes
Knowledge
Skills
are
are
has
Performance
influence
Management
Processes
Climate
S and other Values
Organization
behavior
based on
are
establish
and share
Org Knowledge
influence
“Safety – Org Culture” interface
Safety is a state of ergatic system when
influence of internal and external factors impact
does not lead to its operation deterioration or
stoppage
is
is
are elements of
Safety Culture
= in case S is integrated in all activities
Suppliers
Stockholders
HRM
KM
Operation
SCM
Others
are
K
managed by
managed by
depends on impact of
Regulator
R&D
Operator
Internal factors
Is different for
4
16,7
9,6
8,4
5,1
26,3
3,8
3,8
4,5
21,8мотивация
ПВЛК
психофизиол.качествафункцион.состояниепроф.компетентностьорг. факторы
соц.-психол.ситуацияэргон. р. места
эргон. документ.
Root causes distribution
Motivation
JRPT
Work place ergonomics
Social politic situation
Document ergonomics
Professional competence
Organizational factors
Physiologic characteristics
Fitness to duty, health
36
5
Lesson learned
Take into account not only human being values
and behavior, but organizational ones too
6
Human performance = f (Motivation; Knowledge, Skills; Operation)
Organizational behavior = F (Culture; Knowledge; Processes)
30%
70%
HP
OB
Distribution of root causes of events
7
8
HF Reliability
Medical support
HRM
Social security
support Safety Culture
Ergonomic support
Work organization
Psychological
support
Training
Main components of Human Factor reliability
9
Lesson learned
Support organizational processes with
knowledge about human factor
10
Using any instrument for the assessment of
individual characteristic and the whole work with
personnel becomes meaningless, aimless without
existence of the objective requirements to the staff
member, presented by job contents, its nature, job
conditions, parameters of acceptability.
SC issues: organization design
11
Job position
Psychogram
Individual competences profile
Professional competence profile
Main tasks
Main actions
NPP compartment
NPP
mental function
parameters (103)
Individual
competences
Professional
standards
Main work
implementation
tasks
Main actions to
implement work
tasks
Work effectiveness criteria
Work effectiveness
criteria
NPP job
positions
NPP
compartments
KPI for NPP
compartment
KPI
Motivation potential Job
motivator
s
Work environment
Design of job posts (job analysis, competence approach)
Common classifiers
12
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
cognitiv
e
motiv
atio
n
achie
vem
ent
motiv
atio
n
alle
gia
nce to
org
aniz
atio
n
decis
ion m
akin
g
responsib
ility
dis
cip
line,
dilig
ence
pote
ntia
l of
adopta
tion
self-c
ontro
l
team
work
leaders
hip
org
aniz
ing s
kills
com
mucativ
eness
analy
ticity
critic
ism
repro
ductiv
e
thin
kin
g
notio
n
manip
ula
tion
atte
ntio
n
sele
ctiv
ity
atte
ntio
n s
tability
pro
cedure
mem
ory
opera
tive m
em
ory
vis
ual p
erc
eptio
n
Psychogramm for job post Shift Manager of Reactor Division
Investigation results: job post competence profiles
13
Competence profile for job post Shift Manager of Reactor Division
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
PIDIRDILEQCDOCINFATHTWAPORSPEKNDMSIOPROOROSFSD
Competencies
Degre
e
Abridgements Competence title Abridgements Competence title
PI Interpersonal interaction APO Activity planning and organization
DIR Directiveness and control RSP Responsibility
DIL Diligence EKN Equipment knowledge
EQC Equipment control DM Decision making
DOC Work with documentation SI Information searching
INF Informing OPR Operability
ATH Analytical thinking OOR Orientation on result
TW Teamwork OSF Orientation on safety
SD Self-discipline
Design of job posts
14
ОНИЦ «Прогноз» Абрамова
Happiness
Health
High job results
Family
Home
Material welfare
Interesting job
Children;
Safety;
Comfortable work
environment;
Favourable
climate;
Career …
Psychological
attitudes:
Social attitude
Situation attitude
Aim attitude
Executive attitude Act
Motives
HUMAN VALUES
Sense attitude
Attitude to Safety
Social attitude – civic duty; world-view; human values system; understanding what is good, what is bad; what is honestly, what is corruptly and so on.
Sense attitude. It defines personal sense of work for worker.
Situation attitude. It is formed when environment is estimated. Often to happen when social and sense attitudes are changed by estimation of situation.
Aim attitude appears when aim is formed, when worker knows what to do .
SC in depth
15
Competence “Orientation to Safety”
Worker performs work in accordance with safety priority.
Worker aims, has intention to improve work environment,
documentation, equipment.
16
Scale
A. Intensity and completeness of activity directed at
safety.
B. Breadth of influence
Competence “Orientation to Safety”
17
А.-2 Has inadequate orientation (attitude) for safe work implementation: knows safety requirements
but breaks it with bad intention со злым умыслом нарушает их.
А.-1 Has no orientation (attitude) for safe work implementation: consciously ignores and\or does not
know safety requirements.
А.0 Knows safety requirements and do not break them evidently.
А.1 Has an intention to work safely and\or supports others work safety during a work day.
А.2 Follows safe requirements when job preparation and implementation; notices timely beginning
of declining situation. In accordance with job duties informs and control others supporting
proper safety level.
А.3 Acts in accordance with safety priority. If situation with lack of absence or not enough operative
information acts taking into account risks of the safety decreasing.
А.4 Proposes ideas on SC enhancement and ways how to realize.
А.5 Undertakes efforts to improve safety. Upholds a necessity to follow the safety requirements.
When event situation makes arrangements to prevent the situation aggravation.
А.6 Involves others into SC enhancement process.
А.7
If necessary, risks own health and life to provide safety.
Competency “Orientation to Safety”: Scale A
18
Lesson learned
Use of human factor specialists (psychologists)
makes human factor reliability support more
effective.
19
Nuclear facility Psychological Support Lab
Selection.
Adoptation
Shift manning.
Psycho-physiological monitoring of NPP personnel state.
Participation in an event investigation team.
Participation in Safety Culture improvement process.
Psycho-pedagogic support in training.
Social-psychological monitoring.
Support for managers.
Psychological support for NPP personnel
Psychological rehabilitation for NPP personnel.
MAIN TASKS
20
Lesson learned
Use special tools to train adult people
21
• Conducting lessons and trainings to form, enhance job relevant traits;
• Development recommendations on the individual approach to training;
• Psychological support to simulator training for response to
emergencies ;
• Consulting to the training centre instructors;
• Operative shift manning on base of psychological compatibility.
Psychological support in training
22
Lesson learned
SC: better manage, than operate
23
Basic approaches to Safety Culture improvement
- Proactive approach
- Event-based approach
The improvement strategy of the organizational and psychological factors of the Safety Culture in NPP develops on two
directions:
24
Proactive approach
Analysis and generalization of safety condition information.
Development organizational measures on creation of
psychological conditions which do not allow a possibility for
human errors.
Ongoing diagnostics of NPP operation situation and exposure
latent signs to oncoming danger in acting system.
Safety providing norms development.
Exposure obstacles, which disturb to remove system in necessary
condition.
Development and realization program of the corrective measures,
providing reduction of risk of the emergency processes.
25
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Paym
ent
Psycholo
gic
al
clim
ate
Lodgin
g
Pre
stige o
f
the job
Medic
al
serv
ice
Incre
ase o
f
qualification
level
Safe
ty c
ulture
priority
form
ing
Managem
ent
impro
vem
ent
Job d
iscip
line
Develo
pm
ent
of
leis
ure
sphere
Public
transport
Safe
ty r
ule
s
and job
pro
tection
Public
cate
ring
sphere
Develo
pm
ent
of
dem
ocra
cy
Job r
outine
Labor
fluid
ity
Pro
vis
ion o
f
childre
n
educational
2001 г.
2003 г.
Proactive approach : Social security monitoring
26
Unconscious Conscious
(violation)
Mistake
(Professional
competence)
slip task
simplification
(short cut)
Full ignorance
of safety rules
task
“rationalization”
Human errors
21,8
4,5
3,8
3,8
26,3
5,1
8,4
9,6
16,7
мотивация
ПВЛК
психофизиол.качествафункцион.состояниепроф.компетентностьорг. факторы
соц.-психол.ситуацияэргон. р. места
эргон. документ.
Motivation
Job relevant traits
Work place ergonomics
Social politic situation
Document ergonomics
Professional competence
Organizational factors
Physiologic characteristics
Fitness to duty, health Human factor specialist
take part in root cause analysis team and used method “Psychological root cause analysis of wrong performance”.
SRC “Prognoz” carries out providing and updates the database as subsystem of the corporation information system based on the results of the human errors psychological analysis and prepares analytical reports for managers and Inspection division of JSC “Concern Rosenergoatom”.
Event-based approach ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
27
Lesson learned
Leadership – main factor of success
in SC improvement
28
Str
ate
gy l
eve
l A
dm
inis
trati
ve
le
ve
l
JSC “Rosenergoatom” policy and strategy in SC
improvement
Regulation on SC
monitoring
SC enhancement process regulation
Regulation on
SC group
activity
Regulation on
SC summarized
day
Regulation on interaction with methodological support
organization
Organization Ethic Code
Regular SC improvement process
29
SC self-assessment method
SC self-assessment guide
SC self-assessment software
SC forming and development method for both an
individual and organizational level
Corporate knowledge portal on SC
Tools:
Op
era
tio
nal le
ve
l
Actions on SC enhancement regular process introduction
Ad
min
istr
ati
ve
le
ve
l Regular SC improvement process
30
Corporate knowledge portal on Safety Culture
SC Knowledge
Base
ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE
PROCESSES
METHODS,
TOOLS
NORMATIVE
DOCUMENTS
SCIENCE
SUPPORT
ORGANIZATIONS
EXTERNAL
SOURCES
METHODOLOGY
EXPERTS
TESAURUS
PROJECTS
Regular SC improvement process
31
Lesson learned
Developing SC model, tools to improve you
should use IAEA recommendations, take into
account features of national culture, national
production relations
32
SC methodology
SC
model
Working groups with
NPP personnel
IAEA, WANO, OECD
meetings, working
groups
SC monitoring
results JSC
“Rosenergoatom”
activity results in
SC domain
IAEA documents on SC
Inspections, root
cause
investigations
results
WANO, IAEA
missions
outcomes
Regular SC improvement process
33
Organization of
operating
Safety is a clear
realized value
Commitment to
Safety Culture
Clear
responsibility
contribution
Learning
organization
HR
management Managers role
Regular SC improvement process
34
Stage 1. Health Check. Group interaction assessment process
SC issues: meeting of cultures
Busher NPP
Training of cross-cultural interaction
35
Stage 1. Health Check. Results of the group interaction assessment
2.5
2.83
3.21
2
2.92
2.45
3.4
3.5
2.2
3.3
2.48
3.09
3.34
2.09
3.09
Способность к командной работе
Создание микроклимата в команде
Коммуникабельность Управление конфликтами
Межэтническая толерантность
Персонал ДАТЭК
Персонал BNPP
Весь персонал смены А
Conflict
management
Team work
Cross-cultural
tolerance Group
culture
Sociability
Russian personnel
Iranian personnel
Average
36
The Code defines united ethics values and behavior
standards for Busher NPP workers which provide the
NPP safety and efficiency.
If we will follow these standards we will reach high
reputation and earn society’s and government’s
respect.
The Code contains behavior standards obligatory for all
Busher NPP workers
Stage2. Ethics Code for Busher NPP personnel
From top management appeal:
37
Ho
ne
sty
Stage 2. Ethics Code: Basic values for Busher NPP personnel
38
Stage 3. Training of cross-cultural interaction
The training is addressed to the Russian and foreign
managers and specialists who take part in nuclear
facilities construction and operation
and
has a goal to harmonize cross-cultural contacts on
both intergroup and interpersonal levels, to prevent
conflicts by means of cross-cultural tolerance
forming.
39
Stage 3. Training of cross-cultural interaction
MAIN TASKS:
• to decrease level of preconception to other ethnic
group representatives;
• to develop ethno-cultural sensitiveness;
• to enhance level of ethno-cultural competence;
• to enhance level of empathy;
• to enhance positiveness level of ethnic and other
kinds of social identity;
• to develop readiness to interact with people from
another ethnic group in various social situations.
40
Stage 3. Training of cross-cultural interaction
41
Lessons learned
1. SC concept and improvement must be integrated in all stages of nuclear
facility life cycle
2. Developing SC model, tools to improve you should use IAEA
recommendations, take into account features of national culture, national
production relations
3. Take into account not only human being values and behavior, but
organizational ones.
4. Support organizational processes with knowledge about human factor
5. Leadership – main factor of success in SC improvement Leadership –
main factor of success in SC improvement
6. Use of human factor specialists (psychologists) makes human factor
reliability support more effective.
7. Use special tools to train adult people
8. SC: manage, not operate
9. SC: continuing improvement is in focus, not an appraisal
10.Have a patience – culture is a long term changing phenomenon
42
Thank you
for
the attention!
43
2nd International Summer School on
Safety Culture Russian Federation, Saint-Petersburg, 1 - 5 July 2013
More Information: www.scicet.ru