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FINAL REPORT

2006-005-6 SERIOUS MARINE CASUALTY

Duna 1643-1641 rkm Lágymányosi bridge 17 April 2006

Szombathely tug-towboat with barges 86001314 / 200191

The sole objective of the technical investigation is to reveal the causes and circumstances of marine casualties, serious and very serious casualties as well as marine incidents, and to initiate the necessary technical measures and make recommendations in order to prevent similar cases in the future. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability.

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This present investigation was conducted on the bas is of − Act XLII of 1995 on marine transport,

− SOLAS 1974/1978 and Act XI of 2001 on its proclamation,

− Act CLXXXIV of 2005 on the technical investigation of aviation, railway and marine accidents and incidents (hereinafter referred to as Kbvt.),

− Decree 9/2006 (II.27.) of Ministry of Economy and Transport (MET) on the detailed rules regarding technical investigation of serious marine casualties and incidents.

− In absence of other related regulation of the Kbvt., the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary conducted the investigation in accordance with Act CXL of 2004 on the general rules of administrative authority procedure and service,

− The competence of the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary is based on the Kbvt. until 31st December 2006 and on Government Decree 278/2006 (XII. 23.) from 1st January 2007 respectively.

Under the aforementioned regulations − The Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary shall investigate serious marine

casualties.

− The Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary may investigate marine incidents which - in its judgement - would have resulted in casualties in other circumstances.

− The technical investigation is independent of any administrative, infringement or criminal procedures.

In addition to the aforementioned laws, the A.849 IMO Code (Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents) is applicable. Incompatibility did not stand against the members of the IC. Persons participating in the technical investigation did not act as experts in other procedures concerning the same case and shall not do so in the future. This present final report shall not be binding, nor shall an appeal be lodged against it.

The IC shall safe keep the data having come to their knowledge in the course of the technical investigation. Furthermore, the ic shall not be obliged to make the data – regarding which the owner of the data could have refused the disclosure of the data pursuant to the relevant act – available to other authorities.

This present final report was based on the draft report prepared by the IC and accepted by the Director-General of TSB. The draft report was sent to the relevant parties - defined by law - for reflections.

The IC did not receive any reflections on the draft report within the defined time frame, therefore this final report remains unchanged.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BPPMC

FKFV

Budapest Public Property Maintenance Company

Fıvárosi Közterület Fenntartó Vállalat

CTSA

KKF

Central Transport Supervisory Authority

Központi Közlekedési Felügyelet (predecessor of the NTA)

HSCF

MHD

Hungarian Ship and Crane Factory

Magyar Hajó és Darugyár HSZH Notifications for Skippers

Hajósoknak Szóló Hirdetmények

IC Investigating Committee

IMO International Maritime Organization

Kbvt. Act CLXXXIV of 2005 on the technical investigation of aviation, railway and marine accidents and incidents

KDVVIZIG Mid-Danube Valley Water Authority

Közép Duna-völgyi Vízügyi Igazgatóság

MAHART Hungarian Passenger Shipping Ltd

MET

GKM

Ministry of Economy and Transport

(Gazdasági és Közlekedési Minisztérium)

ms. motor ship

MTW

KHVM

Ministry of Transport,. Telecommunication and Water

(Közlekedési, Hírközlési és Vízügyi Minisztérium)

NAVINFO Marine Emergency Assistance and Information System

NTA National Transport Authority

rkm river kilometre

RSOE National Association of Radio Distress-signalling and Infocommunications

SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea

TSA

KFF

Transport Supervisory Authority (predecessor of the NTA)

(Közlekedési Fıfelügyelet)

TSB Transportation Safety Bureau

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SUMMARY

Occurrence category serious marine casualty manufacturer MHD Balatonfüred / Tiszayacht Kft. type towboat (rebuilt from a tugboat) flag Hungarian registration 8601314 serial number 415 owner Császári Hajózási Kft. operator Dunayacht-Cargo Kft.

Vessel no.1 Szombathely tug-towboat

charterer - manufacturer Decin Shipyard type barge

flag deleted from the Czech register (at the time of the occurrence), certificate invalid

registration invalid, (previous reg. no. 200191) serial number CSPL 1161 owner Pillangó Gmbh operator Dunayacht –Cargo Kft.

Vessel no. 2 barge CSPL

charterer - date and time 17 April 2006. 08 hours 50 minutes location Danube 1643 rkm, Lágymányosi bridge fatalities none Occurrence

number of seriously injured none

Extent of damage to Vessel no.1 none Country of registry Hungary Registration authority TSA Authority supervising rebuilding CTSA

Extent of damage to Vessel no.2 The hull broke (split open) on a 5-metre-length at the bilge and then sank

Country of registry Czech Republic (deleted from the register at the time of the occurrence)

Registration authority Statni Plavebni Sprava-Reditelstvi Authority supervising manufacturing Statni Plavebni Sprava-Reditelstvi Competent investigating body (according to the location of the occurrence)

TSB

Reports and notifications

The casualty was reported to the duty services personnel of tsb by the officer on duty of the competent police at 09:30 on 17 april 2006.

The on duty personnel of tsb reported the occurrence to tsb’s head of department on duty (who was the head of the marine department) at 09:35 on 17 april 2006, and informed the director-general of tsb at 09:40.

The officer on duty of the competent police informed the marine authorities and the bridge master of bppmc, therefore tsb was not required to inform any other organisation.

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Investigating Committee

The Director-General of TSB assigned the following Investigating Committee (hereinafter referred to as IC) on 17 April 2006 to investigate the serious marine casualty:

Investigator-in-charge Dalma Orosz Head of Marine Department Member of IC Pál Burda field investigator technician

Synopsis of the investigation

Having received the notification, the IC set off to the Kopaszi Gát site of the Budapest station of Danube Water Police. When the bridge master arrived, they got into the patrol boat of the water police and viewed the site. As the boat was still manoeuvring at this time, the IC viewed the bridge pillar first. The bridge master established that the left pier of the downstream span of Lágymányosi bridge had been scraped by the barge on a 3-4-metre-length of which the IC took photographs. The pier, however, did not sustain substantial damage. Afterwards, the bridge master got out of the patrol boat and the IC continued its survey with the patrols of the water police. They went to the boat and took photographs and a video recording as well as interviewing the crew of the boat.

The following day the IC informed - via post - the Czech Marine Authority about the occurrence as the captain of the sunken barge had shown a certificate issued by the Czech Marine Authority. In its reply, the Czech Marine Authority stated that the barge had been deleted from its registry more than a month ago; therefore the certificate of the barge was invalid. The IC requested the documentation on the rebuilding of the boat from the CTSA and the water current data measured in the cross-section behind Lágymányosi bridge from KDVVIZIG. The received data were the results of an examination conducted in a previous year - at that time, the water level and the rate of water flow were the same as measured on the day of the occurrence. The IC received copies of the documents prepared and obtained by the Water Police as well as of the recordings of the interview with the captain conducted by the police. The IC obtained the meteorological data from the website of the National Meteorological Services. The Marine Authority of the TSA ordered a partial waterway restriction in the HSZH and requested the owner to refloat the wreckage, which was done - with substantial delay - in October 2006. The crew of the boat and the water police helpfully cooperated in the investigation.

Synopsis of the occurrence

The vessel departed to its destination Constanta on the morning of 17 April 2006 in clear sunny weather. The operator embarked from its Újpest port, then collected and hitched the 4 barges tied next to each other. There was a 6-member crew on the boat; they wanted to sail in A1 mode (daytime sailing for the maximum of 14 hours). The water level on the Danube was quite high on that day; the flooding of the week before had just been subsiding. The barges were loaded with concrete sleepers used on railways. According to the captain, he sailed towards Lágymányosi bridge the usual way approximately at 8:50 when he noticed that he could not turn the caravan any further to avoid collision with the downstream bridge pillar. Therefore he switched the main engine to flank speed, but at this time this manoeuvre did not help either. The far-left barge collided with the bridge pillar approximately 10 metres from its stern; the side of the barge and the bridge pillar scraped each other. As a consequence of the collision, the right-side rope-guiding pulley of the boat broke as well as two ropes which connected the barges to the boat. The captain tried to direct the caravan towards the nearby port on the left bank with the remaining ropes. He also told the other members of the crew to go onto the barges with the emergency pump and check out what damage had been caused, and if there is leaking, start pumping. Having noticed that the left barge was sinking very quickly and was endangering the other barges and the

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boat, he immediately gave orders to the crew to release the ropes of the sinking barge and try to arrange and hitch the other barges to the boat. The left barge turned to upstream with its bow, then after a short time it sank at the side of the waterway at rkm 1641.48, approximately 130 metres from the edge of the left bank. In the meantime, the boat and the crew collected the broken units and re-connected the barges next to each other, turned upstream and finally anchored at Csepel port. This manoeuvre was still in progress at the beginning of the site survey. In the course of the site survey, the police conducted breathalyser examinations and established that one of the crew had consumed alcohol. After the completion of the site survey, the police withdrew the documents/certificates of the boat, the barges and that of the crew until further action. The following day, the Marine Authority of the TSA surveyed the waterway beside the sunken barge, had it marked with a radar-buoy and issued partial sailing restrictions in the HSZH until the wreckage has been pulled out of the river.

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1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 The course of the occurrence Antecedent events

Szombathely ms. was built by MAHART in its Balatonfüred shipyard in 1963. It was the 4th in a series and was designed to be a towboat. While it was in possession of MAHART, it was once rebuilt when the original Láng 6LD 315 RF type main engines were exchanged with SKL 6NVD A2U type, however, the basic function of the vessel - as towboat - did not change.

The vessel was sold to its present owner in 2003 when MAHART was privatized. In river-navigation, there have been considerable technological changes in the last 20 years. Earlier, almost only tugboats were used whereas nowadays self-propelled boats and towboats are more common. (See Appendix 3, Hajózási formák) Tugboats no longer navigate on the upper reach of the Danube. Therefore MAHART began to reconstruct tugboats into so called ‘simplified’ towboats in the beginning of the 1990s. Three of these tugboats were reconstructed, but Szombathely ms. was not among them then. Together with the changes in technology, the regulations on shipbuilding and survey were amended. The most significant change was the new appendix - titled ‘Survey Regulation’ - of KöVim Decree 13/2001 (IV.10.). This Regulation included the prescriptions in the Rajna Regulation which later provided the basis to the Survey Regulation on inland navigation in the European Union. The new regulations applied to the newly built vessels in their entirety, and partially to rebuilt ships. Older vessels were given grace time.

The new owner and operator wanted to rebuild the vessel into a tug-towboat and commissioned a design company to compile the plan. In order to clarify details (length) of the documents to be submitted, this company initiated a meeting with the representatives of CTSA. The meeting took place on 3 October 2005. In the minutes of the meeting, it was recorded that regarding the new parts of the vessel, the regulations in the appendix of KöVim Decree 13/2001 (IV.10.) amended by MET Decree 8/2004. (II.6) - Survey Regulation - applied. It was also recorded that the forward and backward manoeuvre abilities of the pushed barges shall be ensured so they would comply with Regulations TSA 17/2003 and 22/2003 (“Compliance shall be checked by tests”). The Navigation Supervisory Authority did not request calculations with regard to the manoeuvre abilities of the vessel to be reconstructed.

The designers knew the plans of the previously rebuilt MAHART vessels and their navigation experiences, however, those vessels had been rebuilt well before the publication of the new regulations, therefore the task was new to the designers. Also, it was the first time the representatives of the Navigation Supervisory Authority had judged plans on reconstruction from tugboat to towboat since the publication of the new survey regulations. There were several exchanges of letters during the approval process because of the Navigation Supervisory Authority’s comments on the presented documentation as well as of the shift in design concept made by the designers (use of two stern anchors instead of one, and other modifications). The presented plans described the caravan configurations which were associated with particular barge types. The plans did not include the barge types which were used in the towing probe/test and were later involved in the casualty. Neither was described in the plans the caravan configuration which was used at the time of the casualty. (It is worth pointing out, however, that the parameters of one barge in the plan do not differ substantially from the parameters of CSPL type barges which were involved in the casualty.) The Navigation

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Supervisory Authority emphasised that it would approve the caravan configurations only after the towing probes/tests. The rebuilding of the vessel started almost immediately after the submission of the rebuilding plans. The Authority monitored the rebuilding works and conducted two site surveys, the findings of which were recorded in survey protocols. After the rebuilding had been finished, manoeuvring and towing tests were conducted on 21 March 2006. The barges provided by the operator for the tests were the actual ones which later were involved in the casualty. The documentation of the barges was not presented (to the Authority); the actual loadings were calculated from the loading manifests. The test was conducted with the so-called tandem configuration (two-by-two).

The test configuration of the caravan

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Following the test, the Navigation Supervisory Authority issued a temporary permit in which it was stated that “the vessel can be operated as a towboat and can move four DE II.b type barges (for dry goods and materials), the maximum dimensions of the configuration as follows: length 203 m, width 22 m, loading 4319 metric tons.” The site survey protocol which accompanied the permit had a number of observations. Based on the test protocols, the Navigation Supervisory Authority made the necessary calculations and determined the list of permitted configurations. The vessel was submitted to another survey on 14 April 2006 before it was put in service and its permanent documentation was issued. The documentation did not list the configuration of four barges in a row which was the casualty configuration. The Navigation Supervisory Authority did not revoke the temporary permit which carried a validity date of 22 April 2006 and was kept on board.

The operator was eager to launch the caravan to its destination as soon as possible, therefore it quickly recruited a crew the day after the final survey. The following day (Sunday) the captain was notified that he had to depart with a caravan the following Monday. He had served on the vessel as a tugboat captain before the ship was rebuilt, had no experience on towboats, and was not present on the manoeuvring and towing tests.

Departure and route of the caravan

The captain and the crew members boarded the boat early morning (between 5:00 and 6:00) on 17 April 2006 at the port of Dunayacht-Cargo Kft in Újpest. The weather was good (clear skies). The crew prepared the boat for departure which then navigated to pick up the barges which were anchored at their nearby waiting place. They found the four barges tied side by side. The captain did not order to rearrange the configuration, he just manoeuvred the boat behind the barges and hitched them with the ropes. It is possible that the captain did not read the test protocol which was issued after the rebuilding of the boat, and it is also probable

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he did not read the relevant parts of the temporary and the permanent permits either. In his testimony he told the police he thought the temporary permit allowed the “four barges in a row” configuration (which was not the case) and did not notice that the permanent permit also excluded that configuration. He remembered from his tugboating past that he had sailed with such configuration as a captain of the same boat (which was a tugboat then, see the picture below).

Szombathely ms. (when it was a tugboat) sailing dow nstream with a four-barge caravan on the Danube near the Parliament

The caravan left port around 8:00 for Constanta loaded with concrete sleepers for railway tracks. The dimensions of the caravan were within the allowed limits defined in the 3/Du/2006 HSZH.

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The actual configuration of the caravan

The Danube River was receding after a swell in the previous week, nevertheless, gage height at Budapest was still 516 cm.

The caravan sailed under the Danube bridges, passed the Petıfi Bridge, and approached the downstream span of the Lágymányosi Bridge. According to KDVVIZIG data, the stream speed was 1,6 m/s (5,7 km/h) (see Appendix). The captain told the IC he estimated 9 -13 km/h for the caravan’s speed.

During the towing and manoeuvring tests conducted with a two-by-two tandem configuration the downstream caravan speed reading was 14,8 km/h with similar river conditions and with engines full ahead. The calculated stillwater speed was approximately 9 km/h. The great width of the four-in-a-row configuration most probably resulted in a somewhat slower caravan speed, however, (the IC believes) the actual caravan speed was closer to the upper value of the speed range estimated by the captain.

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The navigation route

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The Lágymányosi bridge

Location river km Height (m)

Width (m) span Position

Lágymányosi Bridge, downstream 1643.1 10,00 75,00

2nd span, counting from the right bank

47°28'798" N 19°03'929" E

According to the captain’s account, the caravan reached the Lágymányosi Bridge at about 8:50. The captain approached the bridge span in the usual way when he felt that he could not turn the caravan under the span (the downstream span is 75 m wide) therefore he applied excess thrust and simultaneously steered left. These actions, however, proved ineffective. The far-left barge of the caravan collided with the bridge pillar approximately 10 metres from its stern; the side of the barge and the bridge pillar scraped each other. As a consequence of the collision, the right-side rope-guiding pulley of the boat broke as well as two ropes which connected the barges to the boat. As a result, the tight connection between the boat and the barges were lost on the starboard (right) side. The captain tried to direct the caravan out of the waterway towards the nearby port on the left bank with the remaining ropes. He also told the other members of the crew to go onto the barges with the emergency pump and check out what damage had been caused, and if there is leaking, start pumping. Having noticed that the left barge was sinking very quickly and was endangering the other barges and the boat, he immediately gave orders to the crew to release the ropes of the sinking barge and try to arrange and hitch the other barges to the boat. The left barge turned to upstream with its bow then after a short time it sank at the side of the waterway at rkm 1641.48, approximately 130 metres from the left bank, GPS coordinates N 470 27’ 8.7”, E 190 03’ 31.2”. In the meantime, the boat and the crew collected the broken units and re-connected the barges next to each other, turned upstream and finally anchored at Csepel port. This manoeuvre was still in progress when the IC and water police arrived. The water police notified the Navigation Supervisory Authority.

1.2 Injuries to persons

Injuries Crew Passengers Others Fatal 0 0 0 Serious 0 0 0 Minor 0 0 0 None 6 0 0

There was no injury to persons.

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1.3 Damage to ships The right-side rope-guiding pulley of the boat broke as well as two ropes which connected the barges to the boat. The ropes damaged the capstan and – in a lesser extent – the mainstay at the bow. The boat did not sustain other damage.

The barge sustained a a 5-metre long leak at its bilge, approximately 10 metres from its stern. The leak was so extensive that the barge sank; as a result its electric equipment was destroyed by the water. After recovering the loading, the barge was brought to the surface, towed to the operator’s port where its hull was repaired by welding, and it was subsequently sold.

1.4 Other damage The left pillar of the downstream span of Lágymányosi Bridge was scraped at a length of 3-4 metres. The IC did not receive information on other damage until the end of the investigation.

1.5 Personnel information

1.5.1 The captain of the boat The captain of the boat had 40 years’ nautical experience which he mainly gained on tugboats and self-propelled vessels. He had known the boat well prior to its reconstruction and he had also been a captain on it when it had still been a tugboat. He did not have the opportunity to gain experience on the rebuilt towboat.

Age, gender 59-year-old man Certificate valid „A” category captain since 1973 Medical certificate valid Qualifications Other certificate(s) Radio operator certificate,

Radar operator certificate Period of time in service on the given boat

18 months as captain of the tugboat

in the last 12 months first voyage in tow mode Date of embarkation

in the last 30 days 1 day

1.5.2 Chief engineer n.a.

1.5.3 Other personnel There were 6 persons on board at the time of the casualty (including the captain and the shift supervisor). According to the boat’s documentation, the minimum crew for different sailing modes were as follows: 5 persons at A1, six persons at A2, and seven persons at B mode. All crew members possessed a valid medical certificate and the required qualifications. The crewmembers’ age ranged between 40 and 60 years. All of them had several years of sailing experience on tugboats and towboats, they were familiar with coupling of caravans and boat handling. The water police checked the crew with a breathalyzer and found that one of the boatmen consumed alcohol prior to boarding. The captain told the IC that he did not know about his boatman’s drinking, otherwise he would have requested a replacement. The crewmembers were notified about the departure time the previous evening while they were on Easter leave. They reported to work in the

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following morning; the casualty happened in the 4th hour of the working day. The IC did not have data on the crewmembers’ rest time.

1.6 Vessel data Tug-towboat

Manufacturer MHD Balatonfüred Year of manufacturing 1963

Rebuilt into towboat between October 2005 and March 2006

Date of last survey 14 April 2006 Registration valid until 14 March 2008

Barge

Place of manufacturing Decin Year of manufacturing 1989 Date of last survey Registration valid until

invalid, deleted from register

1.6.1 Hull data Tug-towboat, after the rebuilding

Length 49,47 m Net displacement 308 tons Breadth 7,54 m Freeboard height 2,70 m Maximum draft 1,70 m Fixpoint height from baseline 6,25 m Last underwater survey of the hull 2 March 2006

Barge CSPL 1161 (two other barges of the caravan - CSPL 1159 and CSPL 1121 - were sister barges therefore their main para meters are identical)

Length 70,95 m Breadth 10,47 m Freeboard height 2,52 m Maximum draft 2,20 m Fixpoint height from baseline 4,34 m Tonnage 1236 tons

The fourth barge of the caravan, type „Allod”

Length 65,75 m Breadth 8,24 m Empty draft 0,85 m Maximum draft 2,36 m Fixpoint height from baseline 3,94 m Tonnage 913,3 tons

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1.6.2 Main engines of the tug-towboat

Year of manufacturing 1962 Manufacturer SKL Magdeburg Engine type SKL 6NVD A2U (2 engines) Troughput 2 x 588 kW Run time 84600 hrs

Since last overhaul 23550 hrs Run time

Since last maintenance 320 hrs

1.6.3 Data of the malfunctioned equipment The captain told the IC that the right rope-guiding pulley was damaged in the casualty. The IC could not exclude the possibility that the pulley broke prior to the forced turn into the waterway under the bridge due to the excess forces. As a result the tight coupling between the boat and the barges ceased to exist therefore the caravan did not react properly to the turning manoeuvres.

Year of manufacturing 2006 (installed at rebuilding) Manufacturer Tiszayacht Kft.

The torn ropes were Type 28 steel cables with a tensile strength of 496 kN each.

1.6.4 Vessel loading data Boat loading data

Empty mass 308 352 kg Fuel volume 20 000 litres Fuel type and relative density Diesel fuel, 0,83 g/cm3 Fuel mass 16600 kg Gross displacement 324 952 kg Maximum draft 1,70 m Draft at the time of the casualty 1,55 m

Barge loading data

CSPL 1161 1155 tons concrete railway sleepers CSPL 1159 1117 tons concrete railway sleepers CSPL 1121 1163 tons concrete railway sleepers SL. Allod 884 tons concrete railway sleepers Total 4319 tons concrete railway sleepers

The barges were loaded almost to their maximum allowed limit but were not overloaded; their draft was within the allowed range. The coupled (next to each other) barges formed a 71-metre-long and 42-metre-wide configuration which was not listed among the allowed configurations in the boat rebuilding plans and was not tested in real life. Neither the temporary permit, nor the permanent permit issued by the CTSA listed this configuration as allowed. The permanent permit was issued 3 days prior to the departure, on 14 April 2006.

The survey protocol which was attached to the permanent permit contained a number of deficiencies with a deadline for their repair. Among the listed problems was a leak near the rudder shaft seal which could effect the operation of the

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rudder. The IC observed at the time of the site survey that one of the boat’s auxiliary engines was inoperative.

The fuel type used had no causal effect on the marine casualty therefore its detailed analysis was not required.

1.7 Meteorological data – Clear and sunny weather, good visibility, temperature 16 0C.

– Receding flood, gage reading at Budapest 516 cm, rate of flow 4500 m3/sec, mean current speed 1,50-1,55 m/sec, water temperature 7 0C. The crew had access to this information.

1.8 Aids to navigation The navigation equipment had no effect on the course of events therefore its analysis was not required.

1.9 Communications The communications instruments had no effect on the course of events therefore their analysis was not required.

1.10 Port parameters The parameters of the port of departure and port of destination had no effect on the course of events therefore their analysis was not required.

1.11 Data recorders n. a.

1.12 Wreckage information The Type CSPL1161 barge sank at N 470 27’ 8,7”, E 190 03’ 31,2” at the edge of the waterway, at 1641.48 river km, approximately 130 metres from the left riverbank. While sinking, it was turned in upstream position by the current and sank almost parallel to the bank. The police took custody of the wreckage for expert examination. The marine authority marked the wreckage with a buoy and notified the concerned parties via HSZH. Later the operator arranged for the salvage of the barge and its loading. The barge was towed to the operator’s premises.

1.13 Medical and pathological information Medical forensics examination

n. a.

1.14 Fire There was no fire.

1.15 Survival aspects The sinking of the barge created a life-threatening situation. The captain quickly realised the dangers and immediately directed the crew to release the affected

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barge and to return to the boat. The crew promptly accomplished the task and as a result there was no injury.

1.16 Tests and research The IC did not conduct special tests and research.

1.17 Organisational and management information The characteristics of the organizational and management environment had no effect on the course of events therefore their analysis was not required.

1.18 Additional information The IC did not receive other relevant information and it does not intend to publish additional information other than the factual information above.

1.19 Useful or effective investigation techniques The investigation did not require techniques differing from the traditional approach.

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2. ANALYSIS The captain believed he had extensive marine experience which made him overconfident. As a result, he failed to consider the nautical characteristics of the rebuilt boat and the unusual caravan configuration (which was not listed in the documentation). His experience was related to tugboats therefore he reacted to the erroneous movement of the caravan with a delay and manoeuvred the unfamiliar caravan with high speed at high water level.

If compare the width of the downstream span of the Lágymányosí Bridge with that of the caravan (75 and 42 metres respectively) there is only 15 metres left from the two pillars provided the caravan sails straight in the middle of the waterway. The river, however, has a bend at Lágymányosi Bridge therefore the caravans have to make a turn while sailing under the bridge span. Moreover, strong cross-currents are common near the pillars at high water. It is possible that such a current made the barges turn more than the captain intended and which he was not able to correct. The rudder of the boat was designed for a tugboat. The hull of tugboats is long and narrow to provide directional stability. The barges which the tugboats pull behind have their own rudders therefore the tugboat uses its rudder to steer only itself. Towboats, however, are usually short and wide for increased manoeuvrability and to provide a longer lever arm for a greater turning moment. The rudder of the towboats has to be able to sustain significant loading because it turns the towboat and the coupled barges as a whole. (See the configuration schemes in 1.1.) Towboats usually have dedicated reverse rudders, however, Szombathely ms. was not equipped with such rudders. The marine authority did not request calculation for effectiveness of the rudder in towing mode. The allowed caravan configurations and sizes were determined exclusively based on the towing test results. It is worth pointing out that the boat’s draft was 155 cm while the barges had 220 cm draft. This difference in drafts means the lower edge of the rudder was about 70 cm higher that the barges’ baseline, therefore the rudder was operating in the barges’ turbulence, which substantially weakened the rudder’s effectiveness.

The operator’s decision to assign a captain with no towboating experience indirectly contributed to the marine casualty.

Another indirect cause of the marine casualty was the fact that the captain did not review the rebuilt boat’s documentation and did not check the validity of registrations for the barges of the caravan. (It is probable, however, that even if he had checked the documentation prior to departure, he would not have found out that they were invalid because the Czech authorities failed to revoke the registrations upon deleting the barges from the Czech registry. The registration documents seemed valid.) Nor did the captain notice that the caravan configuration and size was not in the list of allowed configurations. When he manoeuvred the boat to the barges, he did not direct his crew to re-arrange the barges. It is possible that he was under time pressure. The captain did not have towboating experience, nevertheless he accepted the task.

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3. CONCLUSIONS

3.1 Direct causes of the marine casualty The occurrence of the marine casualty can directly be linked to human factors, namely the excessive self-confidence, lack of attention and carelessness of the captain. Although he did not possess towboating experience, neither had he took part in the towing tests, he took the boat to its maiden voyage. It is well probable that he trusted his 40-year sailing experience and was familiar with the boat from its tugboat past.

3.2 Indirect causes of the marine casualty The operator’s decision to assign a captain who had no towboating experience and was not present at the towing tests indirectly contributed to the marine casualty.

3.3 Risk factors which cannot be linked to the mari ne casualty The marine authority did not revoke the temporary permit when it issued the permanent one, thus creating an ambiguous situation for the captain.

The marine authority did not request calculations regarding the manoeuvrability of the rebuilt boat, instead, it accepted the experience gained at rebuilding of the Szombathely’s sister boats by MAHART and the towing test results as substitute for calculations. The documentation of the barges was not presented by the operator at the tests; the actual loadings were calculated from the loading manifests. The marine authority revised its plan approval procedures and practice.

Three of the barges carried no valid registration at the time of the marine casualty because the Czech authority had deleted them from the registry one month earlier and they had not yet been registered by another authority.

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4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS The CTSA Marine Supervisory Authority revised its plan approval procedures and practice after the marine casualty, therefore the IC did not issue a safety recommendation in this regard.

Similar occurrences can be prevented by observing the current laws and regulations, using experience from recommended sailing practice and exercising caution and awareness.

The operator’s actions with regard to the preparation of the sailing prompted the IC to issue a safety recommendation concerning recruiting principles. The IC also addressed the marine authority on the occasion of the marine casualty which involved vessels with invalid registration.

BA2006-005-6_1. The fact that the captain who was assigned to sail a towed caravan with a newly rebuilt boat on its maiden voyage did not possess towboating experience contributed to the marine casualty. The IC recommends to the operator to make sure that prospective employees satisfy the professional requirements.

BA2006-005-6_2. The fact that three barges had invalid registration did not contribute directly to the marine casualty. The IC, however, considers it as an added risk. Therefore the IC recommends the National Transport Authority, Directorate of Significant Affairs, Marine Authority Department (successor of CTSA) to enhance the cooperation with its foreign partner organisations and the water police in order to prevent vessels with invalid registration / invalid documentation from using the waterways on the River Danube.

5. APPENDICES (not translated) 1. General plan of Szombathely ms. prior to rebuilding

2. General plan of Szombathely ms. after rebuilding

3. Sailing modes, methods of towing barges (excerpt from the electronic course book of Baross Gábor Transportation Institute)

4. River stream speed and rate of flow diagram for the time of the marine casualty (source: KDVVIZIG)

5. Excerpt from the Notification For Skippers No. 3/Du/2006

Budapest, „ „ December 2009.

Dalma OROSZ

IIC Pál BURDA

IC member

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Stern anchors of Szombathely ms. after the rebuildi ng. The rudder was not modified.

Scratch marks on the pillar of Lágymányosi Bridge

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The bow mast of the sunken CSPL 1161 barge

Szombathely ms. with the remanined barges anchored at Csepel port

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The damaged rope pulley of Szombathely ms.

The salvage of the barge and its loading in October 2006

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Appendix 1 General plan of Szombathely ms. prior to rebuilding

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Appendix 2 General plan of Szombathely ms. after rebuilding

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Appendix 3 Sailing modes, methods of towing barges (excerpt fr om the electronic coursebook of

Baross Gábor Transportation Institute) 2. Hajózási módok Az elıbbi fejezetekbıl következik, hogy a víziút, és ezzel összefüggésben a hajótípusok sajátosságaiból adódóan

• belvízi (folyami-, tavi-) hajózást,

• Folyam-tengerihajózást és

• tengeri hajózást különítünk el.

Amennyiben a hajózás személyek és áruk szállítására szolgál, kereskedelmi hajózásról beszélünk és ezen belül személyhajózást és áruszállító hajózást (teherhajózást) különítünk el.

A személyhajózás nem képezi vizsgálatunk tárgyát. Itt röviden csak annyit említünk meg, hogy a klasszikus tengeri személyhajózás a II. Világháborút követıen lényeges változáson ment át. A transzóceáni személyforgalom átterelıdött a légi közlekedésre. Jelenleg a tengeri személyforgalom döntı mértékben a közúti-, ill. a vasúti személyszállítási láncba illeszkedı rövidtávú komphajózási formában bonyolódik le, továbbá a nemzetközi idegenforgalomhoz szorosan kötıdı luxus turista- és üdülıhajózási formában nyilvánul meg. Hasonlóképpen, a belvízi személyhajózás is elsısorban turisztikai, üdülési és szórakozási célokat szolgál.

2.1. Belvízi hajózás A belvízi hajózásban, mint hajózási módszert, technológiát tekintve:

• a vontatóhajózást,

• a tolóhajózást és

• az önjáró hajózást különítjük el.

Az egyes belvízi utakon alkalmazott hajózási módszerek elsısorban a víziút adottságaival (kanyarulati sugarak, vízmélység, vízfolyás sebessége, stb.) függenek össze, de nagy szerepe van a hagyományoknak is.

2.1.1. Vontatóhajózás Vontató hajózáson olyan hajózási módszert értünk amikor az áruk befogadására szolgáló uszályokat az elıttük haladó vontató hajó kötelekkel mozgatja (vontatja) a kívánt irányba.

Hazai vonatkozásban az uszályok hordképessége 1000 - 1500 tonna, a vontatóhajók fıgépteljesítménye 220 - 1500 kW közötti. Az uszályokból a Dunán a víziúti adottságok, a vontatási iránya ·(hegymenet, ill. völgymenet), valamint a vontatóhajó fıgépteljesítményének a függvényében 3000 - 10000 3000 - 10000 tonnás karavánok (vonták) alakíthatók ki.

A vontatott uszályok egymáshoz csatolókötelekkel vannak rögzítve, és a vonta nagyságától függıen egy vagy több sorban követik a vontató hajót.

A vontatókötelek hosszát és a csatolás módját a vontatás iránya és a víziút sajátosságai szabják meg.

A vontatóhajózás ma már nem korszerő hajózási módszer, alkalmazása a nagyobb víziutakon mindinkább visszaszorul és helyette a tolóhajózás, ill. az önjáró hajózás kerül elıtérbe.

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Ennek okai a következık:

• Nehézkes a fordítási mővelet és emiatt sok káreset (havaria) keletkezik.

• A géphajó hajtóberendezése (hajócsavar) által keltett vízáram az uszályokba ütközik és így gátolja azok haladását. Ez a jelenség részben kiküszöbölhetı azáltal, hogy hegymenetben a hosszanti uszálysorokat széteresztik - azaz közöttük széles teret hagynak - és hosszú vontatókötelet alkalmaznak.

• Az uszályok egyenkénti vontába rendezése nehézkes és idıigényes mővelet.

• A vontatmány és a vontató hajó nem képez egy zárt egységet, így az elıbbi lendülete nem fékezhetı le a vontató hajóval, meg kell várni amíg az uszályok mozgása a közegellenállás következtében lelassul.

• Az üzemben lévı uszályok mind menetben, mind pedig éjszakázásoknál, illetve kikötıi mőveleteknél önálló irányítást, ırzést igényelnek. Személyzeti létszámuk rendszerint két fı.

2.1.2. Tolóhajózás Tolóhajózáson olyan hajózási módszert értünk, amikor az áruk befogadására szolgáló úszóegységeket (tolt bárkákat) egy speciálisan erre a célra kialakított hajó - a tolóhajó - tolja maga elıtt.

A bárkák és a tolóhajó egy egységet képeznek. A bárkákat a hajóhoz csatolókötelekkel, vagy speciális csatoló berendezésekkel merev- vagy hajlékony csatolással rögzítik.

Hazai vonatkozásban a tolt bárkák 1100 - 1850 tonnásak, a tolóhajók fıgépteljesítménye 220 - 1500 kW. A tolatmányok nagysága a vontatóhajózásnál említett tényezıktıl függıen szintén 3000 - 10000 3000 - 10000 tonna közötti lehet.

Tolóhajózást a víziúti adottságok miatt elsısorban a Duna középsı- és alsó szakaszán folytatunk. A Duna felsı szakaszán a vontató- és önjáró hajózás a jellemzı.

A tolóhajózás fıbb elınyei a vontatóhajózáshoz képest a következık:

• A tolt bárkák építésének költségei a lakóterek, a kormány stb. elmaradása miatt 15 % - kal olcsóbbak, mint a hagyományos uszályoké.

• A tolt bárkák vezetése, ırzése külön személyzetet nem igényel, így a munkabéreknél 15 - 20 % - os megtakarítás jelentkezik.

• Az üzemanyag- és kenıanyag fogyasztásban 5 - 8 % - os megtakarítás érhetı el.

• A mőszaki sebesség 8 - 10 % - kal nagyobb.

• Útközbeni fordítási mőveletekre nincs szükség (a tolóhajó farhorgonyokkal rendelkezik) és így csökken a havaria - veszély.

A tolatmány és a tolóhajó egy egységet képez, így ennek vezetése (korszerő, nagy hatásfokú kormányberendezés esetén) a vontatóhajózáshoz viszonyítva könnyebb.

2.1.3. Önjáró hajózás Belvízi viszonylatban önjáró hajózás alatt a 6.2. fejezetben említett önjáró hajókkal való hajózást értjük. Az önjáró hajók közlekedésére általában bármely hajózható víziúton lehetıség nyílik, gyors árutovábbítást tesznek lehetıvé és alkalmasak kisebb tételnagyságból álló, illetve darabárus rakományok továbbítására is.

Az önjáró hajózás egyik speciális válfaja a toló - önjáró hajózás . A toló - önjáró hajó - miközben maga is árut szállít - kiképzésénél és felszerelésénél fogva alkalmas arra, hogy maga elıtt tolva, vagy mellévett alakzatban egy - egy bárkát, uszályt továbbítson. A hazai toló - önjáró hajók hordképessége 1300 - 1800 tonna.

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Az önjáró hajózás egy másik sajátságos módja az önjáró uszályhajózás . Ilyen 400 tonnás Z hajtású uszályokat közlekedtetett a MAHART az elmúlt években a belföldi forgalomban.

4.2.1. Vontatóhajózási módszerek

A folyami vontatásnál a géphajók egy vagy több vontatókötéllel vontatják az uszályokat. A vontatókötelek száma, hossza, elhelyezése a folyószakasz nautikai jellegétıl, a vízfolyáshoz viszonyított haladási iránytól, a vízsebességtıl és a szakasz hajóútjellemzıitıl függıen tág határok között változik. Ugyanezek a szempontok befolyásolják az egymás mögött felcsatolt uszályok számát és csatolási módját is.

A vontatott alakzat méretét (a vontatott uszályok számát) alapvetıen a vontatóhajó teljesítménye és a szakasz hajózási viszonyai szabják meg.

A vontatott karaván méretére jellemzı adatok

- az egy sorban (oldalaikkal egymás mellé kötött) uszályok száma,

- az egymás mögött felcsatolt uszálysorok száma.

A szakaszonként engedélyezett max. karavánméretet az egyes dunai államok Hajózási Szabályzatainak Nemzeti elıírások c. része tartalmazza.

Folyókon a vízfolyáshoz viszonyított haladási iránytól függıen megkülönböztetünk lefelé és felfelé menı vontatást. Felfelé menı vontatásnál a karavánban az uszályokat egymás mögött helyezik el. A felfelé menı karavánt a hosszabb vontatókötél (80-300 m) és a több vontatott sorból (2-5) álló alakzat jellemzi. A 4.1. ábra a Duna különbözı hajóútviszonyú szakaszain alkalmazott felfelé menı vontatott karaván-összeállításokat szemlélteti.

4.1 ábra

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Appendix 4 River stream speed and rate of flow diagram for the time of the marine casualty by

KDVVIZIG

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Appendix 5 Excerpt from the Notification For Skippers No. 3/Du /2006

KÖZLEKEDÉSI FİFELÜGYELET KÖZÚTI, VASÚTI ÉS HAJÓZÁSI F İOSZTÁLY

HAJÓZÁSI ÉS TENGERÉSZETI OSZTÁLY

3/Du/2006. Hajósoknak szóló hirdetmény A Duna 1811 – 1433. fkm szakaszának kiegészít ı közlekedési rendjér ıl

(Schifffahrtspolizeiliche Anordnung 3/Du/2006. über die Verkehrsregelung der Donaustrecke Km 1811- 1433.)

A víziközlekedésrıl szóló 2000. évi LXII. törvény 56.§-ában kapott felhatalmazás, valamint a víziközlekedés rendjérıl szóló 39/2003. (VI.13.) GKM rendelet mellékleteként kiadott Hajózási szabályzat (a továbbiakban: HSZ) II. része 1.11 cikkének 4. pontja alapján - a magyar - szlovák szakasz

tekintetében a Szlovák Hajózási Hatósággal (SPS) egyetértésben - az alábbi közlekedési rendet léptetem hatályba.

.

- Kivonat a hirdetményb ıl – 3. Fejezet

A Duna Budapesti (1652–1632. fkm közti) szakaszának kiegészít ı2 közlekedési rendje

3.1 A Duna 1652. és 1632. fkm közötti szakaszán legfeljebb az alábbi mérető tolt, illetve vontatott kötelékek közlekedése megengedett:

Menet- irány

Alakzat (Verband)

Hossza (Lange)

m

Szélessége (Breite)

m

Megjegyzés (Bemerkung)

Vontatmány (Zugverband) 160 53 vontatókötél nélkül

(ohne Zugseil)

175 46 Tolatmány

(Schubverband) 220 23 hatékony hátrameneti vagy orrsugárkormánnyal 3

(mit Flankenruder oder Bugsteuereinrichtungen3)

Völ

gym

enet

(T

alfa

hrt)

Mellévett alakzat (gekuppelte Fahrzeuge)

110 35

Vontatmány (Zugverband) 270 35

- vontató és csatoló kötél nélkül (ohne Zugseil und kuppeltende Seil)

- az utolsó sor szélessége 23 m lehet és a vontatóköt él hossza legfeljebb 60 m

Tolatmány (Schubverband)

270 220

23 35

Heg

ymen

et

(Ber

gfah

rt)

Mellévett alakzat (gekuppelte Fahrzeuge)

110 26

3.2 A Duna 1652. és 1632. fkm közötti szakaszán a hajó, illetve kötelék terhelését úgy kell megállapítani, hogy az adott vízállásnál a mederhez képest legalább 6 km/h sebesség elérésére képes legyen és azt – a hajómőveletek kivételével – tartania kell (min. Geschwindigkeit in Bergfahrt 6 km/h).

-/-

Budapest, 2006. január 23.

Horváth Imre osztályvezetı