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Featured briefing The changing faceof the Middle East

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54 Roads less traveled56 A new pact for stability60 The seeds of revolt62 A tale of two armies64 A delicate balance68 Watching and waiting70 NATO’s alliances put to the test74 Economic prospect’s

after the turmoil

An oppositionsupporter liftsa hand drawn placardat the front line nearTahrir Square in Cairo.The placard reads,“Thanks Egypt youth”(top) and “We will notleave till weget the 70 billiondollars.”

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There were very few people who believed that thesuccess of the Tunisian revolution at beginningof the year could have such immediate reper-

cussions on the Arab world. Still fewer would have betthat President Hosni Mubarak would share the fate ofZine El Abidine Ben Ali, losing power in just over threeweeks after more than 30 years in power. Beyond theforms the protests have taken and their possible out-comes, it is clear that after a decades-long stagnation,theMiddle East andArabworld is getting back on track,and it is forcing a reconsideration of what had becomesa mantra ofWestern foreign policy since the end of theColdWar: that immobility was the price to be paid formaintaining regional stability.

The fact that the end of the Cold War, and its at-tendant bipolarity has been metabolized by the Mid-dle East is hardly surprising. The internal dynamics ofthe region had for the most part been able to avoid be-ing overly influenced by ColdWar logic, if anything, ithad curbed the disruptive potential, in terms of re-structuring of regional balance. The Iraqi invasion ofKuwait inAugust 1990,maywell be viewedas anattemptto seize the opportunity for action offered by the endof Soviet-American competition in the region. The in-ternational community’s reaction between 1990 and1991 (OperationDesert Storm), however, because of thechoice of getting the widest possible support, gave fur-ther legitimacy to maintaining the status quo. Para-doxically, even thepositionof SaddamHusseinwasnev-er formally challenged.The only dynamic element wasthe start of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations,as if this were possible if all the other elements of theregional puzzle were froze.

The September 11 attacks in 2001 and the 2003 in-vasion of Iraq, with the subsequent overthrow of Sad-damHussein, brought theUnited States, thoughnot theentire international community or its institutions, to fo-cus on a dynamic approach to the question of stabili-ty in the Middle East. And it is precisely on that occa-sion that the guarantor of post-ColdWar global and re-

gional stability drew a link between the authoritariannature of themajority of Arab andMiddle Eastern statesand threats to regional and international security. Thefailure of the policy related to the Iraqi campaign – cre-ate the foundations for regional stability through thepromotion of democracy – caused a strategic impasse.The return to an approach decidedly in favor of the sta-tus quo was accompanied by a rhetoric of openness todemocratization from below. What the Republicanneocon administration hoped would take place is nowhappeningunder aDemocratic administration. Butwithone huge difference: the marginal role played by theUnited States in this process. If the regime change in Iraqwas not possible withoutWashington’s massive directintervention, the collapse of the regimes inTunisia andEgypt has taken place despiteWashington. In the caseof Egypt, especially, theObamaadministrationwas sus-pended for days between embarrassed support for aregime that had long proved to be the US’s trusted allyand support for the demonstrators. In the end – againstthe advice of his Secretary of State and challenging theprudence invoked by the main European leaders – thePresident decided to break out of the inertia and bet onpeople’s aspiration rather than simply chase events, thuscontributing in all likelihood to a quicker collapse of theregime.

Beyond the deepest convictions of President Oba-ma, the question that many are asking is whetherthese grassroots revolutions prefigure worrying sce-narios for theWest and Europe, or rather open up un-precedentedopportunities to formore collaborationbe-tween the Islamic world and the Western. To respondappropriately to such a question, I believe we must beaware of the complex, gradual loss of influence of theWest (and especially the US) in the region, also causedby the erosion of American prestige during the longcampaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. To paraphraseMachiavelli, today’s Americans are neither loved norfeared in the Middle East. They have long ceased to bean object of admiration. But they no longer fear Amer-

by vittorio emanuele parsi

Roads less traveled

The Great Arab Revolt of 2011 offers a crucial lesson for theWest:do not follow the usual routes,

which are often as wrong as they are familiar.

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A demonstrator puts ascarf on the head ofanother protesterwhose face is paintedin the colors of theEgyptian Dag in Cairo’sTharir Square.

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ican hubris, and this is new. Obama’s policy seems towant to take account of this new situation and try to de-velop a successful policy in the changed strategic con-text. In this sense, the President’s choices appear to beoriented toward realism. Meanwhile those who wouldcontinue to uncritically support autocratic regimes inthe region appear to be an expression of dangerouswishful thinking.

From what has happened Iran, as well as inTunisiaand Egypt, there is the feeling that all regimes in theMuslim world, regardless of whether they are pro- oranti-West, are facing great difficulties in the face ofmounting popular discontent. Far more than being dif-ferentiated by their international position, their formof government or by their principle of legitimacy, theyare all united by a very weak institution, a lack of in-clusiveness, and appalling corruption.This is what hasmade the revolution in Tunisia so exportable. Thoughobviously the success of other revolts depends on in-dividual factors within each nation. What might hap-pen in Egypt will be very different from the possible de-velopments in Libya, and the same goes for Yemen,Tunisia and Bahrain, or any other country in theMaghreb or the Middle East. Acknowledging the im-possibility of a simple restoration of the status quomeans, for us Westerners that we must free ourselvesfrom the established patterns of the past and try newpaths, feeling out whatever new stakeholders mayarise from the changed circumstances. Thus, it ineveryone’s interest to consider a possibility that is by nomeans merely theoretical. Namely, that the disap-pearance of autocracy and opening of the societycould help in the development of democratic politicalmovements inspired by Islam. On the one hand, weshould not forget that the very fact that these move-ments have always had to deal with repressive powersmay have contributed to accentuate their “militarist”

Marshall Plan for Mediterranean econom-ic stability. This plan must mobilize a crit-icalmass of newEuropeanand internationalfinancial resources, in the order of billionsof euros, tomodernize the economies of theregion and improve investment. The re-moval of trade and economic barriers be-tween Mediterranean countries should alsobe a priority. The EU should work togetheron this strategy with the US, whose role re-mains crucial.

The EU, in the meantime, should deep-en its relations with countries in the regionby considering granting all of them “en-hanced status” of association. This entailsprogressive integration into the EU’s inter-nalmarket, participation in a number of EUprograms and regular summits between theEU and Mediterranean countries. It wouldlend substance to the principle of equalpartnership, on which the new relationshipbetween Europe and the Mediterraneancountries must be based. Foreign and se-curity policy should be high on the EUagenda too, with the long-term aim ofMediterranean countries becoming pro-ducers rather than consumers of regionalstability.

Last, personal contactswill be vital to de-veloping civil society. Links in education,above all, will improve prospects, espe-cially for young people and help forestallradicalization. The launch of a massivenew Euro-Mediterranean Erasmus pro-gram inhigher education could help spreadhope among young people. Offering youngpeople the opportunity to study and train inEurope would also be the best way to curbillegal immigration and trafficking.

Of course, there must be conditions. Myproposed development and stability pactwould include a commitment from eachcountry to improve governance, meet in-ternational obligations and respect indi-vidual rights, including for women and re-ligious minorities. Change in the Mediter-ranean is a test for Europe. But it is also anopportunity for European and Mediter-ranean countries to work together in the in-terests of all.

An oppositionsupporter holds up alaptop showing imagesof celebrations inCairo’s Tahrir Square,after President HosniMubarak resigned onFebruary 11.

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A new pact for stability

The new challenge posedby the dramatic changesin the Middle East ishow to maintain stability.To do this we needto understand who our newinterlocuters are.We hope those who haveeffected the trasformationwill also prove to be viablecounterparts.

growth and create jobs. In Egypt, for exam-ple, EU money should be invested intourism. Although damaged by the crisis,this remains a source of income and jobs.

Next, the Union for the Mediterranean,which first saw the light of day over twoyears ago, must accelerate the implemen-tationof its plannedprojects.Toomuch timehas been lost setting up the institutions ofthis new union, a 43-member body incor-porating the 27 EU states and 16 Balkan,North African and Middle Eastern part-ners. Few people in the region even know ofits existence. But the current crisis can be astimulus to redirect the UM toward theconcrete tasks announced when it waslaunched.These include development proj-ects ranging from new maritime and landhighways to renewable energy schemes, thepromotion of small and medium-sized en-terprises and creation of a “Euro-Mediter-ranean higher education, science and re-search area.”

That said, at this transformational mo-ment in our history, we should go even fur-ther. A broader economic initiative is alsoneeded.TheEU, otherworldpowers, and in-ternational institutions such as the WorldBank and the InternationalMonetary Fund,shouldurgently develop an equivalent of the

The Mediterranean poses dramaticnew challenges for European securi-ty. Events in Libya may add a fresh

wave of refugees to the 5,000 Tunisian mi-grants who have landed on the island ofLampedusa already. Human traffickers,criminals and terrorists stand ready to ex-ploit the chaos stemming from the col-lapse of the old order. Europe must actquickly, or this“arc of crisis”will lead tomoreillegal immigration, terrorism and Islamicfundamentalism.

Europe’s security depends on regionalstability. Of course, the pace of democrat-ic transition in Tunisia, Egypt and else-where must be determined by each coun-try. But Europe, acting respectfully, canhelp shape a regional order through anambitious new development and stabilitypact, based on three pillars: substantial(and visible) economic assistance; politicalpartnership; and social inclusion.

How do we develop this pact? First, Eu-rope needs to step in to promote growth.Thismeans improving theEuropeanUnion’sneighborhood policy. Resources for thismust be increased in future EUbudgets andmade commensurate to the strategic valueof this area. Existing resources shouldbebet-ter allocated to programs that stimulate

by franco frattiniItalian Minister for Foreign Affairs

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A man poses for aphotograph in Cairo'sTahrir Square.

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pressure on its borders, allowing it to find a way out ofthe cul-de-sac in which its policy has hunkered down.

The third question, then, relates to the possible in-crease of the Chinese presence in the Middle East,linked not only to its growing thirst for oil, but also be-causeof the farmoreuncritical support thatBeijingcouldprovide to autocratic regimes. After the American de-cision to abandonanally in trouble,manyhave learnedthe lesson that American support could bewanting justwhen it ismostneeded. SaudiArabia, for instance,whichhas already publicly declared its willingness to replacethe flow of US aid to Egypt if Mubarak resisted and theUScuthimoff,would look favorably at a greaterChinesepresence in the region. It is little more than an “acade-mic” hypothesis for now. But may appear less randomina fewyears, especially if the tideof revolt fails toachievetheobjective of effectivedemocratic regimes in the area.

Ultimately one must look at the facts in the Middle

Eastwith close attention to avoid twomistakes.The firstmistake would be to be overly optimistic regarding therapid emergence of democracy, believing that thiswould lead automatically to the resolution of conflicts;and second remaining prisoners of our own prejudices,condemned forever to walk the same streets just be-cause there are more familiar, even though they maylead us in the wrong direction. If nothing else, we willbe helped by the awareness that our ability to activelyinfluence the outcome of those dynamics is essential-ly exhausted. And for the first timewemay findourselvesable to image the world of the future lessWestern, butno less democratic.

A Muslim holding theKoran and a CopticChristian holding across are carriedthrough protesters inTahrir Square.

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vittorio emanuele parsi is Professor of International Rela-tions at theUniversitàCattolica del SacroCuore aswell asmem-ber of the board of LSE IDEAS (Center forDiplomacy and Strat-egy at the London School of Economics).

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structures. On the other hand, it should be noted that,the authorities might no longer be able to keep themat bay (much less ban them) by force.

One thing can be said from looking at the recentevents in Tunisia and Egypt. In the 1950s the Nassercoup inaugurated the season of military socialist gov-ernments throughout the region. In the late 1970s,Khomeini’s Iranian revolution launched the idea thatan Islamic republic could be established at the turn ofthe millennium.Today, the success of theTunisian andEgyptian revolution suggest that grassroots, leaderlessrevolutions will characterize the Middle East. It seemsanewdevelopment to be followed very carefully andde-serving far more sympathy than either Nasser orKhomeini’s revolutions.

At the international level are at least three issues thatarise:

Firstly, there is the waves of migration.This is the is-sue which most affects Europe. Yet it is the most tran-sient issue. Anyprolongeduncertainty could exacerbatethis phenomenon. If there is no longer a dictatorship,but democracy has yet to be established, it is still im-possible for a people to determine their future by vot-ingwith their feet. Such an exoduswas seen inEastGer-many in the last days of the communist regime.This is

why Italian InteriorMinister RobertoMaroni evoked theimage of a new 1989. Still, it is too early to tell whetherthe domino effect will be similar in the absence of acountry like the USSR was to the communist system.Two differences, however, are apparent.The first is thatthemigrations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in someways anticipated the reunification of Europe thatwould be accomplished institutionally, step by step, inthe two decades that followed. It is now clear that noprocess of unification between the two shores of theMediterranean is in sight – nor is it desirable. The sec-ond is that back then the European authorities – the EUand its member states –played the role as unifiers witha great awareness of the challengebefore themand theirgeopolitical position.Whereas today Europe seems likepolitical reality “despite itself,” facing the Mediter-ranean and essentially incapable of having an com-prehensive policy with regard to the Mediterranean,where the immigration issue is paramount.

The second issue is the security of Israel.This prob-lem in not contingent on anything and requires agreater commitment from Europe, which has so farplayed amuch too timid role.The startingpointwas andremains a solemn affirmation, beyond the internal po-litical developments in individual countries whosesovereignty they should respect, that the security of Is-rael is a non-negotiable for Europe. It seems that the lesscertain thedemocratizationprocess, or if it gets derailed,then the more likely it could result in a rise of pan-Ara-bic rhetoric and anti-Israeli sentiment. However, rhet-oric is far less expensive than action (especially when itcomes to war). It should also be emphasized that onlyin the progressive democratization of the area, thecreationof an effective rule of law, cananauthentic Arabmiddle class develop, which is interested in improvingtheir living conditions, creating prospects for theirchildren andholding its government accountable for itsactions.On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that thecurrent stalemate in the peace process and the contin-uationof Israeli domestic policies can goon indefinitelywithout reigniting the conflict inGazaand theWestBank,and radicalizing the Palestinian representatives. So forIsrael the possible democratization of the Middle Eastcould be a chance that should not be wasted. Rather, itshould be exploited in their own long-term interests.Moreover, considering what happened in Iran, theseevents, which will one day will be remembered as “thegreat Arab revolt of 2011” could reach the Gaza Strip,where Hamas rules with methods as authoritarian asthey are ineffective and againstwhom thediscontent ofthe population is growing. It’s not a given that these re-bellions in theMiddle East cannot be translated into anopportunity for Israel, creating a situation that eases the

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Anti-governmentprotesters in TahrirSquare wave shoes indismay as Mubarakspeaks to the nation.

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18.4

20.5

13

3.410,000 - 16,000

GDP ($)

4,000 - 10,000

1,000 - 4,000

25

85

N.A.

2.231

2.9

38

4.4

17.3

41

4.7

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28

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HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION(percent)

POPULATION(in millions)

CORRUPTION1: the highest10: the lowest

15-24 YEARS OLD(percent)

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34

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TUNISIA

TURKEY

LIBYA

JORDAN

SYRIA

YEMEN

SAUDI ARABIA

EGYPTALGERIA

5

MAROCCO

91.7 4.0 49.3 3.8 729.1 7.8 59.6 5.0 27.1 3.4

159 3.8 77.9 10.6 216.8 3.4 434.4 3.4 30 8.0

13,938 million $

TUNISIA

14,445 million $

TURKEY

102,139 million $

SYRIA

11,911 million $

JORDAN

6,366 million $

YEMEN

6,259 million $

SAUDI ARABIA

192,314 million $

EGYPT

23,042 million $

LYBIA

33,133 million $

ALGERIA

45,194 million $

23.733,032 million $

9.7 10.8 16.619,096 million $ 140,869 million $ 15,509 million $ 14,366 million $

13.3 10.6 6.8 17.1 18.3

9,185 million $95,552 million $48,611 million $23,448 million $39,258 million $

12.4 64.0

63.222.9

75.414.9

14.5 74.9

11.4 76.6

63.522.0

31.0 27.6 41.5

49.233.3

11.6 71.7

59.520.3

0.90.3 3.10.1 16.2 6.1 4.1

17.8 17.2 11.6 28.6

98.8

79.82.5

96.7

10.50.8

87.3

8.9 71.6

44.0 39.7

59.917.6 86.63.2

89.8

49.721.5

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$

$

$$ $$ $$ $$

$$ $$ $$ $$ $$

GDP in billion $

GDP growth in 2010

Products and Agricultural MaterialsEXPORT Fuels and Minerals Manufactured Goods

Products and Agricultural MaterialsIMPORT Fuels and Minerals Manufactured Goods$

$ GDP in billion $

GDP growth in 2010

Products and Agricultural MaterialsEXPORT Fuels and Minerals Manufactured Goods

Products and Agricultural MaterialsIMPORT Fuels and Minerals Manufactured Goods

FACTS AND FIGURES FROM THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN

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pressed the reason for why his Free Officers Move-ment took over the government there was a referenceto a financial crisis and the corruption of the fallingregime. He also cited the emergence of new reformmovement called the Muslim Brotherhood, which wasultimately sidelined under Gamal Nasser’s forceful na-tionalism and the almost monarchic leadership thatcontinued under Anwar Sadat.

During Sadat’s reign Egypt opened up to the inter-national economy and to Israel, which initially broughtprogress and wealth to the country, then graduallygave way to new political exploitation and corruption.Over the years, the control of communications andthe imprisonment of several opposition leaders hasweekend opposition parties such as the Muslim Broth-erhood, which is now afflicted by internal ideologicaland political conflicts.

Carthage up from the ruins

Like Egypt, Tunisia has an ancient tradition of culturalexchange with Europe. Historical monuments andarcheological sites are spread out all over the country,reminding us of the Roman presence and the impactthat early Christian communities had on the people.

Through conflicts and encounters, the Islamic pe-riod continued this tradition. Its ideas were crystallizedin the writings of Ibn Khaldun, born in the 14th centuryin what is now Tunisia, who fostered a new philo-sophical approach to the history and the politics of theIslamic world.

Tunisia’s geographical position (few kilometersfrom Italy), combined with the presence of many Ital-ians and French, both workers and intellectuals, dur-ing the years of French rule has made the populationfeel at once faithful to the Arabic-Islamic tradition andvery close to the European way of life and thinking.Tunisia has through the years developed a class of in-tellectuals who regularly commute between Europeanand Middle Eastern universities and cultural centers.Secularization was initiated by Habib Bourguiba, thefirst President of theTunisian Republic, and carried onby his successor Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who stronglysupported secular education. It has produced athoughtful intellectual community and a strong ex-pectations for a full-fledged democracy, somethingneither Bourguiba nor Ben Ali would tolerate. Oppo-sition parties, such as the fundamentalist IslamicTen-dency Movement, whose leader Rashid al-Ghannushiwas exiled, were banned.

If anyone has a crystal ball that can see the future ofthe Arab world after the current uprisings, then it isstill a well kept sect. One thing is certain, however:

in each country there is a different approach to thecommon desire to get rid of worn and corrupted gov-ernments. In order to figure out these differences,thereby glimpsing the future, one might do better tohave quick look at the history and cultural backgroundof each of these countries.

In Egypt the mass movement seems to consistmostly of students, intellectuals and the middle class,people who have a history of dialogue with the uni-versal values that emerged throughout the Mediter-ranean civilization, going back to ancient times, whenAlexandria was a center of both Greek and Near Eastculture. The various waves of Sunni and Shiite Musliminvasions never entirely destroyed this culture, whichwas preserved by both Muslim cultural institutionsand the Christian Coptic tradition. From the beginningof Ottoman rule up to the end of it in the 19th and 20th

centuries, the links between Egyptians and the oppo-site shore of the Mediterranean Sea increased sub-stantially, as witnessed through the“renaissance move-ment” (al-nahda), a moment of deep dialoguebetween this ancient civilization and the new Europethat came out of the French and Industrial Revolu-tions.

Yet often throughout Egypt’s modern history, thereformists have seen their deans fading away. It beganwith the transition from Turkish rule to democracy,when old feudal lords were replaced by political lead-ers, creating power networks tied to a single politicalparty or dominant group. Interestingly, when generalMuhammad Naguib, the first President of Egypt, ex-

The seeds of revolt

Libya is not Egypt. And yet the people of bothcountries have been enflamed by a desire totake their political destiny into their own hands.How each country differs depends largelyon its historical relationship to theWestand its own indigenous cultures.

by francesco zannini

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based on a sort of deal both with the tribal groups andwith the urbanized population, seems to have leftsome areas like the Cyrenaica beyond reach. In thispart of the country opposition groups are gettingstronger and Islamic fundamentalism, which wasbanned, has begun to reappear. In this case we seethe weakness of political power not achieved with areal democratic consensus, but rather by the way of apopulist self-made leadership that has to resort to vi-olence to maintain the established political system.

The Levant and Arabia Felix

The wave of popular uprisings has also touched theMiddle East. In countries like Jordan, which repre-sented the ancient border between theArab andByzan-tine worlds, there has developed through the ages asort of symbiosis between the Bedouin tradition and astrong reference to the Mediterranean world, both forthe sake of trade and cultural interest. The religiouslyshapedHashemite dynasty, which claims descent fromMuhammad’s family, has increased this closeness withthe West and allowed people to open up to universalvalues and a variety of customs.However, a growing de-bate with regard to governance has arisen due to sev-eral factors: the growing presence of Palestinians inthe country, which came as a result of Arab-Israeli con-flict; the question of refugees in the Iraqi war and thecontinuing structural economic difficulties; the emerg-ing corruption of several regime figures; and the rise ofpolitical movements such as the Islamist Action Front.

Then there is the completely different world ofBahrain, where a Sunni Muslim royal family rules overa Shiite Muslim majority. As a result there have beenincreasing tensions between the Sunni and Shiite com-munities, with severe civil unrest, in spite of the factthat Bahrain is a democratic state and has enjoyed in-creasing freedom of expression. Here the claim for po-litical and human rights seems to mix with the resurg-ing ancient conflict between Shiites and Sunnites,exacerbated by Iran, which since pre-Islamic timeshas always seen the Gulf and the southern Arabiancountries as the natural places of cultural and politicalexpansion.

On the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, we arewitnessing uprisings inYemen, the ancient Arabia Fe-lix, a rich crossroads of peoples and civilizations. HereSunni and Shiite population have shared their liveswithin a tribal and urbanized context. The rule of theEgyptian Sunni power and of the Ottoman Empire,has shaped the structure of the modern Republic ofYemen, which after years of border wars between tra-ditionalist North Yemen and Marxist South Yemen

where finally united. Though it has been increasinglymodernized, Yemen is still characterized by its tribaltradition, which is also source of tensions, as the strug-gle for political power conceals tribal competition andthe desire for economic privileges. Millions of peoplehave been displaced by these clashes and conflicts, asthis traditionally rich country’s economy sinks andmany people remain jobless. In such a situation an-other danger is represented by the presence of aYemen-based branch of al-Qaeda, which can take ad-vantage of a situation of unsteadiness, due to the peo-ple rising up against the authoritarian leadership of apresident whose last election was accompanied by vi-olence, violations of press freedoms, and allegations offraud.

Will these different backgrounds play a significantrole in reshaping the political conditions in NorthAfrica and the Middle East? At the moment the situa-tion is too foggy to make any kind of prediction. But itseems clear that any efforts to implement humanrights and democracy will need to come to terms witheach country’s social and cultural situations.

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Jordanians in Ammanhit a TV showingLibya’s MuammarGaddaC with theirshoes on February 22.

francesco zannini is Professor of Contemporary Islamat Pon-tificio Istituto di Studi Arabi Roma

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Battle for Algiers redux

Something similar can be said of Algeria, where,however, there has been a split in the population be-tween French-educated people, very keen on theWest-ern way of life and thought, the Berbers, and the strict-ly Arab part of the population which tends to cling totraditional Arabic and Islamic ways. In fact, since thetime of the struggle for independence the masses fol-lowed the call of the National Liberation Front – not be-cause of its ideology but for the sake of a better future,financial progress, and a more equitable distribution ofwealth.Unfortunately under the government of AhmedBenBella andhis successors, the leadership became in-creasingly authoritarian and corrupted.The misuse ofpower and wealth created the desire for an alternative,eventually proposed by Islamic Salvation Front, whichwon the country’s firstmulti-party elections in 1991.Thesubsequent ban of the movement, despite its victory,cauterized the country’s democratic progress.

Moroccan ripples

Signs of uneasiness also emerged among theMoroccanpopulation where, however, the traditional Muslimspirituality expressed through several Sufi orders min-gleswith an evident element ofmodernity andWesternlifestyle and thinking. New rules have changed the sta-tus of women and nudged the society to a closer en-counter with the European countries, which, throughSpain have long been reference points for Moroccanculture and where many Moroccan immigrants live.Though Morocco has always been known for its liberalinterpretation of Islam, the fear of possible resurgentfundamentalism has given way to strong state control,which restricted not only the spread of fundamentalistideas but also intellectual freedom, creating uneasi-ness among cultural elites in the country.

To the shores of Tripoli

Libya is a different case. The country is rich, andblessed with oil and gas. The industrialization and ur-banization promoted by Muammar Gaddafi, has notfully limited of the ancient tribal traditions or their so-cial and family structures, also linked to the Sufi ordersthat have not only great influence on the society buthave also on several occasions played an importantpolitical role. The authoritarian position of Gaddafihas established a sort of Muslim socialism where bothIslam and socialism have been twisted for the sake ofpower, and where even religious tolerance has beenpart of the agenda. His political control, however,

A tale of two armiesby roberto santoro

Hosni Mubarak and ColonelMuammar Gaddafi both have

a military past in common, butthe similarities end there. The roleof the military in these two coun-tries’ histories is almost opposite.In Egypt, the armyhas always beenthe main political force, the realpower. As in Pakistan, the Egyptianarmy is strong, rich, and popular.Under Sadat it became a profes-sionalized corps compared to oth-er Arab militaries, and for a longtime wearing a uniform meant torealize the dream of a lifetime. Bil-lions of dollars of aid from theUnited States have strengthenedthe status of the military, despitethe progressive enlargement of itsbureaucratic caste. Thus, duringthe “Lotus Revolution,” the army’schain of commandwithstoodpop-ular pressure and proved itself acounterbalancing force, nudgingthe Pharaoh to exit from the scene.

In a month of protests Egypthasmourned 300 victims. Inneigh-boring Libya, with a fraction ofEgypt’s population, the first days ofthe uprising counted more thandouble that number. The armedforces in this case were the instru-ment of power, not a stabilizing fac-tor. After the Cold War, when theSoviet advisers left, Gaddafi’s armybecame impoverished and lost po-litical importance. It was weak-ened by rivalries with the“popularcommittees.” Then the disastrouswar with Chad fueled the mili-tary’s intolerance to theColonel, as

did the tribal divisions between theQhadarfa and other clans that hadbecome hostile to the regime.

It is not yet clear, however, towhat degree Islamists have pene-trated either the Egyptian or theLibyan barracks. That Gaddafi’sarmy was in shambles was clearfrom the events inBenghazi, wheresnipers fired on the crowd in adisplay of psychological unpre-paredness and forced adherence tothe higher ranks (Gaddafi gave or-ders to kill those who refused toobey).The massacre was managedbyGaddafi’s sonKhamis,whograd-uated from the Frunze MilitaryAcademy in Moscow and com-mands of the 32nd Battalion – theKhamis Brigade. Snipers fired froma distance while the dirty work onthe streetswas entrusted toAfricanmercenaries, a foreign legion soruthless as to tempt the officerswhohavemutinied to stage a coup.The army is split, and some pilotshave deserted, landing their jets inMalta after refusing to fire on thecrowds. “The armyhas nopower tochange the situation,” wrote theblogger Djahmi. “Gaddafi has neu-tralized it, replacing with his ownmilitia.”

In Egypt, the opposite has hap-pened. GeneralTantawi, who nowleads the transition, flew toWash-ington before Mubarak fell to reaf-firm the strict pro-American line ofthe Supreme Military Council. Per-haps Tantawi will be forced tomake concessions to the MuslimBrotherhood, but the “cold peace”with Israel does not seem to be inquestion.

Toput it simply, in Libya, every-thingdieswithGaddafi. InEgypt af-ter Mubarak, there will be newMubaraks.

roberto santoro is a journalist atthe online daily l’Occidentale

The riots acrossthe Arab world havebeen largely determinedby the reaction of themilitary. So how do theycompare?

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Mukhabarat could have been unaware of the ongoingcontacts between the Kefayah activists and theirTunisian counterparts, or of the massive demonstra-tion already planned for the end of January. It was asuspicious oversight, considering that a war for suc-cession was already underway, opposing different fac-tions – like the army and the police – that played cru-cial roles in the crisis. Now the whole area has beenreshuffled like a gigantic puzzle, and whether the fi-nal picture resembles more the situation after the fall

of the BerlinWall or the Iranian Revolution will large-ly depend on the course that events will take inside andoutside the region.

The first conundrum is the role of themilitary,whichis determinant for the success of theprotests in all coun-tries concerned and will be pivotal for the transitionphase and its future issues.

In Egypt, it is evident now that Mubarak’s resigna-tionwas the result of amilitary coup.Nothingnew, sincethe army has held power for 60 years after Nasser’s

Egyptian demonstratorlies down on thewheels of a tankCairo’s Tahrir Squareon February 6.

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why the robust apparatus of foreign diplomacy and in-telligence deployed in the region, together with the fa-bled local security structures have been caught com-pletely by surprise and proved unable to manage theprotest. History and internal investigations will – hope-fully – tell why theworld’smost praised intelligence serv-ices have so clearly failed in their tasks.

On the other hand, if such a surprise is under-standable for the riots in Algeria or Tunisia, in the caseof Egypt it is hard to believe that the almighty

When looking at the official declarations andpress commentaries on the not-so-floweryrevolutions shaking the Mediterranean area,

the only uniting factor seems to be the disunion amongall parties concerned about the ways and means of get-ting out of the crisis and the kind of light that shouldflash at the end of the tunnel. It’s an understandablegame of mirrors, considering the perception gapsamong the various players.

But while waiting for the haze of tear gas and thesmoke of the human torches to clear (provided theywill), there are many lessons to learn and many ques-tions to answer regarding the Facebook intifadas thatare bound to change the balance in the Arab world andits relationship with theWest – maybe even in a moredramatic way than the Twin Towers attack.

Obviously, the differences between the small, urban,middle-class,Western-orientedTunisia and the back-ward, overcrowded, contradictory Egyptian reality areglaring.Not tomention the differenceswith other coun-tries also affected in varyingdegrees by the revolts – fromLibya and Algeria to Jordan and Yemen, even the tinyBahrain and Iran.

Nevertheless, in few weeks the epidemics thatstarted with a slap in the face of aTunisian fruit vendorhas brought the fall of two lifelong presidents. The sce-nario is similar to one described by some historians asa global version of“Murphy’s law”: a coincidence of sec-ondary events that , in certain conditions, can spark asystemic collapse. The unexpected speed and dimen-sions of the revolts might help understanding, perhaps,

A delicate balance

“As always happens at the beginning of every revolution,we don’t perceive the shape of the future world, amazedas we are by what is disappearing under our eyes.We sit among the ruins of the past, unable to imagine theworld to come.”

Frederic Martel

by alessandro merola

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Brothers is purely tactical and their proximity to El Ba-radei can be only functional as part of a “long march”to power. As one observer says, the Muslim Brothers“havemany strands,manyofwhichhavebeenquiet un-derMubarak’s repression,” but they are ready to emergewhen the time comes.There’s no doubt that an IslamistEgypt would be a nightmare scenario for the UnitedStates and could also affect the attitude of the army, ifit decided that the popularity of the regime could bemaintained through a less pro-Western policy.

In spite of all these fears, it looks inevitable that everyattempt to prejudicially exclude the religious move-ments from the political life of all the countries wherea new era is expected would be very dangerous, andthere is a widespread opinion that it will be safer to givethe future Islam-oriented parties a chance, confrontingthem with responsibilities that will make it necessaryfor all the movements involved to be pragmatic and actaccording to real choices rather than extremist slogans.

Outside the region, the reactions to the“days of rage”following the inevitable tribute to freedom, democra-cy and internet – varied from weariness to mistrust.

A prominent opinion-maker describes the shockwave as the first “post-American revolution” – an un-fair judgment, perhaps, considering the decisive im-pact that the personal position of PresidentObamahadin acceleratingMubarak’s resignation,whichproves thatsometimes politics comes before realpolitik. Never-theless, contrasts among the different actors inside theadministration were heard loud and clear. From the re-fusal ofVice President Joe Biden to admit the “dictato-rial” character of the Egyptian regime to thewarning ad-dressed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that Arabstates might “sink in the sand” and the conservative at-titude of the Pentagon, it looks evident that Washing-ton hasn’t made up its mind yet on the direction thatdevelopments in the region should take.

The most concerned shareholder, Israel, seems tohave embraced a conservative attitude, looking moreat the Iran analogy than at the opportunities that thefall of theBerlinWall once created.Thedeafening silenceduring the first days of the revolts has been replaced bycautious appeals to meditate on the long-term conse-quences, especially with regard to security.

As amatter of fact, formore than 30 years the strate-gic balance of the region and the security of Israel hasreliedupon the 1978 agreementwithEgypt and the 1994agreement with Jordan, which secured the other vul-nerable border. For the moment, the Egyptian SupremeCouncil of the Armed Forces (composed of officers ap-pointed by Mubarak and faithful to the traditional non-belligerence policy toward Israel) has stated that it willstick to the existing treaties.

Egyptians gather forthe “Day of Departure”protest, in TahrirSquare. A motor oilstand at a refuelingstation becomes asupply point for bits ofpavement whereprotesters armthemselves againstpro-governmentprovocators.

But the impending generational changes inside thearmy and the growing role that might be played by theIslamic component could push it toward a revision ofthe Egyptian position. And yet, it could be risky for Is-rael to surrender to amoremilitant ideology and invokethe Islamic danger as an excuse to avoid any settlementwith the Palestinians or to exclude from the outset anypossibility of compromisewith theMuslimBrotherhoodor the other rising religious movements. As one expertobserves: “If the long-term center of gravity of Israel’snational security is at least the neutrality of Egypt, thendoing everything to maintain that is a military re-quirement thatmust be carried out by political means.”

And the European Union? Divided as usual on the“stability vs. democracy” alternative andwithout a strat-egy after the failure of the Mediterranean Union proj-ect, Europe has spoken with Baroness Ashton’s feeblevoice, but has yet to advance any concrete proposals onhow to help transition, orwhat attitude to adopt towardthe Islamic movements and their political role, or howto avoid the attempts to reestablish old regimes undera new face that are already underway in the countrieshit by the perfect storm. This vacuum should be filledquickly or Europe, despite all its ambitions, will be con-demned to long-term irrelevance in a region that directlyaffects its economic and political security – as the first,massive wave of migrants escaping Tunisia and Egypthas already demonstrated.

alessandro merola served in several European and Asiancountries as Italian ambassador

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putsch and all Egypt’s presidents came from its ranks.The difference this time is that it will be difficult for theEgyptian (and theTunisian) military to merely replacethe ousted presidents with other generals and contin-ue business as usual after the massive demands forchange and democracy that have emerged from thepopulation. And it will be difficult for the West to relyonce again upon the traditional deals concluded with“our sons of bitches” to keep the situation under con-trol. It will be even more difficult to legitimize the dy-nastic vision that prevailed until nowamong those“sonsof bitches” and their grandsons.

The opacity of the context grows if the situation isconsidered from an economic point of view. Theroots of theprotest are entrenched in thepoor economicsituation, which in its turn largely depends on thestrongly centralized, state-oriented model prevailing inthe majority of the countries hit by street revolts – amodel suited to the authoritarian rule.

Will they be able orwilling to share their dominancein the economy (45%according to some estimates)with“liberal” forces that will certainly push for the privati-zation of state industries or – worse – with the religiousmovements?

It seems unlikely that the Egyptian military will beinclined to encourage the birth of the“deepdemocracy”evoked by Baroness Ashton on behalf of the EuropeanUnion, as the target for the aftermath of the crisis.Timewill be a central factor. The demands for real reformsmight find an early and adequate response in which theemerging civilian parties will be associated from the be-ginning with the constitutional changes. Otherwise theonly winners of a prolonged tug-of-war with the mil-itary risk being the Muslim Brotherhood, as the onlyorganized force that could capitalize on discontent.

For many, the best example could come fromAnkara,where the armyallowed theblossomingof civil-ian institutions and amoderate religious partywas ableto win elections and stay in power. The reference is in-spiring, but thedifferencesprobably overweigh the sim-ilarities. Like in Egypt, the Turkish army staged a coupin 1980. Unlike Egypt, however, the military withdrewfrom power and accepted the growing democraticprocess. Also, the heritage of Atatürk left the army withthe taskof preserving the secularist traditionafter the fallof theOttomanEmpire rather than rule the country. TheTurkish military has always respected this role, where-as inEgypt the army looks at itself more as thedefenderof the status quo than the guarantor of secularism.

Furthermore, the military let theTurkish economyopen itself to a dynamic private sector and to inter-national investments. As a result, the Turkish econo-my is now four times bigger than the Egyptian, thoughboth countries have about the same population andEgypt may count on more relevant energy resources.What role will the religious movements have in the newArab world’s future political balance? Can the existingmovements become credible partners in any demo-cratic process? Here again opinions diverge. Everybodyagrees that the Tunisian En-Nahda, like the MuslimBrotherhood in Egypt, had little influence (or none atall) on the uprising. On the contrary, they were bothvery cautious toward the demonstrations. Since the be-ginning of the 1990s, En-Nahda (whose leader was liv-ing in exile until recently) has been active mostlyabroad and therefore enjoys relatively low popularityinside the country.

As for the Muslim Brothers, after years of repressionandcoexistencewith the government, they areno longerconsidered a radical movement and are too divided totake the lead of any future regime, despite their undis-putable grip on the Egyptian masses, especially in ru-ral areas. This weakness is apparently shared by otherIslamic movements in the region (including Algeria’sonce feared Islamic Salvation Front).

Yet several analysts and diplomats think that the at-titude of relative neutrality adopted by the Muslim

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Egyptians of all kindsgathered in TahrirSquare, praying,chanting slogans, andwaving Dags in amostly peacefuldemonstrations.

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must be stressed, especially because of itsgeographical position.

What to donow? Strangely enough, theanswer could be: nothing new.

And the reason for such a response liesin the fact that the interests of all stake-holders are convergent: we need to obtainnatural gas from Algeria at least as muchas Algeria needs to sell it to Italy.Therefore,it is probably irrelevant who is in power inAlgiers. What matters is that someone bein power!

Tunisia will surely find a new politicalbalance. And if this process is fast enough,the temptation forTunisians to go awaywillreturn to the manageable levels of somemonths ago. It is a fact thatTunisia, amongall the North African countries, given thescarcity of energy resources, is the onewhere development depends on an ade-quate level of internal stability – a key el-ement allowing for the tourism so vital toits economy.

The case for Egypt is much more com-plex, because of its size (geographical anddemographic) and its contiguitywith Israel– and therefore, because of its inevitable in-volvement with the Palestinians.

The open empowerment of the armedforces – or rather, the army, given the an-cillary role of the other components – is,

from this point of view, reassuring. Duringthe last decades theEgyptian armyhaspro-gressively, though not completely, assim-ilated the structural elements of a modernand efficient military force. As such, ithas become even more aware of its rele-vance in the national panorama. Withmost of its equipment coming fromWest-ern providers, and its well-distributedcadres being mostly educated and trainedin the US, it constitutes a pivotal elementfor internal stability. The military’s actionplan appears to be realistic and pragmat-ic, inspired by a clear vision of the objec-tive to be pursued, which looks forward toevolution, not revolution. Also very reas-suring is the attitude towards Israel, withthe statement that the peace treatywill notbe put under scrutiny.

Between a scenario in which “every-thing must change so that nothingchanges” and “the overthrow of every-thing” there is a middle ground that maybepossible andwouldbe in the interest notonly of the Egyptian people, but also of theinternational community. This middleground is represented by the emergence ofa new ruling team, which is in some waysthe expression of a growing middle classthat is vital in Egypt as well as in Tunisia,and capable of taking on the responsibil-

ity of power. Certainly we are not seeing areplica of the path followed by the “YoungTurks” and Kemal Atatürk, given the enor-mous differences of the conditions at thestart: i.e., the political, strategic and aboveall cultural climate, with a substantialpresence of Islamic ideas thatwere alien tothe founder ofmodernTurkey. But it is alsoclear that key elements of the Egyptianarmed forces are bearers of realistic andpragmatic ideas.

The following weeks and months willtell us if the projected path canbe followedwithout excessive shocks.So what would be the soundest attitude tobe adopted by Italy, the European Unionand NATO? Probably the wisest thing to dois to observe with deep interest, but withutmost prudence, the development ofevents. Appearing to take the side of anyspecific solution would be immediatelyperceived as undue interference andwouldunleash hostile reactions, with possibly ir-remediable consequences.

Noone likes to receive lessons and sug-gestions on how to manage their own fu-ture, especially people as proud as theEgyptians.

vincenzo camporini is the former Chief of Ital-ian Defense Staff

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The dramatic recent events in thecountries of the southern Mediter-ranean coast have taken most in-

ternational observers by surprise – aca-demics and government analysts alike.Now it’s time to analyze how this couldhappen. In parallel, we need to examinethe consequences that the upheaval inthose lands can have for the nationalpolicies of Western countries.

I believe there are twodetermining fac-tors to getting caught by surprise: First, thedifficulty experienced by any observer indetaching himself from his own point ofview, so as to have the broadest possibleperspective.With this regard, I recall an en-lightening comment by a political scientistwhopredicted a landslide defeat of RonaldReagan in the presidential elections: “Howcould that happen, since no one I knowvoted for him?”Thepoint is that his statisticspecimen was totally unrepresentative ofreality.

Indeed, reality is much more complex,and even within a single culture, severalsubcultures can be identified, which mayescape even the sharpest observer if hedoes not detach from his own vision.

Second, there is tendency to considerany present situation as unchangeable.During the Cold War everyone took forgranted that everything would go on in-definitely with an enduring ideologicaldualism between communism and capi-talism.

Likewise, in the 1990s it was widely ac-cepted that instability hotbeds would de-velop beyondour frontiers. Nowwe are liv-ing in the era of transnational terrorism. Inorder to counter it we are not only com-pelled to engage our military and civil re-sources inno-man’s lands, butwehave alsohad to change our lifestyles. Nonetheless,we are unconsciously convinced thatthings will always be the same.

But in fact, things do change – andquickly. If we do not want to get caught by

surprise, we must use our imaginations.More than that, weneed to understand theimaginations of others: the peasant in theorchard by theNile, the textile dealer in theBakwabazaar, the assembly-line worker inthe Chrysler factory, and so on.

First we need to ask ourselves to whatextent we are involved in what’s happen-ing and what other friendly and alliedcountries are touched by the events. Itseems that Italy is one of the countrieswiththe most to be worried about.

The influx of migrants from across theStrait of Sicily looks very much like whathappened in the mid-1990s when Albani-ans flooded across the Adriatic Sea intoItaly. And there is no doubt that somemodels of social behavior in our commu-nity have been deeply influenced, if notshaken.We have to ask ourselves whetherthis new migration wave is of a temporaryand episodic nature, or arewedealingwitha massive phenomenon with permanentfeatures. Also, is Italy the final destinationor only a temporary staging area with aview to other destinations? In both cases,it begs the question of whether the Euro-pean Union has any real intention to takea leading role in the matter, or whether itwill just be a spectator. So far its trackrecord gives scant real hope for a proactiveattitude.

The situation is made all the more se-rious by Italy’s high level of dependence onthe direct flow of gas and oil from NorthAfrican countries. It also relies on the free-dom of transit and cost affordability fromGulf sources coming through the SuezCanal,which is already less secure given thethreat posed by the resurgence of piracy, aphenomenon which can be reduced, butfor sure not eliminated by the very costlypatrolling put in place by Western naviesin the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and So-mali Basin.

Italy is certainly not the only country tobe worried. But its specific vulnerability

Watching and waitingby vincenzo camporini

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Things change quickly.If we don’t want to becaught out we must useour imagination toforecast possibleoutcomes and take theright steps.

Thousands of illegalimmigrants from NorthAfrica have arrived onthe southern Italianisland of Lampedusasince February 13.

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As history unfolds across the greater Middle East,NATO is facing the second wave of liberty in itshistory after the fall of communism and the So-

viet Union. Similarly, it is not a disinterested spectator.Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the area has become ofvital interest for the security of NATO member statesand the whole international community. In addition,many of the countries being experiencing internal up-risings are NATO partners in the frameworks of theMediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Coopera-tion Initiative (ICI). Therefore, the Alliance is moni-toring with due care the current events in North Africa,the Middle East and the Gulf as well as Southwest Asia.Nobody knows what outcomes will take shape fromsuch turmoil and uncertainty is further raising alarmsaround the major security threats whose the greaterMiddle East is a primary source: terrorism, politicaland religious extremism, weapons of mass destruc-tion and ballistic missiles proliferation. Not to mentionthat the stabilization of Afghanistan seems to be stilltrapped in a deadlock and NATO enduring commit-ment in the country is challenging the political cohe-sion of the Alliance and the Transatlantic link.

While expressing his concern about the possiblefallout of the ongoing situation, Secretary General, An-ders Fogh Rasmussen, has been straightforward inbacking up the legitimate aspirations to freedom ofArab and Muslims populations. Commenting on theprotests in Egypt, he immediately called for “a peace-ful transition to democracy” and “respect for minori-ties, human rights and the rule of law… These are the

by emiliano stornelli

NATO’s Middle Eastalliances put to the test

Most of the countries experiencing upheavalsare NATO partners in the MediterraneanDialogue and the Istanbul CooperationInitiative. So what happens when a hostilewarship takes advantage of the turmoil toprovoke the Alliance?

An Iranian naval shiptravels through theSuez Canal onFebruary 22. TwoIranian naval shipsentered the Suez Canalin a move that couldanger Israel.

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nership relations cannot but be questioned and the re-sulting void of interlocutors would put at serious stakethe whole course of the MD and ICI. In addition, ag-gressive forces could take advantage of the instabilityin the area. To this effect, the decision of the Egyptianprovisional authorities to allow the passage of twoIranian warships through the Suez Canal seems not tobe in line either with traditional Egyptian policy orwith the security arrangements relevant to the NATOmaritime operations Active Endeavor and OceanShield, the latter engaged in combating piracy off thecost of the Horn of Africa.

On the other hand, such a volatile scenario holds “agreat potential for positive, democratic change,” asSecretary General Rasmussen pointed out speaking atthe recent 11th Herzlyia Conference in Israel. On thisoccasion, by acknowledging “the need to address thedemand of Arab societies for democratic reforms,” hereminded the Alliance what goals should be pursued inthe Greater Middle East for the sake of long-term se-curity and stability of the Euro-Atlantic community.Then, turning to the NATO Mediterranean partners,and implicitly to those of the ICI, he also highlightedthree requirements to meet for a better common fu-ture: 1) define our common threats and challenges; 2)find common solutions; 3) understand that we share acommon destiny.

Along these lines, conditions could be created fortackling the common threats to peace and stability inthe greater Middle East. The door of this security com-pact would remain open to new partners around theregion, starting with Iraq, where NATO Training Mis-

sion continues to perform a crucial role, andAfghanistan, which has signed an Enduring Partner-ship with the Alliance. “Nuclear proliferation, ballisticmissile proliferation and terrorism constitute prob-lems for the Middle East and for us all,” Rasmussen ex-plained, and the NATO “decision to develop a MissileDefense Capability” provides further ground for co-operation with the MD and ICI partners. Hence, com-mon solutions for common threats and again the hopefor a common destiny based on freedom and democ-racy for the Arab-Muslim world and theWest.

In seeking these objectives, one of the main obsta-cles to overcome remains the Israeli-Palestinian con-flict. As the Secretary General put it, this dispute “mayno longer be perceived as the only problem in the re-gion, but it still constitutes a major impediment in ad-dressing other issues that threaten regional stability.”Therefore, he urged Israel and the Palestinians torestart negotiations, confirming the Alliance’s avail-ability to deploy a peacekeeping mission if a compre-hensive peace agreement were to be reached, if re-quested by both the parties and if the UN give thegreen light to a possible NATO intervention. Such ascenario is unlikely to occur right away.Yet, this risingnew wave in the Middle East can eventually lead tomore promising circumstances for a peace settlementbetween Israel and the Palestinians as well as for NATOpartnerships in the area.

The Iranian navy frigateIS Alvand accompaniedby the replenishmentship IS Kharg passesthrough the Suez Canalat Ismailia, Egypt, Feb.22, 2011 en route toSyria. This was the Crsttime in three decadesthat Tehran has sentmilitary ships throughthe strategic waterway.

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principles on which our Alliance is based. These arealso the principles we hope will be respected by coun-tries participating in our partnership,” he stated. Infact, Egypt is one of NATO’s seven partners in the MD,including Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, MoroccoandTunisia. Except for Israel, these countries are all ex-periencing domestic unrest. In the same vein, ICIcountries like Bahrain and Kuwait are being affected byclashes, and we will find out whether Qatar and theUnited Arab Emirates (UAE) will remain immune toany turbulence. All that is likely to have an impact onNATO partnerships throughout the Middle East.

Cooperation in crisis management between NATOand the MD partners has a positive record. Morocco,Egypt and Jordan participated in NATO operations inBosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, Morocco and Israelare playing a role in Operation Active Endeavour pa-trolling the Mediterranean Sea against terrorism. Jor-dan has deployed troops in Afghanistan to supportNATO-ISAF mission with training and reconstructiontasks. Unlike the ICI, the MD provides a multilateralformat designed to stimulate talks among the sevencountries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean.Up to now, numerous conferences, programs and rel-evant initiatives have been organized under the MDumbrella. Meetings at a level of the Ministers of De-fense and Foreign Affairs as well as Joint Chiefs of Staffhave been held since 2004, when the MD achievedpartnership status. However, no real multilateral co-operation on security and defense issues is underwayamong the Mediterranean partners. So far, mutual dis-trust and long-standing misconceptions have keptthem from establishing a constructive interaction. Onthe other hand, considering the Israeli-Palestinianconflict, gathering all the MD countries around thesame table is already a good start in promoting secu-rity in the area.

As for the ICI, important agreements have beensigned on information protection and sharing, but theamount of practical bilateral activities is far less thanthe MD, despite the wide menu of tools provided byNATO in the same sectors. This is mainly due to thelow-profile approach the GCC members have adoptedtoward NATO. The history, function and aims of theAlliance are still often erroneously perceived across theregion and may have influenced Gulf countries’ atti-tude, even if they have a strong need for the kind of co-operation that NATO is willing and able to set up. Forinstance, Saudi Arabia and Oman have chosen not toenter the ICI yet, whereas the GCC appointed a repre-sentative to the EU in Brussels but not to NATO. As aconsequence, the bilateral cooperation in the ICI is notas developed as it could be if more energies and re-

sources were committed by partner countries. Againstthis backdrop, theUAE canbe considered an exception,as they have established a deeper security cooperationwith the Alliance and sent troops alongside NATO inAfghanistan and the Balkans, that is well beyond theGulf area.

Concerning the multilateral dimension, the ICIlacks of a structured forum for dialogue among part-ners, as a reflection of the hurdles hampering cooper-ation within the GCC itself. Then, the role of the NATOpublic diplomacy is being crucial to foster talks and in-terchangeatmultilateral other thanbilateral level, evenen-compassingtheGCCcountriesnot involved intheICI.The globalization of insecurity is driving the Alliance toupgrade partnerships with relevant countries and in-ternational organizations worldwide in order to effec-tively cope with the transnational threats and chal-lenges of the 21st century. At the beginning of histenure in August 2009, Secretary General Rasmussenindicated the revitalization of efforts to deepen andstreamline dialogue and cooperation in the MD andICI frameworks as one of his priorities in office. Later,this stance became the official policy of the Alliance inLisbon, where the new NATO Strategic Concept wasadopted last November, advocating an “active en-gagement” with global partners.

As a sign of the growing political relevance of theMD and ICI, the NATO Strategic Concept has also as-sured that the Alliance “will be open to consultationwith any partner country on security issues of com-mon concern,” which is a right that the 1999 StrategicConcept simply recognized to the Partnership forPeace countries. Rasmussen then announced thatNATO is ready to equalize the MD and ICI partners tothe Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council members.

In light of all this, the Alliance has laid the ground-work for a strategic relaunch of the MD and ICI. Nev-ertheless, the future of these strategic partnershipsseems now to be hanging by the dynamics currentlyagitating the greater Middle East. Much will be de-pendent on the conduct of the governments caught upin the demonstrations. NATO put on hold relationswith Mauritania due to the military coup on August2009 and resumed it only after elections were held.This could constitute a significant precedent andsomething similar could be happening at short noticeagain. Or harsher measures could be taken if a partnerresorts to the extreme measures carried out by Libyaagainst the protestors.

The ongoing events could also empower govern-ments which are less friendly or hostile to NATO andwill not respect the bilateral agreements in the securityfield. Should this be the case, the continuation of part-

emiliano stornelli is a researcher on foreign policy and se-curity issues at the Italian Atlantic Committee

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basic consumer goods, which together withdisruptions causes scarcity on the market.On the macroeconomic side this translatesinto greater inflation, devaluation, and aslowdown of GDP growth. Moreover, to ap-pease protesters, incumbent regimes in-creased public wages and subsidies forconsumer goods, thus inflating a publicdeficit which was already hit by the declin-ing revenues caused by the slowing down ofthe economy.

As for external accounts, balance ofpayments is worsening in both current andcapital accounts. Current account is hurt bythe decline in exports as a consequence ofproduction disruptions (only partiallycompensated by the oil price increase dueto the greater political risk in the region),the large fall in tourism revenue, and the di-version of remittances into non-bankingchannels following the progressive devalu-ation of local currency. Capital account suf-fers a decline in foreign direct investment(FDI), a massive outflow of foreign portfo-lio investments, and a large domestic cap-ital flight. Due to the unavailability of newforeign capital, the balance of paymentsdeficit has to be financed through a reduc-tion in foreign assets.

In the last decade Egypt and Tunisia,like many other Mediterranean economies,registered 5% to 7% yearly growth rates andaccumulated significant foreign assets.Therefore, the short-run negative impacton external accounts will remain manage-able, thanks to strong reserves and a liquidbanking system, with no immediate risk offinancial crisis. However, prolonged polit-ical uncertainty would bring about a moreworrisome negative impact.

While political transformation in the Mediter-ranean region is still unfolding, it is too early to assessits medium-to-long-term economic effects. It can beeasily predicted, however, that the key factor affectingthe process will be the future economic policies and,more specifically, the policies aimed at the integra-tion into global economy. A short-run policy objectiveshould be the reactivation of foreign capital inflows, es-pecially FDI, and the repatriation of flight capital. Overthe longer term, the main policy objective should be adeeper integration into the global economy.

The assessment, by new political authorities, of

past economic reforms will play a key role in definingfuture economic policies. The main variable will bethe relationship between political power, technocratsand businessmen. From this point of view, early out-comes of the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt have beenrather different.

In Tunisia the economic focus of the revolt hasbeen the private wealth of the family clan surroundingthe former president Ben Ali. Economic reforms per sehave not been attacked by the protesters. In fact, as asignal in favor of economic reforms, the newTunisiangovernment choose Mustafa Nabli, a former Chief

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goods and growing social inequality set the scene forthe 2011 revolts. However, these revolts have little incommon with the previous bread revolts. This timepolitical demands are key elements of the revolt andthe legitimacy of political systems and ruling elites isunder attack.

MENA economies will be strongly influenced bycurrent political transformation.While it is too early toassess the size and depth of this transformation, someearly considerations on the short- and long-run eco-nomic impacts of recent events, focusing on Egyptand Tunisia, are worth elucidating.

Both Egypt and Tunisia will suffer negative short-run impacts on their economic performance duringthe current year. Key factors are the disruption of pro-duction and distribution activities, the decline intourist flows, the outflow of foreign capital, the do-mestic capital flight, and the precautionary hoarding of

“Once we are past this crisis we can restoregrowth at around 7.5% to 8.5%. If we canmaintain this for five years I can almost

guarantee a significant improvement in the standard ofliving of all Egyptians. But I need five consecutive yearsat above 7.5%.”This quote came fromYoussef BoutrosGhali in 2009, when he was minister of Finance, dur-ing an interview by Al-Ahram on Egypt’s prospects af-ter the 2008 international economic crisis. His state-ments show that the economic team, close to GamalMubarak, who was leading the economic reformprocess, had clearly perceived the risks of economic re-forms that had not sufficiently trickled down to the av-erage citizen. However, neither the interview nor anyother contemporary assessments by leading Egyptianeconomic reformers reveal expectations about phe-nomena which could have sparked the 2011 TahrirSquare revolt.

On the one hand, the economic team close toGamal Mubarak entirely overlooked young people’saspiration to political openness and accountability.On the other hand, they gravely underestimated thearmy’s rejection of their policies and, above all, ofGamal’s presidential ambitions. Consequently, throughaccumulation of foreign assets and precautionary foodimports, they prepared themselves for events such asthe “bread revolts” that have repeatedly occurred theregion, the last time in 2008. This year, however, theyhad to face a rather different phenomenon: a revolt bydisenchanted young people aided or exploited, as onlytime will tell, by an army rejecting the “dynastic” suc-cession from Hosni to Gamal Mubarak, as well as theeconomic policies and business practices of the coterieclose to Gamal.

In the revolts, which are spreading across the Mid-dle East and North Africa (MENA), economic factorsplay mainly a facilitating role. High unemploymentamong the young, increasing prices of basic consumer

Economic prospectsafter the turmoil

Ironically, much of the recent strife has beenthe fruit of past economic reforms. Whoevernow gains power will have to build on them.

by franco zallio

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

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Workers build apipeline fortransporting naturalgas to Israel in northDelta Nile, 300 kmnorth of Cairo.

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mental source of political instability” and, therefore, “ifTunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali or Egypt’s HosniMubarak were hoping for political popularity as a re-ward for economic gains, they must have been sorelydisappointed”. However, as shown by the financial andeconomic crisis which both Egypt and Tunisia had toface in the 1980s, the solution cannot lie in the returnto old centralized economic policies, as sometimessuggested by old-guard generals, still fond of Nasseritepolicies.

Today’s challenge is to build on the positive resultsof the last decade of economic reforms, getting rid asfar as possible of their negative side-effects and im-proving their social impact. Corruption, cronyism andnepotism are the outcomes of the socio-political en-vironment in which reforms were applied rather thanthe result of economic reforms. In other words, theyare the result of an authoritarian regime governed bya narrow elite of strongly interconnected militaries,politicians and businessmen.The social impact of eco-nomic reforms may be enhanced through a more fo-cused wage policy and a better balanced taxation pol-icy, together with a reform of the welfare system, whichis now too centered on subsidies.

However, this is not on today’s political agendaand, on the contrary, a populist tendency that consid-ers all previous economic reforms a mistake that pro-motes corruption, prevails. At the time of writing, the2004-2011 Prime Minister Nazif, the former Minister ofTrade and Industry Rashid and about 40 other formerofficials have been banned from travelling outside thecountry. The former ministers of Tourism, Housingand Interior, together with the industrialist AhmedEzz, chairman of Ezz Steel and a key member of theformer ruling party, have been arrested and their per-

sonal assets frozen, as well as the assets of former min-ister Rashid. The former minister of Finance BoutrosGhali managed to leave the country the very day inwhich Mubarak resigned.

For a new government in dire need to build credi-bility with a disenchanted population, the most promi-nent former ministers and businessmen close to theold government are an attractive political target. Inthese circumstances, the right balance between dueprocess and a witch hunt will be strictly necessary toavoid having the new political climate take a populistturn, which would discourage private investments andpromote domestic capital flight. This would destroythe large economic opportunities built up during pastreforms and grounded on the large supply of a highlyskilled work force.

For long-term prosperity, economic reforms mustbe re-designed rather than discarded. Domestic polit-ical evolution will be crucial, but some positive influ-ence may come from abroad. Specifically, it will be es-sential that, while focusing on building democracyand reforming the security system reform, key donorslike the US and the EU should not forget the support ofeconomic reforms, lest populism end up drasticallyreducing economic prospects and finally destroyingdemocratic efforts.

Opportunities for political and economic develop-ment are numerous, but their realization is far from be-ing assured in the current political context. The sup-port of external partners may play a significant role inhelping Egyptians people to seize these opportunities.

franco zallio is a senior consultant specializing in theMediterrean andMiddle East

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Economist of the MENA region at the World Bank, asnew Governor of the Central Bank.

The situation in Egypt is more complex. The mostrecent, and deepest, phase of economic reformsstarted in 2004, with the formation of the cabinetheaded by Prime Minister Nazif. Some ministers werebrought into the cabinet from the private sector aspart of a drive to improve the investment climate andencourage foreign investors. Interrelations betweenpolitical power, technocrats and businessmen weretherefore much stricter than in Tunisia, and raisedmuch more criticism.Things were further complicatedby the fact that the reform-minded economic ministerswere close to Gamal Mubarak, the son of the presidentoften mentioned as his possible heir.

Therefore, economic reforms have been tainted bythe strict link between their major sponsors in the gov-ernment and the Mubarak family, putting their sus-tainability at risk. Ironically, economic reforms arenow under attack by both the protesters and the army.The former perceive them as a key facilitating factor forthe enrichment of the Mubarak family and the coterieclose to Gamal, as well as for the spread of patronageand corruption. The latter sees economic reforms asthe main cause of the loss of social control by the gov-ernment.

According to a 2008 State Department cable re-leased by the WikiLeaks website, Field Marshal Mo-hamed Hussein Tantawi, Commander-in-Chief of theEgyptian Armed Forces and head of the Higher MilitaryCouncil that took control of Egypt after Mubarak, “hasopposed both economic and political reforms that heperceives as eroding central government power.” Morespecifically, “on economic reform, Tantawi believesthat Egypt’s economic reform plan fosters social in-

stability by lessening government controls over pricesand production.”

These negative assessments are, however, not well-grounded. Egypt and Tunisia have been among thebest economic reformers of the region and the resultsof their reform processes have been quite positive, interms of both human development and increased at-tractiveness for foreign investors. According to the2010 “Human Development Report,” out of the 95countries for which data is availableTunisia and Egyptare respectively in 7th and 8th place for improvement intheir Human Development Index between 1980 and2010.There is still much room for improvement, giventhat their current ranking is rather low (Tunisia ranksnumber 81 and Egypt 101, out of 169 countries), butpast improvements are very noticeable.

A similar positive assessment may be drawn fromstatistics on integration into the global economy, andespecially on foreign direct investments, which in-creased considerably in the last decade. As an exampleof the positive evaluation by foreign investors, the A.T.Kearney report on “Offshoring Opportunities AmidEconomic Turbulence,” published in January 2011when events in the Mediterranean region were at anearly stage, ranks Egypt as the fourth best place in theworld as a location for global services outsourcing,while Tunisia holds the 23rd place out of the 50 rankedcountries. Especially impressive is the rapid improve-ment of these rankings: in 2005 the same A.T. KearneyGlobal Services Location Index put Egypt in 12th placeand Tunisia in 30th.

However, a grain of truth may be found in the neg-ative assessments attributed toTantawi. As economistDani Rodrik recently stated: “economic growth itselfgenerates social and economic mobilization, a funda-

REAL GDP(factor cost)

REAL GDP(Per Capita)

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6.9 7.1 7.2

4.75.1

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’04/ ’05 ’05/ ’06 ’06/ ’07 ’07/ ’08 ’08/ ’09 ’09/ ’10 ’10/ ’11

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6

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CONSUMPTION 1/ INVESTMENT NET EXPORTS

’04/ ’05

0.53.2

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2.04.6

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3.8

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ANNUAL EGYPTIAN GDP GROWTH AND CONTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE ITEMS IN REAL GDP GROWTH

jun ’05 jun ’06 jun ’07 jun ’08 jun ’09 jun ’10 sep ’10

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BUDGETSECTOR DEBT

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BUDGETSECTOR DEBT

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IN PERCENT OF GDPIN BILLIONS

800

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GENERAL GOVERNMENTSECTOR DEBT

TOTAL GOVERNEMENT DEBT (DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL)TOTAL EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT DEBT (DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN)