fabig newsletter issue 50 - fluidyn issu… · welcome to the 50th issue of the fabig newsletter....
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R609 EDITORIAL: FABIG Continues to Grow
Issue No 50 April 2008
www.fabig.comPublished by
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTA Methodology for Fire Hazard Assessment 7Internal Explosive Loading for Steel Pipes American Society of Safety Engineers –Middle East Chapter (ASSE-MEC)Conference in Bahrain addresses GloballyImportant Issues to the Oil and Gas Industry 40CONFERENCESConferences, Seminars and Courses
EDITORIALEditorial April 2008 FABIGFABIG Membership New FABIG Members 3Members of the FABIG Steering Committee for 2008-2009 5Improvements to the FABIG Website 6
PAGECONTENTS
NEW
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Silwood ParkAscot
Berkshire SL5 7QNUK
Tel: +44 (0) 1344 636 525Fax: +44 (0) 1344 636 570
E-mail: [email protected]://www.fabig.com
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Welcome to the 50th issue of the FABIG Newsletter. We are very pleased to announce that the FABIG membership is still growing both within the UK and internationally. FABIG has recently welcomed Technip, Fluidyn and Risky Business amongst its membership (see article 611) and now counts a record 74 member organisations. The cross industry and cross country sharing of knowledge will be facilitated by the continued technical and geographical expansion of the group which is beneficial to the whole membership.
The last Technical Meeting on “Dispersion Modelling” held on the 27th and 28th of February 2008 was very successful and attracted one of the largest audiences since the creation of FABIG with approximately 145 delegates attending the meeting over the two days.
The next event in the FABIG calendar is the Technical Meeting on “Asset Integrity and Hazard Management of Ageing Installations”. The meeting will be held on the 11th of June 2008 in London and on the 12th of June in Aberdeen. The programme is currently being finalised and will be available shortly on the website at www.fabig.com.
Following the last FABIG Steering Committee meeting held in February, we are planning to organise the following Technical Meetings during 2008-2009:
• Process Safety Performance Indicators (September)
• Industry Response and Change following Major Accidents (Joint workshop in
December)• Learning from the Nuclear Industry (March
or May)• Buncefield (March or May)
We are keen to hear about any projects or events relevant to the above topics that could be presented.
We feature 3 articles in this issue:
• RR614: A Methodology for Fire Hazard Assessment by Sirous Yasseri. This article outlines a methodology for the fire hazard assessment of offshore platforms supported by a case study
• RR615: Internal Explosive Loading of Steel Pipes by N. Rushton, G. Schleyer, A Clayton and S Thompson. This article presents the background and preliminary results of a study carried out to determine the failure mechanism of steel pipes subjected to very high rates of loading
• RR616: American Society of Safety Engineers – Middle East Chapter (ASSE-MEC) Conference in Bahrain addresses Globally Important Issues to the Oil and Gas Industry by Fadi Hamdan. This article describes the topics presented at the ASSE-MEC conference and focuses on one topic namely risk criteria and societal risk.
I would like to thank the authors of the articles and I look forward to meeting you at future Technical Meetings and other related events. Meanwhile, if you have any suggestions or comments on any FABIG deliverable or activities, please do not hesitate to contact me (Guillaume Vannier) at the SCI.
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FABIG MEMBERSHIP
Oil CompaniesBG Group LtdBPCentrica Storage LtdChevronExxon MobilGaz de FranceMaersk Oil & Gas ASMarathon Oil UK LtdShellStatoilHydroTotal E&P UK plcWoodside Energy
RegulatorHealth and Safety ExecutivePetroleum Safety Authority NorwayPort District Fire Services & Centre for Industrial Fire SafetyNOPSA
VerifierBureau VeritasDet Norske Veritas ASDet Norske Veritas LtdDet Norske Veritas PrincipiaLloyd’s Register of Shipping
Research / UniversityAalborg Universitet EsbjergHeriot-Watt University Imperial College of Science, Technology and MedicineIRSNKingston UniversityNorwegian University of Science & TechnologyUniversity of LeedsUniversity of LiverpoolUniversity of ManchesterUniversity of StrathclydeUniversity of SurreyUniversity of Ulster
Consultant / ContractorABS ConsultingAdvantica Technologies LtdAMEC Group LtdARUPAstonframe LtdAtkinsBaker Risk Europe LtdBMT Fluid Mechanics LtdCB & ICentury Dynamics LtdComputIT COWI (Consulting Engineers & Planners) ASDSC Engineering ASDuPont Engineering TechnologyESR Technology LtdFluidyn LtdForce TechnologyFrazer Nash Consultancy LtdGexCon ASHill Consultants LtdJGC CorporationMMI EngineeringPetrell asPetrelllus LimitedPetrofac Engineering LtdPoseidonProspect Flow SolutionsQinetiqRAMBØLLRisktec Solutions LtdRisky Business LtdSafetec Nordic ASSAUF Consulting LtdSBM Offshore N.V.Scandpower ASSherpa ConsultingTechnipVectra Group LtdVistek Engineering solutions
ManufacturerInternational Paint LtdMechTool Engineering Ltd
R610
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page �
Welcome to New FABIG MembersR611
For further information, please contact:
David BrownManaging DirectorRisky Business Ltd11 Downs ViewHolybourneAltonHampshire GU34 4HY
T: +44 (0) 1420 542 712E: [email protected] W: www.riskybusiness.bravehost.com
Risky Business Ltd is a small consultancy based in Hampshire, UK. The company provides safety engineering, risk management and reliability services to various industry sectors including Oil & Gas (Onshore and Offshore), Chemical, Nuclear, Rail and Defence.
ServicesA wide range of HSE services are offered including:
• Production of Safety Cases;• Performance of Safety Studies (such as Fire and Explosion
analysis, impact and dropped object studies, toxic and radio-active materials dispersion, escape evacuation and rescue analysis ERRA, ALARP studies, etc);
• Risk management including qualitative (using risk matrix approach) and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA);
• Reliability assessment of protection systems (e.g. High Integrity Pressure Protection, ‘HIPPs’, systems);
• SIL (Safety Integrity Levels) requirements to IEC 61508;• Safety management systems;• Hazard identification (HAZID, HAZOP, SWIFT, Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Functional Failure analysis (FFA));
• Consequence analysis including dispersion analysis, thermal radiation, blast effects, toxic and radio-active materials, missiles, etc;
• Frequency assessment using Fault and Event Tree (FTA and ETA) analysis.
StructureRisky Business is managed by Dr David Brown who is a Chartered Member of the Institution of Chemical Engineers and a registered Safety Specialist with the IChemE. David has many years experience in the fields of safety and risk management across several industry sectors. The company can also call on a range of associates with experience in many aspects of industrial safety and risk assessment.
For further information, please contact:
Laurent ParisTECHNIP France6-8, Allée de l’Arche – ZAC Danton92973 Paris La Défense CedexFrance
T: +33 (0) 1 47 78 53 85E: [email protected]: www.technip.com
With a workforce of 22,000 people, Technip ranks among the top five corporations in the field of oil, gas and petrochemical engineering, construction and services.
The Group’s headquarters are in Paris and its main operating centres and business units are located in France, Italy, Germany, the UK, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, the USA, Brazil, Abu-Dhabi, China, India, Malaysia and Australia.
In support of its activities, the Group manufactures flexible pipes and umbilicals, and builds offshore platforms in its manufacturing plants and fabrication yards in France, Brazil, the UK, the USA, Finland and Angola, and has a fleet of specialized vessels for pipeline installation and subsea construction.
The Health and Safety of persons and property are among the core values of Technip. In order to achieve its Health and Safety objectives, TECHNIP has set up several corporate guidelines that are fully followed by the HSE Design department.
The HSE Design department of TECHNIP France comprises 60 people and has extensive experience in Blast and Fire engineering. The main safety related activities of the department are as follows:
• Risk analysis : Plot review, HAZID, QRA, FMECA, Fault tree
• Safety engineering : F&G detection, Firewater network, PFP
• High performance simulation :• Hazards consequence modelling using CFD
(AUTOREAGAS, FDS) or phenomenological software
• Fire and Blast structural design using high fidelity physics finite element codes (ANSYS, LSDYNA 3D) or internally developed tools.
For many years the HSE Design department has developed a strong technological expertise in the field of consultancy for its industrial clients.
Page � FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
FLUIDYN offers engineering solutions and services based on the fluidyn series of 3D Computational Fluid Dynamics software developed in-house for modelling environmental impact assessment, industrial risk and multi-physics industrial processes.
The fluidyn series of industrial user-friendly software are used by consultants and industrial end-users worldwide for:
• Environmental Impact Assessment, Consequence analysis and Emergency Planning in case of accidental spills of dense gas, aerosol, radioactive products in atmosphere, surface and ground water.
• Real Time management of industrial accidents and internal security
• Ventilation, fires and explosions in industrial warehouses, parking, road/rail tunnels, stations.
• Noise impact from industries or traffic.• Process optimization, Fluid-Structure Interaction
(deformation / displacements), Heat Exchange, 2 phase flow, Combustion, Chemical Reaction, Electromagnetic field and Acoustics
Other consultancy services are proposed for HAZID, HAZOP, Fault-tree analysis, structural design (wave effect on bunds, blast, fire protection)…
The software families (all 3D CFD) are:
• fluidyn-PANACHE (including PANEPR for accidental release, PANEIA for impact, PANFIRE for thermal radiation, ASSESSRISK for petrochemical risk management, PANWAVE for wave effects, PANAIR for urban and regional air quality)
• f l u idyn -VENTIL (VENTCLIM, VENTEX, VENTUNNEL, for confined ventilation and dispersion, explosion, tunnel geometries/ventilation)
• fluidyn-FLOWSOL (FLOWOIL, FLOPOL, FLOWSED, FLOWRIV for surface water dispersion of oil slick or miscible pollutants and erosion/sediment transport, flooding risks and POLLUSOL for underground saturated/unsaturated transport).
• fluidyn-dB (dB, ROADdB, AVNOISE for noise pollution due to industrial sites, road traffic and airports) FLUIDYN offers engineering solutions and services based on the fluidyn series of 3D Computational Fluid Dynamics software developed in-house for modelling environmental impact assessment, industrial risk and multi-physics industrial processes.
References
Alcan, AREVA Group, Aker Kvaerner, CEA (French Atomic Energy Commission), Brent City Council, British Petroleum, Johnson Control, Mitsubishi Chemicals, NEXTER, SANOFI Aventis, SECHAUD Environment, Solvay, Stoke on Trent City Council, Sumitomo, TNO-Holland, WESTLAKES Consultancy.
For further information, please contact:
Fluidyn 15/17, Belwell LaneFour Oaks, SUTTON ColdfieldWest Midlands B74 4AAUKT: +44 (0) 1213 088 168F: +44 (0) 1213 232 009E: [email protected]: www.fluidyn.com
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page 5
Role of the FABIG Steering Committee
The FABIG Steering Committee (SC) is made up from representatives from the FABIG member organisations and spans the different categories of membership to ensure that all stakeholders are adequately represented. A flexible approach is adopted to membership of the Steering Committee with two overriding principles – the willingness of individuals to attend the meetings and contribute to the Steering Committee as set out below and the need to maintain the Committee at a size that ensures efficient functioning of the Committee (typically around 10).
The Steering Committee meets at least twice a year and is responsible for overseeing FABIG’s activities through the following specific functions:
• Overseeing the income, expenditure and management of FABIG funds in accordance with the aims of FABIG.
• Monitoring progress of FABIG deliverables against time and cost.
• Advising the FABIG management team on relevant issues that are facing the industry to ensure that FABIG remains topical by addressing those within its remit and budgets.
• Advising the FABIG management team on subjects to be addressed by FABIG in future Technical Meetings, Newsletters and Technical Notes and on suitable contributors.
• Reviewing FABIG Technical Notes.• Overseeing the content and development of the website.• Notifying the FABIG management team of research
initiative that may be relevant to the FABIG membership.• Advising the FABIG management team on proposals
for joint initiatives with other organisations relevant to FABIG.
• Assisting in the growth of the FABIG membership through providing leads and introductions.
Current Members of the FABIG SC
The list of current Members of the FABIG Steering Committee is published on the FABIG website and terms of reference for the FABIG Steering Committee will be uploaded soon. We are also planning to publish the list of the FABIG Steering Committee Members once a year for your reference in the Newsletter at the beginning of the financial year. The Members of the FABIG Steering Committee for 2008-2009 are as follows:
• Phil Cleaver / Mike Johnson Advantica• Jens Kristian Holen StatoilHydro• Asmund Huser Det Norske Veritas• Wilbert Lee Chevron• Jan Pappas Scandpower AS• David Piper Marathon OiL• Terry Rhodes Shell• Bob Simpson HSE• Vincent Tam BP
Members of the FABIG Steering Committee for �008-�009
R612
For further information, please contact:
Guillaume VannierFABIG Project ManagerSCISilwood ParkAscotBerkshire SL5 7QN
Tel: +44 (0) 1344 636 550Email: [email protected]
Page � FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Finding and ordering FABIG publications online
We have carried out some modifications to improve the functionality of the part of the website dealing with publications. The section of the website originally named ‘Deliverables’ has been renamed ‘Publications’ for clarity.
A new feature of the Publications section is the functionality for ordering publications online (more likely to be used by non FABIG members). As a reminder, website users can access from this section abstracts of all the following publications:
• Interim Guidance Notes
• Technical Notes
• Technical Meeting Reviews
• Newsletters
Whereas non-members will only be able to access abstracts, any member of staff from a company member can register on the FABIG website and access all the FABIG Technical Notes, Technical Meeting Reviews and Newsletters from this section of the website.
Suggest topics for future Technical Meetings
In order to encourage the membership to become more involved in FABIG activities, we have implemented a feature enabling delegates to suggest topics for future FABIG events when registering online to FABIG Technical Meetings. They will be able to do so by filling the text box located at the middle of the page summarising the event and personal details entered as shown in Figure 613.1.
Please do not hesitate to contact me (Guillaume Vannier) directly by email or by phone with any feedback or suggestions (see contact details at the end of this article).
Coming soon – What’s New page
As part of the continual improvements to the website, a ‘What’s New’ page will be implemented shortly on the website. This page will be accessible from the homepage as well as throughout the FABIG website and will enable you to obtain in one click the latest information on FABIG activities and publications.
Improvements to the FABIG websiteR613
Fig 613.1: Interface for suggesting topics for future events
For further information, please contact:
Guillaume VannierFABIG Project ManagerSCISilwood ParkAscotBerkshire SL5 7QN
Tel: +44 (0) 1344 636 550Email: [email protected]
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page �
A Methodology For Fire Hazard AssessmentR614
Research & Development
Abstract
This paper outlines a methodology for the fire hazard assessment of offshore platforms. The assessment process is described using a case study.
Abbreviations
BD BlowdownBLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour ExplosionDHSV Down Hole Safety ValveESD Emergency ShutdownHP High PressureKO Knock Out DrumLER Low Electrical RoomLP Low PressureLQ Living QuarterLV Level Control ValveMOL Main Oil LineMV Master ValvePDQ Production, Drilling and QuartersPFD Process Flow DiagramP&ID Piping and Instrument DiagramPWV Production Wing ValveTEMPSC Totally enclosed motor propelled survival craftTR Temporary RefugeSBW Stand by VesselXXVS Emerge
Introduction
This paper details the result of a case study of fire hazard for a platform comprising living quarters, drilling and process units (PDQ) which contain significant quantities of oil and gas. The assessment identifies credible fire hazards associated with production and export operations for the associated facilities and utilities on the PDQ platform. From the credible fire hazards, specific design fire events can be selected which define the required performance of the active and passive fire protection systems.
Using a case study, the author demonstrates a systematic fire hazard assessment method and shows how to identify the major fire hazard areas and management measures for mitigation.
The objectives of this paper are to:• outline a methodology for systematic fire hazard
assessment • show how all credible fire scenarios can be identified
• estimate the consequences of ignited flammable liquid and gas releases
• ensure that arrangements are in place to prevent, control and mitigate these events
The significant fire hazards are:• jet, or pool fires from the oil production flowlines;• jet, or pool fires from the HP and LP production
manifolds;• jet, or pool fire from the HP and LP separators;• jet, or pool fires from the oil booster pumps;• jet, or pool fires from the MOL pumps;• jet fires from the gas injection and gas lift manifolds;• jet, or liquid fires from the test separator;• drilling or production blowout at the drilling rig floor
or well completions unit; • Helicopter engine fire during personnel transfer (Not
covered in this study).
Riser hazards will form a major fire hazard risk. Potential fire hazards arising from risers and options for their mitigation are not discussed in this article.
Methodology
GeneralThe assessment consists of the following steps:
1. Fire hazard identification i.e. jet fire, pool fire, etc.,2. Estimate hydrocarbon inventories based on isolatable
sections (XXVs to XXVs),3. Define locations and facilities for control and mitigation
using P&IDs, PFDs, Plot plans and other relevant design details,
4. Define characteristic release sizes to be used in the assessment,
5. Based on the releases described above, define the characteristics of jet fires, predict flames’ length and decay with time taking into account no-blowdown and blowdown conditions,
6. Review the effects of jet, pool fire events,7. Review the fire protection measures in place, based on
the above, 8. Make recommendations to reduce the risk.
Event IdentificationThere are a large number of fire events that could potentially occur. These range from small electrical fires to large process fires. The assessment focused on those fire events that could have a significant effect on the overall risk levels to personnel, either directly or by escalation (i.e. hydrocarbon fires).
Accordingly, process and utility systems with an inventory of flammable liquids greater than 5m3 and with a flash point below
Page 8 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & Development
55°C are included in the assessment. This cut-off is consistent with IP15 [1].
Process system The process flow diagrams with associated XXVs are shown in figures 614.1 and 614.2. The isolatable process sections assessed together with their relevant locations, dimensions, volumes, temperatures and pressures are listed in Table 614.1. The quantities, pressure and temperature of the relevant hydrocarbon inventories are taken from PFDs, P&IDs and relevant equipment data sheets.
Release ScenariosFour leak sizes (5, 18, 50 & 100 mm) are considered. These sizes are considered to represent all credible releases due to failure scenarios.
Jet fire analysis Each release size (as described in the previous paragraph) is analysed on the basis of an immediate ignition. For a gas release, the extent of the flame length is evaluated using the computer program PHAST [7]. Initial flame length is assessed at the maximum inventory pressure. Flame decays after the start of the ESD are assessed for 5, 15, 30 and 60 minutes duration for Blowdown and no-Blowdown cases.
Oil ReleasesHaving identified the process inventories it is possible to estimate the size and duration of the associated release events. An inventory of less than 5m3 is unlikely to achieve a pool fire, to cause a BLEVE or provide a fire causing damage to the structural system which could lead to escalation. Consequently this study considers releases from sections with a sizeable inventory (i.e. greater than 5m3). Therefore the following sections which contain oil are not considered:
Section 1 - Production well (DHSV-MV) (for each production well)Section 2 - Production well (MV-PWV) (for each production well)Section 5 - Test manifold
Oil release events are only determined for the start of an event, with the duration of a release being estimated based on the liquid inventory and assuming the process isolation is successful.
Oil release calculations have been determined using Bernoulli’s equation [6]. The liquid release rate is assumed to remain constant until the liquid inventory has depleted; this is a simplification and the release rate will decline with the loss in pressure over time. Releases have been determined for four hole-sizes 5, 18, 50 and 100mm.
The effect of gas Blowdown which reduces the pressure in isolatable sections, thus reducing the driving force for any oil release, has not been accounted for in this study. It is recognised that this will reduce the release rates, but increase the release duration.
•
•
•
The results are detailed in Table 614.2.
Pool FiresA pool fire is a burning horizontal pool of vaporising hydrocarbon, where the fuel has very little momentum. However it should be noted that the fuel pool is not necessarily static and can spread or contract with respect to the release rate of the hydrocarbon and its burning rate. A pool fire takes time to develop and cannot be quickly eliminated by isolating the fuel supply alone.
The model predicts the duration of the fire and the pool diameter. The pool of hydrocarbon will reach an equilibrium diameter; this equilibrium is reached when the fuel release rate is equal to the burning rate of that particular fuel. Hence the pool will no longer spread, due to the fuel undergoing combustion at the same rate as the fuel is supplied to the pool. The fire duration is taken to be equal to the release duration due to the action of open drains removing liquid from the forming oil pool. If the release occurs into an area with a curb surround to the size of the resulting pool will be physically constrained.
According to pool fire tests carried out [6], the heat flux from a pool fire to an engulfed target was up to 160kW/m2. The main trend was that heat fluxes were very low below the hot smoke layer, increasing to about 160kW/m2 inside the layer.
Most of the potential pool fires will originate from fires restricted by curbs below vessels and large equipment items and will have local impinging effects on the equipment and pipework. However, no directional probability or reduction of heat flux due to flame diluted on impact to equipment is taken into account. The pool fire sizes based on the release rates results are detailed in Tables 614.2 and 614.3.
Location of critical/hazardous equipmentEquipment and piping containing hydrocarbon gas or liquid are considered as hazardous items. Using plot plans and PFDs (Figures 614.1 to 614.7) the locations of the items on each deck are identified and assessed based on their relevant inventories and time of decays. Similarly target areas that could cause escalation when subjected to a jet fire are identified and summarised in Table 614.4.
Identification of Fire Hazards
GeneralIt is necessary to determine those fire events that will have significant effects on the overall risk levels. The major types of fires are reviewed below.
The fire types present on the installation are:
• Process events;• Well events, such as blowouts;• Chemical Fire;• Accommodation and electrical fire;
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Research & Development
Process Fires The process and drilling areas of the platforms are subdivided into fire areas. Escalation of an initial fire or explosion to adjacent isolatable sections within a fire area is minimised by control (i.e. isolation and Blowdown) and mitigation (fire fighting and vessel / structural fire protection) measures.
Well FiresDue to the large numbers of wells involved and the intention to carry out simultaneous drilling and production operations, the likelihood and consequences of events is assessed as part of this study.
Blow-out
The platform wellbay area includes provision for production as well as gas and water injection, and cuttings re-injection wells. This assessment is based on 42 production wells with 6 gas injection wells.
A conventional Christmas tree is provided on each well with hydraulically actuated master and wing valves. In addition a hydraulically actuated sub-surface down-hole safety valve (DHSV) will be installed to provide isolation of each well.
On gas injection wells, down-hole annular safety valves will be provided, which will enable the annulus to be isolated and prevent flow of lift gas, or production fluid via the annulus to the topsides.
There is a potential for blowouts to occur during development drilling, production and during workover operations on the wells. A blow-out scenario is the result of loss of well control and the loss of containment of well and reservoir fluids.
The flow rate from an uncontrolled well blowout and the potential size of an ignited release means that escalation to surrounding wellheads is likely, the rig conducting the well entry operation and plant at weather deck level.
For the purposes of this assessment a conservative estimate of the blowout rate of 5 times the production rate. Based on a 35,000 barrel a day well this equates to 275kg/s.
Chemical FiresBased on the guidance IP of Model Code of Safe Practice Part 15, chemicals with flash points greater than 55°C have not been considered in this assessment. They are classified as Class III [1], and are handled below their flash points and hence are not considered as a fire risk.
The only chemical identified with flash point below 55ºC is methanol. Methanol tank (T-42020) is located on the Cellar deck. The container volume is about 20m3.
Methanol FiresThe methanol storage tank and injection pumps are located on the Weather Deck level on PDQ, with the main chemical injection package. The tank contains approximately 19m3 (at atmospheric pressure) of methanol. The methanol is injected
into lines to prevent hydrate formation.
Methanol fire is considered to cause only localised damage if not controlled and escalation to other areas or impairing the escape routes is extremely unlikely.
The fire protection arrangements include a mobile trolley containing alcohol resistance foam to enable local fire fighting for ignited small spills and hydrant outlets.
Methanol tote tanks are used only for transfer purpose and each has capacity of approximately 4.5m3. There is a bund around this area and is provided with a drainage system. The fire escalation event is considered extremely unlikely.
Accommodation and Electrical FiresAccommodation fires can arise in the cabins, galley or laundry areas due to smoking in non-smoking areas, equipment malfunction or unsafe practices. Electrical fires could result from equipment malfunction or unsafe practices. However, the consequences of these fires are greatly reduced by the small amounts of fire fuel available. Safeguards are specified in-line with common practice.
Sea Surface FiresSea surface fires are only considered feasible following ignition of a major hydrocarbon release such as failure of a separator, a well blowout or failure of the oil export line. In extreme cases these scenarios could result in a sea fire that may exceed TR survivability times and lead to structural collapse of the platform.
Small releases from the separators will be collected via drain boxes and routed via the drain lines to the Open Drains Caisson. Major releases however will overload the open drain system and be routed overboard either via the deluge overflow lines or flowing over the edge of the deck. The open drain and deluge overflow systems are designed to prevent the discharge of burning oil.
Inventories and Fire Calculations
Basis for Inventory and Fire Size CalculationsThe basis of this assessment concerning the number of wells in operations and the links to the manifolds are as follows:
• There are 42 well slots that are assumed to be in operation; 21 are linked to the HP manifold and 21 to the LP manifold;
• 24 production wells are considered to be aided by gas lift;
• 6 gas injection wells are in operation;• 1 well is considered to be linked to the test manifold,
with operation considered to occur all the time.
The inventory of small process units has been estimated based on typical data. In particular the following estimates have been made:
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Research & Development
• heat exchangers inventories have a nominal volume of 0.5m3;
• pump inventories have a nominal volume of 0.5m3;• compressor inventories have a nominal volume of
1m3;• filter inventories have a nominal volume of 0.5m3.
The splits between oil, gas and water for certain vessels have been estimated based on normal operating conditions. In particular the separators inventories are taken as oil, gas and water in a 1:1:1 by volume ratio.
Sections inventories and their locations are summarised in Table 614.2. The corresponding fire sizes assessments are listed in Table 614.2.
Flames length calculated for isolation and Blowdown cases are based upon the isolated inventory being depressurised to below 7 barg within 15 minutes. BD orifice diameters have been sized accordingly.
Relevant Safety Systems
Blowdown SystemBlowdown system is primarily provided to prevent equipment from pressure rupture in the event of fire. The design of the blowdown is to depressurise the hydrocarbon gas inventories to below 100PSIG (6.9Barg) within 15 minutes. This is in accordance with API521 design code [3].
To maintain a high reliability and availability on demand for XXVs and BD system, regular proof testing of all components within the system must be carried out.
It is also important that the internal leak rates through sea line XXVs be as low as possible. This study is carried out based on negligible internal leaks from XXVs and LVs.
Guidelines SI 1029 [4] suggests that an internal leak rate less than 1kg/min XXVs is considered acceptable. Similarly for LVs with designated XXVs functions an internal leak rate of less than 0.3ml/min per inch of pipe ID is suggested as acceptable. The rates larger than these needs to be justified by a further fire risk assessment.
Detection/Protection Systems, Emergency Response & Escape Routes
Detection SystemFire and gas detection system will provide automatic monitoring, alert personnel of potentially hazardous situations, and allow executive actions to be manually or automatically initiated in order to minimise the risk of escalation.
Passive Fire ProtectionPassive fire protection is generally applied to platform members and process equipment with risk of being exposed to a jet fire which may cause structural failure and where the use of active
fire protection may be ineffective or not practical.
The fire protection is to be provided to achieve protection of certain structural steel, fire/blast walls, bulkheads and equipment in order to:
• prevent further release of inventory due to failure under fire conditions of selected hydrocarbon carrying vessels for a specified period;
• prevent structural damage or failure which could lead to escalation of events or impairment of any safety system functions for a specified period;
• prevent structural damage or failure, which could lead to impairment of escape and evacuation, for a specified period.
• protect the asset such that production can be restarted following a small fire with minimum delay.
The results of findings from this Fire Hazard Assessment study summarised in Table 614.4 are utilised to assess PFP design requirement.
Active fire protectionThe deluge systems are generally provided in all process areas. Deluge is generally used to cool the equipment items to prevent escalation.
Conclusions
Hydrocarbon inventories based on isolatable sections (i.e. XXVs to XXVs) were marked on PFDs and plot plans. Potential fire scenarios were identified. The escalations due to fire were assessed based on the flames’ length and decay with time. These decays were based on no blowdown and blowdown cases. The blowdown orifice diameter for each section was calculated based on the principle that all isolatable sections can be blown down to 6.9 barg or less within 15 minutes.
For an ignited gas release, the sections taking the longest time to decay to unstable or no flame (after a successful blowdown) are gas dehydration, slug catcher, first stage compression, and fuel gas dehydration. In all areas after a successful BD the flame will decay to no or low momentum flame within 15 minutes.
HP vessels at full pressure if exposed to direct jet fire could rupture within 12 minutes and result in escalation. Stress analysis studies carried out for vessel rupture when subjected to a jet fire suggests that the applied stress is lower than the material yield stress during the whole history of the fire i.e. no rupture for BD cases. This is due to the fact that:
• vessel is designed with a design stress factor (tensile strength / yield stress) of 1.5 for carbon steel;
• vessel operates with a margin between the design and the operating pressures;
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Research & Development
• ‘required’ vessel strength falls with time as the vessel pressure drops due to blowdown considerations.
References
1. IP15, Model Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum Industry, Part 15: Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations
2. Oreda-19943. API 521Guide for Pressure Relieving and Depressurising
Systems4. Guidance notes in support of the offshore installations
(emergency pipeline valve) Regulation 1989:SI 1029, Pub. Dept Energy
5. ANSI B16-104-19766. SINTEF, Handbook for Fire Calculation and Fire Risk
Assessment in the Process Industry, 19927. PHAST, DNV Software for consequence analyses
Acknowledgements
Any resemblance of the case study in this paper is coincidental and it does not represent any existing of planned installation. However, data from actual projects are used to make the case study relevant to the safety professionals. The Tables were prepared by Dr R. Atarzadeh and drawings were produced by Stan Burgess whose contributions are gratefully acknowledged. The author would like to acknowledge reviewers Guillaume
For further information, please contact:
Sirous YasseriKBR Engineering
T: +44 (0) 1372 865226F: +44 (0) 1372 865114E: [email protected]
Page 1� FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & DevelopmentSe
ctio
nN
o.Se
ctio
nD
escr
iptio
nEq
uipm
ent
Loca
tion
Dim
ensi
ons
Volu
me
(m3 )
Con
tent
s (m
3 )Pr
essu
re(b
arg)
Tem
pera
ture
(°C
)G
as
Oil
Wat
er1
Prod
uctio
n w
ell
(DH
SV-M
V)
Con
duct
orSu
bsea
to W
ellb
ay6”
pip
e (5
0m lo
ng)
0.9
0.6
0.3
6043
TOTA
L0.
90.
60.
30.
02
Prod
uctio
n W
ell
(MV-
PWV
)W
ellh
ead
Mez
zani
ne to
Dec
kN
ote
260
43TO
TAL
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3H
P M
anifo
ld/
Sepa
rato
rs
(Not
e 4)
Flow
lines
Cel
lar D
eck
21 le
ngth
s of 6
” pi
pe (5
m
long
)2.
01.
40.
660
43
HP
man
ifold
Cel
lar D
eck
20”
pipe
(30m
long
)6.
14.
31.
860
43H
P se
para
tor (
V-21
110)
Wea
ther
Dec
k12
m x
3.4
m10
8.9
36.3
36.3
36.3
6043
HP
sepa
rato
r (V-
2121
0)W
eath
er D
eck
12m
x 3
.4m
108.
936
.336
.336
.360
43Te
st S
epar
ator
(V-1
3010
)W
eath
er D
eck
9m x
2.1
m31
.210
.410
.410
.460
4318
” W
et G
as L
ine
Wea
ther
Dec
k18
” pi
pe (8
0m lo
ng)
13.3
13.3
0.0
0.0
6043
Gas
pip
elin
e pi
g la
unch
er (V
-360
10)
Mez
zani
ne/W
eath
er D
eck
Not
e 1
TOTA
L27
0.4
102.
085
.483
.04
LP M
anifo
ld/
Sepa
rato
rs
(Not
e 4)
Flow
lines
Cel
lar D
eck
21 le
ngth
s of 6
” pi
pe (5
m
long
)1.
90.
71.
225
32
LP m
anifo
ldC
ella
r Dec
k16
” pi
pe (3
0m lo
ng)
3.9
1.5
2.4
2532
LP se
para
tor (
V-21
120)
Wea
ther
Dec
k15
m x
3.8
m17
0.1
56.7
56.7
56.7
2532
LP se
para
tor (
V-21
220)
Wea
ther
Dec
k15
m x
3.8
m17
0.1
56.7
56.7
56.7
2532
TOTA
L34
6.0
115.
611
7.0
113.
45
Test
man
ifold
Flow
lines
Cel
lar D
eck
1 le
ngth
of 6
” pi
pe (5
m
long
)0.
10.
10.
060
43
Test
Man
ifold
Cel
lar D
eck
8” p
ipe
(30m
long
)1.
00.
70.
360
43TO
TAL
1.1
0.8
0.3
0.0
6Fl
ash
gas
com
pres
sion
(T
rain
1)
Flas
h ga
s suc
tion
drum
(V-3
1110
)W
eath
er D
eck
1.7m
x 3
.6m
8.2
8.2
2442
Flas
h ga
s com
pres
sor (
C-3
1121
)W
eath
er D
eck
1.0
1.0
2442
Flas
h ga
s com
p. d
isch
arge
. coo
ler
(X-3
1140
)W
eath
er D
eck
0.5
0.5
5912
5
TOTA
L9.
79.
70.
00.
07
Flas
h co
mpr
essi
on
(Tra
in 2
)
Flas
h ga
s suc
tion
drum
(V-3
1210
)W
eath
er D
eck
1.7m
x 3
.6m
8.2
8.2
2442
Flas
h ga
s com
pres
sor (
C-3
1221
)W
eath
er D
eck
1.0
1.0
2442
Flas
h ga
s com
p. d
isch
arge
. coo
ler
(X-3
1240
)W
eath
er D
eck
0.5
0.5
5912
5
TOTA
L9.
79.
70.
00.
0
Tabl
e:61
4.1:
Sec
tion
Inve
ntor
ies
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page 1�
Research & DevelopmentSe
ctio
n N
o.Se
ctio
n D
escr
iptio
nEq
uipm
ent
Loca
tion
Dim
ensi
ons
Volu
me
(m3 )
Con
tent
s (m
3 )Pr
essu
re(b
arg)
Tem
pera
ture
(˚C
)G
asO
ilW
ater
8O
il ex
port
MO
L pu
mp
(P-2
4120
)C
ella
r Dec
k0.
50.
525
43M
OL
pum
p (P
-242
20)
Cel
lar D
eck
0.5
0.5
2543
Oil
boos
ter p
ump
(P-2
4110
)C
ella
r Dec
k0.
50.
530
42O
il bo
oste
r pum
p (P
-242
10)
Cel
lar D
eck
0.5
0.5
3042
GU
EST
Plat
form
oil
pipe
line
pig
rece
iver
(V-2
0010
)M
ezza
nine
Dec
kN
ote
1
Oil
pipe
line
pig
laun
cher
(V-2
4080
)M
ezza
nine
Dec
kN
ote
1Pr
oces
s lin
eC
ella
r/Mez
zani
ne D
eck
30”
pipe
(30m
long
)3.
83.
830
42TO
TAL
5.8
0.0
5.8
0.0
9G
as li
ft m
anifo
ldFl
owlin
eM
ezza
nine
Dec
k20
leng
ths o
f 3”p
ipe
(5m
long
)0.
50.
515
045
Gas
lift
man
ifold
/con
nect
ion
Mez
zani
ne D
eck
6” p
ipe
(100
m lo
ng)
1.8
1.8
150
45
TOTA
L2.
32.
310
Gas
lift
(PW
V-D
HSV
)C
ondu
ctor
Subs
ea to
Wel
lbay
Ann
ulus
5-6
” pi
pe (5
0m
long
)0.
30.
315
045
TOTA
L0.
30.
30.
00.
011
Gas
inje
ctio
n m
anifo
ldG
as in
ject
ion
man
ifold
/con
nect
ion
Mez
zani
ne D
eck
20”
pipe
(170
m lo
ng)
3434
00
380
45TO
TAL
3434
12G
as sl
ug c
atch
er(P
WV-
MV
)Fr
om n
eigh
bour
ing
plat
form
sC
ella
r Dec
k3m
x 9
m41
.771
.753
25TO
TAL
41.7
71.7
0.0
0.0
13G
as in
ject
ion
(MV-
DH
SV)
Con
duct
orSu
bsea
to W
ellb
ay6”
pip
e (5
0m lo
ng)
0.9
0.9
380
45TO
TAL
0.9
0.9
0.0
0.0
14PD
Q fu
el g
asFu
el g
as K
O d
rum
(V-4
8010
)C
ella
r Dec
k2.
1m x
5.5
m19
.019
.57
.343
Fuel
gas
hea
ter (
EEH
-480
20)
Cel
lar D
eck
0.5
0.5
57.3
43Fu
el g
as h
eate
r (EE
H-4
8030
)C
ella
r Dec
k0.
50.
557
.343
TOTA
L20
.020
.00.
00.
0
Tabl
e 61
4.1:
Sec
tion
Inve
ntor
ies (
cont
inue
d)
Not
es fo
r Ta
ble
614.
1:N
ote
1: T
his e
quip
men
t is n
orm
ally
isol
ated
dur
ing
oper
atio
n; h
ence
is n
ot c
onsi
dere
d fu
rther
in th
is F
ire R
isk
Ass
essm
ent
Not
e 2:
The
inve
ntor
y of
this
item
is sm
all;
henc
e is
not
con
side
red
furth
er.
Not
e 3:
The
sect
ions
1, 2
and
5 a
re b
ased
on
the
syst
em b
eing
tied
to a
HP
wel
l.N
ote
4: In
vent
ory
for a
sepa
rato
r rel
ease
is to
tal o
f “se
para
tor”
, “m
anifo
ld”
etc.
; inv
ento
ry a
vaila
ble
for a
man
ifold
rele
ase
is re
stric
ted
to “
man
ifold
s” a
nd “
flow
line
s”
Page 1� FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & DevelopmentSe
ctio
n N
o.Se
ctio
n D
escr
iptio
nC
ase
Hol
e si
ze
(mm
)R
elea
se R
ate
(kg/
s) a
t Tim
e (m
in)
Flam
e Le
ngth
(m) a
t Tim
e (m
in)
05
1560
05
1560
3H
P m
anifo
ld/s
epar
ator
sTo
tal i
nven
tory
= 2
70.4
m3
Gas
- 6,
000k
gO
il - 7
0,00
0kg
Wat
er -
80,0
00kg
P at
star
t = 6
0 ba
raTe
mp
= 43
Deg
.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.18
0.09
0.02
-7.
55.
52.
8-
182.
320.
950.
17-
23.4
15.7
7.3
-50
17.9
2.02
--
58.0
22.0
--
100
71.6
--
-10
7.4
--
-Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
50.
180.
180.
170.
157.
57.
57.
36.
918
2.32
1.91
1.29
0.23
23.4
21.4
18.0
8.4
5017
.93.
98-
-58
.029
.7-
-10
071
.6-
--
107.
4-
--
4LP
man
ifold
/sep
arat
ors
Tota
l inv
ento
ry =
346
m3
Gas
- 2,
400k
gO
il - 9
6,00
0kg
Wat
er -
110,
000k
g21
0,00
0KP
at st
art =
25
bara
Tem
p =
32 D
eg.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.08
0.05
0.02
-5.
24.
22.
8-
181.
070.
620.
2-
16.6
13.0
7.9
-50
8.22
1.84
--
41.0
21.1
--
100
32.9
--
-76
.0-
--
Isol
atio
n an
d N
o B
low
dow
n5
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.07
5.2
5.2
5.2
4.9
181.
070.
930.
70.
216
.615
.613
.77.
950
8.22
2.79
--
41.0
25.4
--
100
32.9
--
-76
.0-
--
6Fl
ash
gas c
ompr
essi
on (T
rain
1)In
vent
ory
= 9.
7m3 =
190
kgP
at st
art =
24
bara
Tem
p =
42 D
eg.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.08
0.04
0.02
-5.
23.
82.
8-
181.
010.
13-
-16
.16.
5-
-50
7.78
--
-40
.0-
--
100
31.1
--
-74
.1-
--
Isol
atio
n an
d N
o B
low
dow
n5
0.08
0.07
0.05
0.02
5.2
4.9
4.2
2.8
181.
010.
19-
-16
.17.
7-
-50
7.78
--
-40
.0-
--
100
31.1
--
-74
.1-
--
Tabl
e 61
4.2:
Gas
Rel
ease
Rat
es/F
lam
e L
engt
hs
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page 15
Research & Development
Sect
ion
No.
Sect
ion
Des
crip
tion
Cas
eH
ole
Size
(mm
)R
elea
se R
ate
(kg/
s) a
t Tim
e (m
in)
Flam
e Le
ngth
(m) a
t Tim
e (m
in)
05
1530
600
515
3060
7Fl
ash
gas c
ompr
essi
on
(Tra
in 2
)In
vent
ory
= 9.
7m3 =
190K
gP
at st
art =
24
bara
Tem
p =
42 D
eg.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.08
0.04
0.02
-5.
23.
82.
8-
181.
010.
13-
--
16.1
6.5
--
507.
78-
--
40.0
--
-10
031
.1-
--
74.1
--
-Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
50.
080.
070.
050.
025.
24.
94.
22.
818
1.01
0.19
--
16.1
7.7
--
507.
78-
--
40.0
--
-10
031
.1-
--
74.1
--
--
9G
as li
ft m
anifo
ldIn
vent
ory
= 2.
3m3 =
300K
gP
at st
art =
150
bar
aTe
mp
= 45
Deg
.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.45
0.08
8-
--
10.6
4.82
--
-18
5.78
--
--
36-
--
-50
44.6
--
--
95.8
--
--
100
178
--
--
186.
0-
--
Isol
atio
n an
d N
o B
low
dow
n5
0.45
0.6
0.08
--
10.6
8.1
4.9
--
185.
78-
--
-36
.0-
--
-50
44.6
--
--
95.8
--
--
100
178
--
--
186
--
--
11G
as in
ject
ion
man
ifold
Inve
ntor
y =
34m
3 =
9600
Kg
P at
star
t = 3
80 b
ara
Tem
p =
45 D
eg. C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
1.13
0.29
--
-16
.48.
5-
--
1814
.52.
4-
--
55.9
24-
--
5011
2-
--
-14
9-
--
-10
045
2-
--
-29
1-
--
-Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
51.
131.
121
0.9
0.73
16.4
15.5
1514
1218
14.5
9.05
3.5
0.84
-55
.944
.728
.214
.8-
5011
2-
--
-14
9-
--
-10
045
2-
--
-29
1-
--
-12
Slug
Cat
cher
on
the
neig
hbou
ring
plat
form
sIn
vent
ory
= 41
.7m
3 =
2072
Kg
P =
53 b
ara
Tem
p =
25 d
eg. C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.16
0.08
0.02
--
7.4
5.4
3.0
--
182.
110.
740.
1-
-23
.514
.97.
0-
-50
16.4
--
--
58.3
--
--
100
65.1
--
--
106
--
--
Isol
atio
n an
d N
o B
low
dow
n5
0.16
0.15
40.
151.
380.
113
7.4
7.3
7.1
6.7
6.3
182.
111.
440.
690.
21-
23.5
20.0
14.5
8.9
-50
16.4
--
--
58.3
--
--
100
65.1
--
--
106
--
--
Tabl
e 61
4.2:
Gas
Rel
ease
Rat
es/F
lam
e L
engt
hs (c
ontin
ued)
Page 1� FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & DevelopmentSe
ctio
n N
o.Se
ctio
n D
escr
iptio
nC
ase
Hol
e Si
ze
(mm
)R
elea
se R
ate
(kg/
s) a
t Tim
e (m
in)
Flam
e Le
ngth
(m) a
t Tim
e (m
in)
05
1530
600
515
3060
14Fu
el g
as sy
stem
for
the
inst
alla
tion
use
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.17
0.08
0.02
-7.
35.
22.
8-
182.
230.
48-
-23
.011
.6-
-50
17.2
--
-57
.0-
--
100
68.8
--
-10
5.5
--
-Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
50.
170.
160.
140.
087.
37.
16.
75.
218
2.23
0.99
0.2
-23
.016
.07.
9-
5017
.2-
--
57.0
--
-10
068
.8-
--
105.
5-
--
15G
as d
ehyd
ratio
nC
ella
r Dec
kIn
vent
ory
= 84
.1m
3 =
40
00K
gP
at st
art =
58
bara
Tem
p =
43 D
eg.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.17
30.
036
0.01
7-
-6.
73.
12.
2-
-18
2.2
0.86
0.12
6-
-22
.614
.45.
72-
-50
17.3
--
--
60.8
--
--
100
69.2
--
--
118.
0-
--
-Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
50.
173
0.17
30.
165
0158
0.14
56.
76.
76.
56.
46.
118
2.2
1.85
1.26
0.69
0.22
222
.620
.817
.313
.07.
550
17.3
3.97
--
-60
.831
.0-
--
100
69.2
--
--
118.
0-
--
-15
a18
” W
et G
as p
ipe
from
PD
Q A
cros
s B
ridge
to C
ella
r Dec
kIn
vent
ory
= 13
.3m
3 =
663K
g
P =
58 b
ara
T =
43 D
eg.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.17
0.07
57.
65.
32.
6-
-18
2.2
0.32
--
2410
.5-
--
5017
.3-
--
-60
--
--
100
69.2
--
--
110
--
--
Isol
atio
n an
d N
o B
low
dow
n5
0.17
0.13
0.11
0.08
0.05
7.6
6.7
6.3
5.4
4.4
182.
20.
56-
--
2413
.3-
--
5017
.3-
--
-60
--
--
100
69.2
--
--
110
--
--
16G
UES
T Pl
atfo
rm g
as
slug
cat
cher
Wea
ther
Dec
kIn
vent
ory
= 63
.60m
3 =
3046
Kg
P at
star
t = 2
5 ba
raTe
mp
= 21
Deg
.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.07
80.
2-
--
4.55
2.4
--
-18
1.0
0.13
--
-15
.55.
850
7.7
--
--
41-
--
-10
030
--
--
79-
--
-Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
0.07
80.
078
0.07
60.
073
0.06
90.
062
4.55
4.5
4.3
4.1
3.8
181.
00.
780.
480.
220.
045
15.5
13.7
10.9
7.5
3.5
507.
71.
16-
--
4116
.5-
--
100
30-
--
-79
--
--
Tabl
e 61
4.2:
Gas
Rel
ease
Rat
es/F
lam
e L
engt
hs (c
ontin
ued)
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page 1�
Research & Development
Sect
ion
No.
Sect
ion
Des
crip
tion
Cas
eH
ole
Size
(m
m)
Rel
ease
Rat
e (k
g/s)
at T
ime
(min
)Fl
ame
Leng
th (m
) at T
ime
(min
)
05
1530
600
515
3060
16A
1st st
age
com
p. su
ctio
n sc
rubb
er V
-371
10In
vent
ory=
26.
7m3 =
12
80K
gW
eath
er d
eck
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.17
10.
080.
016
--
6.6
4.6
2.0
--
182.
220.
57-
--
22.7
11.8
--
-50
17.2
--
--
60.5
--
-10
068
.6-
--
-11
7.6
--
--
Isol
atio
n an
d N
o B
low
dow
n5
0.17
10.
168
0.15
0.12
80.
098
6.6
6.6
6.3
5.7
5.2
182.
221.
220.
37-
-22
.717
.09.
6-
-50
17.2
--
--
60.5
--
--
100
68.6
--
--
117.
6-
--
-16
B1st
stag
e co
mp.
suct
ion
scru
bber
v-3
7210
Inve
ntor
y= 2
6.7m
3 =
1280
Kg
Wea
ther
dec
k
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.17
10.
080.
016
--
6.6
4.6
2.0
--
182.
220.
57-
--
22.7
11.8
--
-50
17.2
--
--
60.5
--
--
100
68.6
--
--
117.
6-
--
-Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
50.
171
0.16
80.
150.
128
0.09
86.
66.
66.
35.
75.
218
2.22
1.22
0.37
--
22.7
17.0
9.6
--
5017
.2-
--
-60
.5-
--
-10
068
.6-
--
-11
7.6
--
--
17G
UES
T Pl
atfo
rm g
as
com
pres
sion
Cel
lar D
eck
Inve
ntor
y =
24.3
m3 =
64
0Kg
P at
star
t = 2
5 ba
raTe
mp
= 21
Deg
.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.08
0.04
60.
017
--
4.6
3.5
2.2
--
181.
000.
34-
--
15.4
89.
2-
--
507.
73-
--
-41
.3-
--
-10
030
.9-
--
-30
.9-
--
-Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
50.
080.
073
0.06
60.
057
0.04
24.
64.
44.
23.
93.
418
1.00
0.53
00.
146
--
15.4
811
.46.
1-
-50
7.73
--
--
41.3
--
--
100
30.9
--
--
30.9
--
--
18Se
cond
stag
e co
mpr
essi
on (T
rain
1)
Inve
ntor
y =
1.5m
3 =
425K
gP
at st
art =
381
bar
aTe
mp
= 13
8 D
eg.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.99
60.
164
--
-15
.56.
5-
--
1812
.9-
--
-53
.0-
--
-50
99.6
--
--
141
--
--
100
398
--
--
274
--
--
Isol
atio
n an
d N
o B
low
dow
n5
0.99
60.
381
0.05
715
.59.
73.
9-
-18
12.9
--
--
53.0
--
--
5099
.6-
--
-14
1-
--
-10
039
8-
--
-27
4-
--
-
Tabl
e 61
4.2:
Gas
Rel
ease
Rat
es/F
lam
e L
engt
hs (c
ontin
ued)
Page 18 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & Development
Sect
ion
No.
Sect
ion
Des
crip
tion
Cas
eH
ole
Size
(m
m)
Rel
ease
Rat
e (k
g/s)
at T
ime
(min
)Fl
ame
Leng
th (m
) at T
ime
(min
)
05
1530
600
515
3060
19Se
cond
Sta
ge
com
pres
sion
(Tra
in 2
)In
vent
ory
= 1.
5m3 =
42
5kg
P at
star
t = 3
81 b
ara
Tem
p =
138
Deg
.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.99
60.
164
--
-15
.56.
5-
--
1812
.9-
--
-53
.0-
--
5099
.6-
--
-14
1-
--
-10
039
8-
--
-27
4-
--
-Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
50.
996
0.38
10.
057
--
15.5
9.7
3.9
--
1812
.9-
--
-53
.0-
--
-50
99.6
--
--
141
--
--
100
398
--
--
274
--
--
20Fu
el g
as sy
stem
Cel
lar D
eck
Inve
ntor
y=26
.7m
3 =
1200
Kg
P at
star
t = 5
7.3
bara
Tem
p =
43 D
eg. C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.17
10.
078
0.01
6-
-6.
64.
62.
1-
-18
2.21
0.57
--
-22
.711
.8-
--
5017
.1-
--
-60
.5-
--
-10
068
.3-
--
-11
7.5
--
--
Isol
atio
n an
d N
o B
low
dow
n5
0.17
10.
162
0.15
00.
127
0.09
666.
66.
56.
25.
755.
018
2.21
1.21
0.35
4-
-22
.7-
--
-50
17.1
--
--
60.5
--
--
100
68.3
--
--
117.
5-
--
-21
Firs
t sta
ge
com
pres
sion
(Tra
ins 3
/4)
Inve
ntor
y =
171.
4m3 =
82
00K
gP
at st
art =
57.
3 ba
raTe
mp
= 41
Deg
.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.17
10.
083
0.01
9-
-6.
64.
72.
3-
-18
2.22
0.99
0.19
--
22.7
15.4
7.0
--
5017
.13.
93-
--
60.5
30.0
--
-10
068
.5-
--
-11
7.5
--
--
Isol
atio
n an
d N
o B
low
dow
n5
0.17
10.
171
0.17
00.
163
0.15
86.
66.
66.
66.
56.
418
2.22
2.0
1.70
1.26
0.73
22.7
21.6
2017
.313
.350
17.1
8.3
1.91
--
60.5
42.7
21.1
--
100
68.5
3.72
--
-11
7.5
29.1
--
-22
Seco
nd st
age
com
pres
sion
(Tra
in 3
)
Inve
ntor
y =
1.5m
3 =
420K
gP
at st
art =
381
bar
aTe
mp
= 13
8 D
eg.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.99
60.
098
--
-15
.55.
1-
--
1812
.9-
--
-53
.0-
--
-50
99.6
--
--
141
--
--
100
398
--
--
274
--
--
Isol
atio
n an
d N
o B
low
dow
n5
0.99
60.
381
0.05
7-
-15
.59.
73.
9-
-18
12.9
--
--
53.0
--
--
5099
.6-
--
-14
1-
--
-10
039
8-
--
-27
4-
--
-
Tabl
e 61
4.2:
Gas
Rel
ease
Rat
es/F
lam
e L
engt
hs (c
ontin
ued)
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page 19
Research & Development
Sect
ion
No.
Sect
ion
Des
crip
tion
Cas
eH
ole
Size
(m
m)
Rel
ease
Rat
e (k
g/s)
at T
ime
(min
)Fl
ame
Leng
th (m
) at T
ime
(min
)
05
1530
600
515
3060
23Se
cond
Sta
ge
com
pres
sion
(Tra
in 4
)In
vent
ory
= 1.
5m3 =
42
0Kg
P at
star
t = 3
81 b
ara
Tem
p =
138
Deg
.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.99
60.
098
--
-15
.55.
1-
--
1812
.9-
--
-53
.0-
--
5099
.6-
--
-14
1-
--
-10
039
8-
--
-27
4-
--
-Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
50.
996
0.38
10.
057
--
15.5
9.7
3.9
--
1812
.9-
--
-53
.0-
--
-50
99.6
--
--
141
--
--
100
398
--
--
274
--
--
25a
Gas
exp
ort
com
pres
sion
, suc
tion
scru
bber
Inve
ntor
y=27
m3 =
11
90K
gP
at st
art =
49.
7 ba
raTe
mp
= 17
Deg
. CTh
is is
a fu
ture
ad
ditio
n, d
ata
take
n fr
om d
esig
n
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.17
0.07
10.
013
--
6.6
4.3
1.9
--
182.
20.
71-
--
22.7
13.1
--
-50
17.1
--
--
60.5
--
--
100
68.2
--
--
117.
0-
--
-Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
50.
170.
170.
160.
150.
136.
66.
66.
56.
25.
818
2.2
1.21
0.89
70.
353
-22
.717
.014
.79.
4-
5017
.11.
64-
--
60.5
19.6
--
-10
068
.2-
--
-11
7.0
--
--
25b
Gas
exp
ort
com
pres
sion
Inve
ntor
y =
2.0m
3 =
167K
gP
at st
art =
107
.9 b
ara
Tem
p =
85 D
eg.C
This
is a
futu
re
addi
tion,
dat
a ta
ken
from
des
ign
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5
0.17
0.07
10.
013
--
6.6
4.3
1.9
--
182.
20.
71-
--
22.7
13.1
--
-50
17.1
--
--
60.5
--
--
100
68.2
--
--
117.
0-
--
-Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
50.
170.
170.
160.
150.
136.
66.
66.
56.
25.
818
2.2
1.21
0.89
70.
353
-22
.717
.014
.79.
4-
5017
.11.
64-
--
60.5
19.6
--
-10
068
.2-
--
-11
7.0
--
--
U1
HP
Flar
e D
rum
Inve
ntor
y =
84.8
m3
P at
a st
art =
6.3
bar
aTe
mp
= 21
Deg
.C
Isol
atio
n an
d B
low
dow
n5 18 50 10
0Is
olat
ion
and
No
Blo
wdo
wn
5 18 50 100
Tabl
e 61
4.2:
Gas
Rel
ease
Rat
es/F
lam
e L
engt
hs (c
ontin
ued)
Page �0 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & Development
Sect
ion
No.
Sect
ion
Des
crip
tion
Hol
e si
ze (m
m)
Rel
ease
Rat
e (k
g/s)
Dur
atio
n (s
)Po
ol F
ire D
iam
eter
(m)
Pool
Fire
Loc
atio
n
3H
P m
anifo
ld/
sepa
rato
rs
(rel
ease
ass
umed
to
occ
ur fr
om th
e se
para
tors
)
51.
1760
000
3.7
Wea
ther
Dec
k
1815
.17
4600
13.3
Wea
ther
Dec
k
5011
7.04
600
22.1
/39
Wea
ther
Dec
k/Se
a Su
rfac
e
100
468.
1715
022
.1/4
0W
eath
er D
eck/
Sea
Sur
face
4LP
man
ifold
/se
para
tors
(r
elea
se a
ssum
ed
to o
ccur
from
the
sepa
rato
rs)
50.
7112
0000
3.1
Wea
ther
Dec
k
189.
1993
0011
.1W
eath
er D
eck
5070
.88
1200
22.1
/39
Wea
ther
Dec
k/Se
a Su
rfac
e
100
283.
5330
022
.1/7
8W
eath
er D
eck/
Sea
Surf
ace
8O
il ex
port
50.
84N
ote
14.
4Se
a Su
rfac
e
1810
.83
Not
e 1
15.7
Sea
Surf
ace
5083
.59
Not
e 1
43.5
Sea
Surf
ace
100
334.
35N
ote
187
.0Se
a Su
rfac
e
Wel
l Blo
wou
t27
5 (N
ote
2)C
ontin
uous
78W
ellh
eads
/Sea
Sur
face
Tabl
e 61
4.3:
Oil
Rel
ease
Rat
es
Not
es fo
r Ta
ble
614.
3:N
ote
1: W
hen
sect
ion
is is
olat
ed an
d th
e pum
ps st
op, t
he d
rivin
g fo
rce f
or li
quid
rele
ases
will
be t
he ef
fect
of t
he cr
ude d
egas
sing
as p
ress
ure d
rops
and
the e
ffect
of g
ravi
ty, d
epen
ding
on
the
loca
tion
of th
e re
leas
e in
the
syst
em.
Not
e 2:
Blo
wou
t flow
-rat
e is
bas
ed o
n 5
times
the
prod
uctio
n ra
te o
f 35,
000
bpd.
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page �1
Research & DevelopmentLo
catio
nEv
ent D
escr
iptio
nC
onse
quen
ces
Haz
ard
Man
agem
ent M
easu
res
PDQ
/MO
L Pu
mp
Mod
ule
1. Je
t/spr
ay/ru
nnin
g liq
uid
fire
from
oil
boos
ter p
umps
to se
a.2.
Jet/s
pray
/runn
ing
liqui
d fir
e fr
om G
UES
T Pl
atfo
rm 2
4” o
il pi
g re
ceiv
er to
sea.
3. Je
t/spr
ay/ru
nnin
g liq
uid
fire
from
clo
sed
drai
ns/fl
are
drum
to
sea.
4. Je
t/spr
ay/ru
nnin
g liq
uid
fire
from
MO
L pu
mps
to se
a.
Esca
latio
n fr
om th
e oi
l boo
ster
pum
ps, M
OL
pum
ps o
r clo
sed
drai
ns /
flare
dru
m m
ay o
ccur
if
the
fire
can
spre
ad to
adj
acen
t pum
ps, p
lant
or
pipe
wor
k pr
ior t
o ES
D o
ccur
ring.
Liqu
id fa
llout
will
spill
thro
ugh
the
grat
ed d
eck
to
sea
leve
l and
may
form
a su
bsta
ntia
l sea
fire
.
A fi
re in
the
MO
L pu
mp
mod
ule
may
impa
ir th
e di
rect
nor
th fa
ce e
gres
s rou
te to
the
TR a
nd m
ay
impa
ir th
e lin
k br
idge
land
ing
area
with
hea
t, sm
oke
and
flam
e m
akin
g eg
ress
from
CP
to th
e TR
impo
ssib
le.
Esca
latio
n of
a je
t / sp
ray
fire
from
the
MO
L pu
mp
mod
ule
to a
djac
ent p
lant
or t
he m
anifo
ld m
odul
e is
pos
sibl
e, in
par
ticul
ar if
the
rele
ase
is o
rient
ated
ea
st in
to th
e m
anifo
ld m
odul
e.
If th
e F&
G a
nd E
SD sy
stem
s fun
ctio
n ef
fect
ivel
y as
inte
nded
and
isol
atio
n an
d bl
owdo
wn
of th
e pl
ant a
re a
chie
ved,
then
esc
alat
ion
betw
een
plan
t in
the
MO
L pu
mp
mod
ule
and
beyo
nd th
e M
OL
pum
p m
odul
e is
less
like
ly.
If b
urni
ng o
il fr
om a
n oi
l boo
ster
pum
p or
MO
L pu
mp
fire
or fr
om th
e cl
osed
dr
ains
dru
m is
abl
e to
spill
to se
a, a
sea
fire
is p
ossi
ble.
But
, the
ava
ilabl
e in
vent
ory
prio
r to
ESD
ope
ratin
g is
not
con
side
red
suffi
cien
t to
gene
rate
ad
ditio
nal e
scal
atio
n pa
ths t
o th
e ja
cket
, ris
ers o
r con
duct
ors.
Esca
latio
n fr
om th
e pi
g re
ceiv
er is
unl
ikel
y as
the
unit
is u
sual
ly e
mpt
y an
d is
olat
ed fr
om h
ydro
carb
ons.
Any
act
ivity
on
the
unit
requ
ires p
erm
it ap
prov
al
and
safe
ty p
roce
dure
s in
plac
e.
Fire
wat
er a
pplic
atio
n ca
n be
use
d to
del
uge
the
gene
ral p
roce
ss a
rea
and
redu
ce th
e ef
fect
s of s
mok
e, h
eat a
nd fl
ame
to p
lant
, stru
ctur
e an
d pe
rson
nel.
Liqu
id h
ydro
carb
on w
ill sp
ill th
roug
h th
e gr
ated
dec
k to
sea
leve
l. Po
tent
ial
pool
fire
size
s will
be
limite
d to
the
plan
are
a of
the
drip
tray
s situ
ated
ben
eath
th
e ve
ssel
s. Fi
rew
ater
app
licat
ion
shou
ld b
e su
ffici
ent t
o qu
ench
or c
ontro
l a
liqui
ds fi
re a
t cel
lar d
eck
leve
l.
PDQ
Man
ifold
Mod
ule
1. Je
t/spr
ay/ru
nnin
g liq
uid
fire
from
HP
prod
uctio
n m
anifo
ld to
se
a.2.
Jet/s
pray
/runn
ing
liqui
d fir
e fr
om L
P pr
oduc
tion
man
ifold
to
sea.
3. Je
t fire
from
gas
inje
ctio
n m
anifo
ld to
sea.
4.
Jet fi
re fr
om g
as li
ft m
anifo
ld
to se
a.
The
size
and
con
tain
men
t pre
ssur
e of
the
inve
ntor
y w
ithin
the
prod
uctio
n m
anifo
lds
prov
ides
the
oppo
rtuni
ty fo
r pre
ssur
ised
jet o
r sp
ray
rele
ases
. Esc
alat
ion
betw
een
man
ifold
s is
likel
y gi
ven
the
imm
edia
te p
roxi
mity
and
den
sity
of
pla
nt a
nd fl
owlin
es in
the
man
ifold
are
a.
If a
jet fi
re is
dire
cted
wes
terly
, the
fire
will
ext
end
into
the
MO
L pu
mp
mod
ule
from
the
man
ifold
m
odul
e. If
the
rele
ase
is e
aste
rly th
e fir
e w
ill
exte
nd in
to th
e w
ellb
ay a
rea.
Liqu
id fa
llout
from
a p
rodu
ctio
n m
anifo
ld w
ill
spill
thro
ugh
to th
e se
a be
low
and
may
gen
erat
e a
subs
tant
ial s
ea fi
re u
nles
s the
liqu
id in
vent
ory
can
be q
uick
ly is
olat
ed.
Ope
ratio
n of
the
F&G
and
ESD
syst
ems f
unct
ioni
ng e
ffect
ivel
y as
inte
nded
an
d is
olat
ing
the
plan
t is c
ritic
al to
the
inte
grity
of t
he p
latfo
rm d
ue to
the
inve
ntor
ies a
vaila
ble.
The
ESD
syst
em m
ust i
sola
te th
e m
anifo
lds r
apid
ly to
pr
even
t sub
stan
tial l
iqui
d in
vent
orie
s spr
ayin
g on
to a
djac
ent e
quip
men
t and
sp
illin
g th
roug
h to
sea
to fo
rm a
sea
surf
ace
fire.
Tabl
e 61
4.4:
Haz
ard
Esc
alat
ion
& M
anag
emen
t
Page �� FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & DevelopmentLo
catio
nEv
ent D
escr
iptio
nC
onse
quen
ces
Haz
ard
Man
agem
ent M
easu
res
PDQ
/Wel
lbay
1. Je
t fire
from
gas
inje
ctio
n flo
wlin
e to
pro
duct
ion
man
ifold
.2.
Jet/s
pray
/runn
ing
liqui
d fir
e fr
om o
il pr
oduc
tion
flow
lines
to
sea.
3. S
pray
/runn
ing
liqui
d fir
e fr
om
met
hano
l sto
rage
tank
to se
a.
Esca
latio
n be
twee
n w
ellh
eads
is p
ossi
ble
give
n th
e im
med
iate
pro
xim
ity a
nd d
ensi
ty o
f nei
ghbo
urin
g w
ellh
eads
and
pro
duct
ion
flow
lines
in th
e w
ellb
ay.
Bur
ning
liqu
id fa
llout
from
the
wel
lhea
ds w
ill
spill
thro
ugh
to th
e se
a to
form
a su
bsta
ntia
l sea
su
rfac
e fir
e un
less
the
liqui
d in
vent
ory
can
be
quic
kly
isol
ated
.
Esca
latio
n fr
om a
wel
lhea
d fir
e di
rect
ed w
est
into
the
adja
cent
man
ifold
mod
ule
is li
kely
gi
ven
the
exte
nt o
f pot
entia
l rel
ease
s. Th
e ris
k of
esc
alat
ion
is si
gnifi
cant
ly in
crea
sed
if m
ore
than
one
wel
lhea
d is
invo
lved
. The
fire
may
als
o pe
netra
te u
p to
the
Wea
ther
Dec
k ar
ea d
epen
ding
on
the
deck
hat
ch a
rran
gem
ents
abo
ve th
e w
ellh
eads
. If t
he d
rillin
g rig
or w
ell c
ompl
etio
ns
unit
are
oper
atin
g ov
er th
e w
ellh
eads
the
fire
may
al
so e
scal
ate
into
the
drill
ing
rig fl
oor o
r wel
l co
mpl
etio
ns u
nit fl
oor.
The
wel
lhea
ds sh
ould
pro
vide
inhe
rent
fire
resi
stan
ce to
API
stan
dard
s, co
uple
d w
ith o
pera
tion
of th
e D
HSV
, win
g an
d up
per m
aste
r val
ves s
uffic
ient
to
pre
vent
loss
of c
onta
inm
ent f
rom
flam
e im
pact
.
Ope
ratio
n of
the
F&G
and
ESD
syst
ems f
unct
ioni
ng e
ffect
ivel
y as
inte
nded
an
d is
olat
ing
the
wel
lhea
ds is
crit
ical
to th
e in
tegr
ity o
f the
pla
tform
due
to th
e in
vent
orie
s ava
ilabl
e.
Verti
cal e
scal
atio
n up
war
d in
to th
e W
eath
er d
eck
area
is c
onsi
dere
d un
likel
y if
the
sect
ions
are
isol
ated
and
blo
wdo
wn,
as fi
res w
ill n
ot h
ave
suffi
cien
t siz
e /
dura
tion
to p
unch
thro
ugh
deck
.
Wel
lhea
d ac
cess
hat
ches
and
the
deck
itse
lf sh
ould
pro
vide
suffi
cien
t re
sist
ance
for a
ll id
entifi
ed d
ropp
ed o
bjec
t loa
ds fr
om d
rillin
g, w
ell
com
plet
ion
and
plat
form
cra
ne o
pera
tions
.
A re
leas
e or
ient
ated
eas
t int
o th
e dr
illin
g ut
ilitie
s mod
ule
is m
itiga
ted
by a
fire
ra
ted
divi
sion
s bet
wee
n th
e w
ellb
ay a
nd d
rillin
g ut
ilitie
s mod
ule
on g
ridlin
e 4.
As m
etha
nol i
s sol
uble
in w
ater
stan
dard
pla
tform
fire
wat
er d
elug
e sh
ould
be
suffi
cien
t to
extin
guis
h a
pool
fire
con
tain
ed in
the
drip
tray
ben
eath
the
tank
. Ex
cess
ive
met
hano
l spi
llage
will
spill
thro
ugh
the
grat
ed d
eck
to se
a.
PDQ
/Wel
lbay
(Con
tinue
d)If
a je
t fire
is d
irect
ed w
este
rly th
e fir
e m
ay e
xten
d in
to th
e m
anifo
ld m
odul
e. If
the
rele
ase
is e
aste
rly
the
fire
may
ext
end
into
the
drill
ing
utili
ties
mod
ule.
If a
jet fi
re is
dire
cted
ver
tical
ly u
pwar
ds
the
unde
rsid
e of
the
Wea
ther
Dec
k m
ay d
eflec
t the
fla
me
late
rally
eas
t and
wes
t int
o bo
th a
djac
ent
mod
ules
.
Esca
latio
n fr
om th
e m
etha
nol s
tora
ge a
nd p
umps
is
not
con
side
red
cred
ible
with
the
fire
loca
lised
to
the
pack
age
skid
. Met
hano
l is s
olub
le in
wat
er,
henc
e a
spill
age
to se
a pr
esen
ts n
o se
rious
safe
ty
issu
es.
Bur
ning
oil
from
a w
ellh
ead
will
spill
to se
a le
vel p
rior t
o th
e ES
D o
pera
ting.
In th
is in
stan
ce
addi
tiona
l eve
nt p
aths
are
ava
ilabl
e, in
clud
ing
a su
bsta
ntia
l sea
surf
ace
fire.
A se
a su
rfac
e fir
e m
ay
impa
ir la
unch
ing
of th
e PD
Q T
EMPS
C a
nd m
ay
impa
ir th
e st
abili
ty o
f the
jack
et a
fter a
tim
e.
Tabl
e 61
4.4:
Haz
ard
Esc
alat
ion
& M
anag
emen
t (co
ntin
ued)
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page ��
Research & Development
Loca
tion
Even
t Des
crip
tion
Con
sequ
ence
sH
azar
d M
anag
emen
t Mea
sure
sPD
Q/
Dril
ling
Util
ities
Mod
ule
1. B
ase
oil s
tora
ge ta
nk fi
re.
2. O
il dr
ill c
uttin
gs re
-inje
ctio
n ta
nk fi
re.
3. S
pray
/runn
ing
liqui
d fir
e fr
om d
iese
l sto
rage
and
di
strib
utio
n to
sea.
4.
Non
-hyd
roca
rbon
che
mic
al in
ject
ion
skid
fire
.
Esca
latio
n fr
om th
e ba
se o
il st
orag
e ta
nk o
r oil
drill
cu
tting
s re-
inje
ctio
n ta
nk is
unl
ikel
y as
the
mat
eria
ls
are
low
haz
ard
and
a hi
gh e
nerg
y ig
nitio
n so
urce
is
requ
ired.
Esca
latio
n fr
om th
e di
esel
dis
tribu
tion
and
stor
age
syst
em is
unl
ikel
y as
the
dies
el is
a lo
w h
azar
d m
ater
ial a
nd a
hig
h en
ergy
igni
tion
sour
ce is
requ
ired.
No
high
ene
rgy
igni
tion
sour
ces a
re id
entifi
ed in
the
drill
ing
utili
ties m
odul
e. D
iese
l will
form
a se
rious
fire
ha
zard
onl
y if
a pr
eced
ing
even
t tan
k re
leas
es la
rge
quan
titie
s of d
iese
l ont
o a
high
ene
rgy
igni
tion
sour
ce
such
as a
n ex
istin
g fir
e.
Esca
latio
n fr
om th
e ch
emic
al in
ject
ion
pack
age
is
not c
onsi
dere
d cr
edib
le w
ith th
e fir
e lo
calis
ed to
the
pack
age
skid
. But
the
burn
ing
chem
ical
s may
pre
sent
a
toxi
c ha
zard
to p
erso
nnel
egr
essi
ng a
long
the
north
fa
ce o
f PD
Q.
If th
e F&
G a
nd E
SD sy
stem
s fun
ctio
n ef
fect
ivel
y as
in
tend
ed, t
hen
esca
latio
n be
yond
the
mod
ule
hous
ing
thes
e ta
nks i
s unl
ikel
y.
Switc
hgea
r Roo
m a
ndLE
R1.
Poo
l fire
from
em
erge
ncy
gene
rato
r die
sel d
ay ta
nk.
2. E
lect
rical
fire
in e
lect
rical
switc
hgea
r roo
m, L
ER o
r w
orks
hop.
Ther
e ar
e no
esc
alat
ion
path
s ide
ntifi
ed fo
r the
em
erge
ncy
gene
rato
r die
sel d
ay ta
nk a
s the
inve
ntor
y is
smal
l and
the
deck
is p
late
d in
this
mod
ule.
Elec
trica
l fire
s are
unl
ikel
y to
esc
alat
e be
yond
the
equi
pmen
t whe
re th
e fir
e oc
curs
, or b
eyon
d th
e co
mpa
rtmen
t in
whi
ch th
e eq
uipm
ent i
s hou
sed.
B
ut th
e da
mag
e to
crit
ical
serv
ice
equi
pmen
t cou
ld
esca
late
a sm
all l
ocal
ised
fire
into
a fu
ll pr
oduc
tion
shut
dow
n.
App
ropr
iate
fire
det
ectio
n an
d pr
otec
tion
syst
ems a
re
prov
ided
in e
lect
rical
switc
hroo
m, L
ER a
nd w
orks
hop
usin
g C
O2
or p
owde
r fire
ext
ingu
ishe
rs, t
o re
spon
d im
med
iate
ly to
a fi
re a
nd li
mit
esca
latio
n.
Fixt
ures
and
fitti
ngs a
re sp
ecifi
ed a
s non
-com
bust
ible
.
Util
ities
Mod
ule
1. P
ool fi
re fr
om fi
re p
ump
dies
el d
ay ta
nk.
Ther
e ar
e no
esc
alat
ion
path
s ide
ntifi
ed fo
r the
fire
pu
mp
dies
el d
ay ta
nk a
s the
inve
ntor
y is
smal
l and
the
deck
is p
late
d in
this
mod
ule.
Livi
ng Q
uarte
rs1.
Coo
king
rela
ted
fire
in g
alle
y.2.
Fix
ture
s and
fitti
ngs fi
re in
acc
omm
odat
ion
cabi
ns
and
offic
es.
3. C
hem
ical
s rel
ated
fire
in st
ores
.
Fire
s in
the
livin
g qu
arte
rs a
re u
nlik
ely
to e
scal
ate
beyo
nd th
e co
mpa
rtmen
t whe
re th
e fir
e oc
curs
.A
ppro
pria
te fi
re d
etec
tion
and
prot
ectio
n sy
stem
s are
pr
ovid
ed in
all
com
partm
ents
, in
parti
cula
r the
gal
ley,
st
orer
oom
s and
cab
ins,
and
in c
omm
on p
assa
gew
ays
or c
ompa
rtmen
ts u
sing
fire
ext
ingu
ishe
rs, t
o re
spon
d im
med
iate
ly to
a c
ompa
rtmen
t fire
and
lim
it es
cala
tion.
Tabl
e 61
4.4:
Haz
ard
Esc
alat
ion
& M
anag
emen
t (co
ntin
ued)
Page �� FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & DevelopmentLo
catio
nEv
ent D
escr
iptio
nC
onse
quen
ces
Haz
ard
Man
agem
ent M
easu
res
Pow
er G
ener
atio
n1.
Jet fi
re fr
om m
ain
pow
er
gene
rato
rs.
Fire
s inv
olvi
ng th
e m
ain
pow
er g
ener
ator
s are
no
t exp
ecte
d to
esc
alat
e be
yond
the
gene
rato
r sk
id g
iven
the
size
of t
he a
vaila
ble
fuel
inve
ntor
y an
d th
e is
olat
ion
of th
e ge
nera
tor s
ets f
rom
su
rrou
ndin
g pl
ant.
How
ever
the
LQ is
dire
ctly
ex
pose
d to
a fi
re fr
om th
e m
ain
pow
er g
ener
ator
s.
The
impa
ct to
the
oper
atio
n of
the
PDQ
from
th
e lo
ss o
f one
mai
n ge
nera
tor s
et d
ue to
a sm
all
loca
lised
fire
cou
ld c
ause
a p
rodu
ctio
n sh
utdo
wn
of th
e pl
atfo
rm.
A fi
re in
a m
ain
pow
er g
ener
ator
may
pre
vent
eg
ress
usi
ng th
e no
rther
n or
sout
hern
egr
ess r
oute
s at
Wea
ther
Dec
k le
vel.
Ope
ratio
n of
the
F&G
and
ESD
syst
ems f
unct
ioni
ng e
ffect
ivel
y as
inte
nded
and
is
olat
ing
the
plan
t is c
ritic
al to
pre
vent
esc
alat
ion
of a
loca
lised
pow
er g
ener
ator
sk
id fi
re to
the
adja
cent
pow
er g
ener
ator
and
to p
reve
nt d
irect
impi
ngem
ent o
f fla
me
onto
the
LQ.
Turb
ine
fires
can
be
miti
gate
d us
ing
wat
er m
ist.
Wel
l cre
ws w
ho c
anno
t eva
cuat
e to
the
TR u
sing
the
north
ern
or so
uthe
rn e
gres
s ro
utes
at W
eath
er D
eck
leve
l can
des
cend
to c
ella
r dec
k le
vel u
sing
the
stai
rway
at
the
wes
t end
of P
DQ
and
ent
er th
e TR
from
this
dec
k le
vel s
hiel
ded
by th
e W
eath
er
Dec
k ab
ove.
Dril
l Sup
port
Offi
ces
1. F
ixtu
res a
nd fi
tting
s fire
in
drill
ing
supp
ort o
ffice
s.Fi
res i
n th
e dr
illin
g su
ppor
t offi
ces a
re u
nlik
ely
to
esca
late
bey
ond
the
com
partm
ent w
here
the
fire
occu
rs.
Hea
t and
smok
e de
tect
ion
in a
ll co
mpa
rtmen
ts a
nd p
assa
gew
ays.
CO
2 or
pow
der
fire
extin
guis
hers
pro
vide
d to
allo
w im
med
iate
resp
onse
to a
com
partm
ent fi
re a
nd
limit
esca
latio
n.
Dril
l Der
rick
and
wel
l co
mpl
etio
ns u
nit
1. S
hallo
w g
as b
low
out a
t dril
ling
rig d
rill fl
oor.
2. P
rodu
ctio
n bl
owou
t at w
ell
com
plet
ions
rig
floor
.
A b
low
out s
cena
rio is
the
resu
lt of
loss
of w
ell
cont
rol a
nd th
e lo
ss o
f con
tain
men
t of w
ell a
nd
rese
rvoi
r flui
ds.
The
flow
rate
from
an
unco
ntro
lled
wel
l blo
wou
t an
d th
e po
tent
ial s
ize
of a
n ig
nite
d re
leas
e m
eans
th
at e
scal
atio
n is
like
ly to
surr
ound
ing
wel
lhea
ds,
the
rig c
ondu
ctin
g th
e w
ell e
ntry
ope
ratio
n an
d pl
ant a
t wea
ther
dec
k le
vel.
A b
low
out m
ay im
pair
the
LQ, T
R a
nd li
nk b
ridge
.
As t
he b
low
out i
s a re
sult
of lo
ss o
f wel
l con
trol,
miti
gatio
n m
easu
res c
entre
on
evac
uatin
g pe
rson
nel f
rom
the
inst
alla
tion
as q
uick
ly a
s pos
sibl
e.
Fire
wat
er a
pplic
atio
n ca
n be
use
d to
del
uge
the
drill
ing
rig fl
oor a
nd g
ener
al
wel
lbay
are
a to
redu
ce th
e ef
fect
s of s
mok
e, h
eat a
nd fl
ame
to p
lant
, stru
ctur
e an
d pe
rson
nel.
Prio
r to
the
blow
out o
ccur
ring,
suffi
cien
t wel
l kill
flui
d sh
ould
alw
ays b
e av
aila
ble
to p
reve
nt lo
ss o
f con
trol o
f the
wel
l, w
ith w
ell c
ontro
l mec
hani
sms s
peci
fied
for
the
full
wel
lhea
d pr
essu
re.
Nor
ther
n an
d so
uthe
rn e
gres
s rou
tes p
rovi
de d
irect
esc
ape
to th
e LQ
and
TR
for
the
wel
l cre
ws,
Wea
ther
Dec
k cr
ew, c
rane
ope
rato
rs a
nd te
chni
cian
s at W
eath
er
Dec
k le
vel.
Pers
onne
l can
als
o m
ake
thei
r way
dow
n to
cel
lar d
eck
leve
l usi
ng th
e no
rther
n an
d so
uthe
rn st
airw
ays a
t the
wes
t end
of P
DQ
whe
re th
ey c
an a
cces
s the
TR
is p
rovi
ded
with
H60
rate
d on
side
s and
upp
er le
vel a
nd a
t thi
s lev
el is
shie
lded
by
the
Wea
ther
Dec
k ab
ove
Tabl
e 61
4.4:
Haz
ard
Esc
alat
ion
& M
anag
emen
t (co
ntin
ued)
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page �5
Research & DevelopmentLo
catio
nEv
ent D
escr
iptio
nC
onse
quen
ces
Haz
ard
Man
agem
ent M
easu
res
Sepa
rato
r Mod
ule
1. Je
t/spr
ay/ru
nnin
g liq
uid
fire
from
HP
prod
uctio
n se
para
tors
.2.
Jet/s
pray
/runn
ing
liqui
d fir
e fr
om L
P pr
oduc
tion
sepa
rato
rs.
3. Je
t/spr
ay/ru
nnin
g liq
uid
fire
from
test
sepa
rato
r to
sea.
The
size
and
con
tain
men
t pre
ssur
e of
the
inve
ntor
y w
ithin
the
sepa
rato
rs (H
P an
d LP
) pro
vide
s the
op
portu
nity
for p
ress
uris
ed je
t or s
pray
rele
ases
, or p
ool
fires
. Esc
alat
ion
betw
een
sepa
rato
rs is
like
ly g
iven
the
imm
edia
te p
roxi
mity
of n
eigh
bour
ing
vess
els,
from
a
spre
adin
g oi
l poo
l ben
eath
the
vess
els,
or fr
om d
irect
fla
me
impi
ngem
ent f
rom
a je
t or s
pray
fire
.
A b
urni
ng o
il po
ol c
an sp
ill o
ver t
he e
xtre
miti
es o
f th
e se
para
tor d
eck
into
low
er a
reas
of t
he p
latfo
rm, i
n pa
rticu
lar t
he M
OL
pum
p an
d m
anifo
ld m
odul
es. T
he
link
brid
ge o
r brid
ge la
ndin
g ar
ea m
ay a
lso
be e
xpos
ed
to b
urni
ng o
il fr
om th
e se
para
tors
rain
ing
dow
n an
d pr
even
ting
evac
uatio
n ac
ross
the
link
brid
ge.
The
drill
ing
utili
ties m
odul
e an
d fla
sh g
as c
ompr
esso
r ar
ea a
nd n
orth
ern
cran
e pe
dest
al a
re a
lso
expo
sed
to
dire
ct fl
ame
impi
ngem
ent f
rom
a se
para
tor fi
re.
Ope
ratio
n of
the
F&G
and
ESD
syst
ems f
unct
ioni
ng
effe
ctiv
ely
as in
tend
ed a
nd is
olat
ing
and
blow
ing
dow
n th
e pl
ant i
s crit
ical
to p
reve
nt e
scal
atio
n be
twee
n th
e se
para
tors
and
bey
ond
the
sepa
rato
r are
a. If
sign
ifica
nt
oil i
nven
torie
s are
rele
ased
thes
e ca
n sp
ill in
to th
e lo
wer
ar
eas o
f the
pla
tform
impa
iring
egr
ess r
oute
s and
the
link
brid
ge la
ndin
g ar
ea.
The
sepa
rato
r dec
k is
des
igne
d w
ith a
cur
b su
rrou
nd to
ca
ptur
e an
d dr
ain
the
cont
ents
of a
t lea
st o
ne se
para
tor
com
bine
d w
ith th
e flo
wra
te o
f the
fire
wat
er sy
stem
in
the
sepa
rato
r mod
ule.
Del
uge
can
be u
sed
to c
ontro
l jet
/spr
ay fi
res a
nd q
uenc
h po
ol fi
res.
Fire
ext
ingu
ishe
rs sh
ould
be
used
for s
mal
l le
akag
e fir
es o
nly.
A se
para
tor r
elea
se o
rient
ated
eas
t tow
ards
the
drill
ing
derr
ick
is m
itiga
ted
by th
e fir
e ra
ted
barr
ier b
etw
een
the
sepa
rato
r mod
ule
and
the
drill
ing
derr
ick
on g
ridlin
e M
2.Fl
ash
Gas
C
ompr
esso
r Are
a1.
Jet fi
re fr
om fl
ash
gas s
uctio
n dr
um.
2. Je
t fire
from
flas
h ga
s com
pres
sor.
3. Je
t/spr
ay/ru
nnin
g liq
uid
fire
from
San
gach
al o
il ex
port
pig
laun
cher
to se
a.
4. Je
t fire
from
GU
EST
Plat
form
gas
exp
ort l
aunc
her.
5. Je
t fire
from
fuel
gas
KO
dru
m.
6. Je
t fire
from
fuel
gas
hea
ters
.
Esca
latio
n of
a je
t/spr
ay fi
re fr
om th
e fla
sh g
as
com
pres
sor o
r flas
h ga
s suc
tion
drum
to a
djac
ent p
lant
or
the
sepa
rato
r mod
ule
is p
ossi
ble,
in p
artic
ular
if th
e re
leas
e is
orie
ntat
ed e
ast i
nto
the
sepa
rato
r mod
ule.
If th
e F&
G a
nd E
SD sy
stem
s fun
ctio
n ef
fect
ivel
y as
in
tend
ed a
nd is
olat
ion
and
blow
dow
n of
the
plan
t is
achi
eved
, the
n es
cala
tion
betw
een
plan
t in
the
flash
gas
co
mpr
esso
r are
a an
d be
yond
the
flash
gas
com
pres
sor
area
is le
ss li
kely
.
Esca
latio
n fr
om th
e pi
g la
unch
ers i
s unl
ikel
y as
the
units
ar
e us
ually
em
pty
and
isol
ated
from
hyd
roca
rbon
s. A
ny
activ
ity o
n th
e un
its re
quire
s per
mit
appr
oval
and
safe
ty
proc
edur
es in
pla
ce.
Hel
idec
k4.
Hel
icop
ter e
ngin
e fir
e du
ring
pers
onne
l tra
nsfe
r.Pe
rson
nel i
njur
y if
helic
opte
r cra
shes
ont
o he
lidec
k or
oc
cupa
nts t
rapp
ed in
hel
icop
ter.
The
helid
eck
will
be
man
ned
durin
g he
licop
ter l
andi
ng
and
take
off
by a
hel
icop
ter l
andi
ng o
ffice
r and
at l
east
tw
o fir
emen
man
ning
the
helid
eck
firew
ater
syst
ems.
Fire
wat
er m
onito
rs w
ith fo
am a
pplic
atio
n ca
pabi
lity
can
be u
sed
to sm
othe
r a h
elic
opte
r fire
and
the
area
im
med
iate
ly a
roun
d th
e he
licop
ter a
nd a
cros
s the
he
lidec
k. F
irew
ater
hos
es c
an b
e us
ed to
supp
lem
ent t
he
oper
atio
n of
the
mon
itors
.
Hel
idec
k is
pro
tect
ed b
y w
heel
ed C
O2
and
pow
der
extin
guis
her s
yste
m a
t eac
h ex
it.
Tabl
e 61
4.4:
Haz
ard
Esc
alat
ion
& M
anag
emen
t (co
ntin
ued)
Page �� FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & Development
Figu
re 6
14.1
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page ��
Research & Development
Figu
re 6
14.2
Page �8 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & Development
Figu
re 6
14.3
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page �9
Figu
re 6
14.4
Page �0 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & Development
Figu
re 6
14.5
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page �1
Figu
re 6
14.6
Page �� FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & Development
Figu
re 6
14.7
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page ��
Research & Development
Internal Explosive Loading Of Steel Pipes
Abstract
A programme of numerical, analytical and experimental studies is being carried out at the University of Liverpool on seamless steel pipes 9.5 mm thick with an outside diameter of 324 mm subjected to internal explosive loading. The objective of the study, which is sponsored by AWE plc, Aldermaston, is to determine the failure mechanism of such a pipe under very high rates of loading. The loading imparted to a vessel wall arising from the detonation of a high explosive is sensitive to the charge shape. Numerical simulations have shown that for the same charge weight, a cylindrical shaped charge produces more deformation than the equivalent sphere. A Johnson-Cook strength model in the numerical simulation gives good agreement with test data.
Keywords: containment vessel, impulsive loading, seamless steel pipes, numerical simulations, high explosive tests
Notation
h wall thickness t time
I impulse ta pulse arrival time
i specific impulse ur radial displacement
l explosive length εθ hoop strain
M mass per unit area εy yield strain
Po peak pressure ρ material density
Ri cylinder inner radius σL longitudinal stress
r explosive radius σθ hoop stress
T pulse duration σy yield stress
Introduction
There is no recognised standard and no formal procedures, certainly in the EU, for the design of pressurised vessels to contain explosive or impulsive loading arising from the detonation of high explosive charges, initiation of energetic substances or ignition of a flammable gas. A preliminary design approach has been advanced over the last few years by the development of a draft case in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code - VIII [1] for impulsively loaded vessels. These vessels are typically used for explosive hydrodynamic testing, blast effects testing of structures and hazardous testing of pressurised equipment where a protective barrier is essential.
A programme of numerical, analytical and experimental studies is being carried out at the University of Liverpool on seamless steel pipes 9.5 mm thick with an outside diameter of 324 mm. The objective of the study, which is sponsored by AWE plc, Aldermaston, is to determine the failure mechanism of such a pipe when subjected to very high rate loading. The
data generated from the experiments will be used to validate numerical and analytical models. The underpinning knowledge gained from these studies may be used to develop a methodology for the design of vessels to contain dynamic loading.
The purpose of this paper is to present the background to this work and some preliminary results at the time of writing.
Background
The sudden release of energy following the detonation of a high explosive results in the propagation of a shock wave through the explosive material. This sudden release of energy occurs in a very short time of the order of microseconds and leads to the generation of a pressure wave characterised by a peak overpressure, P0, and exponential decay in pressure as the shock front passes. A typical pressure-time history for a high explosive such as TNT, when detonated in a confined space is illustrated in Fig. 615.1. The pressure wave is reflected by the walls of the containing structure to give successive repeated pulses of decreasing magnitude.
Fig 615.1: Characteristics of a typical contained high explosive pressure loading imparted on a vessel wall
A containment vessel, when subjected to explosive impulse large enough to cause yielding but not enough to cause rupture, will deform plastically up to a maximum strain upon which subsequent motion is elastic involving both radial oscillations and other vibrations. This is non-uniform due to internal pressure reflections affecting the loading on different parts of the shell and the action of stress waves through the material. The impulse is over within microseconds but the wall response takes milliseconds to occur. This large difference between explosion loading time and vessel response time defines the loading imparted on the vessel wall as being impulsive. Although explosion pulses result in a peak overpressure followed by exponential decay, it is the magnitude of the impulse rather than
R615
Page �� FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
the peak pressure that is significant with regard to the vessel response. Further considerations of blast effects on structures arising from an explosion are given in [2].
Theoretical Analyses
A few key papers and studies are reported here as they form the platform from which the current study is conducted.
In 1961, Baker [3] studied the vibration modes of spherical shells. He was able to calculate the first four normal modes and found they closely approximated to those found experimentally, attributing the differences to the non-uniform shape of the spherical shell. The vibration modes of containment vessels are of interest as it is the superposition and interaction of these modes with closely spaced frequencies that are reported to be the mechanism of elastic “strain growth” [4]. These closely spaced frequencies produce a phenomenon known as “beating”.
In 1958, Baker [5] presented the small deflection theory for the dynamic response of an elastic spherical shell subjected to an internal explosion from a centrally located spherical charge and later went on to develop a similar analysis for the elastic-plastic response of spherical vessels [6]. In both these papers, the pressure-time history of the blast was idealised as a triangular pressure pulse, Fig. 615.2.
Fig 615.2: Idealised triangular pressure pulse
Youngdahl [7] carried out studies in 1969 on long, rigid-perfectly plastic cylinders subjected to internal ring loads of various arbitrary pulse shapes. He found that the dynamic effect of the pulse shape is almost completely characterised by the impulse and effective load (impulse divided by twice the mean pulse duration). His findings showed that the pulse shape and the peak overpressure have little importance in determining the plastic deformation of the shell.
Duffey and Krieg [8] carried out a study of the effects of strain-hardening and strain-rate sensitivity on the transient response of elastic-plastic rings and long cylinders. They also studied
the influence of the pressure pulse. Comparing the rigid-plastic solution to the elastic-plastic solution gave results that were within 20% of each other when the ratio of plastic to elastic energy absorbed was greater than about three.
The method proposed by Duffey and Mitchell [9] assumes that the material is rigid- perfectly plastic, displacement is focussed at the middle of the cylinder where the explosive is located, the material is not sensitive to strain hardening or strain rate effects and no axial deformations occur during the loading. The equation of motion for a cylinder under a uniform impulse subjected to an idealised triangular pressure pulse with zero rise time and duration T, equation (1), is solved for certain boundary conditions. For simplicity the membrane hoop stress is equated to the material yield stress.
where ρ is the material density, σy is the yield stress, Ri is the inner radius, h is the wall thickness, t is the time, ur is the wall radial displacement, Po is the peak overpressure and T is the pulse duration.
The analytical procedure evolves a relation for the radial displacement written as
After the pressure pulse has passed, the equation of motion reduces to
Solving equation (3) by integration gives
Maximum deformation occurs at zero wall velocity for
Using the impulse relation 2I = PoT and tmax in equation (4), the maximum radial displacement is given as
If the loading approaches an ideal impulse, i.e. the impulse is held constant, the pressure pulse duration is reduced and the peak overpressure increased, the maximum hoop strain, εθ(max) = ur/Ri, is found to be
ρRih +σyh = Po - Ri,d2ur
dt2PotT( ) (1)
ur = - - , 0 ≤ t ≤ TPot
2
2ρhPot
3
6ρhTσyt
2
2ρRi
(2)
ρRih + σyh = 0, t > Td2ur
dt2(3)
ur = - + - , t > Tσyt
2
2ρRi
PoTt2ρh
PoT2
6ρh(4)
tmax =PoTRi
2σyh(5)
ur(t ) = - max
I2Ri
2ρσyh2
IT3ρh
(6)
εθ( ) = max
I2
2ρσyh2 (7)
Proctor [10] conducted a series of tests on 5 inch diameter stainless-steel cylinders 20 inches long by 0.125 inches thick. For type 304 stainless steel, it was found that the maximum
_
_
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page �5
deformation for marginal containment (defined as the degree of vessel deformation corresponding to the maximum charge weight that can be detonated in a vessel without causing rupture) was approximately 0.6 in/in strain using a spherical 140-gram Pentolite centrally located charge. The equations derived from his experimental analysis were non-dimensional and only usable in the case of water-filled cylinders.
Fanous [11] produced a simplified analysis for shells under impulsive loading causing large deformations. A single-degree-of-freedom analysis together with energy methods were used to predict the final wall displacement of shells in which the deformed shape of the wall and localised loading were assumed. Simplified methods were also used for the prediction of ductility of the shells using an elastic-perfectly plastic model.
In the method proposed by Fanous [11], the impulse is applied over a circular area causing an assumed final deformed shape in the form of an ellipse with the minor radius, a, in the hoop direction and the major radius, b, in the longitudinal direction of the cylinder. The outward radial displacement, ur, at a point with x and y coordinates is written as
where u0 is the maximum displacement normal to the centre of the ellipse. The hoop and longitudinal membrane strains are also assumed to vary with the same deformed shape. The membrane strain energy of deformation is then equated to the impulsive kinetic energy of the loading using the deformed shape function. Bending and shear strain energy are assumed negligible. The material can be idealised as rigid-perfectly plastic or elastic-perfectly plastic. The Von Mises yield criterion was used to relate the membrane stresses to the material yield stress. The analytical procedure evolves a relation for the maximum hoop strain given as
where M is the mass per unit area of the shell.
Clayton [12] produced a paper on the design of vessels for explosion containment. Air blast pressure calculations were combined with a single-degree-of-freedom elastic analysis to determine dynamic magnification factors for the response depending on the natural frequency of the vessel. The paper focuses on designing vessels that will not yield to blast pressures but it has been shown that rule-of-thumb analyses of deformations for given stresses can be used to determine the maximum plastic deformation for basic vessels subjected to impulse loading.
Test on Steel Cylinders
A series of tests will be conducted on seamless 800 mm long, 324 mm diameter, 9.5 mm thick steel open-ended cylinders with an explosive charge centrally located inside the cylinder. The aim of these tests is to characterise the failure process by
increasing the charge size incrementally until rupture occurs. With the pipes being open-ended, some of the complicated effects of blast reflections inside a closed vessel will be reduced. This type of explosion is termed fully vented according to the blast effects design manual TM5-1300 [13].
The cylinder material is API-5LX-42 mild steel which has a minimum yield stress of 42,000 psi (289.6 MPa) and a minimum ultimate tensile stress of 60,000 psi (413.7 MPa). The pipe is seamless and has been manufactured by drawing a hot, pierced billet of steel followed by a cold draw to improve wall thickness and dimensional tolerances. This process leaves residual stress within the pipe walls so material properties need to be characterized by performing tests on specimens made from the pipe. Both static and dynamic characterization of the material will be conducted on specimens taken from the pipe. Material tests so far conducted give the static yield stress as approximately 302 MPa.
Some hydrostatic tests will also be conducted on the pipe sections with closed ends to compare static and dynamic failure modes. These pipe sections will be made 1.0 m long so as to minimise end effects.
Explosion testsThe pipes will be supported horizontally on trestles and slings placed around the pipe. The horizontal alignment is to minimise internal reflections. A cylindrical explosive charge will be located at the centre of the pipe with a detonator connected at each end on the centre of the flat face. The location of these detonators is to ensure the best possible conditions for loading symmetry and amplify the impulsive loading due to two shock waves interacting at the centre of the pipe, a process known as shock shearing. Fig. 615.3 shows the experimental setup for the explosive tests.
Fig 615.3: Experimental arrangement of explosive pipe tests
InstrumentationDynamic pressure gauges will be mounted in the pipe wall approximately 100 mm from each end of the pipe section with suitable protection against debris impact and vibration compensation to differentiate between ringing of the pipe and the pressure loading. Post-yield strain gauges will also be attached to measure hoop strain at the middle of the pipe section. As it is uncertain how the strain gauges will perform under high accelerations, their use may be restricted to tests with smaller charge sizes. De-bonding of the gauge is the concern here. The data will be captured on a transient recorder and high speed photography (on tests with smaller charge sizes).
ur = u0 1- -x2
a2y2
b2[ ] (8)
εθ= +3i2
8Mhσy
εy
2 (9)0
Page �� FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
ResultsThe tests will be conducted at the HSL Buxton field site. At the time of writing, two tests have been conducted with charge sizes of 0.6 and 0.8 kg of PE4. Fig.615.4 shows the first of the test pipes after explosive loading with 0.6 kg PE4. In both the tests, large plastic deformation occurred without failure. Further tests will be conducted incrementing the charge size in steps of about 0.2 kg until rupture occurs.
Fig 615.4: Test cylinder suspended on slings after internal explosive loading (0.6 kg of PE4)
Numerical Analysis
A 2-D simulation of the explosive test was conducted using the ANSYS AUTODYN non-linear dynamic analysis computer code [14] originally developed by Century Dynamics, Inc. The pipe was constructed as a Lagrange mesh in which the elements move due to the applied forces whereas the air and explosive charge were modelled using an Euler grid through which materials can move. The Euler grid was optimised first using a fixed-density Lagrange mesh for a fixed mass of explosive. The Lagrange mesh was then optimised using the optimum Euler grid.
The 2-D axisymmetric representation of the pipe after loading is given in Fig. 615.5, showing the position of the radial displacement gauge measurement points #6-10 at 80 mm intervals from the centre of the pipe.
The transient gauge displacements are given in Fig. 615.6 where the radial displacement (Y) is measured from the axial centreline of the pipe also shown in Fig.615.5.
The 2-D axisymmetric representation of the pipe after loading is given in Fig. 615.7, showing the position of the pressure gauge measurement points #1-5 at 80 mm intervals from the middle of the pipe. Comparison of the pressure-time profiles for gauge #1 and #2 are given in Fig. 615.8.
Fig 615.5: 2-D representation of the pipe in AUTODYN with radial displacement measurement points #6-10
Fig 615.6: Transient gauge displacements up to 7 msec after detonation.
Fig 615.7: 2-D representation of the pipe in AUTODYN with pressure measurement points #1-5 (Euler gauges do not move with Lagrange deformation)
(a)
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page ��
Fig 615.8a & b: Pressure-time profiles of (a) gauge #1 and (b) gauge #2
Parametric studiesThe simulations in AUTODYN were conducted with two material strength models, namely von Mises and Johnson-Cook [15]. The Johnson-Cook material model has been shown to be well suited for taking account of the combination of thermal softening due to high rate loading, strain hardening and strain rate effects in metals. The form of the Johnson-Cook relation is given in equation (10) below,
where, in the first bracketed term, A is the material yield stress at a strain rate of 1s-1, and B and n represent the strain hardening constant and the strain hardening exponent, respectively. These constants are determined from tensile test data. The next bracketed term considers the strain rate effects on the material. Constant C represents the strain rate constant which is determined from experiments at high strain rates using a split Hopkinson pressure bar. The final bracketed term gives an expression to account for thermal effects on the material.
The Johnson-Cook material constants were taken from the nominal properties for class 4340 steel as there are no quoted values for class API-5LX-42 steel in the literature. The results of simulations using the above two material models with varying charge sizes are shown in Fig. 615.9 together with the experimental data. It shows that rate effects are very significant and demonstrates the importance of obtaining actual dynamic material properties at the appropriate strain range and strain rates from characterisation tests for inclusion in numerical and analytical models.
A number of simulations were carried out to study the effect of varying the charge dimensions on the loading and response. As the explosive is in cylindrical form, there are two dimensions that can be varied, namely the cylinder diameter or radius and length. As the r/l decreases, both the peak pressure and impulse increase considerably.
The plastic strain in the pipe wall for different charge dimensions and same mass is given in Fig. 615.10. An analysis for a spherical charge of the same mass was also carried out for comparison and is shown in Fig. 615.10. The spherical charge detonated at the centre of the mass produces less deformation than its equivalent cylindrical charge detonated from both ends. The point of detonation and hence the shock transmission through the explosive material significantly affects the impulsive loading. The results of varying the charge dimensions on pipe wall deformation are illustrated in Fig. 615.11.
Fig 615.9: Comparison of the strength models and experimental data points based on the maximum plastic strain for different charge masses
Fig 615.10: Results of changing the cylindrical dimensions of a 1kg explosive charge
σ = [A +Bεn] [1 +C 1nε *] [1 - T *m]. (10)
Fig 615.11a/b: Extent of deformation for a 1kg charge with (a) r/l = 2 and (b) r/l = 1/6
(a)
(b)
(b)
Page �8 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Research & Development
Comparison of resultsApproximate analyses were performed on the pipes using different analytical models proposed by Duffey and Mitchell [9], Fanous [11] and Clayton [12] previously discussed in brief. In each case, TM5-1300 [13] was used to determine the impulse acting on the vessel wall and the other equation parameters were determined from the nominal pipe material properties and dimensions. Each analysis is based on certain assumptions such as rigid-plastic or elastic-plastic ideal material behaviour, pulse shape of the blast wave and in the case of Fanous [11] the impulsive loading area was a circle of equivalent diameter to the spherical explosive charge diameter. The results are given in Fig. 615.12. Since the AUTODYN results are for a cylindrical charge shape detonated at either end and the theoretical results are for a spherical charge detonated at the centre, it was deemed appropriate not to make a direct comparison. Normalization of the results will be attempted for future comparisons.
Fig 615.12: Theoretical approximations for the maximum plastic hoop strain in a cylindrical pipe under internal impulsive explosive loading for varying charge weight
References
1. ASME BPVC-VIII (2007) Section VIII - Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels Division 1, ASME.
2. Schleyer GK (2004) ‘Predicting the effects of blast loading arising from a pressure vessel failure - a review’. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part E: Journal of Process Mechanical Engineering, 218 (4), 181-190.
3. Baker, W.E. (1961) ‘Axisymmetric Modes of Vibration of Thin Spherical Shell.’ Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 33 (12), 1749-1758.
4. Duffey, T.A. and Romero, C. (2003) ‘Strain Growth in Spherical Explosive Chambers Subjected to Internal Blast Loading.’ International Journal of Impact Engineering, 28, 967-983.
5. Baker, W.E. and Allen, F.J. (1958) ‘The Response of Elastic Spherical Shells To Spherically Symmetric Internal Blast Loading.’ Proceedings of the 3rd U.S. National Congress of Applied Mechanics, ASME, New York, 79-87.
6. Baker, W.E. (1960) ‘The Elastic-Plastic Response of Thin Spherical Shells to Internal Blast Loading.’ Journal of Applied Mechanics, 27 (1), 139-144.
7. Youngdahl, C.K. (1969) ‘The Equivalence of Dynamic Loads for the Final Plastic Deformation of a Tube.’ Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Pressure Vessel Technology, CONF690906, 1, 89-100.
8. Duffey, T. and Krieg, R. (1969) ‘The Effects of Strain-Hardening and Strain-Rate Sensitivity on the Transient Response of Elastic-Plastic Rings and Cylinders.’ International Journal of Mechanical Sciences, 11, 825-844.
9. Duffey, T. and Mitchell, D. (1973) ‘Containment of Explosions in Cylindrical Shells.’ International Journal of Mechanical Sciences, 15, 237-249.
10. Proctor, J.F. (1970) ‘Containment of Explosions in Water-filled Right-circular Cylinders.’ Journal of Experimental Mechanics, 10 (11), 458-466.
11. Fanous, F. (1988) ‘Simplified Analysis for Impulsively Loaded Shells.’ Journal of Structural Engineering, 114 (4), 885-899.
12. Clayton, A.M. (2006) ‘Preliminary Design of Vessels to Contain Explosions’, Proceedings of 11th International Conf on Pressure Vessel Technology, PVP2006-ICPVT11-93735, Vancouver.
13. U.S. Department of the Army (1990), ‘Structures to resist the effects of accidental explosions’, Army TM5-1300, Navy NAVFAC P-397, AFR 88-22. Washington DC: Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
Conclusions
In an attempt to explore the failure process of containment vessels subjected to internal explosive loading, a series of full-scale field tests on steel pipes combined with numerical and analytical modelling has commenced with funding from AWE. The aim is generate experimental data from which failure criteria and a failure model can be developed. This in turn may be used to underpin the design codes. Material behaviour and rate effects are dominant factors that affect the response of the vessel considerably. Hence, it is important to be able to define and model the material properties as accurately as possible in the simulation. Definition of the loading is also an important consideration and could lead to large discrepancies if the dynamic properties of the explosive material and sensitivities to parameters such as charge shape are not taken into account. Simulations have shown that for the same charge weight, more deformation occurs as the geometry of the charge defined by r/l decreases.
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page �9
14. ANSYS AUTODYN v.11 (2006) Explicit Software for Non-linear Dynamics. ANSYS, Inc., www.ansys.com.
15. Johnson, G.R. and Cook, W.H. (1985) ‘A Constitutive Model and Data for Metals Subjected to Large Strains, High Strain Rates and High Temperatures.’ Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Ballistics, The Hague, 541-547.
Acknowledgements
The sponsorship by AWE plc and EPSRC (DTA) has enabled this work to be carried out and is gratefully acknowledged.
For further Information, please contact:
GK Schleyer, N Rushton, University of Liverpool, Department of Engineering, LiverpoolT: +44 (0) 1517 944 825E: [email protected] ClaytonConsultantS ThompsonAWE plc, Aldermaston, Reading, UK
Page �0 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Introduction
The 8th American Society of Safety Engineers - Middle Eastern Chapter (ASSE-MEC) conference on Safety was held in the Kingdom of Bahrain between the 16th and the 20th of February 2008. With a variety of topics including behavioral change, human factors, safety cultures, risk assessment, fires and explosions; the conference was well attended by all stakeholders in the oil and gas industry in the Gulf Region. There were several keynote speakers including Mr. Leo Carey, Vice President of the National Safety Council (USA), and Mr. Geoffrey Podger Chief Executive of the Health and Safety Executive (UK).
The first day addressed issues such as Sustainable SHE solutions, integrated management systems, quality related prequalification program for contractors, anti terrorism standards of US chemical facilities, near-miss analysis, root cause analysis and accident investigation, risk criteria, security risk assessment for the oil and gas industry, selection of hazard evaluation techniques, financial risk analysis.
The second day of the conference had papers on eliminating injury and error through safety awareness and training, behavioral based safety, fire and explosion risk reduction measures, dust explosion hazard assessment, risk based decision making, electrical hazards and electrical safety, explosion modeling for refinery control buildings, electrostatic hazards.
The third day of the conference had papers on job safety analysis, project risk management review, developing hazardous materials response teams, hazards of summer during construction and plant maintenance.
An exhibition took place together with the technical sessions where numerous training companies were offering their services to the major oil and gas companies in the Region.
The remainder of this article will briefly discuss one of the important issues that was addressed in the conference, namely risk criteria societal risk. Future articles may address other topics of interest to FABIG members such as selection of hazard evaluation techniques, fire and explosion risk reduction measures and explosion modelling of refinery control buildings.
ALARP Framework for Tolerability of Risk
The currently used framework for management of risk, as devised by the HSE, identifies three regions of risk as set out
Research & Development
R616 American Society of Safety Engineers – Middle East Chapter (ASSE-MEC) Conference in Bahrain addresses Globally Important Issues to the Oil and Gas Industry
by the HSE’s tolerability risk paper [1] and the Royal society Study Group on Risk Assessment [2]. In these documents the following three regions of risk are identified, as shown in Figure 616.1.
• A region where the risk is so great or the outcome so unacceptable that it must be refused altogether. This is termed the Unacceptable Region.
• A region where the risk is, or can be made, so small that no further precaution is necessary. This is termed the Broadly Acceptable Region.
• A Region where the risk falls between the above two regions, and where the risk can only be considered to be acceptable if it has been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable. This is termed as the ALARP Region. It is possible to demonstrate that risks have been reduced to ALARP by showing that all risk reduction measures have been implemented except those whose cost is disproportionate to their benefit. The mechanism for proving ALARP is discussed in more detail in following sections.
Fig 616.1: Three Regions of risk, including the ALARP Region
In the context of the above discussion, the measures that are used for risk are usually deaths. The HSE and industry at large differentiates between individual risk and societal risk, each having different limits for the broadly acceptable and the unacceptable risk regions.
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page �1
Individual riskThe risk to any particular individual, either a worker or a member of the public, is referred to as the individual risk. A member of the public is defined as either anybody living at a defined radius from an establishment, or somebody following a particular pattern of life.
Societal riskThe term societal risk refers to the total harm suffered by a whole population and to the future whole communities. The risk to a society as a whole, societal risk, may be measured for example by the likelihood of a large accident causing a defined number of deaths or injuries. In other words it is the risk of an accident resulting in multiple fatalities. Societal risk encompasses multiple injuries to the public (public risk) and multiple injuries to workers (worker risk).
Intolerability Criteria for Individual and Societal RiskIntolerable Risk to Individual Worker The Royal Society Study Group [2] and the HSE document on Reducing Risks Protecting People [3] proposed criteria for individual fatality risk. The figure suggested for the tolerable risk was one in a thousand annually (Paragraph 132, Page 46, Reference [3]) even where the person exposed ‘judged he had some commensurate benefit’ such as for example in work place or a leisurely activity. The same figure was recommended by the HSE in the Tolerability Paper [1]. The figure of 1 in 1000 was explicitly related by the Royal Society Study Group [2] and the HSE Tolerability paper [1] to contemporary experience at the time, and thus it is similar to the risk borne by high risk groups at risk in mining.
Intolerable Risk to Individual Member of PublicHowever, the above value on tolerability of individual risk is not universal, in the sense that it does not apply to situations in which the benefit, if any, enjoyed by those at risk is indirect at best; and there may be other detriments or amenity. In such cases the upper limit for intolerability should then be much lower than the figure of 1 in 1000 for workers. The HSE document [3] suggests that the maximum level of risk that should be tolerated for any individual member of the public from any large scale industrial hazard should be at least ten times lower than that tolerated by workers, i.e. it should be equal to or lower than 1 in 10000. Such a risk would equate to the average annual risk of dying in a traffic accident.
Intolerable Societal RiskCriteria for individual risk are necessary but cannot by themselves always be a sufficient condition. There is an additional element of public aversion to risk of an event which might cause multiple fatalities. In addition, in some circumstances the individual risk condition might well be satisfied while there is still an unacceptable large societal risk.
In a comparison carried out by the HSE [4] on the intolerability level for societal risk, it was concluded that there are no readily deducible and uniformly applicable upper level of acceptable societal risk. The figure varies from industry to industry
depending upon judgement involving other factors specific to each case.
Nevertheless, the HSE [3] (Paragraph 136, Page 47) has adopted the criteria below (some of which may come under review) for addressing societal concerns arising when there is a risk of multiple fatalities occurring in one single event. These criteria were developed through the use of the FN curves (frequency of event versus number of fatalities corresponding to an event) corresponding to past accidents. These criteria are considered to be applicable only to risks from major industrial installations. The HSE proposes that the risk of an accident causing the death of 50 people or more in a single event should be regarded as intolerable if the probability of occurrence of such an accident is estimated to be more than one in five thousand per year (2 x 10-4).
Acceptable Criteria for Individual and Societal RiskThe HSE document Reducing Risks, Protecting People [3] (Paragraph 130, Page 45) states that an individual death of one in a million per year for both workers and the public corresponds to a very low level of risk and should be used as a guideline for the boundary between the broadly acceptable and tolerable regions. This figure becomes acceptable in view of statistics showing annual risk of death corresponding to various activities and industry sectors where it can be seen that the background level of risk in the environment we inhabit is appreciable – typically a risk of death of one in a hundred per year averaged over a lifetime. A residual level of risk of one in a 1000000 is extremely small when compared to this background level of risk.
There are no additional concerns related to societal concerns, therefore a value of one in a 1000000 is used as the value of risk between the broadly acceptable risk region and the tolerable risk region, for both individual risk (worker and public) and societal risk. Figure 616.2 (overleaf) presents the various limits discussed in the sections above.
Research Report RR489 [5], which was published in 2006 by the SCI, provides a comprehensive review of the ALARP framework, the various tolerability limits and the process through which ALARP may be demonstrated.
Specific Issues Related to Societal Risk
There are two main points which must be highlighted when comparing the approach to assessing societal risk in comparison to that used for assessing individual risk:
1. The individual risk criteria are usually expressed in terms of the Individual Risk Per Annum (IPRA); while more than one representation is often used for expressing societal risk [6], [7].
2. The intolerable criteria mentioned above for societal risk is not universally acceptable nor universally used.
Page �� FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Different Representations of Societal RiskSocietal Risk is often expressed in terms of one or more out of three commonly used representations:
1. F-N curves [6], [7] which shows number of fatalities versus frequency of events with N or more fatalities per year.
2. PLL Criteria [5], [6], [7] where the frequency of an event and the corresponding number of fatalities are combined into one number to produce the Potential Loss of Life (PLL). Usually this is used in the ALARP demonstration to determine the change in the Potential Loss of Lives (∆PLL) due to variety of risk reduction measures.
3. Risk Contour Criteria where iso-risk contours are plotted to represent the geographical variation of risk for an individual who is positioned at a particular location for 24 hours per day, 365 days a year [6]. This risk representation is also referred to as Location-Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) [7].
In the absence of commonly used regulatory criteria, different operators use different methods for representing societal risk.
Various Intolerable Criteria for Societal RiskThe variation in the regulatory criteria for societal risk is reported to be very wide and is reported to span a factor of a 100 [6]. In the absence of any such criteria being set by the regulator, various operators have set their own criteria for their facilities.
The Next Step Forward? Integrating QRA into a Decision Making Tool
Cavanagh et al [8] identify a main weakness of current QRA procedures, namely that they tend to provide a snapshot
(at a specific time) of the risks associated with a particular installation under a particular set of conditions. This is contrasted against the desire of operational managers of various facilities to have at their disposal quantitative real time risk data, rather than static assessments, to support their decision making in an ongoing process.
The authors developed a method to make decision making easier by having all the necessary data continuously linked to the organisations risk management console. In this manner the risk framework can be used as a continuous monitor of real time risks.
Conclusions
The wide consensus found in the industry in its treatment of individual risk is lacking when attempting to address societal risk where there is a clear and wide variation in the criteria used for the intolerability limit for societal risk.
This in turn leads to an inconsistent approach in the application of the ALARP methodology for risk assessment and reduction and may lead to variations in the risk reduction philosophy within the same country as different companies use their own societal risk criteria.
Recommendations
Notwithstanding current industry initiatives led by the Centre for Chemical Process Safety in the USA for developing criteria for a framework for establishing safety risk tolerance criteria, there is a need for industry efforts to be directed at:
1. Review the legitimate reasons why such criteria have not been universally developed and accepted so far, in contrast to the individual risk case, and
Fig 616.2: Risk tolerability limits for societal and individual risk
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008Page ��
2. To develop criteria for societal risk that will be broadly acceptable to all stakeholders within society.
References
1. The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations. London, HMSO, 1988.
2. Risk Assessment. Report of a Royal Society Study Group. London, The Royal Society, 1983.
3. Reducing Risks, Protecting People, HSE’s decision-making process, HSE Books, Health and Safety Executive; 2001.
4. Quantified Risk Assessment: Its input to Decision Making, Health and Safety Executive, 1989
5. HSE Research Report RR 489, Structural Strengthening of Offshore Topside Structures as Part of explosion Risk Reduction Methods, Fadi Hamdan, The Steel Construction Institute, 2006.
6. Risk Criteria – When is low enough good enough, Ahmad Al-Kudmani and Steve Lewis, Risktec Solutions Limited, American Society of Safety Engineers – Middle East Chapter 2008 Conference, Bahrain, Paper No. ASSE-MEC-0208-22, pp.145-152.
7. A Guide for Quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations, Principal Author: John Spouge, Publisher: The Centre for Marine and Petroleum Technology (1999).
8. Integrating Risk into your Plant Lifecycle – A next Generation Software Architecture for Risk Based Operations, N. Cavanagh J. Linn and C. Hickey, DNV Software London, American Society of Safety Engineers – Middle East Chapter 2008 Conference, Bahrain, Paper No. ASSE-MEC-0208-47, pp.317-325.
For further information, please contact:
Fadi HamdanManaging Partner, MAVEN SarlSarooulla Bldg, 10th Floor, Hamra Road,Beirut, Lebanon
T: +961-3-360943E: [email protected]
Page �� FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April �008
Conferences
R617 CONFERENCES, SEMINARS AND COURSES
Title Dates Venue Contact Tel/Fax Number
Asset Integrity and Hazard Management of Ageing Installations
11th Jun 2008Institution of Structural Engineers, London
Julia HodgeEmail: [email protected]
+44 (0) 1344 636546+44 (0) 1344 636570
Asset Integrity and Hazard Management of Ageing Installations
12th Jun 2008Hilton AberdeenTreetops Hotel,Aberdeen
Julia HodgeEmail: [email protected]
+44 (0) 1344 636546+44 (0) 1344 636570
FABIG Events
Title Dates Venue Contact Tel/Fax Number
Effective Emergency Response - Essential in a Modern Economy
10 Apr 2008Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
JOIFF Secretariat Email: [email protected]
+353 872 429 675
4 Day Symposium and Workshop - Hazards XX - Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Harnessing Knowledge - Challenging complacency
14 Apr 2008
Weston Building, University of Manchester, UK
Mike AdamsEmail: [email protected]
+44 (0) 1539 732845
5 Day Course - Design and Assessment of FPSOs 14 Apr 2008
Al Manzil Hotel Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Modupeola OsinugaEmail: [email protected]
+234 1 2711282, +234 1 4761303, +234 802 5367955
Engineering answers 08Computational fluid dynamics for the oil and gas industry
24 Apr 2008AVC Media Enterprises, Aberdeen, UK
Donna JohnstonEmail: [email protected]
+44 (0) 1224 651831
UKELG Meeting on Hazards from Flame Acceleration and Transition to Detonation
13 May 2008
Shell Technology Centre ThorntonChester
Swarnendo RoyEmail: [email protected]
+44 (0) 151 373 5563+44(0) 151 373 5058
External Events