Externalism and Self-Knowledge

Externalism in the philosophy of mind contends that mental content is partly determined

by the environment. The view has garnered attention since it denies the traditional

assumption, associated with Descartes, that mental content is fixed independently of the

external world. Apparently influenced by this assumption, Descartes also believed he

could know the content of his thoughts1 while suspending all judgment about his

surroundings. (Indeed, such knowledge was thought indubitable.) Yet if externalism is

correct, this may well be a mistake. For as we shall see, externalism can suggest that

Descartes cannot know that his own thought represents, say, elm trees (vs. beech trees)

without knowing that it is elms (and not beeches) that the thought is connected to in the

world. But if such worldly knowledge is a prerequisite, then Descartes could not know

the content of his thought just “from the armchair,” so to speak. Hence there seems to be

a conflict between externalism and such armchair knowledge of one’s own mental

contents (for short: “armchair self-knowledge”). Whether this conflict is real is what

drives the contemporary debate on externalism and self-knowledge.

Officially, we can put the issue in terms of an apparent tension between the following:

EXT: Mental content is determined partly by the environment.2

SK: A subject can know from the armchair what content her thoughts have.3

In brief, the issue is that EXT may imply that knowing about content requires knowing

about the environment. And since the latter is empirical, so too would be the former,

contra SK.4 Now it is usually thought that, if EXT is incompatible with SK, this would be

a serious problem for EXT (though some hold that internalism also conflicts with SK; see

McLaughlin & Tye 1998a, Farkas 2003, Bar-On 2006, p. 434). On the other hand, some

think the incompatibility threatens SK rather than EXT (see section 2.4). Regardless, the

interest in the debate goes beyond EXT. For it pertains to many central concerns of

philosophers, such as the nature of knowledge, and the relation between mind and world.

The debate also touches on more specialized topics, including memory, concept

acquisition, epistemic responsibility, and transcendental arguments.

In the standard terminology, the dispute is between incompatibilists, who hold that the

conflict between EXT and SK is real, and compatibilists who deny this. Incompatibilists

have developed the conflict mainly in two ways. The first way, discussed in section 2, is

by a reductio ad absurdum: Incompatibilists argue that EXT plus SK entail the absurdity

that one can know just from the armchair contingent facts about the external world. The

second way, discussed in section 3, rests on a thought experiment about “slow switching”

between two environments. Incompatibilists argue that such thought experiments show

that EXT precludes SK. We shall also note some lesser-known issues for externalist self-

knowledge, in section 4.

• 1. Why Externalism?

• 2. The Reductio to Armchair Knowledge of the External World

o 2.1 Reply 1: Environmental Implications are Empirical

o 2.2 Reply 2: Externalism about Empty Concepts

o 2.3 Reply 3: Transmission Failure

o 2.4 Reply 4: Self-Knowledge is Empirical

o 2.5 Reply 5: A Transcendental Argument?

• 3. Slow Switching Arguments

o 3.1 Reply 1: Self-Verifying Judgments

� 3.1.1 Counter-Replies: Knowing Too Well and Not Well Enough

� 3.1.2 A Problem with Critical Reasoning

o 3.2 Reply 2: Relevant Alternatives

o 3.3 Reply 3: Externalism about Memory

o 3.4 Reply 4: The Argument is Self-Undermining

o 3.5 Reply 5: Anti-Recognitionalism

• 4. Other Issues with Externalist Self-Knowledge

• Bibliography

• Academic Tools

• Other Internet Resources

• Related Entries

1. Why Externalism?

Given the tension with SK, why should we accept EXT in the first place? One reason is

that EXT is more or less entailed by many contemporary theories of content. For

instance, several theories say (in short) that a concept5 has its content in virtue of

certain causal relations the concept bears to an environmental referent (Dretske 1981,

Millikan 1984; 1989, Fodor 1987; 1990; also, cf. Kripke 1972 and Evans 1982, ch. 6).

Others see mental content as posited when interpreting a subject vis-à-vis objects in her

environment (Davidson 1973; 1987, Dennett 1975). Still others see content as determined

by the inferences that feature the relevant concept; these inferential patterns, moreover,

are often identifiable by the external objects that prompt “entering” and “exiting” the

language (Sellars 1969).

Predictably, however, such theories face various difficulties—so none provide a decisive

case for EXT. Yet the foremost arguments for the view are not so parochial. These

arguments instead rest on various thought experiments, purporting to show that internally

identical subjects can host different thought contents, solely because of environmental

differences (Putnam 1973; 1975, McGinn 1977, Stich 1978, Burge 1979; 1982; 1986). If

the thought experiments are right about this, it means that internal states do not wholly

determine thought content. The environment would play a part as well.

The most famous experiment imagines a remote planet called “Twin Earth,” a planet

which is superficially indiscernible from Earth (so that even its events parallel those on

Earth). But there is one key difference: The compound H2O occurs nowhere on

Twin Earth. In its place is a different compound that looks, tastes, etc., exactly the same,

which we may call “XYZ.” Let us then consider Oscar, a normal adult English

speaker, along with his Twin Earth doppelgänger, Twin Oscar. (Ignore that people are

mostly H2O; that’s an accident of the example.) The externalist intuition is that, even if

these “twins” are unschooled in chemistry, Oscar uses ‘water’ to refer to H2O yet Twin

Oscar uses ‘water’ to refer to XYZ. After all, when Oscar asserts “water is scrumptious,”

this is directed at water, yet Twin Oscar’s parallel assertion is in reference to XYZ, a.k.a.

twin water.6

Moreover, suppose we accept the Fregean view that the meaning of a term determines

what the term refers to (or in Carnap’s words, that “intension determines extension”).7

Then, given the different referents, the twins’ terms must have different meanings as

well. But Oscar and Twin Oscar are physical duplicates; so this reveals that the meaning

of ‘water’ is not wholly fixed by speakers’ internal states. Rather, the environment also

figures into it.8

This claim about linguistic meaning is then extended to the content (McGinn, Stich, op.

cits.) of mental representations for natural kinds like water, as well as for non-

natural kinds like sofas (where the latter kinds are defined by social convention) (Burge,

op. cits.). Consider here that when Oscar says “sofas are delightful,” he expresses

a thought about sofas. Suppose, moreover, that Twin Oscar’s community defines a “sofa”

slightly differently, so that broad, overstuffed armchairs count as “sofas.” Consequently,

when Twin Oscar asserts “sofas are delightful,” he differs from Oscar in expressing a

thought that references (among other things) broad, overstuffed armchairs. But again, if

content determines reference, the difference in reference demonstrates a difference in

intension or content.9 Thus we arrive at EXT.

Some might find these science fiction stories extravagant, and it may be unclear how they

can teach us anything about the real world. Yet there are actual examples which also

illustrate the point (Ludlow 1995b; see also Butler 1997, Tye 1998).10 Consider that

‘chicory’ and ‘endive’ have their denotations switched between Standard American

English and British English. The two types of salad green also seem identical to the

untrained eye (or palate, as it were). Thus a Brit and an American, both untrained, might

be internally the same in all relevant respects, yet refer to different greens when asserting

“chicory is scrumptious.” So ‘chicory’ will express a concept with different content,

despite the subjects being internally alike. (Notably, ‘water’ itself might vary in content

among different locations in actual world. For what flows from taps contains different

admixtures in different municipalities. Cf. Malt 1994.)

Nevertheless, philosophers have rejected these arguments on a variety of grounds (Mellor

1977, Searle 1983, ch. 8, Bach 1988; 1998, Crane 1991, Rosenberg 1994, Chomsky

1995; 2000, Siewart 1998, Segal 2000, Horgan & Tienson 2002, Farkas 2008, Adams &

Aizawa, forthcoming). Other philosophers do not reject EXT as much as restrict it: These

philosophers posit a kind of content—so called “narrow” content—which is determined

independently of the environment. (Block 1986, Loar 1988, Chalmers 1996; 2002,

Jackson 1998, Georgalis 1994; 1999, Wikforss 2007, Mendola 2008. See also the

entry on Narrow Content.) For instance, Two Dimensionalists characterize narrow

content as a function that takes an environment as input and outputs the “wide” content of

the concept in that environment, i.e., the content of which EXT is true (Chalmers op.

cits.). And putatively, the problem with armchair self-knowledge does not arise. (For

more, see Fernandez 2004 as well as the entry on Two Dimensional Semantics.)

The debate on whether EXT is unrestrictedly true is important, yet this is not the place to

discuss it. (But see the entry on Externalism about Mental Content.) For our purposes,

the main point is that EXT is not without support, and so there is some reason to hold

onto the view despite the apparent tension with SK.

2. The Reductio to Armchair Knowledge of the External

World

But is the tension real? One argument on the pro side is a reductio ad absurdum: The

thrust is that EXT and SK jointly entail an obvious falsehood, namely, that Oscar can

know from the armchair contingent facts about the external world (McKinsey 1991;

1994; 2002; 2007, Brown 1995, Boghossian 1997; 1998). If so, then EXT and SK cannot

be jointly true, and the incompatibilist wins the debate.

The argument here is as follows: Assume EXT and SK for reductio, and let ‘E’ name

the Environmental condition that EXT requires for a concept to have a water content

(versus a twin content).11 Apparently, EXT and SK then imply that Oscar can know from

the armchair—or in the incompatibilist’s idiom, know “apriori”—both of the following:

(1) If Oscar is thinking that water is wet, then E obtains.

(2) Oscar is thinking that water is wet.

Here, let us say p is known “apriori” (or just: “p is apriori”) iff p is known without a

concerted empirical investigation of the external world. (Note that introspective

knowledge counts as “apriori” in this context, even though it arises from a kind of

introspective experience. See Miller 1997, Davies 1998, Nuccetelli 1999, and

McLaughlin 2000; 2003 for more on the present conception of the “apriori”). Now on the

current line, (1) can be known apriori if EXT is true (though as we shall see, there are

different ways to spin this). Whereas, (2) is apriori given SK. Yet if Oscar has apriori

knowledge of both (1) and (2), Oscar can then use modus ponens to know apriori that:

(3) E obtains.

But E is an environmental condition that presumably can only be known empirically. So

EXT and SK apparently lead to an absurd sort of apriori knowledge, and are thus

incompatible. (Henceforth, let us call this argument “the reductio.”)

Before we consider the compatibilist’s replies, one clarification of the reductio is in

order. For it may be unclear whether EXT entails (1) in the first place (whether apriori or

not). Yet if EXT is derived from one of the causal theories of content (from section 1),

then acquiring the water concept requires causally interacting with water (if only via your

linguistic community). (McGinn 1989, ch. 1 passim, McCullough 1999. But see Ball

2007.) At the least, the existence of water is required, meaning that the view entails (1).

Even so, if the incompatibilist wants to add that (1) is entailed apriori, she would need

the dubious premise that some causal theory of content is entirely apriori.

So on a charitable reading, the incompatibilist’s reductio does not target an externalism

based on a causal theory. It is rather directed at a view based solely on the Twin Earth

thought experiments, since the experiments are more naturally seen as apriori. (But see

Baker 2007.) For the remainder of section 2, then, ‘externalism’ and ‘EXT’ shall refer

exclusively to this kind of Twin Earth based externalism.

2.1 Reply 1: Environmental Implications are Empirical

Yet it may remain unclear whether EXT is committed to (1). For the thought experiments

alone do not assume that water is necessary for water thoughts (Brueckner 1992). True,

the thought experiments suppose that suitable interaction with water is sufficient for

Oscar to have water thoughts. They also assume that Twin Oscar’s interactions with XYZ

are insufficient. But this does not yet imply that interacting with water is the only way

that someone can arrive at water thoughts.

However, this assumes that E is a condition where water exists (or at least existed at one

time). Yet the incompatibilist’s reductio need not assume that (McKinsey 1994; 2002;

2007). On this tack, one can first see the incompatibilist as presenting a dilemma,

corresponding to two ways that EXT might be interpreted. According to the first reading,

EXT holds that a water thought logically or conceptually implies some environmental

condition E. Yet for the incompatibilist, logical or conceptual implications are apriori. So

if EXT on this first reading is true, (1) is apriori (and nothing here prejudges what E is).12

Even so, the first reading is not the usual interpretation of EXT. On a more standard

construal, EXT holds that a water thought metaphysically implies some environmental

condition E. Yet metaphysical implications, e.g., that “water is wet” implies “H2O is

wet,” are not always apriori. (See Kripke 1972 and the entry on Rigid Designators). So

the apriority of (1) is not guaranteed by the second reading, and the reductio seems in

doubt. Yet incompatibilists reply that the second reading cannot be what the externalist

really intends. For it renders EXT into something trivial—after all, it is obvious that

Oscar’s water thoughts metaphysically imply a number of external conditions, e.g., that

Oscar was born (McKinsey, op. cits.). But of course, for the compatibilist, EXT is more

substantive than that. For the thought experiments suggest that a water thought

metaphysically implies some content specific environmental condition, such as the

existence of water (Brueckner 1995).

Regardless, a different version of the reductio avoids this controversy altogether. Here,

EXT suggests that a water thought metaphysically implies E, yet it is consistently

assumed throughout that:

(4) E = Water or a community using the water concept exists(/existed) (Brown

1995, Boghossian 1997).

Crucially, this identifies E as a non-trivial, content specific condition. Yet even though

this makes EXT non-trivial, the incompatibilist still thinks that the thought experiments

reveal (1) apriori [where E is identified at (4)]. Thus, the reductio draws out that the

externalist apparently can know apriori that either water or a community exists (or once

existed).

Nevertheless, the compatibilist will ask anew: Why think that EXT is committed to (1) or

to its apriori status? Granted, many externalists find it apriori plausible that, besides

interacting with water, Oscar could acquire the water concept from other community

members. Yet some externalists have conjectured that in a waterless world, Oscar can

arrive at the water concept all by himself, just by hypothesizing the H2O molecule (Burge

1982). So EXT does not seem strictly committed to (1).

But incompatibilists have replied that (ironically) these very reflections indicate apriori

something that should not be apriori (Brown, Boghossian, op. cits.). Namely: If Oscar has

no such hypotheses (i.e., if he is “agnostic” about chemical essences), then (1) must be

true. In more detail, if Oscar is agnostic about chemistry and knows that apriori about

himself, he can use the above reflections to know apriori that his water thoughts

metaphysically imply the existence of water or a community. From there, apriori

knowledge of E seems eminent.

Even so, the compatibilist’s opening objection lingers: Nothing yet shows that

the only ways to acquire water thoughts, under EXT, are in the ways catalogued so

far (Ball 2007). So for all Oscar can know apriori, he may be socially isolated and his

water thoughts may reference no natural kind. (See also Gallois & Hawthorne 1996,

Gallois 2008, McLaughlin & Tye 1998a; 1998b; 1998c).

But perhaps additional apriori considerations can rule this out. In particular, Oscar might

reflect on what EXT implies about non-natural kind thoughts (Brown op. cit.). Suppose,

for instance, that Oscar has the concept of a sofa and knowledgeably applies the concept

in a variety of instances. Yet assume he is agnostic on whether the concept applies to

broad overstuffed armchairs. Then, if Oscar has no community to decide the matter for

him, EXT may suggest that Oscar’s concept is indeterminate in what it refers to. And that

seems rather odd.

However, the compatibilist may ask why this is supposed to be a problem (McLaughlin

& Tye, op. cits.). For the indeterminacy may show only that Oscar’s concept is vague and

not that Oscar fails to possess any concept whatsoever. (Brown 2001 replies by defining

‘agnostic’ so it applies only if the concept is non-vague. Yet Brown 2004, ch. 8

admirably concedes that Oscar can then no longer know apriori if he is “agnostic.”) So,

again, it seems that EXT will not reveal apriori that water thoughts metaphysically imply

some content specific environmental condition.

2.2 Reply 2: Externalism about Empty Concepts

Nevertheless, it may remain intuitively compelling that a Twin Earth thought experiment,

if cogent, entails (1) apriori, where E is the condition that water exists13 (if Oscar is

agnostic about chemical essences). For it seems that the experiments reveal apriori that

the water concept is non-empty, i.e., that its referent exists. However, a compatibilist can

counter this by offering an account of empty concepts that is consonant with EXT

(Stoneham 1999, Sawyer 2003, Goldberg 2006b, Haukioja 2006, Parent MSa. See also

Pryor 2007, pp. 184-185). Even so, there are two arguments in the literature suggesting

that any externalist view of empty concepts must fail (Boghossian 1997; 1998, Segal

2000).

On its face, empty-concept externalism can be supported by a Twin Earth thought

experiment (Boghossian op. cits.).14 Consider “Dry Earth”—a planet exactly like ours,

except wherever water occurs on Earth, there are only watery looking holograms (though

Dry Earthians mistake these for a real kind). The intuition is then that Dry Oscar uses

‘water’ to express an empty concept, unlike Oscar. But if Dry Oscar is not referring to

water, then as before, the Frege-Carnap view implies that his concept has a different

intension or content. So even for empty concepts, it would seem that content is

determined partly by facts about the environment (including facts about what

is absent from the environment).

However, carrying this further may lead to absurdity, since externalism about empty

concepts can suggest that a concept’s form is sensitive to the environment as well (ibid).

Suppose first, as is plausible, that empty concepts have a descriptive form—so that (e.g.)

the unicorn concept is understood as the concept “horse with a horn.” For most

externalists, this contrasts with our concept of “water” which does not have a descriptive

form, but is rather atomic. Yet if so, this means that Dry Oscar expresses a descriptive

concept when using ‘water’, whereas Oscar expresses an atomic one. In which case, the

environmental difference creates a difference in form as well as content. But that seems

odd, since form seems to be a purely syntactic matter, fixed entirely by what’s in the

head.

At least one compatibilist has tried embracing environment-dependent syntax, though

concedes it is an uncomfortable view (Ludlow 2003; 2011). Others question the

“supervenience principle” in the argument, viz., that a difference in form necessitates a

difference in internal state (Corbí 1998, Brown 1999, Korman 2006). Further argument

has been offered for this principle (Boghossian 1998), yet such arguments may beg the

question in presupposing a Chomskian, internalist notion of logical form (Parent MSa).

However this issue unfolds, externalism about empty concepts faces a further challenge

(Segal 2000, pp. 54-56). Consider: Either the externalist sees the unicorn-concept

as necessarily empty or not.15 If the former, then the view implies that unicorns are

impossible objects, like round squares. And that is rather counterintuitive (yet see Kripke

1972 on unicorns). But taking the other horn (sorry), a contingently empty concept would

have its content fixed by descriptors like “horse with a horn.” In this case, EXT seems

false. For the constancy of the descriptors guarantees that the concept has the same

content in every possible world, whether or not it contains unicorns. (Yet for replies, see

Korman op. cit., Parent MSa, n. 11.)

2.3 Reply 3: Transmission Failure

If externalism about empty concepts fails, then EXT may well entail (1) apriori, per the

incompatibilist’s reductio. But a compatibilist may try a different line of resistance. She

might simply grant that (1) and (2) are apriori, but still somehow block apriori knowledge

of (3). (For simplicity, we will focus on (3), though similar points apply to putative

apriori knowledge that either water or a community exists.) The most prominent strategy

of this type is to deny the “transmission of warrant” that supposedly occurs in the

deduction of (3) from (1) and (2) (hereafter, “the deduction”). The claim is that, even if

the externalist agrees that (1) and (2) are warranted, none of this warrant “transmits” to

(3) in the deduction (Davies 1998; 2000; 2003a; 2003b, Wright 2000a; 2000b; 2003;

2011; see also Wright 1985). If so, the deduction cannot furnish apriori knowledge of (3),

pace the incompatibilist.

For brevity, let us call the advocate of transmission failure “the advocate.” Then, the

advocate’s core idea is that even though (1) and (2) entail (3), they cannot be used

to prove (3). For in brief, the “proof” seems question begging (Davies, Wright, op. cits.;

also see McLaughlin 2000). ‘Question begging’, however, may not be the right word here

(cf. Beebee 2001, Prichard 2002, Silins 2011). Still, the idea is that (3) in some sense is

presupposed in the context of the reductio, once the deduction gets started. And if such

circularity is operative, the deduction cannot create any warrant for (3), much less prove

it. Or in the advocate’s idiom, the warrant for (1) and (2) does not transmit to (3) in virtue

of the deduction.

As a satisficing approximation,16 the transmission of warrant generally occurs iff:

(TW) If a subject S is warranted in believing p and is warranted in believing

that p entails q (and S further recognizes that q follows deductively from these

beliefs)—then S acquires, potentially for the first time, warrant in believing q.

(Cf. Wright 2000a, p. 140-141.)

But to avoid confusion, (TW) should be distinguished from epistemic closure, as

discussed by some anti-skeptics (e.g., Dretske 1970). Some compatibilists argue that the

reductio indeed exemplifies a failure of epistemic closure (see Bernecker 2000, Hale

2000, Sawyer 2006). Yet transmission failure is a different affair, most obviously since

epistemic closure addresses “knowledge” rather than “warrant.” But warrant transmission

differs even from the “closure of warrant,” characterized as follows:

(CW) If S is warranted in believing p and warranted in believing that p entails q,

then S is warranted in believing q (or is able to be thus warranted).

The difference between transmission and warrant closure is best seen in cases of question

begging. Take an overtly circular argument which concludes (3) using (3) as a premise.

Trivially, anyone warranted in believing the premise is warranted in believing the

conclusion. So (CW) is satisfied in this case. But the argument does not transmit warrant

to its conclusion, since it cannot bestow any warrant for (3) that was not already there. Or

from a different angle, a person cannot use the argument to gain knowledge of (3) for the

very first time. Hence, warrant fails to transmit onto the conclusion, even though warrant

closure holds trivially.

The advocate thus cries “transmission failure” in relation to (1)-(3), on the grounds that

(3) is “presupposed.” Yet in this instance, the presupposition charge is not as

straightforward. For clarity’s sake, let us call (1) and (2) the “*premises” of the

deduction, to contrast them with the premises of the reductio. (The latter are stronger in

claiming that the former are true apriori.) Then, the advocate bases the presupposition

charge on the following: An externalist can rationally grant that the *premises are

warranted only if she has certain “background assumptions” which already imply (3).

The point is also put in terms of a certain “information dependence:” An externalist who

grants warrant to the *premises “rationally requires certain collateral information,”

including (3) (Wright 2000a, p. 149). In this way, an externalist’s “acceptance of those

[background] assumptions cannot be rationally combined with doubt about the truth of

[(3)]” (Davies 2003a, p. 43, but contrast Davies 2000, p. 402).

For simplicity (since rational externalists are the only ones we care about), assume

henceforth that “the externalist” is rational. Then, the force of the presupposition charge

is most readily felt via the following approximation:17 In considering the reductio,

B(3) An externalist grants that the *premises are warranted only if (3) is already

among her Background assumptions.

Note: B(3) is a “second order” thesis about the dialectics of the reductio; the antecedent is

a condition where the externalist grants that the *premises are warranted (regardless of

whether they are warranted). Thus B(3)says that the externalist will be presuming (3), if

she concedes warrant to the *premises in the first place. It is in this way that (3) is

presupposed once the deduction is mobilized, thus resulting in transmission failure.

An argument for B(3) has yet to be given, but there are two on offer. The first starts with

the remark that, since EXT requires water for thinking “water is wet” (as all parties are

currently allowing), the same is true of the self-attributing thought “I’m thinking that

water is wet.” (Davies op. cits). However, if this along with (2) is seen as warranted—

then (3) cannot rationally be put in doubt. For if the existence of water were in doubt,

then this forces a further doubt on whether the thought expressed by (2), “I am thinking

that water is wet,” exists in the first place. But the existence of the thought must be

allowed before one can concede a warrant to it. Consequently, our externalist will allow a

warrant to both *premises only if (3) is already part of the background, which is just what

B(3) says.

The second argument we might attribute to a character called “Wrightgenstein” or just

“W.” for short, since it originates in Crispin Wright’s interpretive work on Wittgenstein.

(For more on W., see section 3.5.) As an externalist, W. first acknowledges the possibility

of error in discerning one’s own mental contents, as when Dry Oscar misjudges his

empty concept to have a natural kind content. But having noted that, he sees no reason to

surrender the warrant possessed by ordinary judgments about content. This parallels a

natural view of perceptual judgment: Even though perceptual illusions occur, ordinarily

we still possess warrant for our perceptual judgments about the world. In both cases, W.

thinks this is because our ordinary perceptual and self-attributing judgments enjoy a kind

of “default” warrant. Such warrant discounts the possibility of illusion, even when one

has gathered no supporting empirical evidence. Though naturally, if a reasonable

suspicion arises, the default no longer applies. But ordinarily our judgments are

“presumed innocent” of error until proven (or at least evidenced to be) guilty; this in turn

is rooted in our communal practices, and is justified on pragmatic grounds (ibid., p. 152-

153).

All this is important for B(3), since if W. grants (2) a warrant in the absence of empirical

investigation, it will be a default warrant (at least in part). And this kind of warrant exists

only in ordinary cases. Thus, he grants this warrant only if he assumes that there is no

Dry Earth illusion where (3) merely appears to be true. So in particular, in the context of

the reductio, W. will allow an apriori warrant to the *premises only if (3) is already

assumed as background. QED

Let us now consider some objections to transmission failure. One is that the whole topic

is a red herring—for (TW) may be unnecessary to convict compatibilists of objectionable

apriori knowledge (McKinsey 2003). In its place, an incompatibilist might just appeal to

the “closure of apriority” understood as follows:

(CAP) If S is apriori warranted in believing p and p entails q, then S is also

apriori warranted in believing q (or at least is able to be thus warranted).

Yet an advocate may reply that it is of no great importance if such closure holds (Wright

2003, though Wright 2011 prefers to just deny (CAP).) For as we saw in the case of

(CW), the closure of warrant does not imply that the deduction created the warrant for

(3)—and that remains true even if the warrants are apriori. (Indeed, W. ordinarily posits a

non-empirical warrant for (3), independently of any deductions.) However, the threat all

along was not that (3) has warrant, but rather that the deduction may create a

new warrant for (3), entirely apriori. For that to follow, the incompatibilist must add that

a new warrant transmits onto (3). Yet that is precisely what the advocate denies.

A different objection accuses the advocate of confusing different types of warrant

(Raffman 1998, Sainsbury 2000). Note first that, if the deduction fails to prove the

conclusion, this does not mean it transmits no warrant at all. (Beebee 2001, Burge 2003).

The objector accordingly proposes that the deduction transmits a “thinner” warrant to (3).

The only reason transmission seems to fail, on this view, is that the thinner warrant is

conflated with something thicker. And indeed, the assumption has been that if the

deduction transmits any warrant, then the warrant transmitted suffices for a proof of (3).

But for the objector, that we should not expect the transmission of a warrant that thick.

Still, an advocate might concede the transmission of a thinner warrant, but still emphasize

that transmission failure is the rule when the warrants are thick (Davies 2003b, but

compare Wright 2003, p. 72). On the other hand, an advocate could take a stronger stance

by doubting the existence of any thinner transmitted warrant. After all, such a warrant

seems to dissipate immediately once any earnest doubt is raised (Wright 2000b, yet

contrast with Wright 2003; 2011).

Be that as it may, the advocate allows the rough distinction between thin and thick

warrants, and may even use it to avoid other difficulties. For instance, an objector might

think that the advocate surrenders SK after all, since (3) is empirical and it is allowed that

(2) presupposes (3) (cf. Wright 2000, p. 151-152). But for W. at least, (3) ordinarily has a

non-empirical “default” warrant, and that makes possible an apriori warrant for (2). Yet

W. is quick to note that this warrant is too thin to prove (3).

Even so, what exactly does the “thinness” consist in? Some advocates unpack this as the

warrant failing as a warrant for equivalent propositions. For instance, a non-empirical

warrant for (2) may fail to warrant the equivalent ‘I am thinking that H2O is wet’ (Davies

2003b, p. 114 and 118). Or as an alternate construal, the “thinness” for W. may reflect

that the warrant is not something earned by gathering empirical or proof-theoretic

evidence. Rather, it is just a defeasible “entitlement” that holds only in the ordinary cases

(Wright 2003).

As a related objection, some propose that if the advocate grants an apriori warrant to (3),

this is already to concede the reductio (Brown 2003; 2004, Sawyer 2006, Brueckner

2006). For the absurdity did not concern transmission directly; instead, the absurdity was

in thinking that (3) can be apriori warranted. However, advocates can respond in two

different ways here. One is to be neutral on whether (3) is apriori, since transmission

failure is still sufficiently explained by (3) being presupposed, regardless of its epistemic

basis (Davies 2000). But such a response is not available to W., for he clearly thinks that

(3) ordinarily has a non-empirical warrant. Still, perhaps W. could soften this by

identifying this apriori warrant as “thin,” and still maintain that such thin warrant is not

transmitted. However, a more recent version of the reductio seems to demonstrate that the

deduction can transmit a thin warrant (Wright 2011, pp. 98-102). If so, then transmission

failure fails with this version of the reductio, and a compatibilist would require some

other response.

2.4 Reply 4: Self-Knowledge is Empirical

So far, the replies to the reductio have been “combative” in that they seek to undermine

some tacit or explicit premise therein. But other responses are “concessive” in that they

admit that the reductio has a point. One concessive response is to reject EXT in light of

the reductio, though as we noted in section 1, EXT has its own arguments to contend

with. But a different concession, considered in this section, is to forgo SK. (There is also

a “quasi-concessive” response, considered in section 2.5, where the apriority of (3) is

simply embraced rather than labeled as absurd.)

Some incompatibilists indeed take the lesson of the reductio to be that SK is false (see,

e.g., McKinsey 2002). Often, the sentiment is that SK should have been highly suspect

from the start. Jacob (2004) once expressed this well as follows:

One aspect of the contemporary philosophical situation is puzzling. On the one

hand, few if any features of the special epistemic authority granted by both the

traditional empiricist and the traditional rationalist pictures of introspective self-

knowledge have survived recent philosophical scrutiny. On the other hand,

several philosophers…assume that the alleged special epistemic authority granted

to introspective self-knowledge by traditional epistemology can bear the burden

of an argument against content externalism…I take externalism about the contents

of an individual’s thoughts…to be more plausible…than anything we may think

about introspective self-knowledge…Imposing top down constraints on

the contents…from the assumptions about the alleged epistemic status of

introspective self-knowledge sounds to me like putting the cart before the horse.

(pp. 401, 402)

Yet however compelling this may sound, one still might like some independent reason to

surrender SK, instead of choosing one of the other replies to the reductio.

There are of course Quinean reasons against apriori knowledge, though this is not the

place to discuss these. (But see section 3 of the entry on Quine.) Ryle 1963, ch. 6 also

denied that self-knowledge is apriori; such knowledge was instead achieved via empirical

observation of one’s own behavior. Yet most contemporary philosophers balk at this,

since it seems to underestimate the “authority” that Oscar usually has in judging his own

mental states (compared to others’ judgments) (Boghossian 1989, pp. 7-8). Even so,

empirical psychology has indicated that “first-person authority” is illusory to a notable

degree (Nisbett & Wilson 1977, Nisbett & Ross 1980, Gopnik 1983. See also McGeer

1996). So a neo-Rylean view may provide just the right amount of first-person authority,

to the extent that Oscar observes more of his behavior than anyone else (Ludlow &

Martin 1993; Martin 1994; McGeer op. cit.).

There is a more recent incarnation of this sort of view, supported by the latest from

cognitive science (Carruthers 2011). Here, the idea is that one interprets sensory input

when attributing thoughts to oneself, just as when attributing thoughts to others.

However, the “sensory input” for self-attributions can include input from interoception,

proprioception, and the like. Nevertheless, the view maintains that interpretation of

“input” is central in both first-person and third-person attributions of thought, which cuts

into so called “first-person authority.”

A rather different line against SK derives from an externalist view about concept

possession. This view hypothesizes that possession of a (non-empty) kind concept

requires the ability to ostend or demonstratively identify instances of the kind by

perceptual means (Brewer 1999; 2000a; 2000b). If so, then to possess the water concept

is already to know perceptually where (instances of) the stuff resides. That in turn

suffices for knowing that water exists (ceteris paribus). So when it comes to the reductio,

the absurdity stems from thinking that (2) is apriori, since knowledge of (2) already rests

on knowledge of (3). Accordingly, one can hardly learn (3) for the first time via

knowledge of (2). The learning proceeds in the other direction.

In the acquisition process, however, the role of demonstrative identification may be

unclear. Nevertheless, a similar argument against SK can be formulated as long

as some kind of empirical knowledge is needed to acquire the water concept. Indeed, it is

typically assumed that a person acquires a concept from experience—which already

portends that acquisition depends on empirical knowledge. Yet if that’s right, then even

knowledge of (2) has an empirical basis, since possession of the water concept does.

Hence, knowledge of (2) does not qualify as purely apriori.

In response, one may concede that there is a “training period” for acquiring a concept.

Still, apriori knowledge might be distinctive in that, once the subject has acquired the

relevant concepts, she can use them to gain new knowledge without further empirical

inquiry (Boghossian & Peacocke 2000, p. 2). But as a rejoinder, EXT usually portrays

concept possession in a way that blurs the distinction between the “training phase” and

the post-acquisition phase (Hawthorne 2007, p. 213). For the externalist thought

experiments allow a subject to possess (e.g.) the sofa concept even prior to being

“trained” that no armchair is a sofa.18

A final doubt about SK is that, if (1) is not apriori (as is plausible), it follows that apriori

knowledge of (2) is impossible (Gertler 2004). After all, if (1) is not apriori, then Oscar

apparently cannot discriminate apriori between his water concept and the Dry Earthian

concept. So it seems incorrect to say that (2) is something known. Now in fact, this raises

the extremely important question of whether such discriminations are necessary for self-

knowledge, but further discussion will be delayed until section 3. The discrimination sub-

literature usually addresses the “slow switching” arguments rather than the

incompatibilist’s reductio.

2.5 Reply 5: A Transcendental Argument?

The last response to the reductio is to deny that the argument is a reductio at all. Instead,

this compatibilist embraces that EXT and SK can facilitate armchair knowledge of the

world. In fact, some externalists have offered independent arguments to that effect

(Putnam 1981). But these independent arguments are significantly more complex, having

to do with model theory and Skolem’s “paradox.” Such things shall not be discussed here

(but see the entry on Skepticism and Content Externalism).

Yet as concerns the incompatibilist’s reductio, it is unclear whether any actual externalist

accepts it as an anti-skeptical argument (though see Peacocke 1996, p. 152). After all,

even if one holds that some transcendental argument can succeed against skepticism, it is

hard to think that the incompatibilist’s reductio is a case in point (cf. Davies 1998, p.

353).

Be that as it may, Warfield (1998) and Sawyer (1998) are often read as embracing the

reductio as an anti-skeptical argument. But the fact is that Warfield is not addressing the

reductio; he is instead mostly concerned with Putnam’s (1981) argument. (Warfield

mentions the reductio in passing, but he explicitly endorses Brueckner’s 1992

compatibilist reply in section 2.1, over a transcendentalist response.)

Sawyer, moreover, clearly discourages those who interpret her (1998) as embracing the

reductio as an anti-skeptical argument: “Remarks by others indicate that in general the

question of whether externalist arguments yield apriori warrants for beliefs about

environmental conditions is seen as synonymous with the question whether we have an

apriori refutation of external world skepticism. I do not see the questions as synonymous”

(2006, p. 150). Instead, Sawyer’s view seems similar to that of W., where speakers are

given a prima facie (albeit quite defeasible) warrant when ascribing their own mental

contents. True, Sawyer allows that given EXT, such a warrant can be transmitted to

(3).19 But it is not the kind of warrant that suffices to undermine skepticism; the warrant

is rather of the “thin” variety, noted at the end of section 2.3. Yet though Sawyer’s view

is not as radical as many have thought, she would face similar obstacles as W.

3. Slow Switching Arguments

We have explored one argument against the joint truth of EXT and SK, namely, the

reductio to armchair knowledge of the world. But there is a further group of arguments to

the same incompatibilist effect. Such arguments rest on a different thought experiment,

the “slow switching” experiment, to bolster the intuition that EXT and SK are not jointly

true. For in brief, the new thought experiment suggests that under EXT, self-attributions

of thought content are not sufficiently discriminating to vindicate SK.

The slow switch thought experiment again features Oscar on Earth—yet this time, we

suppose he is unwittingly switched to Twin Earth (e.g., during his sleep by a secret

government operative) (Burge 1988, Boghossian 1989). Upon his arrival, he then takes

up his usual activities, being none the wiser. Now the externalist’s intuition is that

although Oscar’s use of ‘water’ on Twin Earth initially refers to water on Earth, over time

it comes to denote XYZ. (The switch is thus a “slow” one.) The eventual switch in

referent seems more likely than not—after all, Oscar will acquire the habit of using

‘water’ in the presence of XYZ, and of using ‘water’ to converse with Twin Earthians

about the stuff. Yet if ‘water’ changes its referent, then (by the earlier Frege-Carnap

view) this signals a shift in intension or content. And apparently, the change in content

will occur without Oscar noticing. Indeed it seems Oscar cannot detect the switch just

from the armchair.

What this indicates is that Oscar is unable to discriminate from the armchair whether

specific assertions have a water content versus a twin water content. And as with the

original Twin Earth example, the lesson here is extended to mental content as well.

Hence, if a “water thought” is one that Oscar expresses with help from the term ‘water,

the slow switch experiment indicates that:

(A) Oscar cannot discriminate from the armchair that his water thought has a

water content rather than a twin water content.

His inability to discriminate, moreover, seems pertinent to SK. As Burge (1988, p. 653)

puts it, (A) can easily suggest that SK is false in Oscar’s case, i.e.:

(B) Oscar cannot know from the armchair what content his water thought has.

Generalizing from this, (B) suggests that SK ends up false if EXT is true.

In section 3.1, we shall see that Burge denies that (A) entails (B). Yet in light of this

resistance, Boghossian (1989) formulates a different version of the slow switch argument.

This second version, known as the memory argument, runs as follows. As before,

suppose Oscar unwittingly is subject to a slow-switch, so that the concept he expresses

with ‘water’ at t1 denotes water, and the concept he expresses at t2 denotes twin water.

Then, if p is a thought that Oscar uses ‘water’ in expressing, the argument is:

(1) If Oscar forgets nothing, then what Oscar knows at t1, Oscar knows at t2.

(2) Oscar forgot nothing.

(3) Oscar does not know at t2 that he thinks p.

(4) So, Oscar does not know at t1 that he thinks p. [from (1)-(3)]

(Adapted from Ludlow 1993a.)

Premise (1) is seen as a platitude about memory (though some will deny this; see section

3.3). Premise (2) is then regarded as stipulative, and premise (3) is seen as the lesson of

the slow switch thought experiment. The thinking behind (3) is this: Even if Oscar knows

his water thoughts at t1, yet these morph into twin water thoughts at t2, he no longer

knows at t2 about any water thoughts. For Oscar no longer has water thoughts at t2

(though as we shall see, this too is a point of contention).

Truth be told, there are further variations on these slow switch arguments. What’s more,

there ends up being multiple interpretations of the initial thought experiment. For it is

unclear what effect exactly the slow switch has on Oscar’s conceptual repertoire. The

default stance is that the slow switch causes Oscar’s water concept to be wholly

replaced by the twin water concept. (And unless otherwise noted, this will be the

interpretation assumed in what follows.) But it may be unclear why a slow

switch destroys Oscar’s water concept, even as he becomes acquainted with twin water

(Boghossian 1989; 1992a, Gibbons 1996, Burge 1998). Thus some have regarded

differently what goes on in a slow switch; these views shall be considered toward the end

of section 3.3.

Nonetheless, all variations on the slow switch argument embody the same thought: If

EXT is true, then in a slow switch Oscar cannot distinguish from the armchair a water

content from a twin content. This then forms the basis for why EXT precludes SK. But in

light of the two basic types of slow switch argument, note that sections 3.1 and 3.1.1 only

addresses the first type, i.e., the inference from (A) to (B). Section 3.3, on the other hand,

pertains fairly exclusively to the second type, the memory argument. The remaining

sections, however, plausibly have some bearing on both types of argument.

3.1 Reply 1: Self-Verifying Judgments

As concerns the (A) to (B) maneuver, Burge protests that this glosses over an especially

secure type of armchair self-knowledge. In particular, there are judgments about one’s

own thought contents (a.k.a., “second order” judgments) that are self-verifying. Roughly,

these are judgments where “thinking makes it so”—where judging “I am now thinking

that p” is enough to make it true that one is now thinking that p. Importantly, however,

this self-verifying feature is limited to one’s occurrent thinking of p (in contrast to any

standing or dispositional thoughts).

To illustrate the self-verifying feature, consider the following judgment:

(W) I am thinking, with this very thought, that water is wet.

Burge’s idea is that in executing this judgment, one “runs through” the very thought that

the judgment is about. That is, judging (W) necessitates thinking the thought that water is

wet—and thinking that thought is precisely what (W) contends. So the very act of

judging (W) suffices to make that judgment true. It is in that sense that the judgment is

self-fulfilling or self-verifying. Besides Burge, self-verifying judgments were touted

around the same time by Davidson (1987; 1988) and Heil (1988; 1992), though others

have subsequently embraced them as well (e.g., Falvey and Owens 1994, Gibbons 1996,

Bar-On 2004).

Nevertheless, the suggestion that certain judgments are infallible can seem exceedingly

strong. But for one, infallibility does not imply that the judgment is indubitable. A

judgment could de facto be perfectly reliable, yet the subject might still have some

unanswered questions about it. Second, it is crucial that ‘thinking’ is construed

minimally, in that to “think” that p is not necessarily to believe that p. “Thinking”

that p just means having some mental state or other with the content p—it does not come

with any particular attitude toward that content. Thus, when a “thought” that p is self-

attributed, this is neutral on whether p is believed, hoped, feared, or what have you.

Still, in light of things like Freudian repression, it can be easy to dismiss Burge’s view.

But it is important that his view applies only to a limited class of rather atypical

judgments. For instance, it applies only when the second-order judgment contains a “self-

referential” mechanism, expressed in (W) by the phrase ‘with this very

thought’.20 Moreover, the view pertains to occurrent judgments that attribute the co-

occurrent first-order thought. Thus, self-verifying judgments do not imply that the first-

order thought has existed beyond the very moment it is judged. Relatedly, there is no

implication that the first-order thought is the only thought that presently occupies the

subject. Hence, the judgment that (W) can be true even if the subject’s mind also harbors,

consciously or unconsciously, a variety of other thoughts (Parent, MSb).

Although self-verifying judgments are atypical, Burge still thinks they are sufficient to

block the inference from (A) to (B). For apparently, they provide a kind of Cartesian

knowledge of one’s own thought-contents—and that means that (B) is false even if (A) is

true. Granted, self-verifying judgments are a rarified kind of judgment, so Burge’s view

is hardly satisfying as a general view of self-knowledge (Boghossian 1989, pp. 19-22).

Still, the main goal was to block the inference from (A) to (B), and self-verifying

judgments may do that.

3.1.1 Counter-Replies: Knowing Too Well and Not Well Enough

Predictably, Burge’s self-verifying judgments are not universally accepted. Indeed, some

philosophers “incredulously stare” at the idea that mere mortals can know anything

infallibly. But further substance can be given to this, e.g., by targeting

Burge’s explanation of the infallibility. Burge holds specifically that the relevant

judgments are infallible in virtue of a self-referential mechanism in the attribution (“with

this very thought”). This mechanism is supposedly what “locks” the second-order

judgment to the first-order thought, thus ensuring that the judgment never misses its

target. Yet if the second-order judgment is self-referential, then this at best explains why

the second-order judgment is locked to itself. It does not show why it is locked to

the first-order thought (Parent 2007).

However, this problem can be avoided if the phrase ‘with this very thought’ in (W) is

replaced with ‘forthwith’—where the latter just denotes the first-order thought expressed

by the complement clause of (W) (Parent MSb). For that matter, ‘with this very thought’

could just be deleted. For plausibly, the second order judgment has a compositional

structure such that the first order thought is literally an (ineliminable) part of the

judgment. (Parent 2007; MSc). If so, then tokening the second order judgment

necessitates the occurrence of the first-order thought—just in the way that writing ‘I am

thinking that water is wet’ necessitates writing down its complement clause ‘water is

wet’. Since the occurrence of the first order thought is precisely what the judgment

contends, the judgment is thus invariably true, i.e., infallible.

Besides having us know our thoughts too well, Burge is also criticized for having us

know our thoughts not well enough. For one, it has been suggested that a slow switch

victim will not understand her own first-order thought well enough to count as knowing

it (Cassam 1994, Wikforss 2004 is also relevant). Others have complained that, even if a

self-verifying judgment is infallible, it is unclear whether it qualifies as

genuine knowledge (Brueckner 1990; 1994).

On the latter issue, one might first allow that the relevant judgments are de facto infallible

for the reason Burge says. Yet consider that if (W) is armchair-known, then (if

knowledge is closed under known entailment), it seems one might ipso facto armchair-

know that:

(W*) I am not currently thinking that twin water is wet.

But suppose a skeptic is raising the possibility of a slow switch, a scenario where your

water thoughts have been stealthily switched to twin water thoughts. When taking this

possibility seriously, it seems an externalist cannot be confident about (W*) from the

armchair. Yet if she does not armchair-know this consequence of (W), then (assuming

closure) she does not know (W) itself (Brueckner, op. cits., but contrast with Brueckner

2010). Burge’s second-order judgments hence fail as genuine knowledge, and the

compatibilist’s case falters.

The argument presses that Oscar does not know what he thinks if he cannot discriminate

between water thoughts and twin water thoughts. This represents a kind of

“discrimination requirement” on knowledge (reminiscent of Goldman 1976). And even

armed with self-verifying judgments, Oscar apparently cannot discriminate in this way.

However, if Oscar lacks this discriminatory ability, then it seems he could be thinking

one of two different thoughts, for all he can tell. But normally, Oscar may well know his

thoughts even if he cannot discriminate between them, since twin water thoughts are

usually “irrelevant alternatives” that are properly ignored. In fact, adjudicating the

relevant alternatives issue may be the central task with slow switch arguments, and it is

more appropriate to devote a separate section to it (section 3.2). This controversy is

certainly not unique to Burge’s view.

Nevertheless, in Burge’s case, the discrimination issue is an instance of a larger concern

for the view. The difficulty is that an infallible judgment does not obviously count as

bona fide knowledge. Besides discriminatory abilities, some kind of epistemic

warrant also seems necessary—and it is not obvious how self-verifying judgments are

warranted. However, Burge (1996) adds to his account the notion of an “epistemic

entitlement;” this is understood as what warrants a self-verifying judgment. Burge’s

epistemic entitlements are related to W.’s idea (from section 2.3) that a speaker enjoys,

somewhat automatically, a warrant to one’s self-attributions. Like W., Burge even

describes this as the “default” epistemic status, which need not be earned via some tight,

philosophical argument. However, Burge does not merely state that the default status is

granted by a convention of the “language game.” Rather, Burge attempts to explain this

entitlement further, as rooted not only in (a) the infallibility of self-verifying judgments,

but more importantly in (b) the subject’s capacity for critical reasoning.

“Critical reasoning” is reasoning that occurs while aware of one’s reasons as reasons.

Concordantly, critical reasoning demands that we make judgments about our thoughts,

and their worth as reasons. Yet that of course requires knowledge of what those thoughts

are (cf. Shoemaker 1988, Moran 2001). Indeed, without knowledge of the thoughts

deployed, the attempt to critically evaluate the reasoning seems absurd. For Burge, the

entitlement to one’s second-order judgments arises in light of this: Since critical

reasoning depends on knowing the thoughts deployed, that establishes an epistemic

entitlement to our judgments about those thoughts. So the entitlement is not seen as

assigned by convention without further comment. Rather the entitlement is established by

the need, within critical thinking, for knowledgeable self-attributions.

Of special note, Burge holds that the entitlement persists even through Oscar’s slow

switch ordeal. Yet it may not be obvious why or even whether this is so. Moreover, some

have raised a kind of Euthyphro dilemma for Burge (Peacocke 1996). Is one entitled to

self-attributions because of their role in critical reasoning, as Burge would have it? Or

rather, do these attributions have a certain role in critical reasoning because one is

entitled to them? Contra Burge, the latter can seem more plausible—and so, the

entitlement may need to be explained on independent grounds.

For instance, such an explanation might emphasize “conceptual redeployment,” i.e., that

the very same concepts occur in the self-attribution as occurs in the thought itself

(Peacocke op. cit., though Burge 1998, p. 359 also utilizes this idea.) Alternatively, such

judgments could be seen as warranted in virtue of their perfect reliability, in accord with

a reliabilist epistemology (Gibbons 1996, Brown 2004). Yet another option is to regard

such judgments as warranted in virtue of the target first-order states being “directly

accessible” (where this is spelled out in functionalist terms) (Zimmerman 2006; 2008, cf.

Shoemaker 1996).

3.1.2 A Problem with Critical Reasoning

But again, Burge wants to uphold the rationality of critical reasoning, by positing an

epistemic entitlement to one’s self-verifying judgments. However, a further worry is that

self-verifying judgments, even if they constitute knowledge, cannot support the

rationality of critical thinking. For in brief, they do not enable Oscar to avoid simple

logical errors in the manner we would expect of someone rational. (This is what prompts

Boghossian 1992a to call self-verifying judgments “hollow,” p. 15.) If so, then self-

verifying judgments do not provide the kind of self-knowledge that most concerns us,

when debating the compatibility of EXT and SK.

As one instance of the problem, it seems self-verifying judgments do not reveal to Oscar

which of his thoughts are flatly inconsistent (Bilgrami 1992; 2003, Boghossian 1992a;

1994). This means critical reasoning might proceed without the person knowing that her

premises are impossible, despite whatever self-verifying judgments are available. To

illustrate, consider that it is possible for someone to rationally judge:

(*) Water ≠ H2O.

For instance, a scientist in 1750 might have reasonably denied the newly proposed

hypothesis that water is H2O. But under EXT, this judgment is not just false—it

is inconsistent. For assuming EXT, it seems that the content of the judgment amounts to:

Water is non-identical with itself. Yet the person seems guilty of ignorance, not of gross

inconsistency. But how can the externalist explain that? It seems the best explanation is

that the person was simply ignorant of the content of (*), and so did not knowingly flout

classical logic. Yet if so, then SK does not seem true in any meaningful way, despite

whatever self-verifying judgments were made.

Instead of inconsistency, the problem can also be put in terms of Oscar’s inability to

judge validity from the armchair. (Boghossian 1992a; 1994).21 Here, the difficulty is that

self-verifying judgments do not illuminate whether one thought has the same content as

an earlier thought expressed using the same f9rm of words. However, if Oscar is unable

to discern “same content” from the armchair, then he is unable to know from the armchair

if his reasoning is valid. For he is unable to discern whether his

reasoning equivocates between water thoughts and twin water thoughts.

There is a well-known example to illustrate the point (Boghossian op. cits.). Suppose

Peter is a fan of opera and especially of Pavarotti, and assume he is slow switched

unawares to Twin Earth. Naturally, he continues to pursue his interest in opera—but on

Twin Earth, he is unwittingly reading interviews of, and buying new albums by, Twin

Pavarotti rather than Pavarotti. The problem then arises when memories of Pavarotti are

drawn upon in Peter’s reasoning. For instance, assume he correctly remembers seeing

Pavarotti (on Earth) swim in Lake Taupo. Then, after the slow-switch, suppose he uses

the memory as the first premise in the following argument:

(i) Pavarotti once swam in Lake Taupo.

(ii) The singer I heard yesterday is Pavarotti.

(iii) Hence, the singer I heard yesterday once swam in Lake Taupo.

As things look from Peter’s armchair, the reasoning seems perfectly valid. Yet in fact,

‘Pavarotti’ in (i) refers to Pavarotti on Earth, but ‘Pavarotti’ in (ii) refers to Twin

Pavarotti. After all: (i) expresses a memory of Pavarotti, whereas (ii) expresses a

judgment that is causally connected to Twin Pavarotti. If this is on track, then the

reasoning at (i)-(iii) blatantly equivocates on ‘Pavarotti’, even though Peter is unable to

see this from the armchair.

The issues are somewhat reminiscent of Kripke’s (1979) puzzle about belief. Recall that

Kripke considers a bilingual, Pierre, who is unaware that ‘Londres’ co-refers with

‘London’ (though is otherwise competent with the terms). Due to

circumstance, Pierre then ends up asserting both ‘Londres est jolie’ and ‘London is not

pretty’ As before, the question is then whether the speaker is guilty of inconsistency.

Regardless, Peter’s case is notably different. Whereas Pierre is ignorant of co-reference,

Peter is unaware that his two uses of ‘Pavarotti’ in (i) and (ii) have different referents.

Consequently, Peter’s case uniquely reveals that, assuming EXT, Oscar might

equivocate in his reasoning even though he cannot discern this in the armchair. So even

granting self-verifying judgments, EXT may not uphold SK in a sufficiently robust way.

It may be controversial, however, whether a more robust armchair self-knowledge should

be allowed. An externalist might instead dismiss such knowledge as an illusion of the

Cartesian paradigm (Millikan 1984; 1993, Goldberg 1999b; 2007b, Brown 2004).

Nonetheless, some externalists seek to mitigate the threat that EXT poses to first-person

critical reasoning.

The main strategy here is to deny that Peter, as a slow switch victim, refers to different

people in (i) versus (ii) (Schiffer 1992; Burge 1998; Goldberg 2007a). The more natural

interpretation may have ‘Pavarotti’ denoting Twin Pavarotti in both instances, in which

case, his argument is valid. Of course, this interpretation means that (i) expresses a false

memory. But at least there is no unnoticed equivocation within the armchair. Even so,

there might be other examples of arguments that merely appear valid, whose invalidity

does not turn on the interpretation of the names (Boghossian 1992b). Furthermore, it may

be dubious to see Peter’s memory as “shifty” between environments—where (i) comes to

express a false memory about Twin Pavarotti, even though the memory was initially

caused by Pavarotti on Earth (in the normal way). However, the possibility of a “shifty”

memory has generated a significant amount of discussion, in part, because it alone cuts

against slow switch arguments. Further discussion is thus relegated to a separate section

(section 3.3).

Interestingly, though the problem with critical reasoning is posed initially vis-à-vis

Burge’s view, it has started to take a life of its own. One can see the problem as providing

a general argument against compatibilism, since the compatibilist is strained to keep

separate the logical from the factual errors in Peter’s reasoning.

In that sort of setting, however, some compatibilists respond that the case misconceives

how content is attributed (Stalnaker 2008; also cf. Stalnaker 1990). On this compatibilist

view, “content” is merely something we posit to explain the subject’s behavior. (In this,

Stalnaker apparently adopts an interpretivist view of content, akin to that of Davidson

1973; 1987.) Moreover, it is held that what “adequately explains” behavior depends on

the attributor’s aims or purposes. Consequently, in one context (i) might be seen as

expressing a false memory about Twin Pavarotti, e.g., if the aim is to explain why Peter

talks to Twin Pavarotti as if they were long-time acquaintances. Yet in a different

context, (i) may be interpreted as expressing a genuine memory about Pavarotti on Earth.

And our compatibilist holds that either interpretation of Peter can be legitimate, for there

simply is no attributor-independent fact about what mental contents Peter really has.

Of course, many take exception to this interpretivist view of content. Some say it is

viciously circular to identify Peter’s mental content by what someone attributes to him;

after all, an attribution of content is itself a contentful mental state (Boghossian 2010; cf.

Kriegel 2010). As a second matter, one needs some constraints on what can be attributed

to Peter, yet it is unclear what these would be (Boghossian op. cit.).

3.2 Reply 2: Relevant Alternatives

There is a different reply to slow switch arguments which may have seemed obvious

from the start. It is that the slow switch thought experiment is a bizarre piece of science

fiction, and is simply irrelevant to whether we know our own thoughts from the armchair.

After all, unlike Oscar, we are not the victims of covert switches. So how could the

experiment bear on our capacity for armchair self-knowledge?

The point is often framed in terms of a “relevant alternatives” epistemology (cf. Goldman

1976; 1986). This holds that in order to know that p, one does not need to rule

out every possible scenario where ~p. Rather, it suffices just to rule out the “relevant

alternatives” where ~p. And ordinarily, deviant skeptical possibilities are not among the

relevant alternatives that a knower needs to exclude. So for instance, while driving along

the countryside, one can ordinarily know if one sees a barn—even without excluding the

possibility of a mere barn façade. For barn façades are ordinarily irrelevant. In the same

way, slow switch possibilities ordinarily are irrelevant to knowing what content a thought

has (Warfield 1992, Falvey & Owens 1994, Gibbons 1996, Brown 2004). Accordingly, it

is normally unnecessary to rule out such a possibility in order to know from the armchair

one’s own thought.

But what exactly determines relevance? A popular answer comes from the epistemic

contextualists (DeRose 1995; 2009, Lewis 1998; see also the entry on Epistemic

Contextualism). Contextualism in the first instance is a view about knowledge, yet it

entails that whether an alternative is relevant is determined by the evidential standards in

the context. Consider that in order to know whether it is raining, normally one can just

take a look out the window. However, when talking with a Cartesian skeptic, that is

insufficient. For the skeptic “raises the bar” on the evidence needed to know by

imagining bizarre alternatives that he wants ruled out, e.g., the possibility that you are

dreaming. In this vein, some compatibilists regard slow switching as a bizarre skeptical

possibility which makes exceedingly high the evidential standards for knowledge

(Hohwy 2002; Neta 2003 is also pertinent). Accordingly, if context makes that possibility

relevant, one may lose the ability to self-know from the armchair. If switching

possibilities are irrelevant, however, contextualism says that even an externalist can know

her own thoughts from the armchair.

One worry is that contextualist compatibilism renders armchair self-knowledge no more

“privileged” than perceptual knowledge, since both types of knowledge come and go in

different contexts. But in reply, the compatibilist can stress that context normally does

not require a subject to investigate the environment to know what she thinks. And in that

sense, self-knowledge is especially privileged (Hohwy op. cit.). Granted, self-knowledge

also looks privileged in being more stable or certain than perceptual knowledge. But for

the contextualist, that just reflects that doubts about self-attributions are rarely

contextually relevant (ibid.).

Interestingly, when first presenting the memory argument, Boghossian (1989)

acknowledges the reply from relevant alternatives, but maintains that the slow switch

experiment reveals a tension between EXT and SK anyway. For one can imagine cases

where slow switching is a relevant alternative. And in those cases, one could not rule out

this possibility just from the armchair. In these instances, then, even the relevant

alternatives account denies the externalist armchair self-knowledge.

Still, why exactly does this reveal a problem with our self-knowledge? Granted, if slow

switching actually occurred, it would be a relevant alternative that could not be excluded

from the armchair, and the externalist would lose armchair self-knowledge. But merely to

acknowledge a possible scenario of this sort does not indicate that EXT and SK are

incompatible (Warfield 1992). It shows merely that if EXT is true, self-knowledge is not

necessarily within reach from the armchair.

When pressed in this way, some incompatibilists subversively suggest that switches do

occur on a regular basis (Ludlow 1995b; Butler 1997). Now in section 1, it was shown

that at least one “Twin Earth” scenario actually occurs: Recall the superficially

indiscernible extensions of ‘chicory’ and ‘endive’, which are swapped between British

and Standard American English. We can thus imagine an American ex-patriot being

unwittingly fooled into denoting chicory when speaking or thinking about “endive.” Still,

this may seem like a rather atypical case. But on second thought, the potential for an

undetected switch may be as common as the potential for polysemy in the language

(Ludlow op. cit.). Consider that between different philosophical circles, the term

‘pragmatism’ denotes different yet superficially similar philosophical theses. So thanks to

unnoticed switches between subgroups, one might be fooled into saying or believing

things about different kinds of pragmatism, due to different uses of the term. Moreover,

such variation among linguistic subgroups seems entirely commonplace. (And it is

the prevalence of these switches that makes them relevant, even if no actual switch

occurs in a given instance.)

In reply, a compatibilist can observe that these cases are not cases of slow switching, and

the usual view is that contents do not change in a “quick switch.” (But note that the

individuation of some cognitive processes may switch immediately; see Clark &

Chalmers 1998). Yet even if slow switches regularly occur, it still does not show that

EXT and SK are incompatible (Warfield 1997). True, if slow switches actually occurred

regularly, then EXT and SK may not be true jointly in our world. Nevertheless, they

might still be true jointly in some other possible world. So no incompatibility strictly

follows.

Regardless, it may be troubling enough if an externalist cannot actually have armchair

self-knowledge (Ludlow 1997). It is standardly agreed, moreover, that the externalist

should concede one type of armchair self-knowledge. Specifically, they should concede

armchair self-knowledge that is discriminatory between water contents and twin contents,

a.k.a. “comparative knowledge” of content (Falvey & Owens 1994). But this may not be

a huge concession, since it seems one can still know (W) from the armchair, absent any

armchair comparisons with twin contents. Besides, there is some independent reason to

reject such comparative knowledge anyway (see Owens 1990; 1992).

As a further issue, if the compatibilist allows that SK is false when switches are relevant,

she may be conceding too much (Goldberg 2006a, Parent MSb). For there is a persistent

Cartesian intuition that armchair self-knowledge should be unaffected by skeptical

hypotheses about the external world. Following Meditation Two, if I am entirely agnostic

about the external world, it still seems I can know what I am currently thinking.

However, the slow switch experiment suggests that this Cartesian intuition is mistaken.

For a slow switch hypothesis is a skeptical hypothesis about the external world. And if

such a hypothesis is relevant, then even a relevant alternatives epistemology demands

that we discriminate water thoughts from twin water thoughts. Yet of course, one is

unable to do so from the armchair. Apparently, then, some skeptical hypotheses about the

external world can undermine armchair knowledge of one’s own occurrent thoughts,

contra the Cartesian intuition. Thus, even if the compatibilist can secure a somewhat

“non-discriminating” kind of self-knowledge, something important about armchair self-

knowledge may be lost.

But a relevant alternatives compatibilist may still have hope for rescuing the Cartesian

intuition. First, note that in many slow switch arguments, the issue is not whether

Oscar knows that he thinks that p from the armchair; rather, it is whether Oscar knows

what he thinks. And unlike ascriptions of “knowledge that,” ascriptions of “knowledge

what” are appropriate relative to one’s goals or purposes in a context (Boër & Lycan

1986, Braun 2006, DeRose 2009, ch. 2 appendix).22 Hence, whether it is apt to say

“Oscar knows what he thinks” will partly depend on contextually salient goals or

purposes. Accordingly, if Oscar’s goal is to discern whether his use of ‘water’ has a water

content or a twin content, then he cannot “know what” he thinks from the armchair. After

all, the armchair provides insufficient resources for such discrimination. However, it may

be that for other anti-skeptical purposes, Oscar can indeed “know what” (Parent, MSb).

For instance, suppose the skeptic challenges Oscar on whether he knows the truth of

anything with certainty. Then, if Oscar points to his self-verifying judgment (W) (“I am

thinking forthwith that water is wet”), this plausibly counts as meeting the challenge. For

it is a case where the truth of his judgment looks certain, even if its content is in question.

Before closing this section, it is worth noting that compatibilists sometimes prefer not to

insist on the irrelevance of slow switches, but rather to contest whether their relevance

undercuts armchair self-knowledge (Falvey & Owens 1994, Butler 1997, McLaughlin &

Tye 1998a, Vahid 2003, Brown 2004, Morvarid 2012). Indeed, several different

principles could underlie the incompatibilist’s inference from the relevance of slow

switching to a lack of such knowledge. (Note that the inference from (A) to (B) is

different than the one presently of concern, since the former does not presuppose the

relevance of slow switching.) As a more noteworthy case, the principle here might be

some kind of “truth tracking” condition (cf. Nozick 1981) (Falvey & Owens op. cit.). On

this interpretation, the slow switch argument presupposes that the belief “I am thinking

that water is wet” does not count as knowledge, because the subject S fails to track the

truth in the following sense:

(TC) S’s justification for the belief that p is such that, if some relevant alternative

were true instead, S would still believe that p.

Roughly, S fails to know according to (TC), since S’s justification would not divert her

from the self-attribution in a relevant alternative where the self-attribution is false.

However, if this is the underlying principle behind slow switch arguments, it seems they

can be resisted (Falvey & Owens, op. cit.). For it is plausible that we do not satisfy (TC),

when it comes to self-verifying judgments (see section 3.1). If we consider a

counterfactual where I have twin water thoughts in lieu of water thoughts, I

cannot believe I have water thoughts. After all, any self-attribution expressed as “I am

thinking that water is wet” would inevitably attribute a twin water thought instead. So my

self-attribution “tracks the truth” perfectly in the various counterfactual circumstances.

3.3 Reply 3: Externalism about Memory

Let us now focus our attention on the second version of the slow switch argument, a.k.a.

the memory argument. The argument is that, if t2 is a time after a slow switch, and t1 is a

time before, then:

(1) If Oscar forgets nothing, then what Oscar knows at t1, Oscar knows at t2.

(2) Oscar forgot nothing.

(3) Oscar does not know at t2 that he thinks p.

(4) So, Oscar does not know at t1 that he thinks p. [from (1)-(3)]

As one might expect, each of the premises have been challenged by various writers. As

concerns (1), some reject the suggestion that, even if p was known at t1,

remembering p does not imply knowing it at t2 (Bernecker 2010, ch. 3). But even if

remembering means knowing, there are other ways Oscar can lose knowledge besides

forgetting (Brueckner 1997a; Burge 1998, n. 18). For instance, suppose Oscar knows he

driving through a countryside with at least one barn, but then some defeating condition is

introduced (e.g., he enters Barn Façade County). Then, he may no longer know at t2 that

there is a barn in his environs, even if he truly believes it. That’s because even though

nothing has been forgotten, a defeating condition exists at t2 that was absent at t1.

An incompatibilist might try to stipulate that Oscar meets all the conditions needed to

know that p on the basis of memory. However, the compatibilist may reply that this

stipulation is inconsistent with the occurrence of a slow switch (Brueckner, op. cit.). For a

slow switch just is a defeating condition, akin to entering Barn Façade County. So the

incompatibilist’s argument does not get started.

Besides denying (1) for this reason, a compatibilist can attack the portrayal of memory in

premises (1) and (2). Here, an externalist might claim that Oscar’s memory content is

partly determined not by the Earthly environment in which the memory was formed.

Rather, it is conditioned by the environment in which recall occurs, i.e., on Twin Earth

(Ludlow 1995a, 1996; 1999; Gibbons 1996; Tye 1998; Bernecker 1998). This means that,

even if knowledge of a water thought was initially stored in memory, what is “recalled”

concerns a twin water thought. If so, then a slow switch results in a kind of memory

failure, since the knowledge initially stored in memory is not what is recalled. (N.B.,

memories of second-order thoughts are the most dialectically relevant to the memory

argument, but the literature often uses first-order memories as examples, cf. Kraay 2002.)

This view of memory as “shifty” between different environments may well be a natural

consequence of EXT. For one can just as easily consider a Putnam-style thought

experiment concerning Oscar and Twin Oscar’s memories (Ludlow, op. cits.). Moreover,

in the slow switch experiment, the presumption is that Oscar’s water

thoughts generally change over to twin water thoughts—and that includes whatever

(first- or second-order) thoughts are stored in memory. Now it may be strange to see

Oscar’s memory in this way, and we shall attend to objections shortly. But it is worth

observing that this externalist view of memory allows one to resist the argument at (1)-

(4). A compatibilist might first grant that Oscar does not forget strictly speaking—after

all, we can suppose no neurological impairment occurs in Oscar. Yet she can add that

Oscar loses some memory content regardless, thanks to the slow switch. So on this line,

Oscar does not truly “forget” yet has still lost knowledge by a different route; premise (1)

of the memory argument is thus false. (Note: The “shifty” view of memory has waned in

recent years; Bernecker 2004; 2010 relinquishes it in favor of something like Burge’s

1998 view; see below. Ludlow 2004 exchanges it for a view where a memory is a

temporally extended object, one which has “stages” that hosts different contents at

different times. But see Burge 1998 n. 2 for some remarks against such a view.)

The externalist view of memory can come as a shock; however, it might also enjoy some

intuitive support (Tye 1998). For instance, suppose after the switch that Oscar judges:

(W†) Water is the only thing I now drink; however, many years ago, I

drank water fortified by gin.

Since (W†) is judged after the slow switch, the initial use of ‘water’ refers to XYZ. But

does the second use of ‘water’ refer to XYZ? It seems so, since (W†) is making

a comparison of how Oscar’s imbibes a liquid now versus in the past. Such a comparison,

of course, requires the liquid named in (W†) to be constant. And since the initial use of

‘water’ denotes XYZ, then the second use of ‘water’ must also denote XYZ. The upshot

is that after the switch, the second clause in (W†) expresses a memory that has “shifted”

from water content to a twin water content, as predicted by the compatibilist.

Still, the “shifty” view of memory is fairly controversial. Consider that if Oscar’s

memory content is calibrated to Twin Earth, so to speak, then some thoughts stored in

memory will shift from being true to being false (Hofmann 1995, Brueckner 1997a,

Nagasawa 2000). Suppose Oscar on Earth expresses a veridical memory when he asserts:

(W‡) As a child, I thought that water was positively scrumptious.

However, after the slow switch, (W‡) self-attributes a twin water thought in childhood—

and this (let us suppose) is false. So what was a genuine memory vis-à-vis Earth becomes

displaced by a false memory.

Yet the objection apparently begs the question of how memory is supposed to function

(Ludlow 1996). For the issue is precisely whether memory is supposed to preserve past

contents across different environments. The counter-suggestion instead is that memory

offers information about past events, in terms pertinent to the present environment

(Ludlow 1996; 1999, Bernecker 1998). Ludlow (1999) provides an illustration: “If at t1 I

believed it was possible to drown in water, memory will deliver a t2 belief that it is

possible to drown in twater—and good thing, too! Twater is no less …dangerous than

water” (p. 167).

But as a second worry, if Oscar’s memory contents shift, has he really forgotten nothing?

A case can be made that the memory shifts indeed constitute forgetting (Brueckner

1997a). For on this view, even though memory offers up a similar substitute content, it

seems clear that Oscar fails in his attempt to recall something about water. Yet a failed

attempt at recall just means that Oscar “forgot.” If this is correct, then it is premise (2)

rather than (1) which is the culprit in the memory argument. (Still, there may remain a

sense in which Oscar does not forget; Brueckner op. cit., n. 21; see also Kraay 2002).

Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether EXT entails the “shifty” theory of memory in

the first place. Indeed, Burge (1979, p. 92, passim) had conceded that the Twin Earth

experiments do not show that all mental contents are partly determined by the

environment (though they suggest that that is often so). The contents of memory thus

might stand as an exception. And indeed, Burge (1993; 1998) endorses the view that

memory should “preserve” past thought contents. In a slow switch case, specifically,

Burge holds that Oscar’s properly functioning memory preserves an Earthian thought

content, so that the very same content is available later for recollection.

Consequently, Burge rejects premise (3) of the memory argument: If Oscar truly forgot

nothing, then preservative memory allows him to know at t2 what he knew at t1. (Per

Falvey & Owens 1994,) Oscar’s memory may not provide comparative knowledge of

content, i.e., knowledge that enables armchair discriminations between water and twin

water contents. But his memory could preserve knowledge of his thought at t1—meaning

that (3) is false. (The incompatibilist might rejoin that (3) is stipulative in the thought

experiment; but in that case, Burge will side with Brueckner 1997a in rejecting (2).)

Whether one accepts the “shifty” view of memory or not, the debate here is important to

opening up different interpretations of the slow switch thought experiment. The default

stance has been that the slow switch wholly replaces Oscar’s water concept with a twin

water concept (see, e.g., Ludlow 1996, Brueckner 1997). Following Bernecker 2010, call

this the “conceptual replacement” interpretation. However, Burge’s conception of

“preservative memory” highlights that Oscar could conceivably retain the water concept

while acquiring an additional concept during the slow switch (even if he cannot

discriminate between the two concepts). Call this latter interpretation the “conceptual

addition” interpretation (favored by Burge 1998, Boghossian 1989, Gibbons 1996).

Consequently, after the switch, ‘water’ in Oscar’s mouth seems ambiguous between the

two concepts: On some occasions it expresses the water concept (e.g. when Oscar

expresses childhood memories), and on other occasions it expresses the twin water

concept (e.g., when he asks his waiter on Twin Earth for a glass of “water.”). Yet on the

“conceptual addition” interpretation, it is not entirely obvious whether the added concept

is the twin water concept, specifically. One might instead say that the additional concept

is disjunctive, in denoting water or twin water. Relatedly, an externalist might even

suggest that Oscar expresses more than one concept with ‘water’, or possibly that it is

indeterminate which concept it expresses. (See Bernecker 2010, ch. 6, for an overview of

such options.)

How should we decide among the various interpretations? Surprisingly, only one

externalist has pursued this question at any length, namely, Heal (1998) (but see also

Burge 1998, n. 13). However, Heal’s aim is not so much to settle the question, as to

illustrate that the issue is really much more complex than has been admitted.

Heal first allows that (W†) can be construed in the way suggested earlier, as confirming

the “shifty” memory view. The basis for this interpretation was the following.

(1a) The first occurrence of ‘water’ has a twin water content (since it is used in

expressing a thought about the stuff presently before Oscar).

(2a) The second occurrence of ‘water’ expresses the same content as the first.

(3a) So, the second occurrence of ‘water’ has a twin water content.

But Heal observes one might be just as inclined to reason thus (p. 101):

(1b) The second occurrence of ‘water’ has a water content (since it helps to

express a memory about the stuff on Earth).

(2b) The first occurrence of ‘water’ has the same content as the second.

(3b) So, the first occurrence of ‘water’ has a water content.

And on its face, it is unclear why one argument takes priority over the other. Indeed, Heal

suggests the latter may sometimes be a more appropriate argument than the former,

depending on one’s purposes (pp. 101-102). This is one complexity that seems to have

been underappreciated.

Secondly, Heal notes that Oscar’s transition from English to Twin English is not clean-

cut. She writes: “in the early two or three days of a switch the victim, asked to indicate

what he meant by ‘water’; would specify a mixed bag by offering phrases such as ‘what I

had a bath in last week’, ‘what is in this glass right now’, ‘what, in its frozen form, I

skated on last winter’, ‘what comes out of that tap over there’, etc. (p. 107) And this

raises the question “Under what conditions, then, is a switch complete?” (ibid.). (The

“Triplet Earth” and “triwater” example on p. 99-100 is relevant here as well.)

Nevertheless, Heal offers some guidance on how an externalist should untangle these

knots. Most basically, such matters should be decided by one’s externalist metaphysics of

meaning (of the sorts noted in section 1).23 On Putnam’s (1975) externalist semantics, it

is important here that the environmental objects referred to “serve also as standard-setters

by resemblance to which…other items deserve the same label” (Heal 1998, p. 103).

(Though Putnam himself speaks of “stereotypes” rather than standard-setters.)

Concordantly, “our practice of using natural kind terms can exist and have the features it

does only because we have memories of and generally reliable abilities to re-identify

particular specimens” (p. 104). Against this background, Heal concludes that “[t]he ‘slow

switching’ claim then amounts to this: after a while in the new environment a new set of

(remembered and identifiable) specimens from the new environment will come to play

the standard-setting role” (ibid.). So roughly, the establishment of stereotypes and the

acquisition of re-identification abilities are the crucial matters, for the externalist, for

determining which concepts figure into which of Oscar’s thoughts, and when.

Intriguing as all this is, memory may ultimately be a red herring to slow switch

arguments. Suppositions about memory can seem inessential to the so called “memory

argument” (Goldberg 1997; 1999a; 2000a). For the key issue illustrated by the slow

switch experiment is that our own self-attributions can be open to more than one

interpretation. Thus, if post-switch Oscar claims “I am thinking that water is

scrumptious,” this could conceivably express a second order belief about either a water

thought or a twin water thought. Yet it is this “underdetermination” in its interpretation

which Oscar cannot resolve from the armchair. So already there is a problem with

armchair knowledge, absent any premises about memory.

When spelled out, this “memory free” slow switch argument depends on the following

“principle of knowing identification:”

(PKI) If a subject S recognizes that there is more than one relevant interpretation

of her assertions/beliefs—and S has nothing to decide between them—then S

lacks knowledge of the content of her assertion/belief.

However, one might object that Oscar is missing only comparative knowledge of content

when the antecedent of (PKI) (non-vacuously) applies. That is, in such a condition, Oscar

lacks only self-knowledge that comes with armchair discriminations between a content

and a twin content (Brueckner 1999; cf. Falvey & Owens 1994). But importantly, (PKI)

only addresses cases where (a) there is more than one relevant interpretation, and (b) the

subject recognizes that (Goldberg 1999a). Accordingly, one difference with the “memory

free” argument is that in the thought experiment, we assume that Oscar is informed of the

slow switches at some later time t3 (whence both (a) and (b) are satisfied). Conversely, if

slow switch possibilities are irrelevant or go unrecognized, the “memory free” slow

switch argument does not tell against Oscar’s ability to self-know from the armchair. And

so the argument already allows for the possibility of “non-discriminating” knowledge of

content, thus quelling the objection. (But for a rebuttal, see Brueckner 2000.)

Nevertheless, since it has limited applicability, the “memory free” slow switch argument

does not show that EXT and SK are incompatible, strictly speaking (Goldberg op. cit., p.

217; Goldberg 2000a). But it still reveals that EXT entails that SK is false when certain

skeptical possibilities are entertained (contrary to, e.g., the view in Meditation Two).

3.4 Reply 4: The Argument is Self-Undermining

As should be clear, slow switch arguments can be seen as skeptical arguments, where the

externalist is asked to rule out deviant thought contents from the armchair. Moreover,

since the skeptic thinks these possibilities cannot be so excluded, the skeptical lesson is

that the externalist lacks armchair self-knowledge. But one sort of reply here is that such

skepticism is self-undermining (Ebbs 1996; 2001; 2005; Brueckner & Ebbs, 2012, ch.

12). The contention is that, assuming EXT, the skeptic cannot both deny SK and be

justified in accepting the premises of his own argument. If this line is correct, then

skeptical slow switch arguments end up being incoherent.

Observe that, besides EXT, skeptical slow switch arguments tacitly or explicitly

presuppose the following two claims:

(I) If I am on Twin Earth, then my saying ‘water is scrumptious’ expresses the

thought that twin water is scrumptious.

(II) If I am on Earth, then my saying ‘water is scrumptious’ expresses the thought

that water is scrumptious.

Such arguments also take it that (assuming Twin Earth possibilities are relevant

alternatives):

(III) One cannot know from the armchair which of the two thoughts is expressed

by ‘water is scrumptious’.

The problem, however, is that (III) applies to ‘water is scrumptious’ whenever I say it.

Therefore, it applies to ‘water is scrumptious’ as it occurs in the consequent of (II). So if

(III) is accepted, it follows that I do not know from the armchair what thought is

expressed by the consequent of (II), hence, by (II) itself. Yet if I do not know what

thought is expressed by (II), I can hardly be justified in accepting that thought (Ebbs, op.

cits.). Hence, I cannot simultaneously hold (III) and be justified in accepting (II). (A

similar charge is made about the justification for (I), with similar objections and replies to

think about. But for brevity’s sake, we shall only consider (II).)

Two objections might be made to this “self-undermining” charge. The first is that, though

the exact content of (II) may be unknown from the armchair, one can still be justified in

accepting (II) (Brueckner 1997b). For it seems that (II) can be shown true, no matter

whether one speaks English or Twin English. After all, regardless of what ‘water’

denotes, it will be true to assert “ ‘water is scrumptious’ expresses the thought that water

is scrumptious.” So it seems (II) must be true; hence, one is justified in accepting it.

In reply, however, one can imagine “weird worlds” where (II) ends up false (Ebbs 2001).

I might consider a world much like this one, except ‘Earth’ denotes not the planet that I

am currently on, but rather denotes Twin Earth. In that case, (II) says that if I am on Twin

Earth, then asserting ‘water is scrumptious’ expresses the thought that water (i.e. H2O) is

scrumptious. Yet if so, then (II) is false under those circumstances. So one cannot assume

that (II) is true, no matter how the world turns out, contra the objection.

The second objection against the self-undermining charge takes the form of a dilemma.

Observe that ‘water is scrumptious’ either expresses the content that I believe it

expresses, or it does not. If it does, then (II) is true—and so, in conjunction with (I) and

(III), the slow switch argument remains standing (Brueckner 2003). But suppose on the

other hand that ‘water is scrumptious’ does not express the content I judge that it has.

Then, since my second-order judgment is false, I obviously do not know what its content

is. So in that case, SK is false. Hence, on either horn of the dilemma, the skeptical

conclusion remains viable (ibid.).

Yet even if this is right, the slow switch argument-schema at (I)-(III) cannot justifiably be

seen as a sound argument (Ebbs 2005). After all, in the present case, (II) is no longer

categorically assumed to be true. Regardless, the point stands that not all slow switch

arguments utilizing (III) have been shown incoherent (Brueckner 2007). Specifically, the

dilemma argument above purports to be a perfectly coherent argument for skepticism

about SK.

However, perhaps (III) is precisely where the problem lies. It may seem that (III) is

entirely justified, but why is that exactly? Presumably, it is because we are (putatively)

justified in thinking that ‘water is scrumptious’ can express a different thought than the

one it actually does. But this presupposes (II) (Brueckner & Ebbs, 2012, ch. 12). Yet at

this stage, it was agreed that (II) might be false due to inhabiting a “weird world.” So the

justification for (III) presupposes (II), even though (II) was already conceded. So the

justification for (III) must also go (Brueckner & Ebbs, op. cit. For a reply, see Brueckner

& Ebbs, 2012, ch. 13).

3.5 Reply 5: Anti-Recognitionalism

A more programmatic critique of slow switch arguments holds that they mistakenly

assimilate armchair self-knowledge to perceptual knowledge. In particular, the arguments

falsely assume that for Oscar to know what he is thinking, he must recognize what he is

thinking on the basis of some “inward observation.” Slow switch arguments thus exploit

the fact that what would be “observed” is compatible with more than one thought content.

However, for one kind of compatibilist, such “recognitional” models of self-knowledge

are largely in error. For self-knowledge is unlike perceptual knowledge in that it is

normally not the product of any kind of recognition. (Some even take slow switch

arguments to evidence that armchair self-knowledge is not recognitional, e.g., Moran

2001, p. 15.)

This “anti-recognitionalist” compatibilism can be developed in a number of ways. We

have already seen some precedent in Burge’s view about self-verifying judgments

(section 3.1), since these judgments do not represent a “cognitive achievement” (in the

words of Boghossian 1989). After all, they are automatically self-verifying, whether the

subject invests any epistemic effort in them or not. Further, W’s notion of “default”

entitlement (from section 2.3) results in an anti-recognitionalist view. On that account, a

subject does not need a tight philosophical argument to be entitled to her self-attributions;

such entitlement is instead granted automatically (unless there is special reason to

withhold it).

Burge admits, however, that self-verifying judgments are atypical as far as self-

knowledge goes. Moreover, the idea that armchair self-knowledge largely results from

introspection or “inner recognition” is fairly compelling. So why be so suspicious of the

recognitional model? To be clear, an anti-recognitionalist need not deny altogether the

existence of introspection. However, it is held that “inner recognition” normally does not

explain armchair self-knowledge in a satisfactory way. There are no less

than seven arguments in the literature for this, which shall be reviewed below.

But in the spirit of charity, let us note first that the recognitional model does not require

mind-body dualism, despite its association with Descartes. Nor does it assume that

mental states are essentially “private” objects. For there is a materialist introspectionist

view which explains armchair self-knowledge by a functionally realized “internal

scanning” of the brain (Armstrong 1968, ch. 15, Lycan 1996). Moreover, the process is

seen as reliable (albeit fallible), and thus the resulting judgments might qualify as

knowledge, per a reliabilist epistemology (cf. Goldman 1986). The materialist

introspectionist, moreover, denies that mental states are essentially private, for others can

in principle monitor these states by, say, an artificial scanner.

But this leads to the first worry about introspectionism. No matter how reliable the

artificial scanner is, if the subject repeatedly disagrees with its verdict that (e.g.) she feels

pain, we would sooner question the artificial scanner than the subject (Bar-On 2004, pp.

100-101). This suggests that the subject’s authority on her own mental states is not

wholly explicable by reliable scanning.

Secondly, on the introspectionist picture, self-attributions are vulnerable to brute error,

i.e., error based on “illusions” of what the subject is thinking or feeling (Bar-On, op. cit.;

cf. also Burge 1988). But if the subject asserts “I am in pain” or occurrently judges “I’d

like some water,” it is hard to see how there is room for illusion. Note here that, even if

Oscar on Earth cannot discriminate between water and twin water, his self-attribution

“I’d like some water” still seems secure in attributing a desire for water (Bar-On 2006, p.

432). (Oscar might be fooled into accepting twin water instead, but he was still correct in

self-attributing a desire for water.)

Thirdly, the introspectionist picture allows the possibility of “global systematic failure,”

that is, the possibility of a subject whose is largely “self-blind,” whose inner scanner is

“broken” whereby she is unreliable about her own mental states. But such a thing can

seem incoherent. Indeed, some think that this would preclude seeing the person as having

intentional states at all (Shoemaker 1996; Wright 1998; Bar-On 2004).

As a fourth objection, the recognitional model misportrays beliefs as recognizable by

their phenomenology. Yet arguably, there is no distinctive phenomenology to the belief

that (say) Wagner died happy (Moran 2001, ch. 1). A related objection is that the

recognitional model is untrue to the actual phenomenology of self-knowing (Wright

1989, p. 631). If you are ever unlucky enough to avow (sincerely) “I’m in serious pain!,”

it would not seem preceded by an inner “scanning.” The connection between pain and

knowing the pain seems more immediate than that.

Sixth, the introspective model is dubious in positing “inner objects” that are to be

inspected by the “mind’s eye” (Davidson 1987, Wright 1998, Moran 2001, ch. 1). Such

talk seems to be metaphor if not sheer “mythology” (Wright op. cit., p. 634). But for

Wright’s Wittgenstein, the most important argument against the recognitional model is

the private language argument. Without going into detail, W. holds that there cannot be

standards for correctness in self-attributing mental states if based only on a private

recognition (Wright 1989; 1998; and the related chs. of Wright 2001. But see McDowell

1991; 1998 for criticism. See also Glock & Preston 1995 on how Wittgenstein’s

externalism differs importantly from Putnam-Burge externalism.)

Yet if the recognitional model is in error, what should replace it? Peacocke (1998, p. 82)

gives one anti-recognitional account explicitly aimed at diffusing slow switch worries.

The claim is that what makes reasonable a self-attribution is not that one has recognized

the content by discriminating it from twin contents. Rather, it is the experiential

content itself which makes the attribution reasonable. Thus, the content of the experience

is not only the target of the self-attribution, the very thing that acts as a reason for self-

attribution, in a way that might qualify it as knowledge.

As a different positive view, some say that to assume a speaker is using language to

express her thoughts, ask questions, etc., just is to assume that the speaker has “minimal

knowledge” of the thoughts she expresses (Ebbs 2012; see also Ebbs 1996). Such

minimal self-knowledge consists in a basic kind of competence in using the language,

and can be characterized by at least the following three conditions. If a speaker has

minimal knowledge of a linguistic expression e, then:

(c1) There are some beliefs the speaker expresses by using e.

(c2) The speaker need not have wholly accurate beliefs about what content

is expressed by e. (Cf. Burge’s 1979 “arthritis” example.)

(c3) The speaker knows, without any special empirical investigation on

the matter, what content is expressed by e. (That is so, even though the acquisition

of e requires experiential or testimonial knowledge.)

There is probably more to say on what “minimal knowledge” of e consists in, but (c1)-

(c3) at least give some idea of such knowledge. And of course, an overt “recognition” of

what e expresses is not necessary for this brand of self-knowing.

As for Wright’s Wittgenstein, one might expect an emotivist or expressivist view of self-

knowledge, where a self-attribution is the (non-truth-evaluable) venting of an emotion.

(“[T]he verbal expression of pain replaces crying, it does not describe it,” PI §244.)

However, ignoring the theoretical problems with this, the textual evidence for the view in

Wittgenstein is rather scant (Wright 1998, p. 38). Accordingly, W. instead endorses a

kind of primitivism about armchair self-knowledge. No explanation is offered for why

self-attributions are given a default warrant; in fact, the mistake may be in thinking there

is an explanation to be had (ibid.). (This primitivism is believed to exemplify the “anti-

theoretical” stance that Wittgenstein was known for.)

Expressivism per se currently has few adherents, yet there is a neo-expressivist view that

is gaining prominence (Bar-On & Long 2001, Finkelstein 2003, Bar-On 2004; 2006;

2011; 2012). Unlike traditional expressivism, neo-expressivism holds that self-

attributions are truth-evaluable. But the view has an “expressivist” element in that the

strong epistemic status of a self-attribution is due to its being expressive of the mental

state. (For further introduction to neo-expressivism, see the entry on Self-Knowledge.)

Other anti-recognitionalists make use of agency theoretic ideas in explaining self-

knowledge (Moran 2001, Heal 2002, Bilgrami 2006, O’Brien 2007, Coliva 2009). One

notion that is prominently featured is that of “commitment.” The idea is that when I avow

“I believe water is the most scrumptious beverage ever,” I thereby commit myself to the

first-order belief. In so committing, my status as a rational agent is then subject to

assessment, by whether I behave in accord with the first order belief. In a related vein,

knowledge of one’s own beliefs is seen as a requirement on one’s being epistemically

responsible for those beliefs (Again, see the entry on Self-Knowledge for more.)

The anti-recognitionalist’s positive accounts are not without difficulties however. For

instance, the agency theoretic accounts may explain only why we treat people as

knowing their own thoughts, rather than vindicating that people do achieve such

knowledge (McGeer 1996, cf. also Fricker 1998). But in fact, this may be for the best,

since experimental psychology indicates that self-knowledge is often a spurious

phenomenon (McGeer, op. cit.; see also section 2.4).

Another objection is that it is a misnomer to call self-attributions “knowledge” if there is

no cognitive achievement in acquiring it (Bar-On 2004; 2006). For instance, if self-

attributions are given a kind of “default” security, as W. suggests, then the knowledge

which results, if any, is a very thin, deflationary sort of knowledge. In reply, however, an

anti-recognitionalist might co-opt Peacocke’s (1998) suggestion that the mental state acts

as the reason or the warrant for a self-attribution (Bar-On, op. cit.) Granted, such warrant

does not reflect some kind of recognition on the subject’s part. But possessing a reason or

rationalization for a self-attribution is not cognitively negligible. So in that sense, though

self-knowledge remains anti-recognitional, it can still stand as a kind of cognitive

achievement (ibid.). So self-knowledge need not be seen in a deflationary way.

4. Other Issues with Externalist Self-Knowledge

There are a surprising number of other issues regarding externalism and knowledge of

one’s own mind. Some of these consist in lesser-known incompatibilist arguments. For

instance, there is a kind of “inverted” memory argument suggesting that, if Burge’s self-

verifying judgments count as bona fide self-knowledge, then one’s memory would be

infallible in ways that it is obviously not (Goldberg 2000). As a separate matter, it is also

sometimes argued that EXT and SK preclude the standard analysis of epistemic

possibility. (Ebbs 2003; 2011. But see McLaughlin 2004.)

Questions about compatibility have been extended to more than just knowledge of one’s

own mental contents. There is a case to be made, for instance, that EXT precludes

armchair knowledge of one’s attitudes toward those contents (Bernecker 1996, Gibbons

2001). Thus, even if it is known that you are currently thinking that water is scrumptious,

EXT may preclude armchair knowledge that you believe that thought, since what counts

as “belief” might vary according to one’s linguistic community. In addition, new issues

have arisen in light of externalism about qualia (as defended by Dretske 1995, Lycan

1987; 1996; 2001). Briefly, if a quale is partly individuated by the subject’s environment,

then it seems one could not know that one had a quale of fire engine red unless one

antecedently knew the actual color of fire engines. But since the latter is not knowable

from the armchair, then it seems neither is the former (Levine 2003, Ellis 2007).

Another set of issues concerns the metaphysics of mind. Some have wondered if EXT

and SK absurdly allow armchair knowledge of Fodor’s (1975) Language of Thought

Hypothesis (Davies 1998). Others have suggested that the Language of Thought

Hypothesis falsifies SK, assuming EXT (Boghossian 1989, p. 6, Bonjour 1991). Finally,

some writers have worried that if one can know what one thinks, then one can

know that one thinks. If so, then the ability to armchair know one’s own thoughts would

too easily refute eliminativism about the mental (Dretske 2003a; 2003b; 2004, Bernecker

1998; 2004b; see also Jacob 2004).

Finally, there is a burgeoning literature on whether EXT is compatible with epistemic

internalism, the view that knowledge supervenes on what’s in the head (Pritchard &

Kallestrup 2004, Gerken 2008; also cf. Chase 2001, Brueckner 2002. Goldberg 2007a is

relevant as well). Many of the issues here turn on what kind of self-knowledge is allowed

by EXT, and in particular, whether such knowledge is discriminating enough for

justificatory purposes.

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Collections

Many works cited and further readings are found in the anthologies above: Boghossian

& Peacocke (2000), Frapolli & Romero (2003), Gertler (2003), Goldberg (2007c),

Hatzimoysis (2011), Ludlow & Martin (1998), Nuccetelli (2003), Schantz (2004),

Villanueva (1992; 1998), and Wright et al., (1998).

Other relevant collections include:

• Barber, A. (ed.), 2003, Epistemology of Language, New York: Oxford University

Press.

• Boghossian, P., 2008, Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers, New York

Oxford University Press.

• Brown, J. & M. Gerken, 2012, New Essays on Knowledge Ascriptions, New York:

Oxford University Press.

• Burge, T., 2006, Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays Vol. 2, Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

• Brueckner, A., 2010, Essays on Skepticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Cassam, Q. (ed.), 1994, Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Coliva, A. (ed.), 2012, The Self and Self-Knowledge, New York: Oxford

University Press.

• _____, (ed.), 2012, Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes on the Philosophy of

Crispin Wright, Oxford University Press.

• Davidson, D., 2002, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, New York: Oxford

University Press.

• Hahn, M. & B. Ramberg (eds.), 2004, Reflections and Replies: Essays on the

Philosophy of Tyler Burge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

• Marvan, T. (ed.), 2006, What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism

Dispute, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press.

• Pessin, A. & S. Goldberg (eds.), 1996, The Twin Earth Chronicles, Armonk, NY:

M.E. Sharpe.

• Smithies, D. & D. Stoljar (eds.), 2012, Introspection and Consciousness, New

York: Oxford University Press.

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Content Externalism

Copyright © 2012 by

T. Parent <parentt@vt.edu>

Notes to Externalism and Self-Knowledge

1. There is an unfortunate polysemy in the term ‘thought’. Often, a “thought” is a

contentful mental representation that is expressible by a declarative sentence. On other

occasions, a “thought” is merely the content per se of such a mental representation. Still

other times, a “thought” is only the vehicle for a content (as with the use of ‘thoughts’

that this note attaches to). Consequently, “thought” in the first sense denotes a composite

of a content and a vehicle. In the literature context normally makes clear which sense of

‘thought’ is intended on an occasion of use, and it is assumed that this holds for the

present discussion as well

2. We shall see that this formulation of EXT is too weak (in section 2.1), though it is a

standard formulation and suffices for present purposes.

3. Knowing “from the armchair” is knowing by means other than the five senses.

Knowing pure mathematics and knowing mental states via introspection are examples.

N.B., Macdonald (1995) helpfully separates two questions regarding SK: (q1) How is

armchair knowledge of content possible, given EXT, and (q2) How is it that my

knowledge of content is authoritative, given that it is gained from the armchair? This

entry is focused on (q1), though sometimes it is assumed by writers that a satisfactory

answer to (q1) must answer (q2) along the way.

4. This particular incompatibilist line is usually rejected, since it is agreed that the first

premise is dubious; see Burge 1988, p. 651, 654-655; Boghossian 1989, p. 12. One can

know what x is without knowing the enabling conditions that make such knowledge

possible. Still, this initial argument captures what is most basically at issue, especially in

slow switch arguments (section 3).

5. A “concept” here is understood to be a mental particular that has a content, which can

be joined in accord with compositional rules to form thoughts. N.B., the discussion varies

in speaking sometimes of the content of concepts, and other times of the content of

thoughts. But EXT as formulated concerns the content of both concepts and thoughts, and

the occasional variation in focus is assumed to be harmless.

6. ‘Twin water’ is stipulated be the English translation of the Twin English term ‘water’.

But ‘XYZ’ is not a strict translation of the Twin English term ‘water’ (just in the way that

‘H2O’ is not a strict synonym for ‘water’ in English). Consequently, since thought

attributions are standardly intensional, the sentence ‘I am thinking that water is wet’ in

Twin English ascribes the thought that I am thinking that twin water is wet. But it does

not ipso facto ascribe the thought I am thinking that XYZ is wet.

7. The Frege-Carnap thesis may be rejected by some, but it is this sort of idea which

underlies many of the thought-experiments. (Putnam 1975 is especially clear about this.)

8. In fact, water and other natural kinds can be problematic in illustrating the externalist’s

point; see Dupré (1981). But water will feature prominently here, since this is the

example most used in the literature.

9. Since Oscar and his twin are ignorant of chemistry, it should be clear that EXT applies

to the contents of Oscar’s de dicto or opaquely ascribed thoughts (in addition to de re or

transparently ascribed thoughts). Consider: Both Oscar and his twin assert ‘water is

scrumptious’—but given their ignorance, Oscar would not assert ‘H2O is scrumptious’

nor would his twin assert ‘XYZ is scrumptious’. Even so, the de dicto belief expressed by

‘water is scrumptious’ differs between the twins, since there are different thought

contents. Given only that Oscar refers to H2O and his twin refers to XYZ (albeit not

under those descriptions), the Frege-Carnap view already implies that the twins must

have different contents.

10. Ludlow himself uses ‘arugula’ in the example; however, I am told it is actually

‘endive’ that swaps extensions with ‘chicory’ between the dialects.

11. The term ‘water content’ refers to the content of the water concept, where the water

concept is the concept that is expressed in English by ‘water’. (And in line with note 6,

the water concept is assumed to be different from the H2O concept.)

12. Notably, McKinsey (2002; 2003; 2007) formulates another version of the reductio

which avoids the apriority of (1). Instead, McKinsey invokes the “closure of apriority;”

see section 2.3 for more.

13. The community disjunct from (4) is omitted for simplicity. Besides, EXT may require

water’s existence anyway in order for the community to obtain the water concept (Wright

2000, n. 4).

14. Boghossian first uses Dry Earth to show the thought-experiments do not need the

empirical premise that ‘water’ names a natural kind. Yet though this would support

apriority, Dry Earth also threatens the truth of (1). Thus Boghossian also uses Dry Earth

to oppose empty-concept externalism.

15. Segal formulates the Externalist’s dilemma slightly differently on p. 32ff : Either

deny that ‘unicorn’ expresses a concept, or allow it expresses a descriptive concept.

(Boghossian 1997 notes the “no concept” option as well.) Yet as Sawyer 2003 shows,

those choices are not exhaustive. In contrast, the above formulation indeed presents

exhaustive options.

16. Wright offers a “disjunctive template” to describe when transmission failure generally

occurs; similarly, Davies provides us two “limitation principles.” Besides the reductio,

these are also applied to Moorean anti-skeptical arguments, Putnam’s “brains-in-vats”

argument, and others. Wright’s template in particular has generated an interesting

literature, e.g., McLaughlin (2003), Brown (2004), Brueckner (2006). (See also

Kallestrup 2011 for some overview of the issues.) However, this material is omitted,

given that our interest in transmission is not so general; it concerns only the reductio.

17. As with (TW), an approximation here will do for introductory purposes. But n.b.,

Davies sometimes implies that the antecedent would have the *premises actually having a

warrant, besides being granted one. Relatedly, as we will see, Wright would have the

consequent saying that (3) is warranted, not just that it is assumed. Wright’s modification

makes for a notable difference; see the final paragraph of this section. But otherwise, the

two authors levy the presupposition-charge in roughly in the same way.

18. Hawthorne himself illustrates the point in relation to mathematical concepts, but this

has been changed to sofas to make apparent the relevance of his point.

19. It is important that Sawyer bases her externalism in a causal theory of content—and

as we saw at the start of section 2, such an externalism would seem to rob (1) of an

apriori status. So notably, Sawyer’s view that warrant can transmit to (3) in the deduction

may not even concern a purely apriori warrant.

20. The “self-referential” element seems absent from Davidson (1987; 1988) and Heil

(1988); they seem to describe how a second order judgment tracks the first order thought

in more causal terms. (It thus may be unfair to call Heil and Davidson infallibilists about

second-order judgments, since the causal connections might only hold ceteris paribus.)

21. Though we have discussed occurrent second-order judgments mainly via Burge’s

(1988) view, Boghossian’s (1992a) and (1994) are addressed to Heil (1988) and to

Davidson (1987; 1988), respectively. Boghossian’s official reply to Burge consists in the

memory argument, noted early in section 3.

22. Note that unlike the others, Braun thinks the purpose-relativity in ascribing “S knows

what x is” lies not in the semantics of the ascription, but rather in its pragmatics. The idea

is that goals or purposes do not affect the truth conditions of “S knows what x is,” but

rather affects under what conditions it is “felicitous” to assert such a sentence, vis-à-vis

Gricean norms of conversation.

23. Following Kaplan, it is becoming increasingly popular to call one’s metaphysics of

meaning a “metasemantics,” but this can be misleading. (It is not as if it is the metatheory

for a formal semantics, which is of interest in its own right. On that topic, the author

warmly recommends his dissertation.)

Copyright © 2012 by

T. Parent <parentt@vt.edu>