Human Studies (2005) 28: 101–106

Book Review

Experience and the Environment:Phenomenology Returns to Earth

Charles S. Brown and Ted Toadvine (eds.), Eco-Phenomenology: Back to theEarth Itself. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. 255 pp.

It is well known that Continental philosophy – however one might con-ceive of the storied and controversial rift between American Analytic andEuropean-Continental traditions – has been slow to integrate its argumentsinto environmental philosophy and environmental ethics. This is not becauseof lack of trying. Phenomenologists have long recognized the potential inHeideggerian philosophy to develop an environmental ethics, but manyenvironmental ethicists have been reticent to borrow from a thinker whosedubious political history is exacerbated by an ambiguous stance on ethicalmatters. David Abram’s award-winning book on the environment, The Spellof the Sensuous, attracted much attention when it was first released. The bookmade impressive gestures in a Husserlian/Merleau-Pontian direction, but ittoo has largely fallen off the radar screen. In recent years, the InternationalAssociation for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP), once a small spin-offgroup associated with the Society for Phenomenology and ExistentialPhilosophy (SPEP), has slowly gained committed members. As this grouphas grown, so have its platform and its membership. Still, environmentalphenomenology has had trouble gaining purchase on the larger environmentalreadership.

Perhaps it is the nature of the topic: philosophers of experience are at adistinct disadvantage compared with the environmental ethicists of the world,who are already topically aligned with scientists and politicians. Charles S.Brown’s and Ted Toadvine’s recently released Eco-Phenomenology: Back tothe Earth Itself, however, provides some helpful guideposts in the directionof developing a phenomenologically rooted environmental analysis.

Brown and Toadvine convene an impressive roster of authors for their vol-ume. The editorial duo – colleagues at Emporia State University and familiarfaces at IAEP functions – collect voices and papers from a crowd of incrediblyrespectable and concerned philosophers who have been largely sidelined bythe environmental ethics mainstream.

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For the most part, the volume is geared to stimulate other specialists in phe-nomenology to recognize the ecological relevance of their tradition. Virtuallyevery chapter contains discussions of Edmund Husserl’s critique of naturalism,Martin Heidegger’s “fourfold” and “lifeworld,” or Maurice Merleau-Ponty’sassessment of embodiment. References to Emmanuel Levinas appear in thesecond half of the book, in some of the more practical discussions on alterity.Less prevalent, though nevertheless present, are periodic nods to FriedrichNietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard, and Arthur Schopenhauer.

The book is divided into two primary sections: one historical summary thatoutlines the relationship between environmental theory and phenomenology– “Ecological Philosophy and the Phenomenological Tradition” – and oneforward-looking collection that proposes directions in which authors of theContinental disposition might take their theories – “New Directions in Eco-Phenomenology.” The first half of the book therefore includes treatmentsof three primary phenomenologists: Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.The second half of the book is more current and broad-reaching, thoughmany essays still defer to the big three figures. Likewise, the essays in thishalf are considerably less esoteric than the essays in the first half, and maybe more appropriate to readers unversed in the methodological bracketing ofphenomenology.

To this effect, the first three essays utilize Husserl’s critique of naturalismto argue that eco-phenomenology maintains advantages over the “objective”observations of the environment predominant in environmental ethics andpolicy analysis. Charles Brown focuses on Husserl’s critique of naturalismto propose that it is more closely aligned with the tenets of radical ecologythan many of the radical ecologists recognize. Erazim Kohak investigates the“heartlessness” of reason, as conceived by 17th century European philoso-phers, and finds in Husserl’s lifeworld the “value-laden, meaning-structured”(29) rationality that he proposes is necessary for a responsible environmentalethics. Lester Embree’s “The Possibility of a Constitutive Phenomenology ofthe Environment” draws from Husserl’s Ideen I to argue for another dimensionof phenomenological investigation. Rather than emphasizing the “experienc-ing” of the environment – as appears to be the intuitive default for thosewho might hope to open this line of inquiry – Embree argues that we needto refocus the discussion on “positionality” or “valuing and willing (and ob-jects as valuationally and volitionally encountered)” (38). He emphasizes theencountering of the environment, and proposes that there is much room forphenomenological exploration in these areas, perhaps opening theorists to atreasure-trove of analytical observations.

Widening the spectrum of analysis slightly, John Llewelyn takes up thewritings of multiple phenomenologists – though still primarily Husserl,Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty – to argue that ecology has something togain by investigating the imaginative and increasingly complex discourse

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of phenomenology. Perhaps the most difficult aspect of Llewelyn’s piece ishis deployment of Ancient Greek, German, and Latin terminology. It is atonce illuminating and frustrating. However, to those already familiar with thesometimes enigmatic neologisms of phenomenology, Llewelyn traverses theterrain informatively.

In what is arguably the most provocative essay of the volume, MichaelZimmerman examines the late Heidegger to provide a clear and fascinatinganalysis of the sometimes foregone presumption that Heidegger’s “fourfold”provides a natural springboard into environmental questions. What makes theZimmerman piece so interesting is that he challenges generally accepted wis-dom on the matter and takes Heidegger to task for his reluctance to accepttraditional ethical norms. He goes so far as to suggest that Heidegger’s ownthought “is consistent with modernity’s project of the technological domina-tion of nature” (86), but still finds in Heidegger seeds of ecological redemption.In this vein, he strikes a middle ground between those who read Heidegger asa thoroughbred anti-environmentalist and those who think that Heidegger isa natural bedfellow for ecologists.

Monika Langer argues that not only Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, butespecially Nietzsche, challenge presiding ontological commitments in wayssimilar to those that have predominated in contemporary environmentalistwriting. Nietzsche, she reasons, challenges dualism in much the same waythat later phenomenologists do, and provides perhaps another vantage fromwhich to enrich the burgeoning niche of eco-phenomenology.

Don Marietta Jr’s essay begins from the governing supposition of many inthe volume: that a successful approach to environmental ethics requires a shiftin thinking about ontology. Marietta reasons that the existential phenomenol-ogy of Merleau-Ponty can help us transform our thinking about traditionally“objectivistic ontology” to better understand our place in the world and inour obligations to it. He provides a helpful, albeit very broad, overview ofapproaches in modern environmental philosophy and argues that many con-temporary ethical theories depend on traditional “big picture” metaphysics tosupport their positions. In lieu of these approaches, he proposes a position ofa “critical holism,” arguing that phenomenological reflection will bring us toa better understanding of our relation to, and our consequent obligations to,the environment.

The second half of the volume follows up on the suggestions in the firstchapter by focusing on new directions for eco-phenomenology. From this re-viewer’s perspective, the essays in this section are considerably more casualand diverse than those in the first section; not the hard-edged, defensive phe-nomenology of the early essays. As a whole, they might be characterized asmore engaged in the doing of phenomenology than in the metadiscussionof the first chapter. The uninitiated, however, might pass them over as toostylized.

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Ted Toadvine’s essay is the most cross-disciplinary of the essays in thevolume. No other authors so much as pen the words “intrinsic value,” butToadvine takes such discussions seriously and treats them fairly. He arguesthat authors in the phenomenological tradition can overcome the troublesomeintrinsic value problem by making sense of the role of the il y a (the “thereis”). Whether he is successful in this enterprise should be left up to the in-dividual reader, but his attempt to integrate the discussion of outsiders – theenvironmental ethics mainstream – is admirable and valuable.

In a practical turn uncharacteristic of the other selections in the volume,Irene Klaver’s creative and entertaining piece explores the present state ofphenomenology. Klaver explores the meaning of terms used to describe theenvironment, as they have been used by philosophers and phenomenologists.Her main aim is to call attention to the way in which globalization has helpedto bring nature into the political domain. To aid in her discussion, she ex-plains the paradox of rocks, as always already there, pre-existent, but alsoalways overlooked. Like rocks that become apparent at the mere mention oftheir existence, the political environment of the present brings nature into theforeground. She utilizes pun to great effect, and provides an essay that maysuit the more poetic and literary student or class.

Christian Diehm’s piece invokes the suffering wrought from natural dis-asters to shed light on Levinas. He begins with the proposition that nakedbodies – bodies unprotected and exposed to the unforgiving elements – mightthemselves have faces, a feature fundamental for the recognition of other-ness. The question that he hopes to resolve is whether Levinas’s writing canweather “other-than-humanness,” whether faces can be found in the biologi-cally non-human. “It should strike us that [the logic of Levinas’s work] is oneof inclusion rather than exclusion, and that it should not immediately excludeother-than-human others” (173). Diehm goes on to argue that the vulnera-bilities of other non-humans provide for us an awareness of alterity and ourencounter with alterity, and to remind us that we have obligations to “all thoselives that flicker at once, and then disappear” (183).

Ed Casey follows closely on the heels of this question. He begins fromthe supposition that environmental awareness begins with awareness of a“problematic situation.” Drawing from his own voluminous writings on thesubject, he proposes that people know, at a glance, that something is wrong.His main claim is “that the human glance. . . is indispensible for consequentialethical action” (188). But he asks where we might encounter “faces” in theenvironing world. Surfaces are expressive, he argues; they have faces. If it isthe case that the face can obligate when it is encountered between two humansubjects, then this is just as true of the encounter between subject and other.

David Wood closes the volume with an essay that explores what eco-phenomenology is. (It is a curious editorial quirk that the one article

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with the most straightforward and perhaps relevant title, “What is Eco-Phenomenology?” makes up the final selection in the volume.). Wood com-pares the eco-phenomenology of his compatriots with the doctrine of deepecology. The difference, he contests, lies in the concepts of the “plexity oftime and the boundaries of thinghood” (213). He attempts to find some mid-dle ground between the two doctrines, suggesting that the naıve naturalismof deep ecology could benefit from a heavy dose of phenomenology’s explo-ration of phenomena, and likewise, that phenomenology could benefit from aheavy dose of the reality of imminent ecological devastation. He is critical ofearlier phenomenologists for their reluctance to accept some of the principlesof deep ecology on the charge that it is fascist, and charges in response thatsuch reluctance results in quietism.

Because many authors devote large sections of their essays to defendingtheir deep conviction that phenomenology can work happily with ecology, andthen to contextualizing their standpoint within the history of the philosophy,the volume can get a little dry and repetitive. Such an approach should not besurprising for a collection entitled Eco-Phenomenology, but the book sufferssomewhat from this self-aggrandizing repetition of its own importance toecology. To a fault, the book gestures at possibilities for further explorationin eco-phenomenology, though it does not go very far to explore these areasitself.

Further, the sometimes inaccessible language of phenomenology is madeonly slightly more accessible by the essays in this book. For a topic that shouldbe incredibly earthly, or even “down-to-earth,” the eco-phenomenologists setto the project of describing the experiences of encountering the environmentin some of the most abstract meta-language available. Like their theoreticalpredecessors, the authors in this volume believe that they can overcome someof the troubling ontologies that prevent serious entertainment of environmentalconcerns. They might very well do this, but they will first have to secureadherents by having them read the original masters.

All told, there are many essays of interest to the casual reader of philos-ophy. Still, those unversed in the language of phenomenology are unlikelyto gain much from this collection. The volume should appeal to mid-levelphilosophy majors, so long as it is supplemented with the original texts, aswell as to graduate students and those interested in exploring the frameworkquestions of eco-phenomenology. Environmentalists, nature-lovers, and ecol-ogists are unlikely to find much of interest in the text; nor are philosopherswith specialties outside of Continental phenomenology. One might expectthis from the title, of course, but few authors in the volume even nod to otherfactions of environmental philosophy, including environmental ethics, eco-political theory, or the growing niche of environmental pragmatism. There isscarcely mention of more prominent analytic environmental philosophers, not

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to mention birds, trees, or rocks. In many ways, this could be seen as a goodthing, and phenomenologists need not necessarily integrate the insights of theanalytic establishment to make their points, but one detects a hint of defiantjustification throughout the volume, seasoned with a general vagueness aboutthe real doing of eco-phenomenology, that detracts, I think, from the statedaims of the authors and editors. This is less true with the essays in the latterhalf of the book, but meta-discussion and meta-justification is neverthelesspredominant.

Reference

1. Abram, D. (1996). The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-than-human World. New York: Vintage.

BENJAMIN HALEPhilosophy DepartmentStony Brook University

Stony Brook, New York 11794, USA(E-mail: bhale@ic.sunysb.edu)