Chairman of the 1970 IAEA Safeguards Committee was Mr Kurt Waldheim, now President of Austria. Director General of theIAEA at the time, Dr Sigvard Eklund, is at left.

The 1970 Safeguards Committee

In April 1970, the IAEA Board of Governorsadopted a resolution calling for establishment of aSafeguards Committee to formulate guidelines forsafeguards agreements in connection with theTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons (NPT), which had been opened for signa-ture in 1968 and whose entry into force was immi-nent. The Treaty assigns to the IAEA theresponsibility of applying safeguards to nuclearmaterial in all nuclear facilities in States thatbecome NPT parties for the exclusive purpose ofverification of the fulfillment of their obligationsunder the Treaty. Once the NPT has entered intoforce for a State, it is required to start negotiationson a safeguards agreement with the IAEA within180 days.

As Chairman of the Safeguards Committee, theBoard designated Mr Kurt Waldheim of Austria,who would later become Secretary-General ofthe United Nations and President of Austria.Mr F.B. Straub of Hungary and Mr J.A.K. Quartey

of Ghana were designated as Vice Chairmen. TheCommittee was open to representation to anyMember State. All told, delegations from 50 Mem-ber States participated in one or more meetings ofthe Committee: Argentina, Australia, Austria,Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China,Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt(United Arab Republic), Finland, France, FederalRepublic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary,India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,Republic of Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria,Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Por-tugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, USSR, UnitedKingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, VietNam, and Yugoslavia. Members of State delega-tions included Dr Hans Blix (Sweden), who in 1981would succeed Dr Sigvard Eklund of Sweden asDirector General of the IAEA; Mr Jon Jennekens(Canada), currently the IAEA Deputy DirectorGeneral for Safeguards; and Mr D.L. Siazon, Jr.(Philippines), currently Director General of theUnited Nations Industrial Development Organiza-tion (UNIDO).

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IAEA safeguards: A look at 1970-1990and future prospectsPolitical, financial, and technological developmentscontinue to influence directions and change

by Jon Jennekens

JT ears that nuclear weapons would spread to manycountries have fortunately not come true. To an impor-tant degree, the application of international safe-guards has furthered this reality. For the IAEA, theoperation of an effective worldwide safeguards system isa great responsibility, one that has been carried out overthe past quarter century.

Even after 25 years, new challenges arise: Compli-cated installations are built that handle large quantities offissionable material which have to be safeguarded.Verification techniques which were once satisfactorybecome obsolete. Today's political developments aswell — for example, the discussion of disarmament onmany fronts — have opened up a much greater generalreadiness to accept verification than was true when thesafeguards system began in the 1960s. IAEA safeguardswill benefit both in cost efficiency and credibility if theyare allowed to keep up with the advances made in otherverification schemes.

Over the past decade, these developments, coupledwith financial limitations, have seriously tested theIAEA's capability to carry out effective safeguards oper-ations. Necessarily, the Agency has undertaken a num-ber of steps to increase the overall effectiveness of itssafeguards work. New diversion scenarios and safe-guards concepts for larger and more complex nuclearfacilities have been defined, for example, and safeguardsat such plants have been updated. A safeguards informa-tion system has been introduced for the computerizationof all safeguards data, which has greatly improvedrecord handling and evaluation activities. Simultaneousinspection of all facilities in certain countries has beendeveloped to the point of routine application. Thisprocedure has resulted in improvements in safeguardseffectiveness.

Other steps have been taken through safeguards sup-port programmes of Member States. These includeimprovements in the reliability and performance of filmcameras for surveillance of nuclear facilities. Advanced

Mr Jennekens is Deputy Director General and Head of the IAEADepartment of Safeguards.

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closed-circuit television systems have also been devel-oped and tested. Additionally, there have been signifi-cant improvements in the accuracy, reliability, and easeof use of instruments for non-destructive measurementof the composition of nuclear material.

This article reviews some of the important develop-ments influencing the evolution of the IAEA's safe-guards implementation over the past 20 years, since theentry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970 which has signifi-cantly influenced safeguards activities. Areas specifi-cally addressed include safeguards procedures,equipment, analytical measurements, and inspectionreporting systems and evaluations.

Safeguards agreements and procedures

In 1970, the IAEA's "Safeguards Committee" wasestablished to elaborate guidelines for use by the Direc-tor General in concluding safeguards agreementsenvisaged in Article III of the NPT. (See box.) Beforethen, the safeguards "system" was largely based on theacceptance of safeguards by States receiving nuclearmaterial or equipment from other States for specificprojects. Prior to 1970, the scope of safeguardsimplementation was largely limited to individual nuclearinstallations involving specific quantities of nuclearmaterial and materials and equipment especiallydesigned or adapted for use in nuclear research,development, and industrial activities.

In contrast, the safeguards required by the NPT applyto all source or special fissionable material in all peace-ful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States. Theentry into force of the NPT thus brought about an impor-tant change in the demands placed upon the Agency.

Other changes also affected the Agency's safeguardsactivities. Before 1970, the nuclear materials subject toIAEA safeguards were either highly enriched uranium(HEU) in the form of fuel elements for research reac-tors, or relatively small quantities of natural uraniumintended for use in research and development facilitiesand "pilot" production facilities. Other than a dozen or

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so industrialized States with fledgling nuclear powerprogrammes, there were only 10 or 12 developing coun-tries pursuing nuclear research and development pro-grammes. As a result, there were only isolated instancesof international traffic in nuclear materials and equip-ment. The optimism of the participants of the firstGeneva Conference in 1955 on the peaceful uses ofnuclear energy had long since been tempered by the hardrealities of economics and, more generally, geopolitics.

The Safeguards Committee's report entitled "TheStructure and Content of Agreements between theAgency and States Required in Connection with theTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT)", documented as INFCIRC/153, recommendedthe incorporation of provisions in safeguards agreementswhich were largely but not entirely acceptable to bothindustrialized and developing States. The recommenda-tions were intended to provide the Agency with theverification possibilities required by the NPT and, at thesame time, to avoid undue interference in nuclear indus-try or research activities.

The Committee's recommendations constituted sig-nificant progress in the evolutionary development of thelegal and technical aspects of the Agency's safeguardspolicies, practices, and procedures. According to theCommittee, the primary objectives of IAEA safeguardsare the timely detection of the diversion of significantquantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclearactivities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, othernuclear explosive devices or for unknown purposes, plusthe deterrence of such diversion by the risk of earlydetection. These objectives are to be achieved by meansof nuclear material accountancy, with containmentand surveillance (C/S) as important complementarymeasures.

The proposed conditions under which safeguardsinspections were to be conducted suggested that theAgency would check nuclear material only at strategicpoints jointly defined by the State and the Agency in theinstallations in which safeguards were to be applied. TheCommittee emphasized the need for taking into accountseveral factors: material accountancy control systemsalready existing in States or to be established; the inter-dependence with other States; and the characteristics ofnuclear material, fuel cycle capabilities, and evolvingsafeguards technologies.

The Committee recommended the maximum inspec-tion effort in "person-days" to be applied in each ofthree classes of facilities: reactors and sealed storagefacilities; facilities handling plutonium or uraniumenriched to more than 5% uranium-235, including con-version, fabrication, and reprocessing plants; all otherfacilities handling material of lesser enrichment, includ-ing conversion and fabrication plants processing naturalor slightly enriched uranium.

It was also recommended that the Agency not requiremore than the minimum information needed forsafeguards implementation and that it scrupulouslyrespect the confidentiality of this and other sensitive

information it might receive. Emphasis was placed onthe importance of national accounting and control sys-tems and their role between the Agency and plant opera-tors as a means of expediting and simplifying theapplication of safeguards.

The expectation at the time of the 18 Nation Disarma-ment Committee which drafted the NPT was that mostStates would ratify the NPT and therefore enter intoINFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreements with theAgency. This expectation has been largely realized,although a handful of States with significant nuclearresearch, development, and industrial programmes havedeclined to ratify the Treaty for a variety of reasons.

Facility attachments. The first facility attachmentsnegotiated in accordance with the terms of INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreements included provisionsrelating to plant location, design information, and recordand report systems only. Later versions were expandedto include provisions concerning verification of physicalinventories. Since the facilities in the early 1970s werebasically "item" facilities, (i.e. power and researchreactors), the provisions guiding the implementation ofsafeguards at them were quite simple in comparison withpresent day, very complex facilities. The inspectionactivities conducted in 1970 included examination ofrecords, verification of their consistency with reports,application of C/S measures, and verification of thefresh fuel items by item counting, identification of serialnumbers, and simple non-destructive assay (NDA)methods (normally using portable instruments).

In the early 1970s, the implementation of safeguardsat reactors concentrated on examination of operationalrecords and of burnup calculations. High-resolution sys-tems with magnetic cassette data recording capabilitieswere introduced to confirm the declared plutoniumproduction. The application of seals was quite limited.Reactor operating records were examined to obtain anunderstanding of their operating history and to schedulesubsequent inspections. Eventually, experience obtainedin safeguarding reactors was extended to the safeguard-ing of facilities in which nuclear materials wereprocessed.

Today, following the IAEA's development of techni-cal manuals and guidelines in response to the recommen-dations of consultants and advisers, safeguardsinspectors are guided by a set of comprehensive instruc-tions in a multi-volume document called the SafeguardsManual.

Instruments and equipment

Non-destructive measurements. In the early 1970s,the equipment used for NDA during safeguards inspec-tions was limited to a small number of mostly portableinstruments. These were capable of making approximatemeasurements of gamma radiation to establish thepresence of uranium and its enrichment, and measure-ments of neutron emissions which were characteristic ofvarious plutonium compounds.

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The instruments were later replaced by more sophisti-cated models with which it was possible to perform morecomprehensive and accurate qualitative and semi-quantitative measurements.

In 1990, the Department of Safeguards has more than300 individual portable and semi-portable NDA instru-ments and devices which represent the most advancedand practical measuring systems for routine and specialinspection purposes. They include:

• Gamma-ray measurement instruments for attributetests of radioactive materials (e.g. determination of ura-nium enrichment and spectrometry of fission products inspent fuel by means of portable multi-channel analysers(PMC As)).

• High-resolution gamma-ray spectrometers forplutonium isotopic and spent fuel measurements.

• Coincident neutron emission detectors for quan-titative measurements of plutonium and, with activeinterrogation, uranium-235.

• Cerenkov-glow viewing devices for non-intrusiveattribute measurements of spent-fuel assemblies.

• Load-cell based weighing systems and ultrasonicthickness gauges used together with PMCAs for verify-ing the contents of uranium hexafluoride transportcylinders and uranium dioxide processing equipment.

• Ion chamber/fission chamber spent-fuel monitorsfor attribute measurements of spent-fuel assemblies.

• Portable computers (over 200) used in connectionwith many NDA instruments for data acquisition andanalysis.

Containment and surveillance equipment. The firstphoto-surveillance system for routine inspection workwas installed in 1970. It was a 35-mm photo camera withan enlarged film cassette providing a capacity for200 pictures. Servicing such cameras was a relativelylengthy and tedious operation. The process of loadingfilm into the camera was awkward compared with themuch simpler cassette exchange of the 8-mm "homemovie" cameras which were introduced for the firsttime in 1972. These film cameras had a picture capacityof 3600, which was increased to 7200 in 1974 with theintroduction of a thinner film material. These 8-mm filmcameras are still the workhorse for safeguards surveil-lance purposes. About 290 "Twin Minolta" systems arepresently installed. Thanks to continuing technicaldevelopment these systems have matured to a high levelof reliability.

Production using 8-mm film has been discontinuedworldwide and video systems now serve the require-ments of the amateur movie maker. The Agency willhave to replace all "Twin Minolta" systems by videoequipment, i.e. closed-circuit television (CCTV). Areplacement programme for safeguards surveillanceunits was initiated in 1988 and installation of videoreplacement units is now being done.

The IAEA first introduced CCTV systems in 1976.The advantages of CCTV systems as compared to filmcamera systems are higher picture quality, higher light

sensitivity, date and time annotation, and a lower sensi-tivity to radiation. Also, the direct review of therecorded information on-site without film processing ispossible.

The "Modular Integrated Video System" (MIVS)was developed under the Support Programme of theUnited States. Its production started in late 1989 andinstallation is under way. (See a separate article in thisedition on the MIVS project.) The ' 'Compact Surveil-lance and Monitoring System (COSMOS) is beingdeveloped under the Support programme of Japan and isexpected to be available for installation in the latter partof 1991.

Also available for use by inspectors are reactor powermonitors; ultrasonic seals and seal verifiers; electronicseals; cap metallic seals; adhesive/paper seals; and ther-mal luminescent dosimeters (TLDs).

Microprocessors. Microprocessors have enabled theAgency to raise the level of technical performance to anentirely new, higher level. Microprocessors in tandemwith PMCAs are used for measurement of isotopic com-position, error diagnosis, and data evaluation.

Similarly, the use of portable computers is boostingthe Agency's capability to perform verification of pluto-nium samples in the field by running sophisticated pro-grammes which previously could only be run at IAEAheadquarters.

New technical methods to store and encode informa-tion have greatly improved the performance of C/Sequipment. The recording of surveillance data on filmhas now been replaced by electromagnetic storage media(video tapes). Electronic seals have been developedwhich can be verified by inspectors in the field.

New types of radiation detectors have beenintroduced to improve the Agency's analytical capabil-ities. High purity germanium detectors are quite widelyused, allowing for high performance in the field whichcould only be achieved previously in the laboratory.Miniature cadmium-tellurium detectors have enabled thedesign of small, shielded probes which can be placednext to closely packed nuclear fuel assemblies ratherthan requiring their isolation for verification.

Some examples may demonstrate how newly devel-oped safeguards NDA and C/S equipment have con-tributed to the improvement of safeguards practices:

• Several measurement devices consisting of "highlevel" neutron coincidence detectors with associatedelectronics and computers were installed in a large auto-mated mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication plantrecently. The system is used to verify different typesof plutonium compounds without the presence of aninspector. The design incorporates features to authenti-cate the measurement data and software and to collect,review, and facilitate data evaluation by inspectors. Thesoftware is considered to be "user friendly" byinspectors.

• Operator-installed equipment, such as an X-rayFluorescence Spectrometer (XFS) and Thermal Quadra-

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pole Mass Spectrometer (THQ), has been reviewed,tested, and accepted for routine use in the field. Theprocedures and software enable authentication and anunambiguous evaluation of the measured data.

• In 1970 there were very few reprocessing plants.The largest one in which safeguarded nuclear materialwas reprocessed had a total capacity of 400 tonnes ofirradiated fuel per year. The associated spent-fuelstorage facility had a capacity of 250 tonnes, or 750 fuelassemblies. Today the throughput of modern, large-scale reprocessing plants is of the order of 800 tonnesper year. Storage ponds have capacities of about10 000 tonnes. Such facilities receive irradiated fuelfrom reactors in different regions of the world and thefrequency of unloading is about 12 fuel assemblies perday. To safeguard such plants, the Agency had todevelop new techniques to avoid a large increase in thenumber of inspectors, and at the same time to improvethe quality of safeguards and reduce the impact ofsafeguards activities on the operator. One system devel-oped under the safeguards support programme of aMember State is an unattended, tamper-resistant surveil-lance system, which allows verification of spent fuel byNDA upon receipt. Instead of a regime of continuousinspection, the Agency will be able to reduce the inspec-tion effort required.

• Ultrasonic seals are used to seal stacks of irradi-ated fuel in on-load reactor storage pools. They permiton-site verification, thereby improving the timelinessaspect of safeguards for such reactors. COBRA fibre-optic seals are used to seal irradiated fuel canisters fordry storage. They also permit on-site verification, thusimproving conditions of work for inspectors, especiallyduring winter. Another recent development is the use ofunderwater television for irradiated fuel verification.

• Two new types of Cerenkov Viewing Devices(Mark-IV and UV-II) are used exclusively for verifica-tion of irradiated fuel for light-water reactors (LWRs).New methods are being developed which complementthe use of these viewing devices in cases where the spentfuel has a long cooling time and/or a low burnup. Newprocedures, together with specialized training of inspec-tors, has resulted in a reliable tool for achieving some ofthe safeguards goals for LWR reactors.

Safeguards analytical measurements

The idea of the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Serv-ices was conceived in the early 1970s. It foresaw that theIAEA would establish and operate a fully equippedSafeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL). The analyticalcapability of SAL was to be such that "samples takenfrom any key measurement point of the fuel cycle couldbe analysed and that the data from these analyses wouldsuffice for safeguards accounting verification require-ments". However, to accommodate the large number ofsamples anticipated to be taken annually, a worldwideNetwork of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) was estab-

lished. At the request of the IAEA, analytical laborato-ries were nominated for this purpose by a number ofMember States. The NWAL began to operate in 1975and still functions actively in providing measurementservices as well as support in the development of analyti-cal techniques.

Even prior to 1970, Agency inspectors took samplesof safeguarded nuclear material for chemical and/or iso-topic analysis to determine the fissile material content.These measurements have become an important part ofthe Agency's independent verification system, in partic-ular in support of quantitative conclusions. From a fewdozens of samples taken in 1970, the annual number hasincreased to about 1300 samples.

The use of destructive analysis for verification meas-urements involves several steps, such as sampling, pack-aging, shipping from facilities to SAL, and finally theactual analytical measurement. .Improvements havehelped to reduce the considerable delays which occurredin the earlier years. For example, the average time forshipping samples of input solution from reprocessingfacilities in 1979 was 75 days, compared to 16 days in1989. Similarly, the average time interval required foranalysis of a sample in 1979 was 80 days, compared to17 days in 1989.

The main analytical techniques used at SAL andNWAL are potentiometric titrations, mass spectrome-try, and radiometry. These techniques are subject tocontinuous modification to improve measurements to thelatest state of practice. In these activities the contribu-tions of Member State Support Programmes will con-tinue to be essential. The monitoring of the measurementquality is achieved by a strict quality controlprogramme.

The analytical results reported by SAL and NWALare stored in a central database, together with the cor-responding facility declarations. This data is routinelyevaluated and the results are used in inspection conclu-sions. They also provide the basis for a continuousmonitoring of the actual verification measurementquality.

In the 1990s, it is expected that at large bulk-handlingfacilities, on-site destructive analytical measurementcapabilities will be needed to meet the Agency's goalsfor timely verification. This is a new challenge for theSafeguards Analytical Services and success will dependon collaboration with facility operators and supportprogrammes.

Inspection reporting and evaluation

In 1970, the reporting of safeguards inspections wasdone in a relatively simple format that summarizedinspection activities and their results. Details of theactivities and the "depth" of the inspection werereflected in the inspection report filed by the individualinspector.

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In later years, inspection report forms were improvedin the interests of consistency, completeness, and .reduc-tion of the narrative component. Today's form, com-monly called a "logsheet", records all informationrequired for computerized inspection reports.

Since 1977, the Agency has issued an annualSafeguards Implementation Report (SIR) which containsdata and conclusions drawn on the effectiveness and effi-ciency of the safeguards programme. The growing num-ber and types of facilities, and the introduction of newand more effective verification methods, haveinfluenced both the scope and depth of the report.

The compilation and evaluation of safeguards datahave also improved considerably. The processing andhandling of inspection data is for the most part com-puterized. Significant progress has also been made in thedevelopment of criteria for the evaluation of inspectiongoal attainment.

Future prospects

Since the inception of IAEA safeguards activities, theAgency has constantly recognized the importance ofensuring that technological changes in the nuclear fieldwould be immediately addressed in the evolution of newsafeguards procedures and techniques. During the 1960sand early 1970s, a number of advisory groups wereestablished to examine specific issues which had arisenin the development of safeguards approaches. In 1975,the Director General decided, in consultation with Mem-ber States particularly involved in safeguards matters, toestablish the Standing Advisory Group on SafeguardsImplementation (SAGSI) to provide overall guidance onthe Agency's safeguards programme. SAGSI has ful-filled its senior level responsibilities in a manner whichhas gained the endorsement of Member States and theSecretariat.

In accordance with SAGSI's advice on long-termguidelines which should govern the Agency's safeguardsprogramme, the IAEA is developing safeguardsimplementation and evaluation criteria which areintended to take into account expected technologicaladvances and to provide a more comprehensive basis forplanning, implementing, and evaluating safeguardsactivities. Support and co-operation from MemberStates in the application of these criteria will be highlyimportant to maintaining the effectiveness of thesafeguards system.

Most certainly, the Agency's technical capabilitieswill need to continue to improve in tune with technologi-cal advances being made in nuclear materials measure-ment and accounting systems. Equally, the trend tocomputerized nuclear materials handling, processing,and storage systems — with a consequently reducedaccessibility to these materials for verification purposes— will force further changes in the interfaces betweenthe IAEA's Inspectorate, the national regulatory authori-

Facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States wherenuclear material was subject to safeguardsin 1970 and 1990

Power reactorsResearch reactors and critical assembliesConversion plantsFuel fabrication plants

(including pilot plants)Reprocessing plants (including pilot plants)Enrichment plantsSeparate storage facilitiesOther facilities

Subtotal

— Other locations— Non-nuclear installations

Totals

1970

963—

53

——19

99

57—

156

1990

195177

8

4366

4151

527

4052

934

Nuclear materials subject to safeguardsin non-nuclear-weapon States in 1970 and 1990(amounts in tonnes)

Plutonium in irradiated fuelSeparated plutoniumEnriched uraniumNatural and depleted uranium

and thorium

1970

<1 tonne

243

1146

1990

24511

29 000

43 000

ties of Member States, and.the operators of nuclear facil-ities. A greater interconnectivity between nationalnuclear materials accountancy systems and IAEAsafeguards means that more emphasis will have to beplaced on the authentication of data derived from meas-urement systems that are jointly operated by the IAEAand facility operators, and particularly of data suppliedsolely by systems owned and run by facility operators.

The safeguards support programmes of MemberStates will assume even greater importance in enablingthe IAEA to benefit from the technological advancesbeing pursued in nuclear engineering and related fields.At the IAEA, the likelihood of the continued impositionof a "zero-real-growth" budget policy is very high andit is evident that without the many and varied contribu-tions of Member States the IAEA's safeguards pro-gramme will be progressively impaired.

Possibilities stand on the horizon that could broadenthe scope of the IAEA's safeguards programme:

• The negotiation and entry into force of safeguardsagreements by countries which have not yet placed theirentire nuclear programmes under IAEA safeguards;

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• An extension of IAEA safeguards in nuclear-weapon States to cover the entire civilian nuclear pro-grammes of such States; and

• The continuing expansion of nuclear programmesin countries which have already placed their entirenuclear programmes under IAEA safeguards.

What effect might these possibilities have, if real-ized? Estimates based upon published but unconfirmedinformation indicate that if more countries were to placetheir entire nuclear programmes under IAEA safe-guards, this would increase the IAEA's safeguardscoverage by about 5-10%. If safeguards were extendedto the entire civilian nuclear programmes in nuclear-weapon States, an IAEA "best guess" estimate suggeststhat the total operational safeguards workload would benearly tripled. The continuing expansion of the nuclearprogrammes in countries which already have placedtheir entire programmes under IAEA safeguards islikely to result in a 20-25% increase in the IAEA'ssafeguards workload over the next 5 years.

Thus, the future prospects for IAEA safeguards arequite bright, albeit with a not unexpected degree ofuncertainty. The continuing importance of IAEAsafeguards as a bulwark of the nuclear non-proliferationefforts of the world community is beyond question.States which have undertaken comprehensive safeguardsobligations firmly believe that IAEA safeguards providethe only broadly international and therefore crediblemeans of verifying the peaceful nature of their nuclearactivities. Those States which have chosen not to under-take such comprehensive safeguards obligations are notasked to forego the many humanitarian benefits ofnuclear energy and ionizing radiation, but only tostrengthen the already wide-reaching safeguardsprogramme of the IAEA. The two decades of the 1970sand 1980s have provided striking evidence of the nearuniversal belief in the value of IAEA safeguards. Hope-fully, the decade of the 1990s will see the joiningtogether of all States in a truly universal undertaking ofa system of verifying the non-diversion of nuclearmaterials to non-peaceful purposes. Or, stated in a morepositive way, a system of verification which will providethe necessary confirmation of the solely peaceful use ofnuclear materials. Fuel assembly for nuclear plant. (Credit: French Nuclear Newsletter)

10 IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1990