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"TOTALALTRUISM"IN LEVINAS'S"ETHICS OF THE WELCOME"

M.Jamie Ferreira

ABSTRACT

Levinas'sethics of other-centered service has been criticized at the theo-retical level for failing to offer a conceptionof moral agency adequate to

ground its imperative and at the practical level for encouraging self-

hatred. Levinas'sexplicit resistance to the incorporationof the phrase "as

yourself"in the Judaeo-Christianlove commandmight seem to validatethe critics'complaints.The author argues, on the contrary,that Levinas

does offer a strongand compellingconceptionof moralagencyand that his

ethics, properly understood, does not entail self-abnegation. Levinas's

attempt to counter excessive and manipulative self-concern and self-

inflation by insisting on the dependentand situational positionof the self

has been wronglyoverinterpretedas an abandonmentof the self and its

just claims. The author seeks to establish a more balancedunderstandingby focusing attention on the "ethicsof welcome,"on Levinas's distinctive

conception of passivity, and on the role of "the third" in all human

relations.KEYWORDS:gency,altruism, equality, ustice, Levinas,Ricoeur

CALVINCHRAGOTES,N The Self after Postmodernity,that "one of the

recurring ironies of postmodernity ... is the impassioned call for em-

powermentalongside requiems eulogizing the passing of the subject as

speaker, author, actor and pretty much in every sense conceivable"(Schrag 1997, 61). Schrag suggests that the influential characterof the

requiems, whether formulatedin terms of the death of the author, the

deconstructionof the subject,the displacementof the ego, or the dissolu-tion of self-identity, forces us to re-examine notions of self, ego, and

subject. He draws on the resources of Paul Ricoeur'ssimilar projectin

Oneself as Another,where Ricoeur proposes a hermeneutic of the selfin response to "thevertigo of the disintegrationof the self pursuedmer-

cilessly by Nietzschean deconstruction";Ricoeur'squestion, in the end,is: "Mustone not, in order to make oneself open, available,belongto one-

self in a certain sense?"(Ricoeur 1992, 19, 138). Even more recently,Oliver Davies has argued that an ethics of compassion presupposes a

self-possessed self: "Self-dispossessive virtue entails a prior state of

JRE 29.3:443-70. © 2001 JournalofReligiousEthics,Inc.



444 Journal of Religious Ethics

self-possession if compassionis knowingly to put oneself at risk for thesake of the other"(Davies 2001, 8).Those committedto this effort to recover or reconstructa sense of a

self adequateto supportlove or compassionhave in some cases targetedthe ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, suggesting that by emphasizing "sub-stitution"of self, "totalaltruism,"and the self as "hostage,"he fails tomaintain a sense of self sufficient forresponsible agencyor the dialecticsofrelation.Davies, forexample,claims that Levinas'spictureofhow "the

'hostage'self suffers 'the violence of alterity'in 'oppression, persecution,7'martyrdom' nd 'obsession'" recludesthe "self-presenceand self-posses-

sion" necessary to ethical responsibility (Davies 2001, 188, 31). Heargues that "concreteand realizedacts ofcompassion. . . are not enabled

'throughthe condition of being hostage'" Davies 2001, 189). An earlierand morewide-ranging critiqueof Levinas's ethics is foundin OneselfasAnother.While admitting a deep "debt"o Levinas, Ricoeur nonetheless

suggests that Levinas's ethics implies the "substitutionof self-hatredforself-esteem"or,at the very least, ignores or precludes"solicitude,as themutual exchange of self- esteems"(Ricoeur1992, 168, 221).

Ricoeur sunderstandingof the ethical relation is that I must holdyouin esteem "asI holdmyself in esteem,"and he describeshis own work as

a "phenomenologyof 'you too' and of 'as myself" (Ricoeur 1992, 193).The "asmyself" expresses the "reflexivestructure"of self-esteem: "self-esteem [is] understood as a reflexive moment of the wish for the 'goodlife'" Ricoeur1992, 192).Ricoeur'sview is that the reflexivity of the "as

myself" guarantees the self- through "self-esteem" within the ethicalrelation to another. Other thinkers have similarly argued that the ele-ment of "asyourself"in the classical love commandmentguarantees theself in the relation. S0renKierkegaard,forexample,has arguedthat the"as yourself" of the love commandment both implies the legitimacy ofself-love and puts legitimate limits on self-sacrifice in response to the

command.1They are the same limits that Kierkegaard says are impliedin the need for both a You and an I in the love relationship:he arguesthat the little phrase "as yourself" requires that fulfillment of thecommandment to love the other requires genuine love of self, and heconfirms this need when he claims that an independent whole self is asine qua non of love, for "without a you and an /, there is no love"

(Kierkegaard1847/1995, 266). Kierkegaardreminds us in no uncertainterms that "ifthe commandment s properlyunderstood it also says the

opposite:Youshall loveyourself in the right way. Thereforeif anyone is

unwillingto learn from

Christianityto love himself in the

right way,he

cannot love the neighbor either"(Kierkegaard1847/1995, 22). In other

1For more on this, see Ferreira2001, 31-36, 129-36.



TotalAltruism 445

words, Kierkegaard,too, affirmsthe importanceof maintaining the self(the "I")while in relation, and he connectsmaintaining the self with thereflexive "asyourself"within the love commandment.

Unlike Ricoeurand Kierkegaard,Levinas explicitlydistances himselffrom the phrase "asyourself,"which is foundin both Jewish and Chris-tian versions of the love commandment:"You hall love yourneighboras

yourself" (Lev.19:18;Matthew 22:39;Mark 12:31;Galatians 5:14);2he

highlights, by contrast, "the priority of the other"(Levinas 1975c, 90).This might suggest that he is indeed vulnerable to the criticism that hisethics lacks a sufficient sense of self. Myaim, however,is to suggest that

despite this distancing move, there are resources within Levinas'sthought for an appreciationof the reflexive movementimpliedin the "as

myself" proposedby Ricoeur or the "asyourself"of the love command-ment. I will reconsider Levinas's view of the relevance and role of theself in ethical relation, and I will arguethat his ethics supportsan activeand maintained ethical self, which, despite his emphasis on

"dissymmetry"n face-to-facerelation, accounts for his affirmations ofboth equality andjustice. In particular,I will argue that Levinas's con-tinued designation of his ethics as an "ethics of the welcome"(Levinas

1986a, 151) requires the continued relevance of his early notion of the

self as "host" Levinas 1961). The language of "hostage" hat comes inbetween (Levinas 1974) is not a shift away from his earlier language of

hospitality; it is an elaboration of it. If we are to dojustice to his ethics,we must remember that he construes the self through the dual ascrip-tion of "host"and "hostage" the two notions are to be held in tension ascorrectives to each other. Levinas's later writing does not substitute thenotionofhostage for that of host or the notion of violence for that of wel-

come;the "total altruism" of which he speaks is affirmedin the samebreath as "hospitality."f we want to see what is at stake for Levinas inhis challenge to the "as yourself" of the love commandment,we need

first to examine his stand on its otherdimensions: as a commandment olove the neighbor. Since Levinas expresses some ambivalence aboutthese three elements, it is important to begin by documentingjust howall three elements figure in his account.

1. Love and Responsibility

Levinas equates "theneighbor"with "theresponsibility to the other"

(1974, 47, 100;1975a, 142).3The term "proximityof the neighbor"means

2The Hebrewlinguistic structurethat I consider later does not account for Levinas'sresistance.

3Throughout he remainder of the article, citations of the works of Levinas will giveonly the year of publicationand the page number;citations of all other works will give



446 Journal of ReligiousEthics

forhim "theresponsibilityof the ego for an other,the impossibilityof let-ting the other alone faced with the mystery of death"(1984b, 167). In"Ethics as First Philosophy,"Levinas details how "the Other becomes

my neighbor precisely through the way the face summons me, calls for

me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility,and calls meinto question" 1984a, 83). Levinas occasionallyhesitates aboutwhetherthe term "neighbor"s the best to use- sometimes because it seems toobscure the fact of difference (1962, 27) and sometimes because it mayhave lost its legitimate shock value in coming to be taken for granted("Perhapsbecause of current moral maxims in which the wordneighbor

occurs,we have ceased to be surprised by all that is involvedin proxim-ity and approach" 1974, 5]). Nevertheless, he persists in using it fromhis earliest to his latest writings:"It s as a neighborthat a humanbeingis accessible as a face";"inthis call to responsibility of the ego by theface which summons it, which demands it and claims it, the other

(autrui) is the neighbor" 1951, 8; 1984b, 167).

Levinas, especially in his later years, speaks of "love of one's neigh-bor,"which he defines as "love without Eros, charity,love in which theethical aspect dominates the passionate aspect, love without concupis-cence" 1982b, 103).However,most ofthe time Levinas uses the idiom of

"responsibilityfor" the neighbor,rather than that of love. He learnedearly on, he says, to "distrust the compromisedword'love,'" hoosingin-stead to speak of "theresponsibility for the Other,being-for-the-other"(1982a, 52). Repeatedlyhe distances himself from the term "love,"whichhe considers "worn-out and debased," preferring instead "the harshname for what we call love of one's neighbor" namely, "responsibilityfor my neighbor"(1982b, 103). In sum, Levinas has what he calls "a

grave view of Agape in terms of responsibility for the other"(1982b,113).

Levinas's preference for the term "responsibility"s an understand-

able one. The word "love" ails to announce strongly enough that "I amordered toward the face of the other,"who "commands"me (1974, 11,emphasis added),that my response is his "right," nd that "theright ofthe human"has the very strong connotationof "commandment"1984b,167, emphasis added).Still, despite his "grave" r "harsh" iew of love as

responsibilityfor the other,Levinas does, time and again, use the word

"love,"even within those essays where he uses also the stronger lan-

guage of obligation(1984b, 169; 1975a, 140). However,he does this onlywith the understandingthat "there s something severe in this love;thislove is commanded"

1982b, 108).In one of his later

interviews,he is

author, date, and page, with the exceptionof sec. 3.1 in which the author assumed in thecitations should in all cases be Ricoeur.Italics in quotations may be assumed to have ap-pearedin the originalunless otherwise noted.



TotalAltruism 447

particularlyeloquent about love: he claims that the "ideaof the face isthe idea of gratuitous love" and suggests that faith is "believingthatlove without reward is valuable";he goes so far as to say that "thatwhich I call responsibility is a love, because love is the only attitudewhere there is encounterwith the unique" 1986b, 176, 177, 174). In thissame interview,Levinas explicitlyrefers to "thecommandmentof a gra-tuitous act" like love; he observes that "commandinglove signifiesrecognizingthe value of love in itself" and that "God s a commandmentto love . . . the one who says that one must love the other" (1986b,176-77).

There is some value in refusing to reduce the language of relation tothe language of responsibility after all, responsibility can be fulfilled

grudgingly,hatefully.Perhaps this sad truth accounts forthe extremelynegative reaction readers often have to Levinas's notion of the self as

"hostage"n responsibility (1974, 11, 59); this phrase seems to describea very unloving situation, putting us at odds with the neighbor arelation that we would normally condemn. But Levinas makes it clear

early on that "the other is not a being we encounter that menaces us orwants to lay hold of us" (1948, 87),4 ust as he acknowledgeslater thatthe responsibility of which he speaks "is not a cold juridical require-

ment"(1986c, 186). Responsibilityis, rather, "allthe gravity of the loveof one's fellowman of love without concupiscence" and it is accom-

plished "throughall the modalities of giving" (1986c, 186). Levinas'sreversionto the term "love"may be due, then, to his sense that "giving"calls to mind love rather than mere (juridical)responsibility

2. Reflexivity in the Love Commandment

Let us turn now to Levinas's response to the additional element

of the love commandment the "asyourself."In the course of a formalset of questions put to him, Levinas had been asked the following:"Cannotmoralexperiencebe translated as an experienceofthe other asidentical to oneself? . . . [an experience that] correspondsto the impera-tive . . . 'Loveyour neighbor as yourself" (1975c, 90). His response is

particularlyintriguing forwhat it tells us about his sense of ethical self-hood. He says that he is "perplexed" y the biblical text (and he impliesthat the translators should have been more perplexed).He asks, "Whatdoes 'as yourself signify?" He imagines Martin Buber and Franz

Rosenzweig saying to each other "Does not 'as yourself mean that one

4He writes, "Iwas extremelyinterested in Sartre'sphenomenologicalanalysis of the

'other,' hough I always regretted that he interpretedit as a threat and a degradation"(1981, 53).




loves oneself most?"And he interprets their rejectionof that translationas the reason for their alternative translation, "Loveyour neighbor,heis like you."Levinas, however,is not satisfied with that and proposesanalternative reading that is grounded in the hermeneutical principlethat it is only when the "entiretyof the Bible becomes the context of theverse that the verse resounds with all its meaning"(1975c, 90). He con-cludes that the Bible as a whole "always" posits the "priorityof theother in relation to me,"and so he resists the "asyourself" in favor ofthe "priorityof the other"(1975c, 91).

2.1 Levinas'ssuspicion of the "asyourself

Presumably Levinas has reservations about the way in which "as

yourself" implies a kind of equality that seems to put limits on my

responsibility for the other. He may also feel a need to reject "asyour-self" because it permits a dilution of responsibility. If I am taught tothink of the other as my equal, I am likely to think of the other as some-one who is commandedto regardme as I regardher. Thus, the equalityimplied by the "asyourself"allows us to put the spotlight on the other's

responsibility she, too, is commandedto love her neighbor and, thus,to begin to compare and calculate obligations. It promotes the kind of

"bookkeeping" rrangementthat Levinas equates with "reciprocity"ndcriticizes (1974, 124-25). Thus, his rejectionof the "asyourself" seemsto serve two different functions:First, it deflects attention from the self,as when he retorts that the other's obligation to me is "his affair,"notmine (1975c, 93; 1982a, 98; 1981, 63). Second,it focuses attention on theself by forestalling our escapist tendencies to shift attention to theother'sobligation.In this context, as in many others, Levinas'sconcernis to express the distinctiveness of the ethical relation; his object is to

clarify the ethical relation between us, not to develop an ontologicalpicture of our relation.

There are, in principle, several ways in which a notion of reflexivity("asmyself"or "asyourself") might bejustified. One is formal,a matterof simple consistency:if no one is to be excluded frommy love, I cannot

arbitrarilyexclude myself. Otherways are more substantive. One could

arguethat it is part ofmy duty to others that I maintain myself, in orderto be able to support others, to have something to give. A variation ofthis theme is (as Immanuel Kant suggests) that properconcernfor theself prevents the temptation to transgress our duties to others. 5 In a

5Kantsuggests that "tosecure one'sownhappiness is at least indirectlya duty,for dis-contentwith one's conditionunderpressure frommany cares and amid unsatisfied wantscouldeasily become a great temptationto transgressduties"(Kant1785/1959, 15).



TotalAltruism 449

differentvein, one could argue that if love's proper objectis "thegood"(as Aristotle and ThomasAquinasthink), then one must love the goodinoneself as much as the goodin others.6Anotherversion of this theme isthat reverenceforGod'screation orGod'sgifts entails reverence forone'sself.

What is at stake for Levinas, we saw, was avoidingthe danger of theaddition "asyourself" the dangerthat it emphasizes equality in such a

way as to foster a comparative"bookkeeping"ttitude, an emphasis onwhat the other also owes. Levinas's fear of affirmingself-love seems toblind him to these other meanings of the "as yourself."Deliberately

deemphasizing the "as yourself" is Levinas's way of trying to turn usaway fromourselves towardthe other,but ironically,the effort to focus

only on the self's responsibility can, despite its good intentions, returnthe spotlight to the self. That is, the effort to prevent our obsession with

assessing the other's obligation carries with it the threat of taking ourattention away fromthe other altogether, by enshrining another kind ofself-centeredness in making the self supreme in its agency of loving.

2.2 Kierkegaard's ontrasting interpretation

This potential weakness in Levinas's account is revealed by compari-son with Kierkegaard's contrasting understanding of the love

commandment,developed n Worksof Love.Kierkegaard s willing to in-sist on this potentially dangerous addition to the love commandmentbecausehe values the distinctive richness of the New Testament'svariousformulationsof the commandment,one of which is: "Anew command-ment I give you, that you love one another:that as I have lovedyou, youalso love one another" John 13:34).Acknowledging hat "asyourself"canalso mean "asyou yourselfare lovedby God,"Kierkegaard akes seriouslythe two variants ofthe commandment's"asyourself": a) as (yououghtto

love)yourselfand (b)as yourself (youhave been loved).ForKierkegaard,the "as yourself"puts me and the other "underGod,"and reminds methat there are two of us of equal status under God, two who are com-

manded,but it also reminds me that I have beenloved. Thatis, it remindsme that the author of my being, the one who commandsme, is also thesource of love in me. I can love onlybecause I am loved I cannot love of

my ownresources,on my owninitiative, so to speak.When the command-ment is interpreted "self-lessly" n terms solely of "the priority of the

other,"we lose the reminder that our ability to love arises because we

6Forexample,Aristotlebrings out the ambiguityin the phrase "loverof self" and ex-

plainsthe "natureof true self-love,"affirming hat "thegoodman should be a lover of self"

(Aristotle1954, ix.8).Accountsthat emphasize self-respectand self-esteem wouldfall intothis category.




ourselves have been loved, supported,and encouraged with the para-doxical result that this "selfless" interpretation ends up placing an

importanceon the sovereignself that would not otherwise be attributedto it. The "asyourself,"as Kierkegaardconstrues it, reminds me both of

my createdness and of the gift of love to me, and thus it takes me out of

myself, rendering my responseto the other less subjective.In Kierkegaard'sview, the "as yourself" functions as a reminder of

God'senabling gift of love, and this paradoxicallyremindsme aboutmy-self precisely in order to focus my attention on the other.While Levinasis right to fear the translation "as yourself" because the language of

equality (whetherin the form of "theneighboris worthyas I am worthy"or "theneighboris commandedas I am commanded")s opento the dan-

ger of calculation and comparisonand can be interpretedin such a wayas to set limits on our responsibility, insofar as he abandons the "as

yourself,"he loses an important dimension of the love command theinsistence that our ability to fulfill the commandrests on God'sgraciousgift of love and not our own independent powers. Thus, it seems thatLevinas's strategy for taking the emphasis away from the self actually,and ironically,lifts up the self by denying its dependency on God and

leaving me, in the end, "on my own." My very love becomes a self-

centered achievement.It is worth noting at this point that despite Levinas'sreference to the

difficultyof the translation of the love commandment,his reluctance toaffirmthe "asyourself"is not a function of the originalHebrewformula-tion: V'ahavtare'echa c'mocha. The Hebrew linguistic structure of thelove commandment reads "Youwill love your neighbor as you [im-

plied verb clause]."That is, it does not place "neighbor" s directobject.7It seems plausible to see this structure as allowing an emphasis on

equality: you will love, and your neighbor like you (will love);you willboth love;you (bothequally) will love;you, as equals, will love. The He-

brew, then, can supportthe suggestion that the "asyourself"is meant toremind us that we are both commanded o love and that we are both cre-ated by or in love, and thus enabled to love.

3. Levinas'sConceptionof Ethical Agency

As I noted as the outset of this article, it has been argued that thedeconstructive attack on a Cartesian model of selfhoodputs in jeopardythe very notion of an agent who can act ethically (freely, responsibly).Levinas's

attemptto subordinate

ontologyto ethics has been

subjectto

this same critique, for it has seemed to some to deprive his ethics of asense of selfhood sufficient to ground responsible agency and ethical

71am gratefulto Peter Ochsfor his suggestionsabout this formulation.



TotalAltruism 451

relation. Davies's recent attempt to "build a performative language ofself-realizationas compassionateandjoyful personhood . . [and gener-ate a conceptionof] a self who is exuberantly self-possessing in her own

existence, foundationally reciprocal, and inhabiting a space which is

co-giftedby and with the other" mplicitly criticizes an ethics that talksof the self as a hostage (Davies 2001, 8, 10).This carries on the impulse Inoted earlier in Ricoeur'scritique of Levinas, so let us now return toRicoeur'sanalysis since he develops the criticism more explicitly and inmore detail.

3.1 Ricoeur'scritiqueof Levinas

Ricoeur holds that Levinas fails to do justice to the importance of

self-esteem, and he attributes this failure to the way in which Levinas's

"entire philosophy rests on the initiative of the other in the inter-

subjective relation" (Ricoeur 1992, 188). Ricoeur concludes that "in

reality,this initiative establishes no relation at all, to the extent that the

other represents absolute exteriority with respect to an ego defined bythe conditionof separation" 1992, 188-89). The one-sidednessof the ini-

tiative, which explains why Levinas calls the relation "dissymmetrical,"

is, for Ricoeur,the source of the failure to have a self in a "dialecticallycomplementary" thical relation with an other (1992, 340). According o

Ricoeur,Levinas'sview of the other in Otherwisethan Being is of a "per-secutor"who "has to storm the defenses of a separate T" (1992, 190).This "hyperboleof separation renders unthinkable . . . the distinction

between self and I, and the formationof a concept of selfhood defined

by its openness and its capacity for discovery"(1992, 339). That is,Levinas's attempt to respect the alterity of the other involves an abso-

lute separation and a dissymmetry that render impossible an ethical

selfwith the result "that the self, not distinguished from the I, is not

taken in the sense of the self-designation of a subject of discourse, ac-

tion, narrative, or ethical commitment" 1992, 335).Ricoeur wants an appreciation of the agent's initiative and self-

esteem, and these take the form,for Ricoeur,of the agent's "benevolent

spontaneity"as well as a "movementof recognition"by the other (1992,190). But this cannot just be a reversal of Levinas's position. Ricoeur

wants to find a middlegroundbetween what he calls "twoextremes":on

the one hand, there is the "the summonsto responsibility,where the ini-

tiative comesfrom the other"and, on the otherhand, there is "sympathy

for the suffering other,where the initiativecomes from the

lovingself"

(1992, 192). If these are in fact "extremes," hen presumably Ricoeur

does not mean to opt simply forthe latter position, which wouldjust re-

place one initiative with the other; rather, the middle ground must be

one in which esteem of the other is reciprocallyrelated to, and based on,




esteem of oneself. Seeing "oneself as another" s, more precisely,seeingthe fundamental equivalencebetween "the esteem of the otheras a one-

self and the esteem ofoneselfas an other" 1992, 194).This notion of self-esteem is not foundin Levinas'swork,Ricoeursug-

gests, because Levinas does not work with a distinction between two

senses of sameness or identity- namely,between idem and ipse, or be-

tween ego and self. Levinas's work, he claims, is "directedagainst a

conceptionof the identity of the Same . . . but at a level of radicalitywhere the distinctionI proposebetween two sorts of identity,that of ipseand that of idem, cannot be taken into account"(1992, 335). In sum,

Ricoeur wants to reject Levinas's "unilateral" view in favor of a"two-pronged onceptionof otherness . . . , one that doesjustice in turnto the primacyof self-esteem and also to the primacyof the convocationto justice comingfrom the other"(1992, 331). Presumably, only an ade-

quate notion of ipse can account for a double source ofinitiative, onethat

appreciates the radicality of the demand placed on the agent by theother and, at the same time, allows "theself-designation of a subject of

discourse, action, narrative, or ethical commitment"(1992, 335). And

presumably,an ethics of "substitution"and "hostage" annotsupportthelatter

designationof an ethical self. David Ford

recentlysummarized

Ricoeur s critiqueof Levinas as follows: Levinas "fails to distinguish the'self from the %'and he therefore ends up with a dissymmetrybetweenself and other which amounts to a lack of relation and to the sterility of

interiority. ... In Levinas there is no return from the other to self-affirmationin the mode of self-esteem and conviction" Ford 1999, 95).

It is clear that any ethics must providefor the notion of a responsibleagent a maintained self who can act freely and self-consciouslyand beheld responsibleforsuch action. Given the challengethat we earlier sawLevinas pose toward the "asyourself"of the love command,we need to

ask whether his notions of "substitution"and "hostage"symbolize ex-actly that lack of a sense of self with which he is charged. I will arguethat there is embeddedin Levinas's ethics a significant notion of ethical

agency,which in fact is congruentwith and illuminates his positions on

hospitality,equality,andjustice.

3.2 Confirmationof the nonimperialisticI

Clearly,Levinas wouldnever speak as Ricoeur does about self-esteemnor as

Kierkegaarddoes about love of self.

Instead,he describes our

activity in being responsibleto the other as "substitution" substitutingoneself for another, as a "hostage"does. He suggests even that we aresummoned by the initiative of the other to the extent of being "perse-cuted" (1974, 126-28, 111). He elaborates this in terms of "the self



TotalAltruism 453

emptying itself of itself,""forgetfulof itself,""divestingitself, emptyingitself of its ownbeing"(1974, 111, 117).Such descriptionsmust be taken

seriously, and when they are, we find ourselves wondering whether akenotic (self-emptying)ethics can dojustice to ethical selfhood and re-

sponsible agency.It may seem that a hostage is not free enough to be a

responsible agent or to experience self-esteem;it may seem that substi-tution of the self for the other involves a total loss of self.

There are numerous places in his writings, however,where Levinas

qualifies the meaning of "self-emptying,""hostage,"and "substitution"in such a way that an active responsible agent remains in place in rela-

tion. It is important first to note where this occurs and then to accountforthe co-existenceof these affirmationsof agencywith the more radical

affirmationof self-emptyingand self-forgetfulness.The notion of self-emptying is qualified when Levinas assumes that

the I must maintain its integrity in relation, that "it reaches the apogeeof its existence as an J when everything in the Other concerns it":"thefullness of power in which the sovereignty of the / maintains itself ex-

tends to the Other,not in order to conquerit, but to supportit"(1975b,74). Moreover,he says explicitly that the self is not destroyedby being

put in questionby the other,but is rather engaged in a certain "tension":

"insteadof destroyingthe /, the putting in questionbinds it to the Otherin an incomparable,unique manner"that constitutes an "election,"a

"promotionto a privileged place on which all this not me depends"(1975b, 73). He uses the term "total altruism"to speak of the responsi-

bility that "ridsthe / of its imperialism and egotism . . . [and] confirms

the / in its ipseity, in its central place within being, as a supporterof the

universe"(1975b, 73-74). For Levinas, ridding the I of its imperialismdoes not eliminate ipseity, but confirmsit: "total altruism" s said to be

compatible with a confirmed self. (This, by the way, suggests that

Levinas does not fail to appreciatethe distinctionbetween idem and ipsethat Ricoeurproposes.)

Levinas also makes clear that the "depositionof the sovereign F to

which he repeatedly refers (1982a, 52, 101) does not deprive me of

a locus of agency.The substitution at issue is "my" ubstitution. He saysforthrightly in Otherwise than Being: "My substitution it is as myown that substitution for the neighbor s produced. .. It is in me in me

and not in another, in me and not in an individuation of the concept

Ego that communication opens" (1974, 126). And he continues: "In

substitution my being that belongs to me and not to another is undone,

and it is throughthis substitutionthat I am not

'another,'but me"

(1974,127).8"Substitution,"which is the heart of responsibility, is "not an

8Given Levinas'sunderstanding of activity and passivity, this nevertheless does not

make substitutionan "act"1974, 117).




alienation, because the other in the same is my substitution for theother through responsibility,for which, I am summoned as someone ir-

replaceable.I exist throughthe other and for the other,but without this

being alienation: I am inspired"(1974, 114). In sum, Levinas assumes"theunjustifiable identity of ipseity [which]is expressed in terms suchas ego, I, oneself,"even though he takes his work to be that ofconstruingsuch ipseity in terms of "the soul, sensibility, vulnerability, maternityand materiality,which describeresponsibility for others"(1974, 106).

But could it be that Levinas merely wants to say the right thing,while his own commitments undermine precisely that kind of mainte-

nance and confirmation of self? In what follows I want to highlight theLevinasian commitments that supporthis claims that the agent is bothaffirmed and maintained.

3.3 The "ethicsof the welcome"

First, the underlying commitment of the Levinasian model can bestbe formulated:I am commandedto give and there is always more to

give. The claim that there is no end to giving is made repeatedly inLevinas'swritings:there is an infinite debt to the other;I am "infinitely

responsible" 1996, 18);and I can never say "quits" 1982a, 105-6). Thiscommitment contains in itself the principlethat maintains a responsibleself in the relation. Levinas recognizesthat I must have a self in order tohave something to give. In other words, Levinas doesjustice to the needfor continued agency precisely because in his ethics the counterweightto GIVING ALL is ALWAYSGIVING.

Levinas'strope for continued giving is found in his first majorwork,Totalityand Infinity, where subjectivity is construed in terms of "wel-

coming the Other, as hospitality"for "the subject is a host"(1961, 27,299).9He writes there that "the idea of infinity in consciousness is an

overflowingof a consciousness whose incarnation offers new powers . . .

powers of welcome, of gift, of full hands, of hospitality"(1961, 205). Inother words,although Levinas refuses to affirmlove of self explicitly,hedoes nevertheless presupposea self sufficient forresponsibleagencyanddialectical relation when he construes the self as "host."His repeatedreferences to "hospitality" support a view of active and maintained

agency the sense in which I am to be "host" o the other affirms myselfness. The condition of my hosting the other is not simple loss; as he

acknowledges later in Otherwise than Being, "dispossession" s "not

nothingness"(1974, 109).

9"Ce ivre presenterala subjectivitycommeaccueillantAutrui,commehospitalite";"le

sujet est un hote" 1961 [Frenchoriginal],12, 334).



TotalAltruism 455

In the first one hundred andfifty pages of Totalityand Infinity alone,"welcome" r"welcoming"re used overtwenty times, and they continueto be used up to and in the chapter entitled "Conclusions"1961, 299).Levinas also describes the self's response to the other in terms of

"generosity" 1961, 50, 75), and he repeatedly speaks of "hospitality,"reminding us of the graciousness with which responsibility should befulfilled. The emphasis on welcoming the other is not left behind; itinforms all his later writings and explicitly appears in the way he con-tinues to speak of "greeting"he other (1982a, 88), in "the ethics of thewelcome" 1986a, 151), as well as in the way he ties "hospitality"o the

extreme sacrifice of "givingto the other the bread from one's mouth"(1974, 79).10 n other words, the word "welcome" s used long after theterm "hostage"has been introduced(1974).

I suggest that Levinas's notion of"hostage" otage)is not properlyun-derstoodif it is consideredin isolation from his earlier use of the notionof "host" hdte).The positive connotation of the word"hostage"s appar-ent in the claim that "it is through the condition of being hostage thatthere can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon, and proximity"(1974, 117). "Host"and "hostage"are mutually correcting tropes for re-

sponsibility a point that is made better in the English term "(host)age"

than the French. When Levinas is appealing to the notions of host andwelcomein Totalityand Infinity (1961),he is elsewhere describingwhathe calls "total altruism"(1962, 18). Toput it in another perspective, hiscall for "total altruism"is made at the same time that he claims that"thewelcomingof the face is peaceable fromthe first, for it answers tothe unquenchingDesire forInfinity" 1961, 150).Moreover,at this sametime he also speaks of the commandof the other in terms of gentleness:"TheOtherreveals himself in his alterity,not in a shock negating the I,but as the primordial phenomenonof gentleness" (1961, 151). The callfor"total altruism" s compatiblewith responsibilityconstrued as hospi-tality and graciousness. Furthermore,Levinas at one point decides thatthe grammarof the self goes "beyondaltruism and egoism"(1974, 117).

3.4 Finding oneself by losing oneself

All the talk of persecutionand violence, which fuels much of the criti-cism of Levinas's ethics, needs to be seen against the backgroundofLevinas's own sense of the positive dimension of the ethical self. He

highlights this, when, looking back on his earlier writing, he concludesthat in "in

my essays,the

dis-quietingof the Same

bythe Other is the

10This refers to his earliercomment:"To ive, to be-for-another, espiteoneself,but in

interruptingthe for-oneself, s to take the bread out of one's own mouth, to nourish the

hunger of another with one's ownfasting"(1974, 56).




Desire that shall be a searching, a questioning, an awaiting: patienceand length of time, and the very mode of surplus, of superabundance"(1975c, 81). This conclusionequates the "disquietingof the Same by theOther"with "Desire"as "superabundance" that is, it uses the trope of

superabundance o explain what is elsewhere called violenceorpersecu-tion by the Other. Ford has recently pointed out the early language of

"joy"1961, 211, 242) and the late language of the "exorbitantoverflowofthe caress"(1974, 184), and he has attempted to enrich a Levinasianethics by developingwhat he sees as these "hints ofjoy"(Ford1999, 74)into an ethics ofjoyful obligation.I appreciateFord'ssensitivity to these

aspects of Levinas's work. What I am here suggesting is that they aremore than mere hints; they are full-fledgedcommitments.

Levinas's account of the shattering of the self in the face of the otherrefers to "breakingup the limits of identity, breaking up the principle of

being in me,"but he goes on to explain that this means "theimpossibil-ity to come back from all things and concern oneself only with oneself"

(1974, 114).The rejectionof concerningoneself "onlywith oneself" doesnot commitLevinas to the loss of self so fearedby critics.

The self that cannot concern itself "onlywith itself" is the absolvedself. When Levinas asserts that "the self is absolved of itself" (1974,

115),we should note that this is not the language of annihilation. If onethinks of the absolution one gains with confessionor expiation, one canconstruethe absolved self as the self at one with itself.11 n fact, Levinas

early on discerns in "pardon" asurplus ofhappiness, the strange happi-ness of reconciliation" 1961, 283). With absolution, the self is unified.The self loses itself, but thereby gains itself. This latter understandingis stated explicitly by Levinas: "thisresponsibility against my will ... isthe very fact of finding oneself while losing oneself (1974, II).12

This biblical theme is importantto Levinas we find it repeated pre-cisely in the context of his denial that ethics is a "depersonalizingexigency"(1981, 62). He explains, "Iam defined as a subjectivity,as a

singular person,as an T, preciselybecause I am exposedto the other.. . .I become a responsibleor ethical T to the extent that I agree to deposeordethronemyself- to abdicatemy position of centrality in favourof thevulnerable other. As the Bible says: 'He who loses his soul gains if"

(1981, 62-63, emphasis added).One couldsay that in responsibilitytheself forgets itself, but it is not forgotten.This is a paradoxicalcondition,to be sure, but Levinas highlights precisely this paradox:"What is atstake for the self, in its being, is not to be"(1974, 117). Unfortunately,some critics seem to

hear only the latter part of Levinas'smessage.

11GordonSteffey deserves thanks for bringingthis dimension of "absolution"o myattention.

12Interestingly,Levinasat times speaksof the economicego's osingandfinding tself.



TotalAltruism 457

Levinas's eferencen "God ndPhilosophy"othe "shudderfincar-nation hroughwhichgivingtakesonmeaning" nd "handswhichgive"(1975a,144) s elaboratedn his response o Buber hat sayingThou othe Other(theDu Sagen) "operatesmmediatelyandalready hroughmy body includingmy givinghands), hat it thereforepresupposesmybody(as livedbody), hings (as objectsof enjoyment), nd the Other's

hunger,that the Sagen is thus embodied"1975b,38). As Adriaan

Peperzak ightlysummarizes:

FromLevinas'sperspective,the satisfaction ofhuman needs is necessarilyassociated with the fulfillment of our

obligationsbecause I cannot serve

the Other concretelywithout offeringthe Other a meal, safety, a house,work,education,and sympathy.Being-for s being a body,havinghands as

well as a heart:it is buildinga homein which warmth and meals are avail-

able, and so on. I cannot be for-the-Otherif I do not enjoy the world

[Peperzak1997, 200].

Contrary o what Ricoeur hinks, Levinas,it seems, can agreewithRicoeur hat we wouldbe "unableo hearthe injunction oming romthe other"f we detestedourselves Ricoeur 992,189).In otherwords,the rationale noted earlier for an affirmationof proper self-love

(namely,hat it is partof ourdutyto others hat we maintainourselvesin order obe abletosupportothers) s preciselyone to whichLevinas scommitted.

It is true that the notion of "host"mpliesthe correlativenotion of

"guest,"ut the wayin whichthe "guest"rneedyone takes the initia-tive doesnotprecludeheresponsible gencyofthe host. It is a mistaketo think thatbecauseanother akesthe initiative,I am notresponsibleformy giving.WhenLevinasclaimsthat "theself is absolvedofitself,"he asks,"Is his freedom?"nlyto answer mmediatelyhat "It s a dif-ferentfreedomrom hat of an initiative"1974,115).Thiswayofbeing

"without choice"nlyseems ike"violence,"e says,if weforget hat itis a freedomhat precedes he dichotomy f the "freedom on-freedom

couple"1974,116).Levinas's ttack s directedat what he sees as an excessiveemphasis

on the autonomyand independence f the self. His emphasison theinitiativeof the other s arhetorically ecessary trategy o counter his.

(Incidentally, evinas's enseof the inadequacy f notionsof anautono-

mous, isolated self should mitigate concern about the "fault"of

"separation"o deploredby Ricoeur.)However trongthe initiative oftheother s, evenwhen t is a command, remain he selfwhorespondsto the other,with a freedomhat is, as Levinassays,different rom hefreedom f aninitiative buta responsiblereedomnonetheless.



458 JournalofReligiousEthics

3.5 Rethinking assivityTheresponseofa "host"s nota simplereaction.Areactions distinct

from a knowingresponsibleresponse.Wecan talk of the tropic"re-

sponse" fa planttolight,butsuchmovements nota genuineresponse- it is merelyan automatic eaction,much ike the constriction f thecellmembranewhentouchedbythescientist'sprobe.Theseareparadig-maticpassivereactions,butthe host is notpassive n this way.Levinas

acknowledgeshis when he explainsthat "the term welcomeof theOtherexpressesa simultaneityof activityand passivitywhichplacesthe relationwiththe other outsideof the dichotomies alidforthings:the a prioriand thea posteriori, ctivityandpassivity"1961,89).Evenwhenconsideringhewayin which"there s a commandmentn the ap-pearanceof the face,as if a masterspoketo me,"Levinasemphasizesresponsibleagency, or "as a 'firstperson,' am he who findsthe re-sources orespondo the call" 1982a,88-89).Therecouldbe no clearerstatementof the responsible thicalagencyrecommendedn Levinas'sethics,andthisisjustwhat onewouldexpect,giventheconcern,whichIhavedocumented,hat ipseity, he oneself, s bothmaintainedand con-firmedn therelationship.

Just as Levinas'suse of"freedom"nd "choice"ariesfromstandarduse becausehe discards he standardassumption hat links freedomwithunconstrainedhoice, nitiative,andcontrol, o his use of"passiv-ity"mustbe understoodo be beyondorindependent fourtraditionalcontrasts.His earlyappreciationf the wayin whichwelcomings out-side the traditionaldichotomybetween active and passive is carried

throughn his frequentuse of"passivity"n OtherwisehanBeing.Hisuse of the termthere is distinctive n twoways:

First,the stateto whichhe applies he term"passivity"s actuallyastatethatis prior o thebehaviorshat,in standardusage,wedifferen-

tiate as activeandpassive.Thus,whenhe writesthat "thesubjectivityofa subjects vulnerability,xposureoaffection,ensibility, passivitymorepassivestill thananypassivity"1974,50),thephrase"apassivitymorepassivestill thananypassivity"s usedto greatrhetorical ffect,buthe goeson to admitthat he is notusingthe term"passivity"n its

ordinarymeaning.Heexplains his by sayingthat"subjectivityolon-

ger belongs o the orderwherethe alternativeofactivityandpassivityretains ts meaning"1974,118).Thediscussionsof"recurrence,"self,"and"substitution,"n chapter4 clarify he attribution fpassivity.Sub-stitution,he says,"isnotan act"because t is onthe "hither ideof the

act-passivity lternative"1974,117).Again,our standardcontrastbe-tweenactiveandpassiveis notrelevant n this case,forin the caseof

responsibility"activityand passivity coincide"1974, 115); thus, hewritesthat "theself as an expiation s prior o activityandpassivity"(1974,116).



TotalAltruism 459

Second,he invokes the notion of passivity to highlight the groundingof responsible action in the situation into which we are thrown and the

complex nexus of feelings that that situation awakens in us. To claimthat the self is "passive" s to claim that the self's response is executedin "passion" the "infinite passion of responsibility"(1974, 113, 117,128). It is, however, a mistake to think of "passions"as merely pas-sive- things that simply happen to us (like sneezes).

The fear that a Levinasian ethics is too passive (does not have a re-

sponsible"agent") an thus be mitigated by acknowledgingthe admitted

peculiarity in Levinas'susage of the term. Moreover,as I noted earlier,

one can insist on the initiative of the other without thereby suggestingthat the one who receives the initiative does nothing. This is evident inthe way that even Ricoeur,who criticizes Levinas's ethics as too passive,uses the same language of a summoned self that Levinas uses, andwrites that "acapacityfor giving in return [is] freed by the other'sveryinitiative" (Ricoeur 1992, 189). Unless we are out simply to find faultwith a given account,we need not assume that the simple reference tothe other's initiative implies a nonresponsible passivity.

3.6 SummaryAll of these reminders suggest that Levinas can accommodate the

role of responsible active self, the maintenance of self in ethical rela-tion. They support the conclusion that in the end Levinas can answer

yes to Ricoeur s question:"Mustone not, in order to make oneself open,available, belong to oneself in a certain sense?"(Ricoeur1992, 138). For

Levinas, one must belong to oneself sufficiently to be a host, to welcomethe other, to substitute oneself. In other words, what some see as a re-ductio ad absurdum of his position namely, that there can be noabsolute self-emptying because the self is the one emptying itself- isnot in fact emblematic of weakness or self-contradictionin his argu-ment; it is, from his point of view, the very point of his argument. It isthe insight into the liberating and authenticating powerof sacrificeand

self-forgetfulness that funds all his statements, which I have docu-

mented, affirmingselfhood and agency.Levinas'sdesignation of his ethics as "theethics of the welcome" hus

leaves room for the "yourself"of the "as yourself."Still, it might be

objectedthat Levinas cannot in principleaccommodatean acknowledg-ment ofthe "asyourself"because of his positionon the asymmetryof the

relation, and the inequality implied in asymmetry.In

some ethics, theresponsibilityfor the other is clearlybased on the theologicalclaim thatwe are all equal before God:ourethical equality is a functionof our onto-

logicalequality as creatures. Since Levinas is knownforchallengingourclassical emphasis on equality,we need to ask whether the belongingto



460 Journal of ReligiousEthics

oneself in that certain sense that Levinas's notion of ipseity affirms al-lows the kind of equality that is implied in the "asyourself."

4. Equality in Levinas: Implicit Reflexivity

It is well known that Levinas asserts a "dissymmetry" r "asymme-try"in the self's relation to the other that is "thevery basis of ethics"

(1981, 67): "Theethical rapportwith the face is asymmetrical in that itsubordinates my existence to the other";"inethics, the other's right toexist has primacyover my own";"my duty to respond to the other sus-

pends my natural right to survival"(1981, 60). Whenever the relation isbetween two, one must love the neighbor more than the self, and onemust see the neighbor as more needy than oneself. Levinas's repeatedappealto metaphorsof "height"and "master," ffirmingthat the other is

"higher" han me, indicate that self and neighbor are not equal whenone is talking about the immediate claim of responsibility or love. The

question that remains is whether Levinas's emphasis on asymmetryprecludesthe possibility that in some sense I am, nevertheless, equal tothe other.

4.1 A doubleasymmetry

First, it should be noted that when he speaks of "dissymmetry"or

"asymmetry,"Levinas is highlighting an ethical orientation or attituderather than making an ontologicalclaim. On the one hand, the empha-sis on the "height"of the otheris intended to prevent me fromexercisingmy responsibility"aspity"for the other (1975b, 74). On the other hand,he is describingthe ethical relation from the inside, where I am andfrom that perspective I am not allowed to "demand from the other asmuch as I dofrommyself"(1981, 67). The illustration that precedesthisconclusion reveals his motivation:"IfI say that Virtue is its own reward'I can only say so for myself;as soon as I make this a standard for theother I exploit him, for what I am then saying is: be virtuous towardsme work for me, love me, serve me, etc. but don't expect anythingfrom me in return" 1981, 67). This is an exampleof the perspectivefromwhich I do not considermyself equal to the other.Apart fromthis rela-tional perspective, which affirms inequality in order to humble the selfand prevent self-willed exploitation, Levinas would probablybe per-fectly willing to accede to Ricoeur's assertion (which expresses the

groundsof humility by adversion to the human condition)that "equalityis reestablished . . . through the shared admission of fragility and, fi-

nally, of mortality" Ricoeur1992, 192).Some commentators have so focused on Levinas's claims about the

"height"of the other that they have neglected to appreciatethe fact that



TotalAltruism 461

Levinas affirms that the other is both higher and lower at the sametime- higher in the sense that the other "commands"me, and lower inthe sense that the other is "destitute,"dependent on me for I have "theresources to respond" o his call (1982a, 89). He writes: "the other is therichest and the poorestof beings: the richest, at an ethical level, in thatit always comes beforeme, its right-to-be precedingmine;the poorest,atan ontological or political level, in that without me it can do nothing"(1981, 63). "TheOther,"he insists, "is always, qua Other,the pooranddestitute one while at the same time being my lord . . . the relation isthus essentially dissymmetrical" 1975b, 38). Although this dual status

of height and humility (1961, 200) might seemjust to reverse the asym-metry,or to provide a double form of asymmetry,the fact that Levinas

holds both dimensions in place at the same time suggests that his viewof"height"does not carryin its train what is normallymeant by ontolog-ical inequality. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that Levinas would

want to engage the agenda of ontologyin order to assert an ontological

inequality.13

4.2 Levinas'saffirmationof equality

The double asymmetry also accounts for the way in which Levinasdoes explicitlyspeak ofme and the other as equals. Early on, in fact, as I

shall soon illustrate, he seems to have felt perfectlycomfortablespeak-

ing about me and the neighboras equals.Ricoeur seems to think that his own distinctive contribution is to

requirethat "eachprotagonistholds two roles, being both agent and pa-tient" (Ricoeur1992, 330). Ricoeur sees himself differingfrom Levinas

when he explains that in the face of the one who suffers,

initiative, precisely in terms of being-able-to-act, seems to belong exclu-

sively to the self whogives his sympathy,his compassion.. . . Confrontingthis charity,this benevolence,the other appears to be reducedto the sole

conditionof receiving.In a sense this is actually the case. And it is in this

mannerthat suffering-with gives itself, in a first approximation,as the op-

posite ofthe assignment ofresponsibilitybythe voice of the other [Ricoeur

1992, 190].

But Levinas's account of the other as "lower" s well as "higher"allows

for the other to be, as Ricoeurrequires, "bothagent and patient."More-

over, Levinas's early reference to "sympathy"s carried through in the

image of the other as "poorest." t is because of her distress, her need,

13On the otherhand, he speaks at times of ethics as "moreontological han ontology"and merely rejectsan ethics "laidon the top of ontology"1975c, 90).




that the other awakens in me sympathy,and this seems in perfectagree-ment with Ricoeur'sown representation of the mutuality of equals:

In true sympathy,the self, whose power of acting is at the start greaterthan that of its other,finds itself affectedby all the sufferingother offers toit in return. For from the sufferingother there comes a giving that is no

longer drawn from the power of acting and existing but precisely fromweakness itself. This is perhaps the supremetest of solicitude,when un-

equal powerfinds compensationin an authentic reciprocity n exchange,which, in the hour of agony,finds refugein the sharedwhisperof voices orthe feeble embrace of claspedhands [Ricoeur1992, 191].

If this is what Ricoeurrequires for "authenticreciprocity n exchange,"then surely Levinas's doubleasymmetrycan accommodate hat. Levinaswould not deny the "feelingsthat are revealed in the self by the other's

suffering, as well as by the moral injunction coming from the other,feelings spontaneously directed toward others" (Ricoeur 1992, 191-

92). Levinas would, no doubt, question the precise import of the word

"spontaneous,"but he would nonetheless concur in the idea of a "phe-nomenologyof the self affected by the other than self" (Ricoeur 1992,331). This receiving role of the self is implied in Levinas's much-ne-

glected claim that "myethical relation of love for the other stems fromthe fact that the self cannot survive by itself alone, cannot find meaningwithin its own being-in-the-world,within the ontology of sameness"

(Levinas 1981, 60). Levinas here reveals a dimension of "need"of theother that exposes an important sense in which the other is not simplyan intruder or commander and the self is not simply the one who giveswithoutreceiving.14This passage in Levinas is not an aberrantslip of the

pen it is impliedin his repeatedclaimthat the self loses its life in orderto gain it.

The problemwith dissymmetry, accordingto Ricoeur,is that "taken

literally, a dissymmetry left uncompensated would break off the ex-change ofgiving and receivingand would exclude any instructionby thefacewithin the field of solicitude" Ricoeur1992, 189).I have been tryingto show that Levinas, too, appreciates this problem,and that Ricoeur'sformulation of the answer is one that Levinas can accept namely,that"acapacity for giving in return [is] freed by the other's very initiative"

(Ricoeur 1992, 189). Moreover,Levinas's affirmation of a transformed

ipseity, an ethical self- his claim that "inthis sense the self is goodnessto the point of substitution" (1974, 118) is informed by the same in-

sight that leads Ricoeur to observe that a self can respond to another

only if the self acknowledges itself, because its "resourcesof goodness"

14 n other words,Levinas agrees with Ricoeur that "we need friends" Ricoeur1992,192).



TotalAltruism 463

are available only for "abeing who does not detest itself to the point ofbeing unable to hear the injunction coming from the other"(Ricoeur

1992, 189). Levinas knows that self-hatred would incapacitate a host,precludinggenerous hospitality. We must somehow be there enough to"hear he injunction comingfrom the other,"but not there in the sense ofa self fully constituted ("alreadyposited and fully identified")and con-

tingently waiting for the demand of the other (1974, 115). Levinas's

image of the self as the sound whose echo precedes it (1974, 103, 111)ismeant to affirm both the self and the need of the self for the other.

The equality or implicit self-esteem that Levinas affirms is found in

Totality and Infinity, where he appeals to "equality"frequently andwithout apology:he sees in religion "thesurplus possible in a society of

equals, that of glorioushumility, responsibility,and sacrifice,which arethe conditionforequality itself" (1961, 64). He writes that "thepoorone,the stranger, presents himself as an equal,"addingthat "inthe welcom-

ing of the face (which is already my responsibility in his regard, andwhere accordinglyhe approaches me from a dimension of height anddominates me), equality is founded"(1961, 213, 214). In sum, "Iam I

and chosen one, but where can I be chosen, if not fromamongother cho-sen ones, among equals?"(1961, 279). Otherwise than Being makes

explicit the sense in which I am equal:"Thanks to God' am another forthe others,"referring to the "reciprocal reciproque]relationship [that]binds me to the other man in the trace of transcendence"(1974, 158).

Thus, both early and late majorworks reveal that Levinas does not ex-

clude appeals to equality and reciprocity.It is worth lookingmoreclosely at the context of Levinas's claim that

"thepoorone, the stranger, presents himself as an equal."The passagein full is as follows:

The poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal. His equality

within this essential povertyconsists in referringto the thirdparty, thuspresent at the encounter,whom in the midst of his destitution the Other

alreadyserves. He comestojoin me. But hejoins me to himself forservice;he commandsme as a Master. This command can concern me only inas-

much as I am mastermyself;consequently his command commandsme to

command[1961, 213, emphasis added].

Not only does the stranger present himself as an equal to me, but I am,in a sense, equal to him. The final sentence shows the way in which, for

Levinas, the self is confirmed as master in relation to the command ofthe other.I cannotgive to the other what the other needs unless I belongto myself in a certain sense; I remain, in a certain sense, the one com-

manding. The self retains responsibility precisely because the

commandment "ordersme in my own voice. The command is stated

throughthe mouth of him it commands" 1982a, 110).The exteriorityof



464 Journal ofReligious Ethics

the infinite becomes interior; it is not imposed heteronomously.Thisshows that Levinas'sresponse to what he sees as the excessive emphasison individual autonomyis more nuanced than the mere substitution of

heteronomy.Tosummarize,Levinas, early and late in his careeraffirms"equality,"

and he does not posit an ontological inequality. Both these factors pro-vide supportformy claim that the "asyourself"is not incompatiblewithhis ethics. Still further supportfor this claim can be foundin Levinas's

understanding of the way in which equality is played out injustice.

5. Justice in Levinas: Implicit Reflexivity

It is (I hope) a commonplaceby now that Levinas's account does not

precludethe possibility ofjustice: it does not precludeus fromperform-ing our function as civil magistrates and judges, nor from supportingthose who perform those functions. In his later writings, it becomesclearerthat, forLevinas, talk of equality is what marks the realm ofjus-tice, a realm in which the original asymmetry is suspended:"Whateverbe the ways that lead to the superstructure of society, in justice the

dissymmetrythat holds me at odds with regard to the other will find

again law, autonomy, equality (1974, 127, emphasis added). Levinassuggests that the question ofjustice arises whenever there is more than

just you and me: "Thefact that the other, my neighbor,is also a thirdwith respect to another,who is also a neighbor,is the birth of thought,consciousness, justice and philosophy" 1974, 128). That is, he ties thenotion ofjustice to what he calls "the third" the one who is other to theother. Ethical dilemmas arise because "the third party is other than the

neighbor but also another neighbor,and also a neighbor of the other"

(1984b, 168). In the face of the "third," am led to ask, "Whatam I to do?What have they already done to one another? Who passes before theother in my responsibility?" 1984b, 168). Indeed, "to the extravagantgenerosityof the for-the-other s superimposeda reasonableorder,ancil-

lary or angelic, ofjustice through knowledge" 1984b, 169). He remindsus that "myresistance begins when the harm [someone]does me is doneto a third party who is also my neighbor.It is the third party who is thesource of justice, and thereby of justified repression; it is the violencesuffered by the third party that justifies stopping the violence of theother with violence"(1975c, 83). Justice, accordingto Levinas, is thedomainin which comparisonand calculation become relevant: the realmof

justiceis

where we have to try to do what we cannot do namely,com-pare incomparables(1974, 16), for the neighboris "bothcomparableand

incomparable" 1974, 158).Thereis no doubt, then, that forLevinas, I am responsibleforguaran-

teeing justice for others. But can I claim justice for myself? In other



TotalAltruism 465

words, does "total altruism" mean that I cannot put limits on self-sacrifice the kind of limits that the "as myself" or the "as yourself"legitimates?

5.1 Tworealms?

InEthics and Infinity,Levinas decisively contrasts the situation with

respect to himself ("me!") nd with respect to his "closerelations"or his

"people":hey are "alreadythe others, and for them, I demandjustice"(1982a, 99). The implication is that he cannot demandjustice for him-

self. This also seems to be the implicationof his claim that "ifthere wasonly the other facing me, I would say to the very end: I owe him every-thing" (1975c, 83). But if this means that I cannot claim justice for

myself, then the selfhoodof the subjectis once moreput in jeopardybe-cause there wouldbe no legitimate limits on my self-sacrifice.

However,Levinas does sometimes seem to allow the demand forjus-tice for oneself. "Tobe sure,"he says, "myresponsibility for all can and

has to manifest itself also in limiting itself. The ego can, in the name of

this unlimitedresponsibility,be calleduponto concern tself also with it-

self" (1974, 128). The "concern orjustice, for oneself" is circumscribed

within the concernforjustice for all (1974, 128). Even though in the do-main of justice there is "weighing,thought, obj dification," and thus a

"betrayal" f the "absoluteasymmetry"of substitution, "a new relation-

ship"arises: "it is only thanks to God that, as a subject incomparablewith the other, I am approachedas an other by the others, that is, Tor

myself.'Thanks to God' am anotherfor the others" 1974, 158).That is,

justice is "a terrain commonto me and the others where I am counted

amongthem"(1974, 160). This means that Levinas does not want to de-

value concern for the self, but how can he justify this if he posits a

separate realm ofjustice?The threat to concern for self is raised insofar as Levinas posits a

realm in which what Ricoeurcalls the "mutualityof self-esteems"is in-

appropriate.He seems to posit two separate realms when he writes that"the word'justice' s in effect much morein its place, there, whereequityis necessaryand not my 'subordination' o the other. If equity is neces-

sary, we must have comparison and equality: equality between those

that cannot be compared"(1975c, 82, emphasis added). That is, he

seems to differentiatebetween a realm where I am subordinatedto the

other, in altruism (love your neighbor), and a realm in which equity is

necessary, in justice (as yourself). This implies that althoughthe I

canbe taken care of in the realm ofjustice, it is excluded from attention in

the domainof relation with the other in which I have a responsibilityforthe other "such that I keep nothing for myself" (1975a, 145). That is,Levinas seems to break up the unity of the love commandment n a way




that threatens the all-encompassing relevance of the "as yourself."Itlooks as if the "asyourself"is allowed to operate only in the realm ofjus-tice and is held to be totally inapplicableto the realm of altruism.

5.2 Justice as a limit to self-sacrifice

Yet it must be noted that Levinas qualifies his position in a crucial

way,a way that repeats the suggestion of a quantitative spectrumof re-

sponsibility implied in the phrase "much more" n the passage quotedabove.He writes:

Andconsequently, he word'justice'applies much more to the relationshipwith the third partythan to the relationshipwith the other. But in reality,the relationship with another is never uniquely the relationship with theother: fromthis moment on, the third is representedin the other;that is,in the very appearanceof the other the third already regards me [1975c,82, emphasis added].

In this passage he qualifies the contrast between the two realms in two

ways: first, by repeating that it is a question of degree ("muchmore")

and, more importantly,by acknowledgingthat "inreality"no relation-

ship can be so utterly isolated and abstracted from context as to excludethe relevance or influence of "the third."

Thus, although Levinas sometimes uses a conceptual contrast be-tween personalresponsibilityandjustice, he recognizesthat in daily lifethe situation is more complex. His admission that it is impossible to

speak of a situation in which there are only two, since the third alwaysinfluences both me and the other, means that the claim of justice foroneself (and hence, limits on self-sacrifice) is an integral part of this

complexcontext in which all moral responses are made. Hence he canwrite: "If I am alone with the other, I owe him everything; but there is

someone else" (1982a, 90, emphasis added). Moreover,when he putsforth his most radical formulations of our responsibility for another,henonetheless goes on to caution that these "are extreme formulas whichmust not be detached from their context. In the concrete, many otherconsiderations intervene and require ustice evenfor me" 1982a, 99, em-

phasis added).We can conclude that Levinas does not require a stark contrast be-

tween a pure realm of personal responsibility and a pure realm of

justice. If there is no such contrast, I cannot be expectedto allow unlim-ited sacrifice of myself; a concern for

"justice,for oneself" seems to be a

legitimate concernbecause there are never just two. This may explainwhy at times he even speaks interchangeably of love and justice; for

example, he writes that in the "ethical or biblical perspective" the"interhuman relationship" is considered "as a theme of justice and



TotalAltruism 467

concern for the other as other,as a theme of love and desire"(1981, 56).Although Levinas might seem to deny the relevance of justice in theone-on-one relationship, his admission that there never is a case inwhich the third is not involved reestablishes a single realm, which couldbe called either the realm of love orjustice. In other words,Levinas has

effectivelymaintained the unity of the love commandment,and the con-stant relevance of the "asyourself."

Do the implicationsof this acknowledgmentofjustice and equality do

away with the subordinationthat is so central to Levinas's account?Hasthe attempt to keep an ethical self in relationexcludedthe importanceof

the way in which the self is the summoned self? How can we keep thecounterweight of infinite responsibility in the face of justice's limitson self-sacrifice?The only way to respond to this potential objectionisto say that Levinas maintains his view ofjustice in tension with his viewof infinite responsibility;his appreciationof justice does not come as ashift away from an earlier position. The affirmation of "infinite" espon-sibility continues to be made even while Levinas puts limits on theself-sacrificeexpectedof us: he ends the interview in Ethics and Infinityby claiming:"Inno way do I want to teach that suicide followsfromthelove of the neighborand the truly human life. I mean to say that a truly

human life cannot remain life satisfied in its equality to being, a life ofquietude, that it is awakened by the other"(1982a, 121-22). In other

words,"infinite" esponsibilitydoes not mean that absolutely no limit is

put on what is demanded of us- it does not require suicide. In fact,Levinas repeatedly points to instances in which genuine sacrifice is

being made or could be made even the little "Afteryou, sir" can be an

example of genuine sacrifice (1974, 117; 1982a, 99; 1981, 68) and anillustration of the "everydayness"of his ethics (1974, 141). Infinite re-

sponsibility does mean, however,that we can never say we are finishedwith ourresponsibility.Our sacrificefor the othermay be genuine, with-

out being suicide, but there is never an end to the demand for sacrifice.There will always be another who needs me or another need to which Ican minister, so I can never say "Quits."

6. Conclusion

All of this suggests that there are resourcesin Levinas'sethics for af-

firming a self sufficient to ground responsible ethical agency and tomaintain ongoingrelationship.The self is never simply emptiedor anni-

hilated;the self is, in some sense, equal to the other and can, when there

is a third (andin reality,there always is), claimjustice for itself. Levinasallows for limiting the sacrifice of ourselves insofar as we need to bethere to help the others (since undue sacrifice of self would militate

against fulfilling our responsibility for the others), but he also wants toallowjustice for ourselves to limit the sacrifice of ourselves.




It is worth returning now to re-examine the way in which Levinastakes exceptionto the "asyourself"of the love commandment.He beginsby questioning the phrase "moralexperience"because, he says, it "sup-poses a subject who is there" (1975c, 90). This looks like the loomingshadow of precisely the subjectless ethics he is often said to exemplify,but he explains that by "asubjectwho is there"he means a subject"who,first of all is and who, at a certain moment has a moral experience,whereas it is in the way in which he is there, in which he lives, thatthere is this ethics"(1975c, 90). This rules out only the notion of a sub-

ject who exists priorto a moral context;it does not deny the notion of a

moralsubject.Such a subjectis assumed in the alternate translations ofthe love commandment that Levinas proposes.He says that in the con-text of the whole Bible, the commandment should be read as follows:"'Love our neighbor;this work is like yourself; 'loveyour neighbor;heis yourself; 'it is this love of the neighborwhich is yourself" (1975c, 90).These are striking phrases, almost shocking in their radicality. Thework of loving is your self- the self is the one who loves. These formula-tions function implicitly as the "asyourself"("asmyself,""oneselfas an

other,""an other as oneself"), and in the light of all we have seen ofLevinas's affirmationof the self, they suggest not a rejectionso much as

a reinterpretationof the "asyourself."I suggest that Levinas anticipated Schrag'srecognitionthat "jettison-

ing" a "classical substance-theory of the self and the modern

epistemologicalorfoundational construal of self as transparentmind . . .does not entail a jettisoning of every sense of self" (Schrag 1997, 9).15Levinas rejectsnot only what he regards as a simplistic Hegelian notionof the ego as an "equalitywith itself,"or an "identity," ut also the com-monunderstandingof an "egoalready posited and fully identified"priorto forgettingitself (1974, 115).Nevertheless, he still affirmsthat "Iam aself in the identifying recurrencein which I find myself cast back to thehither side ofmy point of departure" that is, "recurrencebecomes iden-

tity in breaking up the limits of identity," challenging "the intolerablerest"that is characteristic of a being's"definition"1974, 115, 114). Forthis reason, I think it is just right to say, as Peperzak does, that for

Levinas, "seeingmyself as equal to all Others,presupposesa specificex-

perience that differs profoundlyfrom the egoistic experience belongingto the orderof economy. . . then I am alsofor me, but in a radicallyothersense than that of economicdelight" (Peperzak 1997, 128).16Levinas'sclaim that the deposition of the subject is to be conceived in terms of

15See Schrag 1997, 14n., 100, 144, for expressions of sympathy or agreementwithLevinas.

16Whenself-possession s occasionallyconstruedas thematization(1974, 100),it is be-cause the initial self-centered pseity must be transformed.



TotalAltruism 469

"the de-substantiationof the subject,its de-reification" 1974, 127)is hisprefaceto the emergenceof the responsibleand maintained self, the selfwith heart and hands to give to the other.

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ferreira - total altruism and levinas

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