explaining governance outcomes: epistemology, network governance and policy network analysis

Explaining Governance Outcomes: Epistemology,Network Governance and Policy NetworkAnalysispsr_257 195..207

Paul Fawcett Carsten DaugbjergUniversity of Sydney University of Copenhagen

This article focuses on two sets of literature that have developed out of a shared concern with networks: the networkgovernance school, which has been engaged in a set of macro-level questions about the extent to which networksare changing the nature of state–society relations; and the policy network analysis school, which has focused on therelationship between processes of interest intermediation and their impact on policy-making outcomes.We examinehow each school is underpinned by important epistemological differences between positivist, interpretivist andcritical realist approaches. We argue that these differences complicate and make contestable what would otherwiseseem to be an intuitively attractive argument in favour of combining these two schools. In seeking to understandbetter how these two schools might be combined, we adopt a critical realist approach and make a distinctionbetween vertical coordination on the state–society axis and horizontal coordination on the interest integration axis.This produces a typology of governance arrangements, which are evaluated according to the level of input andoutput legitimacy that they are likely to generate, two criteria that are taken as overarching measures of howgovernance outcomes vary between different governance arrangements. This provides the basis for a broaderdiscussion of how these outcomes are conditioned by both a network’s structural characteristics and the way inwhich it is managed.

Keywords: governance; policy networks; legitimacy; coordination

There has been a proliferation in the number of studies dedicated to governance andnetworks in recent decades. This article focuses on two sets of literature that havedeveloped out of a shared concern with these issues: the Network Governance (NWG)school; and the Policy Network Analysis (PNA) school.1 These two schools share acommon interest in networks, but whereas the NWG school has been engaged in a setof macro-level questions about the changing nature of state–society relations, the PNAschool has been more concerned with a set of meso-level questions about the relationshipbetween policy-making outcomes, the structure of a network and the inclusion orexclusion of certain individuals or groups from within that network. This commoninterest in networks, but also the different approach that these two schools have takentowards understanding the role that they play in contemporary governance arrangements,suggests that there is a potential for them to learn important insights from one another.This is a view that is shared by others, including Ismael Blanco et al. (2011, p. 297), who,in an earlier issue of this journal, remarked on not only the ‘different antecedents, anddistinctive analytical offering’ of the PNA and NWG schools, respectively, but also thepotential for both schools to ‘select from, and even combine, alternative perspectives asthey [those engaged with networks] confront a new wave of change in policy making andgovernance’.

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We share this optimism but aim to take Blanco et al.’s conclusions a step further byquestioning to what extent, and in what ways, these two schools might be combined.Webegin by reviewing recent developments in each of these schools, concluding that thereis actually more diversity within each school than Blanco et al. acknowledge. We arguethat this diversity is underpinned by important epistemological differences betweenpositivist, interpretivist and critical realist approaches, which complicates and makescontestable what would otherwise seem to be an intuitively attractive argument in favourof combining these two schools based on their shared concern with networks.Therefore,in our view, it is actually more likely that different epistemological approaches will reacha different set of conclusions as to the desirability and/or practicality of combining thesetwo schools. In the final section of this article, we pursue this line of argument byexamining how the critical realist approach that we identify as being extant in bothschools might be combined and what this might offer in terms of improving ourunderstanding of how governance outcomes vary between different governance arrange-ments. We develop this argument by introducing a distinction between coordination ontwo axes, the vertical state–society axis, which has been the main concern of the NWGschool, and the horizontal interest integration axis, which has been the main concern ofthe PNA school, although we acknowledge that neither school would reject the existenceand importance of either dimension of coordination outright.2 The variation in gover-nance arrangements that exists along these two axes provides the basis for a broaderdiscussion of how governance outcomes are conditioned by both the structural charac-teristics of networks, which has been a long-standing concern of the PNA school, and theway in which governance arrangements are managed, which has become a key concernwithin the NWG school. We begin, however, with a review of the NWG and PNAschools.

The Network Governance SchoolThe NWG school has been primarily concerned with a set of macro-level questionsabout the changing role of the state and state–society relations in a putative era of latemodernity (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009; Pierre and Peters, 2000; 2005; Rhodes, 2007;Sørensen and Torfing, 2007).The intervening period has seen a growth in the number oftheoretical approaches that have sought to understand these changes better, but under-cutting these different theories are a set of more fundamental differences betweenpositivist, critical realist and interpretivist approaches (Furlong and Marsh, 2010). Thesedifferences are briefly explored in this section of the article, starting with the reasonsbehind the emergence of the NWG in the UK.

In the UK, the NWG school largely emerged out of a concern with explaining thepublic sector reforms of the 1980s and their unintended consequences (Rhodes, 1997).This is what Michael Marinetto (2003) has described as the Anglo-governance school,important features of which were: policy networks; governance, rather than government;the core executive; the hollowed-out state; and the differentiated polity. The Anglo-governance school argued that networks had become the dominant mode of governanceand that the power of states had been hollowed out upwards to international organisa-tions, downwards by the marketisation of the public sector and sidewards by the creation

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of arm’s length agencies.This approach towards understanding the impact of networks onstate–society relations reflected the Anglo-governance school’s positivist orientationwhere networks were viewed as a set of fixed structures.This positivist orientation can beseen in other approaches, which share the view that networks have become an integralfeature of public management, and have pointed to the different ways in which they canbe managed using different tools and techniques (Kickert et al., 1999; Klijn and Edelen-bos, 2007; Klijn et al., 1995; Meulemann, 2008).The main argument of these approacheswas that the distinction between state and society had become increasingly blurred andthat the capacity of the state to act independently of others had weakened as a result.

Interpretivists and critical realists have challenged this approach and its underlying setof ontological assumptions about the state as well as its conclusions as to the extent towhich the state’s form and function have been challenged by the factors identified bylate-modernity theorists and others.The interpretivist approach is closely associated withMark Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes’ (2003; 2006; 2010) work on decentred theory. Theimpact of their work has been significant and it marks a distinct departure from theconcerns of the Anglo-governance school, which Rhodes (2007) now criticises for itspositivist orientation (Clarke and Gains, 2007; Durose, 2009; Jose, 2007). The coreconcepts of the interpretivist approach are: belief; practice; situated agency; tradition; anddilemma. Bevir (2011, p. 5) summarises the overall argument as follows: ‘Governanceconsists of contingent practices that emerge from the competing actions and beliefs ofdifferent people responding to various dilemmas against the background of conflictingtraditions’. In short, this approach is based on an anti-foundational theory of the stateleading to what Bevir and Rhodes (2010) have called a ‘stateless state’. It follows that anyattempt to ‘manage’ networks is seen as futile and contrary to the idea of governance asa ‘bottom-up’ construction (Bang and Sørensen, 1999). As Rhodes (2007, p. 1257) states:

A decentred approach undercuts the idea of network steering as a set of toolsby which we can manage governance. If governance is constructed differently,contingently and continuously, we cannot have a tool kit for managing it. Thisline of reasoning challenges the idea of expertise as a basis for policymaking.Aninterpretive approach encourages us to give up management techniques andstrategies for a practice of learning by telling stories and listening to them.

The critical realist approach offers a third alternative, distinct from the two others outlinedabove, although, according to Stuart McAnulla (2006) and David Marsh (2008), it is onethat tends to be overlooked in the extant literature. This approach is closely associatedwith the concept of meta-governance (Marsh, 2011). As such, critical realists reject ananti-foundational theory of the state, focusing instead on the state’s role in redesigning,not only the way in which hierarchy, markets and networks function independently ofone another, but also how the state alters the strategic terrain to favour particular hybridcombinations of these three different modes of governing over and above others (Bell andHindmoor, 2009; Whitehead, 2007). As such, meta-governance is used to refer to thedifferent ways in which the state has re-conceptualised its role in response to the changingcontext within which practices of governance take place. Thus, Bob Jessop (2004, p. 66)argues that, while the state may have become less hierarchical, that trend does not

EXPLAINING GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES 197


necessarily ‘exclude a continuing and central political role for national states’ in setting theground rules and context within which governance takes place. This means that theactivities of self-regulating networks are nearly always negotiated in the shadow ofhierarchy where ‘the state threatens – explicitly or implicitly – to impose binding rules orlaws on private actors in order to change their cost–benefit calculations in favor of avoluntary agreement closer to the common good rather than to particularistic self-interests’ (Börzel and Risse, 2010, p. 116). A state-centric approach to meta-governance istherefore more about ‘governance arrangements’ and their management and less about‘networks’ per se. However, the inherent tendency for all governance arrangements to failmeans that there will always be an active and ongoing need to manage hierarchy, marketsand networks as distinct modes of governing, the relationship that exists between themand the process of meta-governance itself (Jessop, 2011).

In short, the three different approaches discussed above have all been concerned witha set of macro-level questions, but the differences between them have provoked a livelyset of debates within the NWG school. For example, Oliver James (2009, p. 342) hasargued that decentred theory ‘might be accepted as a “rhetorical device” for provokinggreater reflection about the tools of political analysis [but] it offers little when comparedto the insights of mainstream approaches’. At the same time, there have been ongoingdisputes between interpretivists and critical realists as to the ontological status of socialstructure, the nature of power and inequality and the role played by agency, ideas andpolitical tradition/s in practices of governance (Smith, 2008). At one level, it thereforeseems intuitive that the NWG school can add value to the PNA school by highlightinghow governance outcomes are affected by the broader context within which they areembedded. However, what this review highlights is that any potential combination ofthese two schools is complicated by the differences that exist between alternativeapproaches within the NWG school. We will return to this point below.

The Policy Network Analysis SchoolThe PNA school has not been concerned with the macro-level issues that have animatedthe interest of those working in the NWG school (Hay and Richards, 2000, p. 4).3 Itsheyday dates back to the 1990s when the school developed a series of meso-levelanalytical heuristics. These heuristics were used to develop a series of hypotheses abouthow policy-making outcomes are influenced by the structure of a network and theinteractions within it, including the inclusion and exclusion of certain interests in thepolicy-making process. However, there are also important epistemological differencesbetween variants within the PNA. We examine these differences in this section of thearticle, starting with a description of the heuristics mentioned above.

The PNA school starts from the premise that actors within policy networks need toexchange resources with one another in order to achieve their goals (Rhodes, 1981;2006).The power-dependent relationships that emerge from this set of interactions definewho will become core members of a network, who will be positioned at its peripherywith occasional and usually limited influence, and who will be completely excluded.Thishas set the stage for a series of debates between pluralist variants of the school which haveargued that the policy-making process is more inclusive, and structural variants of the



school which have argued that the policy-making process is more exclusionary (seeDaugbjerg, 1998, ch. 2, for a review of this debate).

One important contribution of the PNA school has been the development of variousheuristic devices to map the different types of policy network that exist in an effort toassess empirically some of the claims made by the different positions outlined above.Table 1 shows one version of a network continuum, which is inspired by an earlierheuristic developed by Marsh and Rhodes (1992).

A policy community is formed when a very limited number of actors share a strategicpolicy agenda and possess resources, but are dependent on others to achieve their aims.Power is exercised through an overt exclusion of actors from the network and by the wayin which certain ways of handling policy problems become institutionalised. As Rhodes(1981, p. 122) has argued: ‘each policy community ... has, in fact, an agenda of “relevant”issues and problems. Only some matters will be deemed appropriate ones for decision’.Moreover, each policy community will have ‘evolved its own approach to problems:established routines of contact, shared perceptions and values, and the stock of triedknowledge and policies [that] are brought to bear on new problems’ (Rhodes, 1981,p. 118).These are derived from a shared view between the members of the network on thebroader social, political and economic objectives that it should pursue. As Martin Smith(1993, p. 73) argues: ‘power is structural. Policy outputs ... are the result of actors withinstructural locations making choices from a range of structurally determined options’.

Issue networks lie at the other end of the policy network continuum. They arecharacterised by a lack of consensus on policy principles and procedures. Members arelikely to disagree on the broader social, political and economic objectives that they shouldpursue and, while occasionally agreement might be reached on some specific policymeasures, this agreement does not rest on a deeply rooted consensus about broaderobjectives and policy principles (Smith, 1993, pp. 126–7). The lack of such a consensusmakes it difficult for a particular group of actors to dominate within this type of network.

These heuristics continue to be used in empirical research (for recent examples seeOsborne, 2010, part V) but their usefulness has not gone unquestioned. One of the keydebates has centred on whether networks have explanatory power or not.This debate was

Table 1: Extremes on the Policy Network Continuum

Dimensions Policy community Issue network

Membership Very limited number of members Large number of membersNarrow range of interests

representedWide range of interests

representedIntegration Bargaining and negotiation Consultation

Frequent interaction Unstable pattern of interactionInstitutionalisation Consensus on policy principles

and procedures to approachpolicy problems

Conflict over policy principles andprocedures to approach policyproblems

Source: Daugbjerg, 1998.



prompted by Keith Dowding (1995, p. 142) who argued that any explanation of policyoutcomes ‘lies in the characteristics of the actors’, rather than in the structural charac-teristics of the network itself.

Marsh and Smith (2000) developed a dialectical model of policy networks partly inresponse to this criticism. It maintains that networks should be understood as politicalstructures where the capacity of actors to influence policy decisions varies according to‘the institutionalization of beliefs, values, cultures and particular forms of behaviour’(Marsh and Smith, 2000, p. 6). As such, the dialectical approach sought to addressDowding’s criticism that the PNA school could not explain policy outputs, focusinginstead on the interactive and iterative relationships that exist between network structure,context, policy feedback and reflective agents. In short, Marsh and Smith (2000, p. 8)argued that networks should not be viewed as unchanging structures; rather, they evolveas network members interpret contextual factors and policy feeds back on itself in aprocess that is, in turn, mediated through the network structure.

The differences between rational choice approaches, based on a positivist epistemology,and dialectical approaches, based on a critical realist epistemology, therefore remain andare probably irreconcilable, but, as mentioned earlier, it would appear that this has notdissuaded scholars from continuing to use the heuristics developed by the PNA school.This includes recent contributions by: Colin Hay and David Richards (2000), whodevelop a ‘strategic relational theory of networks’ based on the dialectical approachoutlined above; Jeremy Richardson (2000) and Ben Kisby (2007), who have examined therole of ideas and policy agendas; Andrew Hindmoor (2009), who has examined the roleof priming; and Daugbjerg (1998; see also Daugbjerg and Pedersen, 2004), who hasstudied how policy capacity varies between different network configurations. In addition,the interpretivist school has presented a more fundamental challenge based on similararguments to those presented above, emphasising the need to: decentre networks; focus ontheir social construction from the ‘bottom up’; and use ethnographic methods as a way ofcapturing these realities (Bevir and Richards, 2009).

We therefore reach a similar conclusion to the one that we arrived at when we wereconsidering the NWG school. At one level, it remains true to say that the meso-levelheuristics developed by the PNA school, and particularly its concern with the inclusionand exclusion of different groups, suggest that it can add a new dimension of under-standing to the NWG school. However, we also find that important differences existwithin the PNA school. In short, we would argue that these differences need to be takeninto account when considering whether and how it might be possible to combine thesetwo schools.

Combining the Network Governance and Policy NetworkAnalysis SchoolsThis review of the literature therefore suggests that combining the NWG school with thePNA school might be compatible with some epistemological approaches more thanothers. At the very least, there will be differences in view as to how this should be donegiven the variation that exists between the three approaches outlined above. In this sectionof the article, we propose one way of combining these two schools based on a critical



realist epistemology.We do not have the space to go into an account of the philosophicaltenets of critical realism here or to provide a defence of its position compared with thetwo other approaches discussed above, but both of these issues have been comprehensivelyaddressed by others elsewhere (for accessible introductions to critical realism, see Collier,1994; Hartwig, 2007; Sayer, 2000).

The critical realist imprint of our approach is clear in the analysis that follows by theway in which we characterise different governance arrangements and the conclusionsthat we reach about how they are likely to lead to different governance outcomes. Inparticular, critical realism ascribes causal power to network structures in the same wayas the dialectical approach, a position that is clearly incompatible with positivism andwhich became one of the key debates within the PNA school that we briefly outlinedabove. Furthermore, our analysis makes a distinction between state and society-centredgovernance, which is incompatible with the ontological status ascribed to the state byinterpretivists but which is, nonetheless, compatible with the critical realist approachadopted here, a key feature of which is the theory of emergence (on emergence seeElder-Vass, 2010; Kurki, 2008; Sawyer, 2005). By extension, this means that we wouldalso expect the state to play an important role in governance arrangements either byimposing a shadow of hierarchy over its activities or as a result of the role that it islikely to play in processes of meta-governance. This conclusion is reflected in some ofthe observations that we make below concerning the ongoing viability of governancearrangements where non-state actors play a dominant role.

A critical realist approach therefore forms the basis for our typology, which combinesthe NWG and PNA schools by making a distinction between coordination on two axes,a vertical state–society axis and a horizontal interest integration axis (see Table 2). Theformer axis is most closely associated with the NWG school while the latter is mostclosely associated with the PNA school.These axes are continuums and we acknowledgethat neither school would reject the existence of either dimension of coordinationoutright, although we would suggest that our review of the literatures points to the wayin which each school tends to privilege one axis over another.4

In addition to serving a descriptive purpose, Table 2 also shows how we use thetypology to generate a number of propositions about the relationship between different

Table 2: Explaining Governance Outcomes

Horizontal coordination

Exclusion Inclusion

Vertical coordinationState-centred governance I II

• Medium input legitimacy • High input legitimacy• High output legitimacy • Medium output legitimacy

Society-centred governance III IV• Low input legitimacy • High input legitimacy• Medium output legitimacy • Low output legitimacy



governance arrangements and their associated governance outcomes. In doing so, weacknowledge that governance outcomes can be assessed in a variety of different ways andvarious potential variables have already been identified within the literature. For example,Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing’s (2009) analysis of governance outcomes counts no lessthan 24 different variables spread evenly between ‘effectiveness’ measures on the one handand ‘democracy’ measures on the other (see also Börzel and Panke, 2007; Klijn et al., 2010;O’Toole, 2007; Provan and Kenis, 2007; Sandström and Carlsson, 2008). However, ratherthan provide an extensive list of all of these possible measures here, we use two over-arching criteria: input legitimacy, which refers to the process through which decisions arereached; and output legitimacy, which refers to policy outcomes and their effectiveness.5 Indoing so, we recognise that there is also a broader debate surrounding the concept oflegitimacy, but we use the terms input and output legitimacy here in a way that is broadlyconsistent with how they have been used elsewhere in the network governance literature(for example, Börzel and Panke, 2007; Neyer, 2004; Scharpf, 1999; for a detailed discussionon legitimacy, see Gilley, 2009). We suggest that, whereas input legitimacy has been thetraditional focus of the PNA school, output legitimacy has been the traditional focus ofthe NWG school (Börzel and Panke, 2007, p. 153). This is reflected in how the PNAschool has focused on how differences in the resources available to network actors and thedominant ideologies that exist within networked arrangements lead to the inclusion ofsome interests in the policy-making process and the exclusion of others.This is differentfrom the NWG school where networks were primarily legitimised on the basis of theresults that they achieved, although we acknowledge that there has been a subsequentgeneration of studies that have started to address questions related to the democraticaccountability of networks (Aars and Fimreite, 2005; Klijn and Skelcher, 2007; Mathurand Skelcher, 2007; Sørensen and Torfing, 2007).

In what remains of this section of the article, we describe the four governancearrangements outlined in Table 2 and their associated governance outcomes, payingparticular attention to the way in which governance outcomes are conditioned by anetwork’s structural characteristics and the way in which it is managed.We do not havethe space to include examples here so our discussion is mainly conceptual (but seeDaugbjerg and Fawcett, 2011). However, what the typology clearly highlights is that thereare a series of trade-offs involved in choosing between different governance arrangements.This means that effective meta-governance is about generating governance arrangementsthat deliver adequate levels of input and output legitimacy, but it is unlikely that any onegovernance arrangement will deliver optimal levels of both types of legitimacy at any oneparticular point in time.

Cell I, shown in the top left-hand quadrant, combines state-centred governance with arelatively exclusive policy network. In terms of vertical coordination, this will be a policysector in which state authorities play a central role in influencing the outcomes of thenetwork either through direct intervention or through the imposition of a shadow ofhierarchy over the activities of the network. In terms of horizontal coordination, thelimited number of actors in the network means that there is likely to be agreement onthe ‘rules of the game’ and the structure of the network is likely to be relatively stable overtime.



We have described the outcome of this type of governance arrangement as mediuminput legitimacy and high output legitimacy. On the one hand, we would expect limitedinput legitimacy because the state has given privileged access to some actors. On theother hand, the central role of the state in the network allows it to persuade, or ifnecessary force, network members to consider broader societal interests. However, theexclusivity of the network means that these efforts will be met with limited success asthere will only be weak support for such demands from within the network itself.

The horizontal coordination in this type of governance arrangement is likely to meanthat network participants agree on the ‘rules of the game’, which may lead to more‘efficient’ and faster decision making than might otherwise occur in a more inclusivesetting. In most situations, it is also likely that members of the network will be able toreach an agreement on how to ensure effective policy implementation and delivery. Inshort, this is a governance arrangement that is likely to generate higher levels of outputlegitimacy.

Cell II, shown in the top right-hand quadrant, combines state-centred governance witha relatively inclusive policy network. According to this governance arrangement, the statewill take a central role in all stages of the network’s existence but, contrary to Cell I, thenetwork will be relatively inclusive. This means that it is less likely that there will beagreement on the ‘rules of the game’ between network actors.This may make the networkunstable and require the state to undertake more intensive and ongoing meta-governance.

We have described the outcome of this governance arrangement as high input legiti-macy and medium output legitimacy. High input legitimacy is derived from the relativelyopen and inclusive nature of the network.The state’s involvement in this particular typeof governance arrangement may also help to give the network broader input legitimacy.Medium output legitimacy is likely to result since the larger number of actors within thenetwork will increase the risk of deadlock, preventing the efficient development ofsolutions to the policy problems that the network has been set up to address.This is likelyto require more active meta-governance of the network. For example, the state mayintervene in order to reconstitute the network, create incentives for network actors toreach an agreement, or impose a deadline and ‘force’ a resolution, although actions suchas these clearly run the risk of threatening the overall legitimacy with which the networkis viewed from the perspective of those either engaged in the network or from within thebroader community at large.

Cell III, shown in the bottom left-hand quadrant, combines society-centred governancewith a relatively exclusive policy network. According to this governance arrangement, wewould expect societal actors to take a central role in managing the network, but for thenumber of actors in the network to be limited to a core group.The vertical coordinationpresent in this governance arrangement means that the state is likely to have less controlover the outcomes of the network.

We have described the outcome of this governance arrangement as low input legiti-macy and medium output legitimacy. Input legitimacy is low because the policy networkis exclusive and will display a high degree of autonomy from the state. This does notexclude the state from this type of governance arrangement entirely but it does mean thatnon-state actors will play a key role in managing the network. This might raise issues



concerning the democratic legitimacy of the network since the state’s capacity toinfluence the network is likely to be weak, but its legitimacy is, nevertheless, likely to be(mis)used to confer broader input legitimacy on the network and its outcomes.

Despite the low level of input legitimacy, this type of governance arrangement may,nevertheless, deliver relatively effective policy outcomes. Output legitimacy may bereasonably high for many of the same reasons outlined in Cell I, including the potentialfor faster and more ‘efficient’ decision making as well as more effective policy imple-mentation and delivery. However, the limited role of the state in managing the networkmay result in a situation in which non-state actors capture the policy process and adoptpolicy measures that are short term and narrowly focused on providing policy benefits forthemselves without taking broader concerns into account (rent seeking). We thereforeconclude that this type of governance arrangement is likely to exhibit a medium level ofoutput legitimacy, although the overall lack of input legitimacy is likely to be a keydestabilising factor in this type of governance arrangement.

Cell IV, shown in the bottom right-hand quadrant, combines society-centred gover-nance with a relatively inclusive policy network. Non-state actors will take the lead rolein managing this type of governance arrangement. This may lead to problems similar tothose outlined in Cell II, including instability and potential deadlock. The effectivemeta-governance of this particular type of governance arrangement is therefore importantas output legitimacy is likely to depend upon it.The responsibility for performing this rolewill fall to a non-state actor or group of non-state actors so they must have not only aninterest in performing this role but also the necessary resources, authority and legitimacyto do so. In our view, this raises a problem for this particular type of governancearrangement because non-state actors are unlikely to undertake this role, either becausethey lack sufficient self-interest to do so, or because they lack the command of therequisite combination of resources, authority and legitimacy to be able to perform thisrole effectively (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).

This leads us to describe the outcome of this governance arrangement as high inputlegitimacy and low output legitimacy. High input legitimacy extends from the inclusiveand open nature of this type of governance arrangement. However, the relatively inef-fective policy outcomes that this governance arrangement is likely to generate will leadto low levels of output legitimacy.

The typology that we have developed offers a first attempt to account for the range ofdifferent governance arrangements that exist, their effect on levels of input and outputlegitimacy and how these outcomes are conditioned by the way in which networks aremanaged as well as their structural characteristics. It seeks to combine insights from boththe PNA school, which provides a practical set of meso-level tools that can be used tooperationalise debates within the NWG school, and the NWG school, which provides anunderstanding of the impact of the broader context within which governance arrange-ments operate. However, the way in which we have characterised different governancearrangements and the conclusions that we have reached about how they affect governanceoutcomes clearly reflect our own ontological and epistemological approach, which isinformed by critical realism. We would therefore expect positivist and interpretivistapproaches to reach a different set of conclusions about the desirability and/or practicality



of combining these two schools. As such, we hope to have demonstrated not only themerit of combining the NWG and PNA schools from a critical realist perspective, butalso how such an endeavour is potentially more complex than it might at first seem dueto the underlying epistemological differences that exist between variants within these twoschools.

(Accepted: 15 November 2011)

About the AuthorsPaul Fawcett is a Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University ofSydney. His main research interests are in network governance theory, executive government, political participationand political sociology. Paul Fawcett, Department of Government and International Relations, School of Social andPolitical Sciences, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia; email: [email protected]

Carsten Daugbjerg is a Professor at the Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen,and was a Visiting Fellow at the Political Science Programme, Research School of Social Sciences, The AustralianNational University when this article was written. His fields of research are policy network analysis, historicalinstitutionalism, policy instruments, agricultural policy, trade negotiations, global food regulation and environmentalpolicy. He has published widely on these issues. Carsten Daugbjerg, Institute of Food and Resource Economics,University of Copenhagen, Rolighedsvej 25, DK-1958 Frederiksberg C, Denmark; email: [email protected]

NotesAn earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Australian Political Studies Association Conference, University ofMelbourne, 26–9 September 2010.We would like to thank the participants at this event, Josie Kelly, David Marsh, Jon Pierre, RodRhodes,Yonatan Schvartzman, the editor and the two anonymous referees of this journal for their advice and helpful commentson earlier versions of this article. Carsten Daugbjerg would like to thank the Danish Council for Independent Research (SocialSciences) for financial support.1 Börzel (1998) makes a similar distinction between the ‘interest intermediation school’ on the one hand and the ‘governance

school’ on the other.2 This distinction is not intended to exclude the significant likelihood that coordination is actually far more complex and

multifaceted than we have outlined here. For example, vertical and horizontal coordination clearly coexist and are oftenmulti-scalar, particularly in situations where multi-level governance arrangements exist, such as in the European Union.We wouldlike to thank Jon Pierre for this point.

3 For an exception, see Daugbjerg and Marsh’s (1998) tentative thoughts on how to embed PNA in macro-political theory.4 We have already noted how the continuum used by the PNA school could be disaggregated further but it is also worth briefly

noting that this is also the case for the NWG school. For example, Pierre and Peters (2005, ch. 2) identify five different modelsalong a continuum varying from the étatiste model at one end to the governance without government model on the other endof the scale (the three models in between are: liberal-democratic, state-centric and the Dutch governance school).

5 We acknowledge that the distinction between outputs and outcomes is important and that our use of the term ‘output legitimacy’may indicate that we are privileging one over the other. However, despite using the term output legitimacy, we neverthelessrecognise the importance of both outputs and outcomes but, due to space constraints, we use these terms interchangeably here(O’Toole, 2007, p. 299). We would like to thank Josie Kelly for this point.

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explaining governance outcomes: epistemology, network governance and policy network analysis

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