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Final Draft Approved by SRSG: 4 June 2012

UNMISS Protection of Civilians Strategy

Introduction

1. The protection of civilians (PoC) is a central part of UNMISS’ mandate to support the

consolidation of peace and security in South Sudan, and is a key priority of Mission

leadership. The Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) has the primary

responsibility to provide security and protection for its civilian population. The role of

UNMISS is to advise and assist the GRSS to fulfil this responsibility, but also act

independently and impartially to protect civilians when the GRSS is not providing security.

2. The Security Council has requested in resolution 1894 (2009) that all UN peacekeeping

missions with protection mandates develop comprehensive PoC strategies. This strategy

builds upon the planning documents that were developed during the establishment of

UNMISS in 2011.1 It has been developed based on the DPKO/DFS ‘Framework for Drafting

Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’, using the

strategy template proposed in this guidance.

3. The aim of the strategy is to ensure a more coherent and coordinated approach to the

implementation of UNMISS’ protection mandate and demonstrate the Mission’s added value

compared to other protection actors. In particular, it provides strategic direction to all

relevant parts of the Mission involved in this important mandated task. It does not intend to

duplicate the workplans of different mission components, divisions and sections, but rather

provide a common framework to implement this whole-of-mission responsibility.

4. The document focuses on the strategic level and therefore does not provide specific

operational plans and guidance, which will need to be developed on the basis of this strategy

to address specific protection challenges. In particular, given that the threats to civilians are

not the same across South Sudan, each UNMISS state office will be required to develop its

own action plan2 during the second half of 2012. Different mission components, divisions

and sections might also choose to develop more specific guidance and directives on PoC

relevant to their actions.3 Specific planning documents will also be developed for protection

challenges confronted by the Mission, such as occurred in relation to civilian disarmament in

Jonglei at the beginning of 2012.

1 See the PoC concept of operations developed as part of the ITAPT for the planning of UNMISS and the Mission

framework on PoC developed in October 2011. 2 These action plans will build on the protection risk assessment completed for each state and will be overseen by the

PoC Working Group in Juba and developed according to a common template. 3 The police component has, for instance, already started to develop a document on its role in relation on PoC.

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5. The strategy has been drafted based on an extensive process of consultation with all relevant

components, divisions and sections in UNMISS, through the PoC Working Group at

headquarters and PoC Task Forces at the State level. Consultation has also taken place with

external protection actors including the Protection Cluster, the SPLA and the SSPS.

Vision statement

6. UNMISS action on the protection of civilians will contribute to establishing a safe and secure

environment, in which the physical integrity and rights of all civilians in South Sudan are

fully respected, protected and promoted. This shall be achieved through a combination of

preventive, responsive and institution-building approaches.

Purpose

7. The overall purpose of the UNMISS PoC strategy is:

To prevent and reduce the threat to the civilian population from armed conflict and violence

by building the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and,

when it is unable or unwilling to protect civilians, UNMISS will act independently to prevent

harm to civilians within its resources and capabilities.

The benchmark4 that has been presented to the Security Council and will be used, amongst

other means, to measure progress against this purpose is:

The Republic of South Sudan has developed sufficient capacity to prevent, mitigate and

resolve conflicts and effectively carry out its responsibility to protect civilians.

It should be noted that this benchmark relates to overall context in South Sudan and not

necessarily the effectiveness of UNMISS in fulfilling its protection mandate, which will be

monitored by the indicators related to the strategy’s objectives and activities outlined below.

Scope

8. The protection of civilians is a central and cross-cutting element of UNMISS’ mandate that

touches upon a number of different mission tasks. The scope of the strategy includes all the

PoC-related tasks included in the mandate of UNMISS, which is derived from Security

Council resolution 1996 (2011), in particular:

(iv) Advising and assisting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, including military and police at

national and local levels as appropriate, in fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians, in compliance with

international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law;

4 In resolution 1996 (2011) the Security Council requested that UNMISS develop benchmarks and indicators of

progress in relation to its mandated tasks.

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(v) Deterring violence including through proactive deployment and patrols in areas at high risk of conflict,

within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical

violence, in particular when the Government of the Republic of South Sudan is not providing such security;

(vi) Providing security for United Nations and humanitarian personnel, installations and equipment necessary

for implementation of mandated tasks, bearing in mind the importance of mission mobility, and contributing to

the creation of security conditions conducive to safe, timely, and unimpeded humanitarian assistance;

9. These operative paragraphs above set out the Chapter VII physical protection mandate of

UNMISS to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. This unique ability

to use force and provide physical protection, combined with politically engaging the GRSS at

the highest levels on its protection responsibilities, give the Mission a comparative advantage

as compared to other protection actors. However, the PoC role of UNMISS is broader that

this part of the mandate and includes a number of other mandated tasks5 including: conflict

prevention, mitigation and resolution (Op 3 b) i), human rights (Op 3 b)6 iii), security sector

reform and rule of law (Op3 c)), child protection (Op 3 c) v and Op 10), mine action (Op3 c)

vi), and sexual violence (Op 24.) The scope of the strategy, therefore, also includes all these

tasks.

10. The PoC is a whole-of-mission responsibility that is mainstreamed across the mission. The

strategy is applicable to all Mission components, divisions and sections working on the

relevant mandated tasks mentioned above, which make up the membership of the PoC

Working Group (see below). Compliance with this strategy is mandatory for all relevant staff

within these components, divisions and sections.

11. The scope of the strategy does not include the actions of humanitarian organisations that have

their own protection strategy, developed by the Protection Cluster and included in the

Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). While UN agencies and NGO actors working on

protection have been consulted in the development of this strategy, it is not applicable to their

actions. However, the implementation of the UNMISS PoC strategy requires close

coordination with the Protection Cluster and other protection actors in the mission area,

particularly in relation to common activities, as set out subsequent sections.

12. The strategy does not duplicate, but needs to be closely coordinated with, a number of other

planning documents and strategies in the Mission, including the Mission Concept, Results-

5 See the DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians which sets out the full range of activities

that fall within this mandated task. 6 (iii) Monitoring, investigating, verifying, and reporting regularly on human rights and potential threats against the

civilian population as well as actual and potential violations of international humanitarian and human rights law,

working as appropriate with the Office of the High Comissioner for Human Rights, bringing these to the attention of

the authorities as necessary, and immediately reporting gross violations of human rights to the UN Security

Council;

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Based Budget, the Early Warning and Emergency Response Strategy, and the Peacebuilding

Support Plan.

Timeframe

13. The expected timeframe of the UNMISS PoC Strategy is 12 months from the date when it is

endorsed. It will be revised after 12 months or if there is a significant change in context or

the Mission mandate, as decided by the UN Security Council.

Protection of civilians risks, including threat and vulnerability analysis

14. In order to identify the threats to the civilian population to which the UNMISS PoC strategy

will respond, each of the ten State Coordinators was requested to undertake a protection risk

assessment. This was done according to a common template and in coordination with

relevant actors (including humanitarian organisations) through the state-level PoC Tasks

Forces. The table on the following page summarises the information that was collected and

analysed from this exercise. In particular, it lists the generic threats that are faced by civilians

and matches these threats with underlying vulnerabilities of civilians to produce the risk

assessment.

15. The threats – resulting from the actions by both armed groups and the GRSS security forces –

relate not only to the physical integrity of civilians (e.g. killing and injuries), but a range of

other threats, including forms of coercion such as forced displacement or recruitment. They

are organised around a typology of different armed conflicts and other situations of violence

that are found in South Sudan. It is not easy to categorise the multitude of different situations

in South Sudan in which civilians face the threat of violence. Furthermore the protection

challenges are influenced by wider dynamics, such the rapidly changing economic situation

and austerity measures. However, this typology helps focus what situations the Mission will

respond to in relation to its protection mandated in a more systematic basis. If a situation

arises that falls outside the scope of this typology, but is considered by Mission leadership

that UNMISS should respond as part of its protection mandate, then an approach will be

developed for this scenario and/or this strategy would be revised.

Type of armed conflict/violence Characteristics

International armed conflict between

Sudan and South Sudan

Despite the CPA, there have been aerial

bombardments and incursions within South Sudan

from Sudan, including through proxy armed groups

(e.g. JEM). The unresolved situation in Abyei has

implications for South Sudan as well as the return

movement of South Sudanese from Sudan, which

presents serious protection concerns. The annual

migration of pastoralists across the border can also

lead to conflict.

Internal armed conflict between SPLA There are a number of armed groups that have

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and non-state armed groups (Rebel

Militia Groups)

refused to integrate into the SPLA and have clashed

with the national army. These Rebel Militia Groups

(RMGs) are in decreasing number and their activities

have posed fewer threats to civilians.

Inter-communal violence, including the

involvement of armed civilians and

militia

Ethnic tensions, competition over resources, land

disputes and grabbing, cattle-raiding, disaffected

armed youth, lack of sustainable livelihoods, and

migration are all the causes of serious inter-

communal violence in a number of States. These

situations are characterised by a serious breakdown

of law and order and criminality. Tensions between

IDP and refugee returnees and the receiving local

populations have also created inter-communal

violence.

Potential attacks and human rights

violations by SPLA/SSPS against

civilians during security operations

(especially civilian disarmament)

Rather than providing security and protection for the

civilian population, the SPLA/SSPS have been

responsible for attacks against civilians and human

rights violations. The context of civilian disarmament

has presented significant problems, while DDR could

also present a threat to civilians if those demobilised

remain a threat to civilians. Although not common in

South Sudan political strife also presents another

situation in which attacks against civilians could

occur.

Activities of foreign armed groups e.g.

Lord’s Resistance Army

The LRA has been active in various parts of South

Sudan (including Western Bahr el Gazal and Western

Equatoria) and carried out attacks on civilians

NB. Threats to humanitarian personnel and property are considered as part of the strategy but not

necessarily analysed in conjunction with threats to the civilian population.

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UNMISS PoC strategy protection of civilians threat and risk assessment

Situation Threats Vulnerability Risk States Main counties Main actors

International

armed conflict

between Sudan

and South Sudan

- Aerial bombardment

- Refugee movements

- Insecurity for refugees

- Landmines

- Forced

repatriation/return

- Restriction on freedom

of movement

- Displaced persons from

Abyei

- Forced recruitment

- Child Recruitment

- Conflict-related sexual

violence

- Proximity of

communities to the

border and military

bases

- Lack of

humanitarian

access and

insecurity

-Lack of legal

status and

documentation

- Lack of respect

for refugee law

High - Upper Nile

- Northern Bahr el

Gahazal

- Western Bahr el

Ghazal

- Unity

- Warrap

-Maban

- Aweil North,

Aweil East

-Raja

-Pariang

- SAF

- SPLA

- SPLA-N

- JEM

- PDF

Internal armed

conflict between

SPLA and non-

state armed groups

(Rebel Militia

Groups)

- Killings

- Destruction of property

and livelihoods

- Attacks and occupation

of schools and medical

facilities

- Child recruitment

- Conflict-related sexual

violence

- Landmines

- Forced displacement

- Women,

children, disabled,

young males and

elderly

- Communities in

which reintegration

of RMGs remains

problematic

- Lack of

law/policy on

internal

displacement

Medium - Upper Nile

- Unity

- Jonglei

- Warrap

-Fashoda, Piji,

Doleib Hill, Banglai

-Mayom, Abiemnon,

Pariang

- Khorflus, Pigi and

Fangak

- Twic

- Shilluk

RMGs

- SSLM/A

- SSDM

Inter-communal

violence, including

the involvement of

armed civilians

and militia

- Killings and injured

- Incitement to violence

- Destruction of property

and livelihoods

- Attacks and occupation

of schools and medical

- Women,

children, disabled,

young males and

elderly

- Weak law

enforcement

High - Jonglei

- Upper Nile

- Western Equatoria

- Most counties

affected

- White Army

- SSPS

- SPLA

- Armed youths

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facilities

- Looting

- Theft (of cattle)

- Abductions

- Sexual violence

- Forced displacement

agencies

- Availability of

small arms

- Lack of access to

justice and respect

for human rights

- Warrap

- Eastern Equatoria

- Central Equatoria

- Unity

- Lakes

Potential attacks

and human rights

violations by

SPLA/SSPS

against civilians

during security

operations (

especially civilian

disarmament)

- Arbitrary killing

- Arbitrary and prolonged

detention, including of

children

- Physical abuse,

harassment, intimidation

and other forms of ill-

treatment

- Looting and theft

- Sexual violence,

including rape

- Excessive and

disproportionate use of

force

- Communities

without presence of

security forces or

those that are ill-

disciplined.

- Lack of law and

order

- Lack of access to

justice system

- Availability of

small arms and

light weapons

- Poor arms

management

systems

- Poor conduct and

discipline of

security forces

Medium - All states - SPLA

- SSPS

Activities of

foreign armed

groups e.g. Lord’s

Resistance Army

- Killings

- Abductions

- Conflict-related sexual

violence

- Forced displacement

- Women and

children

- Lack of respect of

international

humanitarian and

human rights law

Low - Western Equatoria

- Western Bahr el

Ghazal

- Central Equatoria

- LRA

POC risk (i.e. probability) = Threats (intentions and capabilities of perpetrators) x Vulnerabilities (of targets)

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16. Given that UNMISS has limited resources and cannot respond to all threats to civilians, it is

important that the Mission prioritises those protection risks to which it will respond. Such a

prioritization is a continuous process based on an on-going analysis of the context through

the early warning system (see below). Each situation will be assessed on a case-by-case basis

for Mission leadership to decide whether the Mission should respond. As per the mandate, of

the mission the main priority are situations in which civilians face the “imminent threat of

physical violence”. In addition, the following criteria will be used when making such

operational decisions on prioritisation:

Accordance with the mandate of the Mission – see relevant paragraphs of resolution 1996

(2011)

Threats to civilians that arise within the context of one of the five different types of

armed conflict and other situations of violence listed above.

Actual, or potential, gravity of the attacks against civilians, including the real or potential

scale of deaths and injuries.

Clear evidence of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

Indication that the GRSS is unable or unwilling to provide security and protection for

civilians.

Broader impact on peace and security in South Sudan and UNMISS’ mandate in this

regard.

Potential for UNMISS to avert the greatest loss of life and injury to civilians.

Analysis of the Mission’s resources and capabilities (see below) in relation to the

potential threat.

Early warning and response system

17. While the table above provides an overview of the threats to civilians that UNMISS will

respond, it only provides a snap-shot of the risk of these at a given time. The protection risk

assessment is a dynamic and on-going process to identify patterns of abuse and priority areas,

which will take place both as part of the on-going work of key sections in the field, and as

part of the implementation of the UNMISS Early Warning and Response System.7 As

required, contingency plans will also be developed in anticipation of scenarios that may have

a serious impact on the civilian population.

18. The principal PoC elements of this Early Warning and Response System that will be taken

forward in conjunction with JOC and JMAC include:

The development of protection indicators to identify threats to civilians, vulnerabilities

and risks that form part of the Priority Information Requirements (PIR)

7 See UNMISS Early Warning and Early Response Strategy (September 2011) and the draft UNMISS Early

Warning and Early Response SOP.

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The development of collection of information processes to monitor these indicators,

particularly by: strengthening early warning links with the Church and other civil society

actors in partnership with the NGO Catholic Relief Services (CRS); using community

police relations committees and other civil society groups; improving the protection

reporting of Integrated Monitoring Teams (IMTs) and Integrated Teams/Patrols; and

improved coordination with the Protection Cluster (including for example the

development of a Protection Matrix.)

Improved consultation with local communities to understand better their threats.

Monitoring of PoC threats and civilian casualties as part of the conflict database being

developed by JOC.

The identification of PoC threats as part of the weekly conflict and protection early

warning matrix.

The production of quarterly analytical reports on the medium-to-long terms threats to

civilians with JMAC.

A protocol will be developed with Human Rights Division for the sharing of sensitive PoC

information, particularly in relation to individual protection cases.

Objectives, activities and indicators of progress

19. The DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on PoC provides the conceptual framework for the

implementation of protection mandates by UN peacekeeping operations. It is based around

three tiers of action: 1) protection through political process; 2) providing protection from

physical violence; and 3) establishing a protective environment. Based on UNMISS’

mandated PoC tasks, the strategy’s objectives and activities are organised around these three

tiers in the following table. In terms of tier two and crisis response, the Mission will follow a

cycle of first taking every effort to prevent threats to civilians. Iff this fails, it shall respond,

potentially with the use of force. Onence the crisis subside, it shall consolidate the protective

environment for civilians.8

20. UNMISS has two principal strategic approaches to PoC. Firstly, given that the GRSS has the

primary responsibility to provide security and protection for its civilian population, the

priority role of UNMISS is to assist and advise the GRSS to fulfil this responsibility through

the actions in the table below. Secondly, when the GRSS is either unable or unwilling to

protect civilians, UNMISS will act independently and impartially to protect civilians,

including, if necessary, the use of force. In accordance with the Mission’s Rules of

Engagement, this would only be after all other measures have failed and as a last resort . The

decision about which approach to adopt will be taken by Mission leadership on a case-by-

case basis given the particular PoC challenge confronted by the Mission.

8 See the DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians

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21. The activities listed in the table are not necessarily undertaken in a sequential manner, but

may be implemented simultaneously for a comprehensive approach to preventing and, if

necessary, responding to threats and attacks against civilians. Mission leadership will decide

what tools and approaches are necessary to address a particular threat to civilians through the

various coordination mechanisms relevant to the protection mandate (see below.)

22. While the table does not relate to the UN County Team and the Protection Cluster and its

Sub-clusters, there are activities contained in it that are also undertaken by these actors.

Where this is the case, UNMISS shall ensure coordination to avoid duplication and

enhancecommon efforts. Each individual humanitarian and development organisations has

not been named in the table, but their complementary protection activites are nonetheless

recognised.

23. The indicators of progress in italics in the table are those that have been presented as part of

the benchmarks to the Security Council, pursuant to resolution 1996. Since these do not

relate to the activities in the table, they have been supplemented by other indicators that are

related to the objectives and activities in the table. However, these indicators do not represent

an exhaustive list of the ones that would be required to monitor the implementation of the

Mission’s protection mandate. Therefore, a more comprehensive list of indicators will be

developed as part of a monitoring plan for the implementation of the strategy and the

UNMISS protection mandate – see section on monitoring below.

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TIER 1: PROTECTION THROUGH POLITICAL PROCESS

Objective Activities Indicators of progress Responsible

1. I

Increased willingness and

capacity of the GRSS to

fulfil its responsibility to

provide security and

protection for civilians

Advocacy towards, and dialogue with, the GRSS to

ensure a better understanding of the state’s

responsibility to protect civilians.

Support the development of GRSS policies and

strategies on the protection of civilians

Promote improved conduct to reduce the ill-discipline

of SPLA and SSPS in locations where civilians are at

risk of physical attack,

Advocacy towards GRSS to tackle impunity and

strengthen accountability

The incidence of large-scale

armed violence in South Sudan

is reduced consistently over

time.

Effective local and national

mechanisms to mitigate and

resolve conflicts have been

developed, and the public

perceives that the Government

has this capacity.

Early warning and early

response mechanisms are

functional and help identify

threats to civilians.

Protection of civilians is being

accepted as a key responsibility

of the country’s security forces

and enforced by directives and

command orders

Reduced number of acts of ill-

discipline and human rights

violations attributed to the

SPLA and SSPS

Number of peace conference

and other conflict mitigation

and peacebuilding processes

supported

Mission leadership

(SRSG, DSRSGs, FC,

PC, etc.), State

Coordinators

2. A

Armed conflict is reduced

through conflict prevention

and mitigation measures.

Providing ‘good offices’ in peace negotiations between

different parties.

Supporting local government authorities to extend state

authority.

Facilitate and support the work of state and local level

peace actors, including the GRSS (e.g. South Sudan

Peace and Reconciliation Comission), traditional

leaders, youth, women, church groups and others.

Supporting the Government in effectively using its

early warning mechanisms

CAD, PAD, State

Coordinators

TIER 2: PROVIDING PROTECTION FROM PHYSICAL VIOLENCE

Objective Activities Indicators of progress Responsible

3. R

Reduced physical threats to

civilians in the mission area

Technical advice to GRSS security forces (including

the SPLA, SSPS and Wildlife Services) on PoC,

including supporting the production of directives and

Civilian casualties from armed

conflict and violence are

reduced.

Military component,

police component, HRD,

CAD, DMS, JOC,

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through timely preventive

and if necessary responsive

actions by UNMISS.

codes of conduct.

Assistance to the GRSS security forces to protect

civilians in accordance with the UN Human Rights

Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). A specific SOP will

be developed by HRD as a framework to guide such

assistance under the HRDDP. 9

Coordination with SPLA/SSPS in relation to their

operations.

Preventive deployment of UNMISS military (including

Company and Temporary Operating Bases) in

prioritised areas at risk of conflict in order to deter

violence against civilians.

Air reconnaissance, short and long duration patrols,

integrated teams of military and civilians, or civilians

only.

Medical evacuation of injured ex-combatants and

civilians, according to developed SOP

Mine action, including the removal of landmines and

explosive remnants of war, and mine risk education.

Engaging with local populations to understand better

their protection concerns and self-protection

mechanisms that the Mission can without exposing

them to greater risk based on do-no harm approaches.

Refuge for civilians that seek safety at UNMISS bases

for which contingency plans should be developed by

the military component in situ.

Engaging with non-state armed groups to remind them

of their obligations to protect civilians (not including

negotiating humanitarian access).

Developing a system for civilian casualty and

protection incident monitoring.

As a last resort, use of force (potentially lethal) against

any party to the conflict found attacking civilians

according to the UNMISS Rules of Engagement.

Cases of forced displacement of

civilian populations are

reduced.

Number of patrols undertaken

by the military, police and

civilian components.

Number of Company and

Temporary Operating Bases

Number of medical

evacuations.

Improved perception of the

civilian population that

UNMISS military presence

enhances their protection

Number of landmines removed

from the ground and areas

cleared

Number of violent attacks

against humanitarian personnel

and property

Number of force protection

escorts/deployments for

humanitarian organisations

UNMACC , State

Coordinators

4. R Deployment, upon request, of UNMISS military in Military component,

9 UNMISS does not in general provide logistical or material support to the operations of SPLA or SSPS and is not mandated to engage in joint operations with

them. Any such role will only be considered on an exceptional basis, if it will demonstrably contribute to the protection of civilians and is in accordance with the

UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP).

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Reduced security threats

against humanitarian

personnel and property, and

increased access for them to

populations in need of

assistance.

prioritised areas in which humanitarian operations are

planned or on-going.

Provision of security, including armed escorts as a last

resort, to humanitarian convoys and other movements.

Development – with humanitarian actors – of standard

operating procedures for UNMISS providing security

for humanitarian movements in accordance with IASC

Guidelines on the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for

Humanitarian Convoys.

Sharing security information with humanitarian actors

for their response and security planning.

Ensuring NGOs are invited to Security Management

Teams.

Allowing humanitarian actors to seek refuge and to

store assets at UNMISS bases as a last resort.

police component,

O/DSRSG/RC/HC

TIER 3: ESTABLISHING A PROTECTIVE ENVIRONMENT

Objective Activities Indicators of progress Responsible

5. I

Increased capacity of the

South Sudan Police Service

(SSPS) to provide security

and establish the rule of law.

Mentoring and advising the SSPS, including through

co-location arrangements.

Training the SSPS on human rights, child rights and

protection, gender-based violence, etc.

Facilitating community involvement in security and

law enforcement through the creation of Police

Community Relations Committees.

Advice on policy, planning and legislative

development in relation to the SSPS.

Monitoring and reporting on arbitrary and prolonged

detention and other human rights violations.

Development of police misconduct and oversight

bodies.

Legislation governing SSPS

operations including

mechanisms for ensuring police

accountability, oversight,

reliable and transparent

registration is adopted.

A National Human Rights

Action Plan is adopted and

there is demonstrable evidence

of the National Human Rights

Commission meeting the Paris

Principles

Mechanisms are in place to

hold human rights perpetrators

among Security Forces

accountable..

Grave violations of child rights

are reduced as a result of the

Monitoring and Reporting

Police component, HRD,

Child Protection

6. L

Less impunity and greater

accountability for violations

of international

humanitarian and human

rights law.

Human rights investigation, monitoring and reporting,

including the issuing of public reports.

Strengthening civil society capacity on human rights.

Capacity building and strengthen national human rights

institutions, including the South Sudan Human Rights

Commission.

HRD

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Mechanism and the

implementation of the Action

Plan by relevant parties

Child recruitment and use by

security institutions is

prohibited and enforced by

directives and command orders

Relevant parties support

monitoring and reporting

mechanisms on cases of sexual

violence in conflict and such

conflict-related cases are

reduced.

A national security strategy is

developed and is consistent

with international standards

and South Sudan’s

international obligations..

There is evidence of increased

effectiveness of the Rule of Law

and Justice Institutions

including the Prison System.

A Military Justice System,

complementary to the Civil

Justice System, is developed.

Arbitrary and prolonged

detention decreases

significantly

Number of training events on

various protection issues

Existence of commitments

related to conflict-related

sexual violence

7. Protection for groups

exposed to specific

protection risks, such as

women or children

Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on

children associated with armed conflict

Implementation of an Action Plan with SPLA to

prevent child recruitment and ensure release of children

from the SPLA and other associated security forces.

Release of abducted women and children

Establishment of Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting

Arrangements (MARA) on conflict-related sexual

violence (including collaboration with GBV sub-cluster

IMS system).

Negotiation with armed actors for them to adopt

commitments to prevent conflict-related sexual

violence

Support the Special Protection Units of the SSPS to

function more effectively

Child Protection,

Women’s Protection

Advisors, HRD, police

component

8. R

Reformed security sector

and justice system and

reduction of the availability

of Small Arms and Light

Weapons (SALW)

Support to bodies providing civilian oversight and

governance of the security sector

Support to the development of a national security

policy.

Advocacy and capacity building with the SPLA and its

Division of Military Justice to investigate and

prosecute SPLA members that have committed crimes.

In collaboration with UNDP, support to the prison

system Capacity building of national mine action

institutions

Support and technical advice to the South Sudan

Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms

Control and Ministry of Interior

Training and advocacy to SPLA, SSPS and civil

society on SALW control

Stockpile management (gun marking, storage and

registration) for all security forces

ROLSISO (SSR,

Military Justice, etc.),

UNMACC, DDR

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Analysis of resources and capacities

24. According to resolution 1996 (2011) UNMISS should “use all necessary means, within the

limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out its protection

mandate”. The Security Council has also requested in resolution 1894 (2009) “that mandated

protection activities must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity

and resources”. UNMISS should therefore ensure that all available resources and capacities

are used to protect civilians, especially in scenarios where this priority competes with other

elements of the mandate. However, there are significant constraints to what can be achieved,

given that these resources and capacities are limited. Furthermore, the Mission frequently

faces critical gaps in these resources and capacities that can significantly undermine its

ability to deliver its PoC mandate. A cursory analysis of the Mission’s resources and

capacities required for it to fulfil its protection mandate reveals the following most critical

gaps:

Current shortfall in the number of deployed troops compared to the mandated level of

7,000.

Insufficient logistical assets (particularly military aircrafts) to transport and support

deployed troops.

Lack of a riverine capability to patrol and respond to protection problems throughout the

country.

Limited UNMISS presence yet at the county level in County Support Bases

Limited time on the ground during military and civilian patrols and monitoring Missions,

due to lack of air assets and security constraints.

Incomplete recruitment process of staff working on protection issues.

Lack of sufficiently trained personnel on PoC in the Mission.

Impeded freedom of movement of UNMISS troops and personnel (including violations of

the SoFA).

25. UNMISS will use the recently-developed DPKO/DFS Resource and Capability Matrix to

develop a tool to more systematically identify and monitor the critical resources and

capability gaps and highlight these to headquarters at crucial milestones, such as the issuance

of the Secretary-General’s reports and the renewal of the Mission’s mandate.

Training

26. The Security Council recognized in resolution 1894 the importance of training on PoC for

UN peacekeeping operations. DPKO/DFS have recently finalized generic training modules

on PoC to be used in pre-deployment training and potentially for in-Mission training. The

UNMISS Integrated Mission Training Centre (IMTC) is the process of customising these

training modules to the South Sudan context. A training plan so that the modules can be

rolled-out to relevant UNMISS staff in a variety of different training and briefing sessions,

particularly at the State level, has been adopted to the PoC Working Group. By early 2013, a

training session on PoC will have been delivered in each of the ten States in South Sudan.

The UNMISS PoC Strategy will be an integral part of the training that takes place.

16

Coordination mechanisms

27. Coordination is vital to the implementation of the strategy given that PoC is a whole-of-

Mission responsibility requiring close coordination between a range of different components,

divisions and sections. The Mission also needs to coordinate closely with a number of

external protection actors. The principal coordination mechanisms related to PoC are:

Within the Mission

a. Protection of Civilians Working Group and Technical Group (Headquarters)

The PoC Working Group (see Terms of Reference) is the main coordination structure within

UNMISS at headquarters that brings together the relevant Mission components, divisions and

sections working on PoC. Chaired by the DSRSG/P, its purpose is to provide strategic

direction and policy guidance on the implementation of the UNMISS protection mandate. It

meets monthly and, as required, on a more regular basis on thematic issues or specific PoC

challenges. The PoC Working Group is supported by a PoC Technical Group (see Terms of

Reference). Chaired by the Senior Advisor on PoC and RRP, this meets on a weekly basis.

Its purpose is to discuss PoC issues and challenges confronting UNMISS, and formulate

proposals and documents to be addressed by the PoC Working Group.

b. Protection of Civilians Task Force (State)

The PoC Task Force (see Terms of Reference) is the counterpart to the PoC Working Group

at the State level. Chaired by the State Coordinator, it acts as the main forum in which

analysis is conducted and operational decisions are taken at the State level to implement the

UNMISS protection mandate. In particular, it will oversee the development of an Action Plan

to implement the overall UNMISS PoC strategy, given that protection threats are different

from state to state. The PoC Task Force is currently not meeting in all States and this should

be mandatory as part of the implementation of this strategy.

c. Other relevant coordination mechanisms

While not explicitly related to PoC, there are other coordination mechanisms relevant to this

mandated task. In particular, the Mission Leadership Team and the Senior Management

Group10

are the fora in which senior Mission leadership make day-to-day operational

decisions related to the UNMISS protection mandate. In the event of a significant PoC event,

a Crisis Management Team11

will be created. The Joint Operations Centre (JOC) at

headquarters, and the State Operations Centre at the state level, are the fora in which

information is shared daily on the protection problems and the operational response required

10

See UNMISS Decision Making System and Headquarters Routine (August 2011) for modalities of the Mission

Leadership Team, Senior Management Group, and Crisis Management Team 11

See Crisis Management SOP (October 2011)

17

UNHCR /

OCHA

UNHCR /

OCHA

UNMISS Protection of Civilians (POC) Coordination Structures

Protection of Civilians Task Force

(State)

Chair: State Coordinator

Participation: HRD, RRP, CAD, POC

Adviser, UNPOL, SMLO, OCHA, UNHCR

(Meeting Monthly)

Protection of Civilians Working Group (HQ)

Chair: DSRSG/P

Participation: DSRSG/RC/HC, FC, PC, HRD, CAD,

POC Adviser, RRP, JOC, JMAC, OCHA, UNHCR etc.

(Meeting Monthly)

National

Protection Cluster

Chair: UNHCR +

NGO

Strategic

Guidance

and Policy

County Level

Thematic Meetings

(e.g. IMT Review Meetings)

Ad Hoc

State Protection

Cluster

Chair: UNHCR +

NGO

Operational

Feedback

Protection of Civilian

Technical Group (HQ)

Co-Chair: POC Adviser +RRP

Participants: Military,

Police, JOC, HRD, CAD,

OCHA, UNHCR, etc.

(Meeting Weekly)

18

is coordinated.12

There are also other relevant coordination mechanisms on specific components

of the UNMISS PoC Strategy e.g. the MRM Task Force related to children and armed conflict

(co-chaired by UNICEF and UNMISS) and the soon-to-be-established coordination mechanism

related to conflict-related sexual violence (the so-called MARA.)

With external actors

d. With the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS)

There are coordination mechanisms with the GRSS relevant to PoC. In particular, the bi-

weekly UNMISS-GRSS Mechanism on Mandate Implementation provides of an opportunity

for UNMISS senior leadership to coordinate with the GRSS on significant policy and

operational PoC issues. The UNMISS military component has also established a coordination

mechanism with the SPLA, both at the national and state levels, to share information and

operational matters. UNMISS’ civilian component sections also closely coordinate with their

respective line ministries of the GRSS in which PoC issues will be addressed. At the state

level, the State Coordinators use their regular meetings with the Governor to raise PoC

issues.

e. With the Protection Cluster

A number of activities included in the strategy (e.g. child protection, human rights, sexual

violence, etc.) are also addressed by humanitarian actors and therefore close coordination is

required with the Protection Cluster, which is the parallel coordination mechanism to the

UNMISS PoC Working and Technical Groups for the humanitarian community. Relevant

UNMISS sections participate in the Protection Cluster and its sub-clusters, and UNHCR, as

UN co-lead of the Protection Cluster and OCHA, to represent the broader humanitarian

community, attend both the UNMISS PoC Working Group and Technical Group. However,

to ensure respect for the neutrality and independence of humanitarian action, neither

UNMISS, nor or the PoC Working Group coordinate or task humanitarian partners outside of

the Mission, who develop their own strategies and work plans. Similarly, the Protection

Cluster does not task UNMISS participants. The purpose of these arrangements is to ensure a

two-way flow of information, joint prioritization and strategic cooperation.

f. With other UN peacekeeping and other Missions in the region

Under resolution 1996 (2011) UNMISS is required to closely coordinate its activities related

to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) with MONUSCO and BINUCA, under the political

leadership of UNOCA, as articulated in the draft UN LRA Regional Strategy. This includes

the sharing of information and coordinating operations, including in support of the AU

Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA), which includes a

12

The JOC provides situational analysis and operational reporting in order to inform effective decision-making by

senior leadership in relation to PoC as well as a forum for the development of integrated operational plans and the

tasking in relation to these plans.

19

Regional Task Force (RTF) of national armies form the region that has a Joint Operations

Centre (JOC) in Yambio, Western Equatoria.13

UNMISS also coordinates its PoC activities

with UNISFA. While UNISFA is responsible for border monitoring through overseeing the

management of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM),

UNMISS is responsible for PoC up until the border with respect to threats against civilians

on the territory of South Sudan.

g. With the local population

Engagement with the local population is vital to understanding protection threats and

supporting the self-protection measures that communities normally have in place. Each

UNMISS military base should establish contact with the community leaders and local

population and use existing community committees or networks to address protection

problems that can be discussed so that the Mission can adjust its operational plans

accordingly. This will require the recruitment of more interpreters and liaison officers

(especially female staff to ensure interaction with women in communities). UNMISS is

integrated into the structures of CEWERS at national and state levels, which provides an

additional source of regular information provided directly by local communities.

Roles and responsibilities

28. Since such a wide range of actors in the Mission are involved in PoC it is important that there

are clear roles and responsibilities.

Senior Mission leadership (SRSG, DSRSGs, FC, PC, etc.)

The SRSG is overall responsible for the implementation of the UNMISS protection mandate.

Strategic direction is provided and decision-making takes places through the Mission

Leadership Team and Senior Management Group. The DSRSG/P is responsible for

coordinating the Mission’s PoC strategic approach and actions through the PoC Working

Group that he chairs. The DSRSG/RC/HC is also a member of the PoC Working Group and

ensures linkages on PoC between the Mission and the Humanitarian Country Team and the

Protection Cluster. The Force Commander has the authority for the use of force in the

Mission and providing clear directives to the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) troops on

this task. Likewise, the Police Comissioner has authority for the operational plan of the

police component. A principal responsibility of the senior mission leadership is engaging

with the GRSS (including the SPLA and SSPS) in relation to its PoC responsibilities.

Military component

The military component’s principal role relates to the physical protection part of the

UNMISS strategy (see tier 2 above). All UNMISS military personnel should be aware of

13

Referenced should be made to the UN regional strategy that is currently being developed under the leadership of

UNOCA with all UN presences in the LRA-affected countries.

20

their responsibilities in relation to the protection mandate of Mission through this strategy

and the Rules of Engagement. In addition to this strategy, more detailed operational

directives on PoC will be sent out by the Force Commander to the UNMISS military

component troops as parts of Operations Orders, Fragmented Orders, Directives, and

Contingency Plans.

Police component

The UNMISS police component’s principal role on PoC relates to establishing a protective

environment (see tier 3 above) and in particular strengthening security and law enforcement

through support of the SSPS in the form of capacity-building, deployment, advice, mentoring

and training.

Civilian component

The majority of civilian component divisions and sections have a clear role to play in terms

of PoC. Given resolution 1996, particular attention must be given to the protection of

children and women. Each division and section should be aware of their activities which

contribute to the Mission’s overall implementation of its protection mandate through this

strategy. The relevant Head of Division/Section is a member of PoC Working Group. In

addition, and as required, they should also designate a Focal Point to follow the coordination

of PoC across the Mission.

State Coordinators

The State Coordinators are responsible for implementing the strategy at the state level14

through the PoC Task Forces and by developing Action Plans to respond to the protect risk

assessments that they carried out. This protection risk assessments should be up-dated on a

regular basis and identified threats reported.

PoC Advisors

The responsibility for PoC has been mainstreamed throughout the Mission and therefore it is

not functionally located in any one component or section. Nevertheless, a Senior Advisor on

PoC is located in the Office of the SRSG and a Protection Advisor in the O/DSRSG/RC/HC.

Three PoC Advisors are being recruited for selected State offices whose role it is to help

coordinate the implementation of this strategy at the State level.

29. In order to rehearse roles and responsibilities related to PoC, especially in relation to crisis

situations, table-top crisis management exercises will be organised by the JOC for senior

Mission leadership and others involved in PoC. The first of these took place in November

2011 and a further one is scheduled for later in 2012.

14 See para 14 of the Directive on the Role and Responsibilities of UNMISS State Coordinators, 27 October 2011

21

Public information, including expectation management

30. As already pointed out UNMISS does not have the resources and capabilities to protect all

civilians. However, this unrealistic popular expectation of the Mission nonetheless prevails.

Furthermore, when civilians are not protected, it is the Mission that is criticised first, calling

into question itscredibility and wider legitimacy. Public information is therefore critical for

explaining to all stakeholders (particularly the local population) the protection mandate of

UNMISS and managing the expectations of what the Mission can realistically do to protect

civilians. Public information is also a useful tool to remind the GRSS and armed groups

about their obligations to ensure the protection of civilians. A range of public information

methods and tools will be developed by PIO to convey these important key messages related

to UNMISS’ protection mandate, including: public statements from the SRSG and senior

leadership and the relayof messages through Radio Mariya and other radio in local

languages. Outreach will be an essential part of this communication plan that will require

working with community representatives, traditional chiefs and religious leaders.

Monitoring and reporting

31. A monitoring system will be developed to review and measure the implementation of this

strategy and UNMISS’ protection mandate. The benchmarks and accompanying indicators of

progress that have been presented to the Security Council will provide the overall framework

for this system for measuring the Mission’s effectiveness in this area. However, as indicated

above, these indicators are not comprehensive and therefore a separate monitoring plan will

be developed as part of the action plans developed by the States.

32. Measuring progress and impact related to PoC is extremely challenging. Nevertheless,

various methods can be employed. For example, civilian casualty and other protection threat

monitoring will help assess changes in the overall context. Specific UNMISS PoC activities

(such as the number of patrols and human rights investigation) could be more monitored and

reported on more systematically. The most important measure of whether the Mission is

having an impact on protecting civilians is arguably the perception of the local population,

which can be assessed through focus groups and surveys. Lessons learned exercises and after

action reviews will also be used to evaluate and learn from the Mission’s response to specific

PoC crises.

33. UNMISS has specific reporting requirements related to its protection mandate. A dedicated

section on PoC is included in the SG’s periodic reports to the Security Council, which

provides an overview of the main developments and challenges related to the implementation

of the protection mandate. Regular situation reports and other reporting requirements also

22

provide an opportunity to follow the more day-to-day activities of the Mission in relation to

PoC.

Reference documents

UN Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians

UN Security Council resolution 1996 (2011) on South Sudan

DPKP/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping

Operations, April 2010

DPKO/DFS Framework for Drafting Comprehensive PoC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping

Operations

UNMISS Mission Concept

Concept of operations and Mission framework on PoC

UNMISS Military Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS), 26 September 2011

UNMISS Rules of Engagement

Role of UNMISS Police in the Protection of Civilians

UNMISS Early Warning and Early Response Strategy, 1 September 2011

UNMISS Early Warning and Early Response SOP (Draft)

UNMISS Decision Making System and Headquarters Routine (August 2011)

Terms of Reference for PoC Working Group and PoC Task Forces

South Sudan Protection Cluster Strategy 2012

UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP).

Directive on the Role and Responsibilities of UNMISS State Coordinators, 27 October 2011