O. Claims Against Estate - Rule 86

1. Notice to Creditors, Publication, Filing of Claims - Secs. 1 to 5

ISIDRO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

LEANDRA MANARANG, administratrix, defendant-appellee.

Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal property which, by his last will and testament dated July 26, 1906, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of this will reads as follows:

I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they may be reli-giously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon with my creditors.

Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various other described as falling due at different dates (the dates are not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee was regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate as might be presented.

In his first assignment of error, the appellant takes exception to the action of the court in denying his petition asking that the committee be reconvened to consider his claim.

Issue : W/n the court erred in not considering his claim from the estate? NO

In support of this alleged error counsel say that it does not appear in the committee's report that the publica-tions required by section 687 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been duly made.

With reference to this point the record affirmatively shows that the committee did make the publications re-quired by law.

This is shown very clearly from the court's order of August 1, 1912, in which the account of the administratrix was approved after reducing final payments of some of the claims against the estate to agree with the amounts allowed by the committee. It is further alleged that at the time this petition was presented the admin-istration proceedings had not been terminated. This is correct.

The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims must be presented is to insure the speedy settling of the affairs of a deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the estate in the hands of the persons entitled to receive it. (Estate of De Dios, 24 Phil. Rep., 573.)

Due possibly to the comparative shortness of the period of limitation applying to such claims as compared with the ordinary statute of limitations, the statute of nonclaims has not the finality of the ordinary statute of limitations. It may be safely said that a saving provision, more or less liberal, is annexed to the statute of non-claims in every jurisdiction where is found. In this country its saving clause is found in section 690, which reads as follows:

On application of a creditor who has failed to present his claim, if made within six months after the time previously limited, or, if a committee fails to give the notice required by this chapter, and such application is made before the final settlement of the estate, the court may, for cause shown, and on such terms as are equitable, renew the commission and allow further time, not exceeding one month, for the committee to examine such claim, in which case it shall personally notify the parties of the time and place of hearing, and as soon as may be make the return of their doings to the court.

If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient cause for reconvening it for further consideration of claims which may not have been presented before its final report was submitted to the court.

But, as stated above, this is not the case made by the plaintiff, as the committee did give the notice required by law.

Where the proper notice has been given the right to have the committee recalled for the consideration of a belated claim appears to rest first upon the condition that it is presented within six months after the time pre-viously limited for the presentation of claims.

In the present case the time previously limited was six months from July 23, 1907. This allowed the plaintiff until January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee. An extension of this time under section 690 rested in the discretion of the court. (Estate of De Dios, supra.) In other words, the court could extend this time and recall the committee for a consideration of the plaintiff's claims against the estate of justice required it, at any time within the six months after January 23, 1908, or until July 23, 1908.

We conclude that the learned trial court made no error in refusing to reconvene the committee for the pur-pose of considering plaintiff's claims against the estate.

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,                  The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. 

In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him.          The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.        (c) Issue:   must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?[2]                  With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is squarely in point.  Therein, the Court held thus: 

         In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.                       Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons.  Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and con-versely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service.  Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus

leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive plead-ings or an opposition; or

(2) (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.

 

            If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of ad-jective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no written explana-tion was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place.  The ex-ercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause “whenever practicable”.             We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and re-sort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. 

Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory.  

Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why per-sonal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. 

In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the im-portance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.  (Empha-sis and italics supplied)                      In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City.  The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great dis-tance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. 

Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

 The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of

creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid.[13]  The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,[14] thus: 

         The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.  As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:             x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it , thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposi-tion of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[15] (Emphasis supplied)

 The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice. 

       Quisumbing vs. Guison

The deceased, Consuelo Syyap, during her life time executed a promissory note dated November 9, 1940 for P3,000 in favor of Leonardo Guison payable sixty (60) days from the date thereof, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per an-

num. The debtor Consuelo Syyap died thereafter. And on the same year, intestate proceedings were instituted and notice given to creditors to file their claim within six (6) months, which period for filing claims expired on August 31, 1941.

In the inventory filed on April 30, 1941, by the administrator of the estate of the deceased, the said obligation of P3,000 was acknowledged as one of the liabilities of the decedent. However, the creditor Leonardo Guison died in 1941, and his son Mariano Guison, who was appointed as administrator of the intestate estate of his deceased father, filed the claim of P3,000 against the estate in 1943. Claimant in his reply to the answer of the estate of Syyap, stated that he be-lieved in good faith that he was relieved of the obligation to file a claim with the court, because said administrator had assured him that he should not worry about it, since the debt was in the inventory and he would pay it soon as he was authorized by the court to do so.

The administrator later on, in contrary, contends that the court erred or abused its discretion in allowing the appellee’s claim under Sec.2 Rule 87, eighteen months after the expiration of the time previously limited for the filing of claims and without previous application for extension of time having been filed by the claimant.

Issue:

(1) whether the claim filed by the claimant may be allowed by the court after hearing both parties, without necessity on the part of the claimant to file a previous application for, and on the part of the court to grant, an extension of time not exceeding one month within which the claim may be filed; and

(2) Whether cause was shown by the claimant why he did not file the claim within the time previously limited

Held:

(1) After a careful consideration of this case, we hold that the claim filed by the appellee may be considered as im-plying an application for time within which to file said claim, and the order of the lower court allowing such claim impliedly granted said appellee an extension of time within which to file said claim. It would have been a waste of time on the part of the court and the parties in this case, if the court had dismissed the claim and re-quired the appellee to file, first, an application for a period not exceeding one month within which to file his claim, and then to file his claim within the time granted by the court, when the latter would allow the claim af-ter all. Strict compliance with the said requirement of section 2 of Rule 87 would be necessary if a claim had to be presented to and passed upon by the committee on claims according to the old law; but now as it is to be filed with and passed upon by the court itself, no harm would be caused to the adverse party by such a proce-dure as was followed in the present case.

Moreover, the appellant, in his answer to the claim filed by the appellee, did not object to it on the ground that the former had not previously applied for an extension of time not exceeding one month within which to present his claim. It is to be presumed that both the attorneys for the appellant as well as for the appellee knew that the claim was being filed under the provisions of section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court, because the time previously limited had then already expired, and had appellant objected to the claim on the above-men-tioned ground and the court considered it necessary for the appellee to do so, the latter would have complied literally with the law.

(2) The last sentence of section 2, Rule 87, provides that the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one month. As it does not state what cause shall be considered sufficient for the purpose, it is clear that it is left to the discretion of the court to determine the sufficiency thereof; and when the court allows a claim to be filed for cause or causes which it considers as sufficient, on appeal this court can not reverse or set aside the action of the court below unless the latter has abused its discretion, which has not been shown by the appellant in this case. That nothing is more equitable than what was done by the lower court in this case, is evident. Appellant does not only acknowledge in the in-ventory the existence of the debt, but does not deny it in his answer to the claim filed by the appellee in the court below, and had been paying interest due thereon up to January, 1943, that is, two months before the filing of the claim. Attorney for appellant, in opposing the claim and appealing to this court from the decision of the court below, relies only on the technicality that no previous application for extension of time has been filed by the claimant-appellee.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.