1 LLLLegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagle November 2012

November 2012

In this issue:

���� New DCF

Reporting

� � � � Contempt

of Cop

���� Terry Stop

Detention

���� Right to

Remain Silent

Legal Eagle

Published by:

LegalEagleServices.net

West Palm Beach, FL

33401

B. Krischer, Editor

A Newsletter for the Criminal Justice Community

Federal law enforcement authorities

were investigating Melvin Colon,

Joshua Meregildo, and others for a

RICO violation arising from unlaw-

ful drug activities and weapons vio-

lations. The agents sought a search

warrant for Colon’s Facebook profile

which contained evidence of the ille-

gal enterprise. The source of the in-

formation for the search warrant was

a Facebook “friend.”

The federal agents viewed Colon’s

Facebook profile through the Face-

book account of one of Colon’s

“friends” who was a cooperating

witness. By that means, the agents

learned that Colon posted messages

regarding prior acts of violence,

threatened new violence to rival gang

members, and sought to maintain the

loyalties of other alleged members of

Colon’s gang. Access to Colon’s

Facebook profile formed the core of

the prosecution’s evidence of proba-

ble cause supporting its application

for the search warrant. Colon moved

to suppress evidence seized from his

Facebook account pursuant to the

search warrant. The District Court,

trial court, denied his motion.

Issue:

Does the Fourth Amendment prohib-

it the seizure of personal information

posted on a web site through the use

of a cooperating witness that has

access to that information? No.

Facebook:

Facebook is a social networking ser-

vice and website that allows regis-

tered users to create a personal pro-

file, add other registered users as

“friends,” join interest groups, and

post photographs with names and

descriptions. The scope and the

amount of personal information that

can be part of a registered user’s

personal profile is virtually limitless-

including contact information, lists

of personal interests, photographs,

and videos.

Expectation of Privacy:

Facebook, and social media general-

ly, present novel questions regarding

their users’ expectations of privacy.

Facebook users may decide to keep

their profiles completely private,

share them only with “friends” or

more expansively with “friends of

friends,” or even disseminate them to

the public at large. Whether the

Fourth Amendment precludes the

Government from viewing a Face-

book user’s profile absent a showing

of probable cause depends on the

user’s privacy settings.

When a social media user dissemi-

Facebook & 4th Amendment

Officers should consult with their agency advisors to confirm the interpretation provided in this publication and to what extent it will affect their actions.

2 LLLLegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagle November 2012

nates his postings and information to

the public, they are not protected by

the Fourth Amendment. However,

postings using more secure privacy

settings reflect the user’s intent to

preserve information as private and

may be constitutionally protected.

The Fourth Amendment guaran-

tees that all people shall be “secure

in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable search-

es and seizures.” A person has a con-

stitutionally protected reasonable

expectation of privacy when he has

both a subjective expectation of pri-

vacy and that expectation is one that

society recognizes as reasonable.

Generally, people have a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the contents

of their home computers. But this

expectation is not absolute, and may

be extinguished when a computer

user transmits information over the

Internet or by e-mail. The courts

have recognized that a person

“assumes the risk” that an email re-

cipient will share its content with

another.

Court’s Ruling:

The District Court’s ruling relied

upon Colon’s security settings,

which did not demonstrate his intent

to preserve his information as pri-

vate. “Here, Colon maintained a Fa-

cebook profile in which he permitted

his Facebook ‘friends’ to view a list

of all of his other Facebook ‘friends,’

as well as messages and photographs

that Colon and others posted to

Colon’s profile. The Government

viewed Colon’s Facebook profile

through the Facebook account of one

of Colon’s ‘friends’ who was a coop-

ernment did not violate the Fourth

Amendment when it accessed

Colon’s Facebook profile through a

cooperating witness.”

Lessons Learned:

First, it is important to understand

that the source of the search warrant

information was from a cooperating

witness’ Facebook account, which

had “friend” status with the defend-

ant’s account. Colon’s Facebook

postings were not examined until

after the search warrant was ob-

tained. The search warrant affidavit

utilized the cooperating witness’

information.

Second, the trial court’s ruling did

not break new ground. Years ago the

U.S. Supreme Court had ruled, “The

risk of being overheard by an eaves-

dropper or betrayed by an informer

or deceived as to the identity of one

with whom one deals is probably

inherent in the conditions of human

society. It is the kind of risk we nec-

essarily assume whenever we speak.”

In Hoffa v. U.S., (S.Ct. 1966), the

Court ruled that the speaker must

assume the risk that the words he

utters into a telephone mouthpiece

will (or at least could) be broadcast

to the world by the person at the oth-

er end of the line, who might be a

government informer. “Neither this

Court nor any member of it has ever

expressed the view that the Fourth

Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s

misplaced belief that a person to

whom he voluntarily confides his

wrongdoing will not reveal it.”

U.S.v.Meregildo

U.S.DistrictCourt,S.D.NewYork

(Aug.10,2012)

erating witness. By that means, the

Government learned that Colon post-

ed messages regarding prior acts of

violence, threatened new violence to

rival gang members, and sought to

maintain the loyalties of other al-

leged members of Colon’s gang.

Access to Colon’s Facebook profile

formed the core of the Government’s

evidence of probable cause support-

ing its application for the search war-

rant.”

“Where Facebook privacy settings

allow viewership of postings by

‘friends,’ the Government may ac-

cess them through a cooperating wit-

ness who is a ‘friend’ without violat-

ing the Fourth Amendment. While

Colon undoubtedly believed that his

Facebook profile would not be

shared with law enforcement, he had

no justifiable expectation that his

‘friends’ would keep his profile pri-

vate. And the wider his circle of

‘friends,’ the more likely Colon’s

posts would be viewed by someone

he never expected to see them.

Colon’s legitimate expectation of

privacy ended when he disseminated

posts to his ‘friends’ because those

‘friends’ were free to use the infor-

mation however they wanted-

including sharing it with the Govern-

ment. See, Guest v. Leis, (6th

Cir.2001) (finding that an e-mail

sender-like a letter writer-loses their

expectation of privacy upon deliv-

ery).”

“When Colon posted to his Face-

book profile and then shared those

posts with his ‘friends,’ he did so at

his peril. Because Colon surrendered

his expectation of privacy, the Gov-

3 LLLLegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagle November 2012 From Palm Beach County Bar Association Newsletter—Oct. 2011

4 LLLLegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagle November 2012

5 LLLLegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagle November 2012

Recent Case Law

“Contempt of Cop”

The police received an anonymous

call reporting a loud argument at

Michael Story’s address. Sgt. Taylor

responded and he proceeded to ask

Storey about the yelling match. Sto-

rey said that he and his wife had

been arguing inside their home, and

that she was no longer home. He

refused to say what the argument

was about, despite Officer Taylor’s

insistence that he was required to do

so. Storey also refused to comply

with Taylor’s order that he step out

of the house. Taylor pulled Storey

out of his house, and handcuffed and

arrested him, explaining “You’re

going to jail because you refuse to

comply because you’ve got a case of

the attitude.” He was charged with

resisting, evading, or obstructing an

officer.

Storey sued Sgt. Taylor for wrong-

ful arrest. The U.S. Court of Appeals

denied the officer qualified

immunity.

Issue:

Was there a legal basis for the arrest

of Michael Story? No. Did the of-

ficer violate his 4th Amendment

rights? Yes.

Qualified Immunity:

Sgt. Taylor argued he was entitled to

qualified immunity. “When a defend-

ant asserts qualified immunity, …the

burden shifts to the plaintiff, who

must clear two hurdles to defeat the

defendant’s motion. The plaintiff

must demonstrate, on the facts al-

leged, that (1) the defendant violated

a constitutional right, and (2) the

right was clearly established at the

time of the alleged unlawful activi-

ty.”

In the end this case was decided

on the basic legal premise that an

officer may not make an otherwise

routine felony arrest in a home with-

out a warrant or exigent circumstanc-

es. Because the law on that issue is,

and was, well defined at the time of

these events the officer was denied

qualified immunity.

Unlawful Arrest:

Police can enter a home without a

warrant only with the voluntary con-

sent of the owner, or a third party

with apparent authority over the

premises, or when exigent circum-

stances exist. To enter a home and

seize an individual for a routine in-

vestigatory purpose, police must

have exigent circumstances and

probable cause, or a warrant, “no

matter whether the seizure is an in-

vestigatory stop or an arrest.”

Sgt. Taylor claimed he had proba-

ble cause to arrest Storey for failure

to obey a lawful order—specifically,

the order to exit the house. Taylor

admitted, however, he did not have

probable cause to believe Storey

committed a domestic-violence-

related offense. The Court of Ap-

peals ruled, “The problem with Tay-

lor’s argument is it relies on the as-

sumption that the order in question

was itself lawful. Absent exigent

circumstances, Taylor had no basis

on which to order Storey out of his

house. Clearly, Storey disobeyed

Taylor’s order to step out of the

house. But a sufficiently coercive

order requiring an individual to

leave his own house counts as a sei-

zure subject to the protections of the

Fourth Amendment.”

“Although the order to ‘step out of

the house’ could be construed as an

investigatory detention rather than a

full arrest, that distinction does not

matter in an individual’s own home,

the ‘sanctity of the home’ lies ‘at the

very core of the Fourth Amendment’

and cannot reasonably be disturbed

absent exigent circumstances. Payton

v. New York, (S.Ct. 1980). (“Even if

an occupant chooses to open the door

and speak with the officers, the occu-

pant need not allow the officers to

enter the premises and may refuse to

answer any questions at any time.”);

United States v. Reeves, (10th Cir.

2008).

The Court concluded, “Thus, the

order was not lawful—and Storey’s

refusal to obey could not justify his

arrest—unless the order was itself

supported by exigent circumstances.”

Exigent Circumstances:

A report of a domestic argument—

standing alone—does not demon-

strate exigent circumstances per se.

United States v. Davis, (10th Cir.

2002). Thus, officers responding to a

report of a domestic dispute must

point to something beyond the mere

6 LLLLegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagle November 2012

ment—without more—that has

ceased by the time an officer arrives,

although relevant to the exigent cir-

cumstances inquiry, does not alone

create exigent circumstances to justi-

fy a warrantless arrest. And, unlike

in the cases cited by Taylor, there are

no additional facts that would signifi-

cantly increase the likelihood of vio-

lence. Accordingly, viewing the facts

in the light most favorable to Storey,

we find Storey’s arrest was not justi-

fied by exigent circumstances.”

In the end the U.S. Court of Ap-

peals found the legal principles un-

derlying Storey’s Fourth Amendment

rights to be clearly established. “It

was also unambiguous that a police

officer must have probable cause to

arrest an individual. And it was also

clear that exigent circumstances were

required. Accordingly, Taylor is not

entitled to qualified immunity.”

Lessons Learned:

The legal principals at work here

have been well delineated since 1980

when the U.S. Supreme Court decid-

ed Payton v. New York. Subsequent-

ly, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals

decided McClish v. Nugent on April

11, 2007. The case has now set forth

a clear statement of the law with

regard to police entry into a home

without a search or arrest warrant, or

exigent circumstances. Accordingly,

any future violation as occurred here

will result in a denial of qualified

immunity for the offending officers.

In sum, the case against them will

not be dismissed and the officers will

have to stand trial for violating the

complainant’s civil rights.

See also, “Arrest at or Just Within

the Threshold of the House,” Legal

Eagle, April, 2010.

Storey v. Sgt. Taylor U.S. Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit

(Oct. 1, 2012)

Terry Stop Detention

Officers responded to a vehicle bur-

glary and upon arrival observe Chris-

topher Hannah emerge from behind a

vacant house half a block away. An

officer inquired as to Hannah’s name

and why he was in the area, exiting

from behind the house. Hannah pro-

vided his name, but was evasive as to

his reasons for being there. A radio

transmission advised the officer that

Hannah was a suspect in another

burglary.

After receiving this information,

Hannah was placed in the back of the

patrol car, without handcuffs, and

transported two houses down to the

crime scene. One of the officers testi-

fied that the distance between the

place where Hannah was stopped

and the crime scene was less than

half a block. When Hannah arrived at

the scene, an officer observed that

Hannah’s shoes appeared to match

the shoe prints on the ground at the

scene. After determining that they

matched, the officers placed Hannah

under arrest for the burglary.

Hannah challenged his arrest argu-

ing that the police officers exceeded

the lawful scope of the investigatory

stop by moving him from the place

where he was initially detained to the

crime scene, half a block away. The

trial court granted his motion. The 1st

D.C.A. disagreed.

fact of an argument to demonstrate

an “objectively reasonable basis to

believe there is an immediate need to

protect the lives or safety of them-

selves or others.”

While Sgt. Taylor was still on

scene Storey’s wife returned to the

house. “Nothing the officers ob-

served about her suggested a risk to

her safety.”

Which again led the court to rule

contrary to Sgt. Taylor, “Even if we

assume exigent circumstances would

have been sufficient for Taylor to

order Storey to ‘step out of the

house,’ the facts here, viewed in

the light most favorable to Storey,

demonstrate a lack of exigent

circumstances.”

Court’s Ruling:

“Here, police responded to an anony-

mous 911 call reporting an alterca-

tion, though in the present case only

loud arguing was reported. When

police arrived, there were no signs of

an ongoing altercation, and the infor-

mation available to the officers did

not indicate violence was imminent.

Taylor claims the fact that Storey’s

wife returned home while they were

questioning Storey could have reig-

nited a volatile situation. We do not

find this particularly probative, how-

ever, given the presence of police

officers and the absence of facts sup-

porting an escalating situation. At

best, this fact was ‘neutral’ and did

not significantly alter the exigent-

circumstances equation since Taylor

did not even ask Storey’s wife to

come to the door before he arrested

Storey.”

“In sum, a report of a loud argu-

7 LLLLegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagle November 2012

Issue:

Did the officers exceed the “Stop and

Frisk Law” by transporting Hannah

away from the place the stop was

initiated? No, as he was moved to a

locale “nearby” the stop.

Stop and Frisk Law:

Section 901.151(3), F.S., commonly

known as the “Stop and Frisk Law,”

codifies the principles set forth in

Terry v. Ohio (S.Ct.1968), and pro-

vides that the scope of an investiga-

tory detention extends to “the place

where it was first effected or the

immediate vicinity thereof.” The stat-

ute does not include a definition for

the term “immediate vicinity,” but

the inclusion of the term in the stat-

ute would seem to demonstrate the

Legislature’s recognition that some

movement of the suspect from the

place where he was initially detained

is permissible.

Further, no Florida court has ex-

pressly construed the term

“immediate vicinity.” One case did

determine, however, whether the

movement of the suspect was within

the “immediate vicinity” of the place

where he was initially stopped. See,

Kollmer v. State, (1DCA 2008).

There, the court held that police of-

ficers exceeded the scope of a lawful

investigatory stop by transporting the

detainee away from the place where

he was initially detained to the scene

of the crime in a police car, wearing

handcuffs, for the victim to identify.

While Kollmer did not provide spe-

cific details regarding the distance

from the place where the suspect was

first stopped to the place that he was

transported, implicit in the court’s

deemed an arrest unsupported by

probable cause. That said, this case

does authorize moving the suspect to

a locale “nearby” the initial stop.

The facts between the two cases,

Kollmer referred to above and this

case, are not even remotely similar.

In Kollmer the police received a re-

port of a car burglary and that the

man fled into a wooded area. K-9

responded, tracked the suspect, and

he was found hiding in another back-

yard. “The man made some move-

ment away from the dog, and Chico

responded with ‘pain compliance,’

biting [defendant] on the stomach.”

He was then cuffed and returned to

the scene to be identified by the

property owner. The D.C.A. found

that the officers had more than rea-

sonable basis to effect the stop of the

suspect, but…”we hold that the of-

ficers exceeded the scope of a lawful

investigatory stop in this case.”

“Regarding investigatory stops,

Florida Statutes, section 901.151(3),

provides, ‘no person shall be tempo-

rarily detained ... longer than is rea-

sonably necessary to effect the pur-

poses of that subsection. Such tem-

porary detention shall not extend

beyond the place where it was first

effected or the immediate vicinity

thereof.’ It appears well settled that

an investigatory stop may not extend

beyond the place of the initial en-

counter: ‘Where ... the detained indi-

vidual is physically removed from

the scene and involuntarily transport-

ed to the police station for question-

ing and/or investigation, the courts

have had little difficulty in constru-

ing such a detention to be a de facto

holding was that the movement of

the detainee was beyond the

“immediate vicinity” of the place

where he was initially stopped.

There are Federal cases that exam-

ine police encounters under the

Fourth Amendment that have found

that the scope of an investigatory

stop is not exceeded when the sus-

pect is moved from the point where

he is first stopped to “a location near-

by.” However, if the suspect is

moved to a location not in close

proximity to where the detainee was

first stopped, then courts have found

that the scope of the investigatory

detention has been exceeded.

Court’s Ruling:

The 1st D.C.A. construed the Federal

rule that a suspect may be transport-

ed to a location nearby to include a

distance of a half a block. “In this

case, Hannah was transported just

half a block from where he was ini-

tially stopped by the police. Based

upon these facts, we conclude that

Hannah’s detention did not extend

beyond the immediate vicinity of the

place where he was initially stopped.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial

court’s order …”

Lessons Learned:

It is important to remember that dur-

ing a Terry stop the suspect is not

your prisoner. You are permitted to

maintain the status quo to ascertain

the individual’s name and the cir-

cumstances of his being abroad. No

more.

As a general rule it is best not to

transport the suspect to the victim’s

location, but rather bring the victim

to your suspect, lest the transport be

8 LLLLegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagle November 2012

lead detective returned to the store

with a photo lineup, the manager

immediately identified Shorter as the

robber and said that he was “100%

sure.” The detective observed the

manager begin to shake and sweat

after identifying Irvin Shorter’s pho-

tograph.

At trial the detective testified that

he advised Shorter of his Miranda

rights, that he understood them, and

he agreed to talk with the detective.

He showed Shorter the photo lineup

that he had shown the manager.

Shorter acknowledged that the man-

ager had circled his picture. The de-

tective next showed Shorter pictures

from the surveillance cameras. The

detective testified that at that point

Shorter stopped making eye contact,

put his head down, and sighed. The

detective then asked Shorter if the

gun in the photos was a real gun or a

toy, to which Shorter responded by

saying, “I don’t see why I should talk

now, you already have these pictures,

what can [Sheriff] Bradshaw do for

me now?” Shorter then asked to go

back to his cell.

The defense argued to the trial

court that the defendant’s actions of

putting his head down and sighing

was his attempt to exercise his right

to remain silent. Additionally, the

defense argued that Shorter’s ques-

tion as to why he should talk to the

detective was a clear indication of

his desire not to talk further with the

detective. The trial court disagreed.

The 4th D.C.A. agreed with the trial

court.

Issue:

Did the defendant clearly and une-

quivocally express his intent to assert

his right to remain silent by putting

his head down and sighing when

confronted with incriminating evi-

dence? No.

Right to Remain Silent:

The law is clear that after a prior

voluntary, knowing and intelligent

waiver of Miranda rights, the police

do not have to stop an interrogation

and clarify an equivocal or ambigu-

ous invocation of Fifth Amendment

rights. Once a suspect voluntarily

waives Miranda rights and begins an

interview by law enforcement, “a

suspect must articulate his desire to

cut off questioning with sufficient

clarity that a reasonable police of-

ficer in the circumstances would

understand the statement to be an

assertion of the right to remain si-

lent.” The determination of whether

a suspect has re-invoked his or her

right to remain silent is analyzed

under the totality of the circumstanc-

es. “A determination of the issues of

both the voluntariness of a confes-

sion and a knowing and intelligent

waiver of Miranda rights requires an

examination of the totality of the

circumstances.”

However, after the defendant

acknowledges that he understands

his rights, and chooses to waive

them, only a clear unequivocal asser-

tion of his right stops the question-

ing. “After a prior voluntary, know-

ing, and intelligent waiver, the police

do not have to stop an interrogation

and clarify equivocal or ambiguous

invocations of Fifth Amendment

rights.” State v. Owen (Fla.1997).

arrest requiring either probable cause

or prior judicial authorization,’

Hayes v. Florida (S.Ct. 1985).”

In the instant case the police trans-

ported the suspect half a block from

the point of initial contact, and im-

portantly did not handcuff him for

the short trip. This is what the Feder-

al courts were referring to when rul-

ing that that a suspect may be trans-

ported to a location nearby.

The exception would be consent

and exigent circumstances. Were the

suspect to agree to accompany the

LEO to the victim, or the victim is

in extremis, stabbed or shot, then

transporting the suspect to the vic-

tim’s location would be legally sus-

tainable. Once again effective report

writing will save the day.

State v. Hannah

1st D.C.A. (Oct. 2, 2012)

Invoking the Right to

Remain Silent

The night manager at a gas station

heard someone enter the store and

demand, “give me the money.” The

manager saw that the man had a gun.

He gave the man approximately $160

that was in the register. The man

demanded more money, so the man-

ager gave him the cash from a shelf

under the register and the money in

the safe. After grabbing the money,

the man fled the scene.

When law enforcement arrived,

the manager described the robber’s

height, weight, and race, and gave a

detailed clothing description. The

manager was able to see the man’s

eyes, nose, mouth, and chin when the

man leaned in close to get the cash

after the safe was opened. When the

9 LLLLegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagleegal Eagle November 2012

law enforcement could offer a deal if

he were to admit guilt. The response

was not an unequivocal or unambig-

uous statement that Shorter wanted

to terminate the interview. When the

detective did not immediately sug-

gest some way in which Sheriff

Bradshaw or law enforcement could

help his situation, Shorter announced

he wanted to return to his jail cell.

We agree with the trial court that the

request to return to his jail cell was

the only articulate statement of suffi-

cient clarity that any reasonable law

enforcement officer would under-

stand to be a desire to terminate the

interview. The trial court made prop-

er evidentiary rulings; we affirm the

trial court on this issue.”

Lessons Learned:

The U.S. Supreme Court in 1994

ruled that a defendant’s invocation of

his right to counsel must be unam-

biguous (Davis v. U.S.). If an ac-

cused makes a statement concerning

the right to counsel “that is ambigu-

ous or equivocal” or makes no state-

ment, the police are not required to

end the interrogation, or ask ques-

tions to clarify whether the accused

wants to invoke his or her Miranda

right to an attorney.”

The Court acknowledged that they

had not as yet applied that ruling to

the right to remain silent. “There is

no principled reason to adopt differ-

ent standards for determining when

an accused has invoked the Miranda

right to remain silent and the Miran-

da right to counsel at issue in Davis.

Both protect the privilege against

compulsory self-incrimination by

requiring an interrogation to cease

when either right is invoked.”

In Berghuis v. Thompkins,

(S.Ct.2010) the defendant, Thomp-

kins, was advised of his rights,

acknowledged his understood them,

and then remained silent for 2 hours

while the detectives asked him ques-

tions. He then acknowledged that he

shot the victim. The Court allowed

his statement in evidence.

“Thompkins did not say that he

wanted to remain silent or that he did

not want to talk with the police. Had

he made either of these simple, un-

ambiguous statements, he would

have invoked his ‘right to cut off

questioning.’ Here he did neither, so

he did not invoke his right to remain

silent.”

n the instant case, Shorter putting

his head down and letting out a sigh

did not invoke his right to remain

silent.

Shorter v. State

4th D.C.A. (Oct. 3, 2012)

Court’s Ruling:

The 4th D.C.A. had no difficulty

finding the defendant’s actions of

putting his head down and sighing

not to be an invocation of his right to

remain silent. “The interview of

Shorter was relatively brief. When

the detective showed still photos of

Shorter from the surveillance camer-

as, Shorter broke eye contact, hung

his head and sighed. Demeanor and

body language indicating a realiza-

tion that the police have incriminat-

ing photographic evidence is not the

same thing as demeanor and body

language indicating a desire to ter-

minate an interview. Shorter’s de-

meanor and body language upon

being shown surveillance photo-

graphs was not behavior a reasonable

law enforcement officer would clear-

ly recognize as an affirmative indica-

tion of the desire to terminate an

interview.”

“When asked if the gun in the pho-

tos was a real gun or a toy, Shorter

responded: ‘I don’t see why I should

talk now, you already have these

pictures, what can [Sheriff] Brad-

shaw do for me now?’ Although one

could infer from the response that

Shorter wished to terminate the inter-

view, one could also infer the re-

sponse was an inquiry as to whether

VOTE: Don’t vote—Don’t complain