ECONOMIC

POLICY

RESEARCH

I NSTITUTE

Feasibility Study for

a Social Cash Transfer Programme

as a Lead Instrument in

Child-Centred Social Protection in Senegal

Final Report

24 April 2009

Dr. Michael Samson

Ms. Cécile Cherrier

Economic Policy Research Institute

Sanclare Building, 3rd Floor, 21 Dreyer Street Claremont, 7700, Cape Town, South Africa

Tel: +27 (0) 21 671 3301 E-mail: directors@epri.org.za

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 3

Preface 5

1. Proposed Social Cash Transfer Programme 8

1.1. Context analysis 8

1.2. Objectives 10

1.3. Targeting criteria and mechanisms 12

1.4. Conditionality 15

1.5. Transfer value 16

1.6. Payment mechanisms 18

1.7. Complementary components 20

1.8. Fears, potential risks and mitigating measures 21

2. Implementation Plan 25

2.1. Overall coordination 25

2.2. Implementation systems 27

2.3. Pilot phase 34

2.4. Scaling-up 36

3. Financing Plan 37

3.1. Fiscal cost 37

3.2. Financing options 39

3.3. Dynamics 41

4. Monitoring & Evaluation Plan 42

4.1. Process monitoring 42

4.2. Impact evaluation 43

5. Conclusion 50

References 54

Annexes 56

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The introduction of a large-scale social cash transfer programme in Senegal is suggested in the National Social Protection Strategy – as a mechanism for mitigating the risks faced by vulnerable groups, as well as in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II – as a mechanism to ensure access of vulnerable groups to goods and services and to the full enjoyment of their rights. The food crisis induced by high food and fuel prices pushed national and international institutions to reiterate the call for social cash transfers. Subsidies and other policy measures adopted by the Government in 2007 to protect the poor from the adverse effects induced by high food and fuel prices proved very expensive and yet inefficient in reaching the poorest. Subsidies created economic distortions that undermine prospects for inclusive economic growth. And the International Monetary Fund recommended the introduction of cash transfer system as a more cost-effective option to address both cyclical and structural threats to the well-being of poor households, and reduce poverty over time. A recent Overseas Development Institute study confirmed growing interest among decision-makers in Senegal in exploring cash transfers as a more effective mechanism to respond to high food priced-induced effects and reduce poverty. And the study documented how child-focused social transfers can have a significant impact on the reduction of poverty and vulnerability in Senegal. The study also reveals that fiscal space for a cash transfer programme can be created, mainly through reallocation from lesser to higher priorities and from less to more effective programmes (e.g. from food subsidies to social cash transfers), without reducing financing to key social services (education, health, etc). The present study further looked at the feasibility of a social cash transfer programme in Senegal, as a lead instrument in child-centred social protection. The study confirmed that such a programme was appropriate and feasible, and identified the potential benefits of a system of child benefits to all children up to the age of 5 years. Young children in Senegal are disproportionately poor, highly vulnerable and yet represent the greatest potential for social investment. And cash transfers to children offer the opportunity to tackle poverty, invest in long-term human resources and lay the foundations for broader economic reforms that can stimulate inclusive and pro-poor economic growth. The study recommends a gradual implementation of a Universal Child Benefit model with the goal of fostering economic growth and a sustainable reduction of poverty. The programme will mitigate perverse effects of high food prices in the short-term, reduce poverty in the mid-term, and prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty in the long-term. The proposed model is relevant to both immediate responses to high food prices and developmental interventions. Although world food prices started to decrease late 2008, they are expected to remain above the 5-year average, and highly volatile. This situation of high food prices is a structural change requiring mitigation and adaptation. Children under 5 are one of the groups most vulnerable to high food prices, with increased risks of malnutrition. And promoting better nutrition can foster economic growth. The proposed programme could be piloted as soon as June 2009. The Cellule de Lutte contre la Malnutrition received World Bank funding to develop a pilot project of cash transfers in response to high food prices and induced malnutrition, and expressed interest in adopting the proposed geographically targeted categorical mechanism. Other technologies recommended (esp. mobile phone-based payments and SMS-assisted birth registration system) could be available for testing by June 2009. The table below presents an outline of the proposed programme, and highlights continuity between emergency responses to high food prices and developmental social protection.

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Programme outline – Towards Universal Child Benefits in Senegal

Emergency/Pilot arrangements ������� Mid/Long-term vision

Goal To foster economic growth and a sustainable reduction of poverty

To foster economic growth and a sustainable reduction of poverty

Overall objectives

To mitigate perverse effects of high food prices

- To mitigate perverse effects of high food prices in the short-term

- To reduce poverty in the mid-term - To prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty

in the long-term Direct expected impact on children

1. Prevention of malnutrition

1. Prevention of malnutrition 2. Improvement of access/use of basic social services 3. Promotion of birth registration for all children 4. Reduction of child mortality

Targeting a. Geographical: most vulnerable areas (as per poverty

and nutrition indicators) b. Categorical: all children under 5 within targeted areas

Categorical: all children under 5, upon presentation of the child’s birth certificate

Transfer recipient Child(ren)’s mother/caregiver Child(ren)’s mother/caregiver Transfer value

Larger transfers (e.g. FCFA 6,500) over a limited period of time (6 to 12 months) to respond to current hardship conditions

Monthly transfers of FCFA 3,800 (USD7.5) per child i.e. 35% of the food poverty line, with a lower benefit for each additional eligible child per mother, index-linked to staple food prices, and possibly capped to 3 children per mother

Payment mechanism Depending on technology readily available: e.g. mobile phone-based cash transfers, or cash hands-out

Mobile phone-based cash transfers

Conditionality No hard conditionality No hard conditionality Number of beneficiaries Gradual implementation, as (financial, human, material) resources are made available

Approximately 2,448,000 children under 5 in 2015

Complementary activities

Comprehensive set of preventive and curative measures to fight malnutrition

Child-focused integrated package of social protection measures: availability of basic services, protection, etc Birth registration mechanisms more easily accessible to the poor leaving in remote areas with SMS-assisted birth registration system Set of preventive and curative measures to fight malnutrition Set of measures on reproductive health and mother-and-child health

Supervision A piloting committee co-chaired by the MEF and MFNSWEM, and including financing, executing, and monitoring partners

A MFNSWEM secretariat set up to enhance coordination among Pillar 3 stakeholders

Execution

Development partners e.g. CLM, Unicef, NGOs National institutions under leadership of a programme management unit set up in the MFNSWEM

Monitoring & Evaluation

Pilot specific M&E indicators and budgets In line with the PRSP’s M&E indicators and framework, covering process, progress and impact

Budget Development partner support for pilot phases/emergency responses

National budget (1.7% - 0.6% of national income)

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PREFACE

This document is the Economic Policy Research Institute’s report on the Unicef-commissioned “Feasibility Study for a Social Cash Transfer Programme as a Lead Instrument in Child-Centred Social Protection in Senegal”. The present report incorporates comments collected during the study restitution and validation workshop held in Dakar on 15 and 16 April 2009.

Study rationale

National Poverty Reduction Strategy Poverty incidence remains very high in Senegal, although individual poverty rates have been falling – from 67.9% in 1994 to 57.2% in 2002. Poverty is particularly pronounced in rural settings (65.2%). And extreme poverty prevalence reaches 20.2% of the rural population and even nearly 30% in Tambacounda and Kaolack regions. Senegal has defined its Poverty Reduction Strategy 2006-2010 (PRSP II) based on four fundamental levels: Pillar 1 - wealth creation for pro-poor growth; Pillar 2 – accelerated development of access to basic social services; Pillar 3 - social protection, prevention and management of risks and disasters; and Pillar 4 – good governance and decentralised and participatory development. The PRSP II recognises that insufficiency of social protection systems – which cover less than 15% of the population – maintains the vicious poverty cycles and traps more and more people in poverty, while undermining investment and economic growth. Actions and measures under Pillar 3 - Social Protection are guided by the National Social Protection Strategy 2005-2015 (NSPS), and are carried out through four components: i) reform and strengthening of the formal social security systems; ii) extension of social protection; iii) improvement of the response capacity to shocks and risks for vulnerable groups; and iv) management of major risks and disasters. The PRSP thus recognises the need to give specific attention to improving the lives of poor and vulnerable groups, including children, by extending social protection mechanisms to help ensure these groups benefit from wealth creation, are protected from risks and have better access to social services. The introduction of a large-scale social cash transfer programme in Senegal is suggested in the NSPS – as a mechanism for mitigating the risks faced by vulnerable groups [République du Sénégal, 2005], as well as in the PRSP II – as a mechanism to ‘ensure access of vulnerable groups to goods and services and to the full enjoyment of their rights’ [République du Sénégal, 2006]. However, the joint review of the execution of the poverty reduction strategy conducted in June 2008, highlighted that two years after the adoption of these strategic papers, no progress had been made on the development of such a programme – and little progress on the development of a social protection system as a whole.

Policy measures to protect the poor from the adverse effects induced by high food and fuel prices The food crisis induced by high food and fuel prices pushed national and international institutions to reiterate the call for social cash transfers. After a prolonged decline, world food prices have increased since 2001, and particularly steeply since 2006. Senegal appears highly vulnerable to high world prices, with already high levels of food insecurity and vulnerability, substantial import bill, etc. High food prices do have serious negative effects on vulnerable Senegalese households and may jeopardize the prospects for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. In 2007, the government introduced subsidies and other policy measures to protect the poor from the adverse effects of rising food and fuel prices in Senegal.

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A review of these policies conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in July 2008 revealed that food subsidies were very expensive1 but yet inefficient in reaching the poorest – with almost 55% of benefits accrued to households in the top 40% of the welfare distribution. Subsidies have created economic distortions that undermine prospects for inclusive economic growth. The IMF concluded that the introduction of a well-targeted conditional cash transfer system would be a much more cost-effective option to address both cyclical and structural threats to the well-being of poor households, and reduce poverty over time [IMF 2008b].

Recent findings for the introduction of a social cash transfer programme Senegal is in a context of technical and political remobilization to develop effective measures to mitigate negative effects of high food and fuel prices in the short-term, and reduce vulnerabilities and poverty to reach the MDGs by 2015. A recent Overseas Development Institute (ODI) study looked at the main pre-requisites for the introduction of a social cash transfer programme in Senegal: political will, available fiscal space, and technical and administrative capacities for its implementation [Pereznieto and Fall, 2009]. The ODI study confirms growing interest among decision-makers in Senegal in exploring cash transfers as a more effective mechanism to reduce poverty. The study documents how “child-focused social transfers can have a significant impact on the reduction of poverty and vulnerability in Senegal.” [Pereznieto and Fall, 2009:x]. And the consultative workshop held in November 2008 confirmed stakeholders’ support to the use of social cash transfers targeted on children as a lead instrument within a child-centred social protection system. There are several reasons for choosing children as an entry point, including: i) children are an especially vulnerable group, with high incidence of poverty; ii) spells of poverty in childhood can have long-lasting effects on later development, including intergenerational transmissions of poverty; iii) reducing child poverty is important in the context of breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty; iv) improving children’s nutrition, health and education can enable those in poverty to escape it and move into growth trajectories, contributing to the country’s economic growth and development; and v) there is a growing body of evidence from developing countries showing that cash transfers targeted on children in poor households, combined with additional investments in basic services, are an effective tool in reducing poverty. Such transfers programmes also demonstrated positive impact on child nutrition, birth registration, and school enrolment and survival rates [Pereznieto and Fall, 2009]. A recent IMF assessment shows that the amount of fiscal space has increased considerably since 2000 – approximately 9% of GDP, and that close to half of the fiscal space created from 2000-2007 (approximately 4% of GDP) has been used for pro-poor spending2 [IMF 2008a]. The ODI study argues that “the good performance of the economy and the possibilities for reallocating resources from less performing programmes (for example, subsidies and transfers which are not pro-poor) opens the possibility for generating fiscal space for introducing a cash transfer programme, although its scale and reach would need to be defined according to its objectives, targets and resource availability over the short and medium term.” [Pereznieto and Fall, 2009:83] Fiscal space for a cash transfer programme can be created, mainly through reallocation from lesser to higher priorities and from less to more effective programmes (e.g. from food subsidies to social cash transfers). This should not mean reducing financing to key social services, but improving efficiency of expenditure in the sector to release resources for social protection.

1 Subsidies have generated costs estimated at between 3 and 4 per cent of national income [Pereznieto and Fall, 2008:54; and consultations with the IMF, World Bank, Office of the Prime Minister]. 2 Under a common IMF definition, ‘pro-poor spending is different from social sector spending as it includes spending on the judiciary and water / irrigation and sanitation in addition to education, health and social development.

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Finally, the ODI study warns that poor governance and weak administrative capacity remain significant constraints to the realisation of a social cash transfer programme in Senegal. While cash transfer is seen as an effective means of channelling support, mobilising funds and mitigating vulnerabilities of the poorest, national institutions lack technical expertise (and leadership) to guide the design and implementation of a large-scale child-centred social cash transfer programme. And a feasibility study is required to inform the proper design of a child-centred social cash transfer programme.

Study Objective The delivery of a cash transfer programme as a lead instrument for child-centred social protection requires a well-conceptualised and well-implemented feasibility study to inform appropriate design decisions. This includes the following seven deliverables:- 1) An implementation plan for a clearly articulated, practical, manageable and cost-effective

cash transfer delivery mechanism to be used for implementing the programme, consistent with the requirements of the Government of Senegal, UNICEF and other key stakeholders.

2) A targeting mechanism that is contextual, practical, manageable and user-friendly that

will support the implementation of the programme in the initial districts and is consistent with the requirements of the Government of Senegal, UNICEF and other stakeholders.

3) An assessment of potential formal and non-formal institutions to be involved in the cash transfer delivery mechanism and the targeting and selection process.

4) A financial analysis of alternative proposed social transfer benefit levels, discussing and

analysing the options in the context of adequacy, affordability and acceptability.

5) Specific recommendations regarding an approach to conditionalities, reflecting the objectives of reducing child extreme poverty in the medium-term and breaking the inter-generational transmission of poverty, and taking into account the limited infrastructure in some districts and the additional administrative mechanisms required. In particular, this will balance the value of conditionalities relative to their cost and make recommendations for required evidence building in order to inform key design considerations.

6) Specific recommendations regarding a monitoring and evaluation strategy, which will

serve three major types of objectives: strategic objectives – is the social transfer programme achieving its goals; operational objectives – how can programme managers improve implementation; and learning objectives – what can be learned from the social transfer programme.

7) A concise high level assessment of the potential risks involved in the proposed cash

transfer programme, particularly the targeting scheme, and which identifies options for managing these risks.

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1. PROPOSED SOCIAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMME

1.1. Context analysis

1.1.1. Social transfer programmes in Senegal

Senegal has limited experience in social cash transfers to households, at least in its formal form. A review of relevant in-country experiences in non-contributory social transfers, either under national/large-scale programmes or under smaller-scale initiatives is presented in Annexe 1. Learning from these experiences can inform the choice of targeting process, and transfer delivery mechanism. However, a recurrent issue is the lack of systematic evaluation of these programmes. There is little documented evidence on their (cost-) efficiency. Despite the fact that a medium to large-scale (institutionalised) cash transfer programme was never implemented in Senegal, the majority of national and international stakeholders are very supportive of the idea of a social cash transfer programme. The concept is actually not new in Senegal. During the multi-stakeholders dialogue that preceded the development of the first PRSP, one association of people with disabilities suggested that if a transfer was provided to people living with disabilities, they would no longer need begging in the street, and could send children at school instead of forcing them to come with them in the street. After attending a World Bank conference on social transfer programmes, Dia who was working in the Ministry of Economy and Finance’s Poverty Reduction Unit at the time, developed late 2006 a concept note for a conditional cash transfer programme [Dia, 2006]. An outline of the proposed ‘Contract for Education’ programme is presented in Annexe 2. It is interesting to see that children had already been identified as a good entry point to social protection, and a way to assist vulnerable women. The proposed Contract for Education never materialised. However, the increased hardship experienced by vulnerable groups, the deterioration of social cohesion, and the low impact of subsidies aroused renewed enthusiasm among Government officials, civil society members, and other development partners for the development of a social cash transfer programme in Senegal, with a focus on children – as confirmed by recent studies and consultations. To date, social transfers in Senegal have largely been perceived as hand-outs to assist households in time of hardship, but not as necessary social investments. However, policy analysis in Senegal is now increasingly focusing on the potential of cash transfer systems to effectively and efficiently deliver social protection and create a foundation for pro-poor economic reforms. The PRSP and the NSPS include a potential role for cash transfers, recent IMF and World Bank studies recommend a cash transfer system as an effective option to mitigate negative effects of high food prices and reduce poverty over time, and ODI makes the case for a child-centred social protection system in Senegal and the use of social cash transfers targeted on children as a lead instrument within that system. Now, the ODI study concludes that fiscal space can be created for such a programme, it also reveals that a universal transfer equivalent to one-third of the food poverty line to every child under the age of 14 would not be an affordable option for Senegal at this stage. It is therefore necessary to analyse which approach – esp. target group and objective – will bring the greatest impact, and represent the greatest potential for social investment.

1.1.2. Child vulnerability and poverty in Senegal Poverty in Senegal disproportionately affects children with child poverty rates significantly higher than those for any other demographic group (cf. Table 1.1). Child poverty is especially pernicious because it represents not only the immediate denial of a child’s rights but also causes the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Insufficient investments in the health, education, protection, and overall well-being of today’s children re-create deprivation

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in tomorrow’s adults. Table 1.1 – Poverty rate and poverty gap in Senegal [Gassmann and Behrendt, 2006]

Poverty rate (headcount)

Poverty gap (as % of poverty line)

Demographic group Food poverty

rate

Basic needs rate

US$1/day poverty

line

Food poverty

rate

Basic needs rate

US$1/day poverty

line All individuals 19.7 65.0 34.4 4.5 22.5 9.6 Children (0-14) 20.9 66.7 38.5 4.7 23.1 10.9 Working age adults (15-59) 18.4 63.3 30.7 4.2 21.9 8.5 Older people (60+) 20.8 66.5 35.2 4.6 23.1 9.4 Men 20.1 65.4 35.0 4.6 22.8 9.8 Women 19.4 64.7 33.9 4.4 22.3 9.5

Children represent 58% of the Senegalese population. This constitutes – in theory at least, a burden for working people, and/or an increased risk for children to have to engage in labour, including worse forms of labour such as seeking money through begging and sexual work. The NSPS identifies the following groups of children as being particularly at risk: children engaged in labour (32% of children between 10 and 14 years of age have already started their working life, up to 52% for boys in rural areas), Talibe boys (who account for 1% of the population), begging children, street children, orphans, and children with disabilities. Young girls may be engaged as domestic servants or street vendors, and in the process are exposed to prostitution, exploitation, rape, and infanticide. In the case of at-risk children, the PRSP II aims “to strengthen the priority actions to eliminate the worst forms of child labour and to protect children against all forms of exploitation, abuse, and violence.” [Republic of Senegal 2008:55] A social cash transfer programme would operate as an incentive to remove children from these risky ways of life and as a preventive measure for households to provide appropriate care to their children. Achievements in the education sector have been mixed. Gross primary school enrolment rate has risen steadily from 69.4% in 2001 to 82.5% in 2005, but remains below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. It varies significantly between urban (95%) and rural areas (70%), and a significant gender gap remains. The gap is significantly wider in secondary education, indicative of significant numbers of girls dropping out of school after completing primary education. There has also been significant progress in children’s enrolment in preschool. There is a positive correlation between wealth and school enrolment – gross enrolment rate differential of 32.4 between first and fifth quintile. The Government demonstrated commitment to support the education sector with increasing budgetary appropriations to the sector. However the rate of demographic growth (2.5%) puts considerable pressure on the education system. In rural areas, 30% of children attending primary school live more than 30 minutes away. Overall, 56% of parents expressed satisfaction with the quality of education. But access to school supply appears like a major problem. Cash transfers would help cover hidden costs, and would help increase enrolment and completion rates, as demonstrated in other countries. Budget allocated to the health sector has been rising continuously, but access to health services remains problematic in Senegal, particularly in the case of emergency services. While more than 50% of the urban population live within 1 Km away from the nearest health service facility, a third of the rural population live more than 5 Km away. The level of poverty in the household is another important determinant of child mortality, with almost double the number of children under five dying in households in the poorest quintile. The main causes of mortality for children under 5 are as follow [République du Sénégal, 2007]:- - Pneumonia (13%) – incidence of Acute Respiratory Infections is greater among wealthier

quintiles/people living in urban areas; - Fever (30%) – no correlation was found between the incidence of fever and the level of

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education or the level of economical well-being; - Diarrhea (22%) – no correlation was found with the economical well-being index; - Malnutrition is directly or indirectly associated to more that 50% cases of death among

children, and its effects on child development aggravate other child health problems. While stunting prevalence rates have fallen from 20% to 17% between 1992 and 2005, the recent food price crisis threatens a new cycle of deprivation, particularly in rural areas where malnutrition indicators are worse. A recent nutrition survey reported worrying trends: Global Acute Malnutrition rate of 11.2% (3 Health Districts out of 13 surveyed showing GAM rate over 15%); Severe Acute Malnutrition rate of 1.9% (3 Health Districts out of 13 surveyed showing SAM rate over 2%); stunting rates ranging from 7.4% to 23.5%; and infant mortality rate over 1/10,000 in 2 Health Districts out of 13 surveyed [République du Sénégal, 2008b]. There is a clear correlation between child malnutrition and household economic well-being. Anemia rates are 6 times more important among children of poorest household, and weight insufficiency is 26% among poorest households and 6% among richest. Children and youth benefit through schemes that include: free deliveries; free caesarean deliveries; free anti-malarial treatment for children and pregnant women; and free immunisation coverage. However, carers must still pay for other health interventions for children. A cash transfer programme would enable caregivers to lift financial barriers to access health services, and is likely to increase the use of health services among beneficiary populations. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) states that all children have the right to a name and a nationality as well as protection of their identity. Thus, birth registration gives legal recognition to a child and grants him or her nationality and hence the right to be protected by the state when parents or caregivers fail to do so. While in 2000, 60.9% of children under five were registered in Senegal, this rate fell to 55% in 2005. The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 2005 does not reveal any significant difference between birth registrations of girls (54%) and boys (56%). However, it revealed significant differences across regions (44% in rural areas against 75% in urban areas). It is thus crucial for Senegal to promote birth registration more actively, in order to respect a fundamental child right, and to contribute to the improvement of the civil registry which constitutes an essential tool for proper planning.

1.2. Objectives The goal of the programme is to foster economic growth and a sustainable reduction of poverty. The overall objectives of the programme are to:-

- Mitigate perverse effects of high food prices in the short-term; - Reduce poverty in the mid-term; and - Prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty in the long-term.

The recent global food price crisis has intensified the grip of poverty in the past two years. Even if world food prices tended to decrease over the past few months, they are expected to remain above the five-year average, and be highly volatile. This is a structural change which calls for long-term adaptation strategies. Children are one of the demographic groups most at risk of suffering long-term consequences of the current and foreseen time of hardship – which is expected to be worsened by the current financial crisis. The economics of nutrition quantifies the economic returns on investing in human capital. In particular, empirical simulations showed that better nutrition can foster growth through three basic channels: both directly via increased physical labour productivity and directly via improvement in cognitive development (and thus productivity) and education performance.

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The positive correlation between malnutrition and economic well-being suggests that cash transfers can have a very positive impact on nutrition, and thus ultimately on economic growth. Cash transfers provided to households are expected to help lifting financial barriers to access to basic services, and preventing and reducing child labour, esp. in its worse forms, thus protecting children against abuse and contributing to child protection. While transfers are targeted at children, other household members will benefit from it, through reducing the burden for working people. International experience shows that social cash transfers have multi-dimensional impacts. They proved to have a positive impact on school attendance, use of health facilities, nutritional status, women participation in work labour, etc. And the human capital development induced prevents the intergenerational transmission of poverty in the long-term. The programme will have the following direct impacts on children:- 1. To contribute to the prevention of malnutrition; 2. To improve access and use of basic social services; 3. To promote birth registration for all children; and 4. To contribute to the reduction of child mortality. The programme will thus contribute to reach the objectives set in the National Strategy for Child Survival, and support the national social protection strategy to establish mechanisms for the universal registration of birth at the registry office – “Mettre en place un dispositif et des mécanismes en vue de l’enregistrement universel des naissances à l’état civil” [NSPS 2006:94]. The social cash transfer programme falls within the national social protection and poverty reduction strategies – protection of vulnerable children appears under the Pillar 4 of the NSPS, and under the Pillar 3 of the PRSP. Social cash transfers will operate in complementarities with other components of the PRSP, and the programme will contribute to the achievement of a number of objectives in Pillars 1, 2, 3, and 4. Table 1.2 below present sectors of the PRSP in which the programme will have an impact, as per the key list of indicators (‘liste restreinte’). The programme will also greatly contribute to strengthen social cohesion, through the redistribution of resources and a universal approach. If there has been a significant reduction of poverty incidence in relative terms over the past few years, the impact of growth on poverty among the various population groups was blunted by ineffective redistribution policies. Inequality remains, with 41% of total annual expenditure is undertaken by the wealthiest 20% of the population, and just 8.1% by the poorest 20%. And this situation is exacerbated by the recent increases in food and fuel prices, leading to unrest in urban areas, and a growing discontent among the population.

Labour productivity GROWTH NUTRITION

Cognitive development

Education

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Table 1.2 – Indicators relevant to the programme among the PRSP II’s list of key indicators PRSP Pillar / Sector Key Indicators

Macroeconomic framework 1. Real growth rate Monetary poverty 5. Percentage of the population living under the poverty line Pillar 1 Microfinance 18. Number of beneficiaries in microfinance

Employment 21. Underemployment rate 22. Employment rate

Pillar 2

Education 23. Gross school enrolment rate 24. Completion rate

Health

30. Proportion of deliveries done in health centre (assisted by trained staff) 31. Proportion of children (0-11 months) who received complete immunisation 32. Number of children (0-5 years) benefiting from community-based monitoring of their nutritional status (weight/height, weight/age)

Pillar 3

Social protection and support to vulnerable groups

42. Number of vulnerable households receiving resource allocations 44. Number of children taken out of worse forms of labour and reintegrated into the socio-educational system

The programme will directly contribute to reach the objectives set out in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the MDGs, in particular:- - MDG 1 – Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger - MDG 2 – Achieve Universal Primary Education - MDG 3 – Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women - MDG 4 – Reduce Child Mortality - MDG 8 – Develop a Global Partnership for Development (Target 8.F: In cooperation

with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications)

1.3. Targeting criteria and mechanisms

Poverty targeting aims to economise on programme resources by directing cash transfer benefits only to the poor. The savings in cash transfers must be balanced against the costs of the targeting processes – which include not only the direct costs to the government from administering the targeting mechanisms, but also the private costs to programme participants they incur in complying with the targeting requirements, as well as a range of social, political, and other costs. Badly targeted programmes can impose costs that exceed the theoretical savings from only reaching the poorest.

1.3.1. Target group Analyses of current social assistance policies and projects and consultations with stakeholders in Senegal over the past several months have identified the potential benefits of a system of child benefits to children up to the age of 5 years. Young children in Senegal are disproportionately poor, highly vulnerable and yet represent the greatest potential for social investment. Cash transfers to children offer the opportunity to tackle poverty, invest in long-term human resources and lay the foundations for broader economic reforms that can stimulate inclusive and pro-poor economic growth. Children under age five are particularly vulnerable, since the consequences of deprivations at this age are largely irreversible. An individual’s capabilities depend critically on early childhood living standards, and 85% of a child’s core brain structure is formed by age three. Children suffering severe deprivation in their first five years are less likely to attend and

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succeed in school, more likely to be unemployed as adults and more likely to suffer chronic illnesses later in life. Early childhood interventions improve subsequent education and health outcomes and raise adult labour productivity.3 The fact that in Senegal poverty incidence increases with household size reinforces the rationale for child benefits. The poorest quintile of households has an average of over 10 members, while the average size of the wealthiest quintile is eight. And reviews of social transfer programmes worldwide documented that “the strong correlation existing between childhood and poverty, and the positive correlation of the number of children in a household and the depth of poverty, ensure that cash transfers can always be effective on their own.” [Barrientos and DeJong, 2006:548]

Recommendation 01 – Target children under 5, within their households.

1.3.2. Targeting approach

Weighing the potential costs and benefits, and in light of the priority of developing a transparent and readily implementable programme, the proposed programme adopts a geographically targeted categorical mechanism, with provision of cash transfers to all children up to the age of five years within the very poor locations identified for the pilot phase, before gradual expansion to the rest of the country. Such an approach effectively employs the granular information on the spatial dimension of poverty, and supports the investment potential of human capital development. The approach is also easy to implement, well-understood by the community and transparent. Geographical targeting is required in view of i) the significant differences between urban and rural areas, ii) the cost of a national programme and the need for a progressive extension of the programme. This appears to be acceptable in Senegal, since it is done by most, if not all, providers of assistance. Ultimately, the programme is meant to have a national coverage. The decision to adopt a universal approach, rather than a targeted one, which would aim to identify children within the poorest households, is supported by a number of considerations. Consultations with stakeholders have identified a range of opinions and assessments of potential targeting processes, with a general consensus that means-tested approaches are unlikely to be cost-effective. The process of means-testing and identifying the ‘deserving poor’ is often invasive and stigmatizing, and might negatively affect community and national cohesion, particularly in a context of high food prices which impact most socio-economical groups. Assessments of the potential of community-based and purely categorical approaches were more diverse. Community-based mechanisms internationally generate a wide range of outcomes, with some of the best and worst outcomes in terms of targeting mechanisms [Coady et al., 2004a]. Community-based programmes have their local political demands and prerequisites, their gender bias, their patronage and clientelism, and may run counter to the universalistic cultures of some communities. They can exacerbate local differentiation, be captured by local elites who may traditionally sanction discrimination, and so on. If some Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) might have been able to develop satisfactory community-based mechanisms in their project, such mechanisms appear hardly replicable at national scale – “There appear to be a trade-off between outreach or coverage and community participation in programme design and implementation – e.g. identification by communities of eligible beneficiaries.” [Save the Children UK et al., 2005:vi]. Community-based mechanisms tend to undermine the importance of empowerment in poverty

3 Save the Children (2003), Aguero et al. (2006), Samson, Mac Quene and van Niekerk (2006), Samson et al. (2004).

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eradication, and bring perverse incentives created by changes in people’s behaviour in attempts to become eligible to the scheme. Universal benefits will not damage market incentives to take a job or make savings for times of hardship. The development of a fair, transparent, scalable and efficient targeting system appears unrealistic given political and administrative difficulties. In addition, targeting would not necessarily translate into larger transfers to the poorest. A number of reviews show that targeting tend to lead to reduced budgets devoted to poverty and welfare, with theoretical savings (or more) being eaten up by administrative and corruption costs [Coady et al. 2004b; Kildal and Kuhnle, 2002]. And looking at the relationship between targeting and the political economy of domestic resource mobilization, a universal approach is one of most effective ways to ensure political support by the middle class of taxes to finance welfare programmes [Mkandawire, 2005]. Abuse and humiliation should not become common features of citizens’ interaction with the state, if the social cohesion is to be supported. Pereznieto and Fall point out that “in Senegal, where cash transfers tend to be seen as ‘handouts’ and not as a means to stimulate households to exit the poverty cycle, an objective rationale for the targeting might be useful for justifying the intervention to the community.” The call for more transparency also appears in the ESPS (Enquête de Suivi de la Pauvreté au Sénégal 2005-2006) findings, and was echoed by numerous interviewed stakeholders4. Given the limited capacity available, and the (high) risk of fiduciary, a categorical targeting approach is preferable. In that case the process is primarily one of registration and cash delivery. Categorical approaches provide more predictable outcomes. And as Dercon argues, what is essential “for any formal safety net and for any risk reduction policy, is that such a policy needs commitment and credibility. It should be permanent and transparent; moreover: it should be highly predictable” [Dercon, 2001:68]. Targeting typically involves uncertainty about whether rights to the benefit will in practice be met or not. Finally, the chronic nature of poverty in Senegal, and the large size of population affected make the case for a universal child benefit even stronger. In a context of chronic poverty and intergenerational transmission of poverty, focus should be put on long-term human capital investment, rather than short-term poverty reduction. Even if both objectives are intertwined in practice, a focus on poverty would suggest exiting beneficiaries from the programme when they are above a certain poverty line. However, as observed in Mexico’s Oportunidades social transfer programme, this strategy does not mean that beneficiaries have built the human capital to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty [Yaschine and Dávila, 2008]. In a context of chronic poverty and high degree of vulnerability, there is a need to take account of the long-term nature of the process of poverty reduction.

Recommendation 02 – Adopt a gradual approach with a geographically-targeted categorical mechanism, and ultimately enrol all children under 5.

1.3.3. Transfer’s actual recipient

Although a child benefit would recognise the rights of children and therefore targets children regardless of household arrangements, in practical terms, it will require an adult to apply for, and collect the transfer. Transfers will be targeted at children caregivers (biological parent or legal guardian) who are predominantly women. There are evidences that cash transfers targeted at women rather than men have a stronger impact on the living standards of their children, particularly girls [Barrientos and DeJong, 2006]. The fact that polygamy remains

4 The list of stakeholders consulted is presented in Annexe 6.

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common also supports the decision to transfer benefits to mothers/caregivers rather than heads of households. Child-oriented grants are, in theory, supposed to move with the child beneficiaries if they move households. However, experience from South Africa suggests there are problems with this assumption, and the issue of street children and Talibé suggests maintaining the transfer to the ‘legal’ caregiver of the child (e.g. his/her mother and not the marabout), while measures will be taken to maintain the child within his/her ‘legal’ household.

Recommendation 03 – Direct transfers to child’s mother/caregiver.

1.4. Conditionality

The purpose of conditionalities is to encourage poor households to prioritise the human capital development of children. This is essential for tackling the inter-generational cycle of poverty. And conditionalities are to be viewed as being developmental rather than aiming to punish households for non-compliance. Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) schemes aim at creating demand by poor households for social services deemed critical to human capital accumulation – usually related to education and health care. There are several reasons why poor households and the vulnerable do not have access to most of these public and social services:- - Households may simply lack the resources necessary to pay the direct and indirect costs

associated with accessing the services. Some of these costs may include user costs – school fees and charges on health care, transportation costs, etc.

- Households may also lack the information about the benefits of some types of social services for instance parents may not recognise the returns to registering children’s birth.

- Household decision-makers might not always act in the long term-best interest of certain members – particularly children where basic survival is a priority. For example, some caregivers might depend on the short term income gains from child labour even while recognising the longer term benefits the child will receive from education.

Conditionalities are costly to implement and require strong and well coordinated administrative machinery. The positive effects of conditionalities are most likely to be registered when the objective of parents and caregivers is not aligned with the welfare of the children, and parents have poor information about the future benefits of education and health for their children [de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006]. Conditionality may also create perverse outcomes. They may penalise the very households which are in most need of support but which are held back by social constraints or adverse outcomes. Considering availability of quality services, risks of penalization for the poorest, and additional costs of conditionalities, the proposed programme adopts no conditionality. Conditionalities could still be introduced at a later stage, once the provision of quality social services has been improved, if deemed necessary. It could be envisioned to have a hard conditionality in areas where the offer of basic services is satisfactory (e.g. in urban areas) and a soft conditionality in areas when essential services are poorly available (e.g. remote rural areas). Experiences from conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean suggest that linking transfers to child attendance at schools or clinics can achieve additional positive outcomes for children. However, to date there is no robust evidence on the incremental impact of conditionalities in well established CCT programmes. There is emerging evidence that non-compliance is rare when the programme has been in place for a while and beneficiaries are fully informed of their entitlements and responsibilities. This has

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prompted the suggestion that conditionality may therefore not always be necessary to guarantee the effectiveness of a programme [Ayala Consulting, 2003; Barrientos and DeJong, 2006]. In Africa, conditional cash transfers have proven less popular to date, possibly because the quality of education and health services is often so poor that the benefits of imposing these conditionalities are doubtful [Save the Children UK et al., 2005]. The Kenya experience might soon bring additional learning. Its OVC (Orphans and other Vulnerable Children) programme is designed with an aim to isolate the impact of conditionalities over and above the impact of the cash transfer. Preliminary comparison between four districts that impose education and health conditionalities and four districts that do not tends to suggest that similar results can be achieved without conditionality. Moreover, international experience shows that people tend to spend transfers primarily on food, education, health and other essential goods and services, even more so when the transfer is targeted at women. And there are evidences from Senegal that recipients of remittances or cash vouchers use their social transfer on essential items [AfDB, 2005; CRS, 2008]. The CLM’s PRN (Programme de Renforcement de la Nutrition de la Cellule de Lutte contre la Malnutrition) seems to have achieved positive impact on health prenatal visits, exclusive breast feeding, and use of impregnated mosquito nets without hard conditionality. Other approaches – some already being developed – might be most appropriate to change behaviour, e.g. communication campaigns, political decisions, extension of school feeding activities, etc. And rather than conditionality, it is proposed to promote a sense of ‘social obligations’ through education campaigns, mothers associations, children clubs, and community committees. Another way of achieving multiple impacts with the cash transfers is to link their delivery with the delivery of basic services (e.g. birth registration, family planning campaigns, nutritional education) or complementary services (e.g. banking). This is further discussed in the ‘Implementation Plan’ section.

Recommendation 04 – Make the transfer unconditional.

1.5. Transfer value

The determination of the appropriate benefit level for the proposed universal child benefit must balance three competing objectives: adequacy, affordability and acceptability. The social transfer must be adequate to make a significant impact – although not necessarily large enough to erase every household’s poverty gap. Government must be able to afford the benefit level – not only in the pilot stage but more importantly as the programme is scaled up to the national level. Affordability includes both providing appropriate coverage to the poorest and ensuring reliability and permanence. Politically, the benefit level must be acceptable to policy-makers and the nation’s population – it cannot be either too small or excessively large. Evidence from Senegal’s household living standards survey indicates that a benefit between 5% and 10% of per capita income will be sufficient to significantly improve the living standards of the poorest – particularly in terms of supporting nutrition. Internationally, there is considerable variability in the size of benefits across child-focused programmes, with benefits usually ranging between 10% and 30% of the respective country’s national poverty line. Figure 1.1 below illustrates the range of benefits in a sample of countries providing child-focused programmes.

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Figure 1.1 – Cross-country comparison of child benefit values

Value of transfer as % of national poverty line

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Zambia

Kenya

RSA

Mala

wi

Hondur

as

Brazil

Jam

aica

Nicara

gua

Mex

ico

ColombiaP

erce

nt

of

nat

ion

al p

ove

rty

lin

e

A benefit level of 10% of per capita income in 2008 equals CAF 45,600 annually (eq. US$90 or €70), or FCFA 3,800 monthly per child under the age of 5. This is approximately 30% of the adult food poverty line, and 42% of the average per capita expenditure of the poorest quintile in Senegal. While not sufficient to eradicate child poverty, this benefit level will provide a meaningful impact in increasing the consumption of the poorest in Senegal. The current family allowance scheme for civil servants provides a transfer of FCFA 2,400 per month and per child with no limit on the number of children for the prenatal and maternity allowance, but with a limit of six children for the family allowance. Although the transfer is targeted at children, it is proposed to consider adopting a scaled benefit, as a way to adjust for economies of scale. The benefit could be scaled, with a lower benefit for each additional eligible child (e.g. FCFA 3,800 for the first child, FCFA 3,000 for the second, and FCFA 2,500 for the third) to take into account the economies of scale associated with multiple children. Households with a large number of eligible children would be subject to additional monitoring from social workers. Alternatively, or in addition, the transfer could be capped per mother. The recent nutrition survey reported an average of 1.4 children between 6 and 59 months per mother, and the national fertility rate is 5.3 children per woman. The size of the transfer could be capped to the benefit calculated for a maximum of three children per mother. This could be considered if any perverse fertility incentives are feared, but should not replace the need to conduct family planning awareness campaigns, in priority among women with numerous children. If transfer capping was adopted, exceptions could be identified in case of adopted children. The transfer value needs to be index-linked to staple food prices to ensure that constant access is maintained whatever the cost of food. ANSD produces a monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI)5, and any variation of more than +/-10% in the food CPI should translate in the adjustment of the transfer value. This will require including a 10% contingency budget. It might also be necessary to adjust the value of the transfer per region if significant spatial variations of food prices (over 10% difference) are observed. Depending on the payment mechanism eventually adopted, the frequency of the transfer should ideally be monthly, or bi-monthly. Smaller transfers tend to be spent on immediate needs, while larger transfers tend to be invested in livelihood assets. Given the primary objective of the programme, smaller but more frequent transfers are to be preferred. The proposed monthly entitlement per household will vary from US$7.6-US$18.6. In other African countries’ social programmes, maximum transfer amounts vary from US$3-US$6 in Mozambique to US$29-US$171 in South Africa. The maximum of US$22 is comparable to what obtains in Kenya. 5 Indice Harmonisé des Prix à la Consommation: http://www.ansd.sn/publications/conjoncturelles/IHPC/mensuelle/IHPC_12_08.pdf

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Recommendation 05 – Adopt a scaled benefit, with a benefit of FCFA 3,800 per month per child (10% of per capita income, 33% of adult food poverty line) for the first child; index-link the transfer value to staple food prices (in the regional); consider capping the total transfer to three children per mother.

1.6. Payment mechanisms

Generally, the emerging typology of payments delivery systems identifies two broad classes of approaches. The ‘pull’ mechanism requires participants to arrive at a specific ‘pay point’ at a pre-determined time in order to access their social transfers. Traditionally, most cash transfer programmes in developing countries employ ‘pull’ approaches. Alternatively, ‘push’ mechanisms transfer the payment into a vehicle available to the participant continuously over time. For example, the ‘materialisation’ of a social transfer on a smart card or cell phone which the participant can use at any time is a ‘push’ mechanism. Much of the innovation in payments systems revolves around the transition from ‘pull’ to ‘push’ mechanisms. The choice of a ‘push’ mechanism (perhaps over a longer horizon) will help support the extension of financial infrastructure that can generate broad developmental benefits in addition to the delivery of cash. ‘Push’ mechanisms are also more likely to be convenient to beneficiaries, who are then able to access the cash as needed, or to simply use the vehicle directly to finance transactions without ever holding physical cash. Beneficiaries need not make special trips to pay-points or wait in queues, or risk theft of their cash-in-transit. ‘Push’ mechanisms are also more likely to facilitate savings and be available to support other financial services, such as remittances or micro-credit. ‘Push’ mechanisms provide much greater flexibility to the beneficiary, particularly for those who have difficulty travelling to pay-points. Naturally, ‘push’ mechanisms also suffer from significant disadvantages. First, they are often more expensive to initially implement than ‘pull’ mechanisms. While the technological advantages may make them more cost effective in the long run, the initial investments required may discourage adoption. Also, ‘push’ mechanisms usually have greater fixed costs, requiring a larger scale operation for cost-effectiveness. The time involved in developing the infrastructure and systems may make them unattractive for pilots aiming at immediate roll-out. Furthermore, some technologies involved with ‘push’ mechanisms require more sophisticated user processes, such as managing an electronic bank account or cell phone transactions system. This may require more training for beneficiaries. The choice of cash delivery mechanism need to consider: transfer cost, convenience for beneficiaries, security for provider and beneficiaries, and developmental impact of the cash delivery mechanism. A review of potential options is presented in Annexe 3. And below are options identified for a practical, manageable and cost-effective cash transfer delivery mechanism that offers a timely and reliable flow of funds to the beneficiaries. A strategy for the long term development of an appropriate and cost-effective mechanism is proposed, as well as an interim arrangement, taking into account the trade-off between short-term expediency in terms of an immediately practical system and the long-term objectives of providing a developmental and socially protective mechanism. Option A – Mobile phone-based payments Mobile phone-based cash transfers were successfully tested in Kenya in 2008. In Senegal, Sonatel and BICIS signed a partnership in November 2008 for the development of a mobile phone-based payment service called ‘Orange Money’. Orange Money allows Orange (prepaid or postpaid) customers to use their mobile phone (even oldest models) for financial

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transactions such as withdrawal and money transfer, bills payment, purchases at affiliated point of sales, airtime credit and transfer. Orange Money is already in place in Ivory Coast since December 2008.6 People do not need to have a bank account to register to the service, only an ID card is required. Being an Orange customer is enough to activate an Orange Money account for free, with no minimum deposit. Deposit on the account is free of charge. Customers are identified by their phone number and all transactions have to be validated by a personal PIN code. Money can be withdrawn in any registered Orange Money agent, with a fee. Indicative fees are presented in Table 1.3. Such an m-payment system would theoretically support monthly or even bi-weekly transfers. For small amounts, transfer and withdrawal costs (as they stand in Ivory Coast) would represent 10-15% of the transfer (which remains very high), but are likely to be reduced in a large programme. Table 1.3 – Indicative child benefit payment costs, as per Orange Money costs in Ivory Coast

Number of children Household monthly entitlement (FCFA)

Transfer costs (FCFA)

Withdrawal fees (FCFA)

One child 3,800 300 300 Two children 7,600 500 500 Three children 11,400 600 600

In Senegal, Orange Money will be tested in three zones as soon as April 2009. The national launching is planned late June 2009 with the ‘Transfer’, ‘Cash In’, and ‘Cash Out’ components. One objective is to get a local distribution network with post offices, banks, Orange network, petrol stations, microfinance institutions, etc – to date, 400 points of withdrawal have been identified. The number of registered Orange Money agents is expected to increase quickly since Orange is signing agreements with all the microfinance institutions in Senegal. Orange is working in close collaboration with Planet Finance which received €1 million from the Bill Gates foundation to develop the partnership between microfinance institutions and Orange. Orange is the largest cell phone company with 64.4% market share. The Orange network already covers 87% of the population and 49% of the territory. And an Orange programme aims at providing network coverage to all villages of more than 300 inhabitants. The entire Senegalese population is targeted, especially people with no bank account (95% of the population). Orange also envisions the possibility to have mobile teams to register new customers and distribute mobile phones. Such a mobile phone-based system provides the poor not only with cash, but also with access to information and communications, which in turn can contribute to making markets work better for the poor. The Senegalese society Manobi7 (whose Sonatel is a shareholder) has already developed SMS-based products such as ‘Texting for Literacy’ sessions, and an access to market prices through SMS text messaging (already consulted by more than 3500 Senegalese producers). These systems, developed along with integrated services to support production and marketing in the agriculture, fishing and food-processing industries present a huge developmental potential. Specific arrangements will be necessary to ensure access to mobile phones to the poorest (cf. Section 2.2.3). Option B – Smartcards In case the Orange Money service is not available, at least for testing, when the pilot phase is to be launched, an alternative option to explore is the use of smartcards. A magnetised/chip card would be charged with key information on the beneficiary: name, photograph, ID card number, entitlement, etc. Beneficiaries would be provided with a PIN code number. Beneficiaries could then withdraw their entitlement either in regular ATMs or/and in Points

6 For more information on Orange Money in Ivory Coast: http://www.orange.ci/omoney/. 7 Manobi Senegal is the first Senegalese operator of value-added services on Mobile and Internet for private entrepreneurs and professionals (http://www.manobi.sn/sites/sn/). It received the African ‘ITC Achiever’ Award’ 2004. For more information on Manobi Development Foundation: http://www.manobi.net/foundation/.

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of Sale (POS) located in strategic locations (post offices, traders, health centres, etc). Again, this system would not require beneficiaries to open bank accounts. Such a card can be easily turned into an electronic food voucher, but still presents less developmental potential that the use of mobile phones. A few banks propose or will soon propose such ‘payroll cards’ (e.g. CBAO, CNCAS,) but they do not appear to be adequate for the proposed system – e.g. withdrawal can only be done per FCFA5,000 bracket, there are only few ATMs mainly located in Dakar, etc. Manobi already provides smartcards to the producers the organisation supports, and is exploring payment options with the CMS, the largest microfinance institution with its 143 pay points throughout Senegal. Option C – (Mobile) Pay Points The option of pay points should only be considered for the pilot phase, in case other technologies are not yet available. This option might prove more cost-efficient during the pilot phase when the number of beneficiaries remains limited, but it should not be considered for the national scale-up. If this option is adopted for the pilot phase, it might be best to launch a tender and compare offers from postal bank, microfinance institutions, private companies, and NGOs, considering proposed costs, frequency of payment, mechanisms to ensure the right person gets the transfer, etc. Even the most decentralised structures such as microfinance institutions might be far from beneficiaries, and the option of mobile pay points should be preferred in rural areas.

Recommendation 06 – Consider the different payment options possible in each geographical area (considering transfer cost, convenience for beneficiaries, security for both provider and beneficiaries, and developmental impact of the payment mechanism) and adopt as soon as possible the most developmental payment mechanism, such as mobile phone-based transfer.

1.7. Complementary components

Cash transfers should be integrated into a comprehensive package of context-specific social protection interventions. For child wellbeing, cash transfers are a key economic intervention as part of a range of social protection measures – policies, insurance schemes, fee waivers, etc – that includes access to and quality of health, education and other services for all children, child protection (including legal) and psycho-social support. A child-focused integrated package of social protection measures will i) offer escape routes from extreme poverty, and ii) ensure children’s rights are respected, in particular children’s ability to access good nutrition, quality education, preventative health care, and prevention of abuse, neglect, violence and exploitation. This could include for instance fee waivers in health centres for pregnant women and children under 5, the development of (community-based) early childhood development centres, children forums, labour market policies (e.g. to increase minimum wage), etc. Such a child protection model is the priority first step of a broader social protection model. Senegal’s financial constraints and limited experience in social protection call for a phased approach to the development of a national social protection scheme. And as previously indicated, children appear to be the priority group in need of assistance in Senegal. It is interesting to remind here that the successful social protection scheme Bolsa Familia in Brazil started as a programme exclusively targeted at children. Its success later pushed the government to expand the programme to other vulnerable groups. Poverty is highly correlated with access to basic infrastructure services, human development,

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employment and vulnerability to external shocks. Senegal has seen significant progress in the supply of basic services, but there are still significant challenges in access to quality services, particularly in rural areas. Thus, the cash transfer programme will need to be developed in a way that does not crowd resources out of investment in basic social services. However, cash transfers to households with children will be a helpful mechanism to strengthen uptake of services, so complementarities can be strengthened. Because of the multidimensional nature of childhood poverty and vulnerability, it is important to pay attention to complementary actions that could address non-material dimensions of poverty, especially exploitation and abuse and voicelessness. Measures need to be taken to strengthen birth control and registration mechanisms, and a range of communication and education campaigns need to be developed, in particular birth registration campaigns and more broadly campaigns on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and family planning and other reproductive health activities. Culturally, the more children a woman has, the better she is considered. In a context of widespread polygamy, this may foster an unhealthy competition between wives/women. A Universal Child Benefit should not encourage such behaviour. It will be important to revisit and intensify birth control activities in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Family, National Solidarity, Women’s Empowerment and Microfinance, and the Senegalese Association for Family Wellbeing (Association Sénégalaise pour le Bien-Etre Familial). Finally, the proposed programme also needs to be part of a set of preventive and curative measures to fight malnutrition. If the recent nutrition survey revealed a deteriorating situation following high food prices and two bad agricultural seasons, it also highlighted poor nutritional practices – in terms of breastfeeding, weaning, and introduction of complementary food. The survey team recommended strengthened behaviour change communication campaigns, systematic screening, and treatment of acute malnutrition. The National Strategic Plan for Child Survival adopted in 2007 put an emphasis on malnutrition and its related diseases. And the Unit for the Fight against Malnutrition (Cellule de Lutte contre la Malnutrition – CLM) is planning an expansion of its activities through the strengthening of its flagship programme PRN (Programme de Renforcement de la Nutrition).

Recommendation 07 – Develop the social cash transfer programme within a broader child-sensitive social protection model.

1.8. Fears, potential risks and mitigating measures

The fears and potential risks presented below were identified based on consultations in Senegal and experience in other countries. Mitigating measures are presented for each of these potential risks. Fears and potential risks related to targeting

- Perverse fertility incentive It is worth noting that the current family allowance scheme for civil servants adopted no limit on the number of children for the prenatal and maternity allowance, and a limit of six children for the family allowance. It was estimated that the risk for the programme to generate perverse fertility incentives existed but was minor, and that it could be mitigated through the measures proposed in the programme. It is thus envisioned i) to limit the number of eligible children under 5 to three per women (with possible exceptions in case of adoptions); ii) to complement the programme with family planning campaigns and awareness campaigns targeted at all women of childbearing age; and iii) to provide a specific support by social assistants to programme beneficiary mothers with numerous children.

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- Population movements to beneficiary areas during scale-up phase

Geographical targeting will be adopted during the pilot and scale-up phases to ensure a gradual implementation of the programme. There is a potential risk to see population movements to present or future beneficiary areas. However, the cost of leaving one’s land/house is likely to be higher than any benefit from the programme, and the programme is unlikely to generate population movements. A potentially more important risk is the risk to have children moved to families living in targeted areas. In order to minimise these risks, it is planned i) to accept registration only over a limited period of time in each successive selected area; and ii) to exclusively register biological children or children under legal guardianship.

- Stigmatisation of the beneficiaries Because the programme will adopt a categorical approach, stigmatisation does not appear to be a risk. Yet, the programme will be implemented in parallel with a wide communication campaign of child rights and the impact of social protection measures on the country’s economic growth, and the population’s overall well-being.

- Power relations, favouritism et politicisation This risk remains minor since the programme is meant to be universal. Large information campaigns will promote a rights-based approach to social protection, and inform citizens of their rights. Geographical targeting will be based on poverty and malnutrition figures already available at the national agency of statistics. And ultimately, all regions will benefit from the programme.

- Missing children with no biological parent nor legal guardian Complementary arrangements will need to be identified to ensure that orphans, street children and child-headed households do not fall outside the conditions for entitlement of the benefit because of the absence of an adult. Nine per cent of Senegalese children under 15 are orphans, and 10% of children between 5 and 14 are fostered (non-orphans but living in a household different from their parents’) [UCW, 2007]. However, given that the programme targets children under 5, this risk seems minor. Street children or children separated from their family represent (only) 1.3% of children between 6 and 18 [Republic of Senegal, 2005] and a recent study in the Dakar region informs that the average age of street children is 11 [UCW, 2007]. Child-headed households remain the exception in Senegal. A mentorship system or an formalisation of the guardian function could be put in place for some children with no biological parents or legal guardian. On the contrary, taking care of children placed in institutions will require the setting up or the strengthening of other appropriate responses of the State.

- Missing most destitute households This risk seems low since the programme is meant to be universal. However, households living in extreme poverty might not be in a position to conduct the necessary administrative procedures to enrol in the programme – in particular the registration of children on the Civil Registry. Procedures will thus need to be as simple as possible, and assistance from social workers and civil society organisations will be required to ensure most destitute households are assisted in their administrative procedures, and thus ensure access of all to their entitlement. Fears and potential risks related to payment

- Poor governance This is a major risk. In order to minimise this risk, programme implementation systems will rely on a segregation of duties (cf. Section 2), and promote transparency through communication campaigns, and the engagement of civil society organisations. In addition, it

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will be important to carry out external audits regularly.

- Intra-household dynamics There are fears that providing cash to women may generate intra-household violence. This risk appears even higher given the fact that nearly a third of the Senegalese households are polygamous. There is also a risk to see cash transfers used for other needs than infant’s essential needs. The strategy to target mothers/caregivers, and link transfer delivery to awareness campaigns on child rights, family planning, nutrition and intra-household violence will mitigate this risk. It is worth noting that social cash transfer programmes were implemented in traditional societies, like Niger for instance, and showed very good results.

- Dependency One argument against unconditional cash transfer is the fear to create dependency. On this dependency issue, it is interesting to look at experiences from Malawi, Brazil, Mexico, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Zambia. In all these different contexts, cash transfers did not create dependency. On the contrary, cash transfers can break dependency traps. It was observed for instance that unemployment rates were lower among cash transfer beneficiary households. In South Africa, women participation in work labour is better for child grant beneficiaries than for the overall population, and even greater for rural women. In Senegal, it will be possible to minimise this risk by involving communities from an early stage and thus engaging self-regulation community mechanisms.

- Inefficiency In the Senegalese family, a household is made up of the extended family, often dependent on one or few incomes, so that vulnerability extends to those beyond the nuclear family. Benefits provided only for the immediate family might have to be shared within the extended family and have little impact on the targeted child. Experience in other countries showed that child benefits give very good results on poverty reduction and economic growth – e.g. in South Africa, the government tripled the number of cash transfer beneficiaries, and the economy grew further. In Senegal, it will be crucial to monitor closely the performance of the programme during its piloting and scale-up phases and make any required adjustments. The risk to have a mother rent her child for him to beg rather than keeping him at home is not specific to the programme. However since the level of transfer is likely to remain inferior to begging gains, the programme alone may not be efficient to stop the begging phenomena. Specific complementary measures might contribute to minimise this risk. Fear and potential risks related to service/goods supply

- Inflation of food prices beyond acceptable threshold The small level of benefit provided is unlikely to foster inflation in beneficiary areas. And the level of benefit will be indexed to inflation. However, arrangements will be taken to monitor prices and inform any necessary complementary actions (e.g. market support activity, State-supported central purchasing department accessible to destitute persons only) or any alternative (e.g. switch to voucher/food aid) to be taken.

- Speculative attitude of traders There are fears that the actual benefit of beneficiaries will be reduced due to speculative attitudes of traders. And the State has little capacity to actually control traders’ behaviour. One mitigating measure could be to use cell phones/SMS-texting platforms to disseminate information on market prices, and ease communication between remote places and consumers association for any denunciation of abuses.

- Low investment in basic services/infrastructures Cash transfers cannot always be effective on their own. They require a significant investment in the provision of basic services – water, education, housing, health, transport –

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to ensure that the supply is able to respond to the increased demand supported by cash transfers. The cash transfer programme will need to be developed in a way that does not crowd resources out of investment in basic social services. Cash transfers to households with children will be a helpful mechanism to strengthen uptake of services, so complementarities can be strengthened.

Recommendation 08 – Update an in-depth risks analysis and develop mitigating measures prior to the first pilot phase.

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2. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

2.1. Overall coordination

Defining who, at an institutional level, will manage the design, implementation and ongoing operation of the social transfer programme is a crucial first step upon adoption of a social transfer programme. The institution that gathers the following characteristics will be the best one to manage the programme [Samson et al., 2006]:-

- A sincere and durable political commitment to social protection; - The political influence to secure resources and defend the programme’s priority; - The institutional capacity to deliver an administration-intensive programme.

However, it is often impossible to find all three qualities in one single institution. And the choice of the managing institution often goes to:-

- the relevant social development ministry (i.e. the most committed one); - the ministry responsible for finance (i.e. the most powerful one); or - a separate agency which reports to a committee of related ministries (i.e. bringing

together commitment, influence and capacity). A reassignment of responsibilities over time is also possible as observed in South Africa (from provincial governments to a national social security agency), Bangladesh (from the Ministry of Social Welfare to the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs), or Namibia (from the Ministry of Labour to the Ministry of Health and Social Services). Such is a shared of responsibility as seen in India where the Ministry of Labour supervises pensions and the National Family Benefit Scheme administers the grants. Each of these models presents advantages and disadvantages, and institutional arrangement need to be informed by a review of relevant Senegalese institutions, the primary objective of the programme (e.g. poverty reduction vs. education), and any longer-term vision for social protection in Senegal. The Senegalese government is quite big, with 29 ministries in charge of often overlapping agendas – a rapid institutional analysis is presented in Annexe 4. The instability of Ministries is seen as one of the problems of policy implementation. Mandates of the different Ministries are often overlapping, and the frequent institutional modifications cause some confusion as to the mandates and activities of some key areas. Social protection is still not clearly attributed to a specific ministry. The number of Ministries also generates high administrative costs and negatively impact government effectiveness. Given the already complex (and expensive) structure of the Government, it is not recommended to set up yet another structure for the supervision of this programme. Instead it is proposed to host the supervision of the programme in the CSPLP (Cellule de Suivi des Programmes de Lutte contre la Pauvreté) in the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). The CSPLP is actively engaged in social protection discussions, and has established connections with other Ministries engaged in poverty reduction. Positioning the programme under the MEF might ensure institutional stability and political support. However the MEF has no decentralised presence, and no implementation capacity. It operates at policy level only, and liaises with decentralised structures – which may be politicised. An implementation arm is required. The Ministry of Family, National Solidarity, Women’s Empowerment and Microfinance (MFNSWEM) chairs the Pillar 3 of the PRSP on Social Protection. It is the Ministry with the most decentralised presence – after the Ministries of Education and Health. The CSO-PLCP (Cellule de Suivi Opérationnel des Programmes de Lutte contre la Pauvreté) is the Ministry’s body

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Poverty Reduction MEF

responsible for the monitoring and coordination of the poverty reduction programmes. Yet the MFNSWEM suffers from institution instability, and lack of resources – no computerization, limited number of CPRS (Centre de Promotion et de Réinsertion Sociale), etc.

Figure 2.1 – Child protection measures within poverty reduction strategies

The supervising body will support the Pillar 3 working group and will gather the different Ministries involved (such as ministry of decentralisation and local authorities (through the CNEC), the ministry of health, the ministry of education, the ministry of labour and the ministry of justice) as well as the CAPE (Cellule d’Appui à la Protection de l’Enfance), technical and financial partners involved (in particular Unicef, ILO, the World Bank, the WFP, etc) and private sector and civil society representatives. This committee will liaise with other Ministries through existing PRSP channels, and maintain close relationship with the following institutions:-

- CAPE established within the President’s Department Staff By virtue of its facilitator role for better child care and the development of child-focused social protection, the Child Protection Support Unit (CAPE) might be able to support advocacy activities and contribute to ensure consistency and synergy with other child-focused social protection stakeholders.

- CNEC under the Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Authorities The National Centre of Civil Registration (Centre National d’Etat Civil – CNED) regroups the different actors engaged in the development and implementation of civil registration systems. Two years ago, the Ministry of Home Affairs and Local Authorities who was in charge of the Civil Registry was split in two between the Ministry of Home Affairs – that coordinates Civil Register officers (prefects, mayors, etc) through the DAGAT (Direction des Affaires Générales et de l’Administration Territoriale), and the Ministry of Decentralization – who’s operating at the policy level.

- CLM under the Prime Minister’s Office The Prime Minister’s Office chairs the Inter-ministerial Orientation and Decision Committee (Comité Interministériel d’Orientation et de Décision) which is in charge of the coordination of the Poverty Reduction Strategy’s implementation. It also supervises the Unit for the Fight against Malnutrition (Cellule de Lutte contre la Malnutrition – CLM) whose role is to define national nutrition policy and oversee the implementation of the nutrition programmes, and in

Social/Child Protection MFNSWEM

Birth

registration CNEC

Mother-Child Health

Bajeenou Gox

Fight against malnutrition

CLM

27

particular its flagship programme, the Nutrition Enhancement Program (Programme de Renforcement de la Nutrition – PRN). The World Bank is planning to support the development of a pilot cash transfer programme within the PRN in 2009. The SMART nutritional survey team also called the CLM to introduce systematic screening of child malnutrition, and treatment of acute malnutrition in its programmes.

- Bajeenou Gox initiative under the Ministry of Health and Prevention The community programme for the promotion of mother and child health (Bajeenou Gox initiative) was launched in Kolda in January 2009. The initiative proposes to identify and train in villages and neighbourhoods community female mentors (called ‘marraine’ or ‘badiène’) to raise awareness on mother and child health among pregnant women and nursing mothers. The initiative also envisions providing mobile phones to enable these female leaders to reach health services quickly and for free. The project will be implemented in Kolda and Sédhiou regions in 2009-2011, in connection with other community-based initiatives (incl. PRN) engaged in family planning, prenatal consultations, assisted delivery, postnatal follow-up, and monitoring of immunization calendar and growth curve of children under 5. There is potential for synergies between this initiative and the proposed programme. The supervising body will also have to exchange learning with other actors considering the development of cash-based interventions, including Ministry of Labour and the International Labour Office (who are studying the feasibility of extending pension schemes to workers of the informal sector), the PNLP (Plan National de Développement Local)8, Unicef (envisioning a cash transfer component within its street children project), and the World Food Programme (envisioning a cash/food voucher-based intervention in urban areas).

Recommendation 09 – Programme supervision will have to be done within the existing committees in charge of monitoring poverty reduction programmes. A supervision body will need to be set up in the MFNSWEM to liaise with the PRSP coordination structures, and coordinate execution and monitoring partners – other national institutions, private sector, and civil society.

2.2. Implementation systems

A key design issue for social cash transfer programmes is addressing fiduciary risk. Good systems help address fiduciary risk, appropriate monitoring and evaluation contributes also. And the capacity of a lack of coordination to impact on the cost-effectiveness of the programme is great. In the context of Senegal, this issue is particularly critical. Although the majority of the interviewed stakeholders expressed enthusiasm for the introduction of social cash transfers, many of them expressed serious doubts about the ability of the national institutions to manage such a programme in a fair and transparent manner, and actually deliver. The Government is perceived as less efficient than before [Ndione, 2008] and systems tend to be less participative and accountable [Pereznieto and Fall, 2009]. A weaken Parliament limits the scope for debate of executive proposals, and delays in the decentralisation process constrain programmes’ implementation. The issues of poor governance and limited capacity were also present in some developing countries that nevertheless managed to introduce social cash transfer programmes. And it is possible to build on their experience. The model presented below (see Figure 2.2) evolved from Brazil’s Bolsa Familia programme, and was later successfully applied in South Africa,

8 For more information on the PNLP: http://www.pndl.org.

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Mozambique and other countries. It relies on a separation of duties between different structures, and a single registry ensures coordination and control. This model proves successful in addressing fiduciary risks and facilitating cash transfer delivery in a fair and transparent manner. Institutionalised programme does not mean that all duties will be performed by one single national institution or by national institutions only. The key to a successful design and implementation is to delegate the responsibility of each duty to the formal or non-formal institution for which it is the core activity, and to establish strong control mechanisms. For instance, cash transfer delivery is banks’ core business, and ensuring people’s rights are respected is traditionally civil society’s role.

Figure 2.2 – Social Protection model implementation systems

2.2.1. Single Registry The Management Information System (MIS) is the heart of the implementation system. It registers and cross-checks who is entitled to receive assistance and who is actually receiving assistance. Currently the Government of Kenya is developing an open source MIS that will be available free-of-charge to any country who wishes to adopt it. It is currently being implemented in the field in four districts in Kenya, and will be available early 2009. This MIS will need to be translated into French. And interfaces to birth registration and payment databases will also need to be designed. Neither the MFNSWEM nor the Civil Registry runs a computerized system centralizing data on beneficiary families or birth certificates. Unlike the ID registry (managed by the Direction de l’Automatisation du Fichier), the Civil Registry is not centralized and largely non-computerised. Each rural community (Communauté Rurale – CR) maintains its own registry. Several towns computerised their Civil Registry. But while Dakar, Ziguinchor and Kaolak adopted similar software, Thies and other towns adopted different software. It is thus recommended to identify mechanisms to link with the CNEC so that the proposed programme stimulates the strengthening of Civil Registry’s capacity and leads to the centralisation of Civil Registry’s data. While ultimately, a national registry needs to be set up, an intermediary solution could be to delegate this task to IPRES (Institut de Prévoyance Retraite du Sénégal) who has experience in this matter, and has experience working with PosteFinances and others for allowances payment. Another option will be to host the MIS in the MFNSWEM’s CSO-PLCP which is developing computer-based systems to monitor poverty reduction programmes, or the MEF’s Directorate for National Planning which adopted DevInfo softwares. The registry can be integrated with birth registration processes to maximize the programme’s developmental

Registre

Commun

Paiements Administration

Suivi et

Evaluation Droits

29

impact. Such developmental linkages (sometimes termed ‘developmental conditionalities’ – since they are non-punitive) can advance the human capital impact of the programme.

Recommendation 10 – Adopt the open source Management Information System developed in Kenya, and establish links with birth registration systems (as well as ultimately with other child tracking and child protection systems).

2.2.2. Administration

Administration includes delivery of all main-line functions of the programme, including registration, service delivery and case management. Civil registry is administrated at CR level. And two types of institutions can be considered to administrate the programme on the ground: the MFNSWEM’s CPRS, and the decentralised authorities. Experience in South Africa indicates that a centralization of responsibility ensures more uniform protection of people’s rights to social assistance, and decentralised authorities might be politicised. On the other hand, the CPRS are not numerous enough and have limited capacities. It is proposed to strengthen CPRS and expand their coverage. Ultimately, these centres could become the interface between the population at grassroots levels and the State institutions. Currently, there are only a few (under-staffed and under-equipped) CPRS, and they are not yet accessible to the mass. To help bridge the remaining gap between rural communities and decentralised structures, it is proposed to i) reinforce CPRS with additional staff and means; and ii) empower communities through NGO-supported community-based approaches – e.g. Tostan-supported CGEs (Comités de Gestion Communautaire) or Plan Senegal-supported GMOs (Groupes de Mise en Œuvre). Community structures may assist with child registration as well as participatory monitoring. Strengthened CPRS would work more systematically with community committees and volunteers (e.g. PRN’s relais communautaires). The centre could then provide guidance, monitor the programme implementation, and manage any complains. It will also be necessary to involve the Ministry of Health’s decentralised structures as well as Civil Registry officials and municipal and rural committees in the child registration process. Large communication campaigns will be organised to inform people on the programme. Caregivers of children under 5 will then need to approach a registration centre. A permanent centre may be established at CR level, and mobile centres may be organised in villages on specific dates e.g. on market days. Registration of children under 5 holding a birth certificate The registration of caregivers of children holding a birth certificate will be straight forward, and can be organised in a systematic way using the CR Civil Registry. Registration of children under 5 with no birth certificate If a child has not yet been declared, the registration will need to be done through a supplementary judgment (‘jugement supplétif’). The child caregiver will first go to the Police who will register her/his identity and request. Then the child caregiver will present her/himself to the CR civil registry officer with two witnesses, and obtain a ‘certificat de non-inscription de naissance’. Finally, the Tribunal will summon the child caregiver and her/his two witnesses to a public hearing (‘audience foraine’), held at the region level. It costs FCFA6,000 to go through the public hearing process. This process is quite burdensome (and expensive) for most parents. Recent research from the CROSP Kolda (Centre Régional de l’Orientation Scolaire et Professionnelle under the

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Ministry of Education) confirmed that main causes of poor birth registration rates are: i) ignorance of parents; ii) poor training of civil registry officers and village chiefs; and iii) lack of computerisation and centralisation of the Civil Registry. In response to this assessment, the CROSP developed interesting initiatives that could easily be scaled up. First, a series of radio broadcasts and talks in communities on child rights, the importance of declaring children, and processes for birth registration showed very good results. Secondly, the CROSP works in close collaboration with the Tribunal to train civil registry officers. Finally, CROSP is developing a system of sponsorship for children with no birth certificates by influential persons of the community to support process and costs of the public hearing process. The CROSP also established child protection committees (Comités d’Orientation et de Protection des Enfants – COPE) to raise awareness in communities, and follow up sponsorship. Improving the civil register system will be a prerequisite to the pilot project in order to minimise risks of fraud, such as (re-)declaring a 7-year old child as being 5-year old. And a broad awareness and registration campaign will have to precede the programme in a given area with potentially exemptions or lower fees attached to public hearing. Registration of newborn babies Birth can be registered at the CR level on the basis of the birth declaration filled by the midwife. This presupposed that delivery is done at the health centre, which is not the norm in rural areas. Alternatively, a declaration can be obtained at the health centre a few days after birth when the mother comes for the first medical visit of the child. With one of these documents, parents have two months to register their child at the CR civil registry centre, which can be quite far from the village. Birth certificate costs FCFA200-300 depending on the CR, if within 2 months following the birth. And parents have little incentive to register their child. The incentive may only come when the child is over 7 and needs to register for exams or access scholarship, for instance. Apart from parents’ ignorance of the importance of birth registration, a serious barrier is distance between the village and the civil registry centre. And it is acknowledged among CNED partners that the system should involve local communities and village chiefs much more. Currently village chiefs have no legal obligations to keep village census registers up to date (cahier de recensement). They receive little/no training for this, and the format of census registers are not harmonised. Village chiefs are given authority through prefectural order, and the DAGAT is considering revising the status of village chiefs – currently working on a voluntary basis. It is proposed to provide midwives and village leaders with free access to cell phone and PDA applications so that the process of birth registration can be launched as soon as the a live birth is confirmed9. This is directly in line with the Bajeenou Gox initiative. Manobi will be able to develop software to enable midwife and village leader to easily enter all information related to a newborn baby in an MMS (cf. Figure 2.3)10. The NGO Tostan could then support the training phase. Since early 2008, the NGO Tostan11 has been running a pilot project in Ziguinchor to train people on the use of mobile phones – in partnership with Manobi. This was initiated as a mean for students of literacy courses to keep practicing, and offers a whole range of developmental potentialities, e.g. to get information on market prices by SMS text messaging through the Manobi platform.

9 A period of eight days between the child birth and birth registration may be kept, since culturally it’s only after this time period that the newborn receives his/her name. This is the opportunity for a gathering in the village, suitable to the birth officialisation. 10 Manobi had proposed such a system to institutions involved in birth registration as early as 2006. At the time, it was felt that other weaknesses in the civil registration model needed to be tackled first. Interviewed stakeholders tend to agree that the system could now be successfully introduced. 11 The NGO Tostan has been running community empowerment programmes in Senegal for over 20 years, and is the winner of the 2007 Conrad N. Hilton Humanitarian Prize. For more information: www.tostan.org.

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Figure 2.3 – MMS-assisted birth registration system (source: Manobi)

The process would thus be as follows:-

a. Midwife and village leader send an MMS containing the following information: father’s name, father’s birth date, father’s ID # (if available), father’s photo, mother’s name, mother’s birth date, mother’s ID # (if available), mother’s photo, child’s sex, child’s name, date of birth, time of birth.

b. This information is translated into an email through the Manobi platform, and received on CR civil registry’s computer/PDA.

c. The civil registry officer prepares the birth certificate, informs the village leader that the certificate is ready, and agrees on the place and date where the parent will be able to collect the certificate.

d. The civil registry officer brings the certificate to the parent e.g. at the health centre where the mother comes for a postnatal consultation.

Not all CR have power supply, and it might not be feasible in a near future to provide all of them with computers – but maybe PDA with solar chargers instead. Yet, all primary civil registry centres at arrondissement level should be provided with a computer – there are a total of 123 sous-préfectures/arrondissements. And sous-préfets are ultimately responsible for population census in their respective arrondissement. Communication campaigns and hot line If introducing information technologies may ease birth registration, it is clear that the primary barrier to child registration is parents’ lack of knowledge of the importance of this action. Thus the programme will have to support important awareness campaigns. The development of the use of mobile phones can support better communication with communities, as well as dissemination of health and protection messages. Communities might also use mobile phones to report speculative attitudes of traders to customers associations, since the State has little capacity to actually control traders’ behaviour. Eventually a hot line will need to be established within the MFNSWEM to respond to beneficiaries’ difficulties – e.g. loss of SIM card, missed entitlement, etc; and any non-beneficiaries’ complains.

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Recommendation 11 – Link programme registration to birth certificates.

2.2.3. Payments

As indicated in Section 1, the preferred payment option is mobile phone-based payment that presents great developmental potentials. Kenya was the first country in the world to use mobile phones for cash transfers. The m-payment service, called M-PESA, developed by Safaricom Limited, was successfully tested by Concern Worldwide early 2008 in the remotest parts of Kenya. The following recommendations were drawn from the M-PESA experience [Datta et al., 2008]:-

- Cluster targeted households into groups of ten or less, and nominate one literate person as cluster leader – the system runs on an SMS platform, meaning that users need to be literate;

- Allow beneficiaries without identification documents to nominate a trustworthy adult member of the household to receive cash on their behalf, with the close monitoring of the cluster leader – identification documents was a key requirement for receiving cash at M-PESA centres;

- Provide cluster leaders with a mobile phone and a solar charger, wherever no cluster members have access to a mobile phone, and train them on how to use the equipment;

- Although the equipment can be shared by all cluster members, provide each beneficiary with a SIM card to register for M-PESA, to reduce the risk of cash transfers falling into the wrong hands;

- As much as possible, ensure that the targeted households have a mobile phone and a compliant SIM card, or increase the ratio of mobiles to families – mobile phones proved not robust enough to cope with frequent changes of SIM card;

- Develop a quick mechanism to deal with lost SIM cards – 20 of the 570 M-PESA beneficiaries lost their SIM cards.

The programme will be designed in line with these recommendations. Clusters could be developed in coherence with Bajeenou Gox-envisioned mother’s associations. And the collection of money could coincide with awareness raising sessions.

Recommendation 12 – Organise beneficiaries and provide equipment and training to promote mobile phone-based payments.

2.2.4. Monitoring and Evaluation

The M&E function is particularly critical in the early stages of the programme. Although pilots can begin to achieve objectives in terms of tackling poverty, supporting social development and promoting economic growth, the main objective of a pilot phase is to build an evidence base to support national scale programmes. The specific objectives of the M&E system are to:-

a. Inform the implementation of the programme: the early stages of a programme present a substantial opportunity for learning and capacity-building;

b. Demonstrate programme impact to policy-makers, development partners and general public;

c. Feed into the global lessons of experience: South Africa became a model throughout the region and world because its programme has been successful and well-documented – and Senegal’s innovative approach has the potential to generate similar levels of interest.

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The overall responsibility of M&E will fall under the CSPLP and/or the CSO-PLCP. The use of new technologies (SMS texting) will enable real time process monitoring and evaluation of the programme. ANSD will be able to provide technical support for impact evaluation. Ad-hoc external support will be sought from structures like: CRDH (Centre de Recherche pour le Développement Humain) who is engaged in DHS and PRN evaluation; CEGA (Centre for Evaluation of Global Action) at the University of California, Berkeley – a Tostan partner for the evaluation of the SMS project; the University of Arizona – who conducted the evaluation of the British Red Cross cash transfer project in Niger; or the IRD (Institut de Recherche pour le Développement) who is involved in the evaluation of the WFP cash transfer programme in Burkina Faso. It will be important to involve the civil society in monitoring and evaluation activities. This could be done through existing coordination channels, and possibly strengthened with the use of new technologies (e.g. with Manobi). Children associations in particular should be empowered. The M&E component is discussed further in Section 4 below.

Recommendation 13 – (Over)invest in M&E during the piloting and scaling-up phases, and involve both internal and external institutions

2.2.5. Rights

This function traditionally falls under the responsibilities of committees and civil society. Complaint mechanisms need to be put in place and supported by civil society representatives and authorities. Children Forums are expected to play a very active role, and may serve as the main vehicle for rights protection. The following institutions could be directly involved:-

- The National Platform of Civil Society Organisations for the Monitoring of the MDG in Senegal (Plateforme Nationale des Organisations de la Société Civile pour le Suivi des OMD au Sénégal) created in 2004 has the mandate to facilitate civil society dialogue around MDG-related issues, to coordinate any activity related to the monitoring of the MDG, and to represent civil society at the National Committee driven by the State. The platform gathers NGOs, trade unions, rural producer associations, youth/women/disabled associations, faith-based associations, etc.

- NGOs’ coalitions, such as Congad (Conseil des ONGs d’Appui au Développement), and Conafe (Coalition Nationale des Associations et ONG en faveur de l’Enfant).

- NGOs successfully supporting community empowerment, such as Tostan (that trained 1386 CGE to date), and Plan Sénégal that supports the setup of GMOs.

- NGOs supporting Child Clubs. Plan Senegal established about 200 Clubs Guneyi – which are involved in immunization campaigns, and supports Radio Guneyi, as well as sport and cultural associations. CCF and Save the Children (through local partners) also support Child Clubs. It is worth noting that the Ministry of Social Assistance also supports the Children Parliament (Parlement des Enfants), and the National Youth Council (Conseil National de la Jeunesse) have structures at departmental, regional and national levels. However, both of these structures appear to be politicised.

- Community committees (Conseils de Quartier, Association de Développement Villageois) are established with the local authority (‘Commune’) and supported by the decentralised technical services (Directorate for Social Assistance, Directorate for Community Development, etc).

- Community-based structures: GIE (Groupements d’Intérêt Economique), women associations, disable associations, farmer associations, etc.

Coordination between these different institutions – decentralised institution, decentralised structures, NGOs, etc – are done through the Development Committees at each administrative levels from arrondissement to regional level (Comité Local de

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Développement, Comité Départemental de Développement, Comité Régional de Développment). Overall, the proposed programme meets the principles stated in the NSPS: proximity (with community-based systems); subsidiarity; delegation (with delegation of public service missions to local authorities, civil society, and private sector structures); transparency (with simple selection criteria, and use of Information and Communication Technologies); participation; equity; complementarity and synergy (with links with PRN and Bajeenou Gox).

Recommendation 14 – Involve civil society organisations to promote a right-based social protection model.

2.3. Pilot phase

The main objective of the pilot is to test and fine-tuned technologies, build evidence to inform any required modifications to the model at national scale, and (maybe more importantly) to raise national and international interest in the proposed model. In January 2009, the World Bank granted US$ 8 million to the CLM to expand the PRN in response to high food prices and induced malnutrition. A key component of this expansion is the introduction of cash transfers to households with children under 5. A minimum of US$ 1.5 million will be allocated to this pilot project. The CLM plans to start the first cash transfers as soon as June 2009. Cash transfers would be provided over a 6-month period in most vulnerable areas. The CLM expressed interest in adopting the proposed geographically targeted categorical mechanism, and the PRN pilot project might thus constitute an initial pilot phase. Alternative or additional pilot areas are proposed below.

2.3.1. Pilot area(s) The model will need to be tested in both urban and rural settings. Ideally, activities should be launched in priority in poorest areas. However, it is also necessary to choose easily accessible areas for a good supervision of the project, and a successful pilot which will bring further political engagement and resources. The recent nutrition survey identified the following departments as most vulnerable to high food prices and crop deficit, and at risk of nutritional crisis: Sédhiou, Gossas, and Matam; followed by Bambey, Fatick, Kaolack, Kaffrine, Kédougou, Vélingara, Kébémer, Louga, Podor, Bakel, Oussouye, Kolda, Pikine and Rufisque. Among these departments, the November 2008 nutrition survey found highest chronic malnutrition rates in Sédhiou, and highest acute malnutrition rates in Matam and Bakel. It is proposed to run the initial testing in the department of Guédiawaye, in Dakar suburbs. Vicinity from the capital city will ensure proper supervision, as well as visibility to other actors, for potential collaborations. The Manobi software and platform will be tested and fine-tuned in this first pilot area. It is then proposed to test the model in the rural department of Kolda, in Casamance. Kolda was picked up for the following reasons: poverty rate in the department reaches 66.5%; high maternal and infant mortality rates; poor infrastructure; a number of relevant stakeholders operate in Kolda: Unicef, PRN, Bajeenou Gox, CROSP, Tostan. Alternatively, the pilot could be run in the department of Sédhiou where chronic malnutrition rates are high, infrastructure is poor, and Bajeenou Gox will also be operating.

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Within these departments, the poorest arrondissement will be selected based on the granular information available at the ANSD. ANSD is planning to update the comprehensive village survey conducted in 2000. Results are expected to be available by June 2009. Village ranking will be based on level of access to basic services, and not monetary poverty. Still it can be useful information to select pilot village(s). It was also suggested to pilot the model in an urban area outside Dakar – for instance in Bambey, and in the department of Matam where needs are huge and providers of assistance few. However, it was felt that Matam was not accessible easily enough for a close supervision of the pilot. Yet, the departments of Matam and Bambey should be considered in the next phase of the scale-up plan.

2.3.2. Pilot management structure A Steering Committee will be established to oversee the pilot phase of the programme. The Steering Committee will be responsible for guiding and capitalising national experiences in social cash transfers, and more specifically for the proposed programme, for: - shortly working on programme fine-tuning (common registry setup, registration system,

payment system(s), etc) and leading to a concrete action plan; - defining a road map and implementing it so that the pilot project is quickly operational; - defining successive geographical areas of the pilot project and scale-up phases among the

poorest and most vulnerable areas of Senegal; - overseeing programme implementation; - commissioning and supervising impact evaluations, and broadly disseminating results. It is proposed to include the following members in the Steering Committee:- - PRSP monitoring units within the MEF and the MFNSWEM; - relevant governmental institutions such as CAPE (advocacy), CLM (cash transfer pilot

project), the National AIDS Commission (CNLS, cash transfer pilot project), and the CNEC (birth registration);

- development partners engaged in social protection such as Unicef, the World Bank, the International Labour Office, and the World Food Programme;

- civil society members – e.g. National Platform of Civil Society Organisations for the Monitoring of the MDG in Senegal and/or the CONGAD; and

- national technical experts. Steering Committee activities will directly contribute to the update of the National Social Protection Strategy as well as the development of an Action Plan for the implementation of this strategy, two initiatives envisioned in the course of 2009 by the PRSP Pillar 3 working group chaired by the CSO-PLCP of the MFNSWEM. Pilots provide a critical element of capacity building through practical experience. And it is often useful to ‘overstaff’ them in order to:- i) increase the chances of success of the pilot (again, the primary objective is to demonstrate

impact and build political acceptability and donors’ interest); ii) document as much as possible the process, and increase the ability to identify good

practices and shortcomings; and iii) train teams who will later replicate interventions during the phase-up stage. NGO or United Nations’ agency staff might directly support the implementation of the pilot project, while the capacity of national institutions is being scaled-up.

2.3.3. Pilot duration In order to ensure significant social protection and child development impacts from the pilot,

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it is recommended that the pilot runs for at least one year, and preferably two years. International evidence suggests that chronically destitute households require long-term social assistance interventions. A mid-term review after 6 month will inform programme adjustments, and a first impact evaluation after 12 months will inform the geographical expansion of the programme.

2.3.4. Capacity-building In order to support a bottom-up approach and ensure decentralized institutions’ support, there is a need to:- - ensure social protection and child protection interventions are appropriately co-ordinated

to avoid duplication of efforts and promote synergies; - strengthen decentralised structures such as CPRS; - train staff of decentralised authorities on social protection issues; and - reinforce capacity for M&E, with data and statistics collection at arrondissement/CR

level. At the national level, there is a need to: - provide financial and technical support to develop systems enabling rapid flows of

information during the challenging start-up period; - provide financial and technical support in impact evaluation; - support the setup of the Single Registry; and - train decision-makers and other development partners on social/child protection.

2.4. Scaling-up

The programme is expected to be progressively scaled-up to its national scale over five years. An indicative scale-up plan is presented in Figure 2.4. Scale-up will need to be coordinated with other relevant initiatives e.g. civil registry improvement plan. Figure 2.4 – Indicative scale-up plan of the pilot

Scope Timeframe Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

Post-pilot

Phase 1 One CR in two departments

Six months to one year

Phase 2 All CRs in the first two arrondissements One CR in two other departments/regions

Six months to one year, based on mid-term review/impact evaluation of Phase 1

Phase 3 All arrondissements in first two departments One arrondissement in two other departments

One year, upon satisfactory evaluation of the arrondissement model developed in Phase 2

Phase 4 At least one department in each of the 14 regions

One year, upon satisfactory evaluation of the departmental model developed in Phase 3

National scale-up

Scale up to all 45 departments

Upon satisfactory evaluation of the 5-year pilot

Universal Child

Benefit Admin Cross-CR administration,

including MIS Scaled-up over five years

M&E Monitoring & Evaluation Phased over five years

Once at national scale, it will be possible to further expand the programme’s outreach by extending the eligibility threshold to 7, and then 14 for instance. This will enable to reach school-age children, and children most at risk of worse forms of child labour.

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3. FINANCING PLAN

Affordability at national scale depends on i) the fiscal resources available to government, ii) the cost structure of the programme and iii) the extent to which the programme itself has an impact on available resources, by generating economic growth and development impacts.

3.1. Fiscal cost The fiscal cost of the social cash transfer programme depends on a number of factors, including the benefit level, the coverage rate and the pace of implementation and scale-up. Pilots need to be designed and costed in light of what is affordable at national scale. Pilots that are unaffordable at national scale fail to provide useful evidence for appropriate social protection. The first step in analysing the fiscal cost of the programme is to quantify the cost at national scale. The second step is to identify the costs of an appropriate initial pilot.

3.1.1. Costing at national scale Micro-analysis of household survey data and demographic modelling indicate that a universal child benefit with transfers equal to 10% of per capita income will cost 1.7% of national income at scale in 2010 (cf. Figure 3.1). This represents less than half the cost of the existing system of general food and fuel subsidies – yet would generate a significantly more efficient poverty reduction impact. Over time, the fiscal burden of such a programme (expressed in % of the Gross Domestic Product – GDP) would fall, given the trend in falling fertility and the impact on economic growth. An initially lower benefit could be scaled up as economic growth and changing demographics increase affordability.

Figure 3.1 – Cost of a universal child benefit (children under 5 years) as a % of GDP

0.0%

0.5%

1 .0%

1 .5%

2.0%

201 0 201 5 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

The initial cost of 1.7% of national income (as measured by GDP) in 2010 is based on a macro-economic and demographic analysis. The International Data Base (IDB) estimates Senegal’s population in 2010 to be 14.1 million people, with 16.1% of this population under the age of 5 years. The benefit is estimated based on 10% of per capita national income (as measured by GDP) in 2008 (an estimated benefit level of FCFA 3,800 or US$ 7.60). The total cost as a percentage of national income depends on the base benefit level (in 2008), per capita annual economic growth rates over the planning horizon (assumed to be a conservative 1% – higher growth rates would cause the fiscal burden to fall more rapidly over time) and administrative costs at scale of 8% of total benefits.

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Given the base benefit level (expressed as 10% of per capita income in 2008), the projected coverage rate (16.1% of the total population in 2010), the per capita growth rate of 1% and the administrative costs of 8%, the total cost of the programme (expressed as a percentage of national income) can be determined by multiplying the benefit level (adjusted for economic growth) by the coverage rate, and then factoring in administrative costs, yielding 1.70% in 2010.12 A similar process is utilised for each subsequent year in order to calculate the fiscal burden over time. For example, in 2015 population is estimated at 16.0 million people, with 15.3% of these being children under the age of 5 years. Adjusting the 10% benefit ratio for real economic growth and maintaining the assumption of 8% recurrent administrative costs yields a total cost burden estimated at 1.54% of national income (as measured by GDP). The burden falls over the five year period for two reasons – as the population ages, the share of the young child population falls from 16.1% to 15.3%, reducing effective programme coverage, and economic growth reduces the burden of a constant real benefit. Similar calculations for each subsequent year maps out cost path graphed in Figure 3.1 above. By 2050, young children under the age of 5 years are estimated to make up only 9.8% of the population, and real economic growth will reduce the fiscal burden by a third. The net effect is that the fiscal burden of the programme will reduce by more than half – to 0.69% of national income. Rough though these estimates are, they still give a good idea of the evolution over time of the fiscal burden of such a programme. More acute estimates will have to take into account the indexation of the level of benefit to inflation (measured by the CPI) as well as the fact that the benefit will be scaled (i.e. all children will not receive the maximum amount). These estimates of the cost of the programme at scale confirm that Senegal can maintain a social cash transfer programme – at least once the programme is at scale and well established. One will also have to consider the starting costs of such a programme. These costs are often high since tools and train staff of the implementation and monitoring structures. The indicative cost of an initial pilot phase which would enable to test the different implementation mechanisms (e.g. registration, payment, etc.) at small scale is estimated below. It will probably take several years of progressive scale-up before the programme reaches its national form and full cost-effectiveness.

3.1.2. Costing of an initial pilot An accurate budget for the pilot depends on the choices made in the design finalisation process. The following table presents an indicative budget for an initial pilot project aimed at testing implementation mechanisms. It is worth highlighting that during the pilot and scale-up phases of the programme, the alpha-ratio13 will be much lower than when the programme will be at scale, in order to ensure proper management, monitoring, documentation, and capacity-building. The cost-efficiency of the programme will significantly increase when at scaled – e.g. administrative costs of social transfer programmes in South Africa only account for 6% of the total programme budget.

12 In this case, 16.1% multiplied by 10% (coverage times benefit level) divided by 1.0201 (to adjust for per capita economic growth from 2008 to 2010), then multiplied by 1.08 (assuming administrative costs of 8%), yielding 1.70% (the ratio of total programme cost to national income as measured by the GDP). 13 The alpha-ratio is the ratio of the level of benefit to the total cost of the programme. The closer to one the alpha-ratio is, the more cost-efficient the programme.

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Table 3.1 – Indicative cost of a pilot project Description Estimate Annual total budget (USD)

Manobi birth registration platform Estimate for 10 villages 55,000 Mobile phone and solar charger set $40 each x 1set/5hh + 10% 17,500 Training sessions & communication Lumpsum 20,000 Child Benefit 2,800 children 253,800 Contingency (in case of inflation) 10% of child benefit 25,200 Transfer and withdrawal costs FCFA 600 per transfer 40,000 Monitoring & Evaluation Lumpsum 70,000

Total 481,500 NB: US$ 1=FCFA 503, and € 1= FCFA 656

Administrative costs include significant fixed components and represent a greater percent of the total budget the smaller is the initial scope of the project. While budgets for cash transfer pilots are not usually public information, estimates from even large scale pilots – such as Ghana’s LEAP pilot, Kenya’s OVC programme, and Zambia’s cash transfer pilots suggest that initial year administrative costs may exceed 50% of the total budget. Administrative costs fall sharply after initial systems are developed and put in place, and particularly as scale economies result from increasing the number of programme participants. Administrative costs can be reduced by economising on monitoring and evaluation, but this undermines the evidence-generating objective of the pilot. Likewise, less can be invested in delivery systems, but this may undermine programme efficiency or defer expenditure to scale-up, when more robust systems may need to be re-developed. The main lesson from Mozambique’s GAPVU pilot in the 1990’s was that economising on administrative costs increased a number of fiduciary risks, including fraud and mismanagement. As a point of comparison, the total cost (over 5 years) of comparable pilots in Kenya, Lesotho and Ghana amounted US$ 60 million. The Government provided FCFA 650 million ($1,277m, €991,000) worth of aid before Tabaski’s celebrations late 2008. Such a budget alone could finance the initial pilot project.

3.2. Financing options

3.2.1. Development donor support Countries similar to Senegal often have the option to finance the initial phases of the pilot with development partner support. For instance, Kenya is implementing multiple pilots with GBP 120 billion in support from DFID, and Lesotho is currently implementing an OVC cash transfer programme with a grant of 50 million euro from the European Commission.

3.2.2. Fiscal space While external funding can support the initial pilot, long-term sustainability requires the identification and building of mechanisms for national funding. Senegal has achieved moderately high growth rates in recent years – with year-over-year GDP growth rates averaging 5% over the past five years, and projections close to 3% in 2009 [IMF, 2008]. Government expenditure reached 28.5% of national income in 2008, with a third allocated to social spending. The PRSP aims to increase this proportion to 40% by 2010, which the IMF recognizes will reduce poverty while improving international competitiveness and economic growth prospects [IMF, 2008]. Key government officials and other stakeholders consulted agreed that the government has ample capacity to expand investments in social protection. In particular, in the face of global economic crisis, these investments yield substantial returns in terms of promoting social cohesion, protecting the human capital of the poor and protecting the foundation for long-

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term development and economic growth. ‘Fiscal space’ can be defined as the “room in a government’s budget that allows it to provide resources for a desired purpose without jeopardising the sustainability of its financial position or the stability of the economy” [Heller, 2005]. The recent ODI study finds that Senegal’s commitment through a social protection strategy signals greater fiscal space for effective interventions, including those that co-ordinate development partner and government resources. However, more resources are required to reduce the significant financing gap. The report cites Handley [2008], pointing out that “the only genuinely sustainable means of creating additional fiscal space at government’s disposal are revenue mobilisation and reallocation.” [Pereznieto and Fall, 2009:58] The report acknowledged the interim potential of development partner support, particularly in motivating and initially financing social protection interventions. The report identified two main ways to increase revenue: i) increasing economic growth, and ii) strengthening tax effort by raising the ratio of taxes collected to national income. Senegal’s relatively robust growth performance leaves room for medium-term improvement, although the global crisis increases the short term challenges. Senegal’s fiscal performance is strong relative to other countries in the region [Diaw et al, 2006 and IMF, 2008]. The IMF notes that continued economic reforms and other improvements will likely attract further investment and economic growth [IMF, 2008]. Effective social protection increases the likelihood of success of these economic reforms. The ODI report suggests the importance of reallocating expenditure to higher priority programmes and those that are more effective in order to improve the economy’s allocative efficiency. For example, generalised food and fuel subsidies do not effectively reach the poor, with over half the benefits accruing to the richest 40% of the population, and cost the country up to 3% of GDP, with some estimates as high as 4%. The ODI report concludes that key stakeholders (including the IMF, World Bank, MEF and MFNSWEM) understand that fiscal space for a cash transfer programme can be created, if evidence demonstrates that this intervention is a cost-effective and efficient way to address poverty and vulnerability. Fiscal space depends on fiscal revenue capacity, government commitment, and economic growth – with all three factors supporting prospects for a cash transfer programme as a core social protection initiative in Senegal. The potential for cash transfers to reinforce economic growth improves the fiscal case. The main variable determining fiscal capacity is fiscal revenue capacity – the ability of government to raise revenues without disturbing the economic processes that create wealth. Revenue capacity in turn depends on a country’s level of economic development, the sectoral composition of the economy, the openness and degree of monetisation of the economy, various demographic factors and a range of other variables. One study of cross-country revenue capacity yielded estimates (summarised in the figure below) that implied Senegal’s unutilised revenue capacity was 11% of total capacity in the most recent period analysed – over 2% of national income.14 Utilising this capacity would more than cover the cost of the proposed child benefit at national scale.

14 Tuan Minh Le, Blanca Moreno-Dodson and Jeep Rojchaichaninthorn (2008). “Expanding Taxable Capacity and Reaching Revenue Potential: Cross-Country Analysis”. Policy Research Working Paper 4559. The World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network. March 2008, Annex 6, pages 33-36. The untapped capacity apparently applies to non-tax revenue.

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Figure 3.2 – Fiscal revenue capacity analysis for Senegal

0

5

1 0

1 5

20

25

1 994-1 998 1 999-2003Percent of National Income (%)

Fiscal revenue capacity analysis for Senegal

actual revenue/GDP revenue/GDP capacity

untapped

revenue

capacity

of 2.1 %

of GDP

Source: World Bank, 2008

3.3. Dynamics

The developmental approach this pilot adopts has the potential to further expand the resources available for social protection delivery. Lessons of experience from many developing countries document how social protection interventions can propel pro-poor inclusive growth and thereby generate a broader tax base and more revenue for government. The dynamic impact of the proposed national programme is likely to support financial sustainability. An emerging evidence base demonstrates that social cash transfers promote economic growth. Policymakers do not necessarily face a trade-off pitting social protection against growth objectives – but rather have the opportunity to engineer a virtuous circle of increased equity promoting growth supporting further improvements in equity. There are at least nine paths through which social cash transfers promote economic growth:-

1. Social cash transfers can generate gains for those otherwise disadvantaged by an economic reform strategy, providing a balancing function that can enlist stakeholder support for the necessary reforms. For example, cash transfers offer an alternative to general food and fuel subsidies, providing more effective protection for the poor at a significantly lower fiscal cost.

2. Social cash transfers promote human capital development, improving worker health and education and raising labour productivity.

3. Social cash transfers enable the poor to protect themselves and their assets against shocks, enabling them to defend their long-term income-generating potential.

4. Social cash transfers mitigate risk and encourage investment.

5. Social cash transfer programmes combat discrimination and unlock economic potential.

6. Social cash transfers support the participation of the poor in labour markets.

7. Social cash transfers stimulate local demand, promoting short-term growth outcomes.

8. Social cash transfers help create an effective and secure state, promoting growth by building social cohesion and a sense of citizenship as well as reducing conflict.15

9. Social cash transfers promote empowerment and growth by improving the negotiating power of workers, smallholder farmers and micro-entrepreneurs in the marketplace.

Annexe 5 further reviews the international evidence linking social protection and economic growth. 15 Samson et al. (2002), Bourguignon and Ravallion (2004), DFID (2005)

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4. MONITORING & EVALUATION PLAN

The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) function is particularly critical in the early stages of the programme. The main objective of a pilot is to build an evidence base to support national scale programmes, although pilots can begin to achieve objectives in terms of tackling poverty, supporting social development and promoting economic growth. The specific objectives of the M&E system are to:- - Inform the implementation of the programme; - Demonstrate programme impact to policy-makers, development partners and general

public; and - Feed into the global lessons of experience. One of the main purposes of monitoring and evaluation is to build the evidence base for effective implementation. In the context of Senegal’s evolving social protection approach, monitoring and evaluation offers the potential to maximise learning-by-doing, to manage programme risk, and to attribute programme impact. The full realisation of the programme depends on mobilising greater political will and donor resources. Rigorous and convincing impact assessments are necessary to mobilise this political will and to bring other development partners on board. Given the need to expand programme resources to reach all vulnerable children at national scale, an appropriate and convincing impact assessment process can help to attract further development partner support. Rigorous and credible monitoring fosters accountability by documenting project performance, particularly in terms of the timely implementation of the activities as planned. It marshals evidence regarding the appropriateness of strategies and their associated resources, providing feedback that aims to improve implementation systems and programme delivery. Effective monitoring (and evaluation) documents the lessons learned through the implementation process, providing transparent information for the benefit of the national programme and contributing to the global learning curve of social transfers. Importantly –particularly together with the lessons from the impact assessments and quantitative evaluations – these lessons help to reinforce and further mobilise the government’s political will and the support of development partners in order to sustain and expand the programme. The M&E framework will be developed in line with the PRSP’s M&E indicators and framework.

4.1. Process monitoring The design of key monitoring activities will go hand-in-hand with the implementation strategy for cash transfer programme. The monitoring process will incorporate two key operational areas: i) registration, and ii) payments, as well as certain community indicators. The registration monitoring process will aim to assess whether or not all eligible children have been registered, whether programme registration leads to official birth registration, and operationally whether or not the registration process is cost-effectively and efficiently implemented, according participants a dignified link to the programme. Key payments questions for the monitoring process include:- - Did the intended recipients receive the transfer? - Did the recipients/suppliers receive the correct sums of money? - Was the payment made on time? - Were the recipients and other stakeholders satisfied with the process and methods of

implementation?

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At a community level, the monitoring process will capture information on:- - Food prices; - Market functioning, particularly availability and prices of basic goods; - Market responsiveness to increased demand for basic goods; - Community-level economic impacts – including on microfinance activities.

4.2. Impact evaluation The proposed child benefit aims to reduce extreme poverty and to improve nutritional outcomes and school attendance in poor households, while potentially yielding impacts in terms of broadly fostering pro-poor and inclusive economic growth. These benefits enable the poor to manage the social risks they face. International evidence demonstrates that these interventions will generate a range of impacts. First, by providing cash income, they directly reduce both income and expenditure poverty over the short term. Second, given typical consumption patterns, poor households allocate a significant proportion of the expenditure to food, improving nutritional outcomes. Depending on intra-household allocation decisions, much of this spending is likely to benefit children. In most cases, social transfers will also support children’s human capital accumulation, particularly in terms of increased school attendance and educational outcomes (for school age children of beneficiary households), and increased access to primary health care. In addition, an evolving evidence base demonstrates that social transfers contribute to pro-poor and inclusive economic growth. The range of outcomes contributes to long term poverty reduction, particularly by breaking the inter-generational transmission of deprivation. Pilots such as this proposed programme are necessarily geographically limited. As a result, national indicators may fail to significantly reflect programme impacts. The following discussion identifies local indicators that may appropriately reflect the range of programme impacts.

4.2.1. Poverty indicators Child benefits generate a direct impact on income poverty, and an almost immediate indirect impact on expenditure poverty. Given resources constraints, a fiscally sustainable and well-targeted social transfer programme will almost never lift a significant number of people above the poverty line. Either the fiscal cost of this outcome would be too high, and almost certainly unaffordable; or else the programme would have to be targeted to households right below the poverty line, as opposed to the very poorest. As a result, poverty headcount indicators will almost always fail to reflect the substantial impact of the programme. A more appropriate indicator is the poverty gap measure, which reflects the extent to which the programme has raised a household’s income or expenditure up towards the poverty line. An appropriate target for the poverty gap indicator depends on a number of factors: the relevant poverty line, the size of the transfer, and the depth of poverty (as measured by the poverty gap indicator) for the target population. A smaller transfer will be associated with a lower target. A higher poverty line would be associated with a higher target if the poverty gap is measured in absolute terms, or a lower target if measured in relative terms (percentage of the poverty line). Most of the evidence on poverty impact is from middle-income countries with fairly generous programmes. In South Africa social transfers reduced the poverty gap by 47% [Samson et al., 2005]. A recent study has shown that 62% of beneficiary households do not have a member earning a wage through employment, and 78% of households have no

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member with a regular income [de Koker et al., 2006]. In the absence of the social pension 30% of households with older people in Mauritius would be below the poverty line compared with only 6% with the social pension [Gopee, 2006]. Other studies document inequality impacts in terms of the Gini coefficient (the most common measure of inequality). In Brazil, the social pension reduces the country’s Gini coefficient by one percentage point, and Bolsa Familia reduces the Gini by another half a percentage point. From 1995 to 2004, Brazil’s Gini has fallen from 60% to 57% [Veras, 2007; IPC, 2007]. In South Africa, the comprehensive system of social grants reduces the country’s Gini coefficient by three percentage points [Samson et al., 2004]. These are two of the largest social transfer programmes in the world – smaller scale programmes are unlikely to have such a substantial effect.

Recommendation 15 – It is recommended to track money and median household poverty gaps for participating households, on an income and expenditure basis. Targets can be estimated based on micro-simulation analyses using existing household survey data, or more precisely with baseline data from locations selected for monitoring and evaluation. Proposed targets will depend on expected inclusion error and levels of income and expenditure for participating households. In addition, it is recommended to track the poverty reduction efficiency of the transfers – with and without administrative costs. This measures the percent of programme cost that results in a money reduction in the household poverty gaps of participating households.

4.2.2. Nutrition indicators

The most common human capital indicator – and the most frequent developmental impact – associated with social transfers is improved nutrition. A range of indicators reflect the nutritional impact of social transfers for the targeted population. The simplest and most frequently measured indicators assess nutritional inputs – total spending on food, the composition of food expenditure (to measure dietary diversity), and the allocation of food expenditure to children. Anthropometric indicators provide better evidence, particularly in terms of intra-household allocation of expenditure. The height-for-age indicator provides a long-term measure of nutritional impact (reflecting the prevalence of stunting), and the weight-for-height indicator provides a short-term measure (reflecting the prevalence of wasting). Expenditure surveys for both social transfer pilots and national programmes find that poor households spend most of their transfers on food. When evaluated, the impacts on nutritional status are unambiguously positive. In addition, there is further evidence that social transfers encourage food production. Regardless of the type of social transfer programme, household food spending consistently increased. Households in Afghanistan spent 90% of the wages earned in Oxfam’s public works programme on food [Oxfam, 2005]. An extensive assessment of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme found that three-quarters of participants consumed a greater quantity and quality of food compared to the previous year, and were more likely to retain their own food production for household consumption, and less likely to sell assets in order to buy food [Devereux, 2007; Slater et al., 2006]. Social pension recipients in Lesotho report spending two-thirds of the transfer on food [National University of Lesotho, 2006]. Households receiving social grants in South Africa spend a significantly greater share of their income on food than do comparable households not receiving transfers [Samson et al.,

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2004]. With Brazil’s social pension, 42% of the transfer is allocated to purchasing more nutritional food [Beales, 2007; Kugel, 2007]. In Colombia participation in the Familias en Accion programme increased food consumption by 15% compared to the previous year [Ayala et al., 2005]. Progresa beneficiary families in Mexico increased their food expenditure by one-third more than non-beneficiaries [Sedlacek et al., 2000]. This increased expenditure translated in broad improvements in different indicators for hunger and nutritional status. In South Africa, self-reported hunger rates for both children and adults fell in households receiving child grants and social pensions [Samson et al., 2004]. Height-for-age and weight-for-height indicators are significantly better in households receiving social transfers [Duflo, 2003]. Participants in Zambia’s pilot cash transfer scheme who reported feelings of still being hungry after a meal fell from 56% to 35%. And the percentage of households subsisting on one meal per day fell from 19.3% to 13.3% [MCDSS/GTZ, 2007]. Participation in Nicaragua’s Red de Proteccion Social (RPS) reduced the rate of stunting by 5.3% [Schady, 2006]. Increased food spending by households in Colombia’s Familias en Accion programme translated into improved nutritional indicators, including child growth and weight [Ayala et al., 2005]. Likewise, Food-for-Work (FFW) programmes in Bangladesh significantly improve nutritional outcomes [Devereux et al., 2006] and Mexico’s Progresa documents significant improvements in infant nutrition [Szekely, 2001; Britto, 2005]. In some cases, social transfers also generate a positive impact on the supply of food. In remote rural areas of South Africa, cash transfers stabilise the demand for food, reducing market risk and supporting local agricultural production [Samson et al., 2004]. The direct and indirect effects of Bangladesh’s Food-for-Work (FFW) programme significantly raised agricultural production in the country [Devereux et al., 2006]. Malawi’s Targeting Inputs Programme (TIP) contributed to a significant increase in the annual maize harvest [Devereux et al., 2007]. Zimbabwe’s Protracted Relief Programme generated over two months of additional food supply in an average beneficiary’s households [Devereux et al., 2007].

Recommendation 16 – It is recommended to track the share of household spending on food, as well as anthropometric indicators for height-for-age and weight-for-height. Targets will depend on baseline levels. The share of household spending on food is usually declining with additional income, but the target might be a stable share – as social transfers often improve intra-household allocation, leading to greater food expenditure for children. No target should be set for the height-for-age indicator over the short term as this indicator is not very sensitive to short term interventions. Targets for weight-for-height will depend on baseline levels.

4.2.3. Education indicators

Most social transfer programmes around the world yield improved educational outcomes, most commonly measured in terms of increased school enrolments and attendance. Evidence from Latin America, South Asia and Southern Africa demonstrates the positive impact of cash transfers on school enrolment and attendance rates [Adato, 2007; Rawlings, 2004; Samson et al., 2004 and 2008]. Not surprisingly, programmes that require households to send their children to school in order to qualify for the programme usually produce consistently positive impact assessments on schooling indicators. In Brazil, participants in the Bolsa Familia programme are 20% less likely to have a one-day absence from school in any given month; they are 63% less likely to drop out of school; and 24% more likely to advance an additional year than are comparable children in households not participating in

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the programme [Veras, 2007; IPC, 2007]. In Columbia, Mexico and Nicaragua, conditional cash transfer programmes significantly improve enrolment rates – although the effects tend to be much greater for those groups (such as secondary school students) where enrolment prior to the transfer is low. Primary school enrolment rates in Mexico were high before the programme was implemented – round 94% – and the attributed impact of Oportunidades for this group is only 1%. However, for secondary school students (with 70% enrolment rates prior to the programme) the impact is 8%. Drop-out and repetition rates are usually more sensitive to social transfers, and the measured impacts for these indicators are greater. An assessment of Honduras’ conditional cash transfer programme documents relatively weak impacts – but in large part due to the very small level of transfer and the lack of complementary initiatives to support the delivery of education services to meet the increased demand [Olinto, 2004; Lindert, 2005; Schady, 2006]. Several social transfer programmes in Bangladesh – including those targeted at education as well as broader public works programmes – yield significant improvements in schooling outcomes, particularly attendance rates [Ahmed et al., 2003; Molla, 2003; Reimers et al., 2006; Devereux et al., 2007]. Likewise, Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme significantly improved school attendance [Slater et al., 2006]. In Lesotho, approximately 10,000 school children nationally are getting some educational support from the pension money – 60% of the pensioners live in households containing young people attending school or college. A significant number of these dependent children have been orphaned by HIV/AIDS. Pensioners are buying uniforms, books and stationery [National University of Lesotho, 2006]. In South Africa, school attendance rates are significantly higher in households receiving social grants compared to similar households not receiving them. The effects of social grants on the education of girls are particularly strong [Samson et al., 2004]. In Namibia, the social pension supports children’s school attendance [IMF, 2006]. For both conditional and unconditional social transfers, clear and convincing evidence documents positive educational outcomes. In every study surveyed where the impact on education was measured, social transfers yielded positive results. The variability among the results is primarily explained by initial enrolment rates – with programmes generally yielding lower marginal impacts the higher the initial enrolment rates. As a result, impacts on education tend to be greater in low income countries compared to middle income countries – since middle income countries tend to have higher enrolment rates, particularly for primary school. The programme targets primarily children under 5 – i.e. children who are too young to attend primary school. And even if the Senegalese State demonstrated a willingness to develop pre-primary structures for children between 3 and 6, the availability of these structures remains very limited for a large part of the territory. However it will be interesting to monitor the impact of the programme on school attendance of any older siblings of the targeted children.

Recommendation 17 – It is recommended to track school enrolment, school attendance and grade progression of school age children of targeted households. Since the programme targets children under 5, no specific objective is recommended.

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4.2.4. Health indicators The nutrition indicators discussed above are also effective proxies for health impacts. In addition, a number of other health indicators are used to measure the impact of social transfers, particularly increased immunisation rates and improved access to primary and secondary health care. However, international evidence on health impacts is weak, even for the most successful programmes. For example, the impact assessment of Bolsa Familia found no evidence of a positive programme impact in terms of reducing stunting or improving rates of child immunisation [Veras, 2007; IPC, 2007]. In South Africa, households including women eligible for the old age pension reported significantly better weight-for-height indicators for girls, but not necessarily for boys [Duflo, 2000 and 2003]. Health outcomes are more dependent on who receives the social transfer within the household – with grandmothers producing very developmental outcomes. Households receiving social transfers enjoy higher expenditure shares on food and education, and lower expenditure shares on alcohol, tobacco and entertainment than do similar non-participating households – but there is no significant impact on health expenditure [Maitra and Ray, 2003]. It may be possible that social transfers produce two positive impacts that tend to cancel each other out when measured in terms of household health expenditure. The education, nutrition and income impacts of social transfers may support healthier living – and reduce the necessary demand for health care. At the same time, the income effect may increase effective demand in the reduced number of cases when medical care is necessary. The net effect may be a statistically insignificant change in household expenditure on health care services. However, in many countries we find significant evidence of positive impacts on health. In Lesotho, 50% of pension recipients spend more on health services since the implementation of the pension. In many low income countries, however, impact assessments have not yet provided a comprehensive evidence base on health outcomes. Because these transfers are often much smaller than in middle-income countries, they rarely even cover the household’s food budget, leaving little discretionary income for health care expenditure. Most of the positive impact is likely to come from nutrition transmission mechanisms – and these effects may take much more time to manifest themselves. In Bangladesh cash transfers interact with direct health interventions to improve immunisation, access to micro-nutrients and ante- and post-natal care [Devereux, 2007]. Conditional cash transfer programmes in Brazil [Lindert, 2005], El Salvador [Britto, 2007], Honduras [World Bank, 2005], Nicaragua [World Bank, 2005] and Peru [Bailey et al., 2007] as well as public works programmes in Ethiopia [Devereux et al., 2007; Slater et al., 2006] promote access to health services, although less evidence exists on links between social transfers and health outcomes. Health outcomes for Mexico’s Oportunidades programme, however, have been extensively documented and are significantly positive in terms of number of days ill and other measures of health status.16

Recommendation 18 – It is recommended to track the share of household expenditure on health care, immunisation rates, access to health care conditional on illness or injury, and number of days ill. However, given the ambiguous international evidence and the difficulty in measuring access impacts, no specific targets are recommended.

16 Braine (2006), Britto (2006), Szekely (2001), Sedlacek et al. (2000), Gertler et al. (2005), Pauw et al. (2007), Schady (2006)

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4.2.5. Economic growth indicators

An evolving evidence base is documenting the extent to which social transfer programmes promote pro-poor and inclusive economic growth. Much of this impact is linked to human capital accumulation and generates impacts over a medium-to-long horizon. For these effects, the human capital indicators described above are more appropriate than the downstream economic effects, which may take a long time to materialise. Other effects – such as those linked to social cohesion or pro-growth reform strategies – are difficult to identify at the pilot stage. These effects can be important at national scale for support growth-oriented economic reform strategies, particularly those that strengthen international links and enable countries to benefit more from globalisation.17 A number of other conditions that promote pro-poor growth have identifiable impacts at the pilot stage, including reducing risk and vulnerability, broadening access to assets and markets, and promoting household investment.18 For example, in the Mexican Oportunidades, beneficiaries invest 25% of their transfer in small-scale enterprises and agriculture generating returns between 32 – 49%. Even the very poorest are able to invest. In the Zambian cash transfer pilot targeting the poorest 10% of the population, 29% of the money was spent on livestock and agricultural supplies, 70% of which was locally produced. Recipients of the Namibian social pension make similar investments.19 Social transfers also share the benefits of economic growth, enabling countries to more sustainably implement trade-related reforms without adversely affecting the poor. Some social transfer programmes, however, have an immediate impact on labour market participation and employment. For example, several studies demonstrate that public works programmes in Bangladesh, India, Malawi, South Africa and many other countries effectively create jobs (if only short-term) and reduce unemployment [Chirwa et al., 2004; Devereux et al., 2006; McCord, 2004 and 2005; and others]. There is also evidence of positive long term impacts. Argentina’s Jefes y Jefas de Hogar public works programme, for example, increased the propensity of workers to participate in the labour force and to find a job in the formal sector [Ronconi, 2005], particularly for women [Devereux et al., 2006]. However, evidence of positive impact is not unambiguous. Slater [2006] warns that households participating in Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme may find the work requirement reduces their ability to pursue successful alternative livelihood activities.

There is also evidence that unconditional programmes – such as social pensions, child support grants, disability benefits and household transfers – have positive impacts on livelihoods and employment. Schüring et al. [2006] find that participants in Zambia’s cash pilot scheme use a significant proportion of the benefits to hire labour, for example in order to cultivate the land around their homes and consequently multiply the value of the social transfers while creating employment for local youth. Barrientos and Sabates-Wheeler [2006] find that Mexico’s Progresa (now Oportunidades) social transfer programme is associated with local economy impacts that improve consumption, asset accumulation and employment broadly within communities – for both programme participants and non-participants. Gertler et al. [2005] find that participants in Progresa invest a portion of their social transfers in productive assets and are more likely to engage in entrepreneurial activities, improving their potential for sustainable self-sufficiency. Harnett and Cromwell [2000] found that participants in one of Malawi’s social transfer programmes were empowered by the

17 How to accelerate pro-poor growth: a basic framework for policy analysis [DFID Pro-poor briefing note, September 2004]

18 How to accelerate pro-poor growth: a basic framework for policy analysis [DFID Pro-poor briefing note, September 2004]

19 Social protection and economic growth in poor countries. Social protection Briefing Note Series, No. 4. DFID, March 2006.

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resources to invest in their own farms during the planting season rather than rely on dead-end casual employment for their immediate survival.

Recommendation 19 – It is recommended to track the labour force participation, employment status and other livelihoods activities of participating and control group households.

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5. CONCLUSION

There are real opportunities for significant change in Senegal, given the genuine interest of both government and development partners to develop a social cash transfer programme as a lead instrument in child protection and poverty reduction. Initially, the PRSP had focused on investments to create wealth with the aim to promote growth at an average rate of 7 to 8% over the period 2001-2005, and reduce poverty by half by 2015. However, with an average growth rate of around 5% over the period 2001-2008 and IMF projections for the years 2009 and 2010 averaging 3%, it is necessary to invest in social protection and maximise chances to reach initial poverty reduction objectives. During the restitution workshop of this feasibility study held on 15 and 16 April 2009, jointly with the Ministry of Family, National Solidarity, Women’s Empowerment and Microfinance, the Ministry of Economy and Finances, and Unicef, participants validated the progressive development of a national social cash transfer programme in line with the following key principles: - Universalism: for all children under 5 i.e. ultimately over two million children; - The mother or legal guardian of the child(ren) is identified as cash transfer recipient; - Any conditionalities attached to the cash transfer will remain soft (e.g. children’s civil

registration, permanent presence of the child(ren) in the household, etc); - The payment mechanism chosen will be the one that can reach beneficiaries the more

easily and that presents the greater potential for development. Such an approach will enable not only to reduce monetary poverty but also to promote children’s rights and strengthen social cohesion and vertical solidarity. The programme will rely on the co-responsibility of the State and families, and operate in synergy with other child protection and poverty reduction programmes. A new milestone towards the operationalisation of a social cash transfer programme has been reached, and the next steps for the quick launch of a pilot programme are proposed below.

Setting up of a Steering Committee (May 2009) Establish a Steering Committee that will be responsible for guiding and capitalising national experiences with social cash transfers (CLM, CNLS, WFP, etc projects) and coordinating the pilot phase of the proposed universal social cash transfer programme, in particular activities presented below.

Pilot model finalisation (May-December 2009) Fine-tune the analysis on the basis of ongoing studies such as the study on family structures and poverty, the survey on villages and infrastructures, the studies on socio-economical transformations and intergenerational transmission of poverty, etc and launch additional studies as necessary – e.g. for a better understanding of community solidarity mechanisms. Consult targeted groups and communities on the relevance, appropriateness and implementation of the programme, and exchange on the role of different community members and structures in programme implementation and monitoring. Exchange with the CLM on the design of the planned World Bank-funded pilot cash transfers to children under 5 within the PRN, and explore possibilities to use the PRN pilot to inform the development of the proposed Universal Child Benefit, considering in particular: targeting (universal or targeted), level and frequency of transfer, pilot areas, capacity strengthening activities, and M&E (if the CLM was to keep a targeted approach, developing

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a common M&E framework could enable to compare universal vs. community-based targeting e.g.. Work with the CNEC and its partners (including DAGAT and CROSP Kolda) on the improvement of the birth registration systems, in priority in the proposed pilot areas; and discuss in particular: - Village Chief Status - Registration fees/incentive - Process and delays to produce document - Requirement for the caregiver to have an ID card - Civil Registry’s data centralisation - Fraud risk reduction Further explore options for administrating body at arrondissement/CR level – political support for CPRS strengthening, decentralisation policies, etc. Work with Manobi on the development of the software and overall MMS-assisted birth registration system proposed. Further explore payment mechanisms with Sonatel, and others (esp. PosteFinances and CMS) if necessary. Work with the Ministry of Labour and the International Labour Office to ensure consistency and synergy with the pension scheme expansion initiative (40% of the Senegalese households include both children and elderly) and thus promote economies of scale (e.g. developing jointly the single registry). Work on the Management Information System to develop interfaces between Civil Registry and payment databases, and to promote developmental links with pension systems, street children monitoring system, etc. Work with institutions engaged in family planning activities to promote synergies between the proposed programme and awareness campaigns and other family planning activities. Work with ANSD and partners on the pre-selection of beneficiary villages/neighbourhoods. Work with the CAPE, the civil society and other relevant institutions on complementary actions aimed at promoting child protection stressing on the co-responsibility of the State and parents, especially by supporting communication on child rights convention, dissemination of existing laws on mendacity and mandatory schooling until 16, strengthening of children associations, etc. Further outline a common M&E framework for social cash transfer programmes in line with the PRSP’s M&E framework, and invest in M&E activities in a concerted manner. Draw the lessons from the CNLS’s pilot project (first evaluation planned in August/September 2009) and the CLM’s initial experiences (if the pilot project is quickly launched). Organise a one-day workshop to present the finalised pilot project design, and exchange on the design of the other envisioned cash transfer programmes (CLM, Unicef, WFP, Ministry of Labour/HelpAge).

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Finalise pilot project design with the development of an implementation manual, clarifying:- - roles and responsibilities, especially between MEF and MFNSWEM; - monitoring and evaluation arrangements – including required additional human and

financial resources; - capacity-building plan – including training, additional staffing and mechanisms; - building of the Single Registry.

Programme financing (June-December 2009) Run new micro-simulations to come up with more accurate estimates of the total cost of the programme at scale, and estimate the cost of the initial pilot phase. Include the cost of the pilot phase in the 2010 budget planning (PRSP II’s PAP), especially in the prospect of the upcoming parliamentarian meeting on the budget bill (September-October 2009). Estimate the programme launching costs and finalise a 5-year financing plan.

Orientation workshops on social protection (June-December 2009) Organise an initial 3-day orientation workshop on social protection, with the objective to improve the understanding of the fundamentals of social protection, social safety nets and social cash transfer programmes among resource persons involved in the implementation of the national social protection strategy. Develop a communication plan and tools to popularise and disseminate social protection general concepts as well as justifications for the different options recommended or adopted in Senegal among stakeholders (state institutions, civil society members, private sector entities, and communities). Organise regional workshops (e.g. with the support of members of the Civil Society Organisations’ National Platform for the monitoring of the MDGs in Senegal) on social protection aimed at disseminating social protection concepts and train resource persons at regional levels on the recent developments in Senegal.

Weaving of the social safety net system (from June 2009 onward) Seek economies of scale, complementarities and synergies between social assistance programmes. Promote a participatory phased approach for the weaving of the social safety net aimed at: i) analysing the context and agreeing on a definition of vulnerability in the Senegalese context; ii) reviewing existing safety nets (cost-efficiency, gaps); and iii) weaving the social safety net distinguishing long-term mechanisms to tackle chronic poverty and vulnerability from emergency mechanisms to tackle transitory poverty and vulnerability. Organise a technical forum aimed at drafting a broader social protection model relevant to the Senegalese context, looking at experiences developed in other countries (e.g. Ghana, Niger, Ethiopia).

West African workshop (late 2009) Organise a technical forum for regional stakeholders on the development of child-centred social protection systems in West Africa based on feasibility studies and pilot learning in Senegal, studies in Mauritania, Mali and Burkina Faso, LEAP programme in Ghana,

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evaluation in Niger, etc.

Implementation of the initial pilot phase (January 2010-June 2011) Launch Pilot Phase 1 in Guédiawaye (January 2010) and Kolda (April 2010). Conduct a mid-term review, organise a workshop to present mid-term review results, and exchange on learning from other studies and programmes (CLM, Unicef, WFP, HelpAge, etc), and make necessary adjustments (July 2010). Conduct an impact evaluation in Guédiawaye (December 2010) and Kolda (May 2011). Make any necessary programme adjustments (February-June 2011). Launch Pilot Phase 2 (July 2011).

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REFERENCES

ANSD (2007) Enquête de Suivi de la Pauvreté au Sénégal. ESPS 2005-2006. Rapport National. September.

BAfD (2007) Les transferts de fonds des migrants, un enjeu de développement. Les Comores, Mali, Maroc, Sénégal. October.

Barrientos, A. and J. DeJong (2006) Reducing Child Poverty with Cash transfers: A Sure Thing? Development policy review 24(5):537-52.

Coady, D., M. Grosh, J. Hoddinott (2004a) Targeting of transfers in Developing Countries. Review of Lessons and Experience. World Bank. October.

______ (2004b) Targeting outcomes redux. The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 19, No.1, pp.61-85.

Datta, D., A. Ejakait and M. Odak (2008) Mobile phone based cash transfer in emergency response: Lessons from Kenya. 20 May 2008.

de Janvry, A. and Sadoulet, E. (2006) When to use a CCT versus a CT approach? Note Presented at the Third International Conference on Conditional Transfers organized by the World Bank and the Government of Turkey in Istanbul, July 26-30, 2006.

Dercon, S. (2001) Assessing Vulnerability to Poverty. Mimeo. Jesus College, Oxford, and Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University.

Dia, I. (2006) Contrat pour l’Education. Programme Prestations sociales conditionnelles aux femmes pour l’éducation des enfants. October.

Fall, A.S. and B. Guèye (2005) Gouvernance et corruption dans le système de santé au Sénégal.

FARPAS (2008) Contribution de la FARPAS aux assises nationales de l’action sociale. August.

Gassmann, F. and C. Behrendt (2006) Cash Benefits in Low Income Countries: Simulating the Effects on Poverty Reduction for Senegal and Tanzania. Discussion Paper 15. Geneva: International Labour Office.

Government of Ghana (2007) The National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS): Investing in people. Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment (MMYE). March.

Gupta, S., C. Pattillo and S. Wagh (2007) Making Remittances Work for Africa, Finance and Development 44(2).

Heckman, J. and P. Carneiro (2003) Human Capital Policy. NBER Working Paper No. 9495. National Bureau of Economic Research. February.

International Monetary Fund (2008a) Senegal: Staff Report for the 2008 Article IV Consultation, First Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, and Request for Waiver of Assessment Criteripn and Modification of Assessment Criteria – Staff Report. IMF Country Report No.08/209, June. Washington, D.C.

______ (2008b) Senegal: Selected Issues. IMF Country Report No. 08/221. July, 2008. Washington, DC.

Kildal, N. and S. Kuhnle (2002) The principle of Universalism: Tracing a Key Idea in the Scandinavian Welfare Model. Paper presented at the First Conference of the European Social policy Research Network, Social Values, Social Policies. Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands, 29-31 August 2002.

Mkandawire, T. (2005) Targeting and Universalism in Poverty Reduction. Social Policy and Development Programme Paper Number 23. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. December.

Ndione, M. (2008) Contraintes d’une Croissance Inégalement Répartie. Echos de la Banque Mondiale. No 10. April. Dakar, Senegal.

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Pereznieto, P. and A. S. Fall (2009) Social Protection and Children in West and Central Africa: Case Study Senegal. Overseas Development Institute. January.

République du Sénégal (2005) Stratégie Nationale de Protection Sociale et de Gestion des Risques. Rapport Provisoire. October.

______ (2006a) Suivi des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement. Rapport OMD 2006. Dakar.

______ (2006b) Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper. Draft. September.

______ (2007) Plan National Stratégique pour la Survie de l’Enfant 2007-2015. Ministère de la Santé et de la Prévention. July.

______ (2008a) Assises Nationales sur l’Action Sociale. Rapport introductive présenté par le Directeur de l’Action Sociale. Ministère de la Famille, de la Solidarité Nationale, de l’Entrepreunariat Féminin et de la Microfinance. Direction de l’Action Sociale. August.

______ (2008b) Enquête Nutritionnelle SMART. Evaluation de la Situation Nutritionnelle au Sénégal. Ministère de la Santé et de la Prévention Médicale. Direction de la Santé. Division de l’Alimentation, de la Nutrition et de la Survie de l’Enfant. Unicef. November.

Sadio, A, (2008) Revue de la composante Groupes Vulnérables de l’Axe 3 du DSRP II. Cellule de Suivi du Programme de Lutte contre la Pauvreté.

Samson, M., van Niekerk, I., Mac Quene, K. (2006) Designing and Implementing Social Transfer Programmes. EPRI. Cape Town, South Africa.

Sander, C., I., Barro, M., Fall, M., Juhlin and C. Diop (2003) Etude sur le transfert d'argent des émigrés au Sénégal et les services de transfert en microfinance, Working Paper n° 40, Social Finance Unit, Geneva: International Labour Office.

Save the Children UK, HelpAge International, and Institute of Development Studies (2005) Making Cash Count. Lessons from cash transfer schemes in east and southern Africa for supporting the most vulnerable children and households.

UCW (2007) Enfants mendiants dans la région de Dakar. Understanding Children’s Work. Project Working Paper Series. ILO. Unicef. World Bank. November.

Van Vlaenderen, H., S. Mansour Tall and G. Gaye (2004) Till to Tiller: Linkages between International Remittances and Access to Land in West Africa. FAO Livelihood Support Programme, July.

World Bank (2007) Sénégal. A la recherche de l’emploi – Le chemin vers la prospérité. Memorandum Economique sur le pays. September.

Yaschine, I., L. Dávila (2008) Why, When and How. Should Beneficiaries Leave a CCT Programme? Poverty in Focus. Number 15:8-9. International Poverty Centre. August.

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ANNEXES

Annexe 1 – Review of experiences in non-contributory social transfers in Senegal Annexe 2 – Outline of the proposed ‘Contract for Education’ project Annexe 3 – Review of potential payment mechanisms Annexe 4 – Institutional analysis Annexe 5 – International evidence linking social protection and economic growth Annexe 6 – List of stakeholders consulted during the feasibility study & List of participants to the validation workshop Annexe 7 – Child-oriented cash transfer programmes in Africa

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ANNEXE 1 – Review of experiences in non-contributory social transfers in Senegal

Listed below are relevant in-country experiences in non-contributory social transfers to households, either under national/large-scale programmes or under smaller-scale initiatives. This quick review does not intend to be exhaustive, but learning from these experiences can inform the choice of targeting process, and transfer delivery mechanism.

(Semi-) Formal social food transfers

The World Food Programme and its partners are the main providers of food aid. The budget allocated by the State to school feeding was increased from FCFA250m to FCFA600m. The governmental body CSA (Commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire) is in charge of food aid distribution. Formal social food transfers in Senegal are done on a regular basis through school feeding, food-for-work , or food-for-training programmes. All of these forms of social transfers are conditional – to children attending school, or to recipient completing work or attending training. An impact evaluation of the school feeding activities conducted in 2004 concluded that the programme had a positive impact on school attendance and completion. However the efficiency of school feeding is still being questioned – both at national and global levels, and the Ministry of Education will launch a new impact evaluation study in November 2008. The CRES (Consortium de Recherche Economique et Sociale) will be in charge of this 2-year study. Currently, FCFA600m from the national budget is allocated to school feeding activities. And the Government is willing to take over from WFP and expand school feeding activities in the long run. A new Directorate for School Feeding (Division Nationale des Cantines Scolaires) is about to be established, with the responsibility to develop an appropriate national strategy for school feeding, and help improve the efficiency of school feeding activities managed by the national institutions. All of these food transfer programmes are targeted. The first level of targeting is geographical. Activities are directed to most food insecure areas (and with the highest child malnutrition rates in the case of nutritional programmes). A second level of targeting is then applied. To become eligible to a school feeding programme, a school needs to meet the following criteria: public school (although a few private schools are supported through Caritas); located in rural area; hosting between 50 and 300 pupils; meeting minimum water and sanitation requirements; and having a management committee. In the case of food-for-work activities, NGOs select beneficiary households with community members on the basis of their poverty/vulnerability/food insecurity status. WFP does not use a national questionnaire to select beneficiary households, but let it to the responsibility of its partner NGOs to support a community-based targeting process. In some areas of Senegal, a redistribution of transfers is observed. Although the village committee will have established a list of beneficiaries (i.e. most vulnerable households) with the NGO, food transfers are later on re-distributed to all households in the community, regardless of their vulnerability status. However this is not the norm in Senegal. No study was conducted to assess the efficiency of community-based targeting.

(Semi-) Formal social cash transfers

Social cash transfers to most vulnerable people are done through the Directorate for Social Assistance (DAS) in the Ministry of Family. As outlined by Pereznieto and Fall (cf. Box A1.1) the current system is very sporadic and resource-driven. Support to associations and individuals representing USD2 million in 2004 is made on a case-by-case basis rather than on a programmatic approach. In order to benefit from the scheme, one individual will need to: know about the programme; approach the local CPRS (Centre de Promotion et de

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Réinsertion Sociale – only 45 throughout Senegal); gather the supporting documentation (copy of ID card, death certificate, school certificate, etc); have a social worker confirming the state of destitution; have the national commission ranking the request among priorities within what the DAS resources can cover; be able to travel to Dakar to redeem the cash transfer (or empower someone to redeem it and send it back). The transfer provided is a one-off subvention, which cannot be granted to the same person two years in a row. In 2004, 910 requests were approved out of 3,547. While this system surely helps some individuals to cope during special times of hardship – e.g. death of spouse, beginning of school year, religious celebrations, etc – the overall impact on national poverty reduction is questionable. A more systematic approach to social assistance would improve fairness, transparency (and thus ‘trust’ in national institutions), and if properly designed would offer a high return on economic growth and poverty reduction. Box A1.1 Individual cash transfers through the Directorate for Social Assistance “The National Directorate for Social Assistance in the MFNSWEM [Ministry of Family] is responsible for a cash transfer to the ‘destitute’ or ‘indigents’. Individuals who consider that they fall under this classification and want to obtain the benefits must approach a local CPRS, where a social worker will assess them and determine whether this is a real case of destitution. If it is, a certificate must be issued (if it is issued by the mayor, the cost of the subsidy must be afforded by the local government; if it is approved by the regional prefect, the transfer will be responsibility of the state, but the criteria for who claims responsibility remains unclear). With the ‘certificate of destitution’ (carte d’indigence), the person and his/her dependents can have access to free basic health care in selected health centres and are entitled to receive a transfer (up to FCFA200,000 a year), but this transfer is allocated to the main beneficiary and not adjusted to the number of children, therefore bigger families will have fewer resources. The benefits provided through this programme remain restricted to those who are aware of it, as there are no awareness raising campaigns, social mobilisation or outreach that could improve programme targeting.

In addition to its unsystematic approach to the provision of cash supports to mitigate deprivations, this programme was developed with an ‘assistance’ perspective rather than through a ‘rights based’ lens, so the target populations are not considered by the state as rights holders entitled to a guaranteed minimum standard of living, but rather as beneficiaries of a system of assistance to the needy that depends on a residual social policy and expenditure approach: the support granted will depend on the resources the Directorate manages to obtain at the end of a very complex process of budget negotiations in which the ministry is not a particularly strong player. The consequences are that the cash transfer support to the destitute is unpredictable and poorly targeted, and has few incentives for expansion as a result of resource constraints. No comprehensive M&E has been carried out of the programme, so it is difficult to provide evidence of its benefits and/or constraints. Our initial findings suggest that it is a programme that would require significant structural strengthening to achieve its potential.”

[Pereznieto and Fall, 2009:65]

In 2005/2006, Plan Senegal implemented a 24-month project providing scholarships to girl students. The project was implemented by Plan in partnership with parent associations, local authorities, and IDEN (national education departmental inspection). The scholarship was granted for the first two years of the medium education level to girls from eligible underprivileged social classes and ranking high on the end of primary level exam. The education institutions were supportive of the project, and efficient in supporting its implementation. Cash was delivered directly by Plan staff. The programme was closed with the end of the Canadian funding. An impact evaluation concluded that the programme had been successful in retaining girls at school. Late 2008, the CNLS (Conseil National de Lutte contre le Sida – National AIDS Commission) designed with the World Bank’s support a Conditional Cash Transfer project for the schooling of 5,000 orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) in 2008/2009 throughout Senegal. The project targets children between 2 and 18 coming from underprivileged social classes and particularly vulnerable. The HIV entry point is not exclusive. The level of

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family grant varies according to school grade, from FCFA108,000 in nursery school up to FCFA165,000 in secondary school, and depends on the number of eligible children. This project is implemented through the 11 CNLS regional offices, in partnership with NGOs working with people living with HIV/AIDS, and with PosteFinances for money transfers through the provision of savings accounts. The transfer is conditional and the child caregiver has to provide proof of: OEV’s school enrolment, school/training fees payment, regular school/training attendance, and proper child health care. The first grants were provided in January 2009 (e.g. long after the start of the academic year). A first programme evaluation is planned in August/September 2009. In February 2009, the Ministry of Infrastructures, Land transport and Air transport and the European Commission launched the PUHIMO (Programme spécial de voiries urbaines à haute intensité de main-d’œuvre), a FCFA18 billion public work scheme in the built-up areas of Dakar, Pikine, Guédiawaye, Rufisque, Bargny and Ziguinchor. This programme is expected to create about one million days of work, equivalent to 13,000 jobs of medium duration. The programme falls within a broader strategy to fight clandestine emigration, and aims at promoting youth employment. In addition to these social transfers to individuals, cash transfers are also made to groups such as women association, farmer associations, village committees, etc for the development of income-generating activities. These transfers are now often done to an account either open in a bank or the nearest Mutuelle (microfinance organisation). However delays in delivery can be observed with small Mutuelles, as experienced by Plan Senegal for instance, who now operates mainly through banks.

Transfers in the form of vouchers

Between November 2007 and March 2008, CRS implemented a food voucher programme in Dakar. This was a pilot project within a larger 3-year food assistance programme targeted at people living with HIV (PLHIV), aimed at testing the feasibility of an alternative to food aid. CRS already had experience in the use of seed vouchers, and the option of voucher was chosen as it allowed an easy monitoring of the use of the transfer. Recipients received a FCFA12,500 voucher at their monthly medical visit (voucher countersigned by the medical structure); and had a period of 2 weeks to redeem it in an identified shop in their neighbourhood. The evaluation revealed that i) people did spend the transfer on essential items – mainly powdered milk, sugar, soap bar, and oil; ii) a similarly positive impact on nutrition was observed among food voucher and food basket recipients; and iii) food vouchers had less stigmatising effects. The programme was stopped at the end of the 6-month funding. However CRS found the experience successful and plans to replicate it in the regions of Ziguinchor and Kolda over the period January 2009-December 2010 if funds can be secured. The programme would be implemented in urban areas. CRS expressed doubts about the feasibility of such a programme in a rural setting given the food availability issues on rural markets.

Informal social cash transfers Remittances sent by the increasing number of Senegalese emigrants – estimated to 4% of the total population in 2005, play an important role in the national economy. In 2006, official remittances (alone) accounted for USD633m or 7.1% of GDP. These remittances represent a form of informal social cash transfer to emigrants’ families that remain in Senegal. Emigrants use different mechanisms to deliver cash in Senegal, including:- - International bank transfer: usually used for large amounts due to their cost, it takes a

minimum of five days, and some fees may be charged to the recipient. - International bank card, e.g. Flouss card: a Flouss card costs EUR19 (no annual fees), and

can be charged easily using the provider’s debit card details through a mobile phone or

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the Internet. Currency exchange and withdrawal fees are charged to the recipient. A Flouss card does not enable payments in shops. Flouss (member of the Accord/Auchan group) also provides a certificate for the Tax Revenue Authority which enables to deduct remittances from the revenue declaration.

- International debit card: this is an (illegal) cheap alternative which consists for the emigrant to open a second bank account in his/her bank, and send the debit card attached to it to the recipient in Senegal.

- Money transfer companies, e.g. Western Union, MoneyGram, Money Express, Coinstar Money Transfer, etc: this is a reliable and fast option with no charge for the recipient, but often expensive for the emigrant.

- International money order, e.g. postal bank’s: this is often the cheapest mechanism – after the illegal personal debit card option.

- Informal mechanism such as payment to a Senegalese/Lebanese trader’s bank account in Europe in exchange for provision of cash in local currency or goods in kind to the recipient in Senegal.

- Simple, free but unsecure method of sending cash (often in FCFA) in an envelope by recorded delivery, or through a trusted traveller.

In the current difficult economic context, community-based solidarity mechanisms are eroding. Households are often not in a position to provide aid or to return assistance received. More individualistic behaviours appear, and inter-household solidarity tends to be replaced by remittances from family members who migrate to cities or abroad. Some evidence suggests that national and international transfers can account for 30% to 70% of income in rural households [Van Vlaenderen et al, 2004]. Studies in Senegal and elsewhere suggest that remittances are primarily used to cover basic needs such as food, education, and health. And some authors have suggested that ‘remittances augment recipient households' resources, smooth consumption, provide working capital and have multiplier effects through increased household spending’ [Gupta et al, 2007].

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ANNEXE 2 – Outline of the proposed ‘Contract for Education’ project

After attending a World Bank conference on social transfer programmes, Dia who was working in the Poverty Reduction Unit at the time, developed late 2006 a concept note for a national social transfer programme. The proposed ‘contract for education’ project is outlined below.

Type: Conditional cash transfer Objectives: Increase school enrolment and attendance Alleviate child labour Improve children health, nutrition and immunisation Eradicate extreme poverty among women Target group: Children from vulnerable households attending school – at primary, medium or

secondary level Entry procedure: Candidate households fill a request form at the school Social workers study requests with parent associations, and establish lists of

beneficiaries # of beneficiaries: 248,000 pupils and students the first year Transfer recipient: Child(ren)’s mother Transfer value: FCFA3,500 (USD16.5 in 2006) per child i.e. 35% of the food poverty line, with

a maximum of 3 beneficiary children per households with a gender positive discrimination – i.e. up to 3 girls, or 2 boys and 1 girl

Cash delivery: A debit card is issued to the mother for use in post/bank offices The transfer is made bimonthly Conditionality: All the household’s children attend at least 80% of school days

All the household’s children have marks close to the class average All the household’s children receive the appropriate immunisations None of the household’s children is engaged in labour

Supervision: A piloting committee co-chaired by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry

of Family, and including the members of the National Social Protection Strategy Execution: A programme management unit setup in the Ministry of Education Budget: Between FCFA8.2m and FCFA12.3m the first year

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ANNEXE 3 – Review of potential payment mechanisms

Below is a quick review of the existing and potential mechanisms for cash transfers in Senegal. This assessment includes a comparison of costs and considers the ability of the payment institution to reach remote areas, as well as its experience with providing financial services to the poor.

Financial institutions

Postal bank

PosteFinances is an autonomous structure established under the reform of the postal sector. PosteFinances operates through the network of post offices – 144 offices throughout the territory (cf. Figure A3.2). It is a partner of IPRES for the delivery of pensions – to any pensioner who decided to open an account in PosteFinances. PosteFinances proposes different forms of money transfer: through regular bank transfers, Western Union or mandat-fax. The system of mandat-fax is a cheap option (FCFA 1,500) to transfer cash to a field office which is not yet connected and computerised. PosteFinances proposes four types of accounts for individuals:

Minimum deposit Opening fees Annual fees

Current account with chequebook FCFA 20,000 FCFA 1,780 FCFA 19,980 (1) Current account without chequebook (2) FCFA 12,000 Minor savings account FCFA 5,000 FCFA 1,700 FCFA 5,000 Major savings account FCFA 10,000 FCFA 2,300 FCFA 5,000

(1) monthly fees of FCFA 1,665 (2) in partnership with a company, monthly fees either charged to the employer or the employee

In addition to these costs, an ID card and a photograph are required to open an account. All of these types of account support cash deposit, cheque deposit and (national and international) bank transfers. The owner of a savings account can make one withdrawal (or two) monthly, in any PosteFinances branch, free of charge. Both savings accounts have an annual interest rate of 3.5%. PosteFinances’ current challenge is the computerisation of the whole system and electronic banking. It is envisioned that by the end of the year 2009, the whole network of field offices will be computerised, and PosteFinances will be in a position to propose debit cards to its clients. PosteFinances is a member of the GIM-UEMOA (Groupement Interbancaire Monétique de l’Union Economique et Monétaire de Ouest Africaine).

Private banks The banking sector qualifies Senegal of ‘emergent market’. There are a large number of banks present in Senegal (cf. Box A3.1). However none of them seem to have developed pro-poor strategies to make financial services accessible to the poor. Efforts are made to develop e-banking solutions, and the e-banking interbank association GIM-EUMOA regroups an increasing number of companies – including the postal bank, private banks, and large microfinance institutions (Mutuelles). It is envisioned that by the end of 2009, all banks in Senegal will be interconnected through the GIM-EUMOA. This will bring economy of scale for the development of e-banking solutions in Senegal. The GIM-EUMOA is a regional structure of regulation set up by banks in consultation with the BCEAO (Banque Centrale des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest) within the project for the

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modernisation of payment mechanisms and systems (Modernisation des Systèmes et Moyens de Paiement). It became an International Organisation in 2004, present in eight countries of the region: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Its primary objective is to develop the GIM bank card, the first payment instrument in the West Africa Money and Economical Union zone. The GIM-EUMOA proposes a smartcard which can be used in all interconnected banks in the region – e.g. in BAO and BRS banks in Guinea Bissau. By 2010, all banks are thus likely to operate through the same network of Points of Sale (POS) and Automated Teller Machines (ATM). And it might be possible to negotiate tariffs with the most ‘pro-poor’ company – as of today, possibly PosteFinances due to its State affiliation. Dialogue and partnership between social protection leaders and banks/GIM-EUMOA would help develop a convenient network of ATM/POS e.g. located at weekly markets, health posts, etc. Box A3.1 List of bank companies present in Senegal Attijari Bank Sénégal (ABS) Bank of Africa – Senegal (BOA) Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) Banque de l'Habitat du Sénégal (BHS) Banque des Institutions Mutualistes d’Afrique de l’Ouest (BIMAO) Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie du Sénégal (BICIS) Banque Islamique du Sénégal (BIS) Banque Régionale de Solidarité (BRS – Sénégal) Banque Régionale des Marchés (BRM – Sénégal) Banque Sahélo Saharienne pour l’Investissement et le Commerce – Sénégal (BSIC – Sénégal) Banque Sénégalo-Tunisienne (BST) Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal (CNCAS) Citibank Sénégal Compagnie Bancaire de l'Afrique Occidentale, Groupe Attijariwafa Bank (CBAO/GAWB) Compagnie Financière de l'Ouest Africain (CFAO) Crédit Lyonnais Sénégal (CLS) Ecobank Sénégal Société Générale de Banque au Sénégal (SGBS) The SGBS (Société Générale de Banque au Sénégal) was listed first bank of Senegal in 2007. It operates cash transfers through Western Union and the i-transfert system (proposed to SGBS clients for an amount comprised between EUR50 and EUR600). Box A3.2 Geographical coverage of PosteFinances (left) and SGBS (right)

The Moroccan group Attijariwafa Bank is developing quickly in a number of West Africa countries. In Senegal, the group took control in 2007 and 2008 of the BST (Banque Sénégalo-Tunisienne), the CBAO (renamed CBAO Groupe Attijariwfa Bank), and the Crédit

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du Sénégal. The group now controls a third of the Senegalese bank market. The CBAO Groupe Attijariwfa Bank now proposes prepaid/smart card called ‘Carte salaire’. The individual card is issued for two years and costs FCFA10,000 a year. Loading and withdrawing are free of charge. Withdrawal can only be done per FCFA5,000 bracket. In Casamance, the CBAO has 2 agencies in Ziguinchor and suburbs, and one in Kolda. They now propose a service of SMS-banking enabling customers to get information on their accounts by text messages on their mobile phone. It has joined the GIM-EUMOA. Ecobank has 30 agencies in Senegal – 9 of them outside Dakar, and plans to have 35 by March 2009. They started to propose prepaid cards a few months ago. They organise payments in lieu i.e. outside Ecobank agencies for a few clients such as IPRES. It is organised to avoid having long queues of people – retired, staff, etc in front of Ecobank agencies, and no mobile ATM is available for that matter. Ecobank also do ‘mise à disposition’ for a few NGOs. This costs FCFA3,500. Opening a simple savings account costs FCFA25,000 and is free to run. The CMS owns an Ecobank account. Ecobank is a member of GIM-EUMOA. The CNCAS (Crédit Agricole) has a presence in each region through its twenty or so sub-offices in the country. The CNCAS proposes debit cards to its clients since 2005. And it envisions to further develop electronic banking services in 2009 through the introduction of prepaid cards (‘carte pour tous’) aimed at promoting the use of banking services to people with no bank accounts (e.g. pensioners, cotton producers, etc). This requires working on two aspects: the card itself and the network of POS and ATM. The project is expected to be launched mid-2009. The following step would be to use the network of the Mutuelles (microfinance institutions), and in particular ACEP which works with the same money transfer partner company as the CNCAS i.e. MoneyGram. However this preferred partnership might be challenged when all banks become interconnected. The CNCAS is already a member of the GIM-UEMAO. Today, a CNCAS client will pay FCFA117 to withdraw cash in a CNCAS ATM (or BRS, or Attijari ATM), and FCFA500 in an ATM of a bank not connected to the GIM-EUMOA platform. This cost difference should have disappeared in 2009.

Money transfer companies The need to transfer remittances to recipient families is likely to have contributed to the development of money transfer institutions that can facilitate the transfer of cash to the grassroots. The network of money transfer companies in Senegal appears dense, diversified and competitive. The main money transfer products in Senegal include Western Union, MoneyGram, and Money Express. These products are proposed in banks and Mutuelles – e.g. Money Express with PosteFinances, MoneyGram with CNCAS and ACEP, etc. There are attempts to better link the two payment systems – e.g. Money Express/PosteFinances pilot project until mid 2009.

‘Mutuelles’ The ‘Mutuelles’ are microfinance institutions. Sometimes initiated by NGOs, some structures grew significantly, and today offer services and costs often similar to the banking system – and not necessarily pro-poor. The largest ones include CMS (Crédit Mutuel du Sénégal), PAMECAS and ACEP. The CMS was established in 1988, and aims to contribute to ‘the improvement of living standards and the promotion of well-being among populations from all socio-economic backgrounds by offering a wide range of local financial services’. The CMS is dedicated to fight excessive indebtedness, promote savings and defend interests of its 210,000 members.

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The CMS proposes ‘mise à disposition’ i.e. to pay staff members. However, this might be hard to organize for a large population. And the CMS recommended beneficiaries to open an account. An input of FCFA10,000 is required to open a basic savings account (‘Compte sur livret’), and monthly fees of FCFA1,500. FCFA2,200 is charged to the cash transfer recipient. The CMS is a member of the GIM-EUMOA platform. In March 2007, MicroRate – one of the main rating agency for microfinance worldwide, rated the CMS among the four best microfinance organisations in Africa, giving a rate of ‘α-’ with a positive perspective. The AFD (Agence Française de Développement) is the CMS’s main financial partner – directly or through the Government of Senegal. The CMS has a network of 118 permanent posts and a total of 143 selling points with mobile posts – e.g. mobile teams present at weekly markets. The CMS offices are decentralized to arrondissement level, and some can even be found at CR level. The regions of Kolda, Tamba, and Kaolack are well covered. The Treasury already has agreements with the CMS for the payment of civil servants’ salaries in the regions. And the CMS also delivers IPRES pensions. The CMS plans to propose prepaid cards in 2009, in Dakar. PAMECAS operates mainly in urban areas – mostly in the vicinity of Dakar, but has a national coverage with at least one office in each department. ACEP has 9 regional offices and 35 local offices – in Dakar, Pikine, Thies, Mbour, Saint Louis, Ourossogui, Diourbel, Tamba, Kaolack, Ziguinchor, Kolda, Touba. ACEP proposes cash transfers through Western Union and RIA, current account, saving accounts, credit for individuals, and credit for small enterprises. The MECAPP (Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit des Agents du Public et du Parapublic) was established by the Post, operates through the post office network. There are numerous smaller microfinance associations present at the grassroots level but with no representation at the national level. If these decentralised structures can provide cash in rather remote areas, money is usually kept at ‘arrondissement’ level for security reasons, and a cash transfer would need to be planned in advance, and deemed on a given day, with 24/48h-minimum advance notice. The AT/CPEC is the entity within the Ministry of Economy and Finances in charge of controlling the Mutuelles. Mutuelles have to report regularly to the Ministry of Finance, and there is inspection from the AT/CPEC. The performance of the small Mutuelles is very diverse. It seems a large number of them propose revolving credit and/or credit with 5-10% interest, which is increasingly condemned for encouraging debt burden. The BIMAO (Banque des Institutions Mutualistes d'Afrique de l'Ouest) was established in 2005 by the CCMAO (Confédération des Caisses Mutualistes d'Afrique de l'Ouest), the CMS, the Union Jémini du Mali, the Crédit Mutuel de France and the CICM. The BIMAO’s mission is to raise resources on financial markets for mutuelles. It proposes financial services such as investment, financing at medium and long term and international bank transfers. FERLO is the structure providing debit/smartcards for (large) microfinance associations. FERLO is a member of the GIM-UEMOA.

ICT environment Cell phone companies

Two cell phone companies are well established in Senegal: Orange (Sonatel/Alize group) and Tigo (Sentel group). And since January 2009, a third operator Sudatel was attributed a licence. Mobile networks cover 90% of the Senegalese population and is growing

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exponentially. The ARTP (Agence de Régulation des Télécommunications et des Postes), a public institution under the authority of the Senegalese President, is in charge of the regulation of the sector for a fair and loyal concurrence. It reported that in June 2008 nearly half of the population had a mobile phone, and that the number of cell phones in the streets was increasing at a quarterly rate of 14%. Prepaid formulas represent 99.23% of the market. Orange is the largest company with 64.4% market share. In November 2008, Sonatel and BICIS signed a partnership for the development of Orange Money in Senegal. Orange Money allows Orange (prepaid or postpaid) customers to use their mobile phone (even oldest models) for financial transactions such as withdrawal and money transfer, bills payment, purchases at affiliated point of sales, airtime credit and transfer. Orange Money is already in place in Ivory Coast since December 2008. People do not need to have a bank account to register to the service, only an ID card is required. Being an Orange customer is enough to activate an Orange Money for free, with no minimum deposit. Deposit on the account is free of charge. Customers are identified by their phone number and all transactions have to be validated by a personal PIN code. Money can be withdrawn in any registered Orange Money agent, with a fee. In Senegal, this new service will be tested in three zones (Thies, Mbour, Kaolack, Touba) as soon as April 2009. The national launching is planned late June 2009 with the Transfert, Cash In, and Cash Out components. One objective is to get a local distribution network with post offices, banks, Orange network, petrol stations, microfinance institutions, etc – to date, 400 points of withdrawal have been identified. The number of registered Orange Money agents is expected to increase quickly since Orange is signing agreements with all the microfinance institutions in Senegal. Orange is working in close collaboration with Planet Finance which received €1 million from the Bill Gates foundation to develop the partnership between microfinance institutions and Orange. The Orange network already covers 87% of the population and 49% of the territory. And an Orange programme aims at providing network coverage to all villages of more than 300 inhabitants. The entire Senegalese population is targeted, especially people with no bank account (95% of the population). Orange also envisions the possibility to have mobile teams to register new customers and distribute mobile phones. Tigo might have a similar initiative – although less advanced. And IPRES once expressed the idea of using cell phone network for the delivery of pensions in remote areas – in the long run, but nothing seems to have been done at this stage.

Other ICT services In an effort to reduce the North-South digital divide, the Senegalese President Wade supported the idea of a Global Digital Solidarity Fund, which was launched in 2005 in Geneva. And in July 2008, the Senegalese National Assembly adopted a bill establishing a voluntary contribution of 1% of the contract value for goods or services related to ICTs in line with the global initiative. Manobi is an operator of mobile phone and Internet services. It received the African ICT Achievers Award in 2004. Manobi offers m-banking solutions to the agriculture, fishing and food-processing industries, along with integrated services to support production and marketing. Sonatel and CNCAS are among Manobi’s shareholders. Products proposed by Manobi include: access to market prices through SMS text messaging (already consulted by more than 3500 Senegalese producers), farm management tools, traceability, GIS, fresh food supply, marketing, etc. Manobi is for instance engaged in the health mutual insurance for the fishing industry providing a mobile banking component. And it is a partner of the Tostan’s Community Empowerment Program in Casamance. It has already helped develop the software for SMS Texting for Literacy sessions, and could further work with Tostan and

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pilot communities to define services that its platform can facilitate such as:- - Market linkages for subsistence and vulnerable farmers, artisan fishermen, and small

women-owned enterprises; - Local government services to improve basic service delivery; - Well-being services (birth registration, vaccinations, pre- and post-natal consultations,

malaria prevention and treatment, family planning products and services). Manobi is interested in further developing participatory monitoring and evaluation mechanisms using cell phones. Senegal’s télécentres are phone shops that offer ‘fractional phone service’ to others – people who cannot afford a mobile phone, by reselling their minutes. The Unetts (Union nationale des exploitants de télécentres et téléservices du Sénégal) that regroups the quasi-totality of télécentres’ managers in Senegal, reports that there were 18,000 télécentres in Sénégal in 2000, accounting for 33% of the Senegalese operators’ revenues and 30,000 jobs. The industry provides annually FCFA7.5 billion of VAT to the State of Senegal. But today, most of them have closed down. Phone companies, seeing that there is a market for small increments of phone credit and shared phones, introduced much more granular offers. Tigo offers billing-by-the-second (10 seconds for FCFA20), electronic recharges (‘izi’ from Tigo, and ‘seddo’ from Orange) as low as FCFA100, and free unit transfers between consumers (available on the ‘Tigo Jeune’ plan). And most télécentres have come out of business. The Unetts estimates that télécentres lost 33 to 44% of their revenue. Télécentres that still manage to make profit are those that reconverted in the sale credit retail. Having an ID card is a prerequisite for the opening of any bank/cell phone account. Yet, poorest individuals do not necessarily have one. A vast operation of provision of digitalised ID card was organised before the 2007 presidential elections, and today about half of the Senegalese population has an ID card.

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ANNEXE 4 – Institutional analysis

Presented here is a rapid assessment of potential formal and non-formal institutions to be involved in the supervision, implementation and monitoring of a social cash transfer programme. This review is not exhaustive, but provides elements to outline potential institutional arrangements.

Governmental bodies The Senegalese government is quite big, with 29 ministries in charge of often overlapping agendas (cf. Box A4.1). The responsibility of protecting most vulnerable families and individuals falls under the Ministry of Family, National Solidarity, Women’s Empowerment and Microfinance (MFNSWEM). And the Ministry of Interior’s Directorate for Civil Protection is the focal point for disaster management. Activities around risk management are shared between several ministries and agencies: MFNSWEM, Ministry of Health and Prevention, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labour (Ministère de la Fonction publique, de l'Emploi, du Travail et des Organisations professionnelles), Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Youth (Ministère de la Jeunesse et de l'Emploi des jeunes). These ministries received 43% of the national budget in 2005, even if only a part is used for risk management in rural areas. The rapid review below outlines mandate, main social protection-related and capacity of a few Ministries that needs to be considered as potential supervising institution.

Ministry of Family, National Solidarity, Women’s Empowerment and Microfinance The MFNSWEM chairs the Pillar 3 of the PRSP on Social Protection. The Pillar 3 on Social Protection was granted 0.72% of the PRSP implementation budget for 2007 of XOF478,642 billion. Out of these XOF2,937 billion, 11.58% went to elderly; 3.40% to displaced and refugees; and 35.58% to youth (FARPAS, 2008). The Ministry works in close collaboration with UNICEF. The Ministry coordinates a number of institutional structures, including:-

- National Solidarity Funds - Food Security Commissariat - Directorate for Social Assistance - Directorate for Community Development - Directorate for the Protection of Child Rights - National School for Specialised Social Workers

The Directorate for Social Assistance (Direction de l’Action Sociale – DAS) is the institution in charge of the execution of the governmental policy on support to destitute populations and vulnerable groups. If until 1998, the DAS was often connected to the Ministry of Health, the DAS suffered from institutional instability in recent years (cf. Box A4.2). The structure and its agents always maintained its presence, but this institutional instability renders difficult the sustainable implementation of programmes. Succeeding supervising authority would bring changing strategic orientation to DAS activities. Few legal texts support the DAS organisation and mandate. The decree No 88-1569 dated 28 November 1998 specifies that the DAS is responsible for:-

- Providing assistance to destitute populations; - Promoting social insertion of persons with disabilities; - Studying strategies for a better social prophylaxis; and - Ensuring proper management of the centres.

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Box A4.1 List of Senegalese Ministries

Ministries with State Ministry: 1. Ministère de l'Intérieur 2. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères 3. Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 4. Ministère de la Justice 5. Ministère des Forces armées 6. Ministère des Mines, de l'Industrie et des PME 7. Ministère de l'Environnement, de la Protection de la Nature, des Bassins de rétention et des Lacs

artificiels 8. Ministère des Infrastructures, des Transports terrestres et des Transports aériens 9. Ministère de l'Economie Maritime, des Transports maritimes, de la Pêche et de la Pisciculture 10. Ministère de l'Urbanisme, de l'Habitat, de l'Hydraulique urbaine, de l'Hygiène publique et de

l'Assainissement; 11. Ministère de la Décentralisation et des Collectivités locales

Other ministries: 12. Ministère de la Famille, de la Solidarité nationale, de l'Entreprenariat féminin et de la Micro-

finance; 13. Ministère de l'Agriculture; 14. Ministère de l'Aménagement du territoire et de la Coopération décentralisée; 15. Ministère de l'Enseignement Secondaire, des Centres Universitaires Régionaux (CUR) et des

Universités; 16. Ministère de l'Hydraulique rurale et du Réseau Hydrographique national 17. Ministère de la Fonction publique, de l'Emploi, du Travail et des Organisations professionnelles 18. Ministère du Commerce 19. Ministère de la Santé et de la Prévention 20. Ministère de l'Elevage 21. Ministère de la Culture, du Patrimoine historique classé, des Langues nationales et de la

Francophonie 22. Ministère des Sports et des Loisirs 23. Ministère de l'Energie 24. Ministère des Biocarburants, des Energies renouvelables et de la recherche scientifique 25. Ministère de l'Information, des Télécommunications, des TICS, du NEPAD, des Relations avec les

Institutions et Porte-parole du gouvernement 26. Ministère de l'Education chargé de l'Enseignement Préscolaire, de l'Elémentaire et du Moyen 27. Ministère de la Jeunesse et de l'Emploi des jeunes 28. Ministère des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur, de l'Artisanat et du Tourisme 29. Ministère de l'Enseignement technique et de la Formation Professionnelle

Over the years, different technical notes – from the different successive supervising ministries, brought additional missions to the DAS. However these notes have no legal value, and only partially contribute to give a real identity to the DAS. These additional tasks include: support to socio-economical programmes for the insertion of vulnerable groups; coordination of research on social assistance matters; psychosocial support in urban areas; supervision of social assistance activities – of NGOs, associations, etc. With its CPRS (Centre de Promotion et de Réinsertion Sociale), the DAS is the State institution with the most decentralised presence – after the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. The number of CPRS – 45 to date, hardly increased since its creation in the 1960’s, illustrating the lack of funds allocated to social assistance issues. The number of CPRS and their repartition is inadequate to reach the objective of national coverage: 2 in Dakar, 31 in other regions, and 2 in rural communities, no CPRS nor field social workers in the departments of Bakel, Kédougou, Guédiamaye, Ranérou, Kanel, Sédhiou, Vélingara and Oussouye. CPRS offer community-based services: identification of persons in need of assistance; support to complete National Solidarity Fund’s assistance request forms; support to disable associations; literacy courses; life skills courses; youth activities; etc. Each CPRS ought to have one social worker and two social assistants supported by community

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volunteers and communes’ social workers. But 30 CPRS only have one social worker. There is a total of 137 DAS social workers i.e. one social worker for 58,500 inhabitants when the standard is one for 10,000. If the objective is to establish CPRS down to rural communities with a average of one CPRS for 30,000 inhabitants, the current situation is far from this vision with one CPRS for 700,000 inhabitants. Establishing one CPRS in each commune/community would require about 400 new CPRS. Box A4.2 Institutional positioning of the Directorate for Social Assistance 1958 Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population 1959 Service des Affaires Sociales 1964 Ministère de la Santé Publique et des Affaires Sociales 1978 Ministère de l’Action Sociale 1983 Ministère du Développement Social (né de la fusion du Ministère de l’Action Sociale

et du Secrétariat d’Etat à la Promotion Humaine) 1990 Ministère de la Santé Publique et de l’Action Sociale 1998 Ministère de la Famille, de l’Action Sociale et de la Solidarité Nationale 2000 Ministère de la Famille et de la Solidarité Nationale 2001 Ministère du Développement Social et de la Solidarité Nationale 2002 Ministère de la Famille et de la Solidarité Nationale (distinct du Ministère du

Développement Social) 2003 Ministère de la Famille, du Développement Social et de la Solidarité Nationale 2005 (mars) Ministère de la Famille, de la Femme et du Développement Social (la Solidarité

Nationale étant alors un Ministère Délégué) 2005 (juin) Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale (distinct du Ministère du Développement Social) 2006 (février) Ministère de la Famille et du Développement Social (la Solidarité Nationale ayant été

supprimée) 2007 (début) Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale 2007 (fin) Ministère de la Famille, de la Solidarité Nationale, de l’Entreprenariat Féminin et de

la Micro-Finance

In August 2008, a national conference on social assistance gathered the different institutions engaged in social assistance incl. DAS, IPRES, Education Social Workers, Health Social Workers, etc. One main recommendation was to de-compartmentalise social assistance work in Senegal. The FARPAS (Fédération des Associations de Retraites et Personnes Agées au Sénégal) also called for a right-based approach to social assistance in Senegal. The Directorate for Community Development (Direction du Développement Communautaire – DDC) is composed of three units: coordination of NGOs; support to community development; and programme evaluation. Out of the twenty or so NGO investment programmes the DDC approves every year, a maximum of 15 are evaluated. Evaluations often reveal coordination issues e.g. lack of implication of decentralised institutions, lack of tools to make intervention sustainable, and incoherence in budget previsions. When serious problems are found, it is often fraud-related rather than technical issues. The DDC has decentralised structures at regional and departmental levels. These decentralised services implements the DDC activities, and represent other MFNSWEM’s institutions – to the exception of DAS, at regional/departmental levels. The DDC works with governor and préfet as technical advisor. DDC staff is concentrated in Dakar. And there is often only one agent at the regional/departmental level. In Bakel even, there is no staff member, and the DDC operates through the CERP agent (who reports to the sous-préfecture). Currently, there is no recruitment plan to replace/reinforce DDC staff. And the last recruitment brought in persons with a financial background and no social assistance skills, who cannot be sent to the field. The CSO-PLCP (Cellule de Suivi Opérationnel des Programmes de Lutte contre la Pauvreté) established in 2001 is the MFNSWEM’s body responsible for the monitoring and coordination of the poverty reduction programmes. The CSO developed in 2005 a project to support monitoring and evaluation of poverty reduction programmes in order to fill its

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mission to ‘provide reliable and operational data on poverty reduction issues’. The CSO proposed to develop a database, GIS tools, and a Website which will provide access to information on poverty issues and poverty reduction programmes. The CSO would mainly compile information provided by ‘deconcentrated’ technical services. Regular direct data collection is expected to be minimal. However the CSO would request specific studies to consultants, thesis students, etc. Every three years, a large impact evaluation study would be followed by a workshop with all stakeholders to present findings and discuss programme orientations. The CSA (Commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire) at the MFNSWEM issues a monthly bulletin on regional cereal prices, rains, agricultural production, etc; and works with WFP and others to provide food assistance in times of hardship.

Ministry of Economy and Finances The Ministry of Economy and Finances (MEF) chairs the PRSP National Steering Committee composed of representatives of the ministries, civil society, organisations, local governments, the private sector, and trade unions. The CSPLP (Cellule de Suivi des Programmes de Lutte contre la Pauvreté) at the MEF provides secretariat services for the National Steering Committee, and for the Pillar 3 of the PRSP on Social Protection. The MEF developed in June 2008 an emergency programme to respond to high food prices (Programme Social d’Urgence) – no mention of social cash transfers. The MEF will chair the Programme Steering Committee (Commission d’Orientation du Programme) and the CSPLP will provide secretariat services. The CSPLP is composed of 10 technical experts supported by administrative staff, based in Dakar. Its role is to coordinate the implementation of the poverty reduction strategy with sector-based institutions and decentralised authorities. Initially the unit was working with one focal point person (only) in each ministry, but this proved inefficient and sector-based committees (Comité Sectoriel) were established in each ministry. These committees oversee the implementation of the flagship programme developed by their ministry. The Unit has no decentralised structures. It liaises with regional services of statistics, planning, development, etc, and regional councils, as well as with the Civil Society Committee hosted by the NGO FAFS (Comité de la Société Civile pour la mise en oeuvre de la PRSP). The latest PRSP review outlined the need to reinforce the Unit with human and material resources. During interviews, its coordinator also suggested the potential of establishing CSPLP units at regional levels. Professional training is required (on gender, environment, etc) for unit members and sector-based technicians who develop planning tools. The MEF also supervises: the Directorate for National Planning (Direction de la Planification Nationale), which uses DevInfo software; the Unit for Technical Assistance to Savings and Credit Funds (Cellule d’Assistance Technique aux Caisses Populaires d’Epargne et de Crédit) which monitors the performance of large to grassroots microfinance institutions; and the ANSD (Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie). Under its 2008-2013 plan, the ANSD plans to complete:- - An APPS, study on poverty perception (Enquête sur la Perception de la Pauvreté au

Sénégal) every 6 months – the last one was conducted in 2007; - An ESPS (Enquête de Suivi de la Pauvreté au Sénégal) every two years –

questionnaire to 13,000 households providing departmental representation; the last one was conducted in 2005-2006 and compiled in September 2007;

- An ESAM (Enquête Sénégalaise Auprès des Ménages) every six years – comprehensive questionnaire to a sample of 6,000 households providing regional

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representation; the last one was conducted in 2001-2002. The national budget should support 40% of all the study costs (including census).

Prime Minister’s Office The Prime Minister chairs the Interministerial Orientation Committee. It directly supervises the Unit for the Fight against Malnutrition (Cellule de Lutte contre la Malnutrition) whose role is to define national nutrition policy and oversee the implementation of nutrition programmes. The Unit’s flagship programme is the Nutrition Enhancement Program (Programme de Renforcement de la Nutrition – PRN). It is implemented with decentralised authorities, by contracting NGOs who work with community volunteers (relais communautaires). The programme runs in 10 regions covering 34 out of 56 with community volunteers in 924 villages/neighbourhoods. The PRN is a World Bank-supported programme, with technical support from WFP, Unicef, etc. The Prime Minister’s Office also supervises the Unit for Economic and Social Analysis (Cellule d’Analyse Economique et Sociale), the Unit for Coordination and Monitoring of Projects and Programmes (Unité de Coordination et de Suivi des Projets et Programmes); and the National Food Security Council (Conseil National de la Sécurité Alimentaire).

Ministry of Education The responsibility for formal education is shared between two Ministries: Ministère de l'Education chargé de l'Enseignement Préscolaire, de l'Elémentaire et du Moyen for pre-primary and primary education, and Ministère de l'Enseignement Secondaire, des Centres Universitaires Régionaux (CUR) et des Universités for secondary education. The Ministry of Pre-primary and Primary Education’s ‘deconcentrated’ structures are the IA (Inspection d’Académie) at regional level, and the IDEN (Inspection Départementale de l’Education Nationale) at departmental level. While the IDEN only coordinates pre-primary and primary education activities, the IA also supervises technical and professional educational structures (which report to the Ministère de l’Enseignement Technique et de la Formation Professionnelle). It was envisioned that the proposed ‘contract for education’ project could be implemented through the CGE (Comité de Gestion des Ecoles). The CGE is a structure that was established by presidential decree in 2002. The CGE is composed of: the school director, teachers, parent association, school cooperatives (children representatives), and community-based organizations. The CGE develops and coordinates a planning document (Project d’Ecole). This is intended to promote a citizen control of public action within a community dynamic. The Ministry structures also coordinate school health activities, and have social workers.

Ministry of Labour The Ministry of Labour (Ministère de la Fonction publique, de l'Emploi, du Travail et des Organisations professionnelles) and its Directorate Labour and Social Security run programmes for the eradication of child labour, and for the reform and expansion of social security services to atypical workers. The Ministry works in close collaboration with the ILO. In 2008, IPRES (Institut de Prévoyance Retraite du Sénégal) injected more than XOF40 billion in the economy national through allowances. It served 109,500 pensioners – 59% of which in Dakar. IPRES has a decentralisation policy with regional agencies, and a perspective to delegate increasing responsibilities to field offices. For a year now, IPRES

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has been testing the use of smartcards – with the BICIS bank. Among the 60 beneficiary pensioners, 5 or 6 lost the card. It is planned to extend the use of smartcard as a way to provide better quality services to pensioners, and avoid long queues at payment centres. A smart card could also ease relations with social security services, Mutuelles, etc. IPRES will also be engaged in discussions around the PRSP project to extend social security to atypical workers.

Ministry of Health The deconcentrated structures of the Ministry are as follow. Health regions (Régions Médicales) are similar to the administrative regions, and are coordinated by one chief doctor. One social worker is assigned to each of these regions, but is often assigned communication/health education tasks, and does not really fill social assistance duties. Public health structures (Etablissements Publics de Santé) appeared in 1998 after the health reform. They have a social service reporting to the direction. Health districts (District Sanitaires) supervises district hospital, health centres, health posts, etc of the area. Each of these structures have a social service with very limited capacity.

Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Authorities The Ministry supervises several institutions including: the Directorate for Decentralisation (Direction de la Décentralisation); the Directorate for Local Authorities (Direction des Collectivités Locales); and the National Centre of Civil Registration (Centre National d’Etat Civil). Decentralised structures include: regions (with Governors), departments (with Prefets), arrondissements (with sous-préfets), communes (with mayors), neighbourhoods (with chefs de quartier), and rural communities. Decentralised structures were delegated nine fields of competencies including social assistance. Funds provided to Communes (Fonds de Dotation) include an envelope for emergencies (volet secours). This budget is spent to assist people affected by disasters – e.g. floods, or during religious celebrations. These actions are often politicised, and sometimes poorly coordinated with the DAS/CPRS. The Governors and Préfets respectively chair the Regional and Departmental Steering Committee composed of the State’s ‘deconcentrated’ services, civil society organisations, and local governments. The CERP (Centre d’Expansion Rurale Polyvalent) regroups the ‘deconcentrated’ technical services – one DDC agent, one Ministry of Agriculture agent, etc; to interact with rural communities (CR). The CERP seems to be structures currently neglected. The Ministry of Labour also supervises the Unit for Planning and Technical Evaluation of Programmes and Projects (Centre de Planification et d’évaluation technique des programmes et projets); and the National Steering Committee of the National Local Development Programme (Comité National de Pilotage du Programme National de Développement Local).

Civil society organisations The National Platform of Civil Society Organisations for the Monitoring of the MDG in Senegal (Plateforme Nationale des Organisations de la Société Civile pour le Suivi des OMD au Sénégal) was created in 2004. Its mandate is to facilitate civil society dialogue around MDG-related issues, to coordinate any activity related to the monitoring of the MDG, and to represent civil society at the National Committee driven by the State. The platform gathers NGOs, trade unions, rural producer associations, youth/women/disabled associations, faith-based associations, etc. It is a member of the World Alliance Against Poverty (Alliance Mondiale contre la Pauvreté). The platform is run with one coordinator, one assistant, and a

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piloting committee made of 12 key members. The platform was involved in the Livingstone I & II process, and will soon launch a communication campaign targeted at communities but also at the private sector. One focus will be put on social protection and social cash transfers. The platform coordinator is in favour of cash transfers. He sees them as a way to support the setting up income-generating activities for better living standards, and as an assistance that should be limited in time. There is a demand from civil society actors for training sessions and documentation on social protection (in French) and possibly study tours in countries who have already developed a social cash transfer programme. NGOs are organised in several coalitions, such as Congad (Conseil des ONGs d’Appui au Développement), and Conafe (Coalition Nationale des Associations et ONG en faveur de l’Enfant). The NGO Tostan has been running community empowerment programmes in Senegal for over 20 years, and is the winner of the 2007 Conrad N. Hilton Humanitarian Prize. Since 2000, Tostan has set up and trained 1386 CGE (Comité de Gestion Communautaire). Tostan intervenes for a minimum of 30 months in each beneficiary community – budget of USD 15,000 per community. And Tostan helped set up 37 federations to sustain community programmes. Since early 2008, Tostan has been running a pilot project in Ziguinchor to train people on the use of mobile phones. This was initiated as a mean for students of literacy courses to keep practicing, and offers a whole range of developmental potentialities i.e. get information on market prices by SMS text messaging – through the Manobi platform. Plan Sénégal supports community structures GMO (Groupe de Mise en Oeuvre) similar to the Tostan’s CGE. Community committees (Conseils de Quartier, Association de Développement Villageois) are established with the local authority (‘Commune’) and supported by the ‘deconcentrated’ technical services – Directorate for Social Assistance, Directorate for Community Development, etc. They ought to develop local development plans, which are often developed quickly with limited (quality) technical inputs. Each community has several community-based structures: GIE (Groupement d’Intérêt Economique), women associations, disable associations, farmer associations, etc. These structures do not always include the most vulnerable households. Several NGOs support child clubs. Plan Senegal established about 200 Clubs Guneyi which are involved in immunization campaigns. Plan also supports Radio Guneyi, and sport and cultural associations. CCF and Save the Children (through local partners) also support Child clubs. The Children Parliament (Parlement des Enfants) supported by the Ministry of Social Assistance, and the National Youth Council (Conseil National de la Jeunesse) have structures at departmental, regional and national levels. Both of these structures tend to be politicised. Coordination between decentralised institution, ‘deconcentrated’ structures, NGOs, etc are done through the Development Committees at each administrative levels from arrondissement to regional level (Comité Local de Développement, Comité Départemental de Développement, Comité Régional de Développment).

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ANNEXE 5 – International evidence linking social protection and economic growth

An emerging evidence base demonstrates that social protection promotes economic growth. Policymakers do not necessarily face a trade-off pitting social against growth objectives – but rather have the opportunity to engineer a virtuous circle of increased equity promoting growth supporting further improvements in equity. There are at least nine paths through which social protection promotes economic growth. Most of these mechanisms work by increasing overall economic efficiency—through better policies and strategies, improved resource allocation (increasing employment, human capital development and other investment and reducing discrimination), and by more effectively taking advantage of the economy’s capacity.

1. Social protection can generate gains for those groups who might otherwise be disadvantaged by specific elements of a pro-poor growth strategy, providing a balancing function that can enlist stakeholder support for the reforms necessary to sustain long-term growth.

Labour unions in Nepal, for example, have identified effective social protection as a prerequisite for necessary labour market reforms, the combination of which would enhance both equity and growth. Cash transfer initiatives have compensated the poor for reduced price subsidies in Mexico and Indonesia. Bolivia established a social pension with the proceeds from the privatization of public enterprises.20 Social protection generally increases the positive impact of growth on poverty reduction.

2. Social protection promotes human capital development, improving worker health and education and raising labour productivity.

Studies in South Africa and Latin America repeatedly document significant responses of health and education outcomes, particularly in response to both conditional and unconditional cash transfer programmes and social health initiatives.21 Child benefits (particularly cash transfers) and school assistance packages improve school attendance, and education constitutes the single most effective HIV- prevention asset.22 Social cash transfers piloted in countries with high HIV prevalence (Zambia and Malawi) successfully reduce poverty in HIV/AIDS-affected households.23 The Child Support Grant in South Africa promotes livelihoods, improves nutrition and facilitates access to education.24

Social health protection directly improves the health status of people, which in turn contributes to promoting economic growth.25 A ten percent increase in life expectancy adds an estimated 0.3 - 0.4 percentage points to the annual growth rates in per capita incomes.26 Empowerment of the poor and vulnerable improves their access to public services, further developing human capital. These human capital outcomes sustain the basis for long-term pro-poor growth.

3. Social protection enables the poor to protect themselves and their assets against shocks, enabling them to defend their long-term income-generating potential.

Droughts in Ethiopia have significantly reduced household earning power as long as 15 years later.27 Social protection enables households to resist desperate measures and reduce future vulnerability. For example, social health protection prevents impoverishment due to

20 Birdsall and Nellis (2002) 21 Adato (2007), Samson et al. (2006), Samson et al. (2004) 22 Irish Aid GPN (2007) 23 UNICEF ESARO (2007) cited in Irish Aid GPN (2007) 24 Agűero, J.M. et al. (2006) cited in Irish Aid GPN (2007); also Samson et al. (2004), Samson (2007), etc. 25 Sachs, J.D. 2002; Gyimah-Brempong and Wilson 2004; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2004 26 WHO Macroeconomic Commission on Health estimates cited in GTZ GPN (2007). 27 Dercon (2005)

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catastrophic health expenditures, consequently protecting productive assets.28 Cash transfers can assist households to maintain their consumption without selling productive assets.

4. Social protection (incl. social health protection) mitigates risk and encourages investment. The downside of the riskiest and yet most productive investments threatens the poor with destitution. Social protection enables people to face these risks. For example, farmers protected by the Employment Guarantee Scheme in Maharashtra, India, invest in higher yielding varieties than farmers in neighbouring states. The risk associated with impoverishing health expenditures in rural China has adversely affected work migration and school enrolment decisions of households.29 Improved social risk management supports long-term pro-poor growth.

5. Social protection programmes combat discrimination and unlock economic potential. In Bangladesh, Brazil and South Africa, transfers provided to women have a greater positive impact on school attendance by girls compared to boys.30 Empowerment directly tackles discrimination, improving society’s employment of human resources. In particular, while gender inequality exacerbates the spread of HIV and AIDS, empowering and increasing resources in the hands of women improves child survival, nutritional status and school attendance.31 “When women are healthy, educated and free to avail of life’s opportunities, children also thrive. In households where women are key decision makers, the proportion of resources devoted to children is far greater than in those in which women have a less decisive role.32 Consequently, who controls cash transfers at household level is crucial in terms of AIDS and poverty mitigation, child survival and empowerment of both women and children.”33

6. Social protection supports the participation of the poor in labour markets, contributing to broader empowerment objectives.

Job search is often expensive and risky. In South Africa, workers in households receiving social transfers put more effort into finding work than those in comparable households not receiving these grants – and they are more successful in finding employment. The impact of cash transfers on women’s labour market activity is about twice as great as that for men.34 Social health protection increases labour productivity by improving people’s health status and replacing inefficient risk-coping mechanisms, which in turn promotes employment and economic growth.35 There is a need to better understand how more effective social protection for informal sector workers might promote access to sustainable decent employment.36 An emerging evidence base is providing evidence of how social protection interventions support employment and entrepreneurial activities. Participants in Zambia’s cash pilot scheme use a significant proportion of the benefits to hire labour, for example in order to cultivate the land around their homes and consequently multiply the value of the social transfers while creating employment for local youth.37 Mexico’s Progresa (now Oportunidades) social transfer programme is associated with local economy impacts that improve consumption, asset accumulation and employment broadly within communities— 28 GTZ GPN (2007) 29 Jalan and Ravallion 2001 cited in GTZ GPN (2007) 30 Samson et al. (2004, 2006) 31 UNICEF, State of the World’s Children (2007) cited in Irish Aid GPN (2007) 32 HelpAge International (2006) 33 Irish Aid GPN (2007) 34 Samson et al. (2004), Samson and Williams (2007) 35 GTZ GPN (2007) 36 Lund (2007) 37 Schüring et al. (2006)

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for both programme participants and non-participants.38 Participants in Progresa invest a portion of their social transfers in productive assets and are more likely to engage in entrepreneurial activities, improving their potential for sustainable self-sufficiency.39

7. Social protection stimulates demand for local goods and services, promoting short-term growth outcomes.

In Zambia 80% of the social transfers are spent on locally purchased goods, supporting enterprises in rural areas. In South Africa the redistribution of spending power from upper to lower income groups shifts the composition of national expenditure from imports to local goods, increasing savings (by improving the trade balance) and supporting economic growth.40 A social account matrix analysis of the Dowa Emergency Cash Transfer (DECT) programme in Malawi found multiplier impacts from the payments broadening benefits to the entire community.41 In Namibia, the dependable spending power created by social pensions supports the development of local markets and revitalises local economic activity.42 However, the macro-economic impact for any given country will depend on the patterns of demand across income groups and the manner in which social transfers are financed.

8. Social protection helps create an effective and secure state, promoting growth by building social cohesion and a sense of citizenship as well as reducing conflict.43

Social health protection, for example, is grounded in values of equity and solidarity, strengthening bonds of co-operation and reciprocity and thereby promoting social stability.44 A safe and predictable environment is essential to encourage individuals, including foreign investors, to work and invest. The social pension, for example, in Mauritius contributed to the social cohesion necessary to support the transition from a vulnerable mono-crop economy with high poverty rates into a high growth country with the lowest poverty rates in Africa.45 Likewise, Botswana’s social pension provides the government’s most effective mechanism for tackling poverty and supporting the social stability that encourages the high investment rates required to drive Africa’s fastest growing economy over the past three decades.

9. Social protection promotes empowerment and growth by improving the negotiating power of workers, smallholder farmers and micro-entrepreneurs in the marketplace.

Workers who have a better fallback position (provided by social protection) can search for a job that takes more effective advantage of their capabilities, rather than accepting the first job that becomes available. This raises labour market efficiency—by better matching workers to positions that harness greater productivity and pay higher wages, thereby reducing underemployment. Small-scale producers with access to social protection benefits are less compelled to sell produce at a loss in order to survive—such as at harvest times when temporary gluts in food markets might severely depress prices. Participants in one of Malawi’s social transfer programmes were empowered by the resources to invest in their own farms during the planting season rather than rely on dead-end casual employment for their immediate survival.46 Social protection enables the poor to engage with the market system on a more equal footing, improving its efficiency and legitimacy.

38 Barrientos and Sabates-Wheeler (2006) 39 Gertler et al. (2005) 40 Samson et al. (2004) 41 See Davies and Davis (2007), which estimates multipliers ranging from 2.02 to 2.45. 42 Cichon and Knop 2003 43 Samson et al. (2002), Bourguignon and Ravallion (2004), DFID (2005) 44 GTZ GPN (2007) 45 Roy and Subramanian (2001) 46 Harnett and Cromwell (2000)

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ANNEXE 6a – List of stakeholders consulted during the feasibility study

Organisation Nom et fonction Institutions gouvernementales Ministère de la famille, de la Solidarité nationale, de l'Entreprenariat féminin et de la Micro finance

Mr Ousmane Ka, Coordinateur Cellule de Suivi Opérationnel des Programmes de Lutte contre la Pauvreté (CSO-PLCP) Mme Awa Wade Sow, Coordinatrice PRP/SL

Mr Coly, Directeur Mr Gaye, DAS Mr Moustapha Thioune, Chef de service de l’Action Sociale de Ziguinchor

Direction de l’Action Sociale

Mme Mbodji, Directrice du CPRS de Ziguinchor Direction du Développement Communautaire Mr Mamadou Mbengue, Directeur Adjoint M Boubacar Traoré M Lissa Diop Ndiaye M Ndèye Soukey Gueye Direction Stratégie et Développement Social Mr Sidy Gueye Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances

Mme Fatou Diouf Cellule de Suivi des Programmes de Lutte contre la Pauvreté (CSPLP) Mr Thierno Seydou Niane Cellule d’Assistance Technique aux Caisses Populaires d’Epargne et de Crédit (AT/CPEC)

Directeur

Mr Bakary Djiba, Directeur des Statistiques Démographiques et Sociales Mr Mamadou Matar Gueye Mr Abdoulaye Tall

Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie (ANSD)

Mr Diouf Macoumba, Administrateur Ministère de l’Education

Mr. Mamadou Mboup Focal point PRSP

Mr. Djibril Sene Responsable du CROSP de Kolda, Adjoint au Directeur

Primature Mme Maguette Niang Cellule de Lutte contre la Malnutrition Mme Khadidiatou Dieng, Coordinatrice Mission de Formulation et de Gestion du Millenium Challenge Account

Mr Ibrahima Dia, Directeur

Ministère de l’Intérieur Direction de la Protection Civile Mr Lamine Ndiaye Direction des Affaires Générales et de l’Administration Territoriale (DAGAT)

Mr Aliou Badara Diop

Mr Ameth Diop, Sous-Préfet de l’Arrondissement de Djibanar Mr Diop, Adjoint Administratif au Gouverneur de Kolda Ministère du Travail IPRES Mr Cheikh Tidiane Gaye, Service informatique Institutions internationales

Mr Mohamed Azzedine Salah, Représentant Adjoint Mr Rémy Pigois, Chef de la Section Politiques Sociales Unicef Mme Christina de Bruin, Chef de Sous-bureau à Ziguinchor

Commission Européenne Mr Stéphane Halgand, Chef de la Section Sécurité Alimentaire et Développement Rural Mme Bockstal

Organisation Internationale du Travail Mr Luis Frota

Fonds Monétaire International Mr Seydou Ba Mme Lily Meskerem Mulatu, Représentante a.i. Mr. Mamadou Ndione, Economiste Mr Moukim Temourov, Senior Economist

Banque mondiale

Mr Menno Mulder-Sibanda, Senior Nutrition Specialist - Africa Region Mr Jean-Noël Gentile, Directeur Adjoint Mme Yuvé Guluma

Programme Alimentaire Mondial

Mme Andree Turpel, Chargée de Programme

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Organisation Nom et fonction Mr Ndeley Agbaw, Chargé de Programme FAO Mr Jacques Strebelle, AU/Nepad mission leader PNUD Mr. Ousmane Ndoye, Conseiller en Politique et Stratégie Economique Coopération Italienne Mr Tamba Société Civile

Mme Margie Morard, Conseillère Régionale en Sécurité Alimentaire Oxfam GB Mme Kate Norgrove,

Regional Campaigns & Policy Manager Save the Children UK Mme Jenni Marshall, Conseillère Régionale

Mme Molly Melching, Directrice Tostan Mr Cody N. Donahue, Coordinateur de Suivi, Evaluation, Recherche &

Apprentissage Conseil des ONGs d’appui au développement Sénégal (CONGAD) Plateforme Nationale des Organisations de la Société Civile pour le Suivi des OMD au Sénégal

Mr Momar Talla Kane, Vice-président du Congad et Coordinateur de la Plateforme

ATD Quart-Monde Mr Jaime Perez, Représentant CRS Mr Joe Curry, Chef des programmes

Mr Doumbia, Vice-président Comité de la Société Civile pour la mise en œuvre du DSRP Mr Amidou Sidibe, Directeur de Collectivités Educatives et

Coordonnateur du Pôle des Jeunes de la CSC/DSRP Mr Mansour Fall, Conseiller régional

World Vision Mr Paolo de Felice, Conseiller régional

Plan International Mr Massamba Dieng, Program Support Manager Secteur privé Groupement Interbancaire Monétique de l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (GIM-UEMOA)

Mr Souley Maikarfi, Responsable Informatique et Monétique

Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal (CNCAS)

Mr Friard Augustin Coly, Chef du Service Monétique et Télématique

PosteFinances Mr Saïd Yahya Faye, Responsable Cellule Grands Comptes Manobi Mr Daniel Annerose, Directeur

Mr Diouf, Service Financier Mr Thiam, Service Financier Crédit Mutuel du Sénégal Mr Madiyou Sane, Gérant de la caisse du Crédit Mutuel de Samine

CBAO Groupe Attijariwfa Bank Mme Betty Traoré Touré, Directrice de la Clientèle Privée et Institutionnelle

Ecobank Mr Julien Koffi, Country Treasurer

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ANNEXE 6b – List of workshop participants

N° Name Structure Telephone Email

1 ALAVO Minouche UNICEF 33.889.03.00 halavo@unicef.org

2 ALBORGHETTI Mara ONG ACRA 77.718.23.81 mara-alb81@yahoo.it acradk@orange.sn

3 ANNEROSE Daniel MANOBI 33.869.20.50 daniel.annerose@manobi.net 4 BAMBA Jacob Annur FM 76.852.63.57 jacobgueye@yahoo.fr 5 CABRAN Manolo UNICEF 77.156.57.68 mcabran@unicef.org 6 CHERRIER Cécile EPRI 77.156.56.53 cecile.cherrier@yahoo.fr

7 CISSE Fatou Terre des Hommes - Sénégal 33.827.97.37 77.544.30.16

fatou.cisse@tdh.ch

8 CISSE Marième RDV 77.640.94.70 redactionrdv@yahoo.fr

9 COULIBALY Kankou SECNLS 33.869.09.09 77.637.93.79

kcoulibaly@cnls-senegal.org

10 COULIBALY Moussa RTS/TV 11 DE BRUIN Christina UNICEF 77.637.26.11 cdebruin@unicef.org 12 DIA Mamadou ATM (Cameraman) 77.514.89.43 dia.mamaid@gmail.com 13 DIAGNE Amadou DTSS/MFPETOP 77.657.42.91 mao-diagne@hotmail.com 14 DIALLO Dieynaba TOSTAN 77.442.88.10 dieynabadiallo@tostan.org 15 DIATTA Edouard ENDA TM 77.654.54.57 edouard@enda.sn 16 DIATTA Odile Napama DPDE/MFSNEFMF 77.571.08.90 odilenapama@yahoo.fr 17 DIAW Cheikh Amadou Bamba PARRER 77.553.57.80 bambadiaw@yahoo.fr 18 DIEME Séckou ATM 77.655.90.75 diemeseckou@yahoo.fr 19 DIEYE Sanor CSPLP/MEF 77.547.83.52 sanor71@yahoo.fr 20 DIOP Amadou Guèye RTS/TV 21 DIOP El Hadj Malick AMS/VAEL- Assemblée Nationale 77.644.94.30 rppdsenegal@yahoo.fr 22 DIOUF Alé Samba FARPAS CSC/DSRP 77.824.75.68 farpasenegal@hotmail.com 23 DIOUF Fatou CSPLP/MEF 33.889.21.66 ffdiouf@hotmail.com 24 DIOUF Fatou Dème CLVF 77.540.71.68 ndewdiouf@yahoo.fr

25 DIOUF Ramatoulaye NDAO Présidence de la République 33.889.09.37 77.639.49.65

ramandao@yahoo.fr

26 DIOUF René Massiga RTS/TV 77.564.77.10 rmassiga@yahoo.fr

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N° Name Structure Telephone Email 27 DIOUM Aïssatou UNICEF 77.645.50.04 adioum@unicef.org 28 DJOSSA Bienvenu PAM Sénégal 33.849.65.00 Bienvenu.Djossa@wfp.org 29 DONAHUE Cody TOSTAN 77.108.51.99 codydonahue@tostan.org 30 DOUCOURE Bakary LARTES 77.203.67.52 doucourebakary@yahoo.fr 31 FALL Abdou Salam LARTES/IFAN/UCAD 77.639.34.75 asfall@refer.sn 32 FAYE Abdou MEF - Cellule de Communication 77.550.00.41 abdoubirame@yahoo.fr 33 FELIX Céline Julia BIT 77.737.04.09 felix@ilo.org 34 GAYE El Hadj Doudou DAS/MFSNEFMF 77.551.26.81 dudugaye@yahoo.fr 35 GAYE Mame Diarra PARRER 77.638.59.67 diaragaye@orange.sn 36 GNING Seckel COS-CSC/Pole - CONGAD 77.544.38.32 gningseckel@yahoo.fr 37 GUERIN Olivier Louis BIT 33.860.11.25 oguerin@orange.sn

38 GUEYE Mama Projet de lutte contre la traite et les pires formes de travail des enfants/MFSNEFMF

77.612.65.26 33.842.66.41

piresformes@yahoo.fr amagueye@hotmail.com

39 GUEYE Mamadou S.C 77.553.34.87 douis22@yahoo.fr 40 HAJJAR Ralph SEMLEX Europe 00.32.473.26.15.71 rh@semlex.net

41 HOUNSOUNOU Gilberte Kedote

Consultante 77.114.84.47 k_gilberte@yahoo.com

42 KA Madiop ANCTP 77.653.04.56 poidamak@yahoo.fr

43 KA Ousmane CSO-PLCP/MFSNEFMF 33.889.25.80 77.637.44.57

ousmanekacso@yahoo.fr

44 KANE Momar Talla CONGAD 77.644.42.45 33.824.44.09 33.824.44.13

mtakane1@yahoo.fr congad@orange.sn

45 KANE Safietou Le Quotidien 77.532.05.29 sakane@lequotidien.sn 46 KANTE Boubacar APS 33.823.32.94 boubakante@hotmail.com

47 KEBE Mamadou Projet de lutte contre la traite et les pires formes de travail des enfants/MFSNEFMF

77.553.57.24 33.842.66.41

mouhabachir@yahoo.fr

48 KOUTCHO Della Nathalie UNICEF 33.889.03.00 ndakoutcho@unicef.org

49 LAISON Justine C.A. CONAFE SN 33.824.69.70 77.574.39.21

conafesenegal@yahoo.fr laisonjustine@yahoo.fr

50 LOKHAT Rouxanna UNICEF 33.889.03.00 rlokhat@unicef.org

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N° Name Structure Telephone Email 51 MABITA Marie Aimée UNHCR 77.450.69.62 mabita@unhcr.org 52 MARECHAL Laurence AED 33.822.27.18 laurence.marechal@yahoo.fr 53 MARSHALL Jenny Save The Children 77.450.04.92 j.marshall@savethechildren.org.uk 54 NDIAYE Abdou CSO/PLCP 77.636.13.72 abdoundiaye206@yahoo.fr

55 NDIAYE Amacodou EMAP sarl 33.832.64.70 77.569.16.03

emap@orange.sn hamacodou@yahoo.fr

56 NDIAYE Mouhamadou BICIS 33.839.04.14 mouhamadou.ndiaye@bnpparibas.com 57 NDONG Ch. Seck Express News 77.568.21.00 seck.express@yahoo.fr 58 NIANE Thierno Seydou MEF/CSPLP 33.889.21.66 tsniane@yahoo.fr 59 NIANG Madiagne RDV redactionrdv@yahoo.fr 60 PIGOIS Rémy UNICEF rpigois@unicef.org

61 PORTAS IGLESIAS Beatriz Coopération décentralisée de la Galice 77.213.15.07 beatriz.portas@aecid.sn

62 POUYE Jean RDV redactionrdv@yahoo.fr 63 SAALFELD Mark MANOBI 33.869.20.50 msaalfeld@manobi.sn 64 SABARA Marie UNICEF 33.889.03.00 msabara@unicef.org 65 SAKAMOTO Noriko UNICEF 33.889.03.00 nosakamoto@unicef.org 66 SAKHO Cheikhou Dr SE/CNLS 77.529.50.08 csakho@cnls-senegal.org 67 SALAH Mohamed UNICEF masalah@unicef.org 68 SANE Idrissa Le Soleil 77.566.56.28 didisane@yahoo.fr 69 SECK Falilou PLAN Sénégal 77.536.60.25 falilou.seck@plan-inter.org 70 SENE Amsata DGP/MEF 77.422.44.69 a.sene@aliceadsl.fr 71 SENE Mbaye CAFSP/MSP 77.646.21.59 msene51@yahoo.fr 72 SEYDI D. APS 33.823.32.94 73 SIDIBE Amidou CSO/DSRP 76.475.76.50 sidibe_amidou@yahoo.fr 74 SONKO Gnambi Consultant 77.542.19.66 sgnambi@yahoo.fr 75 THIAM El Hadji Momar CLM 33.869.01.99 ethiam@clm.sn 76 TURPEL Andrée PAM Sénégal 33.849.65.00 andree.turpel@wfp.org 77 WANE Mamadou PAM 33.849.65.30 Mamadou.Wane@wfp.org 78 WANE Mamadou Sociologue Consultant 77.637.58.52 maowane@gmail.com 79 ZAPATA Ines Diego Coopération Espagnole 33.849.07.82 ines.diego@aecid.sn

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ANNEXE 7 – Child-oriented cash transfer programmes in Africa

Concept Ghana Kenya Lesotho

Child-oriented cash transfers

Permanent cash transfer programme (LEAP) plus new crisis-related programme (Emergency LEAP)

National OVC cash transfer pilot (OVC-CT)

Child-targeted social cash transfer pilot transfer transfers, food aid and others

Vulnerable population

30% below intl. poverty line; 40% below national poverty line

20% below intl. poverty line; 46% below national poverty line

43% below intl. poverty line; 35% below national poverty line

Programme coverage

Main LEAP: 8,500 HHs Emergency LEAP: 17,000 HHs

41,000 households Still at pilot stage

Per household or individual cost or benefit

Monthly benefit of US$6-12 per household

$18/month (avg) $12 per month per child

Implementing agency

Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare

Ministry of Gender (OVC-CT) and Ministry of Northern Kenya

Government (Ministry of Finance) & UN agencies

Financing available

Government, World Bank, DFID, UNICEF

120 million GBP over ten years (DFID), 13 million USD/year (World Bank) and 10 million USD/year (Govt. of Kenya)

Govt. and donor funds ($8.6 million from EU and UNICEF)

Comprehensive financing gap

USD 6million required for necessary capacity-building

Current funding covers less than 10% of need

Estimated at 50%

Leadership Government Government

Government

SP strategy Yes (2007) Draft (2008)

Yes

Scale-up capacity Funding committed by govt.,

High Strong and progressively expanding

Scale-up requirements

Institutional capacity-building at local level; data for targeting

Financing and capacity development

Funds and capacity

Delivery systems capacity

National systems, including co-ordinating committee, single registry.

Well-developed multi-pillar scalable delivery systems

Strong, with solid govt. investment

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Concept Namibia South Africa Zambia Child-oriented cash transfers

Cash transfers for orphans and vulnerable children

Cash transfers for poor children and foster children

Social cash transfer pilot in five districts

Vulnerable population

43% below national poverty line

46% below national poverty line

64% below intl. poverty line; 68% below national poverty line

Programme coverage

Rapidly growing programme coverage

Over eight million children are covered

Aims to cover only about 10-15% of population

Per household or individual cost or benefit

$18 per month per child $24 per child per month, and $58 per foster child per month

$8-11 per household per month

Implementing agency

Ministry of Gender Ministry of Social Development

Ministry of Community Development

Financing available

Central government budget

Central government budget

Donor funding

Comprehensive financing gap

Zero—100% financed Zero—100% financed $30 million required for national cash transfer programme

Leadership Central government Central government Development partners, NGOs and government

SP strategy No Yes, comprehensive social security strategy

Draft

Scale-up capacity Govt. capacity is strong and financing readily available

Govt. capacity is strong and financing readily available

Limited implementation capacity and funds

Scale-up requirements

Still exclusion error in remote areas

Some poor households excluded by means test

National commitment required for sustainability

Delivery systems capacity

Strong delivery systems with private sector focus

Strong provincial delivery systems in the process of being consolidated at national level

Strong community-based systems developed; requires single registry and payments systems