fema york, ny 10278-0002 · o new femayork, ny 10278-0002?vd s" march 3, 2010 mr. don...

U.S. Department of Homeland SecurityRegion IIJacob K. Javits Federal Office Building26 Federal Plaza, Room 1311New York, NY 10278-0002

o FEMA?VD S"

March 3, 2010

Mr. Don TailleartU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionNuclear Security and Incident Response11555 Rockville Pike, Mail Stop T3B46MRockville, MD 20852

SUBJECT: Final Exercise Report for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant Full Scale

Exercise of September 22, 2009

Dear Mr. Tailleart:

Please find enclosed the Final Exercise Report for the federally evaluated, full-scale exerciseheld for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant on September 22, 2009.

The State of New York and local emergency response organizations successfully demonstratedthe capabilities to implement their off-site radiological emergency response plans andprocedures, based on the evaluation of this exercise by the Regional Assistance Committee and ateam of Federal evaluators. There were no deficiencies; three Areas Requiring Corrective Actionwere identified.

Therefore we find that State and local preparedness is adequate to protect the health and safety ofthe public living in the vicinity of the Nine Mile Point NPS and will provide reasonableassurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiologicalemergency.

If there are any questions concerning this report, the FEMA Region II Technological HazardsBranch Chief and RAC Chair, Rebecca Thomson, can be reached at 212-680-8509.

Sincerely yours,

ynn CantonRegional Administrator

cc: Vanessa E. Quinn, REP Program Chief, FEMA HQ

www.fema.gov • PH: (212)680-3600

FINAL EXERCISE REPORT

NINE MILE POINT

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Licensee: Constellation

Exercise Date: September 22, 2009

Report Date: February 25, 2010

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCYRegion II

26 Federal PlazaNew York, New York 10278

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EX ECU TIV E SU M M A R Y ................................................................................................. 1

II. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 2

III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................. 4

A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description .............................................................. 4

B . Exercise Participants ........................................................................................................ 5

C . Exercise Tim eline ........................................................................................................ 7

IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS ................................................................ 10

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation ...................................................................... 10

B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated ................................................................................... 13

1. STATE OF NEW YORK .......................................................................................... 15

1.1 New York State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/State EmergencyC oordination C enter .......................................................................................... 15

1.2 New York State Accident Assessment (AA) ................................................... 151.3 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ............................................................... 151.4 Nile Mile Point Joint Information Center (JIC) ................................................. 161.5 EAS Radio Station (WSYR) ............................................................................ 17

2. O SW EG O CO U N TY ................................................................................................. 18

2.1 Oswego County Warning Point (WP) ............................................................... 182.2 Oswego County Emergency Operation Center (EOC) ...................................... 182.3 Oswego County Accident Assessment (AA) ................................................... 192.4 Oswego County Radiological Field Monitoring Teams ................................... 202.5 Oswego County - Traffic Control Point -Oswego County Sheriff ................... 202.6 Oswego County - Traffic Control Point -Oswego City Police Department ........... 212.7 Oswego County - Backup Route Alerting ....................................................... 222.8 Oswego County - School Interview - Fredrick Leighton Elementary School ....... 232.9 Oswego County - School Interview - Mexico High School .............................. 232.9 Oswego County - School Bus Company - Oswego County BOCES ................ 232.10 Oswego County - Special Population Bus Company - CNY Centro ................ 24

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2.11 Oswego County - Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center - HighwayG arage Parish, N Y ............................................................................................ 24

2.12 Oswego County - Medical Services Transport Oswego Fire Department ........ 242.13 O sw ego County H ospital ................................................................................. 252.14 Oswego County - General Population Reception Center - Onondaga County ...... 25

APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................... 26

APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS ........................ 28

APPENDIX 3 - EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT ............................................................ 30

APPENDIX 4 - SCENARIO SYNOPSIS .............. I ........................ 65

List of Tables

Table 1 - Exercise Tim eline ............................................................................ 8

Table 2 - Summary results of Exercise Evaluation ...................................................... 11

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On September 22, 2009, a full scale exercise was conducted in the 10-mile Plume ExposurePathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plantby the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region II. The purpose of theexercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to aradiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies andguidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans(RERPs) and procedures.

The most recent previous exercise at this site was conducted on March 7, 2007. Thequalifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on September 15, 1981.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in New York, Oswego andOnondaga Counties who participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participantsand an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought thisresponsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the final evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of thefollowing out-of-sequence activities: Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center(PMC) at the County Highway facility on September 22, 2009; Traffic Control Points -Oswego County Sheriff and City of Oswego Police on September 22, 2009; SpecialPopulation Bus Company Interviews at Centro of Syracuse on September 23, 2009; SchoolBus Company Interview at BOCES on September 23, 2009; School Interviews at LeightonElementary School in Oswego and Mexico High School in Mexico on September 23, 2009;Reception Center at New York State Fairgrounds on October 15, 2009; and a MedicalServices MS-Drill (Transportation and Facility by Oswego Fire Department and Facility atOswego Hospital on October 23, 2009.)

The State and local organizations except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledgeof their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. Therewere no Deficiencies and three Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified as aresult of this exercise. In addition, corrective actions were demonstrated for two priorARCAs, thus closing those issues. One ARCA from a previous exercise remains unresolved.

I

II. INTRODUCTION

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for alloffsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Codeof Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element inthe Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following theThree Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial andcontinued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning andpreparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, onState and local governments' participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilitiesinclude the following:

Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation ofRERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;

* Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis ofobservation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by Stateand local governments;

" Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuantto the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17,1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and

Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiologicalemergency planning process:

- U.S. Department of Commerce,- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,- U.S. Department of Energy,- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,- U.S. Department of Transportation,- U.S. Department of Agriculture,- U.S. Department of the Interior- U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and- US Department of Defense.

2

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region II Regional AssistanceCommittee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Nine Mile Point and James A. FitzPatrick NuclearPower Plants (JAFNPP) to FEMA Region II by the New York State and involved localjurisdictions occurred on July 15, 1981. Formal approval of the RERPs was granted byFEMA on February 1, 1985, under 44 CFR 350.

A REP exercise was conducted on September 22, 2009 by FEMA Region II to assess thecapabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing theirRERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiologicalemergency involving the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this exercisereport is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsiteresponse organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluatorteam, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region II RAC Chairperson, andapproved by the Regional Administrator.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

" NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation ofRadiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of NuclearPower Plants," November 1980;

* '"Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," publishedin the Federal Register on September 12, 2001, and revised April 25, 2002, andcontained in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15, 2002)

Section III of this report, "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevantto the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, alisting of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and atabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV of this report, "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information onthe demonstration of applicable exercise objectives at each jurisdiction or functional entityevaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1)descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommendedcorrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions foreach identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed duringprevious exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.

3

III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW

Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the September 22, 2009,exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the NineMile Point Nuclear Power Plant. This section of the exercise report includes a description ofthe plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities thatwere evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exerciseevents and activities.

A. Piume Emergency Planning Zone Description

The area within the Nine Mile Point/James A. FitzPatrick site is located on LakeOntario in Oswego County. Oswego County is predominantly rural in nature withapproximately 75 percent of its total land acres consisting of woodland, wetlands, andinactive agricultural land. Although active agriculture land only accounts for 16 percentof the local land acres, agriculture is the major land use in the county. The majoragriculture activity in Oswego County is dairy, accounting for approximately 63percent of the value of all farm products produced in the county. The major harvestedcrops are hay, alfalfa, and corn. The major livestock animals are cattle and hogs.

The 10-mile EPZ contains a total population of 41,284 (2000 Census PopulationEstimates). The Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant site is located seven miles to thenortheast of the city of Oswego and thirteen miles north of the city of Fulton. Asidefrom these two areas of population concentration, the region is sparsely populated.

The industrial activities within the 10-mile EPZ are confined principally to themetropolitan area within the city of Oswego, with little industry in the outlyingcommunities of Scriba, Minetto, Volney and Mexico. Manufacturing firms directlyaccount for 33 percent of the total employment of Oswego County.

The public institutions, aside from the schools and churches, within the EPZ are ahospital, a college, and a jail. There are also a number of special facilities locatedwithin the 10-mile EPZ.

Continuing urban and industrial expansion of the area will increase both the populationand the amount of land used for residential and commercial purposes. It is anticipatedthat the population in the region will increase by about 30 percent in the next twentyyears, with larger increases in the urban areas.

4

B. Exercise Participants

The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in theNine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise on September 22, 2009.

NEW YORK STATENew York State Emergency Management OfficeNew York State Department of HealthNew York State PoliceNew York State Department of Environmental ConservationNew York State Department of TransportationNew York State Department of LaborNew York State Office of AgingNew York State Department of Agriculture and MarketsNew York State Thruway AuthorityNew York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic PreservationNew York State Department of Correctional ServicesNew York State Office of Mental HealthNew York State Office of Fire Prevention and ControlNew York State Education DepartmentNew York State Energy Research and Development AuthorityNew York State Public Service CommissionNew York State Division of Military and Naval AffairsNew York State Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure Organization

RISK JURISDICTIONS

OSWEGO COUNTYOswego County Sheriff's DepartmentOswego County Department of Public WorksOswego County Emergency Management OfficeOswego County Chairman of the LegislatureOswego County Information TechnologyOswego County Personnel DepartmentOswego County AdministratorOswego County Administrative ServicesOswego County Department of Social ServicesOswego County Highway DepartmentOswego County Superintendent of SchoolsOswego County Department of HealthOswego County Fire CoordinatorOswego City School District

5

Mexico Central School DistrictOswego County AttorneyOswego County Promotion and TourismOswego County Probation DepartmentOswego County Planning DepartmentOswego County Emergency Medical ServicesOswego County Communication Center - 911Cooperative ExtensionNew York State AssemblyBOCES of Oswego County

SUPPORT JURISDICTIONSTown of Palermo Fire DepartmentCity of OswegoCity of FultonFulton Police DepartmentOnondaga City Emergency Management OfficeCooperative Extension

PRIVATE/VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONSAmerican Red CrossRACESEntergy - James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power PlantConstellation Energy Corporation - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power StationWSYR Radio Station, SyracuseOswego County Opportunities Transportation

6

C. Exercise Timeline ..,

Table 1, on the following pages, presents the time at which key events and activitiesoccurred during the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise on September 22,2009. Also included are times that notifications were made to the participatingjurisdictions/functional entities.

7

Table 1. Exercise Timeline

U D"'•I.TT AJITT"CT Dn•Ylx7u DI A NMIT

Oswego Co.Warning PointNY State EOC EOF JIC Oswego Co.

EOC

EAS RadioStation

WSYR

0817 0829 0828Unusual Event

Alert 0858 0906 0906 - 0905 - -

Site Area Emergency 1121 1129 1123 1128 1129 - -

General Emergency 1226 1240 1226 1240 1240 - -

Simulated Rad. Release 1128 1228 1228 1228 1228 -

Started

Simulated Rad. ReleaseTerminated

Facility Declared Operational 1017 1003 1010

County Declared State of Emergency - - 1015 1015

Exercise Terminated 1501 1453 1452 1501 -

Early Precautionary Actions:Close Parks and Beaches 1046 1045 1015 1015Schools 1045 1024 1024 __

"Heads Up" Siren Activation 1046 - - 1046 -

"Heads Up" EAS Message 1050 - 1053 1050 - 1050Ist Protective Action Decision

14--1246 1245 ---

Evacuate 1, 2,3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 26, 27Siren Activation 1256 - 1256 1256 - -

EAS Message 1300 - 1300 1300 - -

2 d Protective Action DecisionEvacuate 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 1355 - 1357 1355 -

24, 25, 28Siren Activation 1406 - 1406 1402 -

EAS RadioStation

WSYR

I AIA 1 AI•, | J|/•

ILAi iviessage IVIu - 1,l 1't u -

KI Administration Decisions:

All EWs and Evacuation Zones 1, 2,

3,5, 6,10,11,26, 27 1245 - 1246 1245

Remaining EPZ Population 1355 - 1355 1310

IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of alljurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the September 22,2009 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of Stateand local governments in the EPZ surrounding the Nine Mile Point NuclearPower Plant.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstrationof criteria contained in the September 12, 2001 Federal Register Notice (revisedApril 25, 2002) and in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15, 2002).Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used inthis exercise is found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2

The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status ofall exercise criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exerciseby all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria arelisted by number and the demonstration status of those objectives is indicated bythe use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) assessed and nounresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercises)

D - Deficiency assessed

A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from priorexercise(s)

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B)

10

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FI ELDI ~~PROTECTIVE ACTIONFILEMERGENCY OPNS PROTECTIVE ACTION P MEASUREMENT & EMERG NOTIF & SUPPORT

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EOC M _ M M M _ M M MAccident Assessment M MEOF M M MMJoint Information Center M : M M M A MEAS Station M M MOswego County ._ _ -~> :

Warning Point MEOC M M M M M M I M MI M Mj M AAccident Assessment M[M I M MI I I I M IM - Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) Assessed and no Unresolved ARCA(s) from Prior Exercises A - ARCA(s) Assessed or Unresolved ARCA(s) from PriorN - Not Demonstrated as Scheduled (Reason Explained in Section IV.B) ExercisesBlank - Not Scheduled for Demonstration or Not Assigned to Facility/Function Al- ARCA Corrected

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EMERGENCY OPNS PROTECTIVE ACTION PROTECTIVE ACTION MEASUREMENT & EMERG NOTIF &I SUPPORTMANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING IMPLEMENTATION 3 ANALYSIS PUBLIC INFO OPN/FACILITIES

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Oswego County __ __ _

Field Monitoring Team 1 M M M M M M M

Field Monitoring Team 2 M M M M M M M

Traffic Control Point - Sheriff M M A

Traffic Control Point - Police Department M M A

Backup Route Alerting M

School Interview - FLES M

School Interview - MHS M

School Bus Company - BOCES M M M _

Special Population Bus Company - CNY Centro M M M

Emergency Worker PMC HGPNY M M MM

Medical Services Transport - DMAC M M M

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) Assessed and no Unresolved ARCA(s) from Prior ExercisesN - Not Demonstrated as Scheduled (Reason Explained in Section IV.B)Blank - Not Scheduled for Demonstration or Not Assigned to Facility/Function

A - ARCA(s) Assessed or Unresolved ARCA(s) from PriorExercises

Al- ARCA Corrected

12

B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated

This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdictionand functional entity, in a jurisdiction-based, issues only format. Presented below is adefinition of the terms used in this subsection relative to evaluation criteria demonstrationstatus.

" Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation criteria under which noDeficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which noARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

" Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation criteria under whichone or more Deficiencies were assessed during this exercise. Included is adescription of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

* Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exerciseevaluation criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during thecurrent exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and therecommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the nextbiennial exercise.

" Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise evaluation criteria which were notdemonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were notdemonstrated.

" Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previousexercises that were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

" Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during priorexercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCAremains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated beforeor during the next biennial exercise.

13

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues that are discussed in thisreport.

A Deficiency is defined in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15, 2002) as"...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in anexercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is notadequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures canbe taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety ofthe public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

" An ARCA is defined in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15, 2002) as"...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in anexercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health andsafety."

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficienciesand ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issuesamong FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is alsoused to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements,with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

" Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility BillablePlant Site Codes.

* Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

* Objective Number - A two-digit number corresponding to the objective numbers inFEMA-REP- 14.

* Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficienciesand ARCAs are included in exercise reports.

* Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexingnumber assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

14

STATE OF NEW YORK

1.1 New York State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) StateEmergency Coordination Center

a. MET: 1.al; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 2.b.2; 3.b.1; 5.a.1; 5.b.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE

1.2 New York State Accident Assessment (AA)

a. MET: 1.e. 1; 2.a.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





1.3 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

a. MET: 1.a.1; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE




15


1.4 Nile Mile Point Joint Information Center (JIC)

a. MET: 1.a.1; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 5.b.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE




f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: ONE

ISSUE: 40-07-5.a.1-A-01

CONDITION: The first EAS message, issued at 1131, didnot contain the four required elements as prescribed. Themessage did not contain information referencing publicinformation materials or to stay tuned to the radio station forfurther information.

REASON UNRESOLVED: The initial EAS Message thatwent out at 1050 contained 3 out of the 4 required elements.EAS Message #1 stated that the EAS was activated by"Oswego County officials". FEMA Guidance requires"Identification of the State or local government organizationand the official [emphasis added] with the authority forproviding the alert signal and instructional message."("Guidance for Providing Emergency Information andInstructions to the Public for Radiological Emergencies usingthe Emergency Alert System", FEMA Memorandum, Feb. 2,1999.)

SCHEDULE OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Thecorrective action for this issue will be demonstrated at thenext federally evaluated, biennial exercise.

16

1.5 EAS Radio Station (WSYR)

a. MET: 1.d.1; 5.a.1; 5.b.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





17

2. OSWEGO COUNTY

2.1 Oswego County Warning Point (WP)

a. MET: 1.a.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.2 Oswego County Emergency Operation Center (EOC)

a. MET: 1.a.1; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 2.a.1; 2.b.2; 2.c.13.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.1; 3.c.2; 3.d.1; 3.d.2; 5.a.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: ONE

ISSUE: 40-09-5.b.1-A-01

CONDITION: There was an instance where an EAS message and aNews Release were inconsistent, which could have led to confusion on thepart of the public. In News Release number 6, it stated that the CountyDepartment of Health recommended that everyone in the entire 10-mileEPZ take KI. Subsequently, EAS #3 indicated that a General Emergencyhad been declared and the population in Emergency Response PlanningAreas (ERPA's): 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22 (per the previous Protective ActionDecision) along with and additional ERPA's 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11 were toevacuate and ingest KI. The follow-on News Release to this EAS messagewas consistent with the EAS message, but neither EAS #3 or New Release#7 indicated that everyone in the EPZ was being encouraged to take KI bythe County Department of Health.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Inconsistent messages on ingestion of KI probablycaused by PIOs not remembering that KI had been recommended foreveryone, not just those evacuating.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, E,5 7: G.3a, G.4.c

18

EFFECT: Potentially the public could have been confused as to whetheror not to take KI.

RECOMMENDATION: When EAS messages and follow-on NewsReleases are being drafted, the previous messages should be reviewed toensure that the new messages are consistent with those that have alreadybeen released.

SCHEDULE OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The corrective action forthis issue will be demonstrated at the next federally evaluated, biennialexercise.


e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: 5.a.1

ISSUE: 40-07-5.a.1-A-04

CONDITION: In the transmission of the first EAS message to theJIC, the EAS writer inadvertently listed the number of pages as 2,including the cover page, instead of 3. Consequently, when thedocument was received at the JIC, only the first page of the EASmessage was forwarded to the EAS station.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The personfaxing the EAS messages made sure to include proper numbers oneach page and the total number was noted on the cover sheet.


2.3 Oswego County Accident Assessment (AA)

a. MET: 1.e.l; 2.a.l; 2.b.1; 4.a.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE



e. ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE


19

2.4 Oswego County Radiological Field Monitoring Team A

a. MET: 1.a.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 4.a.1; 4.a.3

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.5 Oswego County Radiological Field Monitoring Team B

a. MET: 1.a.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 4.a.1; 4.a.3

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE



e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE

2.6 Oswego County - Traffic Control Point - Oswego CountySheriff

a. MET: 3.b.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE


ISSUE: 40-09-3.d.l-A-02

CONDITION: Detailed instructions and maps are provided in eachdosimetry kit for route alerting, but there were no instructions, maps, ordiagrams to provide Emergency Workers information concerning accesscontrol or evacuation route control.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Unfamiliar with NUREG requirements.20

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, J.1O.g,j

EFFECT: Without providing detail mission preplans issuing verbalinstructions to Emergency Workers during an incident, either in person orby radio without reference material could lead to confusion and cause adelayed response.

RECOMMENDATION: There should be written instructions toestablish ACP & TCP's; written instructions should be brief and location-specific, contain maps to each point, a diagram of the setup showing trafficflow control, and an inventory of required traffic visuals (cones, barriers,signage).





2.6 Oswego County - Traffic Control Point - Oswego City PoliceDepartment

a. MET: 3.b.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE


ISSUE: 40-09-3.d.1-A-03

CONDITION: Detailed instructions and maps are provided in eachdosimetry kit for route alerting, but there were no instructions, maps, ordiagrams to provide Emergency Workers information concerning accesscontrol or evacuation route control.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Unfamiliar with NUREG Requirements.

REFERENCE: NUREG - J 10 g.j

21

EFFECT: Issuing instructions to Emergency Workers during an incident,either in person or by radio without reference material could lead toconfusion and cause a delayed response.

RECOMMENDATION: There should be details to establish ACP &TCP's; written instructions (brief), maps to each point, a diagram of thesetup showing traffic flow control, and an inventory of required trafficvisuals (cones, barriers, signage).





2.7 Oswego County - Backup Route Alerting

a. MET: 5.a.3

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE


e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: ONE

ISSUE: 40-07-5.a.3-A-09

CONDITION: Backup route alerting for siren fourteen was notcompleted within the required 45 minutes. Additionally, one roadwith several residences within the siren coverage area has not beenincluded in the route instructions.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Oswego Countysuccessfully demonstrated the use of their automated callout system"Hyper-Reach," to alert residents in an area which was affected by asiren failure during this exercise.


22

2.8 Oswego County - School Interview - Fredrick LeightonElementary School

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.9 Oswego County - School Interview - Mexico High School

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.10 Oswego County - School Bus Company - Oswego County BOCES

a. MET: 3.a. 1; 3.b. 1; 3.c.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





23

2.11 Oswego County - Special Population Bus Company - CNYCentro

a. MET: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.12 Oswego County - Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center -Highway Garage Parish, NY

a. MET: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 6.a.1; 6.b.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.13 Oswego County - Medical Services Transport - Oswego FireDepartment Ambulance

a. MET: 3.a. 1; 3.b. 1; 6.d. 1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





24

2.14 Oswego County - Oswego County Hospital

a. MET: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 6.d.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE





2.15 Oswego County - General Population Reception Center - OnondagaCounty (Oct. 15, 2009)

a. MET: 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 6.a. 1, 6.b. 1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

c. DEFICIENCY: NONE


e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE

25

APPENDIX 1

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations used in this report.

AA Accident AssessmentACP Access Control PointARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action

CCC Congregate Care CenterCFR Code of Federal Regulationscpm Counts Per Minute

DOC U.S. Department of CommerceDOE U.S. Department of EnergyDOI U.S. Department of the InteriorDOT U.S. Department of TransportationDRD Direct Reading Dosimeter

EAS Emergency Alert SystemECL Emergency Classification LevelEEM Exercise Evaluation MethodologyEOC Emergency Operations CenterEOF Emergency Operations FacilityEPA U.S. Environmental Protection AgencyEPZ Emergency Planning ZoneERPA Emergency Response Planning Area

FDA U.S. Food and Drug AdministrationFEMA Federal Emergency Management AgencyFR Federal Register

GE General EmergencyGM Guidance Memorandum

HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human ServicesHQ Headquarters

JIC Joint Information Center

KI Potassium IodideKLT K.L. Travis and Associates

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

26

NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- 1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparationand Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans andPreparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November1980

NYS New York State

OCEOC Oswego County Emergency Operations CenterOCFA Oswego County Field ActivityOEM Office of Emergency ManagementOnFA Onondaga County Field ActivityORO Offsite Response Organization

PAD Protective Action DecisionPAG Protective Action GuidePAR Protective Action RecommendationPIO Public Information OfficerPMC Personnel Monitoring Center

R RoentgenRAC Regional Assistance CommitteeRACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency ServiceRC Reception CenterREM Roentgen Equivalent ManREP Radiological Emergency PreparednessRERP Radiological Emergency Response PlanR/h Roentgen(s) per hour

SAE Site Area EmergencySECC State Emergency Coordination CenterSEOC State Emergency Operations CenterSOP Standard Operating Procedure

TEDE Total Effective Dose EquivalentTCP Traffic Control PointTL Team LeaderTLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter

USCG U.S. Coast GuardUSDA U.S. Department of AgricultureWP Warning Point

27

APPENDIX 2

EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plantexercise on September 22, 2009. Evaluator Team Leaders are indicated by the letters "(TL)" aftertheir names. The organization which each evaluator represents is indicated by the followingabbreviations:

FEMA - Federal Emergency Management AgencyNRC - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionUSDA- U.S. Department of AgricultureUSCG - U.S. Coast GuardICF - Consulting Firm Performing Evaluation

EVALUATION SITE

Exercise Oversight

STATE OF NEW YORK

State EOC

EOF

Joint Information Center

EAS Radio Station WSYR

EVALUATOR

Rebecca Thomson

ORGANIZATION

FEMA

Brian Hasemann (TL)Todd SniffinDeborah BellMarcy Campbell (AA)Michael LealMichael DeBonisChris Cammarata (TL)Michele SturmanMiriam Weston

FEMAICFICFICFFDAEPAFEMAFEMAFEMA

28

OSWEGO COUNTY

Oswego County EOC

Warning PointField Monitoring Team AField Monitoring Team B

Traffic Control PointsBack-up Route Alerting

Bill Cullen (TL)Joseph Keller (TL/AA)Jon ChristiansenMabel SantiagoLaura ForrestTerry SheehanJohanna BerkeySara GelvesKorky DulgerianRon Biernacki

Kevin ReedPatricia Mason

FEMAICFICFFEMAFEMADOTFEMAFEMAFEMAFEMA

FEMAFEMA

OUT-OF SEQUENCE EVALUATIONS

Emergency Worker PMCHighway Garage Parish, NY

School Bus Company InterviewBOCES

School InterviewsMexico HS and Fredrick LeightonElementary School

Oswego Medical ServicesTransport - City of Oswego FireDepartment Ambulance

Sam NelsonLouis Sosler

Sam Nelson

Sam Nelson

Patrick TaylorPatricia Mason

ICFICF

ICF

ICF

ICFFEMA

29

APPENDIX 3

EXTENT-OF-PLAY GROUND RULES

* REAL LIFE EMERGENCIES TAKE PRIORITY OVER EXERCISE PLAY.

* The Scenario Development Team will develop the free play messages. The State Controller willinject the message to the County Emergency Management Director or designee for action.

* Free play messages for Public Inquiry at the JIC will be developed by the Scenario DevelopmentTeam. Public Inquiry messages will be injected at the JIC by a control cell to enable the publicinquiry function to identify trends and false rumors.

* The State Controller will inject radiological data for any radiological field activities.

" According to REP Program Strategic Review Initiative 1.5, "During tabletop exercises, drillsand other demonstrations conducted out-of-sequence from an integrated exercise, if FEMA andthe offsite response organizations (ORO) agree, the FEMA Evaluator may have the participantsre-demonstrate an activity that is determined to be not satisfactorily demonstrated. Immediatecorrection of issues in an integrated exercise is authorized only if it would not be disruptive andinterrupt the flow of the exercise and affect other Evaluation Areas." This initiative is notapplicable to EOC/JIC/EOF demonstrations during the September 22, 2009 exercise.

30

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element L.a - Mobilization

Criterion I.a. 1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel andactivate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

WARNING POINTS (NYS and Oswego County)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

* The latest revised call lists will be provided at the Federal/State evaluators briefing session the daybefore the exercise, if requested by FEMA. The lists will contain home and business telephonenumbers and it is requested that these lists remain confidential.

* There will be no free play messages introduced at the Warning Points.

EOCs (NYS and Oswego County)


The State Liaison will be pre-positioned in the area and will arrive at the County EOC no soonerthan 30 minutes after the notification is received by the State to mobilize. The Utility TechnicalLiaison assigned to the State EOC will be pre-positioned and arrive at the State EOC no sooner than30 minutes after the notification to mobilize.

EOF


* State liaisons will be pre-positioned in the area and will arrive at the EOF no sooner than 30 minutesafter the notification is received by the State to mobilize.

JIC


* State JIC Staff will be pre-positioned and arrive at the JIC no sooner than 30 minutes after thenotification is received by the State to mobilize.

31


Sub-element 1.b - Facilities

Criterion I .b. 1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654, H.3)


0 NOT SELECTED FOR EVALUATION

32


Sub-element 1 .c - Direction and Control

Criterion I .c. 1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to thatpart of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A. .d; A.2.a., b.)


* The State Controller will inject free play messages to the County Emergency Management Directoror designee for action.

33


Sub-element 1.d - Communications Equipment

Criterion I .d.l: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly,and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F. I,2).


* A State Controller will inject a free play message to the County Emergency Management Director toinitiate the demonstration of backup systems at/or to communicate from Oswego County EOC to theEOF, JIC, and Field Monitoring Teams.

Backup communications:o RACES EOF to EOCo RACES EOC to JICo 800 MHz Radio EOC to Field Monitoring Teamso UHF Frequency Radios EOC to Field Monitoring Teams

34


Sub-element I.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

Criterion I.e. 1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies aresufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.1O.a, b, e, J. 11; K.3.a)


No equipment such as barriers, traffic cones, signs, etc. will be deployed to the field.

35

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 2.a. 1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriatecoordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place foremergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrativelimits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e, f; K.4)


* A State Controller will inject a free play message to the County Radiological Officer to discuss whatactions would be taken should a Field Monitoring Team's dose rate exceed the turn-back value.This will be a discussion only activity.

* A State Controller will inject a free play message to the Field Monitoring Teams to drivedemonstration of activities associated with reaching an exposure that would require call back to theEOC.

36


Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for thePlume Phase of the Emergency

Criterion 2.b. 1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information onplant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge ofon-site and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, 1.8, 10 and Supplement 3).


All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actualemergency.

37


Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for thePlume Phase of the Emergency

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessarycoordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including therecommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.f, m).



38


Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.(NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, e)

EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT FOR THE FOLLOWING:

* TRANSPORTATION DEPENDENT POPULATION

" NOTIFICATION OF HEARING IMPAIRED

* NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS

* SCHOOLS

* SPECIAL FACILITIES

AGREEMENT:All above activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actualemergency.

39


Sub-element 2.d. -Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway

Criterion 2.d. 1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriateprotective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J. 11).

NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING TrilS EXERCISE.

40


Sub-element 2.e. - Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, andReturn

Criterion 2.e.l: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated asappropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/orprocedures. (NUREG-0654, 1.10; J.9; M.1)

NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING TIllS EXERCISE.

41

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 3.a. 1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiologicalexposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workersperiodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on theappropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)



42


Sub-element 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision

Criterion 3.b. 1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KIbe made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers andinstitutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J.10. e)



43


Sub-element 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations

Criterion 3.c. 1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schoolswithin areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J. 1O.c, d, g).

EVACUATION OF TRANSPORTATION DEPENDENT POPULATION


* Bus companies will be interviewed in accordance with the offsite extent of play activities schedule.

* Each company will provide a dispatcher and at least 10% of that company's drivers needed toimplement the Plan for interview.

* During the September 22, 2009 exercise, there will be initial contact with the transportationproviders (telephone call) by the Transportation Coordinator. Initial contacts will be actual andsome follow-up calls may be simulated. All calls to the transportation provider will be logged at theCounty EOC.

" There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles during the exercise.

NOTIFICATION OF HEARING IMPAIRED


* The hearing impaired list will be available for inspection at the County EOC. The list will bereviewed but not retained by the Federal evaluator. The procedures for notification will also bediscussed at the County EOC.

" There will be no actual notification of hearing impaired individuals during the exercise.

" A State Controller will inject a free play message to the 911 (1) Center to initiate a test of the TDDsystem which will cause a test message to be sent to the 911 (2) Center (OCEOC).

EVACUATION OF NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIREDINDIVIDUALS


* The list of non-institutionalized mobility impaired individuals will be available for inspection at theCounty EOC. The lists will be reviewed but not retained by the Federal evaluator.

44

* There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles for transport of non-institutionalized mobility impairedindividuals.

* During the exercise, there will be no actual contact of non-institutionalized mobility-impairedindividuals identified on the list.

45


Sub-element 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J. 10.c,d, g).

EVACUATION OF SCHOOL POPULATIONS


* Bus companies will be interviewed in accordance with the offsite extent-of-play activities schedule.

* Each company will provide a dispatcher and at least 10% of that company's drivers needed toimplement the Plan for interview.

* During the September 22, 2009 exercise, there will be initial contact with the schools (telephonecall) by the School Coordinator. Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up calls may besimulated. All calls to the Schools will be logged at the County EOC.

SCHOOL INTERVIEWS


* One school from each (Oswego City and Mexico School Districts and BOCES) will be interviewedas per the offsite extent-of-play activities schedule.

SPECIAL FACILITIES


* During the exercise, there will be initial contact with the special facilities (telephone call). Initialcontacts will be actual and some follow-up calls may be simulated. All calls to special facilities willbe logged at the County EOC.

* There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles to the special facilities.

46


Sub-element 3.d. - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criterion 3.d. 1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided totraffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J. I 0.g, j)

TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL POINTS (TCPs and ACPs)


* During the September 22, 2009 exercise, law enforcement officials will discuss how to activateTCPs/ACPs at mutually agreed upon locations. (Oswego City, Oswego County EOC)

* The TCPs/ACPs will be identified by a free play message provided by the State Controller to theCounty Emergency Management Director or designee. Actual travel to the TCP/ACP will not bedemonstrated

* Each designated law enforcement agency will provide one officer for interview.

* There will be interviews of two (2) different law enforcement agencies responsible for staffing thedesignated TCPs/ACPs.

47


Sub-element 3.d. - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10.k).

IMPEDIMENTS TO EVACUATION


" The County will demonstrate the organizational ability to deal with at least two (2) impediments toevacuation on the day of the exercise.

* The State Controller in the County EOC will hand the free play messages to the County EmergencyManagement Director or designee for action to test the procedures for the removal of trafficimpediments.

No equipment (Barriers, Traffic cones, Signs, etc.) will be deployed to the field.

* This demonstration will not involve the dispatch of a police or other emergency vehicle to the sceneof a simulated impediment on the day of the exercise. Initial contact of resource providers willactually occur. All calls concerning traffic impediments will be logged at the County EOC.

48


Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Criterion 3.e.l: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate informationregarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathwayemergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11).

NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING THIS EXERCISE.

49


Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developedfor implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, andagricultural production. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11).

NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING TI-iS EXERCISE.

50


Sub-element 3.f. - Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions

Criterion 3.f. 1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and returnof the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654, M. 1, 3).



51

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a. 1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure(cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H. 10;1.7, 8, 9)


* The monitoring teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing. However, the clothingwill be available for inspection.

52



Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the releaseand to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; 1.8, 11; J.10.a)



53



Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, andradioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low backgroundlocation to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount ofradioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, 1.9).

FIELD MONITORING TEAMS


" The County will dispatch two (2) radiological monitoring teams. Each team will be provided with aState Controller and FEMA evaluator.

" Each team will take at least six (6) ambient radiation measurements and at least two (2) air samples.All teams must take the air samples as though they were in the presence of the plume (even teams

that may not be impacted by the plume). (Contamination Control)

* The use of silver zeolite cartridges will be simulated and charcoal cartridges will be used. However,the silver zeolite cartridges are available in the kit.

" There will be no actual transport of samples to the laboratory. All arrangements up to transport willbe demonstrated. EOC staff will be questioned only regarding means of transportation of air samplesto a central point and the location of the laboratory. Field teams will demonstrate how to obtain airsamples during the exercise and will be questioned only regarding the procedures for the pick-uppoint of air samples.

* The RO2A and E140N do not have installed check sources. Button sources for the EI40N areavailable for inspection.

54


Sub-element 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

Criterion 4.b. 1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and tocollect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequateassessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654, 1.8; J.1 1)

NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED AT TIllS EXERCISE.

55


Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to supportprotective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3; J. 11)


56

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Criterion 5.a. 1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completedin a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify thepublic of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as aminimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D& NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7)


* There will be no actual siren sounding, no actual tone alert radio activation, and no broadcasting ofEAS messages.

* Airing of at least one EAS message will be simulated with the radio station.

" Contact with the radio station for subsequent EAS-messages may be simulated.

* Regular programming responsibilities of the radio station may preclude participation at the time ofthe issuance of the simulated EAS message.

57



Criterion 5.a.2: RESERVED

58



Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) arecompleted within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officialsto notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public iscompleted within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alertand notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c).


* There are no exception areas that require supplementary route alerting.

* During the September 22, 2009 exercise, one (1) simulated siren failure will be discussed at theCounty EOC. The State Controller will inject a free play message regarding this siren failure to theCounty Emergency Management director or designee for action to test route-alerting procedures.

In accordance with the offsite extent-of-play activities schedule," An interview of one law enforcement representative will be conducted at the County EOC.* A vehicle capable of public notification will be available during the interview.* One law enforcement representative with a vehicle capable of public notification will

actually drive the route as determined by the Federal Evaluator.* The route alerting demonstrations will not include actual vehicle siren sounding or public

address announcement of emergency instructions. However, the emergency instructions ormessage will be read aloud to the Federal evaluator.

" The route will be timed from the start of the route. (Starting point location)

59


Sub-element 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and thenews media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c).

PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION


* All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actualemergency.

EMERGENCY INFORMATION


* All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actualemergency.

PUBLIC INQUIRY


* The public inquiry function at the JIC will be staffed by at least four operators with one supervisor.

• Inject messages will indicate false or misleading information to enable the public inquiry function toidentify a minimum of 2 trends or false rumors.

* Conduct at least 2 actual briefings as selected by the Federal Evaluators. All briefings will beprepared/developed up to the point of performance of the actual briefing.

60

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.a - Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers, and Registrationof Evacuees

Criterion 6.a.l: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequateresources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacueesand/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J. IO.h; J. 12; K.5.a)


NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING TI LIS EXERCISE.

61

* EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment

Criterion 6.b. 1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment ofmonitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654,K.5.b).

Extent-of-Play Agreement

NOT TO BE DEMONSTRATED DURING THIS EXERCISE BY OSWEGO COUNTY.

* State PMC at Mapleview will be demonstrated.

62

0 EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees

Criterion 6.c. 1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources toprovide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (foundin MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assurethat evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriateprior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12).


\OT TO BE DEMONSSTRATED DURRING THIS EXERCISE.

63

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals

Criterion 6.d. 1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnelto provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injuredindividuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)


* The transportation and facility component of this medical drill will be demonstrated in accordancewith the offsite extent-of-play agreement schedule.

* The facility component of this drill will involve the transport of a patient from the Nine Mile Pointsite to Oswego Hospital for treatment. This component was evaluated on October 7, 2005.

* The use of flashing lights and sirens for exercise play is not required.

64

NINE MILE POINTREP EXERCISE

September 22, 2009

SCENARIO SYNOPSIS

65

Wlnen directed Dy tne LeaaController, insert message:Input Simulator MessageSIM-1

SIM-1All communication to the Unit 2Shift Manager will go throughextension 2078, simulator

I I_ operator.0800 Control room briefing /

turnover D 100% power [c Conduct shift turnover

Time • Indications P / Plant Response or Control Room Actions,2 contro~l~lerInject~ Inject Messages, &

oC-1 Preset Malfunction/ Remote Function/InstructorOverrides to begin scenario with these initialconditions:1. Core Life: Middle of life

Rod Sequence: AlPlant Conditions: 100% Reactor Power for 164 days, >100% rod line2. Technical Specification LCOs in effect:L 3.1.2.b Liquid PoisonL 3.1.6.b Control Rod Drive

3. Significant problems /abnormalities:[] #11 CRD marked up for seal repair/replacement,expected to be returned to service on 9/23/09 @ 1500.

r] #11 Liquid Poison Pump marked up for repair ofleaking piston found during monthly testing, expectedto be returned to service on 9/24/09 @ 1300.

4. Evolutions/maintenance for the upcoming shift:11 Continue work on 11 CRD pump seal0 Work 11 LP pump piston repair.

5. Meteorological Conditions:U Light and variable wind from the northeast (from 45deg) between 5 and 10 mph,U Air temperature 72oF, no precipitation expected forthe next 24 hours. Lake water temperature 68oF

65

0805 When directed by the Lead SEC-1Controller, insert message: "This is Security we received andInput Simulator Message validated a message from theSEC-1 NRC Operations officer issuingSee Supplemental Scenario 1 an Informational Threat

notification call of a large aircraftwhose flight path is trackingtowards Nine Mile Point and isgreater than 50 minutes away."Note if asked:The aircraft is an Airbus A330-300,traveling at 500 mph, flying in anunauthorized air corridor andunauthorized elevation. We areunable to establish communicationwith the aircraft.

0805SimulatorActivity

When directed by the LeadController, insert message:Input SimulatorMessageSIM-2

SIM-2Sim. Instructor willcontact U1 SM:"This is the Unit 2 SMverifying that you havereceived securitymessage concerningthe information threat, Iam currently executingSOP-76 actions andevaluating my EALs,and UI will take thelead in this event."CrewImplements N 1-SOP-27.1, section DD Secure RWCU systemLi Start CREVS

SM[] Reviews EPIP-EPP-01[I Classifies UnusualEvent in accordancewith EAL 8.1.3

0805 Expected Response:Control Room Personnel] Report message of information security threat to SM.

SMW Evaluates EPIP-EPP-10, directs CRS to implementNi-SOP-27.1

0806 at the direction of the * When called by Ul Shift SIM-3 (as U2 SM)Lead Controller Simulator Manager I concur that we are in a

Activity SIM-3 site event, lAW EAL8.1.3; NMP Unit 1 has thelead.

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TIA: At completion of messageSEC-1.TIA:Declared:Notification:

El Reviews EPIP-EPP-01 and declares an UnusualEvent per EAL 8.1.30 Assumes Emergency Director (ED) duties &implements EPIP-EPP-180 Directs Communications Aide implement EPIP-EPP-20 for notifications, after completing appropriate factsheets

-0810 COM-1 COM-1This is for all ERONs Comm Aide fax ERONs sheet toactivations X4874, controller will initiate

ERONs activation.This is for all ERONsactivations

OC-2 OC-2Provide message if SM directs precautionary If SM determines a need to perform a precautionarystaffing of facilities staffing of the facilities, state you acknowledge this

action, but for the purpose of this drill, do not perform aprecautionar staffing.

-UNUSUAL EVENT erEAL#8.1.3-0820 OC-3 OC-3If the SM does not declare an UE Confer with facility lead controllers in Declare the Unusual Event per EAL

the TSC and EOF and provide this 8.1.3 and implement necessarymessage to the SM/ED Emergency Plan Procedures.

-0825 SEC-2 SEC-2At direction of EP lead "This is Security; the NRCand after notification is Operations officer has calledcomplete via RECs line stating that the Informational

Threat is no longer in effect. Thelarge aircraft whose flight path istracking towards Nine Mile Pointhas been intercepted and re-directed to Buffalo InternationalAirport."Note if asked:Aircraft was flying out of its assignedflight path at too low of an altitudewith associated communicationsproblems.

67

At direction of EP leadInject message

"This is Security; the NRCOperations officer called with anupdate, stating that the largeaircraft is currently on the groundat the Buffalo InternationalAirport. The Aircraft was flyingout of its assigned flight path attoo low of an altitude withassociated communicationsproblems.

Following Threat Notice nolonger in effect

SM/ED evaluatestermination of eventrL Evaluate recovery of

RWCU (if isolated)0 Secure CREVS (ifstarted)

SM11 Reports thatInformational SecurityNotification is no longer ineffectLi Directs CRS to exit N1-SOP-27.1U1 Evaluates EPIP-EPP-25Termination and Recoveryfrom Unusual Event.[I Contacts Plantmanagement

Control Room PersonnelL] Acknowledge theTermination of the securityevent[- Exit N1-SOP-27.1

-0850SimulatorActivity

When directed by LeadController, activate thefollowing malfunction bydepressing the key:Trigger Io FP08C DIESEL DX-2141A, TrueEl A4-4-5 DSL.GEN.102STAND BY OFF NORMALON/OFF (cry wolf.annunciator and provideinject SIM-4)

CROReports following:1. Annunciator A4-4-5 inalarm (DSL GEN 102Standby Off Normal)2. Computer point F013 inalarm (provide inject SIM-4)3. DX-2141A, one of thecross zone fire alarms inEDG 102 room

CRSEnters N1-SOP-21.1 forfire.

-0850 SIM-4 SIM-4At direction of EP lead Provide computer point to controlMessage room operator responding to

See Supplemental Scenario 2 Annunciator tile A4-4-5 and after theoperator looks at computer of logtyper."F013 DSL GEN 102 START AIRPR LOW"

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Provide message 10 secondsafter fire alarm

• •VI-o

This is Security I was outside theEDG 102 roll door when I heardan air compressor start and thenheard something explode; I cansee smoke, dust, and debris,looking under roll door. I canalso hear the sound of airrushing in EDG Room.

I-0850 8.2.1

,,Confirmed fire in or contiguous toany plant area, or Table 5 or Table6, not extinguished in <15 minutesof control room notification.'Not expected to declare basedupon fire .... as report will bereceived by control room of nofire, but damage to equipment inEDG 102 Room. Initial report wasfor explosion.

ICRS-l Directs operators to dispatchoperator to EDG Room

SMEl Acknowledge reportsLi Directs operators respond toplant transiento] Reviews EPIP-EPP-01 andshould evaluate UE per EAL 8.2.1L1 Implements EPIP-EPP-18Li Implements appropriate stationprocedures

-0855 SIM-6 SIM-6Provide message 5 minutes This is the FBL, in the EDG 102

after fire alarm room, we have no fire; I repeatwe have no fire.

-0856 SIM-7 SIM-7Provide message 1 minute "This is the Fire Brigade Leader; it

after message SIM-6 appears that air compressor 96-02had one of the cylinder headsexplode which also caused somedamage to the 96-03 compressorand the common discharge piping.The air tanks have discharged alltheir air. We do have some oil onthe floor from the explosion andsome mechanical debris spreadaround the room from the aircompressor explosion. Both aircompressors are out of service dueto the damage."

69

-0856 TIA: At completion of messageSIM-7.8.2.2"Fire or explosion in any plant areawhich results in damage to plantequipment or structures required toestablish or maintain safe plantshutdown.'TIA:Declared:Notification:

SML1 Acknowledge reportsL1 Directs operators respond to planttransient[I Reviews EPIP-EPP-01 anddeclares an ALERT per EAL 8.2.2L Implements EPIP-EPP-181E Directs activation of theEmergency Response Facilities(ERF)L1 Directs notification/activation ofthe ERO11 Implements appropriate stationprocedures11 Directs Protected Area Evacuationin accordance with EPIP-EPP-05B(simulated)11 Directs Simulated Accountability inaccordance with EPIP-EPP-05D

________________________________ __________ i. .~

-0900SimulatorActivity

If directed by control roomto reset fire zone:Wait 1 minute and deletemalfunction:[- FP08C DIESEL DX-2141A

CROReports following:1. Clearing of DX-2141A

CRSExits N1-SOP-21.1 for fire.

ALERT per EAL ................. • H • -4 4 ::- - : ........................ -: ........................ ...................... % :::2 :::¸ .................................. :- % :: b H 2 :•: • % 2 - w 4 ............................. ......

After plant Alert message OG- 3aInject Message for TSCIOSC only,after plant announcement for Alert

OC-3aState that the Control Room hasannounced a Protected AreaEvacuation.TSCIOSC only

-0905 COM-1 COM-1Inject Message Comm Aide fax to X4874, then

controllers will initiate ERONsactivation.This is for all activations

-0910 OC-4 OC-4If the SM does not declare an Alert Confer with facility lead controllers in Declare an Alert per EAL 8.2.2 and

the TSC and EOF and provide this implement necessary Emergencymessage to the SM/ED Plan Procedures.

70

During activation of the TSC/OSC Li Recovery actions for loss ofEDG102

Li Continues to monitor plant status0i Provides plant status turnover toTSCM

TSCMF1 Receives turnover from SM/EDLi Oversees staffing and activation ofthe TSC per EPIP-EPP 23 & 13Li Briefs the TSC staff on plantstatusLi Determines needs of control roomand provides assistance as neededLi Ensures activation of the OSC

-0935 CN-1 CN-1Accountability Complete Provide message 30 minutes 30 minutes after Alert, Security

after Alert Liaison reports accountability

Inject Message for Security complete, all persons accounted for.

LiaisonWhen DCT dispatched for 102 EDG OC-5 OC-5

For the purpose of this drill, NMPUnit 2 is not participating. NMP Unit2 is operating at full power.Direct any communications to Unit 2through your facility controller.U2 participation will be simulated.

When DCT dispatched for 102 EDG DC-1 DC-1See Supplemental Scenario 2 EDG 102 air compressor exploded

damaging both air compressors andcommon discharge piping. Thediesel cannot start because of a lossof starting air (air start tanks havebeen bled off). If DCT is able torestore air - allow success.

71

............... Trigger 2 CROSimulator 0 RP01B REACTOR 0 Acknowledges halfActivity TRIP BUS MOTOR scram

GENERATOR TRIPS 141 L] Acknowledges loss ofRPS MG 141L] Acknowledges loss ofone string of Feed waterheating

CRSIi Directs stationannouncementLi Directs power reductionlAW N1-SOP-1.1Li Directs entry into N1-SOP-16.1Li Evaluates Nl-OP-48 forreset of feed waterheating.

SML] Notifies TSC of need toform DCT to addressperforming a dead bustransfer of RPS MG to I&C130 to reset half scram.[I Notifies TSC of need toform DCT to reset feedwater heating.

-0950During activation of the EOF El Recovery actions for loss of

EDG102Ll Recovery of 1/2 scram due to lossof RPS MG 1411] Loss of one string of Feed waterheating due to loss of RPS MG 141

ED/RMD Receives plant status update fromSM/ED, Oversees staffing andactivation of EOF per EPIP-EPP 23& 13L1 Briefs EOF staff on plant statusLi Ensures notifications are up todate, and ensures turnover ofcommunication responsibilities arecompletedLi Reviews activities of emergencyresponse to date

When DCT dispatched for RPS MG DC-2 DC-2:141 transfer to I&C Bus 130 See Supplemental Scenario 3 Spurious trip of RPS MG 141,

results in half scram and loss of one

string of FW heating. Cause of trip isMG141 Motor Thermal OverloadRelay 49 opened. The DCT will needto investigate failure of RPS MG set141 and support operations inplacing on I&C Bus 130 to allow*reset of half scram and reset of feedwater heating. This action will besuccessful.

/2

When contacted by DCT that MG141 is on I&C CROSimulator Bus 130. [] Receive report that MG141 is on I&CActivity Trigger 3 (Remote) Bus 130A

L. RP02 RX TRIP BUS 141 POWER SOURCE, D1 Request permission to reset half scramMAINT

CRSLi Directs half scram to be reset

Time

When DCT dispatched DC-3to reset lost feed water See Supplemental Scenarioheating string 3

nse or ConrolRoom Actions, Injectject> Messages, & Simnulator Activity

SimulatorActivityWhen contacted by DCT that MG141 is on /&C Bus130.Trigger 3 (Remote)Lw RP02 RXTRIP BUS 141 POWERSO U .............CRO11 Receive report that feed water heating has beenreset.

SimulatorActivity

When contacted by DCT thatFW heaters have been reset#121, 122, 123, 124, 125Trigger 4 (Remote)Lw MS02 HP FW HTR 125RESET

Trigger 4 (Remote)D1 MS05 FW HTR STRING12RESET

When DCT dispatchedto reset lost HWC atPanel 500

DC-4See Supplementa3

DC-4I Scenario Spurious trip. of RPS MG 141 results in half scram

and FCV-51-59 & FCV-51-60 fail open resulting inloss of HWC. The DCT w/ operations support willreset lost hydrogen chemistry. This action will besuccessful.

When contacted by DCT that HWC Panel 500 reset.Trigger 10L: FW46A SW537 H2 ISOL TO FWBP 11, AUTOL1 FW45A HWC H2 Flow Setpoint, powerL1 FW36B HWC Remote Reset, normal[I FW36C HWC Annunciator Reset, normal

SimulatorActivity

73

---------..--.----- enier malTunctions:Simulator Trigger 5Activity [] RR29 @ 6%

11 Drywell pressure risenoted by operators

L- When drywell pressurereaches alarm set pointControl Room will insert amanual scram

0i The Main Generator willTrip

LI Four banks of controlrods fail to insert (ATWS)

11 Turbine bypass valves

fail closed

11 Fuel damage begins

Trigger 6Li TC01 w/ Mode Switchgoing to SIDLi TC12 Turbine BypassValves Fail Shut set @100%Li RX01 at 13% rampedover 30 minutes w/ ModeSwitch going to SID

See SupplementalScenario # 4, 5, and 6If directed to pull HPCIfuses FU8/9Trigger 7FW24 Removal of HPCIFuses FU8/FU9, PULLEDIf directed to resetAcoustic Monitor AlarmTrigger 8ADO7 Acoustic MonitorAlarm Reset

uperatorsLi Drywell pressure risenoted by operatorsEl Prior to drywell pressurereaching trip set point theCRO will insert a manualscramLi Four banks of controlrods will fail to insert(ATWS)1[ Recognize that theTurbine bypass valveshave failed closed

CROEl Identifies that not allrods have insertedLI Failure to scam hasoccurred, Rx Power isgreater than 6%

SMLI Acknowledges CRO11 Reports plant status toTSCM & ED/RM11 Enters EOPs and directsactions to stabilize plantLi Refers to EPIP-EPP-01,recommends upgrade to aSite Area Emergency perEAL # 2.2.2

CROLi Reports plant status toSM11 Performs operations asdirected11 Will recognizeincreasing drywell Radlevels11 Makes announcementsas directed

If DCT is sent to take chemistrysample

DC-5See Supplemental Scenario 6

74

DC-5Chemistry data should be providedas follows:1. Log time sample is requested.2. Add one hour to time logged,and use the sample analysis forthis time as the time sample wascollected.3. Provide TSC Staff with theanalysis for sample collected instep 2, 30 minutes after the timeit was collected.

TIA: When reported by Operator of failure to scramand power greater than 6%.2.2.2Any RPS scram set point has been exceededANDAutomatic and manual scram fail to result in a control rodpattern which assures reactor shutdown under allconditions without boronAND EitherPower >6%ORTorus Temperature >110 F

El Acknowledge reportsLi Reviews EPIP-EPP-01 and declares a Site AreaEmergency per EAL 2.2.2[I Implements EPIP-EPP-1811 Directs activation of the Emergency ResponseFacilities (ERF)Li Directs notification/activation of the EROLi Implements appropriate station procedures11 May Directs Exclusion Area Evacuation in accordancewith EPIP-EPP-05C (Simulated).

TIA:Declared:Notification:

SIT~E AREA EMERGENCY per EAL 2.2.-1122 OC-6If the ED/RM does not declare an Confer with facility lead controllers inSAE the TSC and EOF and provide this

message to the ED/RMWhen DCT dispatched to perform DC-6inplant surveys See Supplemental Scenario 4

If DCT sent to evaluate loss of DC-7Turbine Bypass Valves See Supplemental Scenario 5

OC-6Declare Site Area Emergency perEAL 2.2.2 and implement necessaryEmergency Plan Procedures.DC-6In plant survey team(s) sent out toperform radiological surveys.DC-7The failure of the bypass valve ispostulated to be caused by a failureof the bypass valve positioning units.A failure of a summer circuit willcause no demand signal to beprovided to the valves thus ensuringthe valves will not open. DCTmembers assigned to troubleshootthe failure should be provided withindications, by the controllers usingtheir expertise, sufficient to indicate afailure as described above. Thefailure of these valves to open willnot be resolved in the time frame ofthis exercise.

75

If DCT is sent to investigate trip of DC-8the 12 Liquid Poison See Supplemental Scenario 10

If DCT sent to insert 5 stuck controlrods (when identified by CR staff)

If DCT sent to implement EOP-3.2,alternate boron injection



DC-8DCT actions to investigate failure of12 liquid poison pump. DCTmembers assigned to troubleshootthe failure should be provided withindications, by the controller. Thefailure of this pump to operate willnot be resolved in the time frame ofthis exercise.DC-9DCT actions taken to insert thecontrol rods that were identified bycontrol room as being unable to bedriven in via RMCS. DCT isexpected to vent over piston area ofassociated control rods. The DCTsent into the reactor building will beeventually forced to evacuate thearea due to rising area radiationlevels and airborne concentrationsfollowing the EC Steam Line breakoutside the Primary Containment.DC-10Due to failure of Liquid Poisonpumps the DCT will take actionslAW N1-EOP-3.2 alternate boron

-1147injection.

Another EAL entry 1.3.2,station is already in SAE.Li Drywell Radiation

reaches -3000 R/hr

EDIRMLi Receives plant statuschange and briefs TSCM0 Ensures offsiteagencies are notified onplant status change, andall notifications arecompleted[I Reviews and approvesmedia news releases asappropriate

76

SimulatorActivity

Li EC steam line break inEC IV room.[] Release of into RxBuilding begins[i RB Area radiationmonitors respondappropriatelyEI RB Area temperaturesincrease

Message #~When Drywell radiationreaches -20,000 R/hrand when EC is initiatedinsert Trigger 6, atdirection of EP Lead insimulator.Trigger 9E] EC08A EC LOOP 11STEAM IV'S FAIL TOCLOSE (EC steam IVfails open) set @ 100%Li EC08B EC LOOP 11STEAM IV'S FAIL TOCLOSE (EC steam IVfails open) set @ 100%ii EC02 STEAMLEAKAGE OUTSIDEPRIMARYCONTAINMENT, set@13%[I EC02 (remote) IV 39-06 valve Position Limit0/100%, 0%

TIA: When EC loop 11isolation failure isreported.3.4.2Main Steam line, ECsteam line or RWCUisolation failureANDA release pathway,outside normal processsystem flow paths fromthe unisolable system,exists outside primarycontainmentAND any:1I Coolant activity >300pCi/gmLi RPV level cannot berestored and maintained>-84"

Li RPV Flooding required[I DWArea Radiation>3000 R/hr

Inject Messages, &Simulator ActivityOperatorsLi Acknowledge ARM"s /PING alarms in Reactorbuilding1] Report EmergencyVentilation ActivationLi EC area hightemperatures

CRO] Reports plant status toSM, determine based onRx Building conditions thata leak exists in the RxBuilding.

OperatorsLi Attempt to isolate ECLoop 11, recognize ECLoop 11 Fails to isolate(TIA)

SMLi Acknowledges CROLi Directs actions lAWEOPsLi Reports plant statuschange to TSC/EOFLi Refers to EPIP-EPP-01and recommends upgradeto a GENERALEMERGENCY per EAL #3.4.211 Identifies releasepathway

EDIRMLi Receives plant statuschange and briefs TSCM11 Ensures offsiteagencies are notified onplant status change, andall notifications arecompletedLi Reviews and approvesmedia news releases asappropriate

-1210Li EC are unable to beisolated.

77

Time

-1212 ED/RML Receives update from SML1 Declares a GENERAL EMERGENCY per EAL #3.4.2L: Determines / provides PARs to NYS and OCEMOvia Part 1 Notifications Fact Sheet[I Completes appropriate notifications

-1225If the ED/RM does not declare aGeneral Emergency

If a exclusion area evacuation isdiscussed

OC-7Confer with facility lead controllers inthe TSC and EOF and provide thismessage to the ED/RMOC-8Input Message

OC-8aInput Message

OC-9Input Message

If a Reactor Building evacuation isconducted

If KI is planned to be administered toERO

OC-7Declare a General Emergency perEAL 3.4.2, implement necessaryEmergency Plan Procedures.OC-8Do not announce an ExclusionArea Evacuation to the Station.

This will be simulated.OC-8aAnnouncement of a ReactorBuilding Evacuation.

This will be simulated.OC-9No one is allergic or refusing totake KI.

KI use will besimulated.

If DCT sent to investigate EC system DC-11 DC-1Ibreak See Supplemental Scenario 7 The purpose of this malfunction is

to provide a release pathwayoutside the secondarycontainment and into theenvironment. The coolant leak islocated inside the EC Steam IVroom, reactor building elev. 298".Radiation levels and airborneconcentration levels will preventany DCTs from entering the area.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR NOTE: Actions taken by the operators to emergency depressurize should occur whenthe following conditions exist per the EOPs: More than one reactor building radiation level exceeds 8 R/hr or135oF (N 1-EOP-5) or information is provided based upon Dose projections or field surveys lAW N 1-EOP-6.

78

SIMULATOR OPERATOR NOTE: DCT"s sent to isolate the leak will be turneitemperature in the vicinity of the line break, which is located within the reactorisolation attempts from the control room of the EC"s will also fail.If DCT sent to investigate EC DC-12system break See Supplemental Scenario 8 & 9

z•i•,muiaxor CIVld back due to radiation levels andbuilding elevation 298". Manual

DC-12The purpose of this malfunction isto prevent the isolation of thesteam leak to allow offsite dosesrequiring implementation ofprotective actions to be reached toensure offsite objectives areaccomplished. The failure to closethe EC Steam IV 39-09R willpermit an unisolable flow path tothe reactor building atmosphereand out through the breach insecondary containment. Thecontroller should provide sufficientindications and information to anyDCT members assigned torepair/close this valve to make theDCT aware that dose levels andtemperatures in the building willresult in them being turned back.DC-13:Based upon N1-EOP-5, a steamleak into the Reactor Building onelevation 298" with rad release, aDCT will need to be sent out toprovide area temperatures andradiation levels for determinationof an EmergencyDepressurization.

If DCT sent to evaluate MAX SafeTemps per N1-EOP-5


OC-10 OC-10:Inject Message If Dose Assessment projects greater than PAGs

beyond 10 miles. Controller will inject values greaterthan PAGs beyond 5 miles but not beyond 10 miles.

The Exercise will be terminated when the following conditions have been met:[I FEMA, NRC, Oswego County and NY State have been contacted and have had sufficient time to observe allneeded aspects of the exercise.

1400 at the direction of the Lead SIM-8 SIM-8Controller I have the shift.

79

When exercise is terminated CN-2 CN-2Termination of the Exercise Place GAltronics in Merge,message sound the station alarm, and

announce:Attention, Attention allpersonnel, the Exercise isterminated.Repeat alarm and announcement

The Exercise will be terminated when the following conditions have been met:1] FEMA, NRC, Oswego County and NY State have been contacted and have had sufficient time to observe allneeded aspects of the exercise.

1400 at the direction of the LeadController

When exercise is terminated

SIM-8

CN-2Termination of the Exercisemessage

SIM-8I have the shift.

CN-2Place GAltronics in Merge,sound the station alarm, andannounce:Attention, Attention allpersonnel, the Exercise isterminated.

OC-11The Exercise critique willcommence following exercisetermination in the respectivefacilities.Please bring all logs/records withyou to the critique. We will collectthem at that time.

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fema york, ny 10278-0002 · o new femayork, ny 10278-0002?vd s" march 3, 2010 mr. don...

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