Fallacy of Allegations

Against

People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran

(PMOI)

Compiled by:

Anglo-Iranian Community in Greater London

8 November 2005

List of Documents

1. Written statement submitted by Humanitarian Law Project / International Educational Development, Inc., to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, on 21 August 1995 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/NGO/55) HLP/IED expresses distress about the misrepresentation of events in and near the Kurdish region in the spring of 1991, and details events related to a military incursion by Iranian forces to suppress opposition NLA forces and outlines HLP/IED independent investigation and first-hand experience in the region about: relations between the NLA and local Kurdish people and groups; events leading up to the post-war conflict in Iraq in 1991; use of Kurdish uniforms by Iranian forces in attacking NLA forces as attested to by captured Iranian troops; source of allegations against NLA identified as an agent of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence.

2. A Reuters report by Jonathan Wright, on 22 May 2002, quoted then Head of Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq’s International Relations, currently Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hoshiyar Zebari as absolving the Mojahedin of any alleged involvement in the events of 1991 and the conflict in northern Iraq.

Reuters separately obtained a copy of a 1999 legal document signed by a senior official of a major Iraqi Kurdish group that said there was no evidence the Mujahideen took part in the Iraqi government's 1991 campaign against the Kurds. The document, which was part of a lawsuit in the Netherlands, was received on condition that the author and the original recipient remain anonymous. The Iraqi Kurds have regular contacts with the Iranian government. ("We) can confirm that the Mujahedin (sic) were not involved in suppressing the Kurdish people neither during the uprising nor in its aftermath. We have not come across any evidence to suggest that the Mujahedin have exercised any hostility towards the people of Iraqi Kurdistan,"

3. An excerpt from Peyvand, Publication of Political-Cultural Association of Peyvand,

associated with Karim Haqi Moni in the Netherlands - an agent of the Iranian MOIS - recounting in his own words an encounter with Dutch security services and their allegation that he has been identified as an agent of the Iranian regime from his contacts with regime operatives.

4. An excerpt from Jaarverslag Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (Annual Report of the Dutch

Internal Security Service) in 2001, pointing out the activities of the Iranian MOIS in recruiting former members of the PMOI to “spread negative information” and “destabilize the organization and demonize the Mojahedin in the host country and thus end their political and social activities.”

5. An excerpt from the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group report titled, Iran: State of

Terror, in which it is outlined how the regime uses “a small number of defectors who once cooperated” with the opposition to provide information on assassination targets in Europe (such as the assassination of Dr. Kazem Rajavi in Geneva).

6. An excerpt from the Annual Report of the Office for Protection of the Constitution – 1999,

published by the German Bundeministerium der Innern. It is pointed out that:

“The priority aim of the Iranian Intelligence Service VEVAK (Ministry for Intelligence and Security) is to combat Iranian dissidents living in Germany. In departure from the violent approach taken until the mid-1990s - inter alia, attempts on the lives of leading opposition politicians in Western foreign countries, including Germany (175) - VEVAK activities were, as in the previous years, focused on the political neutralization of opposition groups and their anti-regime activities.”

“…the Iranian service initiates anti-MEK publications which in part are published by former MEK activists and have the aim of persuading the readers of these publications to turn their backs upon this organization”

7. A press release by the Iran Policy Committee in Washington, D.C., on 24 October 2005, titled

Iranian Intelligence Agents Sow Seeds of Terrorism in America, revealing a disinformation operation by Iranian Intelligence agents travelling to the US.

8. A UPI press report about the IPC statement on 26 October 2005.

May 22, 2002 US says Iraq-based Iran opposition aids Iraq government By Jonathan Wright WASHINGTON, May 22 (Reuters) - The Bush administration has alleged the Iraqi-based opposition to the Iranian government performs internal security functions for the Iraqi government, adding a new allegation against a group which the United States has called a foreign terrorist organization since 1997. The opposition Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), also known as the People's Mujahideen, dismissed the allegation as Iranian government propaganda. A document obtained separately also appeared to challenge a U.S. claim that the group helped the Iraqi government against a Kurdish uprising after the Gulf War in 1991. The allegations appear in the "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001" report released by the State Department this week and did not appear in the same report in previous years. In a written response, the Mujahideen said: "The new allegation and lies are another gift and 'goodwill gesture' to the religious fascism ruling Iran ". "Astonishingly it has taken eleven years for those who are making these allegations to reach 'the realm of certitude' about the lies that the mullahs' regime has repeated a thousand times," the statement added. Reuters separately obtained a copy of a 1999 legal document signed by a senior official of a major Iraqi Kurdish group that said there was no evidence the Mujahideen took part in the Iraqi government's 1991 campaign against the Kurds.

The document, which was part of a lawsuit in the Netherlands, was received on condition that the author and the original recipient remain anonymous. The Iraqi Kurds have regular contacts with the Iranian government. ("We) can confirm that the Mujahedin (sic) were not involved in suppressing the Kurdish people neither during the uprising nor in its aftermath. We have not come across any evidence to suggest that the Mujahedin have exercised any hostility towards the people of Iraqi Kurdistan," it said. The Mujahideen has a large and well-equipped military force on the Iraqi side of the Iranian border. It receives much of its money from the Iranian community in the United States. Members of Congress sympathetic to the Mujahideen were unavailable to comment on the new allegation, which would tend to discredit the organization in the eyes of many Americans. The Mujahideen challenged its designation as a "foreign terrorist organization" in the U.S. courts and won a partial victory last June when a federal appeals court ruled that the State Department should give such organizations a chance to answer the allegations against them.

Peyvand Publication of Political-Cultural Association of Peyvand ... On February 1, 2000, around 16:30, an agent of the Dutch secret police went to the residence of Haqi in the township of Elst. Subsequent to reading a list of names, the secret police said: “All of you are in contact with the Iranian regime and has set up a major network. We have plenty of information that you are in contact of the Iranian regime and the Iranian regime pays for your publication.”

1. AbolHassan Bani Sadr 2. Alireza Nourizadeh 3. Bahman Niroumand 4. Nasser Khajeh Nouri 5. Parviz Yaghoubi 6. Mehdi Khanbaba Tehrani 7- Mehdi Khoshal 8- Asghar Borzou (Sweden) 9- Bahman Rastgou ( the Netherlands) 10-Jafar Baghal-Nejad (Norway) 11- Hassan Khalaj ( Norway) 12- Abed Haj-Esmail ( Great Britain) 13- Hadi Shams Haeri (the Netherlands) 14- Ghassem (Mohammad Towfiq Assadi, the Netherlands) 15- Hassan Alijani (the U.S.) 16- Karim Haqi Moni (the Netherlands) 17- Ms. Nadereh Afshari ( Germany)

Document 5

Jaarverslag Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst 2001 Iran Het democratiseringsproces in Iran dat met de verkiezing van de hervormingsgezinde president Khatami in 1997 in gang is gezet en met diens herverkiezing in 2001 is bekrachtigd,schrijdt voort.Het land kent echter nog altijd een strijd tussen hervormingsgezinden en conservatieven en moet beschouwd worden als een theocratische republiek.Het buitenlands beleid van Iran kenmerkt zich door -deels succesvolle -pogingen tot normalisering van de betrekkingen met het Westen. Nederland staat niet onwelwillend ten opzichte van toenadering,maar stelt onder meer als voorwaarde dat de mensenrechtensituatie in Iran verbetert. De Iraanse inlichtingendienst MOIS heeft onder andere tot taak personen in het buitenland die in contact staan met oppositionele groeperingen op te sporen en te registreren.(Ex-)aanhangers van de belangrijkste groepering,de Mujahedin-e Khalq (MKO),genieten daarbij bijzondere belangstelling (zie 3.8).De Iraanse autoriteiten beschouwen de MKO als terroristische organisatie en dringen er bij westerse landen op aan de groepering ook als zodanig te bestempelen en te verbieden. Het MOIS probeert met gebruikmaking van leden en ex-leden van de MKO zoveel mogelijk informatie over deze organisatie te verzamelen.Daarnaast krijgen agenten van de Iraanse inlichtingendienst opdracht om negatieve informatie over (individuele leden van)de MKO te verspreiden.Hiermee tracht men de organisatie te destabiliseren en in het gastland in een kwaad daglicht te stellen,waardoor het politieke en maatschappelijk draagvlak voor de beweging verloopt.De MKO,zich van deze activiteiten bewust,komt hiertegen met behulp van een strikt,intern gericht, controleregime in het geweer en brengt als National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI),iedere (vermeende)poging tot penetratie of negatieve berichtgeving van de Iraanse inlichtingendienst onder de aandacht van de autoriteiten in het gastland. _______________________________________________________________________________ Iran(English - Translation) "One of the tasks of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security is to track down and identify those who are in contact with opposition groups abroad. Supporters of the most important opposition group, the People's Mojahedin, is specially under scrutiny of Iranian security service more than any other group." "The Intelligence Ministry tries to gather information on the Mojahedin through its members and ex-members as much as possible. Intelligence Ministry officers are instructed to spread negative information against the People's Mojahedin Organization (and its members). They are trying therefore, to destabilize the organization and demonize the Mojahedin in the host country and thus end their political and social activities. The Mojahedin are aware of these activities. Instead, they are waging an armed struggle against the regime inside the country, while outside the country, through the National Council of Resistance of Iran, they inform the authorities of host countries of the secret activities of Iranian Intelligence Ministry which is trying to spread negative information against them."

Document 3

Bundesministeriumdes Innern

Annual Reportof the Office forProtection of theConstitution

1999

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IV. Activities of Intelligence Services of Coun-tries in the Near/Middle East

Also, the services of several Near/Middle East countries continueto pursue intelligence activities in, and against, Germany. Theirintelligence interest covers the classical areas of espionage - poli-tics, the military, industry, science and technology - and, to aparticular extent, infiltration of, and spying on, organizations orpersons in Germany which/who are in opposition to the govern-ment of their respective country of origin. In order to achievethese ends, they are also prepared to use force which may eveninclude acts of (state-sponsored) terrorism. Also, they are inter-ested in the subject of proliferation.

1. Iranian Intelligence Services

Priority aim: spying onregime opponents

As before, the priority aim of the Iranian Intelligence ServiceVEVAK (Ministry for Intelligence and Security) is to combat Ira-nian dissidents living in Germany. In departure from the violentapproach taken until the mid-1990s - inter alia, attempts on thelives of leading opposition politicians in Western foreign coun-tries, including Germany 175) - VEVAK activities were, as in theprevious years, focused on the political neutralization of opposi-tion groups and their anti-regime activities. The "People’s Muja-hiddin of Iran" (MEK) and its political arm which is active world-wide, the "Nationaler Widerstandsrat Iran" (NWRI - "NationalResistance Council of Iran"), continued to be the focus of theintelligence interest of the Iranian intelligence service.

"Culture Associations" andanti-MEK publications

In its fight against the Iranian opposition-in-exile, VEVAK makesuse of so-called "culture associations". These are cover organi-zations founded as directed by VEVAK and acting in accordancewith Iran’s interests and wishes. In addition, the Iranian serviceinitiates anti-MEK publications which in part are published byformer MEK activists and have the aim of persuading the readersof these publications to turn their backs upon this organization.

Severe harassment as alever

For spying on the MEK, the Iranian intelligence service also re-cruits supporters of that organization and other Iranian nationals.Recruitment mostly takes place during visits by exiled Iranians toIran. When in that country, they will be approached by VEVAKand, in instances, under threat of massive harassment againstthemselves or their relatives in Iran, are compelled to co-operatewith the intelligence service.

On 24 November, the trial began in the Berlin Higher RegionalCourt of Appeal against a 36-year old Iranian national living inGermany for a number of years and arrested in Berlin in July. Hewas under strong suspicion to have spied, as a supposed MEK

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supporter, on leading functionaries and activities of that organi-zation in Germany on behalf of the Iranian intelligence service*).

2. Syrian Intelligence Services

Also the Syrian intelligence services continued their intelligencecollection activities in Germany.

Residencies control thesource and informantnetwork

For the development and control of the source and informantnetwork set up to this end, they run undercover bases estab-lished at the official and quasi-official missions (legal residen-cies). The latter include the Syrian Embassy.

The main tasks of the Syrian intelligence service officers operat-ing from these missions under diplomatic cover are intelligencecollection, and spying on and monitoring of compatriots living inGermany who are critical of the political system in their homecountry. The primary observation sites of Syrian secret servicesinclude the Islamic Centres and mosques whose frequenters areconsidered to be among the political opponents. With the help ofsources and informants, the services attempt to gather informa-tion on the living conditions, contacts and political aims of thesepersons so as to induce them, by using the information thus ob-tained, to abandon their dissident stance.

A case in point concerns a 43-year old Syrian who, after his asy-lum application had been turned down in August 1995, as a walk-in volunteered co-operation with the Syrian intelligence service.Since then, he had maintained intensive intelligence contactswith the resident of the civilian Syrian intelligence service whoheld the cover post of attaché in the Consular Division of theSyrian Embassy. In this context, he procured, and delivered tohis handler, personal data on a large number of ethnic Syriansand Lebanese living in Germany. For this purpose, he increas-ingly made use of clandestine methods and means.

This intelligence contact ended in May 1999 when he was ar-rested. In early October, he was sentenced by the Hamburg OLG(Higher Regional Court of Appeal) to two years' imprisonment(suspended on probation) on the charge of intelligence activity onbehalf of Syria.

At the instigation of the Foreign Office, the agent controller of theSyrian Embassy left the Federal Republic of Germany on 24July.

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*) On 19 January 2000, the Berlin Higher Regional Court of Appeal sentenced the accused to18 months’ imprisonment (suspended on probation) and to a fine of 5,000 DM.

Iran Policy Committee

1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, DC 20004

info@iranpolicy.org www.iranpolicy.org 202-742-6517 (o); 202 333-4126 (f)

Press Release Contact: Prof. Raymond Tanter For Immediate Release 202-742-6517 October 24, 2005 rtanter@iranpolicy.org

Iranian Intelligence Agents Sow Seeds of Terrorism in America Washington—Today, intelligence agents of the Iranian regime are holding a news conference in Washington, DC. This panel is a disinformation ploy mounted by the new president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is mobilizing Iranian intelligence services in a world-wide series of probes against the United States. Professor Raymond Tanter, co-Chair of the Iran Policy Committee stated that, “Ahmadinejad is following Lenin’s principle: ‘You probe with a bayonet. If you encounter mush, proceed. If you strike steel, withdraw.’” Tanter added that, “Steel rather than mush should meet Iranian intelligence agents sent to this country to probe for opportunities and exploit our vulnerabilities.” Since the accession to power of Ahmadinejad as president, Iran is more aggressive in its nuclear weapons program and negotiations with the European Union. He resumed activities at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Isfahan and appointed Iranian Revolutionary Guards commanders in charge of overseeing the country’s nuclear program. Ahmadinejad also stepped up Iran’s activities in Iraq, sending arms, explosives, and funding to support pro-Iran groups. It is noteworthy that Iranian intelligence operations in Iraq preceded insurgent attacks killing American and British forces. Clare Lopez, former CIA official and Executive Director of the Iran Policy Committee, stated that, “Just as Ahmadinejad’s intelligence activities came before insurgent attacks in Iraq, so Iranian intelligence actions in the United States may signal terrorist attacks on the American homeland." Bruce McColm, former Executive Director of Freedom House and co-Chair of the Iran Policy Committee stated that, “As part of a global campaign, Ahmadinejad accelerated attacks against Iranian dissidents abroad. Traditionally, intelligence operations by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security preceded assassination attempts by its agents.” Because Americans of Iranian heritage are the dissidents of today and are bound to become leaders of Iran tomorrow, McColm stated that, “The Iranian regime’s agents are casing the dissidents for possible assassination.” McColm added that, “If Tehran succeeds in establishing a beachhead for assassination in America, Iranian Americans would be first; and any of us could be next.”

Who are the agents who would seize the beachhead in the American homeland?

• Karim Haqi: Iran Policy Committee exposed veteran Iranian intelligence agent, Karim Haqi, in its June 30, 2005 White Paper, “U.S. Policy Options for Iran: Sham Elections, Disinformation Campaign, Human Rights Abuses, and Regime Change.” The White Paper demonstrates that in Spring 2005, Haqi ran an intelligence operation that succeeded in duping Human Rights Watch, the New York City-based American nongovernmental organization, into fronting as a mouthpiece for Iranian intelligence.

• Mahrukh (Parvin) Haji: An agent of Iran’s intelligence service, Haji maintains active links

with a network of agents in Canada and Europe. The Pars-Iran association, which is the organizer of the October 24, 2005 press conference in Washington, is a front for Iranian intelligence in Canada.

• Amir-Hossein Kord Rostami: An agent of Iran’s intelligence service in Ottawa, Rostami

was officially a member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps along the Caspian Sea since 1979.

What is to be done by the U.S. Government?

• The Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services should block entry into the United States of additional Iranian agents.

• The Department of State should revoke visas and expel three Iranian intelligence agents—

Karim Haqi, Mahrukh (Parvin) Haji, and Amir-Hossein Kord Rostami, who are in Washington for a press conference on October 24, 2005.

• The FBI should assign additional agents to monitor activities of Iran’s intelligence officials

on American soil, with a view toward eliminating such presence. Just as Tehran increases its own intelligence operations within the United States, Iran might also task its surrogates to engage in additional intelligence activities prior to terrorist operations within the American homeland. Because Iran is a state sponsor of such terrorist groups as Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, U.S. intelligence services should allocate additional resources to monitoring these organizations. To prevent Iran’s intelligence services from sowing the seeds of terrorism within the American homeland, U.S officials need to act against those who seek to probe our vulnerabilities and exploit our freedoms.

October 26, 2005

Analysis: Iranian agents in U.S? By CLAUDE SALHANI UPI International Editor WASHINGTON, Oct. 25 (UPI) -- Iranian Intelligence agents have entered the United States to spread disinformation, according to the Iran Policy Committee, a group composed mostly of former U.S. government officials who are lobbying the Bush administration for regime change in Teheran. The agents, who reportedly flew into the United States from Toronto, Canada, using Dutch and British passports, held a news conference at the National Press Club in Washington Monday -- except no press showed up. When opponents of the Tehran regime who were present took photos and videos, the agents tried to have security officers confiscate the films and tape. The Iran Policy Committee believes the agents are in the country as "a disinformation ploy mounted by the new president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is mobilizing Iranian intelligence services in a world-wide series of probes against the United States." The IPC is also lobbying the Bush administration to take the Mujahedeen-e-Khlaq, or MeK, off the terrorist list. Raymond Tanter, co-chair of the Iran Policy Committee stated that, "Ahmadinejad is following Lenin's principle: 'You probe with a bayonet. If you encounter mush, proceed. If you strike steel, withdraw.'" Tanter added that, "Steel rather than mush should meet Iranian intelligence agents sent to this country to probe for opportunities and exploit our vulnerabilities." Since Ahmadinejad's election as president, Iran is becoming more aggressive in its nuclear weapons program and in its negotiations with the European Union. He resumed activities at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Isfahan and appointed Iranian Revolutionary Guards commanders in charge of overseeing the country's nuclear program. Clare Lopez, former CIA official who served behind the Iron curtain, and Executive Director of the IPC, stated that, "Just as Ahmadinejad's intelligence activities came before insurgent attacks in Iraq, so Iranian intelligence actions in the United States may signal terrorist attacks on the American homeland." "Traditionally, intelligence operations by Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security preceded assassination attempts by its agents," said Bruce McColm, former executive director of Freedom House and co-chair of the Iran Policy Committee. "Because Americans of Iranian heritage are the dissidents of today and are bound to become leaders of Iran tomorrow," said McColm, "the Iranian regime's agents are

casing the dissidents for possible assassination. If Tehran succeeds in establishing a beachhead for assassination in America, Iranian Americans would be first; and any of us could be next." The IPC has identified the Iranian agents as:

- Karim Haqi: exposed as a veteran Iranian intelligence agent by the Iranian Policy Committee in its June 30, 2005 White Paper. "U.S. Policy Options for Iran: Sham Elections, Disinformation Campaign, Human Rights Abuses, and Regime Change." The White Paper demonstrates that in Spring 2005, Haqi ran an intelligence operation that succeeded in duping Human Rights Watch, the New York City-based American nongovernmental organization, into fronting as a mouthpiece for Iranian intelligence.

- Mahrukh (Parvin) Haji: An agent of Iran's intelligence service, Haji maintains

active links with a network of agents in Canada and Europe. The Pars-Iran association, which was the organizer of the October 24, press conference in Washington, is a front for Iranian intelligence in Canada, according to Tanter.

- Amir-Hossein Kord Rostami: An agent of Iran's intelligence service in

Ottawa, Rostami was officially a member of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps along the Caspian Sea since 1979.

According to Sara, an Iranian student who gave only her first name and who attended the conference, the three intelligence agents intended to "alert" the American public of the connection and cooperation between Iraq's former dictator Saddam Hussein and the MeK. However, supporters of the MeK, as well as Iranians opposed to the regime kept shouting questions at the Iranian agents, who in turn shouted back. "One of them, Rostami, got aggressive," Sara told United Press International. Eventually, the affair was called off. The unanswered question is how did known Iranian intelligence agents enter the United States, a fact that has Iranian dissidents worried. The U.S. government knew of their presence on U.S. soil because federal agents were keeping a discreet eye on the press conference, according to several eyewitnesses. Questions put to the U.S. State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs were not answered by press time.