failure to communicate r2
TRANSCRIPT
Failure to Communicate ? An opportunity for aviation to do even better
Richard E. Hayden Technology Integration LLC [email protected]
July 14, 2016
CMMC, Chatham, MA
• ~20,000 passenger carrying aircraft today, projected to go to 35,000 in 15-20 years
• ~360,000 general aviation aircraft, including 21,000 “business jets”
• 5000 public use airports in US; 9000 globally • Largest airline is Delta with 850 aircraft carrying 125M
passengers/yr • >100,000 commercial flights per day globally • 1.4M passenger trips daily
Aircraft ops and safety in context
Fear of Flying?
Year Number of accidents per one million departures
2009 4.1
2010 4.2
2011 4.2
2012 3.2
2013 2.8
Type per bn journeys
per bn hours per bn km
Motorcycle 1640 4840 108.9
Foot 40 220 54.2
Pedal cycle 170 550 44.6
Car 40 130 3.1
Water 90 50 2.6
Van 20 60 1.2
Rail 20 30 0.6
Bus 4.3 11.1 0.4
Air 117 30.8 0.05
Accidents Deaths
Type of Flight Fatalities per M flight hrs
Airliner (Scheduled &nonscheduled Part 121) 4.03
Commuter Airline (Scheduled Part 135) 10.74
Commuter Plane (Nonscheduled Part 135 - Air taxi on demand)
12.24
General Aviation (Private Part 91) 22.43
Sources: NTSB Accidents and Accident Rates by NTSB Classification 1998-2007
Odds of being on an airline flight which results in at least one fatality
Odds of being killed on a single airline flight
78 major world airlines 1 in 3.4 million
78 major world airlines 1 in 4.7 million
Top 39 airlines w/ best accident rates 1 in 10.0 million
Top 39 airlines w/ best accident rates 1 in 19.8 million
Bottom 39 w/ worst accident rates 1 in 1.5 million
Bottom 39 w/ the worst accident rates 1 in 2.0 million
Cause 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s All
Total Pilot Error 58 63 44 57 55 57 53
Pilot Error 43 33 25 29 29 34 32
Pilot Error (weather related) 9 18 14 16 21 18 16
Pilot Error (mechanical related)
7 4 5 2 5 5 5
Other Human Error 2 8 9 5 8 6 6
Weather 15 12 14 14 8 6 12
Mechanical Failure 19 19 20 21 18 22 20 Sabotage 5 4 11 12 10 9 8 Other Cause 0 2 2 1 1 0 1
Causes of Fatal Accidents by decade (%)
• Airplanes and navigation- Role of wireless in aviation • Today’s wireless infrastructure, aircraft equipage, and ATC • AF447 • MH370 • Colgan Air • Others • A solution • Institutional issues and barriers to change
Scope
• Cardinal Rules for Pilots 1. Aviate 2. Navigate 3. Communicate
• Aircraft 101 • Lift, drag, flight envelope • Stall & stall recovery • Instruments (the aircraft knows where it is and what condition it is in)
• Navigation 101 • Celestial, inertial, GPS • VFR, IFR • Avoiding other objects
• Passive-charts (now on iPads) • ATC routing • Active: Radar, TCAS, TAWS, ADS-B
• Flight Plans • Great circle routes-the world is not flat
• Communication 101 • HF, VHF, Mode-S, SATCOM • Role of Dispatcher
Airplanes & navigation
Firsts
• 1901: Transatlantic radio signal: Marconi: Cape Cod to England
• 1903: Aircraft flight • 1912: Radio transmission
to/from aircraft (US Navy) (range 15 miles)
• 1919: Transatlantic flight • Chatham connection (aircraft
stopped for repairs) >>
US Naval Air Station-Chatham, MA 1917-1922
US Naval Air Station-Chatham 1917-1922
US Naval Air Station-Chatham 1917-1922
• System • Aircraft Equipage • Infrastructure • Procedures & Protocols
Utilizing Wireless in Aviation
Aircraft equipage
COMMUNICATIONS • HF RADIO • VHF RADIO
• Autopilot • Auto-throttle • TCAS • TAWS • GPS • INS • ADFs • Radar • Transponder • ADS-B • ACARS • CVR/FDR • ELT • EHM systems • Central maintenance
Computer • SVS • ILS
• SATCOM • Inmarsat • Iridium • Ku/Ka band
A note about radar
A note about radar
Antennas
• HF/VHF • Active Steered/High gain;
highly directional
• Passive: Iridium- omni dir.
Tracking: • Primary radar (ground) : 200 mile range (non-cooperative-ping and
reflect) • Secondary radar (ground): 50 -100 mile range (cooperative-ping and
respond) • ADS-B: ground stations (& future satellites) (limited data) • GPS constellation and stationary and mobile receivers
Voice and data communication: • VHF: line of sight • HF: lower frequency=longer travel distances • Satellite
• Geo stationary • Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
Wireless infrastructure
Geo Stationary Satellites Inmarsat “Beams”
Note: Polar axis view Geostationary satellites do not cover the poles (i.e., 70 deg. latitude)
Inmarsat-GEO satellites
Lim
it of
relia
ble
conn
ectiv
ity
Global Star Aircraft IFE (Ku band)
Other SATCOM Coverages
Unique Network in the Sky
• The Iridium network is comprised of a constellation of 66 cross-linked, low earth orbit (LEO) satellites
• Iridium is the only satellite network that provides fully global voice and data communications
• Messages are routed from satellite to satellite and grounded at teleports around the world
• Aircraft connectivity is seamlessly transitioned from satellite to satellite
• The dynamic nature of the Iridium constellation provides added redundancy and exceptional network availability
Iridium constellation provides 100% global service area
© 2014 Iridium Satellite LLC
AF447
• June 1, 2009 • Rio-Paris • 228 on board • Crashed near equator • Flight data recorders
recovered May 2011 after extensive and expensive search
Airbus A330-one of most modern aircraft
AF447
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HJND9CE7Euc
Transcript is revealing:
Crew chose to fly through TPTS* in the ITCZ**
*TPTS : Troposphere Penetrating Thunderstorm **ITCZ: Inter tropical Convergence Zone
• No aircraft defect or failure • No voice communication with flight ops or ATC or nearby aircraft • Failure of crew to understand the situation • Inappropriate crew coordination and response • Time from onset to crash: 6 minutes 20 sec. = time to “get it right”
(BEA later recommended triggered tracking and data transmission: https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf)
Conclusions/Observations AF447
MH370
Boeing 777-200ER (among most modern in world) March 8, 2014
• KL-Bejing • 239 on board • Abrupt turn West • No distress messages or calls • Stopped reporting and did not
respond to repeated queries • Limited data transmitted • Parts found in East Africa
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26503141 Good summary:
Air Asia
Airbus A320 –among most popular
• Bad weather did not play a role in the crash, instead, system malfunction and the crew's response were the contributing factors. The initial faults appear to stem from a rudder control system malfunction, which had occurred 23 times in the year prior to the crash.
• A cracked solder joint on an electric card caused the rudder system to malfunction four times on the Dec. 28, 2014 flight. While the rudder malfunction itself likely would not have led to a crash, a crew member appears to have removed a circuit breaker in an attempt to reset the system — outside of handbook recommendations — causing the autopilot to disengage. After this, the aircraft began to roll, but reports show that no movement was detected on the manual stick for nine seconds.
• The accident report states that this changed the flight control logic from "normal law to alternate law, the rudder deflecting 2 degrees to the left."
• The voice recorder shows an apparent miscommunication between the pilot and copilot. The pilot says, "pull down," but the plane is rapidly ascending at a 54-degree angle of bank, before entering a prolonged stall and plummeting into the Java Sea.
QZ8501
Dec 20, 2014, 162 lost
Colgan Air 3407 EWR-BUF Feb. 12, 2009, 50 fatalities
• Stick shaker (stall warning) activated at 131 knots (aircraft flying too slow) • Autopilot disconnected • Captain reacted with “startle and confusion” • Captain pulled nose to 19 degrees nose up pitch • Stall, extreme roll • Stick pusher (nose down) activated 3 times – each countered by captain’s
actions of pulling up • Loss of control resulted • 2 min 12 sec = time to “get it right” ?
Bombardier DHC-8-400 (Q400) Twin turboprop
• Crew not processing data that is available • Troubleshooting difficulties • No support from ground during troubleshooting and
decision making • Inappropriate actions taken in response • Time available was potentially sufficient to “get it
right” if information was correctly interpreted quickly • Airmanship issues revealed
Common Traits (MH370 excepted)
• Asiana Air 214; B 777; short VFR landing at SFO; “flight crew's mismanagement of the airplane's descent.. [NTSB] ” (July 2014)
• Quantas QS32 - notable for its different outcome; A380 440 Pax; uncontained engine failure; 5 highly-qualified pilots on board to expertly process information, diagnose issues, and prescribe options. Landed safely (Nov. 2010)
• Hypoxia events ending in fatalities • Payne Stewart et al; Lear35 (1999) • Helios Airways Flight 522 (2005) B-737 • Socata TBM 700 –private-(Sept 2014)-ATC slow to respond
Other incidents
The Automated Flight Information Reporting System (AFIRSTM) See:
A solution: real time global alerting, tracking and data connectivity
http://flyht.com/solutions/flyhtstream/
How it works
“Blue Box” Automated reporting Voice & data - 2 way. Connects to Flight Data recorder and other data sources
Global satellite communications (Iridium)
— no gaps or coverage limits
Relays secure information from Blue Box to server and back
Data transformed into timely messages and usable information-
delivered to user IP addresses in seconds
N1XYZ DEPARTED: EGNR AT: 2011-05-16 16:36:26 FOB: 4693
G- XYZ Exceedance: N1 Overspeed Left Engine LIMIT: 99.5 OVER LIM SEC: 25 PEAK: 100.25 GMT: 16:36:05 Location: LAT: 53.184814 LONG: -2.9680176
SAT: 14 PALT: 160 MACH: 0.24 IAS: 159
Simple routing of messages from & to aircraft
Seamless, secure, automatic
Notice: This briefing contains proprietary information and is disclosed to IATA ATTF solely for ATTF evaluation purposes. No dissemination beyond ATTF members is authorized without explicit written approval from FLYHT Aerospace Solutions, Ltd.
Flight tracking-Global View
Alerting - automated without pilot tasking
Maintaining connectivity in extreme attitudes
Conclusion-No loss of data, even at >80deg roll
Issue: If aircraft experiences extreme attitude changes, can a satcom-based (Iridium) triggered position and data transmission system maintain its link?
Actual aircraft position can be compared to flight plan position automatically and autonomously
Detecting Unauthorized Flight Path Deviations- “Dynamic Geofence”
If aircraft leaves the flight plan “tube”, alerts are sent automatically and track and data streaming starts
• As a minimum, we would know exactly what happened and where the aircraft is (in real time)
• Expert support from ground could have advised correct diagnosis and appropriate actions
• If aircraft went down, exact location would have been known ASAP Future issue: Could we take control? Should we? • Technology exists (UAVs, drones) • Protocols • Infrastructure • Expertise in real time? • Security
How could AFIRS have changed things?
• Attitude* (“Not enough people have been killed” (Learmount)) • 40-50 year life of aircraft-technology >> Lowest Common Denominator equipage argument • Unchallenged financial arguments from Industry • International and industry lobbies seek lowest common denominator and misinform politicians and the
public • Rapid expansion globally = shortage of trained crew and ground personnel • Who pays?
• Owner • Operator • Passengers • Insurance companies
• Lack of a comprehensive aviation policy in the US • FAA Reauthorization Act • Largest net export • Critical enabler of commerce and individual lifestyles • Controllers/security/infrastructure
Institutional Issues
• Honest industry/government assessment of actual incremental costs and recovery options (e.g., passengers might pay pennies per flight for the “security blanket”)
• Airlines /operators/insurers pay for cost of searches, not taxpayers
• “OnStar” for Aviation • Semi-private but global and available to all
• Level the playing field: all equipage simultaneously-requires a regulation
• Citizen involvement with and oversight of government
What can be done?
• Wireless is a key enabler of aviation and improved safety and efficiency
• Aviation is very safe but unforgiving if mistakes are made
• The technology for providing real time troubleshooting support to crews is here and now
• Change focus: Prevent the crash vs. record the crash? • More can be done
Summary