Female Empowerment in Northern India: Effects of the Political Reservation System on Gender Bias

May 10th, 2008

Sze-chuan Suen ssuen@stanford.edu

314-853-1784

Under the direction of Dr. Anjini Kochar

The government of India has attempted to address the low status of women

in society though a constitutional amendment that mandates a woman must be elected as village leader every third election cycle. Several papers have shown that female reservations have significant effects on local policy decisions, but it is unknown whether the amendment is effective in its primary goal to erode discrimination against women. In my thesis I use uniquely-tailored household and village data to investigate whether political gender reservations can decrease sex bias by evaluating changes in female investments of those living in villages with female village leaders. Using OLS regressions, I find that only when a female village leader has financial resources are there changes in sex ratios, immunization rates, and school enrollment that are consistent with greater female bargaining power. However, I also find that maternal bargaining power is correlated to low sex ratios. These results show that political reservations for females must be supplemented with sound financial resources in order to increase women’s status and bargaining power, but doing so without changing maternal son-preference will not be effective in fixing the skewed sex ratio.

Key Words: India, female sarpanch, son preference, female empowerment The author would like to express her heartfelt appreciation for Dr. Anjini Kochar for investing so much time and energy in this project. This would not have been possible without her. She would also like to thank SCID, the Rai Foundation, and the wonderful translators from Delhi Business School, and all the other mentors who contributed to the project.

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Section 1: Introduction

Male-skewed gender ratios in East and Southeast Asia have been extensively

documented, and 22 to 37 million females are estimated to be “missing” from India alone

(Mohan, 2005), with 930 females for every 1000 males (Borooah 2004); evidence from other

countries has shown that the gender imbalance can reasonably be assumed to be outside the

range of natural biological fluctuation (Sen 1990). Son-preference also extends beyond the

skewed sex ratio and into other socio-economic factors; there is a significant gender disparity

in health and education measures as well. The causes of son-preference in India are complex

and involve both economic and cultural factors. The method of son-selection is also hard to

accurately document, as a variety of methods, from abortion to childhood neglect, could be at

play.

While the sociological motivations for sex preference are unclear, the phenomenon’s

existence shows that in general, the social perceived value of women is smaller than that of

men. The elevation of the status of women in society, which would increase female

bargaining power and raise female worth, could therefore be a lynchpin for solving this

problem, especially since tackling the problem by limiting the means of selection and

propaganda campaigns have shown limited success (Dale 2006). One of the most

comprehensive and enforced policies to this end was the 73rd amendment in the Indian

constitution, which mandates that one third of all rural elected governmental positions must

be reserved for women randomly on a rotating basis. Through this act, theoretically, women

would gain a political voice, be empowered to address their concerns about their villages, and

occupy a highly-visible position in the political ladder that would erode the perception that

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women should not be involved in “men’s roles,” like politics, outside the home. This could

result in the empowerment of women in society, where female labor might become more

desirable, and in the home, where they might be able to counter extreme son preference by

having a larger say in household resource allocations. Therefore the gender of the village

leader could affect son preference through a variety of methods.

However, this long chain of cause and effect has been incompletely documented.

There have been studies showing that female sarpanches (village leaders) make decisions that

better address the needs of women, and that the village perception of the effectiveness of a

female as sarpanch changes with the number of female sarpanches the village has been

exposed to, but whether the policy has been effective in empowering women in non-political

contexts has not been explored. In this paper, I ask whether the 73rd amendment has been

able to achieve its ultimate goal of reducing gender discrimination, and more generally,

whether a policy that seeks to empower women through political power can succeed. To do

this, I look at the revealed gender preferences of parents.

I measure changes in gender discrimination through changes in the sex ratio, health

and educational investment differences across sexes and examine whether these investment

patterns change after a female sarpanch takes office through the 73rd amendment. The study

is based in Haryana, which the 2001 Indian census documented as one of the most gender-

skewed states in India.

In section two I review literature which discusses gender preference, health and

education disparities between male and female children and provide background on

government action, the 73rd amendment, and past findings concerning the effects of the

policy. In section three I explain the theoretical framework motivating the question. Section

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four provides the methodology used to answer the question at hand, then in section five

presents the results of the analysis and in section six I conclude. The appendix, section seven,

provides definitions, tables, and graphs referred to throughout the previous sections.

Section 2: Literature Review

Gender Preference and Sex Ratios

Son-preference could be an age-old attitude in India, but the advent of amniocentesis,

ultrasound, and safe abortion practices in the 1980’s provided a reliable method to realize

these preferences (Guilmoto 2007). Ten million girls have been estimated to be “missing”

since 1985 (Dale 2006). Gender ratios have become especially skewed in the north during

the last decade, where Haryana has reached a sex-ratio of 820 females to 1000 males in the 0-

6 age range, and Punjab 793 females to 1000 males (Bhat, 2006). These numbers are

unnaturally low – female-to-male ratios in countries such as Europe or the Americas usually

hovers around 1.05 females to one male, where the slight rise above parity is an artifact of

the larger mortality rate of men at every age. India’s sex ratio figures show strong evidence

of being humanly-generated rather than some natural variation in male health or birth rates;

the likelihood of having a son is much higher if the parents already have one or two

daughters and no sons (Jha, 2006).

Health and Education Disparities between Genders

Son preference has also affected other measures of child investment, namely health

and education. Sex selection through neglect may take the form of decreased post-natal care,

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breastfeeding, parental surveillance, food allocation, spending less on healthcare, or

inadequate prevention from disease, as in not getting all the available vaccinations (Guilmoto

2007). Arokiasamy et al., 2004, finds that there are higher immunization coverage rates for

males than females in all states besides Goa and Kerala, and north-central Indian states,

where the gender ratios are the most skewed, show the largest bias. In cases where disease

has already been contracted, girls are likely to be taken to a health care center later than boys

(Sachar 1990), which decreases their likelihood of effective treatment – there is significantly

higher mortality rates for hospitalized girls than boys. This disparity extends to outpatient

care, where girls are less likely to receive routine outpatient and preventive care (Sachar

1990).

Similarly, girls are less likely to attend school or go to private schools (Wu 2007),

which are perceived to be of higher quality but have higher costs. In Rajasthan, 71% of the

students in secondary and senior-secondary schools in 2003 were male (Wu 2005), and the

literacy gap between genders can rise as high as over 32.5% in north western India (Office of

the Registrar General and Census Commissioner 2001). Thus both health and education

show heavy sex discrimination.

Background on Gender Bias: Motivations and Results

Potential causes of son-preference range from the economic to social. While

practices vary between different ethnic, religious, and geographic groups, Indian tradition

generally requires bride’s family pay a dowry to the groom upon marriage. The bride

becomes a part of the husband’s family thereafter, and any productivity she generates

contributes to her husband’s family income – women are quite economically dependent on

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men, even to the extent of not usually inheriting a husband’s property should he die

(Dasgupta 1995). The economic reasons against having a daughter are exacerbated by the

lack of a pension system in much of rural India, since aging parents can only depend on their

sons for financial support. Social costs include any children who are born to the married

couple – they are part of the husband’s caste and family lineage (gothra) and not the wife’s.

Thus parents sometimes pay exorbitant amounts in land or jewelry for a daughter to get

married, and they also lose her labor and productivity, as well as any children she might have.

There are therefore limited incentives for her parents to invest in her education or health, or

even to have female children at all.

Sex selection methods make son-preference hard to identify on a household level, as

amniocentesis and ultrasound technologies have made it easy to discreetly abort unwanted

female children without attracting the censure of neighbors or village members. While such

methods are not available to many living in the rural countryside where families may lack the

facilities or the resources for such a procedure, sex selection is hypothesized to occur through

more subtle channels such as childhood neglect. However, this may happen with less

frequency, as female infanticide may lead to greater emotional costs for the parents.

Whatever the reason behind the phenomenon, the abundance of males leads to many

social problems as the cohort ages; projected conservative estimates show about 25 million

missing wives by 2030. This may lead to bride importation and trafficking, which is already

happening – the 1981 census revealed that 30% of Indians live somewhere besides their

birthplace, and 80% of these were women who had moved for marriage (Dasgupta, 1995).

Whether the move is voluntarily or not, marrying a long way from the maiden home can

decrease the bargaining power of the wife and further disempowering women. The female

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deficit may also lead to increased demand for traditional women’s roles in the home, and

increase the pressure for women to not pursue a career or acquire education, which in turn

may lead to weakening of the bargaining power of women in the home and skew sex ratios

further. The lack of women would therefore exacerbate the further marginalization of

women in public life and limit the ability for them to make independent decisions.

All of the manifestations of son-preference mentioned above are generated in part by

the low level of female bargaining power within the home and society. With greater social

status would come greater freedoms in economic and cultural practices for women, thereby

lessening the costs and increasing the returns for potential parents of girls – with a greater

ability to determine household resource allocations, wives might choose to send income or

resources back to her parents or visit them more often to contribute to their household

through labor. The husband may also require a smaller dowry when they marry since she is

bringing a larger set of social assets to his house, and also thus reducing the cost of having a

daughter. Wives may also directly decrease the manifestation of son-preference with greater

bargaining power by choosing to keep more girls; several studies have shown that mothers

show less bias towards sons than fathers (Thomas 1990, 1994, Liu 2008, Songa 2006, Glick

2000).

The geographical distribution of son-preference severity can support the female

bargaining power framework as well as the hypothesis that low female investments are due to

low female economic returns. The two causes of low female investment positively reinforce

each other; with less bargaining power, women cannot generate high economic returns, and

the lack of financial contribution to the home reduces potential female bargaining power.

Thus it is reasonable to see that son-preference is roughly inversely correlated with female

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labor participation rates, which is higher in southern Indian states (Raju 2005), and also

inversely correlated with female education rates, which reach up to a 30% gap in northern

states (Pal 2003). The driving force of these negative correlations does not seem to be overall

family wealth, which one might be expected to be positively related to female labor

participation and female education. Son preference manifests strongly in rich states --

Haryana, with the third highest per capita income in India, holds within it four of the ten

districts with the most skewed child sex ratios in India (Indian Census 2001). This could be

due to the relatively high price of the medical procedures needed to identify and remove

unwanted female children so only richer states can afford to implement sex selection so

pervasively.

Government Action

The Indian government is aware of the sex preference issue and has enacted a variety

of programs that attempt to reduce sex bias through both economic and bargaining power

motivations of son preference. Some are incentive programs like Ladli, a Haryana

government scheme where a savings account is started at a girl’s birth and Rs. 100,000 is

given to the girl at age 18 (Central Chronicle, 2008). Others attempt to increase the social

cost of son-preference through as propaganda, as in the popular slogan “save the girl child.”

A variety of NGO and governmentally supported women’s support groups have also sprung

up to run village-based programs which support mothers and children, like the childcare

centers known as Anganwadi centers that appear throughout India. These groups may

provide nucleation points where women’s communities can form so women can find power

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in numbers or simply allow women to become more productive, and therefore independent,

by offering better health, sanitation, or educational opportunities.

Changing female bargaining power would be more difficult, and the government

recognized that the problem extended beyond the facilities and resources women had access

to; gender discrimination is also sustained by the lack of representation of female needs and

ideas in both village and household level decision-making. A cultural paradigm shift was

needed to overturn attitudes about female status and power. In an attempt to spark this

mental shift the government implemented sweeping political reforms in the form of the 73rd

amendment to the constitution, the most visible women’s empowerment initiative, where

every third term the democratically elected village leader position is to be reserved for a

woman. If this plan was successful in changing attitudes that devalued women in the

workplace and in the home, not only would females be empowered within the political

sphere, but it women’s bargaining power at home would be affected as well.

The 73rd Amendment and Political Reservation System

In 1992 the Indian government passed the 73rd amendment to the constitution, which

mandated a three tiered, devolved level of government in rural areas. Although this situation

had nominally been the case, non-federal government levels were not in full operation due to

the lack of regular elections, prolonged supersessions, an overly powerful central government,

and lack of financial resources (Indian Constitution 73rd Amendment, 1992). The primary

impact of the 73rd amendment was not simply to devolve more power to rural government,

however. It also mandated that the three sub-central levels of government -- the district (zilla

parishad), block (panchayat samiti), and village level (gram panchayat) -- were all to have a

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quota for the scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST) in accordance with their

relative population in that voting area, of which one-third were to be reserved for women.

Furthermore, one-third of the total elected seats were to be reserved for women, including SC

and ST women (Singh 1994). The particular seats reserved for women were to be randomly

selected and rotated, and on average, every third term the panchayat president (the sarpanch,

at the gram panchayat level) would be a woman. SC, ST, and women were groups

traditionally believed to have low bargaining power and social status; this sea change was an

effort to introduce a mechanism by which these under represented demographics might be

able to thwart discrimination and achieve higher social and political status.

Village councils, or gram panchayats, vary in size with village population, and do not

have jurisdiction over urban areas. Each gram panchayat is composed of a number of

panches, or council members, and one sarpanch, or village president, all of whom are elected

by popular vote. All members of the gram panchayat are residents within the village. The

gram panchayat identifies the needs of the village, plays a limited role in allocating public

resources, implements development programs, and identifies below poverty line (BPL)

residents, who then qualify for certain public programs. This includes the construction of

local infrastructure, such as roads and drainage systems.

The 73rd Amendment gave the panchayats the power of taxation, and additional

funding for operations can come from the federal government, allocated through four general

programs. In addition, there is a drinking water funding scheme, welfare funding, and a

general gram panchayat operations fund. The gram panchayat also holds public land, or

shamlat land, in the village, and can rent it off or otherwise use it to generate income.

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The changes made in the 73rd amendment were implemented starting in 1993, and

villages began obeying the women and SC and ST quotas in their 1995 cycle election. While

all villages held elections roughly every 5 years, the election year vary both inter- and intra-

village, with some villages holding elections in 1994 or 1996 and again in 2000.

With this constitutional amendment, India joined a growing number of countries that

legislated women’s participation in government. Worldwide, the number of laws mandating

women’s inclusion in the political process has increased drastically; as of 2003, there were

twenty-two countries with laws requiring all political parties to nominate a minimum

percentage (ranging from 20% to 50%) of women as candidates for national legislative office

(Baldex 2003). These laws have led to an eight percentage point increase in the number of

women elected to national governing bodies (Htun and Jones 2002). Therefore the laws are a

success to the extent that women are in government; however, are these women successful in

implementing real change? Much early anecdotal evidence points to women sarpanches

merely operating as proxies for their fathers or husbands, or independent female sarpanches

becoming victims of violence or ousted using manipulated votes of no-confidence or other

political maneuvers (McSweeney 2008).

Fortunately, there exists a body of past work in evaluating the success of the 73rd

amendment in regards to women’s empowerment. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) have

found that contrary to the popular stories, substantial differences in expenditure patterns can

be attributed to the gender of the sarpanch. Women leaders invest more in public goods

more closely aligned with women’s concerns, which varied across region, and less in men’s

concerns (Chattopadhyay 2004). In southern India, less than 20% of women were found to

have been persuaded to run for the sarpanch position by their husbands, and were generally

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wealthier, more politically experienced, and more politically knowledgeable than the average

woman (Rao 2008). Additionally, villages reserved for women leaders were found to have

less corruption (Duflo 2005).

In terms of attitude changes, there is even some evidence that mandated female

leadership might reduce prejudice against women in political positions. Beaman et. al (2008)

finds evidence that first-time women leaders receive worse evaluations from their

constituents than their male counterparts while second time females are rated equivalently.

However, residents of villages with female sarpanches report being less satisfied with public

goods than villages with male sarpanches, although they may have more of them and some of

this dissatisfaction stems from public goods outside the jurisdiction of the panchayat (Duflo

2005). Therefore it is yet unclear whether reservations for female sarpanches are able

successfully urge villagers to accept that politics can be a place for women, although not for

lack of studies on the subject.

To this date, however, there has been no exploration of whether greater political

representation of women are able to effectively change the status of women in society, the

primary goal of the 73rd amendment. While female leaders may be capable and can

effectively address women’s concerns in the village, they may still not be an effective tool in

empowering all women in non-political realms and changing gender discrimination. I

therefore ask directly in this study whether women sarpanches are effective at increasing the

value of women in general by looking at changes in bargaining power of women in the

household.

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Section 3: Theoretical Framework

Women’s Bargaining Power Changes Resource Allocations to Children by Sex

The non-unitary model of bargaining power for intra-household resource allocation

(Thomas 1990) assumes that when the preferences of the husband and the wife differ on how

household resources will be allocated, the outcome will depend on their respective

bargaining powers, which can be determined by contributions to the household. These in

turn can be determined by a variety of factors, such as the magnitude of financial

contributions, labor (such as childcare or housekeeping), or some form of ability (like having

a political connection, social status, or knowledge). The past literature shows that there is

evidence to suggest that maternal resource allocation patterns differ from paternal ones

regarding childcare and investment; if so, bargaining power changes between parents,

induced by policies aimed at empowering women, the result would be reflected in resource

shifts for children by gender.

The non-unitary model of bargaining power has been empirically tested, and there is

much evidence in favor of it over the unitary model for inter-household resource allocation.

Thomas (1990) finds in Brazil that maternal unearned income (pensions, etc) has almost a

twenty times larger effect on child survival than paternal unearned income, and mother’s

education has a bigger impact on daughter’s height and weight for height measures while

father’s education has a larger affect on son’s (Thomas 1990, 1994).

Since then there have been a plethora of studies on the effects of parental bargaining

power on child health and education. A maternal head of household is likely to have taller

children than in a household with a male head (Liu, 2008). In West Africa, mother’s

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education raises daughter’s schooling while father’s education raises school for both sexes

(Glick, 2000), while in China maternal education has a weaker effect on daughter’s

secondary school enrollment than paternal education does (Songa 2006) but the opposite is

true for primary school enrollment. These studies all show that bargaining power between

parents can and does have an effect on health and education investments of children by

gender, and therefore can change the degree of child sex bias in resource allocation in the

household. In general, these studies agree that mothers seem to show less son-preference, so

in increase in female bargaining power should result in a greater sex ratio and larger female

health and education investments.

Mechanisms by Which Female Leaders Empower Women

Greater political representation can directly empower women through voicing their

political concerns and helping them acquire village resources for their needs. Although these

direct changes are likely to be the main affect of the policy, female sarpanches can also

change female returns and bargaining power in a variety of indirect ways.

One is to directly do so by increasing the productivity of women in the village. If

female sarpanches efficiently address the needs of the village, it would publicly demonstrate

their ability to perform tasks in a public domain, and perhaps erode the social barriers for

women to serve the community in other non-traditional ways. The increased scope of

allowable “women’s work” would yield potentially better matches between the workers and

their work, thus generating higher returns for the whole community. Women would then

have a higher probability of serving in a visible position while receiving a wage, they may be

valued for their social and economic contribution to their family; the social return can extend

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to both her husband’s family and her maiden home, if her maiden family is in the village.

This would justify increased investment in her from both her parents and her husband’s

family. Additionally, if female sarpanches enact programs that address women’s needs, then

the women of the village may be more productive by having better resources with which to

perform their work, be that through better infrastructure, health, or childcare, again

generating benefits for both parental and spouse families. The outside wage for women

would then increase with the rise in women’s productivity. In addition to increasing the

economic returns for women, this allows a higher threat point when bargaining in intra-

household resource allocation decisions.

This leads to the second mechanism female sarpanches might be able to change

female bargaining power -- through women’s social status and communal resources. In

“Bargaining and Gender Relations,” Bina Agarwal argues that rights in communal resources,

social support systems, and support from the state and nongovernmental organizations affect

the bargaining power of women within the household (Agarwal 1997). The introduction of

female sarpanches has the potential to change all three of these factors, as the sarpanch

obviously has the right to divide communal resources, and theoretically does so through the

support of the entire village. She may be able to introduce governmental programs or NGOs

into the village that support women’s rights in general. Bina Agarwal continues, saying that

notions about the division of labor, resources, and perceptions concerning the relative

contribution and needs of men and women also play a role in the range of bargaining power

for women. These, too, have the potential of being changed, as women are introduced into a

new field and would therefore have new contributions and needs. However, this may be

mitigated by what the Amartya Sen calls the “perceived contribution response,” where the

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community perceives the contribution of the women to be lower than in reality, and so

continues to be undervalued.

Finally, the bargaining power of women in the village may increase due to the feeling

of self-worth that comes with successfully contributing to one’s community. Sen argues that

there may be psychological factors governing successful bargaining, and “the underdog

comes to accept the legitimacy of the unequal order and becomes and implicit accomplice”

(Sen 1990). However, if traditional gender roles are disrupted through the inclusion of

women into politics or increased productivity in women, women may come to expect more

from their communities and bargain more efficiently for decision-making power.

As seen in the previous section, a rise female bargaining power should decrease son-

preference, and female inclusion in local governance could theoretically achieve higher

bargaining power for women. However, there are some doubts as to whether female

sarpanches are able to achieve these goals. I now turn to examining that question in northern

India using parental investment in female children as an indicator of the perceived value of

females.

Section 4: Methodology

I ask whether the reservations for females in leadership positions are able to change

the perceived value of females in society through increasing female bargaining power. To do

this, I draw from three sources for my data. The first is a small subset of the Study for Fiscal

Decentralisation done collaboratively by the Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial

Development (CRRID) and the Stanford Center for International Development (SCID) in

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2005-2006 in Pubjab, the second is village and household surveys of nineteen villages in

Haryana, India, and the third is the Indian Census -- town and village census data on the

villages of interest from the 1991 census, and state data from the 2001 census.

I first confirm that reservations for female sarpanches can successfully affect political

decision-making by observing that villages reserved for female sarpanches have different

panchayat expenditure patterns than those without. If female sarpanches are unable to

influence panchayat decisions, there is little possibility that they are able to affect child

investment measures. Female sarpanch efficacy has been shown before in Duflo’s work in

West Bengal and Rajasthan, and from the analysis presented below, I find that it holds true

for Punjab as well. Both Rajasthan and Punjab border on Haryana, and Punjab is Haryana’s

most demographically similar neighbor, so this offers substantial evidence that this finding

holds true in Haryana as well.

I then analyze whether female sarpanches are able to influence the status of females

by measuring parental investment in girls. The Haryana data, supplemented with the census

data, is used to identify whether the presence of female sarpanches are correlated with

behavioral changes in gender discrimination at the household level. I use the sex ratio and

gender differences in immunizations/prenatal checkups as a way to measure changes in

household gender preferences towards infants, and I use the gender differences in educational

quantity and quality to measure changes towards school-age children.

Econometric Methods

1. Effect of women sarpanches on panchayat expenditures

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In order to find whether female sarpanch reservations affect panchayat expenditures, I

use the regression:

Y j = α + β1(d_reserved for female)j + β2(controls) j + ε j (1)

where j denotes village. Y can be whether funds were spent, or how much was spent, on

thirteen different expenditure categories (see appendix for complete variable definitions).

Control variables include measures that reflect the “neediness” of the village – for example, a

large number of landless poor might encourage spending on community buildings. Variables

reflecting the popularity of the sarpanch (such as the percentage of votes received by the

winner) are also held constant, as I am attempting to isolate the effect of reserving a sarpanch

position for a woman, not the effectiveness of any particular sarpanch.

Note that the dummy indicator here is whether the sarpanch seat is reserved for a

woman, not whether the sarpanch was a woman. The estimated coefficient will therefore

capture the effect of the policy in isolation, not of the affect of the sex of the sarpanch.

Female sarpanch reservations are randomly assigned to one third of all villages, and this

assignment is rotated every term, so a village will be reserved to have a female sarpanch

every third term. This exogenous variation in female sarpanch assignment ensures that there

is no selection bias.

One important consideration is also the panchayat income. I control for variables that

are sources of potential income (village resources such as public land that can generate rent,

or fishing ponds), and also estimate the regression above where Y is the total panchayat

income to see whether female-reserved villages systematically receive different income than

those which are not. There does not seem to be any significant differences in female

panchayat incomes between male and female sarpanch terms.

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2. Female Sarpanches and sex ratios, health, and education

After seeing whether female sarpanches can influence panchayat decisions, I wish to

see whether this sort of highly-visible female exposure in a traditionally male-dominated

realm can affect household behavior towards female children. The variables of interest

include decisions made before children are born (though sex ratios), after birth (by looking at

immunization rates), and during childhood (through educational quality changes).

I first check that bargaining power is a significant factor when considering sex ratios

using the regression:

Sex ratiojc = α + β1(average maternal education)jc + β2(average paternal education)jc

+ β3(controls) jc + ε jc (2)

where j denotes village and c denotes cohort was born (cohorts are composed of all

individuals born in a given year). So (average maternal education)jc designates the average

education of all mothers in village j who had a child in cohort c, and similarly for paternal

education. Controls is a vector of controls which includes the log village earnings and

village characteristics, such as village population by sex and number of village households.

Here, maternal education is being used as a proxy for bargaining power, to see if it influences

the sex ratio.

I then repeat this analysis for my other variables of interest – the vaccination sex ratio

and primary school enrollment sex ratio. (The vaccination sex ratio is the percentage of

females vaccinated in a cohort to the percentage of all individuals vaccinated in a cohort; the

primary school enrollment sex ratio is the percentage of females who attend at least one year

of school in the cohort to the percentage of all individuals who did so). The cohorts here are

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created in a similar manner as before – for the vaccinations, a cohort is composed of all

individuals who could have received a vaccination in a given year, and for education, a

cohort is composed of all individuals who could have been enrolled in primary school for the

first time (all children aged 6) in a given year. Numerous other studies have shown that

maternal bargaining power has an affect for such measures of child health as height and

height-for-weight (Thomas, 1990, 1994; Liu 2008) so it is reasonable to expect a statistically

non-zero coefficient on the maternal education variable.

Maternal bargaining power is more commonly measured through more direct

measures of female contributions to the household, such as female income or pensions, etc.

However, 95% of the females in the dataset are unemployed and generate no income. It is

likely that their main contribution to the household is through non-income labor such as

household chores, child care, and work in their own fields. Female education may therefore

be an indirect measure of female bargaining power, since education may make these efforts

more efficient and therefore vary with the female contribution to the household. However,

maternal education may not accurately capture the full female contribution to the household

since it is not a direct measure of female household contribution, so while the results

presented later from this analysis are suggestive, alternative interpretations of the results are

valid.

After determining whether bargaining power has an effect on sex ratio, I turn to

finding the effect of a female sarpanch on sex ratio. Theoretically, as outlined previously, a

female sarpanch has the ability to affect female bargaining power in the village; through this

avenue she might change the sex ratio. As in the expenditure analysis above, the regression

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here uses the exogenous discontinuity between having and not having a female leader to

examine sex-ratio differences by exploiting the randomness of female sarpanch assignment

across villages over time. I compare cohorts in villages which have had a female sarpanch to

cohorts in villages which have not, and selection bias is not a concern because village

sarpanch seats are reserved for women at random times. As in the bargaining analysis, the

sex ratio cohorts are made up of all individuals born in the same year, and the sex ratio of the

cohort is the subset of all females born in the cohort over the total number of individuals born

in the cohort. This sex ratio comparison can be repeated for all years/cohorts starting from

when the first village had a female sarpanch in order to reveal whether there is a difference

between the reserved and non-reserved villages. Thus the comparison is at the cohort level

across villages, and not across time, so it is unnecessary to be concerned about time trends,

and the inclusion of village fixed effects will not confound the analysis.

The exogenous nature of assignment of female sarpanch reservations is therefore

crucial to the analysis. The method of implementation of the policy ensures that the timing

of the reservation is random and it is therefore highly unlikely that there is any systematically

biased village characteristic for all the villages assigned to have a female sarpanch in a

particular election, but the sample size used here is small so it may contain villages that

suffer from such systematic bias simply by chance. I therefore confirm that village

characteristics are similar between the villages that had female sarpanches in 1995, 2000, and

2005 (see Table 2).

In order to find the effect of female sarpanch exposure on the variables of interest, I

use the regression:

yjc = α + β1(d_femaleLeaderVariable)jc + β2(shamlat) jc + β3(controls) ijc + ε ijc (3)

22

where i denotes individual in village j, cohort c. See appendix for complete variable

definitions. In the base regression, yjt is the sex ratio for village j for cohort c, which is

regressed on a dummy for having a female sarpanch in the village to find whether exposure

to female sarpanches can affect the sex ratio.

In equation (3), shamlat denotes the amount of public land a village owns. The rental

of shamlat land is a major source of income to the village panchayat, who have complete

discretion over the spending of these funds -- unlike much of its federally-allotted budget. It

therefore provides a measure of the economic power of the sarpanch.

Here, ‘controls’ is a vector of control variables that include village characteristics,

since the effect is expected to be different for different village populations, resources

available, and village average incomes. These factors may limit the “social effectiveness” of

a female sarpanch – for instance, if a village is five or ten times the size of a typical village,

as is the case for certain outliers in the sample, fewer village members may be aware that the

sarpanch is a woman, diluting the effect of having a woman in power. These controls are not

theoretically necessary if the sample size is large, since the female sarpanches are assigned

randomly, but including them here may significantly help overcome the issue of the small

sample size.

Son preference is also examined through the health and education investment

differences between sexes, because these measures may provide additional information

distinct from sex ratio patterns. Vaccination sex ratios and primary school sex ratios (see

definitions in appendix and above) are regressed against whether that village has been

exposed to a female sarpanch or not in order to determine whether female sarpanches can

affect these measures of investment.

23

The affect of a female sarpanch on son preference indicators may change over time

and across villages of different characteristics (such as village income or average parental

education), and therefore I include a sensitivity analysis section exploring these relationships.

To see whether the affect of a female sarpanch changes over time, I estimate the same

regressions while replacing the female leader dummy with a variable measuring the number

of years since the village had a female leader (starting at the beginning of her term). The

coefficient would then estimate the effect of exposure to female leader over time. I also run a

separate regression that includes the square of this variable to explore the possibility that the

effect of the female sarpanch on sex ratio might be increasingly time sensitive – i.e., the

effects of having a female sarpanch may be “forgotten” (in terms of the gender ratio or

education ratio, etc) more rapidly as time goes on. This might occur if there is a social effect

to the influence of having a female sarpanch – originally many households may decrease

their preference for males, but as more and more households revert back to their previous

beliefs, the societal pressure to have more girls will drop, causing a parabolic effect on the

sex ratio. Conversely, this could happen in the opposite direction, if societal pressures for

accepting women achieved critical mass in the village and more and more people were

pressured into, and eventually accepted, that females had greater value than they originally

believed.

In the second part of the sensitivity analysis I examine whether there is heterogeneity

within the results. There are two sources of heterogeneity – variation by the resources the

sarpanch has at her disposal, and variation by the characteristics of the village. Each of the

three sex bias indicators – sex ratio, vaccination sex ratio, and education sex ratio – is

regressed on interactions between the female sarpanch variable with indicators of sarpanch

24

resources (like available shamlat land) and village characteristics like average log village

income, average village maternal education, and average village paternal education. The

regression is:

yjc = α + β1(village characteristic * d_has ever had a female sarpanch)jc

+ β2(shamlat) jc + β3(village characteristic)jc + β4(controls) ijc + ε ijc (4)

where i denotes individual, j village, and c cohort, and village characteristic can be shamlat

land, earnings, average village maternal education, or average village paternal education and

controls are as specified in equation (3). I am therefore able to determine whether the female

sarpanches with greater access to resources (shamlat land) are more able to influence sex

ratios than those who don’t and whether female sarpanches with wealthier or more educated

villages are more influential.

Background on the Datasets

In order to ask the question of whether female sarpanches can change the perceived

value of women in households, the reservation system must be effective in bringing a woman

into office. While compliance with the 73rd amendment is complete within the sample, there

is ample anecdotal evidence that female sarpanches do little to influence panchayat decisions.

Duflo has already shown that female sarpanches are effective in initiating policies that cater

to the needs of women in Rajasthan, which borders on Haryana on the west, but Rajasthan is

demographically dissimilar to Haryana. Punbaj, however, to the northwest of Haryana, is

quite similar in size, population, literacy rates, and other demographic measures (see Figure 1

and Table 1). I briefly compare the difference between various demographic measures

between Haryana and its neighbors (standardized by national standard errors) to see that

25

Punjab is Haryana’s the most similar neighbor by far, and is actually very similar to Haryana

in absolute terms in many demographic categories as well.

Therefore Punjabi data from a subset of the CRRID-SCID Study of Fiscal

Decentralisation, which includes panel data on 300 villages at the village level, is used to

examine the relationship between female sarpanch reservations and panchayat expenditures.

If the female sarpanches elected through the reservation system are effective in representing

female concerns, then their villages would be expected to have different expenditure patterns

than non-reserved villages. The survey data was collected at the village level, and includes

whether the sarpanch position was reserved for a female, whether the panchayat spent funds

on public goods (which are broken down into 13 categories) in 2004-2005 and if money was

spent, how much. Sarpanch elections were held in 1993, 1998, and 2003; legally, one third

of the villages were reserved for female sarpanches. The 2003 reservations are analyzed here,

and in compliance with the law, 32% of villages were reserved for a female sarpanch that

year. The dataset also includes measures of village resources and sources of funding as well

as the proportion of poor (as measured by land ownership, income) and needy in the village

(i.e., pension drawing status).

After finding whether panchayat spending was influenced by female reservations, I

turn to the question of whether female sarpanches are able to directly influence the perceived

value of women in society. For this question, data was obtained from household and village

surveys of nineteen villages in Haryana state (in Faridabad, Rohtak, and Sonipat districts),

outside Delhi, India. Surveys were verbally conducted and translated from Hindi.

Nineteen villages were randomly chosen from village lists obtained from block

development offices. Village surveys were verbally conducted with the panchayat or with

26

the sarpanch. Survey information included village-level characteristics, such as panchayat

member characteristics and amount of various village resources. Since the 73rd amendment

was implemented, all villages have held elections once in 1994-1996 (exact year differs

between villages), 2000, and 2005.

Household surveys were conducted with 10-15 households in every village, except

one village which only had 4 households. At least two below poverty line (BPL) households

were included from every village to insure variation in income, and social economic group

variation was ensured by covering at least one household from every caste in the village.

Besides these variations, households were chosen randomly from the village resident list.

Household representatives were asked to give ages, relationships, educational characteristics,

and children of all household members along with other individual characteristics as well as

provide household level information (such as household income, landholdings, etc).

This dataset is uniquely tailored to answer the question of how gender ratios change;

all family members (including away or dead children) are documented by age, gender,

whether they were vaccinated, and educational level and status. The village and household

sex ratios over time can therefore be reconstructed using the ages of all household members,

even if they are currently away or dead. All individuals are assigned a cohort by the year

they were born and the village they were born in; the sex ratio (females born to total born) is

then calculated by village and cohort. In this way one can “look back in time” in the sex

ratio data to examine the sex ratios of cohorts born in villages before the sarpanch position

had been reserved for a woman and after.

Immunization rates are reconstructed in a similar manner, since immunization takes

place in the year after birth. The relationship between primary school enrollment (whether

27

one currently attending or completed one year of primary school) and female sarpanch

exposure can also be determined if one makes the assumption that the decision to attend

primary school for all children is made when they are six years of age. I designate all

individuals who have had a female sarpanch by reservation in their village prior to age six as

having parents who have been exposed to a female sarpanch, and I can see whether there is a

difference between school sex ratios (percentage of 6-year-old females who will complete

primary school to the percentage of all 6-year-olds) of those cohorts which have parents who

have been exposed to a female sarpanch and those which do not have such parents.

The dataset therefore provides unique information needed in variable construction –

may datasets do not include immunization or prenatal checkup history for all individuals, for

example. It is for this reason that it is chosen over other public datasets which have larger

sample sizes. This dataset includes information on over 1600 individuals in 18 villages, but

the sample size shrinks as those without various control variables must be excluded, resulting

in a minimum sample size of 213 individuals for certain regressions. The sample size also

varies by dependant variable; while all individuals surveyed provided information on age and

education, vaccination data could only be obtained for individuals with a living parent in the

survey household, cutting the maximum sample size to just over 564 (may be less due to

omission of control variables used when regressions were run).

The source of the advantages for this dataset -- that the questions were tailored to

answer questions about sex ratios -- could have potentially generated biased answers since

there are legal and social repercussions to gender selection. Therefore all questions

concerning births and health of children were framed in the context of gathering general

household information instead of asking expressly about gender preference.

28

Compliance with the 73rd amendment was close to complete: all but one of the

villages had a female sarpanch once in the last three terms, with only two exceptions to the

expected female sarpanch pattern. (The exceptions were one village which reported an non-

mandated female sarpanch in 1996 and mandated one in 2005, and another village which

reported a mandated female sarpanch in 1990, before the policy was implemented.) One

third of all panchayat members were female in all villages. Thus all villages are standardized

in that each had only one female sarpanch through the reservation system.

The third source of data used is the census of India. The census is taken every ten

years by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, and includes state, district,

and village level information on population and household size and number. 1991 census

data is chosen over other censuses for use in the controls since female sarpanches are only

assigned after the passage of the 73rd amendment in 1992, and changes in the villages

reflected in the 2001 census could be the direct result of sarpanch actions. The 2001 census

data is used to show that comparisons between Haryana and Punjab are valid; the two states

are demographically similar and effects of the reservation system should be comparable.

Section 5: Results

A graphical representation of the total number of children born by sex over time for

all villages is shown in Graph 1. There are significantly fewer girls born than boys after

around the 1980’s, and the absolute sex ratio over this period is lower than parity. Sex ratios

for all villages, by years normalized to the first year that a female sarpanch was in office, are

shown in Graph 2. A simple visual analysis of the graph may lead one to believe that if there

29

changes due to female sarpanches the changes are not immediate or do not occur in all

villages, which motivates the sensitivity analysis.

Female Sarpanch Reservations and Expenditure patterns

The analysis of whether reservations for female sarpanches are able to influence

panchayat decisions confirms that reservations indeed make a difference on village

expenditures (See Table 3a, 3b, and 3c). I look at thirteen categories in which panchayats

can invest, and for each I examine whether the reserved or non-reserved sarpanches of

funded it and the amount they funded it by.

The regressions indicate that female sarpanches selected through reservations tend to

spend more on irrigation canals and tanks, drinking water and water works (significant at the

15% level), streetlights (significant at the 10% level), and salaries for panchayat members.

These sarpanches were also less likely to spend on hospitals and health centers, but those that

did spent more than their male counterparts (both measures significant at 10% level). Less of

the reserved villages spent funds on public buildings and community centers. (All

differences between the two types of villages are significant at 5% level unless otherwise

stated.) Therefore out of the thirteen expenditure types, six categories show differences

between non-reserved and reserved sarpanch positions.

This shows that reserved panchayats act differently from non-reserved villages, and

since female reservations are randomly assigned, this difference must be due to the

reservation system. Previous literature shows that women sarpanches are better able to

address the needs of women in the village; while this analysis does not show that these

30

changes in Punjab cater to village women, they at least reflect the concerns of the female

sarpanch. These changes could potentially demonstrate to villagers that women have a role

in public office and decision-making positions in the home, thereby increasing the perceived

value of women. To see if they can, I must first determine whether female bargaining power

can influence the dependent variables I use in my analysis.

Sex Ratios and Bargaining Power

The first regression here determines whether maternal bargaining power can affect

sex ratios, where village average maternal and paternal education act as proxies for

bargaining power (see Table 4). The results show that both maternal and paternal education

are strong predictors of sex ratio at the 5% level, even controlling for village characteristics

such as village populations and households (and therefore household size). However, the

sign of the maternal education coefficient is negative, indicating that increases in maternal

bargaining power decrease the sex ratio (reduce the fraction of girls born). This is a contrary

result to that found in much of the literature, which shows positive correlations between

maternal bargaining power and child health. This anomaly could be due to attitudes specific

to Haryana, which is unique in having one of the lowest sex ratios in the country. However,

it could also be an effect of not having a direct measure of maternal bargaining power within

the home.

Since health and education sex ratios are also of interest, I also wish to find whether

female bargaining power is a force that can change girls’ health and education investment. In

the vaccination sex ratio regression, the maternal education coefficient is significant and

31

positive, indicating that mothers with more bargaining power give daughters more

vaccinations.

The next regression shows that maternal bargaining power does not change

daughters’ primary school enrollment rates, and I therefore should expect no change in

primary school sex ratios if the female sarpanch influences the perceived value of women

through maternal bargaining power. Examining this female investment indicator is still

valuable, since it can act as, in the language of medical testing, a “negative control” -- it will

help identify when changes in female investment patterns are due to an affect on maternal

bargaining power or due to some other change in the village.

If the above analysis is correct, then if the female sarpanch were able to increase

female bargaining power within the home it might depress the sex ratio still further, although

vaccination ratios should rise. I explore whether that is the case in the next section.

Female Sarpanches and Sex Ratios

I examine whether female sarpanches influence the perceived value of women in

society by measuring changes in the sex ratio, an indicator of the desirability -- and by proxy

the social value -- of women. The sex ratio can be followed over time in Graph 1. In the

base case, the sex ratio (fraction of female individuals in the cohort, where a cohort consists

of all individuals born in the same year) is regressed on whether that village has had a female

sarpanch at the time of a cohort’s birth. These results are shown in Table 5 (regressions 1, 2,

and 3). The estimates indicate that there seems to be no relationship between having ever

had a female sarpanch and the sex ratio.

32

Shamlat land does not significantly affect the sex ratio when village fixed effects are

taken into account; it would be reasonable to assume that shamlat land is not a fixed village

characteristic (as it may be sold or rented out in various quantities to provide income for the

panchayat) and therefore evaluating it with the inclusion of village fixed effects is correct.

One might be concerned that the accuracy of self-reported ages decreases with the

age of interviewee, causing measurement error and biased estimators; higher mortality rates

for older persons may also increase the variance of yearly sex ratio measurements even given

accurate reporting, which would influence the t-statistics. Therefore identical regressions

were run using only individuals born after year 1960. I find similar results regarding

coefficients and t-statistics, showing that the data from older people in the sample generally

reinforce the same trends in the data from younger people.

Over-fitting is not seen to be a concern even though the regression only uses 564 data

points for a considerable number of independent variables as the R value is actually quite low.

The regression suffers from some non-robustness, as the coefficients and significance levels

change dramatically as more variables are controlled for, but all the variables included in the

final regression are reasonable and theoretically justified. The amount of shamlat land

affects the degree of influence a sarpanch has by providing the ability to fund panchayat

projects. The village average income could reasonably be related to desirability of males

(necessity of old age support, etc). Individual characteristics such as savings and parental

education might be important for controlling for household-level characteristics. Village

population measures would also reflect the transparency and publicity of panchayat and

sarpanch actions (for instance, the smaller the village, the larger the fraction of constituents

the sarpanch may have had personal contact with) which would effect the degree to which

33

the sarpanch is able to influence public perception. This result, then, indicates that the

gender of the sarpanch is not able to elevate the perceived value of females enough to change

child sex preferences.

Sex Preference Indicators through Health Investment: Immunizations

A sufficient increase in the perceived value of females to overcome cultural and

social sex preferences might be difficult to achieve. Here, I examine changes in health

investment of female children that parents have already decided to have. This measure is

expected to vary independently of sex composition choices as parents may have more

autonomy over the level of investment in a child’s health than the sex of the child. Here, the

vaccination rate is an index of health investment

Vaccination rates have changed dramatically in rural villages. Out of the entire

sample, an average of 71% people are vaccinated against any sort of disease (the most

popular vaccinations include polio, diphtheria, BCG, and hepatitis B) while children under

the age of 14 had an average vaccination rate of 88%. Vaccinations are normally

administered at or soon after birth, with the child taking a series of booster shots that ends

before age two. Crucially, investment in vaccinations occur after the sex and health of the

child are known, so the sex of the child may well play a role in determining whether he or

she receives vaccinations or not. The bargaining power regressions show that mothers with

bargaining power favor giving vaccinations to their daughters, so there should be an increase

in the vaccination sex ratio if female sarpanches are able to increase female bargaining power.

34

Even so, the regressions show there is no significant change in the proportion of

female vaccinations as compared to total vaccinations (see Table 6 regressions 1, 2, and 3).

Ever having a female sarpanch does not change vaccination behavior for women.

Sex Preference Indicators through Educational Investment: Primary School Enrollment

While households may not respond to a female sarpanch by changing health

investments for girls, they might change other types of investments. The analysis from

Punjab showed that villages reserved for female sarpanches were less likely to spend

panchayat funds on hospitals and health clinics; if the female sarpanch was catering to female

desires, as suggested by previous literature, then perhaps health investment is not a priority

for women in the household. Then more bargaining power for females would not result in

greater health investment for either sex.

I therefore turn to education, a measure of investment that happens later in a child’s

life. The increase in the child’s age also changes the factors behind the parental investment

decision, since the parent has now already invested in the child. This gives another reason to

believe that analysis of educational investment patterns will generate an additional dimension

of information on sarpanch efficacy. I estimate whether having had a female sarpanch in the

village changes the primary school enrollment sex ratio, defined (in the appendix) as the

percentage of females in the cohort who attend at least one year of primary school to the

percentage of all children in the cohort who attend at least one year of primary school. The

analysis finds that those parents who live in a village which has had a female sarpanch by

reservation before their child is six years of age (when they must make the decision whether

35

to send their child to primary school) are not any more or less likely to enroll their girls in

primary schools (see Table 7 regression 1, 2, and 3).

While this is consistent with the findings concerning maternal bargaining power,

where the analysis found that daughter’s education investments do not vary with mother’s

bargaining power, the results from the previous two sections showed that female sarpanches

were not able to change sex ratios or health investment ratios, which maternal bargaining

power is important in predicting. Therefore this negative result is likely due to the lack of the

influence of the female sarpanch, not a lack of response due to the inability of female

bargaining power to change educational sex ratios.

Sensitivity Analysis: Allowing for a Nonlinear Effect of Female Sarpanch Exposure

1. Sensitivity of the Sex Ratio to Time from Female Sarpanch Exposure

In order to more fully understand whether the female sarpanch reservation has an

affect on the sex ratio, I explore whether there is a linear or parabolic relationship between

the time since the female sarpanch took office and the sex ratio (wee Table 5 regressions 4-9).

There does not seem to be any relationship.

2. Sex Ratio and Heterogeneous Exposure to Female Sarpanches

I also separate out various village characteristics which might influence how

receptive the village is to a female sarpanch. If the sarpanch has more disposable income, for

instance, she might be able to enact more effective or more visible programs, which could

change villagers’ perceptions about her efficacy and the desirability of a woman in politics

36

(see Table 8a). Shamlat land is a large source of a sarpanch’s non-earmarked funds, so I use

this as a measure of the amount of resources the sarpanch has available. I find that the

interaction term between having a female sarpanch and amount of shamlat land has a

statistically non-zero effect on sex ratios at the 10% level. The sign of the coefficient

indicates that the wealthier the female sarpanches are, the more depressed the sex ratio

becomes, which is consistent with the effects of greater maternal bargaining power as seen in

the bargaining power estimations. This would then imply that the efficacy of the female

sarpanch in elevating female bargaining power is dependent on the financial resources she

has at her disposal.

The resources of the residents of a sarpanch’s village may also affect how effective

she is. I test whether female sarpanch reservations can change sex ratios for villages that are

on average wealthier, have higher average maternal education, and have higher average

paternal education in three separate regressions. I find no significance for any of them,

indicating that whether female sarpanches change the perception of women is independent of

village average income and parental education.

3. Sensitivity of the Health and Education Sex Ratios to Time from Female Sarpanch

Exposure

As with the analysis of the sex ratio, I wish to check for changes over time as well as

for sarpanch and village characteristics that might make it more likely for a female sarpanch

to have an affect on health and education investment decisions. There are no linear or

parabolic relationships for the health (see Table 6 regressions 4-9) or education sex ratios

37

(see Table 7 regressions 4-9) over time since the female sarpanch was in office once village

fixed effects are controlled for.

4. Health and Education Sex Ratios and Heterogeneous Exposure to Female

Sarpanches

As in the sex ratio analysis, the amount of shamlat land a village has is an important

factor for female sarpanch efficacy (see Table 8b). The vaccination sex ratio increases with

shamlat land interacted with female sarpanch reservation while education investment does

not; this is consistent with the directions of change seen when maternal bargaining power is

increased. Along with the sex ratio results, this confirms that disposable funds are a crucial

factor influencing the ability for female sarpanches to change female bargaining power and

early-childhood investment decisions. This is result is reiterated with the education

regression, which shows that even female sarpanches with shamlat land do not change

education investment in girls (see Table 8c). The bargaining power analysis earlier showed

that maternal bargaining power does not influence girls’ educational attainment even while

being significant for the sex ratio and health regressions, so the fact that the sex ratio and

health investment patterns changed in villages with landed female sarpanches while

education did not is one clue that female sarpanches act through changes in maternal

bargaining power to affect these measures of female investment.

There are no changes in health or education investment patterns if the female

sarpanch village is wealthier or if fathers in the village are, on average, more educated.

However, if mothers are more educated in the female sarpanch village, there is a decline in

the vaccination sex ratio, indicating that fewer girls are vaccinated (see Table 8b). Therefore

38

the affect of the sarpanch does vary slightly with maternal education in the village, although

only by affecting vaccination sex ratios and no other measures of female investment. The

sign of the change is also interesting; it is contrary to the results that an increase in female

bargaining power would give. The mechanism for this change is unclear, and this finding is

unsupported by the data in the other two sex preference variables.

While the direction of the effect of female sarpanches with shamlat land is consistent

with increases in maternal bargaining power, the magnitude of the effect is slight. In the

maternal bargaining power analysis I found that an additional year of maternal education

results in a -0.00998 change in the sex ratio, 0.0475 change in the vaccination ratio, and no

change in the education sex ratio. A female sarpanch reservation in a village with one

additional acre of shamlat land results in a -0.000381 change in the sex ratio, 0.00102 change

in the vaccination ratio, and no change in the education sex ratio. A rough evaluation of the

magnitudes shows the effects are roughly 25 to 45 times stronger respectively for an

additional year of maternal education than the effect of the female sarpanch. This would

roughly mean a female sarpanch would need roughly 45 more acres of shamlat land to have

the same effect on female bargaining power as an additional year of maternal schooling

(assuming that non-linear effects are still negligible at this range). This is a large difference;

82% of the individuals surveyed live in villages with 80 acres or less of shamlat land, and

70% in villages with less than 40 acres. So while the effect of a female sarpanch with land is

significant and increases female bargaining power in the village, the magnitude of the change

is small.

39

Section 6: Conclusion

Several papers have shown that female reservations in the Indian panchayat

leadership system have significant effects on policy decisions and allow for greater

representation for women’s concerns. However, effective female governance may not

necessarily lead to the erosion of discrimination against women. In this paper I asked

whether political gender reservations can increase the perceived value of females by

evaluating changes in familial investment in girls living in villages with female village

leaders.

Looking at the discontinuity between villages before having a female sarpanch and

after having one, I confirmed that the female sarpanch reservation alters panchayat

expenditure patterns, showing that female sarpanches are able to effectively influence

panchayat decisions in the region of interest.

The average village maternal bargaining power is important in determining the sex

ratio and vaccination sex ratio, although not the primary school sex ratio. Even so,

reservations for female sarpanches alone are unable to affect village sex ratios or female

health and educational investments. Only in villages which have both a female sarpanch and

shamlat land are all female investment indicators consistent with an increase in maternal

bargaining power, and the size of the change varies linearly with the amount of shamlat land

the village has.

This shows that reserving sarpanch seats for females is not enough to change female

status and bargaining power in the village; the female sarpanch must also have disposable

income in order to be an effective leader and demonstrate that females belong outside the

40

home. Ironically, though, the policy would fail in achieving its goal of fixing the sex ratio

even if the government provided greater financial resources to female sarpanches -- greater

maternal bargaining power is correlated with lower sex ratios in Haryana. Political

reservations for females must be supplemented with sound financial resources in order to

increase women’s status and bargaining power, but doing so without changing maternal son-

preference will not be effective in fixing the skewed sex ratio.

While it is reasonable and expected that female sarpanches require resources in order

to be effective, it is somewhat surprising that female empowerment does not reduce son

preference. This is especially so in light of other studies, like Thomas’, which have shown

that female bargaining power increases investment in daughters. One possibility for maternal

son preference in Haryana is the unique level of dependence of mother’s on sons. As

reviewed earlier, females have very low status in northern India and have limited property

rights without male representation (Dasgupta 1995). This dependence is particularly striking

for widows who must rely on sons – unlike in the regions where Thomas and others based

their studies, widows in northern India often rely almost completely on sons for resources,

and therefore may show more son preference than fathers. It is therefore plausible that

increasing women’s bargaining power without addressing their financial dependence on sons

may increase gender bias.

This study focuses on villages in which there have only been one female sarpanch;

the literature shows that different results can be seen as a village is required to have a female

sarpanch more than once. Further studies need to explore the effect of repeated female

sarpanches on discriminatory attitudes. However, the present analysis shows that political

reservations alone are not an effective tool for changing discriminatory attitudes and should

41

be supplemented with financial resources if the goal is to allow female sarpanches to be

effective in increasing female bargaining power and social status. At the same time, this

result will be likely to exacerbate the sex bias problem, which is already of grave concern in

Haryana. I therefore see little hope that this policy will be able to address all measures of the

sex discrimination problem in India effectively.

42

Section 7: Appendix

Definitions:

Regression set 1:

Y j = α + β1(d_reserved for female)j + β2(controls) j + ε j

• Where j denotes village. • Where Y can equal total panchayat income, or whether there were expenditures

on (13 regressions), or how large the expenditures on (13 separate regressions): o electricity supply • irrigation canals and tanks • drinking water and water works • sewage and drainage • roads • schools • hospitals and health centers • street lighting • panchayat buildings and community centers • anganwadi center • sports stadium • salaries • other

• d_reserved for female is a dummy variable for whether the village was reserved

for a female sarpanch.

• Controls are a vector of control variables listed in the regression tables.

43

Definitions (cont.): Regression Set 2:

yjc = α + β1(d_femaleLeaderVariable) jc + β2(shamlat) jc + β3(controls) ijt + ε ijc

where i is the index for the individual belonging to j for village and cohort c. Each cohort is made up of all children born in a particular year.

• y can equal the sex ratio, prenatal checkup sex ratio, immunization sex ratio, school attendance sex ratio, or educational quality sex ratio which are defined as follows:

• sex ratio = (females born in village j in cohort c) / (total children born in

village j cohort c)

• prenatal checkup sex ratio = (females given prenatal checkup in village j cohort c) / (total children given prenatal checkup in village j cohort c)

• immunization sex ratios = (females immunized in village j cohort c) / (total

children immunized in village j cohort c)

• school attendance sex ratio = (percentage girls who are in or will complete 1 year of primary school in village j in cohort c) / (percentage of total individuals who will enroll in or complete 1 year of primary school in village j cohort c)

• D_femaleLeaderVariable is a dummy variable that denoting whether a female leader

has been in office in the village before or during the year of the births, the time between the birth year of the individual and the year the female sarpanch took office, and time between the birth year of the individual and the year the female sarpanch took office squared.

• Shamlat is the amount of shamlat land the village has

• Controls is a vector of control variables (see regression tables for complete list) which

include characteristics of individual i and village j. 1991 Village Characteristics, as seen on the regression tables, is part of the control vector and contains village characteristics from 1991. They are: village land area, population, female population, male child and female child population, no. of houses, and no. of households.

44

Graph 1: Total Males and Females Born by Calendar Year

Total No. born in Haryana sample (5 yr MA by calendar year)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

Calendar year

# bo

rn MalesFemales

Graph 2: total number born, by sex and calendar year for all villages. Graph is smoothed using a 5-year moving average to reduce visual noise. The total number of females born after the 1990’s (when the 73rd amendment was ratified and implemented) are smaller than the total number of males born then. The trend seems to begin before the 1990’s, and may be part of the reason that the policy was enacted. I will be looking for discontinuities in the sex ratio of each village at the time the female sarpanch took office, which are 1995, 2000, 2005, depending on the village.

45

Graph 2: Sex Ratios Over Time

3 yr MA Sex Ratios

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

-70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30

Normalized Years

Sex

Rat

io (g

irls/

tota

l bor

n)

Graph 1: Shows the sex ratio over time, using a three-year moving average of sex ratios to reduce visual noise, with years normalized to the year that the female sarpanch took office. All sarpanches serve for a 5 year term, so villages had a female sarpanch for years 0 - 5.

46

Figure 1: Map of Indian States

Haryana's neighboring states. Previous literature shows that female sarpanches in Rajasthan (to the southwest of Haryana) are able to effectively influence panchayat expenditures. I do the same analysis for Punjab (to the northwest of Haryana) and see the same results. Map modified from Census of India 2001 accessed at http://www.censusindia.gov.in/maps/india2.jpg on May 1, 2009.

Table 1: Demographics of Haryana and its Neighbors

Total Population:Total 29443371.56 38029976.34 21144564 24358999 -0.085 5360926 -0.415 56507188 0.930 166197921 3.814Males 15908512.94 19485479.36 11363953 12985045 -0.083 6077900 -0.271 29420011 0.927 87565369 3.911Females 14188923.6 17947311.95 9780611 11373954 -0.089 3087940 -0.373 27087177 0.964 78632552 3.836

No. Households 5530855.829 6743173.138 3712319 4348580 -0.094 1221589 -0.369 9317675 0.831 25757640 3.269

Rural pop:Total 21214018.26 28352071.97 15029260 16096488 -0.038 5482319 -0.337 43292813 0.997 131658339 4.114Males 10902933.54 14731050.98 8052988 8516596 -0.031 2756073 -0.360 22426640 0.976 69157470 4.148Females 10311084.71 13627313.85 6976272 7579892 -0.044 2726246 -0.312 20866173 1.019 62500869 4.075

No. SC: Total 5207365.625 7353406.288 4091110 7028723 -0.399 1502170 -0.352 9694462 0.762 35148377 4.224No. SC: Male 2690273.75 3833753.766 2188585 3714350 -0.398 763333 -0.372 5067679 0.751 18502838 4.255No. SC: Female 2517091.875 3521369.987 1902525 3314373 -0.401 738837 -0.330 4626783 0.774 16645539 4.187

Male Births Last Year 298197.2286 399011.0159 238814 197007 0.105 59676 -0.449 810308 1.432 1873074 4.096Female Births Last Year 270004.3429 360983.7419 187658 155092 0.090 50402 -0.380 700126 1.420 1687395 4.155

Literacy Rate: Total 16019651.34 19473893.35 12093677 14756970 -0.137 4041621 -0.413 27702010 0.802 75719284 3.267Literacy Rate: Male 9615249.029 11875017.3 7480209 8442293 -0.081 2278386 -0.438 18047157 0.890 48901413 3.488Literacy Rate: Female 6404402.314 7693359.11 4613468 6314677 -0.221 1763235 -0.370 9654853 0.655 26817871 2.886

* the difference between Haryana and state means in national standard errorsData from Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India, Census of India 2001 accessed online at http://www.censusindia.gov.in/default.aspx on May 1, 2009

Himachal Pradesh Average

Diff. from Himachal (in national. s.e.)*

Rajasthan Average

Diff. from Rajasthan (in nat. s.e.)*

Mean of all states national s.e.

Haryana Average

Punjab Average

Diff. from Punjab (in national. s.e.)*

Uttar Pradesh Average

Diff. from Uttar Pradesh (in nat. s.e.)*

The demographics of India, Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. We find the national standard error using data from all 28 Indian states, then use this as a standard by which we can use to compare the differences between Haryana and its neighbors. A visual inspection of the demographic distance between Haryana and its neighbors shows that Punjab is the most similar to Haryana -- most of Punjab's demographic measures are less than 0.1 standard errors away from Haryana's while the other states are much higher. We therefore use Punjabi expenditure data to confirm that reserved female sarpanches are able to affect panchyat expenditures and assume that this conclusion holds for sarpanches in Haryana.

Table 2: Average Village Statistics By Female Sarpanch Term In Haryana

AllNever 1995 2000 2005

Village Area (Sq km) in 1991 504.15 462.68 384.06 430.03 643.92Village Shamlat Land Amt 113.33 6.99 14.96 149 177.11Average VillIage Per Capita Income 1169.79 704.33 1257.87 1421.25 1094.71Ave. Rooms Per House 877.01 892.2 883.49 858.39 883.63Ave. TV Possession Rate 875.65 891.88 883.54 856.39 881.74Total Village Pop. in 1991 3175.7 1764.08 1834.5 2068.1 5575.41Percentage of Village are Female in 1991 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.46

1990Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max

Village Area (Sq km) in 1991 233 462.6828 501.9881 171 1322.9Village Shamlat Land Amt 233 6.987124 1.743166 4 8Average VillIage Per Capita Income 233 704.3257 106.2533 642.5867 886.4035Ave. Rooms Per House 233 892.1974 308.7298 0 999Ave. TV Possession Rate 233 891.8755 309.6595 0 999

Total Village Pop. in 1991 233 1764.077 213.5378 1640 2130Percentage of Village are Female in 1991 233 817.0129 103.2826 757 994

1995Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max

Village Area (Sq km) in 1991 132 384.06 253.9036 131.12 637Village Shamlat Land Amt 295 14.96271 18.90368 4 70Average VillIage Per Capita Income 295 1257.872 326.2619 716.6765 1703.704Ave. Rooms Per House 293 883.4881 319.3605 1 999Ave. TV Possession Rate 294 883.5442 319.8179 0 999Total Village Pop. in 1991 132 1834.5 391.9876 1444 2225Percentage of Village are Female in 1991 132 869.5 172.1533 698 1041

2000Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max

Village Area (Sq km) in 1991 412 430.0331 158.7298 200.32 650.32Village Shamlat Land Amt 412 148.9951 263.9359 0 750Average VillIage Per Capita Income 511 1421.251 1216.043 287.6812 4282.412Ave. Rooms Per House 510 858.3873 347.1542 1 999Ave. TV Possession Rate 511 856.3933 349.6559 0 999

Total Village Pop. in 1991 412 2068.097 1138.377 465 3967Percentage of Village are Female in 1991 412 957.2184 523.0696 215 1827

2005Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max

Village Area (Sq km) in 1991 401 643.9214 403.2707 187 1188Village Shamlat Land Amt 613 177.1062 221.2399 0 500Average VillIage Per Capita Income 613 1094.714 446.5239 452.6931 1668.317Ave. Rooms Per House 613 883.6346 319.0079 1 999Ave. TV Possession Rate 613 881.7406 321.6878 0 999

Total Village Pop. in 1991 401 5575.409 5581.774 821 13805Percentage of Village are Female in 1991 401 2577.823 2579.978 382 6385

Table 2 shows the village

demo- graphics of

Haryana villages for

those villages with female

sarpanches in 1995, 2000, and 2005 for comparison

across village types (top

box) and with more detail (sections

below). In general, the

three types of villages do not system- atically vary

by any particular

measure, and this justifies

our assumption that female sarpanch

assignment was indeed

random. Data from Registrar

General & Census

Commissioner, India,

Census of India 2001 accessed online at

http://www.censusindia.gov.in/default.aspx on May 1,

2009

In Villages with a Female Sarpanch in Year:

In Villages with a Female Sarpanch in Year:

In Villages with a Female Sarpanch in Year:

In Villages with a Female Sarpanch in Year:

In Villages with a Female Sarpanch in Year:

Table 3a: Female Sarpanch Reservations and Irrigation & Drinking Water Expenditures(1) (2) (1) (2)

VARIABLES

-0.0549 6525*** -0.0479 3864~(0.0387) (2351) (0.0482) (2376)0.000164 -11.17 0.000149 -6.054(0.000116) (7.051) (0.000144) (7.126)-1.66e-05 2.843 -0.000128 5.152(7.40e-05) (4.499) (9.22e-05) (4.547)2.95e-05 -3.747 0.000151 -6.430(8.46e-05) (5.144) (0.000105) (5.199)0.00794 -314.2 0.0306 -779.6(0.0504) (3067) (0.0628) (3100)-0.00943 308.4 -0.0300 848.0(0.0505) (3070) (0.0629) (3103)-0.00805 360.3 -0.0326 769.2(0.0504) (3067) (0.0628) (3099)-0.00890 379.5 -0.0302 809.5(0.0504) (3066) (0.0628) (3098)-0.000298 15.38 -8.20e-05 17.12(0.000369) (22.44) (0.000460) (22.68)0.00797 -952.3 0.00888 -729.1(0.0158) (961.9) (0.0197) (972.2)-0.0824 429.5 -0.129 -771.0(0.0966) (5874) (0.120) (5936)-0.0225 893.1 -0.0634*** 995.0(0.0194) (1180) (0.0242) (1192)0.0539 4090 0.0800 -14266**(0.103) (6282) (0.129) (6349)-0.0105 1001 0.0107 -1452*(0.0138) (838.7) (0.0172) (847.6)0.000682 -94.23 -0.000598 11.29(0.000957) (58.19) (0.00119) (58.81)0.00670 -559.9 0.0207 -1001(0.0274) (1664) (0.0341) (1682)-0.00100 -9.994 0.000226 -48.99(0.00126) (76.58) (0.00157) (77.39)

Constant 1.945*** 2976 1.864*** 39197**(0.306) (18611) (0.381) (18810)

Observations 291 291 291 291R-squared 0.073 0.092 0.063 0.065

In order to confirm that female sarpanches are able to effectively influence some measure of panchayat operations, we analyze whether villages reserved for female sarpanches allocate village expenditures differently. We here see that they do for irrigation/water tanks and drinking water. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ~ p<0.15. S.e. in parenthesis. Data from CRRID-SCID Study of Fiscal Decentralisation..

Amt. of funds for drinking water

No. votes received by 2003 sarpanch winner

No. of shops generating revanue% landless village householdsNo. candidates for 2003 sarpanch

Total No. of OBC BPL HouseholdsTotal No. of SC BPL Households

Funds for Drinking water?

Rental revanue from shops?

Amt of Shamlat LandShamlat land use in past 5 years

Any fishing ponds?

Area of fishing ponds

Total No. of all BPL householdsTotal No. of General Caste BPL

Reserved For Female SarpanchSGRY funds at District LevelTotal Village Population 2001Total Village Population 1991

Funds for irrigation?

Amt. of funds for irrigation

Table 3b: Female Sarpanch Reservations and Lighting & Building Expenditures(1) (2) (1) (2)

VARIABLES

0.0413* -1964 -0.120** 8909(0.0247) (1876) (0.0484) (6865)0.000139* -13.62** 1.52e-05 -7.305(7.42e-05) (5.628) (0.000145) (20.59)1.25e-05 -1.571 -0.000247*** 11.53(4.74e-05) (3.591) (9.26e-05) (13.14)-1.63e-05 1.440 0.000246** -5.591(5.42e-05) (4.106) (0.000106) (15.02)-0.00321 43.77 0.0348 -3542(0.0323) (2448) (0.0632) (8957)0.00271 -18.71 -0.0354 3689(0.0323) (2450) (0.0632) (8965)0.00398 -81.74 -0.0371 3469(0.0323) (2448) (0.0631) (8955)0.00311 -61.04 -0.0340 3409(0.0323) (2447) (0.0631) (8953)-0.000452* 45.74** 0.000574 -53.90(0.000236) (17.91) (0.000462) (65.52)0.00475 -68.39 0.0245 -2549(0.0101) (767.8) (0.0198) (2809)0.0265 2676 0.275** -34733**(0.0618) (4688) (0.121) (17153)-0.000859 416.6 0.0482** -6328*(0.0124) (941.5) (0.0243) (3445)0.0535 -6849 -0.247* 19440(0.0661) (5014) (0.129) (18345)0.0136 -1045 -0.0407** 1778(0.00883) (669.4) (0.0173) (2449)0.000121 0.347 -0.00108 340.7**(0.000613) (46.44) (0.00120) (169.9)-0.000862 -251.8 -0.0513 1827(0.0175) (1328) (0.0343) (4859)0.000480 -42.80 -0.00278* 132.9(0.000806) (61.12) (0.00158) (223.6)

Constant 1.703*** 20405 2.168*** 10601(0.196) (14855) (0.383) (54350)

Observations 291 291 291 291R-squared 0.063 0.064 0.111 0.059

No. votes received by 2003 sarpanch winner

No. candidates for 2003 sarpanch

In order to confirm that female sarpanches are able to effectively influence some measure of panchayat operations, we analyze whether villages reserved for female sarpanches allocate village expenditures differently. We here see that they do for the street lighting and panchayat building/community center catagories. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ~ p<0.15. S.e. in parenthesis. Data from CRRID-SCID Study of Fiscal Decentralisation.

% landless village households

Amt of Shamlat LandShamlat land use in past 5 years

Any fishing ponds?

Area of fishing ponds

Amt. of funds for lighting

Funds for buildings?

Rental revanue from shops?

Amt. of funds for buildings

Total Village Population 1991Total No. of all BPL households

Reserved For Female SarpanchSGRY funds at District LevelTotal Village Population 2001

Funds for lighting?

Total No. of General Caste BPL Total No. of OBC BPL HouseholdsTotal No. of SC BPL Households

No. of shops generating revanue

Table 3c: Female Sarpanch Reservations and Health & Salary Expenditures (1) (2) (1) (2)

VARIABLES

-0.0325* 9035* -0.0425 2220*(0.0166) (5424) (0.0593) (1242)4.75e-05 1.979 0.000372** -2.908(4.98e-05) (16.27) (0.000178) (3.725)3.15e-05 -2.290 -3.79e-05 -0.635(3.18e-05) (10.38) (0.000113) (2.377)-5.81e-05 0.205 3.48e-05 2.619(3.64e-05) (11.87) (0.000130) (2.718)0.00191 -268.8 -0.130* 361.6(0.0217) (7076) (0.0774) (1621)-0.000675 187.1 0.130* -390.7(0.0217) (7083) (0.0774) (1622)-0.00231 313.3 0.130* -304.5(0.0217) (7075) (0.0773) (1620)-0.00202 300.1 0.129* -361.2(0.0217) (7073) (0.0773) (1620)-6.65e-05 -10.27 -0.000968* 28.09**(0.000159) (51.77) (0.000566) (11.85)0.00305 -764.7 0.0326 -511.4(0.00680) (2219) (0.0243) (508.2)0.0237 4164 0.0502 4340(0.0415) (13552) (0.148) (3103)0.00979 785.6 0.0197 557.4(0.00834) (2721) (0.0298) (623.2)-0.0170 4219 0.0753 849.8(0.0444) (14494) (0.158) (3319)-0.00736 1185 0.00366 337.3(0.00593) (1935) (0.0212) (443.1)0.000394 -284.8** -0.000847 0.368(0.000411) (134.3) (0.00147) (30.74)0.00893 -692.6 0.0220 -258.5(0.0118) (3839) (0.0420) (879.1)0.000720 -129.1 0.000348 -30.78(0.000541) (176.7) (0.00193) (40.46)

Constant 1.901*** 7514 1.320*** -6060(0.132) (42940) (0.469) (9833)

Observations 291 291 291 291R-squared 0.090 0.030 0.084 0.120

Any fishing ponds?

Area of fishing pondsRental revanue from shops?

In order to confirm that female sarpanches are able to effectively influence some measure of panchayat operations, we analyze whether villages reserved for female sarpanches allocate village expenditures differently. We here see that they do for health clinics/hospitals and salaries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ~ p<0.15. S.e. in parenthesis. Data from CRRID-SCID Study of Fiscal Decentralisation.

No. of shops generating revanue% landless village householdsNo. candidates for 2003 sarpanch No. votes received by 2003 sarpanch winner

Total No. of all BPL householdsTotal No. of General Caste BPL Total No. of OBC BPL HouseholdsTotal No. of SC BPL Households

Shamlat land use in past 5 years

Funds for health?

Amt. of funds for health

Amt of Shamlat Land

Reserved For Female SarpanchSGRY funds at District LevelTotal Village Population 2001Total Village Population 1991

Amt. of funds for salaries

Funds for salaries?

Table 4: Female Bargaining Power and Dependent Variables of Interest(1) (2) (3)

VARIABLES Sex Ratio

-0.00998*** 0.0475***(0.00361) (0.0114)0.0122*** -0.0261*(0.00387) (0.0137)

0.0124(0.00855)0.00705(0.00764)

0.000113 0.000851* -5.60e-05(0.000154) (0.000438) (0.000327)-0.0741* -0.219* -0.103(0.0430) (0.119) (0.0912)-0.0618 0.116 0.0420(0.0489) (0.145) (0.104)-2.33e-05 -0.000232 -4.92e-05(7.20e-05) (0.000213) (0.000153)0.000545 -0.00130 -3.93e-05(0.000538) (0.00150) (0.000869)-0.00105 0.00280 0.00101(0.000895) (0.00248) (0.00191)0.00162 -0.00692 0.00140(0.00215) (0.00637) (0.00458)-0.000601 0.00948 -0.00644(0.00326) (0.00961) (0.00700)-0.00179* -0.00901*** 0.00363*(0.00105) (0.00307) (0.00211)0.00123 0.00639*** -0.00350**(0.000852) (0.00245) (0.00163)

Village Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes

Constant 0.876*** 2.252*** 1.642***(0.265) (0.726) (0.559)

Observations 841 516 516R-squared 0.053 0.078 0.062

We find whether female bargaining power, proxied here with maternal education, has the ability to change our dependent variables of interest: the sex ratio, the vaccination sex ratio, and the education sex ratio. We find that it does influence sex ratios and vaccination rates but does not change female school enrollment. Increases in maternal bargaining power decreases the sex ratio and increases the vaccination sex ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008 Surveys.

average education of mother with children born at time t in villageaverage education of fathers with children born at time t in village

Vaccination Sex Ratio

School Sex Ratio

log village average per capita income

amt. shamlat land in village

average education of fathers with children age 6 at time t in village

average education of mothers with children age 6 at time t in village

village female child population in 1991

village houses in 1991

village households in 1991

village has doctor

village land area in 1991

village population in 1991

village male population in 1991village male child population in 1991

Table 5: Female Sarpanch Reservations and the Sex Ratio(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

VARIABLES Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio-0.0122 0.00119 -0.00303(0.0205) (0.0267) (0.0377)

2.36e-05 1.34e-05 3.40e-06 4.05e-05 -2.38e-05 0.00160(1.76e-05) (3.14e-05) (3.78e-05) (4.32e-05) (7.75e-05) (0.00110)

-9.01e-09 2.61e-08 -1.58e-06(2.11e-08) (4.96e-08) (1.09e-06)

2.11e-05 7.96e-05 0.000292** 3.03e-05 0.000129 0.000244* 2.72e-05 0.000130 0.00188(4.30e-05) (6.16e-05) (0.000133) (4.26e-05) (8.32e-05) (0.000134) (4.33e-05) (8.33e-05) (0.00120)

-0.0544** -0.149*** -0.0326 -0.0329 -0.0255 -0.167*(0.0228) (0.0364) (0.0396) (0.0476) (0.0418) (0.0962)7.77e-05 9.72e-05 9.29e-05 9.72e-05 9.15e-05 8.67e-05(4.84e-05) (8.05e-05) (7.93e-05) (8.05e-05) (7.94e-05) (8.08e-05)0.000143***0.000123 0.000137 0.000123 0.000136 0.000123(4.91e-05) (8.94e-05) (8.74e-05) (8.94e-05) (8.75e-05) (8.93e-05)0.000102** 9.08e-05 9.34e-05* 9.08e-05 9.01e-05 9.83e-05*(5.18e-05) (5.76e-05) (5.67e-05) (5.76e-05) (5.71e-05) (5.78e-05)0.000287 0.000330* 0.000324* 0.000330* 0.000320 0.000321(0.000192) (0.000195) (0.000194) (0.000195) (0.000194) (0.000195)0.00383 0.00778** 0.00749** 0.00778** 0.00770** 0.00800**(0.00303) (0.00369) (0.00361) (0.00369) (0.00363) (0.00369)0.0224 0.0497* 0.0482* 0.0497* 0.0481* 0.0463*(0.0211) (0.0277) (0.0275) (0.0277) (0.0275) (0.0278)-0.000801 -0.00340 -0.00319 -0.00339 -0.00354 -0.00303(0.00300) (0.00367) (0.00357) (0.00367) (0.00364) (0.00367)-0.0225 -0.0496* -0.0481* -0.0496* -0.0481* -0.0463*(0.0211) (0.0277) (0.0275) (0.0277) (0.0275) (0.0278)7.06e-05 -3.97e-05 -3.88e-05 -3.98e-05 -3.78e-05 -4.00e-05(0.000219) (0.000228) (0.000227) (0.000228) (0.000227) (0.000228)

village land area in 1991 No No Yes No No Yes No No YesVillage Fixed Effects? No No Yes No No Yes No No YesConstant 0.485*** 0.356 0.947*** 0.458*** 0.0501 0.0752 0.453*** 0.00181 3.215

(0.0119) (0.241) (0.300) (0.0201) (0.357) (0.388) (0.0235) (0.369) (2.122)Observations 1524 747 564 1524 564 564 1524 564 564R-squared 0.000 0.085 0.138 0.001 0.135 0.138 0.002 0.136 0.141

landholdings of individual i in villagefather's education of individual i in villagenumber of brothers of individual i in village

village has had a female sarpanch reservationtime since village had a female sarpanch

caste of individual i in village

time squared since village had a female sarpanch amt. shamlat land in villagelog village average per capita incomeeducation of individual i in village We find whether female

sarpanch reservations can affect the sex ratio by regressing it on whether the village has had a female sarpanch, the time since having a female sarpanch, and the that time squared. We do not find that female sarpanch reservations can influence the sex ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008 Surveys.

mother's education of individual i in villagenumber of sisters of individual i in villagebirthorder of individual i in village

if individual i in village has been ill in past year

Table 6: Female Sarpanch Reservations and Vaccination Sex Ratios(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

VARIABLES

0.124** 0.102 0.163(0.0570) (0.100) (0.101)

-7.42e-05* -0.000207**-0.000164 -0.000283**2.93e-05 0.00203(4.40e-05) (8.29e-05) (0.000102) (0.000118) (0.000219) (0.00261)

1.12e-07* -1.68e-07 -2.18e-06(5.86e-08) (1.44e-07) (2.59e-06)

0.000138 0.000457* 0.000228 4.82e-05 0.000415* 0.000300 0.000119 0.000387 0.00314(0.000130) (0.000238) (0.000360) (0.000126) (0.000236) (0.000360) (0.000131) (0.000238) (0.00289)

0.00811 -0.130 -0.0778 -0.159 -0.132 -0.258(0.108) (0.129) (0.111) (0.130) (0.120) (0.239)-0.000275 -0.000209 -0.000244 -0.000210 -0.000236 -0.000229(0.000185) (0.000187) (0.000184) (0.000187) (0.000184) (0.000188)0.000293 0.000262 0.000277 0.000262 0.000289 0.000260(0.000208) (0.000210) (0.000206) (0.000210) (0.000206) (0.000210)3.76e-05 8.44e-05 3.29e-05 8.44e-05 6.13e-05 9.27e-05(0.000167) (0.000166) (0.000164) (0.000166) (0.000166) (0.000166)0.000866 0.000748 0.000728 0.000749 0.000741 0.000763(0.000695) (0.000691) (0.000691) (0.000691) (0.000691) (0.000692)-0.0184* -0.0192* -0.0195* -0.0192* -0.0208* -0.0189*(0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0108)0.108 0.0605 0.108 0.0602 0.109 0.0467(0.131) (0.133) (0.130) (0.133) (0.130) (0.134)0.0132 0.0112 0.00972 0.0112 0.0118 0.0119(0.00970) (0.00968) (0.00949) (0.00967) (0.00965) (0.00971)-0.108 -0.0610 -0.109 -0.0607 -0.110 -0.0472(0.132) (0.133) (0.130) (0.133) (0.130) (0.134)0.000785 0.000611 0.000804 0.000612 0.000767 0.000618(0.000554) (0.000553) (0.000549) (0.000553) (0.000549) (0.000554)

No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes

village Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No YesConstant 0.850*** -0.223 0.733 0.977*** 0.908 1.356 1.024*** 1.327 4.921

(0.0403) (1.017) (1.108) (0.0519) (1.099) (1.180) (0.0574) (1.156) (5.058)Observations 679 352 352 679 352 352 679 352 352R-squared 0.007 0.075 0.105 0.005 0.089 0.105 0.010 0.093 0.107

Vacc. Sex Ratio

Vacc. Sex Ratio

Vacc. Sex Ratio

Vacc. Sex Ratio

Vacc. Sex Ratio

Vacc. Sex Ratio

Vacc. Sex Ratio

Vacc. Sex Ratio

Vacc. Sex Ratio

We find whether female sarpanch reservations can affect the vaccination sex ratio by regressing it on whether the village has had a female sarpanch, the time since having a female sarpanch, and the that time squared. We do not find that female sarpanch reservations can influence the sex ratio after village fixed effects are taken into account. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008 Surveys.

number of sisters of individual i in villagebirthorder of individual i in village1991 Village characteristics?

landholdings of individual i in villagefather's education of individual i in villagenumber of brothers of individual i in villagemother's education of individual i in village

log village average per capita incomeeducation of individual i in village caste of individual i in village if individual i in village has been ill in past year

village has had a female sarpanch reservationtime since village had a female sarpanch reservationtime squared since village had a female sarpanch

amt. shamlat land in village

Table 7: Female Sarpanch Reservations and Education Sex Ratios(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

VARIABLES0.145*** 0.0688 0.0591(0.0398) (0.0858) (0.0920)

-4.20e-05 -4.45e-05 -5.44e-05(3.34e-05) (7.24e-05) (9.23e-05)

4.43e-09 -1.33e-08 -4.31e-08(1.55e-08) (4.35e-08) (9.13e-08)

4.30e-05 -0.000151 -0.000337 -3.64e-05 -0.000153 -0.000313 -2.15e-05 -0.000153 -0.000300(8.84e-05) (0.000166) (0.000294) (8.73e-05) (0.000166) (0.000298) (8.83e-05) (0.000167) (0.000307)

-0.0388 -0.0186 -0.0618 -0.0285 -0.0588 -0.0348(0.0794) (0.100) (0.0810) (0.101) (0.0844) (0.104)-0.000289**-0.000310** -0.000291**-0.000311** -0.000298**-0.000314**(0.000142) (0.000147) (0.000142) (0.000147) (0.000142) (0.000147)3.63e-05 6.79e-05 3.68e-05 6.84e-05 3.86e-05 6.93e-05(0.000154) (0.000160) (0.000154) (0.000160) (0.000154) (0.000160)0.000175* 0.000170 0.000186* 0.000171 0.000190* 0.000172*(0.000103) (0.000104) (0.000101) (0.000104) (0.000101) (0.000104)0.00102** 0.000951* 0.00101** 0.000953* 0.00103** 0.000957*(0.000479) (0.000488) (0.000481) (0.000488) (0.000481) (0.000488)0.00779 0.00680 0.00719 0.00681 0.00739 0.00684(0.00691) (0.00724) (0.00697) (0.00724) (0.00701) (0.00724)0.0416 0.0377 0.0418 0.0376 0.0418 0.0374(0.0600) (0.0616) (0.0600) (0.0616) (0.0600) (0.0616)0.00357 0.00390 0.00418 0.00396 0.00442 0.00408(0.00704) (0.00720) (0.00698) (0.00719) (0.00697) (0.00719)-0.0408 -0.0369 -0.0410 -0.0368 -0.0410 -0.0366(0.0600) (0.0616) (0.0600) (0.0616) (0.0600) (0.0616)-0.000678* -0.000660* -0.000681* -0.000660* -0.000682* -0.000660*(0.000351) (0.000356) (0.000351) (0.000356) (0.000352) (0.000356)

1991 Village Characteristics? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes YesVillage Fixed Effects? No No Yes No No Yes No No YesConstant 0.777*** -0.0629 -0.107 0.870*** 0.198 0.103 0.820*** 0.121 0.187

(0.0241) (0.719) (0.816) (0.0400) (0.779) (0.869) (0.0296) (0.807) (0.986)Observations 881 295 295 881 295 295 881 295 295R-squared 0.015 0.154 0.158 0.002 0.153 0.158 0.000 0.153 0.157

Edu Sex Ratio

Edu Sex Ratio

Edu Sex Ratio

Edu Sex Ratio

amt. shamlat land in villagelog village average per capita income

Edu Sex Ratio

Edu Sex Ratio

Edu Sex Ratio

Edu Sex Ratio

village has ever had a female sarpanch reservationtime since village had a female sarpanch reservationtime squared since village had a female sarpanch reservation

Edu Sex Ratio

education of individual i in village

caste of individual i in village

mother's education of individual i in villagenumber of sisters of individual i in villagebirthorder of individual i in village

We find whether female sarpanch reservations can affect the school enrollment sex ratio by regressing it on whether the village has had a female sarpanch, the time since having a female sarpanch, and the that time squared. We do not find that female sarpanch reservations can influence the sex ratio after village fixed effects are taken into account. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008 Surveys.

if individual i in village has been ill in past yearlandholdings of individual i in villagefather's education of individual i in villagenumber of brothers of individual i in village

Table 8a: Female Sarpanch Reservation Interactions and Sex Ratio

(1) (2) (3) (4)VARIABLES

-0.000381**(0.000153)

0.0451(0.0548)

0.00774(0.00880)

-0.0130(0.00819)

everFsar 0.0569 -0.312 -0.0294 0.114(0.0446) (0.378) (0.0598) (0.0763)

momEduYearInt -0.0155* -0.0106(0.00819) (0.00713)

dadEduYearInt 0.0174** 0.0211***(0.00740) (0.00774)

0.000301** 0.000254* 0.000238* 0.000239*(0.000135) (0.000135) (0.000135) (0.000135)-0.0203 -0.0459 -0.0514 -0.0528(0.0473) (0.0496) (0.0479) (0.0478)0.000103 9.51e-05 0.000101 0.000101(8.02e-05) (8.06e-05) (8.22e-05) (8.20e-05)0.000122 0.000125 0.000115 0.000112(8.89e-05) (8.95e-05) (9.02e-05) (9.01e-05)9.10e-05 8.88e-05 8.64e-05 8.38e-05(5.74e-05) (5.77e-05) (5.77e-05) (5.76e-05)0.000312 0.000338* 0.000316 0.000306(0.000194) (0.000195) (0.000195) (0.000194)0.00678* 0.00780** -0.00143 -0.00129(0.00370) (0.00369) (0.00538) (0.00537)0.0490* 0.0494* 0.0552** 0.0572**(0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0278) (0.0277)-0.00387 -0.00347 0.00219 0.00236(0.00366) (0.00367) (0.00511) (0.00510)-0.0490* -0.0493* -0.0552** -0.0572**(0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0278) (0.0277)-2.40e-05 -3.00e-05 1.96e-05 3.09e-06(0.000227) (0.000228) (0.000228) (0.000228)

1991 Village Characteristics? Yes Yes Yes YesVillage Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes YesConstant -0.00553 0.176 0.179 0.133

(0.364) (0.379) (0.367) (0.365)Observations 564 564 564 564R-squared 0.148 0.139 0.149 0.152

Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio

We find whether female sarpanch reservations interacted with shamlat land, average village earnings, maternal education, or paternal education have an affect on the sex ratio. We find that only the shamlat land interaction has significance, showing that female sarpanches must be properly funded to have any affect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008 Surveys.

birthorder of individual i in village

if individual i in village has been ill in past yearlandholdings of individual i in villagefather's education of individual i in villagenumber of brothers of individual i in village

amt shamlat land * had a female sarpanch reservationlog village average per capita income * had a female sarpanch ave. maternal education * had a female sarpanch reservationave. paternal education * had a female sarpanch reservation

amt. shamlat land in villagelog village average per capita income

education of individual i in village

caste of individual i in village

mother's education of individual i in villagenumber of sisters of individual i in village

Table 8b: Female Sarpanch Reservation Interactions and Vaccination Sex Ratio

(1) (2) (3) (4)VARIABLES

0.00102**(0.000445)

-0.199(0.171)

-0.0623**(0.0275)

0.00682(0.0261)

everFsar 0.00198 1.529 0.461*** 0.0881(0.123) (1.182) (0.177) (0.241)

momEduYearInt 0.0512** 0.0183(0.0239) (0.0194)

dadEduYearInt -0.0527** -0.0599**(0.0217) (0.0251)

0.000290 0.000113 0.000170 0.000213(0.000528) (0.000373) (0.000361) (0.000365)

-0.0823 -0.0683 -0.0755(0.135) (0.129) (0.130)

-0.000202 -0.000209 -0.000260 -0.000249(0.000186) (0.000187) (0.000189) (0.000190)0.000254 0.000249 0.000293 0.000307(0.000209) (0.000210) (0.000210) (0.000212)7.99e-05 0.000100 0.000130 0.000122(0.000165) (0.000167) (0.000165) (0.000166)0.000857 0.000580 0.000904 0.000879(0.000689) (0.000706) (0.000684) (0.000691)-0.0160 -0.0189* 0.00403 0.00183(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0134) (0.0135)0.0678 0.0625 -0.0447 -0.00430(0.133) (0.133) (0.135) (0.135)0.0124 0.0115 0.00583 0.00631(0.00963) (0.00968) (0.0117) (0.0118)-0.0682 -0.0630 0.0443 0.00385(0.133) (0.133) (0.135) (0.135)0.000551 0.000562 0.000264 0.000416(0.000550) (0.000555) (0.000555) (0.000558)

1991 Village Characteristics? Yes Yes Yes YesVillage Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes YesConstant -0.248 0.521 0.350 0.644

(0.732) (1.122) (1.101) (1.102)Observations 352 352 352 352R-squared 0.119 0.108 0.136 0.123

Vacc. Sex Ratio

Vacc. Sex Ratio

We find whether female sarpanch reservations interacted with shamlat land, average village earnings, maternal education, or paternal education have an affect on the vaccination sex ratio. We find that only the shamlat land interaction has significance, showing that female sarpanches must be properly funded to have any affect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008

Vacc. Sex RatioVacc. Sex Ratio

mother's education of individual i in village

education of individual i in village

caste of individual i in village

number of sisters of individual i in village

birthorder of individual i in village

if individual i in village has been ill in past yearlandholdings of individual i in villagefather's education of individual i in villagenumber of brothers of individual i in village

amt shamlat land * had a female sarpanch reservationlog village average per capita income * had a female sarpanch ave. maternal education * had a female sarpanch reservationave. paternal education * had a female sarpanch reservation

amt. shamlat land in villagelog village average per capita income

Table 8c: Female Sarpanch Reservation Interactions and Educational Sex Ratio

(1) (2) (3) (4)VARIABLES

-0.000153(0.000380)

0.259(0.177)

0.0332(0.0203)

0.0292(0.0206)

everFsar 0.0896 -1.724 -0.0585 -0.192(0.119) (1.219) (0.116) (0.197)

momEduYearInt -0.0180 -0.00347(0.0184) (0.0148)

dadEduYearInt 0.0124 0.00401(0.0146) (0.0154)

-0.000321 -0.000291 -0.000316 -0.000333(0.000297) (0.000295) (0.000295) (0.000295)-0.0177 -0.0692 -0.0403 -0.0369(0.101) (0.106) (0.102) (0.102)-0.000310** -0.000301** -0.000290* -0.000286*(0.000147) (0.000147) (0.000150) (0.000150)6.85e-05 5.33e-05 6.21e-05 5.20e-05(0.000160) (0.000160) (0.000162) (0.000162)0.000170 0.000172* 0.000162 0.000166(0.000104) (0.000104) (0.000105) (0.000105)0.000943* 0.00100** 0.000880* 0.000915*(0.000489) (0.000488) (0.000489) (0.000489)0.00658 0.00716 0.000894 0.00138(0.00727) (0.00723) (0.00978) (0.00978)0.0375 0.0329 0.0470 0.0418(0.0617) (0.0616) (0.0623) (0.0624)0.00365 0.00206 0.00335 0.00273(0.00723) (0.00729) (0.00933) (0.00936)-0.0367 -0.0321 -0.0463 -0.0410(0.0617) (0.0616) (0.0623) (0.0624)-0.000662* -0.000660* -0.000631* -0.000626*(0.000356) (0.000355) (0.000357) (0.000358)

1991 Village Characteristics? Yes Yes Yes YesVillage Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes YesConstant -0.123 0.253 0.0943 0.0941

(0.818) (0.850) (0.823) (0.826)Observations 295 295 295 295R-squared 0.158 0.164 0.168 0.166

Edu. Sex Ratio Edu. Sex Ratio

We find whether female sarpanch interaction variables can change the education sex ratio. We find no affect though the shamlat interaction variable showed significance for the other sex ratio measures. This supports our hypothesis that female sarpanch affects these sex ratio measures through increasing maternal bargaining power; since we found maternal bargaining power has no affect on school sex ratios. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008 Surveys.

Edu. Sex Ratio

Edu. Sex Ratio

mother's education of individual i in villagenumber of sisters of individual i in village

birthorder of individual i in village

if individual i in village has been ill in past yearlandholdings of individual i in villagefather's education of individual i in villagenumber of brothers of individual i in village

amt shamlat land * had a female sarpanch reservation

log village average per capita income

education of individual i in village

caste of individual i in village

log village average per capita income * had a female sarpanch ave. maternal education * had a female sarpanch reservationave. paternal education * had a female sarpanch reservation

amt. shamlat land in village

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