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Thomas Bernauer, International River Management 1

Explaining Success and Failure in International River Management(Abbreviated Title: International River Management)

Thomas BernauerCenter for International StudiesSwiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH)ETH Zentrum, SEI G.2CH-8092 ZurichPhone +41-1-632-6771Fax +41-1-632-1946Email: [email protected] (until 31.12.2001)

[email protected] (from 1.1.2002)Web: www.bernauer.ethz.ch

Word count:15’179, plus 3 figures

Forthcoming in: Aquatic Sciences, Spring 2002.

Abstract

When and why are international efforts to solve transboundary river management problemssuccessful, when and why do such efforts fail, and what does success or failure mean? With morethan 260 international river basins covering 45 percent of the Earth’s land surface, and withfreshwater being humanity’s most valuable natural resource, these questions are obviously nottrivial. Natural scientists and engineers have provided some answers, but these remain far fromcomplete without major input from the social sciences. While technical know-how andinnovation are also crucial to successful international river management, success in this contexthinges primarily on political processes in which institutional arrangements are designed andimplemented. This review essay claims that social scientists have made considerable progress inthis field since 1977, when a landmark book by David Le Marquand on the politics ofinternational river management was published. This progress includes the development oftheoretically better informed explanatory models, and their evaluation against an increasingamount of empirical information. It provides a solid foundation for proceeding to a larger-scaleresearch effort that involves the analysis of a larger set of empirical cases on the basis of a singleexplanatory model.

Keywords: international river management, water policy, transboundary water resources.

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.bernauer.ethz.ch/


Introduction

Recent work by geo-scientists has established that, as of 1999, there were 261 river basins thatcrossed international boundaries and covered more than 45 percent of the Earth’s land surface(Wolf et al. 1999). While obstacles to successfully coping with domestic river managementproblems can be formidable, pollution or other problems on transboundary rivers appear to beparticularly difficult to solve. Unlike at the domestic level, the sovereign equality of states, thedominant principle in international politics, implies that there is no political unit above andbeyond the nation state that could impose solutions, such as prohibitions, emission taxes orlicenses, subsidies, or product or production process requirements, on unwilling states.1

Legal frameworks, through which victims of water pollution or other international riversproblems could seek remedy, are weak at the international level (Cano, 1989; Benvenisti, 1996).International courts and tribunals exist, for example the International Court of Justice in TheHague. But in most cases, states have maintained the right to accept or refuse referral of a disputeto an international court or tribunal as well as any verdicts by such institutions.2 They have alsomaintained the monopoly in enforcing international judgments and international regulations moregenerally. In regard to international rivers, general principles of international water law exist, butin practice they provide only little guidance in resolving transboundary river managementproblems. (E.g. Frederiksen, 1992; Wolf, 1997; Marty, 1997; Salman/Boisson-de-Chazournes,1998) Marty (1997:17) notes, “the golden rule of water law (…) says that there is no goldenrule.” More generally, institutional structures for reconciling conflicting interests at theinternational level tend to be less sophisticated and less resilient to opportunistic manipulationthan their counterparts at the domestic level. At the international level, solutions thus have to befound through consensus-oriented negotiations among riparian countries under conditions that, inmany parts of the world, resembles what Realist theorists of international politics have called ananarchical self-help system (Waltz, 1979).3

Wolf (1997:334) observes, “Water is the only scarce resource for which there is no substitute,over which there is poorly developed international law, and the need for which is overwhelming,constant and immediate.” While this statement may not be valid in any rigorous sense (e.g.biodiversity is not substitutable either), water is clearly a key resource in most human activity,and in regard to the ecosystem as a whole. Motivated by its practical importance (see, e.g. Gleick,1998), research on international freshwater issues, carried out by natural scientists and engineers,has produced an enormous amount of literature. I dare claim that, although these contributionsare important, they cannot provide conclusive explanations of success and failure in internationalriver management. Technological know-how and innovation are obviously important to findingsolutions to international freshwater problems. However, in most cases, the most seriousobstacles to successful international river management do not appear to be primarily technical, 1 The author would like to thank Elisabeth DeSombre, Ronald Mitchell, Raphaël Tschanz, David Victor, and OranYoung for highly useful comments on earlier versions of this article.2 Exceptions include the European Court of Justice, the WTO, and the UN Security Council.3 There is an ongoing debate among theorists of international politics on the differences between international andnational political systems, and the implications for resolving conflicts at the two levels (see Waltz, 1979;Keohane/Ostrom, 1995). See also Wolf, 1997. In one of the extremely rare cases of supranational imposition of anenvironmental policy, the Iraq compensation commission, established and operated by the United Nations, isallocating parts of Iraq’s oil revenue to victims of environmental damages resulting from Iraq’s occupation ofKuwait and the subsequent war. It has also funded environmental monitoring.


but political. Answers to when and why such efforts succeed or fail must then, to a large extent,be found through the study of societal processes in which institutional arrangements are designedand implemented. This is the domain of political science, economics, and other social sciences.

The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has counted more than 3600treaties on international water issues between the years 805 and 1984. Wolf (1997:339, see alsoFAO, 1978) has counted around 300 international treaties on non-navigational issues of watermanagement, flood control, hydropower projects, and allocations for consumptive or non-consumptive uses of international rivers since 1945. The opportunities for using these “real worldexperiments” for observational studies designed to evaluate theory-derived explanations ofsuccess or failure in international river management are almost infinite. These opportunities arein stark contrast with the actual amount of social science research on the issue.

International environmental policy is (still) a small subfield in all social sciences, and very fewresearchers within this subfield have focused on international rivers. Given the large number ofinternational rivers, the even larger number of associated transboundary institutions and treaties,and the small number of researchers active in this area, social scientists have, at this stage, verylimited knowledge of the nature and extent of variation in the performance of existinginternational river management schemes. While the criteria for measuring performance remaindisputed (see further below), some international river management institutions appear to workrather well, whereas the performance of others leaves much to be desired and some arrangementshave remained “paper tigers” altogether (Le Marquand, 1977:2; Marty, 1997:21-25;Birnie/Boyle, 1994:250; Bernauer, 1997; Golubev, 1993; Biswas, 1994). The extent of variationin institutional performance among the total population remains unknown.

Not surprisingly then, knowledge on the conditions for success/failure is also in its infancy.Social scientists and practitioners have put forward a large number of characteristics ofinternational river management problems and institutional structures, postulating negative orpositive associations between these characteristics and success or failure (for earlier reviews, seeMarty, 1997; Bernauer, 1997).4 But very few attempts have been made to develop coherentexplanatory models embedded in social science theories, and to evaluate them systematicallyagainst the empirical evidence. Most of the literature on international river management is almostentirely descriptive and focuses on management practices on individual international rivers. Insome cases, such descriptive work is assembled in collective volumes in an effort to tease out the“lessons learned”. Other work is predominantly prescriptive, proposing (presumably) effective orefficient management strategies and arguing rather eclectically with empirical illustrations, or(often the case in work by economists) making claims on the basis of pure theory (e.g. gametheoretical or economic optimization models, e.g. Kilgour/Dinar, 1995). The vast majority of thevery few observational studies that are designed to empirically evaluate an explicit set of

4 First efforts to study more systematically how international rivers are managed and how such management could beimproved were made by the United Nations, with a first symposium on the subject in 1949. Marty (1997) exploresthe extent to which the major academic disciplines have concentrated on different aspects and problems ofinternational river management. He distinguishes an ecological, a developmental, a political, a legal, and amanagement paradigm.


hypotheses derived from social science theories are single case studies (e.g. Mingst, 1981; Lowi,1995; Bernauer, 1996).5

In this review essay I concentrate on the latter type of research because, in my view, it holds thegreatest potential for generating cumulative knowledge on the issue of concern. In view of theshortcomings pointed out above, the research task ahead may look rather challenging. And yet,social scientists have made substantial progress since a first landmark study by David LeMarquand appeared in 1977. This progress is particularly visible in recent work by Rainer Durth(1996), Frank Marty (2001), and Aaron Wolf (1997), for three authors have addressed whatarguably is the biggest gap in research on international river management: the lack of multi-casecomparisons within a single and coherent theoretical/analytical framework. I thus focus moresystematically on publications by Durth, Marty, and Wolf, while also referring to work by otherauthor where this provides additional insights.

The 1977 book by Le Marquand was the first study to outline an explicit set of hypothesesexplaining when and why riparian cooperation succeeds and when and why it fails, and toevaluate these hypotheses against a set of empirical cases (Colorado salinity issue; High RossDam controversy; integrated development of the Columbia river; Rhine water quality problems).6Le Marquand’s list of explanatory variables is rather long and insufficiently embedded in socialscience theory (as it existed in the mid-1970s). Also the empirical evaluation of propositions is,from a methodological viewpoint, less rigorous than one might hope for. Nonetheless, LeMarquand’s five principal conclusions are quite plausible and in any event more systematicallyderived from empirical analysis than those in previous research. They have, in part, also beenconfirmed by subsequent research (see below).

First, Le Marquand finds that riparians were better able to solve their respective problem if theyhad common perceptions of the problem, win-win solutions were created, and national leadershipwas committed to solving the problem. Second, economic optimization was less crucial tocooperation than non-economic factors. Third, cooperation was more successful when socialconcerns and objectives were evaluated and defined in the planning process, and whenconsequences and costs of alternative strategies were assessed in detail. Fourth, cooperation was

5 Lowi, for example, highlights the role of hegemonic powers in resolving transboundary water disputes, focusing onthe Jordan. Bernauer examines the effectiveness of compensating upstream polluters in an effort to resolve pollutionproblems on the Rhine.6 Other comparative studies include, for example, Chapman, 1963, United Nations, 1975, Fox/Le Marquand, 1978,Vlachos et al., 1986, Frey, 1993, World Bank, 1993, Rangeley et al., 1994, Barrett 1994, Ganoulis, 1996, Nakayama,1997, Elhance, 1999, Shmueli, 1999, and Holtrup 1999. While these studies also compare several cases ofinternational river management, they are less systematic than Le Marquand’s book in terms of using a coherentanalytical framework. The latter two, which are edited volumes, illustrate this drawback rather well. Both of themcontain some theoretical chapters and some chapters with empirical case descriptions. But no attempt is made toconnect theoretical arguments and empirical analysis in a coherent manner. Among the very few larger-N studies oninternational rivers are articles by Mandel (1992) and Haftendorn (2000). Mandel studies 14 river basin conflicts,concluding that conflicts are most intense in cases where border and water disputes coincide (Shatt-al-Arab, RioGrande) than in water quality cases (Colorado, Danube, La Plata), and when conflicts are triggered by man-madetechnological disruptions (Euphrates, Ganges, Indus, Nile) rather than by natural events (e.g. flooding, Columbia,Senegal rivers). Haftendorn concentrates on the origins of water conflicts and attempts at solving them. Hercomparison suggests that cooperation is facilitated by improvements in information exchange and promotion ofconfidence, embedding the conflict in a positive interactive complex, creation of package solutions through linkagestrategies, use of arbitration, mediation, and intervention.


more successful when agreements were flexible enough to adapt to changing values,technologies, and market conditions. Fifth, reciprocal interests in cooperation were mostconducive to problem solving, whereas upstream-downstream problems were most difficult todeal with. Third parties, such as international organizations and donor countries, wereinstrumental in overcoming the latter type of problems.

The remainder of this article is structured by four questions:

(a) How do the three authors, on whose work this review essay primarily focuses, define theoverall analytical framework for their research?

(b) How do they define success or failure in international river management?(c) What are their key-explanations accounting for when and why riparian countries are able

to establish cooperative arrangements?(d) What are their findings in associating particular characteristics of institutional

arrangements with success or failure in international river management, and what are theirpolicy-recommendations?

I conclude that, taken together, the work by Durth, Marty, and Wolf, as well as other workreferred to at various points throughout the essay, has contributed substantially to answeringthese three questions. It provides a sufficient foundation for proceeding to a larger-scale researcheffort that involves the analysis of a larger set of empirical cases on the basis of a singleexplanatory model that is well embedded in extant social science theories.

Analytical Framework

Figure 1 shows in most general form the analytical framework that implicitly or explicitly guidesmost authors in this field of research. The most explicit approach in this regard is adopted byMarty who distinguishes three (groups of) explanatory variables: the structure of the problem tobe solved, the tools employed to achieve the formation of an international regime7, andinstitutional properties (i.e. design features of an international regime). Environmental problemstructure as well as policy tools and socio-economic conditions (in terms to be defined) influencethe likelihood of international regime formation (the creation and form of institutions, as well asregulatory output). The latter, in turn, affect the behavior of riparian actors and ultimatelyenvironmental outcomes. This framework sets the stage for two principal analytical steps, thefirst focusing on the explanation of regime formation, the second on the explanation of changesin actor behavior and environmental conditions. As discussed below, each of the two outcomes tobe explained can be regarded as a measure of success/failure.

Figure 1: General Framework of Analysis

This approach connects research on the causes of success or failure in international rivermanagement to a larger research program, particularly in political science and international law, 7 The term international regime is widely used in political science and international law and denotes a system ofprinciples, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures designed to influence the behavior of states, firms, orindividuals. These systems may or may not include international organizations. In this essay, I use the termsinternational regimes and international institutions synonymously. See, e.g., Young, 1999.


which examines the determinants of international regime formation and regime effectiveness ininternational environmental policy (e.g. Miles et al., 2001; Brown/Jacobson, 1998;Haas/Keohane/Levy, 1993; Keohane/Levy, 1996; Young, 1999, 1999a). While Marty drawsextensively on this literature, Durth and Wolf ignore it almost completely.

Success and Failure

As noted above, analysts of international river management have defined the outcome to beexplained, and thus also success or failure, primarily in terms of regime formation and in terms ofeffects of cooperative arrangements on riparian behavior and environmental outcomes. At a moregeneral level, social scientists have measured outcomes of international environmental policy or,more specifically, the success or failure of policies mainly in terms of Pareto-efficiency,compliance, and problem solving (e.g. Mitchell, 1994; Victor et al., 1998; Sprinz/Helm, 2000;Sand, 1992; Young, 1999; Bernauer, 1995).

Economists tend to concentrate on Pareto-efficiency (e.g. Wishart, 1989; Colby, 1995). Successor failure, in this context, means the extent to which a given policy approximates the point whereno riparian country could be made better off without making another riparian country worse off.Political and many other social scientists regard this criterion of success with skepticism. Mostimportantly, it is very difficult to apply empirically: gains or losses of concern to policy-makersin the real world are often difficult to express in economic terms; and measurement of Pareto-efficiency involves a counterfactual element, namely, showing whether or not other policies,which did not materialize, would have made one or more actors better off and no one worse off.So, political scientists have, instead, focused on behavior, that is, the degree to which theexistence and operation of an agreement has changed the behavior of key actors.

Legal scholars and also some political scientists have concentrated on compliance withinternational treaties. This criterion has been heavily criticized because, in many cases, it does notcapture the extent to which riparian countries are able to resolve a particular problem. Indeed, fullcompliance with an international treaty that is nominally but not substantively designed to resolvean international river management problem should rightly be regarded as a poor indicator forsuccess (see Mitchell, 1994; Bernauer, 1995; Downs/Rocke/Barsoom, 1996).

Many social scientists have thus used broader empirical proxies for the measurement ofsuccess/failure, the most popular one being the extent of “problem solving” (e.g. Young, 1999;Victor et al., 1998). This concept may appear more vague than Pareto-efficiency or compliance.Moreover, problems along international rivers can differ enormously, making rigorouscomparisons and generalizations across rivers and time difficult. The decisive advantage is,however, that it connects researchers more directly to what policy-makers and natural scientistsor engineers are preoccupied with, namely, when, why, and how riparian countries are able tosolve specific environmental problems. Or more precisely, when do the institutions ripariancountries create in order to solve a problem actually cause changes in behavior that help to solvethe problem at hand. In addition, the empirical literature focusing on Pareto-efficiency andcompliance in international environmental policy illustrates rather well that systematicassessment against these criteria is no less problem-ridden than measurement of the extent ofproblem solving. Recent work on a variety of international environmental policies (e.g. Victor et


al., 1998; Suter, 2000) demonstrates that the following research steps can produce reliable andmeaningful measurements of success or failure: (a) clearly delineating the problem (e.g. pollutionby specific substances, decline of biodiversity in specific forms); (b) choosing a starting point intime and establishing the state of affairs at that time; (c) measuring whether and how far theextent of the problem has increased or decreased over time, whether and how far the outcome(e.g. the level of pollution) has moved towards what experts would define as desirable, and howthe outcome would have looked like without policy-intervention (see, e.g. Sprinz/Helm, 2000;Mitchell, 2001; Suter, 2000).

The most sophisticated attempt to date to connect social science theorizing on policy success orfailure with empirical research on international rivers is Gurtner-Zimmermann’s (1998) study onthe effectiveness of the Rhine Action Program (RAP). Based predominantly on expert-interviews,he assesses the RAP’s problem solving capacity, studies progress in program implementation andbehavioral changes connected to the program, and assesses the degree of goal-attainment.8

How does the work by Durth, Marty, and Wolf compare to these standards? Durth’s theoreticalarguments concentrate very much on Pareto-efficiency. His empirical analysis then withdrawswithout further discussion to a much simpler measurement of success/failure. In his statisticalanalysis, a dummy variable, the existence/non-existence of an international treaty, serves as aproxy for success/failure. This measurement is highly problematic: as noted above, too manyinternational river treaties are known to have remained “paper tigers”. In the worst case, riverswhose riparians engage in the greatest amount of green window-dressing and conclude lots ofecologically meaningless treaties will, in this type of measurement, be coded as success-stories.In his qualitative case studies on the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Euphrates, Durth does not specify indetail how he measures the outcome to be explained and does not make any reference to theconceptual literature relevant to this issue. Instead, he uses a broad set of rather opaque criteria toargue that cooperation was most successful in the Rhine case, followed by the Elbe, and has beenlargely unsuccessful in the case of the Euphrates. Readers with some knowledge of the threecases will probably agree with his overall assessment of variation across the three cases, but willcrave for more precise criteria of success/failure and empirical assessments guided by thesecriteria.

Marty’s study includes a more thorough conceptual discussion of success/failure. Hedistinguishes “regime formation” (the conclusion of international treaties and establishment ofinstitutional arrangements) and “regime effectiveness”, with explicit reference to the extant socialscience literature on this topic. The latter concept leads Marty to define more clearly whatproblem solving means. It also helps in assessing whether a particular problem was solved orreduced because of international cooperation or for other reasons. Marty applies these conceptsand criteria in qualitative case studies on the regulation of the Alpine Rhine (involvingSwitzerland and Austria), the Rio Grande rectification project (involving the United States andMexico), the Pancheshwar multipurpose project on the Mahakali river (involving India andNepal), the Colorado river salinity problem, and the sanitation problem in the Tijuana river basin(both involving the United States and Mexico). Whereas Durth’s assessment of success/failuresuffers from a combination of oversimplification and opaqueness, Marty’s measurement ofsuccess/failure subscribes strongly to the problem-solving criterion and will thus be of greater 8 In view of the questions of principal interest in this essay, the drawbacks of Gurtner-Zimmermann’s study are thatit focuses on one river only, and that it does not explain why the RAP was successful.


interest to practitioners, natural scientists, and engineers. On the downside, Marty’s measurementat times drowns the reader in empirical detail, making it hard to keep an eye on the criteria ofsuccess/failure and the respective empirical evidence, and to compare success over time andacross cases.

The work by Wolf does not explicitly define “conflict resolution”, the authors’ principal outcometo be explained. The quantitative part of this work subscribes, without much discussion andwithout reference to the literature on international regimes or institutions, to the legalisticapproach also adopted by Durth, focusing on the existence/non-existence of international treaties.The University of Alabama/State University of Oregon Transboundary Freshwater DisputeDatabase project, run by Wolf and others, is almost exclusively concerned with analyzingtreaties. It also contains a number of process case studies (Danube, Euphrates, Jordan, Ganges,Indus, Mekong, Nile, La Plata, Salween; two aquifer systems, US-Mexico shared systems and theWest Bank aquifers; two lake systems, the Aral Sea and Great Lakes; and one engineering works,the Lesotho Highlands Project) (see also Bingham et al., 1994;http://terra.geo.orst.edu/users/tfdd/). But these case studies are less substantive than those ofDurth, Marty, or other authors (e.g. Lowi, 1995 on the Jordan) and define “conflict resolution”only in vague terms.

Regime Formation

Analysts of international environmental policy have proposed a plethora of explanatory variablesin an effort to account for the likelihood of regime formation and associated institutional designprinciples (e.g. Young, 1999; Victor et al., 1998; Keohane/Levy, 1993).9 The work by Durth andMarty, as well as other studies on international river management that connect directly to thebroader research program on regime formation in international environmental policy, has framedthe explanation more narrowly: it regards environmental problem structure as the keydeterminant of regime formation, and has conceptualized socio-economic variables and process-oriented variables (policy tools) in terms of conditions for overcoming adverse environmentalproblem structures.

More precisely, Durth’s and Marty’s principle hypothesis is that, generally, regime formation isless likely in upstream-downstream situations than in situations characterized by moresymmetrically distributed environmental damages (notably, in the case of common poolresources, see below). Even in the more adverse situation, however, regime formation is stillpossible if specific socio-economic situations are present and particular policy-tools are applied.The reason for this approach is primarily empirical: whereas many international environmentalpolicy issues are characterized by mutual pollution (e.g. ozone depletion, biodiversity),unidirectional externalities are at the heart of many international river management problems.

Durth and Marty, whose theoretical argument on regime formation is more detailed andsophisticated than the one of Wolf (1997, and related work by Wolf et al.), agree that upstream-

9 For reasons of space and focus I do not discuss in detail how the conclusions drawn from research on internationalriver management map onto the conclusions drawn from research on local common pool resources and internationalenvironmental regimes more broadly.


downstream conditions are least conducive to cooperation. This argument corresponds to whatgame theorists would call a deadlock game, for example of the following form:

Figure 2: Upstream-Downstream Game

In this stylized situation, which is quite typical of many international river pollution and alsowater scarcity problems, the upstream country is assumed to be able to fully “export” the socialcosts of its water consumption (e.g., discharge of pollutants) downstream, whereas thedownstream country suffers in the order of 50 percent from self-inflicted and 50 percent from“imported” pollution.10 In this case, the dominant strategy of the upstream country (meaning itcan not increase its benefit by changing its strategy, irrespective of the strategy adopted by thedownstream country) is to not reduce pollution. The dominant strategy of the downstreamcountry is to reduce pollution. The equilibrium in this game (outcome of the interaction) islocated in the field marked by an asterix and consists of pollution reduction by the downstream,but not by the upstream country.

In economic theory, problems of this nature are referred to as externality problems. In the case ofinternational rivers, externalities are costs (sometimes also benefits) that one actor, in consumingwater, which is a scarce natural resource, imposes on another actor or on future generations.Externalizing consumption costs becomes possible when entitlements to quantities or qualities ofwater are not or only poorly defined, and no riparian actor can, at acceptable cost, be excludedfrom using the river. These two circumstances create incentives for unsustainable use of waterresources (in the jargon of economics referred to as “market failure”) because those consumingriver water do not incur the full cost of their activity. Game theory and collective action theory(e.g. Sandler, 1992; Ostrom, 1990) have shown that the infamous “tragedy of the commons”(Hardin, 1968) logic can prevail also in cases of symmetrically distributed externalities.Resources affected by this problem are often defined as common pool resources11 (e.g. in globalclimate change, where virtually everyone pollutes everyone). However, unidirectionalexternalities are particularly difficult to resolve. In game theoretic terms, unidirectionalexternalities are frequently deadlock games, whereas public goods problems are very similar toN-actor prisoner’s dilemmas12. Common examples of negative upstream-downstreamexternalities on rivers are listed in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Downstream Effects

10 In this example, the benefits each country can obtain range from zero to four. The benefits of the downstreamcountry are depicted in the lower left corner of each quadrant, those of the upstream country in the upper right cornerof each quadrant.11 Common pool resources are resources characterized by ‘non-excludability’ and ‘rivalry’, i.e. everyone has accessto the resource concerned, and the consumption of the resource by one actor reduces the opportunities forconsumption by other authors. Fisheries are an example.12 In the prisoner’s dilemma game, each country would be better off if all countries cooperated. However, the worstoutcome for each country is if it reduces pollution whereas all the other countries do not. In this game, the inabilityof countries to credibly commit to cooperation produces an uncooperative equilibrium. Strategies for overcoming theprisoner’s dilemma include cooperation in steps (notably, tit-for-tat strategies in iterated interactions) and theestablishment of institutions that provide for monitoring and enforcement, which in turn enables countries to crediblycommit themselves. See Sandler, 1992, Young, 1994.


In a 1997 article, Waterbury (1997:280) provides a useful summary of these cooperationproblems on international rivers and also hints at possible solutions13:

“International relations theory, as well as a good deal of economic theory, would warn us of thedifficulties of achieving cooperative solutions to multi-player games in which the actors aresovereign and the pay-offs to cooperation asymmetrical. Asymmetrical rewards alwayscharacterize the potential outcomes of cooperation in international river basins (…) those with theleast to gain will retain veto power over cooperative solutions. They must be compensated bythose who stand to gain the most, and it is no easy task to arrive at compensatory schemes whenthe beneficiaries of cooperation are not sure of what they will gain nor the losers of the extent oftheir potential losses. The indifferent may prefer the familiarity of the status quo to theuncertainties of binding cooperation.”

Of the three research efforts examined in most detail in this essay, Durth’s book provides themost rigorous argument as to when and why riparian countries are likely to overcome upstream-downstream asymmetries and engage in efficient cooperation. His principal hypothesis is thatsuch problems are easier to solve when riparian countries are more “integrated”, i.e. when thedensity of political, economic, and societal ties among countries is greater. He claims thatefficient cooperation is more likely in more integrated settings because: (a) compensation ofupstream countries, which is necessary to motivate the latter to cooperate, is easier; (b) integratedsettings enable riparian countries to make more credible commitments to each other because theyinteract in a larger number of policy-areas; (c) information is likely to be more complete andevenly distributed; (d) notions of equity or justice are more likely to be congruent; (e) unequalbargaining leverage is mitigated by transboundary institutions, which also provide for moreclearly defined and transferable property rights and lower transaction costs; (f) opportunities fornon-governmental (including private) actors to influence outcomes are greater. As to the latter,Durth highlights two competing predictions. In integrated settings one might expect internationalriver commissions to loose in importance relative to private actors. One might also expect,however, that they could gain in importance: governments may be more willing to establish,fund, and entrust such commissions with more substantive tasks because they have already losttheir monopoly on transboundary information flows and negotiations, while countries in non-integrated settings have yet to loose that monopoly and are thus more likely to resist a transfer ofauthority.

Similar to Durth, Marty claims that upstream-downstream externality problems are harder tosolve than what he calls “collective problems” (the more common term would be common poolresources, i.e. problems that affect all riparians similarly). He then concentrates on processvariables that may enable riparians to overcome adverse problem structures. Most of Marty’sarguments, e.g. on compensation of upstream externality producers, and the reduction ofuncertainty and transaction costs, are, in terms of their substance, very similar to those of Durth.In contrast to Durth and Marty’s work, Wolf adopts a predominantly inductive approach. Heconcentrates on “lessons learned” from studying 140 transboundary water treaties and 14 processcase studies collected on the University of Alabama/State University of Oregon TransboundaryFreshwater Dispute Database, as well as workshops with stakeholders and scientists that took 13 In most general terms, solutions to upstream-downstream problems can be achieved through coercion,compensation, issue-linkage, and changes in the group of participants and/or bargaining fora. See Bernauer,1997:174-180.


place in the framework of the International Water Resources Association Committee onInternational Waters. Theoretical arguments about the success or failure of riparian cooperationappear at some points in the discussion of empirical results, but the author does not outline andthen test systematically a specific set of propositions derived from social science theory.

In view of the large number of candidate explanations14, possible interaction effects or colinearityof explanatory variables, and conditions exogenous to explanatory models that vary substantiallyacross time or rivers, there is an evident degrees of freedom problem in any empirical analysis ofinternational river management. Even if there were sufficient data on all relevant environmentaland policy variables for all 261 international rivers – and we are still far away from having such adata set – the problem would be more than challenging. How have social scientists coped?

Using descriptive statistics, Durth examines whether riparian cooperation occurs earlier and ismore frequent in more integrated areas of the world. The areas he examines are – in decreasingorder in terms of integration – the European Union, the European Economic Area, all otherEuropean States, and Canada, Mexico, and the United States. His sample includes 127agreements (involving a total of 35 countries plus the EU) from 1852 to 1992. He concludes thatthe evidence, especially for upstream-downstream cases, confirms his principal hypothesis.Plausible as these findings may be, they suffer from two shortcomings. First, as noted above, thedependent variable is measured in terms of treaty/no treaty, with no reference whatsoever to thesubstance of cooperative arrangements. One way of reducing the risk that validity problems withthe dependent variable bias the results would be to make sure that the “paper tigers” among theagreements analyzed are evenly (statisticians will prefer ‘randomly’) distributed across the fourcountry groups and time. The author does not address this issue. Second, the analysis should havecontrolled for the number of international rivers in each country group, the extent of theirutilization, and other factors. In the absence of that the reader is left to speculate whether theobserved correlation between integration and the timing and frequency of cooperation may ratherbe a function of exogenous variables, for example the number of transboundary rivers orpopulation density, the extent of industrial activity along these rivers, the level of economicdevelopment more generally, water scarcity, the number of countries involved, etc. One shouldalso expect strong colinearity between the level of economic development, integration, and publicopinion on environmental issues. Indeed, if one subscribes to the “environmental Kuznets curve”argument (e.g. WTO, 1999), public demand for environmental protection increases with the levelof income, particularly as societies approach the so-called third industrial revolution (informationtechnology boom, expansion of the services sector).

The results of Durth’s qualitative case studies are more convincing. At the most general level, hefinds that cooperation has been more successful in the case of the Rhine. International efforts onthat river have indeed been so successful that the very interpretation by decision-makers of theproblems to be solved has evolved from an upstream-downstream to a public goods issue.15

14 In an overview of the literature on international river management, Marty (1997) lists the hypotheses mostfrequently encountered. Explanatory variables include, for example: demand for problem-specific cooperation, ahigh level of regional integration, consensus on fundamental principles and norms, creation of win-win solutions,leadership commitment, availability of data and information, third-party assistance, issue-specific confidencebuilding. See also Bernauer, 1997.15 See also Nollkaemper, 1996, who makes this point very convincingly. See also Holtrup (1999), who examines theRhine and assesses the applicability of a similar management scheme to rivers in Center and Eastern Europe (Elbe,Oder, Weichsel, Bug, Nemunas (Memel), and Daugava (Düna)).


Cooperation in the case of the Elbe was more successful only after the fall of the iron curtain, theunification of Germany, and rapidly growing ties between the Czech Republic and WesternEurope (equivalent to increased integration). International efforts on the Euphrates have failed allalong. In his overall explanation of success/failure in terms of integration, Durth also adds aseries of ad hoc explanations, including industrial accidents (e.g. Sandoz in 1986), politicalprestige benefits, interactions between domestic and foreign environmental policy, etc.

The most interesting findings emerging from Durth’s cases studies are arguably those thatrespond to why (and not whether) integration increases the chances of solving upstream-downstream problems. First, because in more integrated settings countries find it easier tocredibly commit to binding agreements the Rhine riparian countries were able to move to moreflexible forms of cooperation (notably the Rhine Action Program).

Second, compensation or transfer payments are used less frequently than initially assumed byDurth (and, in fact, many others). Issue-linkages to reduce or neutralize existing asymmetries incountries’ expected benefits of cooperation appear to be easier to employ than direct transferpayments. While compensation seems to be a prerequisite for cooperation in non-integratedsettings it tends, in Durth’s view, to be less necessary in integrated settings.16 Given that we donot have data of this nature on the total population of international rivers, such conclusions arevery preliminary. Moreover, the even more interesting question, why compensation or transferpayments are rarely used in integrated settings, is not answered by Durth (neither by others) andawaits further research.17

Third, Durth observes that norms of equity and justice have converged more strongly in moreintegrated settings, such as the Rhine case, where there has been a paradigm shift from“upstream-downstream” cooperation to ecosystem protection/restoration and the provision of apublic good.

Fourth, efficient cooperation is more likely when information is more symmetrically distributedand when institutional structures provide a better guarantee that agreed measures areimplemented (problem of clearly defined, enforceable, and tradable property rights). Theseconditions are met in decreasing order in the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Euphrates cases. The sameholds for the hypothesis that cooperation is more likely and more efficient when risk perceptionsand preferences regarding the timing of proposed solutions are similar, and when there are fewerpossibilities for threats as a bargaining tactic.

Fifth, in what appears to be a paradox at first glance, private actors find it more attractive inintegrated settings to have governments represent their interests: one might have expected privateaction to gradually replace intergovernmental cooperation in more integrated settings. Thetheoretical explanation for this finding is that in integrated settings governments maintain certaincomparative advantages in representing domestic interests abroad, while private actors find itmore attractive to resort to their respective governments because they now have more alternatives(e.g. lawsuits abroad, direct negotiations with foreign polluters) and can thus reduce their 16 Bernauer (1996) shows that compensation or side-payments in international river management among highlydeveloped countries have been extremely rare. Moreover, in the most prominent case to date, the Rhine chloridepollution case, this strategy has resulted in an inefficient and in many ways also ineffective solution to the problem.17 See Bernauer/Ruloff, 1999.


political rewards to governments – in other words, asking the government to represent theirinterests abroad is becoming cheaper for private actors. Again, the Rhine case providesinteresting evidence supporting this proposition.

In conclusion, Durth’s analysis is commendable in particular for going far beyond the usualhypothesis that better relations among riparian countries facilitate cooperation, and for showingsystematically why and how closer ties among societies on international rivers make a difference.

Marty’s five case studies lend support to the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, upstream-downstream externality problems are harder to solve than collective (common pool resource)problems. In the Alpine Rhine flood control case, the bay villages of Hard and Fussach inAustrian Vorarlberg, in association with some industry groups, complained that construction of achannel proposed by Switzerland would negatively affect them. In the Pancheshwar case, theNepalese government did, in the first phase of the process, not expect any benefits from a jointproject with India and believed that all benefits from developing Nepalese water resources wouldflow to India. The seven US states in the Colorado river basin as well as the Wellton-Mohawkirrigation and drainage district rejected demands for a reduction of their salinity input because ofhigh costs and alteration of existing water rights in favor of Mexico. The Mexican federalgovernment rejected US demands to invest more in sewage treatment in the city of Tijuana. In theRio Grande flood control case, Mexico was somewhat less eager to solve the problem because oflower land values threatened by floods on the Mexican side of the river. In all five cases, therewere some asymmetries that had to be overcome by riparian countries. However, asymmetrieswere less pronounced, and cooperation thus easier, in the two flood control cases (Alpine Rhineand Rio Grande) than in the upstream-downstream externality cases (Pancheshwar project on theMahakali River, salinity problem on the Colorado river, sanitation problem in the SanDiego/Tijuana area).

Durth’s focus on integration as the key condition for overcoming upstream-downstream problemsproduces a theoretically compelling though empirically perhaps not very surprising explanation.It also leaves the reader wondering whether all international river problems in less integratedparts of the world are necessarily impossible to solve. Marty’s explanation focuses on “tools” forovercoming externality problems and is somewhat less compact and systematic than Durth’sexplanation. But it contains a number of empirically important and innovative insights that arerelevant beyond the divide of integrated and non-integrated societal settings. It also directs ourattention to variables that policy-makers can manipulate, or rather improve on, in the short tomedium term, with evident implications for the policy-relevance of research results.

In contrast to Durth, Marty finds that concerns over equity (or fairness) can be equally intense inmore integrated and less integrated settings. Moreover, he shows convincingly that such concernscan arise and stall international efforts even when there is no substantial cost-benefit asymmetryin the material (economic) sense. This finding receives support from a recent book, edited byBlatter and Ingram (2001, see also Ingram/Blatter, 2000 and Blatter, 2001), in which the authorsexplore the range of subjective meanings and values that water has in different societal contexts.They claim that, in many places, water is essential for the existence and identity of social actors,and serves as a focal point for community building. They assume that when riparian actors’connection to water is “essentialist” or even fundamentalist policy processes “cannot be capturedby game theory based on the assumption of strategic action. Neither perceived threats to national


security nor fundamental value conflicts allow for ‘rational’ solutions like side-payments orpackage-deals” (Blatter/Ingram, 2001:35). Blatter and Ingram do not systematically test thishypothesis. The empirical evidence produced by Durth and Marty suggests, however, thatfairness concerns of riparian actors that are unrelated to material (economic) costs or benefits canindeed complicate international efforts to resolve upstream-downstream problems throughcompensation, issue-linkage, or other policy-instruments. Marty proposes that joint research,joint development and implementation of solutions, jointly owned infrastructure, and third partyinput of know-how can help in overcoming such difficulties.

Another important finding by Marty is that cost-benefit asymmetries often exist at the local level,rather than at the national level of riparian countries. One of the key questions then concerns theconditions under which local interest groups are able to engage their respective nationalgovernments in international negotiations on the issue. The analysis of the Alpine Rhine floodcontrol, the Colorado salinity, and the Tijuana sanitation cases in particular shows thattransforming an issue from an inter-local to an inter-national problem can foster progress in twoways: first, a wider set of possible issue-linkages for changing the incentives of uncooperativeactors is available at the international level; second, national governments’ capacity to fundprojects is higher. The Colorado case testifies to both these mechanisms. Hardest to solve are, inMarty’s words, problems plagued by a “double asymmetry”, i.e. strong differences of interestbetween riparian countries, and between local actors and their respective national government.The Tijuana case comes closest to the “double trouble” situation, followed by the Alpine Rhinecase in some phases of the interaction. In contrast to Durth, Marty finds that compensation of themore unwilling participants - either by national governments, other riparians, or third parties (e.g.non-riparian countries and/or international financial institutions such as the World Bank) - iscrucial to cooperation in many cases.

Design Principles and Policy Recommendations

The “real” success or failure in sustainably managing international rivers depends, of course, notonly on whether or not riparians are able to sign treaties and establish international organizations(the outcome on which explanations discussed in the previous section focus). Policy-makers inparticular will often be interested primarily in how cooperative arrangements should be designed,so that they have a positive (problem solving) effect on riparian behavior and the environment.

Again, this question connects to a broader research program in political science, law, andeconomics, which examines the effects of variation in regime design on environmental policy-outcomes. One line of research in this larger program concentrates on design principles that makefor more successful management of common pool resources at the local level (e.g. fisheries,irrigation schemes, alpine meadows; see, e.g., Ostrom 1990 and Keohane/Ostrom 1995). Thesecond line of research, which in terms of theory is closely connected to the first (e.g.Keohane/Ostrom, 1995), examines the effects of variation in regime design on problem solving.Marty’s work draws quite systematically on this larger research effort, whereas Durth and Wolfrefer to it only at the margin.


Research on the effects of regime design on success/failure in international river management ishampered by three interrelated problems. First, the explanatory variables in this context(institutional design features) are analytical constructs with no objectively definable boundaries:cooperative arrangements can be characterized and compared in terms of an almost infinitenumber of features. Research on design principles in regard to local common pool resources andinternational environmental regimes more broadly (see above) has resulted in a wide range ofcandidate propositions (e.g. Young, 1999; Mitchell, 2001; Brown/Jacobson, 1998;Haas/Keohane/Levy, 1993; Bernauer 1997). Yet, at this stage of the research program, it providesonly vague guidance as to which variables are potentially the most influential in internationalriver management. Second, the number of international rivers that have been studied in detail bysocial scientists is very small. Of the 261 international rivers (if one counted also smaller rivers ortributaries, there would clearly be many more), around 20 have been subject to intense scrutiny.And even those that have been studied in greatest detail, for example, the Rhine, Jordan, Danube,Colorado, Rio Grande, Nile, and Mekong, have not been systematically compared in largernumber within a single analytical framework. The studies by Durth and Marty, and to a limitedextent also Wolf, are so far the most substantial efforts of this kind.18 Third, many of the featuresof cooperative arrangements studied so far, do not vary much over time. These three problems(many explanatory variables, few cases, little variation across time) amount to the well known“too many variables, too few observations” problem.

The easy way out, one might assume, is to confine inferences strictly to the empiricalobservations in the analysis. While such findings may still appeal to policy-makers interested incase-specific knowledge, they will be less appealing to social scientists interested in thedevelopment of (generalizable) theory. However, even inferences restricted to very few rivermanagement cases are often problematic, for contextual conditions (i.e. variables exogenous tothe explanatory model) frequently vary substantially across cases and/or time and are difficult tocontrol for.19 More generally, emphasizing what social scientists call “internal validity” (fitbetween theory and observed/analyzed data) will often come at the expense of “external validity”(fit between theory and unobserved/non-analyzed data). Tying the validity of findings to dozensof contextual conditions characteristic of the cases analyzed will automatically make the findingsless generalizable. Emphasizing external validity without compromising internal validity tends toresult in a higher level of abstraction of explanatory models, reducing the policy-relevance offindings. In other words, there is no optimal solution to the problem. Each analyst must weigh thepros and cons of emphasizing internal or external validity with a view to the principal purpose ofthe analysis (e.g. theory building vs. policy-advice).

In qualitative case studies, the most frequently used method in the analysis of international rivermanagement, these problem arise already at an early stage in the research process. Whereas inmultivariate statistical analysis certain algorithms permit researchers to isolate the effects ofindividual explanatory variables, qualitative case study research must do so through caseselection (Mitchell/Bernauer, 1998). Researchers must conduct a quasi-experiment with the casesthat nature and politics offer. Ideally, the cases to be analyzed must be selected so that there are at

18 Those few works that have compared more rivers than Durth and Marty within a single theoretical framework relyon a rather cursory use of data from secondary sources (e.g. Haftendorn, 2000; Mandel, 1992).19 A very common problem in the study of international river management (and also other areas of environmentalpolicy) is the focus on cases where policies were successful. Such studies are often prone to understating theimportance of favorable problem structure and high willingness of riparian actors to pay.


least as many observations (and if possible more) than values on the explanatory variables (thewell-known degrees-of-freedom issue in statistics), and that conditions exogenous to the model tobe tested remain constant. Nature and politics are, unfortunately, not as benign to social scientistsas one might hope. To make things worse, qualitative case studies often involve an enormousamount of work, while offering no guarantee that, when the empirical work is done, allcontextual conditions were in fact constant or could, in other ways, be controlled for.

In view of these problems, orthodox methodologists are likely to give up and turn to other topicsthat are more accessible to statistical analysis. Others may convert to “post-positivist” approachesthat have in recent years become fashionable in some areas of the social sciences.20 Fortunately,those few social scientists who have studied international river management have (so far) notbeen deterred by these fundamental epistemological debates but have remained pragmatic.

Concentrating only on those issues in international river management that lend themselves tostatistical analysis would either force researchers to concentrate on very few (and perhaps not themost relevant) aspects of the overall problem. Or it would force analysts to structure research at alevel of generality and abstraction that does not capture the hearts and minds of practitioners.Durth’s statistical finding, for example, that cooperation in more integrated settings takes placeearlier and is more frequent has virtually nothing to offer in terms of policy-advice (try telling theIsraelis and Palestinians to establish an EU-like setting in the Middle East to solve the Jordanriver problem!).

Turning one’s back on positivist social science and focusing on how riparian actors attributedifferent meanings and values to water in specific contexts and thus construct their own identityand communities may be helpful for better understanding the interests of different riparian actorsin specific cases. Ultimately, however, “post-positivist” approaches cannot provide systematicanswers to the questions pursued in this essay because they reject hypothesis-based empiricalresearch designed to produce generalizable findings.

The works by Durth, Marty, and Wolf perform quite differently in light of these concerns. Martypays more attention to case selection than the two other authors. In comparing the results of hiscase studies he also makes an attempt to compare pairs of cases with most similar contextualconditions – e.g. the Alpine Rhine regulation and the Rio Grande rectification project. He alsohighlights more systematically than the other studies the difficulties in comparing the casesanalyzed and generalizing results. Symbolized by a very specific problem in one case ofinternational river management (pocket mice!), Marty discusses at considerable length and at thevery beginning of his book, the issue of theoretically unexpected (or non-generalizable orrandom) events or developments that may affect river management. In spring 1994, when the USand the Mexican governments had finally agreed to solve the Tijuana sanitation problem bybuilding a sewage treatment plant, there were suddenly rumors that an endangered species, theperognathus longimembris pacificus (or Little Pacific Pocket Mouse) could be present on theproject site. Fortunately, an additional investigation showed that there were no pocket mice onthat site, so the project could go ahead. But what if…? 20 Post-positivist approaches deny the usefulness of empirically testing hypotheses and striving for generalizablefindings. They stress the singularity of political events and processes, relying on hermeneutic (interpretational)approaches. The most comprehensive research effort of this kind in regard to international water issues isBlatter/Ingram, 2001. See also Ingram/Blatter, 2000.


Ultimately, and not surprisingly, none of the three authors (and none of the authors of otherpublications referred to in this essay) is able to fully cope with these methodological difficulties.All findings in regard to institutional design features and their effect on success/failure must,therefore, be taken with a big grain of salt. Moreover, at this stage of research, any policy-recommendations that flow from these findings cannot be more than preliminary suggestions.Because Marty’s book contains the most extensive analysis of institutional design features andtheir effect on success/failure in international river management, I concentrate largely on thispublication.

The finding likely to spark most debate among policy-makers and ecologists is Marty’sconclusion that integrated river basin management, though desirable in ecological terms, has inpractice been a recipe for failure (see also Marty, 1997:20-21). He states that international riverregimes that focus on a small number of core issues and detailed and operational regulations tendto be more effective. This finding is very vulnerable to criticism by the large and strongcommunity of integrated river management supporters, particularly because it suffers fromselection bias: all cases studied by Marty are cases of specific (functional) river management. Hisclaim would have been more defensible had he also explicitly studied attempts at integrated rivermanagement (e.g. those on the Zambesi or the Rhine).

A quick look at the evidence suggests that the history of international river management islittered with cases in which integrated river management schemes have largely failed (e.g.Gambia River Development Agency, Niger Basin Authority, Lake Chad Basin Commission,Kagera Basin Organization, Zambezi Action Plan, see Lee/Dinar, 1995). Thought the totalpopulation of integrated international river management efforts remains unknown, it appears thatfailure are most common in sub-saharan Africa. More sophisticated analysis of this propositionwould thus have to control for level of development of riparian countries, geographic region,political stability, and other variables.

The ultimate test of Marty’s claim would be to show that, in a range of empirical cases (includingcases in the developing and industrialized world), policy-makers did engage in efforts ofintegrated (or non specific) river management that ended in failure, that it would have beenpossible (given the bargaining situation, the particular ‘win set’, and other conditions) to engagein more specific (functional) river management, and that the latter approach would have beenmore successful. Needless to say, this is a heroic, but necessary task. It will be instrumental inmoving beyond simple claims about whether or not integrated international river management isuseful, and towards more insightful arguments about the conditions under which integratedmanagement can succeed.

Other design features Marty associates with successful river management include “feasibility”(match between objectives and available resources and know-how); “flexibility” (adaptivecapacity of cooperative arrangements in view of changing interests of riparians and changingscientific knowledge and environmental problems); effective organizational structures (notablywell-run professional international river commissions); inter-administrative relations (close ties


between international river commissions and national-level authorities); and “openness”(involvement of non-governmental stakeholders and sub-national political units).21

The principal problem with all these findings in regard to institutional design features is thatMarty (and also the other authors working on this subject) is ultimately unable to disentangle theeffects of institutional features, such as specificity, from the effects of antecedent cooperationproblems (e.g. upstream-downstream vs. common pool resources). His research design rests ontwo assumptions he does not explicitly discuss. The first assumption is that the problem structure(e.g. upstream-downstream) as well as political efforts (negotiations among riparians) to dealwith it result in a “win set” – the latter denotes the range of possible bargaining outcomes thateach of the participants regards as preferable over the status quo (non-agreement). The secondassumption is that policy-makers can make better or worse choices within this win set. Thisanalytical distinction is rarely congruent with the real world of politics. For example, lackingspecificity that is associated with failure of the problem solving effort may simply be the result ofriparian countries’ inability to come to terms with a difficult upstream-downstream situation,rather than inability of policy-makers to get the institutional design right. In other words, we stilldo not know whether, in the Colorado salinity case for example, it was the upstream-downstreamobstacle or the attempt of some policy-maker to broaden the range of issues to be tackled thatproduced delays in solving the problem.

One of the most systematic attempts to overcome such difficulties can be found in work byVerweij (1999, 2000a, b, c) and Tschanz (2001).22 The two authors have focused on the effect ofvariation over time in one regime design principle on environmental outcomes in oneinternational river management case.23 While this approach does not permit generalizationsbeyond the case studied, it is commendable for its methodological rigor: it enables the authors tofocus on a single, and important, hypothesis while holding conditions exogenous to theexplanation (e.g. the nature of the environmental problem, the number and level of developmentof riparians, the institutional setting) constant.

Verweij and Tschanz examine whether voluntary pollution reduction measures (notably in regardto heavy metals), adopted by industry along the Rhine, have been more effective (successful)than government-imposed national and international measures (notably the Rhine ActionProgram and earlier agreements). Verweij (notably, 2000:109-150) claims that industry madelarge-scale voluntary investments in water protection and thus reduced water pollution prior tothe imposition of reduction measures by governments and the Rhine Commission. Voluntarymeasures, implemented by industry (in addition to domestic political measures), are, in his view,primarily responsible for dramatic reductions in heavy metal and other pollution of the Rhine.

Verweij’s conclusion rests primarily on data demonstrating massive overcompliance by industrywith international pollution control standards. Tschanz argues that Verweij’s interpretation of theavailable data is in part incorrect. Correcting for such errors, he arrives at the oppositeconclusion: that government-imposed measures (national and international) have contributedmore to reducing heavy metal pollution of the Rhine than voluntary measures. Further analysis 21 The list of institutional design principles discussed here is far from complete. For a more comprehensive overviewof the relevant literature and the design principles discussed therein, see Marty, 1997 and Bernauer, 1997.22 See also Bernauer and Moser, 1996; Dieperink, 1998, 2000.23 Verweij’s study also includes a comparison of the Rhine case to the Great Lakes in North America.


will be required to determine whose conclusions are, in light of the available evidence, morewarranted. Findings of this nature are not only theoretically interesting, but also highly relevantfrom a policy-perspective.

Policy Advice

Ideally, social scientists will be able to draw robust inferences from empirical information onregime design principles, outcomes in international river management, and control variables.Casting such inferences (e.g. on whether voluntary or government-imposed measures are moreeffective in reducing pollution) into policy-advice is straightforward. As shown above, however,it is particularly this part of the overall research effort that suffers from the most seriousdeficiencies. Consequently, any policy advice that flows, at this stage, from comparative casestudy research on international rivers can only be very preliminary.

Durth, Marty, and Wolf provide policy-recommendations at the end of their work. The trade-offsbetween recommendations systematically derived from theory-guided empirical research on theone hand and practical relevance on the other become immediately apparent. Durth’s policy-advice is closely tied to theory and empirical inferences, producing rather abstractrecommendations, whereas the recommendations by Marty and Wolf are more specific, albeitonly loosely connected to theory and empirical results. Moreover, the policy advice by the threeauthors moves beyond regime design principles in the narrow sense (e.g. form of regulation) toinclude cooperation strategies in broader terms. In the following sections I group what I considerthe most important policy recommendations around a limited set of simple “rules of the thumb”.

Mobilize national governments

Marty states that local interest groups should be pro-active and try to capture the attention of theirrespective national government because national governments have more resources and are betterorganized to negotiate with key-actors abroad. River management problems are, in the absence ofconcerted political pressure by local actors, often not at the top of national governments’ politicalagendas. This recommendation lines up with a suggestion already made in a 1975 UN report(United Nations, 1975) and many times since, that active participation by well-informed top-levelpolicy-makers is essential to successful river management. The paradox between political andeconomic integration and increasing demands on national governments, explored by Durth,supports this point. On a related note, Marty proposes that cooperative arrangements are likely tobe more successful if they link international river commissions and national level authorities, thusensuring financial and political support within riparian country bureaucracies.

Use every means possible to alleviate equity or fairness concerns

Durth, Marty, and Wolf agree that fairness (equity) is one of the key concerns of all governmentswhen they engage in international cooperation. Such concerns are contingent on the overallrelationship between riparian countries and a variety of contextual factors. Wolf notes thatdistributional concerns are likely to become more intense when there is a strong “national waterethos”. The latter can derive from mythology of water in national history, the importance ofwater/food security in political rhetoric, or other concerns (see also Blatter/Ingram, 2001). Durthclaims that distributional concerns are likely to be more intense in non-integrated than in


integrated settings (often a proxy for the state of relations between countries), whereas Martyconcludes that such concerns can be equally intense in integrated and non-integrated settings.Further research will have to clarify this issue.

How can concerns over fairness or equity, whenever they arise, be alleviated without having tobring about political or economic integration between riparian countries in the first place (inmany areas of the world an unlikely prospect)? Marty proposes that joint investigations intoscientific aspects of a problem and possible solutions, as well as joint projects for implementingagreed measures can mitigate fairness concerns, particularly if such concerns do not emanatedirectly from material conditions (e.g. cost-benefit distributions). Wolf (1997) shares this view.He also stresses that spending more time on examining the details of bargaining positions caninduce mutual learning and adjustment of interests so that distributive bargaining gives way tointegrative bargaining (search for win-win solutions). In a 1995 study, however, he emphasizesthat increasingly integrated infrastructure as a method for solving water allocation conflicts isonly feasible if riparians can first resolve equity problems (equitable allocation of existingresources) and control problems (control by each country over its major water sources). In otherwords, if there are serious conflicts over water allocation, a “dis-integration” of control overwater resources might be necessary to stabilize the situation before proceeding to moresophisticated international management structures (e.g. market mechanisms).

In more theoretical terms, joint activities may, besides their psychological impact, also create“hostages” (benefits country A could capture and B would lose if country B reneged on acommitment). Durth proposes to establish hostages or, more generally, mutual dependencies, toenable riparian countries to make more credible commitments. He also suggests that ifperceptions of fairness diverge riparian countries should focus more on rule-oriented consensusthan on outcome-oriented consensus, or on generating efficiency gains to be allocated to a jointgoal. As to the latter, he proposes, for example, that the riparians on the Euphrates could auctionwater rights and spend the income on a trilateral program for the development of technologiesthat facilitate more efficient water use. He claims, moreover, that if bargaining leverage is veryasymmetric among riparian countries, early breakdown of negotiations is likely. In suchsituations it may be in the long-term self-interest of the more powerful country to increase itscosts of non-agreement and increase the weaker side’s threat-potential to keep the cooperativeprocess going.

Employ political symbols and prestige effects to encourage cooperation

Durth claims that creating political prestige effects can be important in reducing asymmetries ofinterest where material incentive strategies fail to address concerns over fairness, or wherecountries are generally reluctant to cooperate. The Salmon 2000 program on the Rhine is animportant example. In a recent study of integrative symbols and regulative norms in water qualitymanagement on Lake Constance, Blatter provides important insights in this regard. He shows thattransboundary regulations emerged even though problem pressure was only moderate and thegame theoretic situation was not conducive to cooperation. He attributes cooperation to theattempt by political actors to occupy a newly emerging political space named “Lake ConstanceEuregio” and benefit from certain prestige effects of cooperation.


Systematically assess the problem and the range of possible solutions before deciding on andimplementing policies

Marty shows convincingly that quick fixes in international river management are virtually non-existent. Successful cooperation evolves in decades, rather than in years. He thus argues thatadditional time spent on fully investigating a problem and evaluating different possibilities foraction will be compensated for by more effective implementation. Similarly, Wolf proposes toengage in joint data gathering and analysis to avoid data disputes later on, which frequently are amajor component of overall water conflict. He cites the Mekong Committee as an importantexample. Related to that, one might expect that, on occasion, technological innovations wouldfacilitate solutions to water scarcity or pollution problems (see, for example, Murakami/Musiake,1997). Unfortunately, none of the cases examined in the research reviewed here suggests thattechnological fixes have ever played a decisive role in solving international river problems.

Involve all principal stakeholders

Involvement of all principal stakeholders may delay agreement, but tends to prevent subsequentbreakdowns in the implementation process. Wolf claims that the exclusion of parties with anability to hamper implementation is frequently an obstacle to success. Examples he cites includethe Kurds (Euphrates) and Palestinians (West Bank aquifers, Jordan). Durth calls for moreopenness of river management efforts to non-governmental participation, expecting thatefficiency-reducing information asymmetries will thus decrease and governments will be forcedinto more efficient cooperation and accountability. Greater involvement of non-governmentalstakeholders may also open up more avenues for transnational (instead of inter-national) activitythat generates new and innovative solutions (e.g. lawsuits over liability, contracts betweenmunicipalities and private firms).

A 1999 study by Milich and Varady (see also Milich/Varady, 1998) highlights the relevance ofthese recommendations. Examining seven international river basin cases, the two authors arguethat the dominant river management paradigms ignore local needs and public inputs. They thendiscuss recent experiences along the US-Mexican border, most notably the efforts of the BorderEnvironmental Cooperation Commission (BECC), portraying them as a more promisingmanagement approach. The principal weakness of the Milich/Varady study is, however, that theauthors do not explain whether variation in success/failure across the seven river managementregimes studied results from deficiencies in the four management paradigms they distinguish.They simply assume so. Thus, while few observers would dispute the relative success of theBECC, it is unclear whether that success is a function of increased openness and transparency, orother factors, such as tighter integration of the U.S. and Mexican economies.

Pursue functional strategies

Following up on his claims about functional vs. integrated river management, Marty proposes toavoid complicated package deals (issue linkages) that risk creating a mismatch between tasks andresources, and to focus on clearly defined problems and specific and operational institutionalarrangements. He thus endorses a recommendation already put forward on the occasion of a 1961conference on international river management, held at the University of British Columbia


(Chapman, 1963). On a closely related note, the conclusions of Durth, Marty, and Wolf seem tosuggest that cooperation is easier if riparian countries manage to de-link specific rivermanagement problems from “high politics”, particularly if the latter is characterized by tenserelations between riparian countries. The evidence from other studies (e.g. Mingst, 1981; Lowi,1995; Haftendorn, 2000) suggests, however, that “technocratic de-linking” is usually not feasible,and that technocratic problem solving efforts usually remain hostage to higher-level conflictsamong riparian countries (e.g. in the Middle East). Moreover, this recommendation appears tocontradict the recommendation by Marty and others that engaging policy-makers at the highestlevel is crucial to success.

In regard to linkage-politics and integrated river management, Wolf appears to propose theopposite of Marty, albeit in rather vague terms. He suggests that multi-resource linkages provideopportunities for creative trade-offs.24 He (Wolf, 1997:362-63) argues “Creating incentives forvoluntary resolution of water resource conflicts is key. While international institutions may nothave the laws and authorities to enforce solutions, they often have access to other carrots andsticks – some of which may be resources other than water – which can help induce agreement bycapitalizing on differences, and creating trades or linkages (…) The issue is watershedmanagement, not river management. This links quality and quantity, surface- and groundwater,water and people. Everything is connected to everything else.”

His examples, however, apply exclusively to transboundary financing operations: World Bankfinancing for the resolution of the Indus dispute between India and Pakistan; UN-led funding ofthe Mekong Commission; Thai financing of a hydropower project in Laos in exchange forelectricity; Egypt’s payments to Sudan for water; South African financing for ahydropower/water diversion project in Lesotho under which South Africa receives drinking waterfor Johannesburg and Lesotho gets the electricity. Wolf also proposes greater efforts to arrangefor intra-issue linkages. He (Wolf, 1997:361) suggests, for example, that “Litani or Turkish waterdiverted into the Jordan headwaters in Israel, for instance, can be ‘credited’ for Yarmuk water toJordan, which in turn might allow more water in the lower Jordan for the West Bank, whichmight result in surplus West Bank groundwater being diverted to Gaza, and so on.” Many suchoptions have been proposed and discussed before, but have never been implemented. Morefruitful than restating them would have been to examine why such proposals have not beenimplemented in the past, and which options would be more feasible, given specific political,economic, social, and technological constraints. At other points, Wolf seems to contradict hisearlier argument by proposing incremental cooperation, starting with small-scale and clearlycircumscribed and operational projects and moving gradually to more complex managementstructures. Examples include Israeli-Palestinian water issues and the Mekong. These examplesremind us that the conclusion by Durth, that compensation and financial transfers more generally,play a minor role in international river management is incorrect and probably stems from Durth’sfocus on river management in Europe and North America where such solutions have indeed beenrare (see Bernauer, 1996).

Perhaps the most radical proposal in this context can be found in an article by Waterbury (1997).He proposes to address the most difficult international river management problems not byengaging in small-scale functional cooperation in the first place, but by adopting unilateral

24 For similar proposals, see Haftendorn, 2000.


approaches. He criticizes what he calls “the mantra of physical planners, engineers, internationallawyers and environmentalists” which has been “comprehensive and integrated river basindevelopment” (Waterbury, 1997:279). He suggests what in modern “climate change speak”would be “no regrets” measures, i.e. unilateral policies that will be beneficial to the country thatimplements them, irrespective of whether other countries follow up with similar measures andengage in international cooperation. The expectation is, though, that unilateral steps will enhancethe prospects for international cooperation. In particular, Waterbury proposes unilateral reformsof water pricing policies so as to promote more efficient water use and technological innovation.

Balance flexibility and stability

Marty, like many others before him (e.g. Chapman, 1963), claims that international rivermanagement will be more successful if cooperative arrangements are flexible in terms ofallowing for adaptation to new scientific evidence, new management problems, or changinginterests of riparian countries. At first glance, there seems to be a contradiction in Marty’s claimsfor functional/specific management on the one hand and flexibility on the other. One might thinkof cooperative frameworks that provide for concrete projects but leave room for adaptation andnew projects. Marty does not clarify this point. Wolf makes essentially the same proposal andhighlights the need for dispute resolution mechanisms. He also urges attention to parameterscommonly ignored in international water treaties, such as fluctuations in seasonal, annual, andlong-term water supply, groundwater, water quality, the physical environment, changes in theunderstanding of the physical system, technical breakthroughs, economic parameters, generalhydropolitics, and enforcement mechanisms. The latter list of recommendations set forth by Wolf(1997) is in fact quite representative of most of the literature on international river management(e.g. Abu-Zeid et al., 1996; Ganoulis et al., 1996; German Advisory Council, 1999; Kirmani/LeMoigne, 1997; Beach et al., 2000), in that it contains an assembly of statements about lessonslearned from empirical cases and normative statements (what should be done), without clearlydistinguishing the two.

Use a variety of policy instruments to internalize externalities

In view of the intense debate over market-instruments in domestic water policy, the rathercursory treatment of this issue by Durth, Marty, and Wolf may surprise some readers. Theprincipal reason appears to be empirical: market-instruments, such as tradable emission-permits,taxes, or liability mechanisms, are extremely rare in international river management. In the samevein, and echoing a conclusion of Le Marquand (1977), both Durth and Marty note that economicefficiency issues have very rarely been among the principal concerns of policy-makers in thisfield. Even when costs are very high (and they often are), policy-makers appear to be much morepreoccupied with problems of political feasibility than possibilities for economic efficiency gains.

Durth’s treatment of economic efficiency is much more extensive than Marty’s and Wolf’s, butremains largely theoretical. He ends with the recommendation that none of the three commonlyused methods for internalizing external costs (standards, liability, markets) is likely to be optimalin all cases, and that a range of instruments should thus be used. This recommendation rests onshaky ground, simply because there is an insufficient empirical track record of economicinstruments in international river management. The same applies to Durth’s explanation of whygovernments seem to be less interested in economic efficiency issues than one would expect or


hope for. He argues that governments may be afraid that more economic transparency couldcomplicate negotiations, and that benefits other than efficiency gains were more important togovernments. The latter borders on tautology. The political economy literature (e.g. McNutt,2000) might have helped Durth (as well as the other two authors) in developing a moresophisticated argument on why economic efficiency appears to be persistently subordinated toother policy-goals.

Where to Go From Here?

Natural scientists and engineers have provided some answers to when and why internationalefforts to solve transboundary river management problems are successful, when and why suchefforts fail, and what success or failure means. But these answers remain incomplete withoutsubstantive input from the social sciences. While technical know-how and innovation areobviously crucial to successful international river management, success in this context is shapedprimarily by political processes in which institutional arrangements are designed andimplemented.

In this review essay I have shown that social scientists have made considerable progress sinceDavid Le Marquand’s influential 1977 book on the politics of international river management.This progress is particularly well reflected in books by Durth (1996) and Marty (2001), as well aswork by Wolf (notably, 1997) As a result of this work, and also other research referred tothroughout this article, we now have theoretically better informed explanatory models and morerobust empirical evidence. Durth and Marty in particular have contributed to improving on LeMarquand’s rather eclectic explanatory framework. They have also gone far beyond most earlierstudies that had focused on “political will” as a catch-all explanatory variable for success/failure(e.g. Donahue, 1988:136; Biswas, 1977; Biswas, 1993; Linnerot, 1990:634; Nakayama, 1997).Durth’s and Marty’s explanations include a more systematic distinction of different problem-structures and their implications for the likelihood of international cooperation. They also providea more sophisticated explanation as to the likelihood of overcoming adverse problem-structuresby means of specific policy-instruments. Moreover, Marty, and to some extent also Wolf andDurth, explore the effect of variation in institutional design features on the success/failure ofproblem solving efforts. In addition to progress on the theoretical side, researchers have produceda vast amount of new qualitative and quantitative information on international river management,primarily in the form of case studies.

As shown above, even the most sophisticated explanations still suffer from substantialdeficiencies. These problems notwithstanding, time seems ripe to address what is perhaps themost important gap in the literature at this stage: the lack of large-N research on the basis of asingle theoretical framework. Diagnostic single-case studies are certainly useful in developingtheory. The same holds for small-N studies. Ultimately, however, probing the generalizability offindings requires larger-scale research guided by a single explanatory model. Large-N researchwill, moreover, help in addressing problems of selection bias, for a disproportionate number ofcases studies have thus far concentrated on the more successful river management efforts.

Many researchers have stressed the importance of the following explanatory variables, thusproviding a starting point for constructing an analytical framework for a larger-N project: the


nature of externality flows (e.g. upstream-downstream vs. public goods); the extent of political,social, economic integration between riparian countries; the level of economic development; thescope of cooperation (e.g. integrated vs. issue-specific management); number of ripariancountries; involvement of NGOs and other non-governmental actors; extent of federalgovernment and/or third party funding; application of liability rules; technical and politicalpossibilities for monitoring compliance with agreements; endowment and efficiency ofinternational river management authorities; political symbols and prestige effects.25

In designing a larger-scale project, researchers will also have to explore whether focusing oninternational rivers alone is sensible, or whether comparisons should, for example, be organizedalong environmental problems with a similar structure (e.g. upstream-downstream problems in avariety of environmental issue-areas). Because existing data and expertise around the world areorganized primarily in terms of environmental issue area, I submit that it will be more productive(for pragmatic reasons) to focus on international rivers at this stage. This approach should not,however, preclude intense collaboration with researchers focusing on other internationalenvironmental issues, notably in regard to theory and methodology. Moreover, larger scalecomparative research on international rivers should be coordinated with ongoing efforts tocompare larger numbers of international environmental regimes in an effort to understand thedeterminants of regime formation and regime effectiveness. In particular, data collection inresearch on international river management should be designed in a way that also producesinformation on key variables in the broader research program.

In conclusion, social scientists have so far examined only a fraction of worldwide internationalriver management efforts – in fact, the total population of such efforts remains unknown. Theopportunities for drawing on a huge reservoir of social science theories, constructing explanatorymodels, and applying them to international river management efforts around the world are almostinfinite. Engaging in such research promises not only to produce new and interesting theoreticalinsights into the workings of international environmental policy. It is also crucial from a practicalviewpoint. If social scientists can contribute to a better understanding of when and whyinternational river management succeeds or fails – and I believe they can – it is, from a normativeviewpoint, more than appropriate for them to do so.

25 Such variables could, for example, be organized into a coherent framework along the lines recently proposed byRonald Mitchell (2001). Mitchell’s framework includes regime design features, problem characteristics, contextcharacteristics, and country characteristics. See also Breitmeier et al., 1996.

Thomas Bernauer, Inter

Reducespollution

Figure 1: General Framework of Analysis

Figure 2: Upstream-Downstream Game

Upstreamcountry

Does not reducepollution

Downstreamcountry

Reducespollution

Does not reducepollution

0

2

4

Environmentalproblemstructure

Process strategies (policytools) and socio-economicconditions

Regulatory output(regime formation,regime design)

Behavior ofriparian actors

Environment(pollution,floods, etc.)

4

national River Managem

2

0

0

*

ent 26

4


Figure 3: Downstream Effects

Type of water use Downstream effectsHydropower production Creates additional peaks, reduces water flow,

affects migratory species, hinders navigationIrrigation Removes water from the system, adds salinity

and other pollutantsMunicipal and industrial water use Removes water from the system, adds

pollutionNavigation Creates pollution and noiseAgriculture Adds sediments and agricultural chemicals

and nutrientsForestry Adds sediments and chemicals, increases

runoffFilling of wetlands Reduces ecological carrying capacity,

increases magnitude of floodsFishing Reduces fish stock

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