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Final report
EVALUATION
OF
CORDAID’S FLOOD RESPONSE 2010 PROGRAMME
PAKISTAN
December 2011
Ton de Klerk
Shahida Sultan
Executive Summary
In late July 2010, heavy monsoon rains caused severe flash floods in the northern mountain regions
of Pakistan. Next the floodwater waves washed down from north to south submerging in the next
two months at one point a fifth of the country’s land mass. Early August 2010, the Aid Agencies in the
Netherlands (SHO) started a joint fund raising campaign for an emergency response to the Floods in
Pakistan. Total donations amounted to € 27.5 million, of which Cordaid received approx. € 5 million.
Cordaid was implementing a health programme in Shangla District, in the North-Western part of
Pakistan. The district was severely affected by the monsoon rains. The health team responded
immediately, providing medical assistance and assuring medicines supplies in the worst affected
areas. A first rapid need assessment was conducted in early August identifying the fields in which
emergency response was needed: shelter, NFI’s, WASH and Health. On the basis of this assessment it
was decided by Cordaid to scale up its programme in Shangla, focusing on shelter, WASH and Health.
Later on it was decided to start-up a shelter rehabilitation programme in Kohat. In Shangla and Kohat
districts Cordaid implemented the programme itself (budget: approx. €3,25 million). CRS received
additional funding for its shelter programme in Shangla, Kohistan and Swat districts for the
construction of latrines, to complement the budget of other donors (budget: € 458.655). Cordaid co-
funded the CRS Emergency Response programme in Sindh (budget: € 1.592.894). In Punjab, two local
partner organisations of ‘Mensen met een Missie’, one of the constitutional member organisations of
Cordaid, received funding for an early emergency response (total budget: € 173.707).
The main purpose of the evaluation study was to measure the performance of Cordaid in the 2010
Flood Response Programme, looking at the overall performance of Cordaid HQ, Cordaid Field Office
Pakistan and Cordaid’s Partners, CRS and ODP&TWO. The programme had a duration of 16 months,
starting in August 2010 while it was closed at the end of November 2011. SHO funding had to be
spent within 12 month, i.e. before mid-August 2011.
In the 16 months period all activities and output targets as defined in the different project proposals
have been achieved.
• 5150 kits of non-food items (kitchen utensils, bedding, plastic sheets etc.) and 2900 food
packages have been distributed
• 783 new shelters have been constructed, 125 houses were repaired, 300 tents were
distributed and 2500 families received plastic sheets for temporary shelter
• 2301 latrines were constructed (adjacent to new transitional shelters)
• 107 water systems were rehabilitated
• 3000 families received aqua tabs to disinfect contaminated water
• 7500 hygiene kits were distributed and 591 hygiene promotion sessions were conducted
• 3751 families benefited from a ‘cash and vouchers’ scheme providing them agricultural
inputs (seeds, fertilizer) and cash to pay for ploughing of their land and water for irrigation.
• 46 Cash for Work schemes were implemented, mostly rehabilitation of irrigation systems.
• The health programme in Shangla assured medical care in 4 Union Councils, through
deployment of medical staff, mobile health units (MHU’s) and provision of medicines during
the project period. Repairs were done on 3 Basic Health Units (BHU’s) and the district
hospital and the BHU’s received medical equipment and furniture. Trainings were given to
medical staff to strengthen their capacity.
However implementation of the programme has not been without problems, especially the shelter
components of the programme executed by Cordaid itself in Shangla and Kohat districts. There have
been major delays in the start-up of the shelter projects and later on during its implementation.
ii
A major cause for the delay were problems with the recruitment of international staff, especially in
the start-up phase. Except for the early emergency response of the health team in early August 2010,
which was already present in the region and could respond rapidly, Cordaid didn’t have the capacity
to respond timely. Also, weaknesses in the procurement and problems with suppliers caused delays
throughout the implementation of the programme.
It was also found that the needs assessments for the shelter projects showed major deficiencies
resulting in an overestimating of the needs. There were major doubts about the relevance for an
emergency response in the last phases of the shelter project in Shangla, when the real needy
beneficiaries were already served, and of the repairs of the houses in Kohat. The needs assessments
generally lacked a systematic approach to define a proper intervention strategy, such as a partner
strategy or an emergency response and exit strategy for its health programme. Also no proper
systems were in place, until late in the programme, for a ‘remote control’ approach as required for
the ‘high security risk area’ of Kohat district.
CRS (Catholic Relief Service) has been performing well in both programmes, in Sindh and in the
North-Western districts, that were co-funded by Cordaid. CRS is already active in Pakistan for more
than 50 years and has experience with emergency response programmes in Pakistan since the big
earth quake of 2005. It has a well-established office in Islamabad and could rely on experienced local
staff and international staff and the support of its regional office. The interventions were well
structured, from the needs assessments to the actual implementation, and lessons learnt from
earlier projects were integrated in the new projects (example: the cash and voucher scheme). It was
found that all targets have been achieved and in time.
CRS has developed an effective partner strategy. It implemented all the projects in cooperation with
local partners. As these partners mostly lack experience in emergency response programmes,
especially on a large scale as required after the floods of 2010, it developed a system wherein CRS
provides close supervision; the approach can be defined as an ‘on the job training’. Starting with
close supervision, gradually more responsibility was assigned to the partners.
Also the two local partners of “Mensen met een missie” have performed well. Their major advantage
was good knowledge of the communities where they implemented the projects, mainly distribution
of NFI’s, hygiene kits, food packages and tents. The beneficiaries praised especially the transparency
of the registration and distribution process and the orderly way in which it was organised. Approval
of the project proposal by Cordaid has taken a long time; therefore the implementation of the
project was much later (Nov. – Dec. 2010) as originally planned. At that time the local NGO’s had
already lost one of their main comparative advantages, namely to be able to respond rapidly when
the international organisations have not yet arrived. In Nov. – Dec. there was a higher risk for
duplication with the assistance arriving from other agencies.
The recommendations which are formulated target especially Cordaid HQ’s, addressing weaknesses
in the programme performance of Cordaid as an implementing agency. We recommend that Cordaid:
• should consider how to improve its capacity to recruit qualified staff in a timely manner.
• should review its needs assessments procedures and tools for emergency response
programmes. Joint assessments with other INGO’s should also be considered.
• should consider if it has developed adequate guidelines for the implementation of
programmes in high security risks areas.
We recommend further that Cordaid should review its policy for partnership with local NGOs in order
to improve its contribution at capacity building of local NGO’s (and DRR), and pay special attention in
future emergency response programmes to the needs of vulnerable groups and seek ways to assist
them to assure equity (instead of equality)
.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................. i
Table of Contents .....................................................................................................................................ii
1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 General background ................................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Methodology ........................................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Limitations of the study........................................................................................................... 3
2 Programme description................................................................................................................... 6
2.1 Cordaid’s programme in Shangla. ........................................................................................... 6
2.1.1 Early response ................................................................................................................. 6
2.1.2 Health Programme .......................................................................................................... 6
2.1.3 WASH Programme.......................................................................................................... 7
2.1.4 Shelter programme ......................................................................................................... 8
2.2 Cordaid’s shelter programme in Kohat ................................................................................... 8
2.3 CRS Sind Programme ............................................................................................................... 9
2.4 CRS Latrines project in Shangla, Kohistan, Swat districts...................................................... 10
2.5 ODP & TWO Programme ....................................................................................................... 10
2.6 Total funding and programme outputs ................................................................................. 10
3 Assessment of the individual programmes. .................................................................................. 14
3.1 Cordaid’s programme in Shangla. ......................................................................................... 14
3.1.1 Early response ............................................................................................................... 14
3.1.2 Health Programme ........................................................................................................ 14
3.1.3 WASH programme......................................................................................................... 18
3.1.4 Shelter programme ....................................................................................................... 19
3.2 Cordaid’s shelter programme in Kohat ................................................................................. 23
3.3 CRS Programme Sindh........................................................................................................... 24
3.4 CRS Latrines project in Shangla, Kohistan, Swat districts...................................................... 27
3.5 ODP & TWO Programme ....................................................................................................... 27
4 Overall Assessment of the Programme......................................................................................... 30
4.1 Cordaid’s performance.......................................................................................................... 30
4.1.1 As Implementing Agency............................................................................................... 30
4.1.2 As Funding Agency......................................................................................................... 34
4.2 CRS Performance................................................................................................................... 34
4.3 Performance of ODP and TWO.............................................................................................. 35
4.4 Cross cutting issues ............................................................................................................... 36
4.4.1 Respect of Sphere guidelines and Code of Conduct ..................................................... 36
4.4.2 Cost effectiveness.......................................................................................................... 36
4.4.3 Gender and vulnerability issues .................................................................................... 37
5 Recommendations......................................................................................................................... 38
ANNEXES................................................................................................................................................ 40
Annex 1. Terms of Reference. ............................................................................................................. 41
Annex 2. List of persons interviewed and sites visited....................................................................... 45
1 Introduction
1.1 General background
Pakistan’s 2010 floods are considered amongst one of the major disasters of the 21st
century due to
the disaster’s widespread geographical scale and distribution, the unprecedented caseload of
affected population and its economic impact. According to the Pakistan’s National Disaster
Management Authority (NDMA), the 2010 floods constitute the country’s largest disaster as some 20
million persons, approximately 10% of the country’s population, was affected, despite the scale of
the disaster, casualties remained relatively low at approx. 2000.
The 2010 Pakistan floods began in late July, and following heavy monsoon rains that lasted for more
than eight weeks, they evolved from normal flash floods into a massive disaster affecting large parts
of the country. The floodwater waves washed down from north to south and at one point the Indus
River submerged a fifth of the country’s land mass. Initially, the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) were flooded. In mid-August, as flood waters flowed south Punjab and Sindh
provinces experienced resultant widespread flooding. The floods directly and/or indirectly affected
78 of Pakistan’s 121 districts, devastating and submerging entire villages, roads, bridges, water
supply and sanitation infrastructure, agricultural lands, livestock as well as washing away houses and
health and education facilities.
22 July: Heavy monsoon rains fell in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan displacing
thousands and killing hundreds of people.
29 July: Flash floods and landslides force
massive evacuations and displacement of people
as floodwaters flow from north to south and
rivers converge with the Indus.
6 August: The floods enter Sindh breaching
banks on the Indus and flooding the western
areas of the province.
Mid-August: The monsoon rains and floods had
impacted an estimated 160,000 square
kilometres of land, affecting over 18 million
people across the country.
25 August: More than 800,000 people are cut
off the floods.
26 September 2010: Flooding in southern Sindh
where the embankments of Lake Manchar
breached caused an estimated 1.5 million people
to be displaced in a matter of days.
The impact of the flood was very diverse in each province due to the changing nature of the disaster,
the different levels of preparedness (in terms of capacity, resources and systems in place), and the
access to individual and common resources. Kyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) was only affected by flash
floods while other provinces where exposed to both flash and riverine floods. Sindh was the worst
affected province, as the Indus River did not find an outlet due to the flat topography of this area.
While waters receded within days in Balochistan and KPK, it took several weeks in Punjab and
months in some areas of Sindh. Where water receded rapidly most of the displaced population was
2
able to return during the months of August and September. In October most of the affected
population in these areas had returned. In Sindh some 7.3 million people were affected by the
floods, In Punjab approx. 6 million, and in KPK some 3.8 million persons.
On the 12th
of August 2010, the Aid Agencies in the Netherlands started a joint fund raising campaign
for an emergency response to the Floods in Pakistan. Total donations amounted to € 27.5 million, of
which Cordaid received approx. € 5 million.
Cordaid was active in Pakistan from 2003. From 2005, following the earthquake, it had been involved
in earthquake relief work and in the IDP crises in KPK. From November 2007 till early 2009, Cordaid
continued a third phase of earthquake relief work that focused on housing and education. In 2009,
in Shangla district (KPK) a health programme for IDP’s started aiming to strengthen the access
capacity of health structures in the district. Cordaid was implementing also an education programme
in Shangla as well as starting up a WASH-Health intervention in Kohat district, also in KPK.
Shangla district was severely affected by the heavy monsoon rains at the end of July, resulting in
flash floods, landslides and houses and other infrastructure damaged by heavy rains. The health
team of Cordaid and its local partner Cavish responded immediately, providing medical assistance
and assuring medicines supplies in the worst affected areas. The team conducted a first rapid need
assessment in early August identifying the fields in which emergency response was needed, i.e.
shelter, NFI’s, WASH and health. On the basis of this rapid assessment it was decided by Cordaid to
scale up its programme in Shangla, focusing on shelter, WASH and health. Later on it was decided to
start-up a shelter rehabilitation programme in Kohat.
In Shangla and Kohat districts Cordaid implemented the programme itself (total budget: approx.
€3,25 million). CRS received additional funding for its shelter programme in Shangla, Kohistan and
Swat districts for the construction of latrines, to complement the budget of other donors which
didn’t provide for funding of this component. (budget: € 458.655). Cordaid co-funded the CRS
Emergency Response programme in Sindh (budget: € 1.592.894). In Punjab, two local partner
organisations of ‘Mensen met een Missie’ (CMC), one of the constitutional member organisations of
Cordaid, received funding for an early emergency response (total budget: € 173.707).
1.2 Methodology
The main purpose of the evaluation study was defined in the ToR as to measure the performance of
Cordaid in the 2010 Flood Response Programme, looking at the overall performance of Cordaid HQ,
Cordaid Field Office Pakistan and Cordaid Partners (CRS and ODP – TWO). It was further elaborated
as to assess:
• The suitability (appropriateness) of the operation and the level it has been carried out.
• The degree to which the objectives pursued have been achieved (effectiveness) and whether
the means employed have been effective.
• To quantify the impact of the operation in terms of outputs.
To analyse:
• Cordaid’s role as coordinator and donor as well as an implementing agency.
• Cordaid’s partners performance as implementing agencies.
• The link between relief, rehabilitation and development in the flood response.
To check: - if the principles contained in the Code of Conduct and Sphere guidelines have been
respected. To formulate: - precise and concrete recommendations to improve future operations in
Pakistan and Cordaid globally.
3
The ToR further identified a list of issues to be covered in the study, including analysis of the
relevance, effectiveness, cost effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the programme, and gender
issues as a cross cutting theme. The ToR is attached in Annex 1.
The evaluation study was carried out in the period of 14 November – 3 December 2010. The
evaluation team consisted of Mr Ton de Klerk (team leader), Dutch nationality and expert in
evaluation studies of humanitarian assistance programmes, and Mrs Shahida Sultan, Pakistan
nationality and expert in M&E and educational programmes.
The team leader had a briefing on November 14th
at Cordaid’s HQ’s in The Hague. On the 17th
, he had
a telephone interview with the ad-interim Head of Mission (Dec. 2010 – Jan. 2011; June – July 2011).
The team received all required programme documents from HQ’s, Field Office in Islamabad and in
the field. Field visits were carried out from November 20th
to December 2nd
, followed by a debriefing
at the Field office of Cordaid in Islamabad on December 3rd
. A debriefing was held at Cordaid HQ’s at
the 15th
of December. Feedback received during the debriefings is incorporated in the report.
The field visits started with a briefing and interviews of senior programme staff of Cordaid in the
Islamabad office (Nov. 20th
- 21st). Next the team visited Southern Punjab (Multan) where assistance
had been provided to flood affected villages by two local NGO’s, ODP and TWO (Nov. 22nd
- 23rd
).
From Multan the team travelled to Northern Sind (Sukkur) to visit the project locations of the CRS
programme (Nov. 25th
- 26th
). Returning to Islamabad on Nov. 26th
we had additional interviews with
Cordaid programme staff and the shelter team of Kohat on Nov. 27th
. The second week we visited
Shangla region, where the team spent two days with Cordaid staff and visited villages benefiting of
assistance by the Cordaid programme (Nov. 29th
and 30th
) and one day with CRS (Dec. 1st
). On Dec. 3rd
we had a meeting with the Country Director and the Coordinator Partnerships of CRS.
During the field visits the emphasis was on discussions with programme staff and group meetings
with beneficiaries. The evaluation team, composed of a male and a female evaluator, could have
separate meetings with male and female beneficiaries. Some government representatives (DCO’s of
Jabobabad –Sindh and Shangla districts, senior engineer of TMA Shangla) and medical staff of the
public health services could also be met. In addition, we had meetings with staff of local partners of
CRS and of Cavish, a local partner of Cordaid.
We conducted semi-open interviews with programme staff, government representatives and local
partners as well as in the group meetings with the beneficiaries, following a list of key issues to be
discussed which were identified by the evaluation team before each interview.
The interviews with the beneficiaries served the purpose of assessing in particular beneficiaries’
satisfaction with the assistance provided, the timeliness of the interventions, beneficiaries’
involvement in the programme, checking if proper beneficiaries selection procedures were observed
etc. The number of interviews which were conducted was small, but the programme reports were
generally of good quality; through the interviews we could check the accuracy of the reports.
1.3 Limitations of the study
A major limitation for the study has been the short time available for the field visits. Only one and
half day was available to assess the CRS Sind programme, an integrated programme with NFI’s,
Shelter, WASH and livelihood sector activities and covering some 30 villages. Only two days were
available to assess Cordaid’s programme in Shangla with activities in the NFI, Shelter, Health and
WASH sectors; the shelter programme alone covered 66 villages1. We could visit only a small sample
of villages and, apart from programme staff, conduct interviews with a small number of other
1 The programme of TWO in Punjab and the Cordaid programme in Kohat could not be visited due to time
constraints
4
stakeholders. Therefore some findings of the evaluation, especially regarding the effectiveness
(qualitative) and the impact of the programme, should be considered with caution, especially where
we indicate that the findings are based on just a few observations.
Planning our field visits we tried to arrange for random sampling of the villages to be visited. But we
succeeded only partially, due to the far distances of many villages, especially in the mountainous
region of Shangla with many of the villages on a hiking distance of 20 – 40 minutes from the main
road, and the fact that we wanted to visit villages where several sector interventions were carried
out simultaneously. In the end we had to choose for villages near to the road and where multiple
interventions could be assessed.
The programme of Cordaid had closed down just before our evaluation study2. The local field staff
had already left and thus couldn’t be met. During our visit we were accompanied by the project
coordinator of the shelter project and the M&E officer of the shelter /WASH project, whose contracts
had been prolonged for our visit. In the field we also met some, locally recruited, social mobilizers of
the shelter programme. Besides we had a short meeting with the former project coordinator of the
health programme. Because we got better informed about the shelter project, the assessment of
Cordaid’s programme in Shangla will consequently be more focused on this component.
Due to a high turnover of expatriate staff it was difficult to get information especially on the start-up
phase of the programme. But we hope that these gaps have been filled by meeting (accidently) the
acting head of mission in the period Oct. – Dec. 2010 , the above mentioned telephone interview
with the ad-interim head of mission and the feedback we received on our questions from the senior
programme officer for the Pakistan programme at Cordaid HQ’s.
Because of the limitations, especially the time constraint, we have focused more on a few issues
which we considered of main importance, after studying the programme documents, to assess
Cordaid’s performance, such as programme management and partnership relations.
The evaluation team didn’t have in-depth knowledge of all sectors covered by the programme. Due
to this, in combination with the time constraint, not all questions defined in the ToR could be dealt
with adequately, for example those related to logistics, warehouse management and appliance of
Sphere standards in all different sectors (Health, WASH).
Besides the programme reports, we relied heavily on the information gathered through the
interviews with programme staff. This information was triangulated with feedback we got from
beneficiaries and other stakeholders, and through direct observations (shelters, utilisation of
equipment distributed etc.). We believe that, nonetheless all these limitations we succeeded in
making a reliable assessment of the programme.
2 It was planned to carry out the evaluation while the field staff would still be available but due to delays in the
visa application process of the team leader and problems with obtaining a NOC (Non Objection Certificate) to
visit the Shangla district, the programme had to be re-arranged.
5
Table 1. Overview of meetings and field visits.
Nov. 20th
Briefing session with the Head of Mission, Head of Programme and Administrative
Manager of Cordaid Pakistan and interview with the Logistics Manager.
Nov. 21st
Interviews with the Programme Managers Health, and WASH-Shelter, the former
Acting Head of Mission (Oct.- Dec. 2010), and a representative of Cavish. Afternoon:
travel to Multan (Southern Punjab)
Nov. 22nd
Briefing session in the office of ODP, followed by a visit to two villages where group
meetings were held with beneficiaries, and a visit to the offices of a local partner
(NGO) of ODP involved in the implementation of the programme.
Nov. 23rd
Meeting with staff of TWO were met in the office of ODP, followed by a meeting with
beneficiaries (and ODP’s implementing partner) of a third village.
Nov. 24th
Travel over land to Northern Sind (Sukkur). After arrival interview with the Head of
Office and the M&E Officer of CRS Sindh.
Nov. 25th
Three villages were visited in Jacobabad district, accompanied by the Programme
Officers Livelihood, Shelters and WASH of CRS. In two villages we had separate group
meetings with men and women; in the third village we visited some beneficiaries of
the shelter programme. In the evening we had a meeting with the Programme
Managers and the District Coordination Officer of Jacobabad district.
Nov. 26th
Meeting with the programme staff of the shelter programme of the local NGO
Implementing partner for CRS. In the afternoon: travel back to Islamabad.
Nov. 27th
Interview with the Administrative Manager of Cordaid Pakistan, and meetings with the
Programme Manager and the local staff of the shelter programme in Kohat
Nov. 28th
Travel to Shangla district (Besham), where we met with the project coordinator of
Cordaid’s shelter programme and the M&E officer for Shelter/WASH.
Nov. 29th
Meetings in Alpuri with the former project coordinator of the Health programme, the
Senior Medical Officer and a female Gynaecologist of the District Hospital (DHQ), the
District Coordination Officer of Shangla, and the senior engineer of the Tehsil
Municipal administration (TMA), in charge of water systems. It was followed by a visit
to one village, where we had separate group meetings with men and women and visit
to some beneficiaries in their new shelters.
Nov. 30th
Second day of field visits with Cordaid. Separate group meetings with men and women
in two villages. Visit to a BHU (Basic health Unit) and interview with the medical
doctor. On our return in Besham, meeting with Head of Office of CRS programme in
Shangla / Kohistan / Swat.
Dec. 1st Field visit with CRS, accompanied by the Project Manager Shelter. Visit to one village,
where separate meetings were held with men and women. Meetings with two local
NGO’s, implementing partners for CRS shelter programme.
Dec. 2nd
Travel back to Islamabad. Interview with former field officer of Cordaid, involved in
the Shangla Programme from August 2010.
Dec. 3rd
Meeting with Manager Human Resources of Cordaid.
Meeting with country director and coordinator partnership relations of CRS.
Debriefing for CRS senior staff.
6
2 Programme description
2.1 Cordaid’s programme in Shangla.
2.1.1 Early response
Due to the presence of its health programme in Shangla Cordaid could and did respond rapidly after
the devastating heavy rains causing floods and landslides in the district. Shangla was one of the most
affected districts in KPK province. Four Mobile Medical Units (MMU’s) moved immediately into the
most affected areas providing medical assistance, i.e. curative care and provision of medicines. The
teams stayed overnight at the BHU’s (Basic Health Units) or dispensaries. Medicines were forwarded
by means of mule carriage using the mountain roads, since the main roads were heavily damaged
and bridges were washed away. Within the first month after the floods Cordaid also distributed 900 NFI kits containing kitchen items, bedding and plastic sheets.
Early August a first rapid assessment was done by the Cordaid team, assisted by its local partner
Cavish, to assess the damage and identify the priority needs for emergency assistance and early
recovery. Health, WASH, Shelter and distribution of NFI’s were identified as the priority intervention
areas. While in this early phase an emergency response was anticipated (emergency shelter,
provision of WASH services to temporary settlement areas, i.e. camps, provide affected households
with water purification tablets, jerry cans etc.), later on the programme strategy shifted towards
early recovery interventions. Few people lived in temporary shelter such as camps or public building;
most affected families found refuge with host families or could rent temporary housing. WASH
interventions shifted to rehabilitation of water systems. Many water systems had been damaged
creating health risks since people had to take recourse to unsafe water sources.
2.1.2 Health Programme
Expenditures: € 512. 104
The overall objective of the Cordaid Health program was to reduce mortality and morbidity and to
improve the health status of the population in Shangla District by strengthening the existing Health
System. Health care activities were conducted in collaboration with local partners, the Ministry of
Health (MoH), and WHO. Cordaid provided health care services to the population of Shangla District
through the seconded MoH staff as well as Cordaid contracted staff members. Services were
delivered in static and mobile sites where medical teams consisting of one doctor and one dispenser
were used per each supported facility.
Cordaid did minor repairs to rehabilitate the government health facilities in the area, by installation
of electricity and repair of faulty doors and windows. In total 3 BHU’s (Basic Health Units) were
rehabilitated. A hydropower station was installed at the DHQ’s in Alpuri
Access to basic health care services was improved by running Mobile Medical Units (MMU) in remote
areas. Increased awareness on the prevention of diseases is part of the strategy as well as efforts to
improve the behaviour of the local population towards health & hygiene. Cordaid provided basic
health services by providing free health consultations and free medications to the affected
population, promote good health practices through health and hygiene education sessions, while
supporting the local health authorities by capacity building of personnel of the Ministry of Health.
Cordaid’s strategy in the early stage was focused on provision of emergency health services, through
static and Mobile clinics. A second stage saw a shift to early recovery which included activities related
7
to repair and rehabilitation of the health facilities and provision of support to the MoH through
medicines supply, staffing, provision of medical equipment and furniture, incentives for staff and
capacity building through trainings.
Prior to the floods there were acute shortages of health professionals in the District. All BHU’s were
under staffed, often with no medical doctor. Due to the presence of the Taliban there were very few
female health workers. There was only one female medical doctor/gynaecologist based at the DHQ in
Shangla District, seriously affecting most women’s opportunity for access to maternity healthcare.
LHV’s (Lady Health Visitors) assigned at the BHU’s received incentives from Cordaid during the
project period and received training on MNCH (Maternal, New born and Child Health Care).
A provincial DHIS (District Health Information System) cell has been established by the KPK
Government, which has conducted introductory trainings on DHIS system in 13 districts of KPK for
implementation of DHI. Shangla District was not included in the role out of the Government
programme. Cordaid took the initiative in this regard and was able to recruit a DHIS coordinator who
worked to build the capacity of the MoH staff in health information system management and trained
facility based staff in accurate data entry in the required reporting formats.
In all four BHU’s included in the programme community health committees (CHC’s) were established
and trained. This was to ensure that local people had a voice and a part in the decision making.
A Leishmaniasis outbreak occurring in May 2011 required Cordaid health team to provide curative
and preventive intervention in the Jatkool area of Shangla. This Leishmaniasis project was initially not
included in the programme. In collaboration with WHO and the district MoH, Cordaid sent out a
team of a medical doctor and dispenser to the area. Medicines were provided by WHO. Cordaid
distributed mosquito nets and hygiene kits and shared health education on disease prevention.
2.1.3 WASH Programme
Expenditures: € 289.019
In total 80 community water schemes (gravity) have been rehabilitated. Funding for the first 50
schemes was provided by UNICEF. Cordaid had planned to fund an additional 20 schemes but as a
result of savings 10 extra schemes could be rehabilitated. The work consisted of rehabilitation of the
water sources, installing main pipe lines connecting the sources with the distribution tanks,
construction or rehabilitation of distribution tanks and laying of tertiary distribution lines connecting
to the houses.
The project was implemented in 4 UC’s (Union Councils). Project Facilitation Committees (PFC’s)
were formed in each location. These committees were responsible to solve issues regarding the path
of the main lines, ownership of the source and other related issues. They also organised the work on
the rehabilitation of the water source and laying of the main pipelines, under supervision of the
Cordaid engineer. Each committee signed an agreement to complete the work themselves receiving
payment on completion of the work. Cordaid did not pay for work in the final stage, the community
were required to dig and lay the tertiary pipelines which connected each home to the water supply.
Before the rehabilitation of the water systems, aqua tabs water purification tablets were distributed
to disinfect the water collected from unsafe sources. Hygiene kits and jerry cans were distributed.
Hygiene awareness sessions were held, sensitizing on appropriate essential health and the means to
adopt good hygiene practice, also for students in various schools.
By late February 2011 it became clear that there would be an under spending of the UNICEF funds
and therefore Cordaid developed five additional activities to promote hygiene. The activities included
a cricket match displaying hygiene messages, training of WASH committees, celebration of World
Water Day, celebration of Sanitation days and TOT sessions for hygiene promotion.
8
2.1.4 Shelter programme
Expenditures: € 1.361.163
A total of 723 semi-permanent shelters have been constructed in 5 UC’s (66 villages), that were most
affected by the floods, landslides and heavy rains of July - August 2010. The shelter packages
contained a latrine which was built adjacent but separated from the house. Initially the target had
been set at 750 houses to be constructed in 4 UC’s. However, after phases 1-3 it was clear that there
would not be enough beneficiaries in these four UC’s following the initial selection criteria. Two
changes were therefore proposed and approved by Cordaid:
A fifth UC (Damouri, still in Shangla district) to be included in the area of operation, enabling to find
more eligible beneficiaries for shelters;
A number of classrooms of flood affected government schools and BHUs to be included, allowing
more shelters within our area of operation.
Henceforth, 23 classrooms have been constructed on school premises in flood-affected villages and 4
rooms for different functions (waiting room, delivery room, OPD treatment room) have been
constructed on BHU premises in flood-affected villages.
Cordaid formed Project Facilitation Committees (PFCs) in each of the 66 villages. The role of the PFC’s
was: - to prepare an initial list of households eligible to receive shelters; - assist Cordaid’s shelter staff
in the re-assessment process of this initial list; - facilitate establishment of agreements between
landowners and households who needed temporary sites; - confer with eligible households to
identify suitable sites for construction; - arrange voluntary community labour to perform site
preparation on behalf of households without an able-bodied member; - assist in arranging delivery of
materials kits to household construction sites; - verify completion of construction completion jointly
with Cordaid; - and provide trouble-shooting and problem-solving as necessary.
The construction materials were transported by Cordaid to a nearby distribution point at the main
road where they were collected by the beneficiaries. Most of the houses were constructed by
carpenters. Skilled people were identified from the beneficiaries’ communities who received a
special training. Carpenters were awarded to build shelters as much as they had capacity. The trained
carpenters hired more unskilled persons from the communities. Overall 40 carpenter teams (160
persons) were supported for capacity building and income generation through the programme.
Similarly 80 vulnerable beneficiaries were also identified and trained for masonry works. A complete
masonry toolkit including a practical handbook was awarded to each trainee to support them for a
good start of skilled jobs.
2.2 Cordaid’s shelter programme in Kohat
Expenditures: € 193.023
A rapid needs assessment done by Cordaid in August 2010 identified 283 flood affected HHs within
the local population in 3 selected Union Councils of Kohat district. The assessment revealed 70 HHs
with completely damaged houses and 213 HHs with partially damaged houses.
Data collected in August 2010 were found to be unsatisfactory to plan effective response thus a new
physical assessment was carried out in January 2011 to examine gravity of damage on each affected
building. As the re-assessment showed that the project budget would not be completely utilized in
the three initially selected UC’s, it was decided after consultations in the Shelter Cluster and with the
PDMA (Provincial Disaster Management Authority) to include two more UC’s in the project.
Following the needs assessment it was decided to construct 60 new shelters and to repair 110
houses with major damage and 15 houses with minor damage in the 5 UC’s. The design of the new
9
houses differed from the semi-permanent shelters in Shangla district. Cordaid in agreement with the
community designed a one room shelter constructed out of brick and rein-forced cement concrete.
The work approach is the same as in the shelter programme in Shangla, with village shelter
committees assigned the same role as in Shangla, except identification of beneficiaries which was
already done, and the training of masons and carpenters to execute the construction and repairs.
2.3 CRS Sind Programme
Expenditures: € 1.592.777
CRS was awarded a grant from Cordaid to provide NFIs (emergency shelter and hygiene kits), WASH
support, and agricultural inputs for cropping seasons through a combination of commodity vouchers
and cash grants. The beneficiary households for the three project components overlapped to the
greatest extent possible, while ensuring that they met the targeting criteria for each intervention.
The project goal was that flood-affected families rebuild their livelihoods and their communities.
There were four objectives: - targeted families have access to NFI’s to meet their immediate hygiene
and shelter needs; - flood-affected households have access to sufficient clean water to meet their
essential household needs; - flood-affected farming households have resumed farming; - and flood-
affected households live in locally-appropriate shelters that provide the basis for disaster recovery.
For NFIs, CRS used a blanket coverage approach in the villages in the targeted UCs; all had sustained
great damage from the floods. Beneficiary selection for the NFI/hygiene kits followed the criteria
established for the shelter program – total destruction or severe damage to the home. Prior to
distributions in a village, CRS mobilized communities to form village committees. Active community
members signed up to participate in these and were approved by their peers. The VC’s created by
the NFI/Shelter program team were later used in the WASH, livelihoods and shelter programs.
Aassessments conducted immediately after the flood showed hand pumps had been left partially or
fully damaged after the flood. Poor hygiene practices, such as open defecation in fields, further
contaminated water sources. These results led CRS to focus on providing clean water to communities
and teaching them proper maintenance of the water system and better hygiene practices. With
Cordaid funding, CRS reached 27 villages in two UC’s in District Jacobabad with water supply scheme
interventions. Also hygiene promotion sessions were conducted separately for men and women.
CRS began implementation of its livelihoods recovery project in Sindh in September 2010 after
conducting a rapid needs assessment. Funding from Cordaid covered beneficiary need for agriculture
assistance in the two seasons immediately after the flood: Rabi (winter) season or Kharif (spring)
season. Wheat is the primary crop for Rabi season and rice is the primary crop for Kharif season.
For the Rabi season, beneficiaries received three separate vouchers to be redeemed for wheat seed,
fertilizer and vegetable seed. Voucher packages were designed to generously cover one-acre for
wheat cultivation and the total value of the package was 176 USD. Complementing the voucher
package was a cash grant of 50 USD which was calculated based on the cultivation costs of tractor
rental. The cash grants were checks to a reputed bank in the area.
Similar to Rabi season, commodity vouchers and cash grants were distributed for Kharif season, but
the amount of money for the cash grant was increased to 95 USD in anticipation for beneficiaries
needing fuel for pumping water from the tube wells as the primary crop for Kharif season is rice. In
addition to this activity, a cash-for-work program was started to repair the productive infrastructure
of communities. Schemes took an average of between 5-8 days to complete. Through Cordaid, CRS
rehabilitated 45 irrigation channels and 1 link road.
Through the shelter project 10,000 plastic sheets were provided, which made possible the
construction of 2,500 transitional shelters. Initially it was planned that Cordaid would also fund
10
(budget: € 500.000) construction of 1050 transitional shelters, but because CRS feared procurement
problems and it would not be able to finish the project in time (SHO deadline) this component was
cancelled. However, CRS constructed transitional shelters with funding from other donors. As a result
Cordaid returned 500,000 Euro to the SHO fund to be redistributed among SHO partners
CRS worked through three local partners – GSF (Goth Singhar Foundation), RDF (Research
Development Foundation) and YAP (Youth Action Pakistan) – to implement the project in Sindh.
2.4 CRS Latrines project in Shangla, Kohistan, Swat districts.
Expenditures: € 458.655
CRS received funding for its shelter programme in Shangla, Kohistan and Swat districts for the
construction of latrines, to complement the budget of other donors. The latrines were constructed
adjacent to the shelters. Latrine and bathing space materials were provided to 2301 HH’s.
In order to build the transitional shelters and latrines and bathing spaces, CRS used a Cash for Work
approach in order to support local skilled resources, build the capacity of unskilled workers, facilitate
community ownership in the project and inject cash into flood-affected communities. The same
workers who constructed the transitional shelters also constructed the latrines and bathing spaces.
CRS worked with local partners ISWDO (Indus Social Welfare Organization) based in Kohistan, ROAD
(Rural Organization for Awareness and Development) based in Shangla, and LASOONA based in Swat.
2.5 ODP & TWO Programme
Expenditures: € 173.703
In November – December 2010, ODP distributed two monthly rations of food items to 700 families in
6 villages (from 7 UC’s) in Southern Punjab. Tents were distributed to 300 families in the same
villages and one additional village. TWO distributed a one month ration of food items, a set of
kitchen utensils and a hygiene kit in 12 UC’s to 1500 HH’s. In addition 4 medical camps were
organised in 4 different UC’s in December and January.
2.6 Total funding and programme outputs
Expenditures: € 4.658.954
Figures regarding total funding and outputs of the programme are presented in Table 2 – 4
11
Table 2 Total Programme Funding
Total expenditures from 01 August 2010 and 31 October 2011
SHO People in
Need CAFOD CERF
Caritas
Germany
Caritas
Tjechie Unicef
Cordaid
adoptions TOTAL
Cordaid, Shangla 1.671.912 153.923 170.000 37.511 91.366 8.278 31.722 76.084 2.240.796
NFI's 27.355 42.154 69.509
Health 230.084 74.509 170.000 37.511 512.104
Shelter 1.181.518 79.414 66.301 33.930 1.361.163
Wash 223.955 25.064 8.278 31.722 289.019
Cordaid, Kohat
Shelter 73.622 91.379 28.022 193.023
CRS, Shangla,
Kohistan, Swat
Latrines 387.516 71.139 458.655
CRS, Sindh 1.576.847 15.930 1.592.777
NFI 97.062 97.062
Shelter 174.368 174.368
Wash 108.003 108.003
Cash & Vouchers 881.934 881.934
Program Support 1 331.527 331.527
ODP, Punjab
TWO, Punjab 124.878
48.825 173.703
TOTAL 3.834.775 245.302 170.000 37.511 119.388 8.278 31.722 211.978 4.658.954
Table 3. Expenditures per Sector
Total expenditures from 01 August 2010 and 31 October 2011
NFI's 376.694 90.979 467.673
Health 239.084 74.509 170.000 37.511 521.104
Shelter + Latrines 1.859.112 170.792 94.324 105.069 2.229.297
WASH 397.829 25.064 8.278 31.722 462.893
Cash & Vouchers 962.056 15.930 977.986
TOTAL 3.834.775 245.301 170.000 37.511 119.388 8.278 31.722 211.978 4.658.953
1. Programme support costs of local partners
12
Table 4. Overview of Programme Outputs
NFI's Food Shelter WASH Livelihood Health3
Shelter +
latrines
Latrines Water
systems
Aqua
tabs &
storage
items
Hygiene
kits
Hygiene
promotion
sessions
Agriculture:
Cash&
voucher
Cash for
Work
Consul-
tations
Medicine
supply. Cordaid
Shangla
Training
medical staff Cordaid
Shangla
Cordaid,
Shangla
1000
kits
723 2
723 80 benef.
3000
HH's
6000 175 in
villages +
34 in
schools
93.566
Cordaid,
Kohat
60 new
shelters +
125
repaired
CRS, KPK 2301
CRS,
Sindh
2650
kits
Plastic
sheets for
2500 HH's
27 382 3751
commodity
vouchers +
cash grants
46
schemes
ODP,
Punjab
1400 1
packages
300 tents
TWO,
Punjab
1500
kits
1500
packages
1500 2430
Standard
list of
essential
medicines
provided
by WHO
were
supplied
to the
clinics and
DHQ
Shangla
supported
in the
program
8 trainings
were
conducted.
Total # of
participants:
109
TOTAL 5150
NFI
kits
2900
Food
packages
783 new
shelters.
125 houses
repaired.
300 tents.
2500HH’s
got plastic
sheets
2301
Latrines
107
Water
systems
3000
HH's
Received
aqua
tabs
7500
Hygiene
kits
591
Hygiene
Promotion
sessions
3751 HH's
Received
Cash &
Vouchers
46 Cash
for
Work
Schemes
95.996
medical
consulta-
tions
8 trainings
conducted:
109
participants
1. 700 beneficiaries received two monthly packages 2. 23 additional classrooms + 4 additional rooms at BHU's were built out of remaining budget
3. The health programme consisted of a wide range of other activities. For a complete overview, see par. 2.1.2 and 3.1.2
13
Photo 1: CRS shelter constructed in Shangla district.
Entrance in the middle; kitchen on the left and latrine on the right.
Photo 2: Cordaid shelter constructed in Shangla district.
14
3 Assessment of the individual programmes.
3.1 Cordaid’s programme in Shangla.
3.1.1 Early response
The early response by the health team immediately after the floods was highly appreciated by the
beneficiaries, other stakeholders (DCO, medical staff of MoH) and the local staff of Cordaid. The
medical teams were among the first ones to visit the devastated areas and could provide timely
much required medical support.
“People had suffered a lot as the roads were destroyed and there was no access to other
health facilities. They set up Diarrhoea Treatment Centre (DTC) and saved thousands of
people including children which was possible due to the timely response”. (Senior Medical
Officer, DHQ Alpuri )
The distribution of the NFI’s was a blanket distribution. In two of the three villages we visited in
Shangla it was found that not everybody had benefited. Families living along the main road had
received the NFI’s, but those living in the mountains had not. Especially among the women there
were complaints that they had not received any NFI’s. A Cordaid staff member, who was field officer
at the time of the distributions, explained it by the chaotic situation at that time. There was
insufficient time to inform all beneficiaries. Those who had received NFI’s were highly satisfied with
the assistance. The women who had not benefited were disappointed.
“All my belongings were washed away in flood. Cordaid has given me 2 blankets, 1 carpet, 2
cooking pots, 1 cooking pan, 4 plates, 1 hygiene kit, 1 big box, and 1 lantern. I am happy as I
needed them”. (female beneficiary, Derai)
3.1.2 Health Programme
Due to its presence at the moment of the floods the health team could respond quickly and
adequately in the emergency and in the early recovery phase. Its interventions during this period
have been highly relevant. Also the repairs of the BHU’s, of damages caused by the floods and heavy
rains, can be qualified as an appropriate emergency (recovery) response. In particular the rental and
equipment of an alternative building in Shahpur which was set-up as a temporary clinic, since the
existing structure of the BHU was beyond use after the floods, can be mentioned.
But the objectives of the programme, except for the assistance to be provided in the early recovery
phase, were basically development oriented. Prior to the floods there were acute shortages of health
professionals in the District. All clinics were under staffed, often with no doctor. The BHU’s were
poorly equipped. Many of the medical staff were poorly motivated. Political instability and fear
combined with long term mismanagement on behalf of state and non-state actors as well as
inherited financial constraints further enhanced by lack of transparency and accountability lead to
poor infrastructure and practically non-existing social welfare services (source: Project proposal for
health programme). With the short duration of the programme - initially 6 months, later extended to
15 months – it was unrealistic to expect sustainable results.
The exit strategy as defined in the project proposal was to hand over to local authorities, expecting
that training of medical staff and better equipment of the clinics would have a lasting effect on their
15
performance and the quality of the health services provided to their constituencies in the long run.
After withdrawal of Cordaid’s medical teams staff shortages would however still remain while the
withdrawal of the incentives of which medical staff benefited during the project period might also
impact their motivation.
Later on, from August 2011, an exit strategy by handing over to another INGO has been pursued.
Maltheser International which specializes in Healthcare Programmes and has been operational in
Pakistan for the last 6 years showed interest. Discussions were successfully concluded and resulted in
a MOU for the handing over of the programme on October 31st. Maltheser has developed a proposal
that builds on the work carried out by Cordaid. The proposal reduces the financial support to the
Health Authorities but continues the support in primary healthcare. Maltheser proposes to focus on
underdeveloped components of the health system, such as obstetrics, the training of traditional
birthing attendants and support for the midwifery training centre as an example. Currently Maltheser
has secured 8 months funding from Caritas Germany, but it expects to be able to obtain longer term
funding (2 – 3 years).
Programme effectiveness3
All objectives, in terms of outputs (and activities), as defined in the project proposal have been
achieved.
Result 1: Government health facilities in Shangla are rehabilitated and equipped and are provided
with sufficient medicines:
• DHQ and 3 BHU’s have 90% availability of medicines as per WHO standard in the health facilities
for distributions during consultations.
Cordaid used a standard list of essential medicines provided by WHO and ensured that these
drugs were at a minimum 90% availability at all times in the DHQ and the BHU’s supported in the
programme. All MoH health staff has been trained in improved drugs management.
• BHU’s have been renovated and supplied with medical equipment.
Four BHU’s were rehabilitated. As the MoH had received funds to carry out rehabilitation work
on health infrastructure, only minor repairs needed to be done by Cordaid. Cordaid renovated
water supplies, provided additional shelters to be used as labor/delivery rooms (Amnovi and
Shalizara clinics) and fully equipped the facilities. Shahpur clinic, where the existing structure was
beyond use after the floods, Cordaid rented an alternative building which was set up as a
temporary clinic. All 4 BHU’s have been provided with appropriate equipment and furniture.
• Electricity in the DHQ is available 24/7, to be provided by Hydro Generator
Work began in late August 2011 and was finished by early October. The hydro generator is fully
functional and handed over to the Hospital end October 2011.
Result 2: Increased capacities of government health staff and health institution to provide quality health care services.
• Medical teams consist of 1 medical doctor and 1 dispenser.
All Medical teams were in place consisting of a doctor and a dispenser. Cordaid provided health
care services to the population through the seconded ministry of health staff as well as Cordaid
contracted staff. Services were delivered in static and mobile sites. During the project there
were 6 medical doctors and 8 dispensers working for Cordaid in 6 medical teams.
3 Source: Final Report Emergency Health Response in support of the flood affected population of Shangla.
Reporting period 01/08/2010 – 31/10/2011
16
• The health staffs are trained on the provision of quality services.
A total of 9 formal trainings and several on job trainings were conducted for various heath
cadres for both MoH of health and Cordaid hired staff, where 109 health staff members
benefitted. Cordaid also supported the midwifery school. The trainings included: - Introductory
H&H, -DEWS and outbreak alerts, -Diarrhoea management, - Health care waste management, -
Leishmaniasis, - Standard treatment protocol and rationale drug use, - Rational drug use, - DHIS
management, - and MNCH training for LHVs.
• A Health management information person (DHIS) is trained in compiling daily and monthly DEWS
reports and collects relevant health data.
A DHIS coordinator was recruited who worked to build the capacity of the MoH in health
information system management and trained facility based staff in accurate data entry in the
required reporting formats. On the closure of Cordaid’s Health Programme a DHIS coordinator
was recruited by MoH who was trained by Cordaid DHIS coordinator and took over the
responsibilities to sustain the DHIS system in the future.
Result 3: Mobile Medical Units (MMU) are complementing the governmental clinic services in remote areas by conducting medical camps.
• MMUs have medical camps in remote areas at least 2/week/MMU.
The MMU concept was developed to support Government efforts to provide healthcare in
remote areas. Cordaid created 3 MMUs operating in 3 Union Councils, in locations where there
was no healthcare available. The health camps were operated 3 times every week initially but in
Shahpur the services went on to 5 days a week making the facility comparable to a static facility
in terms of healthcare provision. The MMU teams were able to conduct 278 out of the 331
camps planned seeing a total of 42,304 patients since August 2010 to October 2011.
• Medical Teams give 7,000 consultations per month to flood affected people
Cordaid health programme targeted 70, 000 people to utilize the health facilities and mobile
camps and participate in the health awareness sessions. There were 93,566 consultations carried
out in the implementation period (August 2010 to October 2011). Female consultation was
44754 (48 %) Male 48812 (52.17%) and Children < 5 years: 20551 accounting for 22% of the
general consultations of patients seen in the facilities.
Result 4: Communities demonstrate improved/increased awareness on basic health and hygiene.
• 7000 community members have received health education sessions through the health facilities
Facility based health and hygiene sessions were conducted in the morning when patients wait at
the triage area. These sessions were carried out by the medical doctor to each male participant
and by the LHV (Lady Health Visitor) to female participants. In total 501 health education
sessions were conducted, with a total of 10,678 community members reached.
• Students in 10 schools have received health & hygiene sessions.
28 Health and Hygiene sessions were conducted in various schools by a team of community
health promoters employed by Cordaid and those working with CAVISH.
• Health committees are actively involved in the implementation of the basic health & hygiene part
of the project and socially support the health structures in the community.
At the 4 BHU’s community health committees (CHC’s) were established. Thus the Cordaid health
facilities had in place community health committees which met periodically.
• 80% of 7,000 community members / families can give examples of health & hygiene problems
and how to solve or prevent these problems.
A study was conducted in July and August 2011 to assess the knowledge of the people on
hygiene practices. It emerged that 78 % of population knew about the common health problems
and acknowledged that good personal hygiene can prevent diseases like diarrhoea. More than
17
73% of the population understood that “unclean” water can cause diseases. In accessing the
knowledge of the respondents on the causes of diarrhoea, 73.1% gave their answer as unclean
water, 51.3% unsafe food, 33.3% indicated flies as cause of diarrhoea, 63.5% dirty hands, 20.6%
bacteria and 6.4 % did not had any idea of the causes of diarrhoea.
Result 5: Improve the health status of Leishmaniasis affected people in UC Jatkool of District Shangla.
For two consecutive years Leishmaniasis outbreaks had been reported from the same area of
Shangla District. After the Leishmaniasis outbreak that occurred in May 2011, the Cordaid health
team provide curative and preventive intervention in the Jatkool area. In collaboration with
WHO and the district MoH Cordaid sent out a team of a medical doctor and dispenser to the
area. Medicines were provided by WHO. In addition mosquito nets were distributed (2650 in
Jatkol area) as well as hygiene kits and hygiene sessions conducted. To combat the disease a
vector control methodology was used, through spraying insecticide.
Further Observations
The evaluation team had meetings with the PM Health in Islamabad, the PC for Shangla district, the
Senior Medical Officer and the female Gynaecologist of DHQ’s in Alpuri and the District Coordination
Officer (Administration) of Shangla. We visited also one BHU of Shahpur where we interviewed the
medical doctor and had meetings in three villages with groups of men and women.
All senior officials appreciated the Cordaid health programme. They expected that especially the
hardware provided to the DHQ and the BHU’s would have a lasting impact. In particular the
installation of the hydropower station at the DHQ was valued, but also the medical equipment and
furniture provided to the DHQ and the BHU’s. In addition the curative care provided during the
project period was highly appreciated, including the assistance provided during the Leishmaniasis
outbreak. A lasting impact was expected from the establishment of the DHIS. The MoH had recruited
a new coordinator and it was observed in the DHQ as well as in the BHU which we visited that the
data were collected and entered in the database. Regarding the sustainability of the components
related to the capacity building and institutional strengthening of the health services, the answers
were less explicit. Recruitment and motivation of staff and proper support of the health facilities
after the project period were beyond their control.
During our visits to the DHQ and the BHU Shahpur we observed that not all equipment and the extra
facilities provided by Cordaid were fully used. In the DHQ, furniture and teaching equipment for the
midwife school was still stocked awaiting new funding for the start of the school. The equipment of
the delivery room was not used because, as it was revealed, they needed the technical skills and the
required number of staff as well as the required space to make it fully functional. The two extra
shelters constructed at the BHU for a delivery room and as a working place for the LHV were still
empty and the equipment for the delivery room unused. It was explained by the medical that, as
they were not yet connected, there was still no water and electricity available for the new shelters.
The local NGO Cavish was recruited to provide support for community mobilisation and the
establishment of the community health committees (CHC’s). CHC’s were established at the 4 BHU’s
which were included in the health programme. We received a project completion report from Cavish
(January 2010 – July 31st
2011)4. The report contains information on the activities undertaken and
project outputs but not on any achievements at outcome level. We asked the doctor of the BHU
Sharpur on the functioning of the CHC. They should have assisted in organising the (small) works to
be done to connect the shelters to electrical and water supply. All he had to say was “The CHC
4 We had an interview with a representative of Cavish in Islamabad, but he had joined the organisation just two
weeks before, so he couldn’t inform us about the health programme. The Cavish sub-office in Shangla district
was closed after termination of the contract.
18
members come, discuss the problems and go back…”. Based on these observations we have strong
doubts about the achievements regarding the establishment and proper functioning of the CHC’s.
We will discuss the results of the hygiene promotion under the WASH programme. It appeared that
more of the participants in the group meetings in the villages had participated in hygiene sessions
organised by the WASH team, which also conducted these sessions in the 80 villages where they had
rehabilitated the water systems than at the promotions organised at the health facilities.
3.1.3 WASH programme
According to the information we received from the Teshil Municipal Administration (TMA) of Shangla
District, a total of 276 water supply schemes was damaged due to the Flood disaster of July 2010
with damages in the range of 10 – 20% to 40 – 80%. It was estimated that 90% of these schemes got
repaired by different NGO’s. Cordaid repaired in total 80 water schemes.
Availability of clean uncontaminated water was a top priority for the beneficiaries. They used to have
functioning water schemes connected to their houses. After these schemes got damaged women
(and sometimes men) had to fetch water from the river or other far away and sometimes
contaminated sources. In our meetings in the villages water schemes were classified by many of the
participants as priority no. 1 even before shelter. Cordaid provided material and technical support
but the communities organised the actual works by themselves, for which they were paid after they
finished each of the three stages in which the work had been subdivided (catchment and distribution
tanks, main pipeline, the tertiary pipelines). For the work on the tertiary pipelines they were not
paid. The level of participation from the communities involved was qualified as outstanding, which is
also indicative for the importance they gave to the project.
First funding for the WASH project was received from UNICEF (Phase 1: 50 water systems). The
starting date of the project was 27th
of August 2010 with a project duration of three months. Because
of changes in the initial project proposal (among others oriented on emergency water supply which
was not needed) and delays in the project implementation an extension of the project was accorded
until end of February 2011 and later on a second extension was awarded till March 15th
. Actual
implementation of the repair of the water schemes started in October/ November 2010. The second
phase of the programme consisted of the rehabilitation of 30 schemes funded by Cordaid. This phase
was started after Phase 1 was done and was finalized in September 2011.
Programme Effectiveness5
All objectives, in terms of outputs (and activities), as defined in the project proposal have been
achieved, but with delays.
The specific objective of the project was “to ensure access to sufficient clean drinking water and
appropriate sanitation and enable good hygiene practice for people affected by the floods.”
Result 1. 3,000 flood- affected households or 21,000 persons in Shangla have access to sufficient
supply of clean drinking water as per Sphere guidelines and UNICEF core commitments for children.
• 300,000 aqua tabs water purification tablets were distributed and in used by households.
• 80 community water supply systems were repaired and disinfected and operational, providing
clean drinking water to 24,311 flood affected persons (3,473 HH at 7 ppHH).
5 Source: Final Report Emergency to 2010 Monsoon Floods – Shangla KP. Reporting period 01/08/2010 –
31/10/2011
19
Result 2: 6,000 flood- affected households or 42,000 persons in Shangla are reached with appropriate
essential public health messages and sensitized on how to adopt good hygiene practices
• 6,000 hygiene kits and 6,000 jerry cans were distributed, reaching 42,000 people in 5 U/Cs.
• 175 hygiene awareness sessions were held, reaching and sensitizing 10,749 persons (flood
affected) on appropriate essential health and the means to adopt good hygiene practice.
• 34 hygiene awareness sessions were held for 2,252 students in various schools on appropriate
essential health and the means to adopt good hygiene practice.
Further observations.
In the meetings we had in the villages men and women could recall the main messages from the
hygiene promotion. Typical answers on our questions of what they recalled, were: “Keep drinking
water covered”. “Keep your food covered to save it from flies and germs”. “Wash your hands before
eating and after using the toilet”. “We learnt ‘eat less but eat clean”. “Children suffered from
diarrhoea frequently before but now we give boiled water to small children, due to this diarrhoea is
reduced now”
However, it was observed that many washrooms were not clean and there was no water and soap in
it. Many children were seen in unhygienic condition. We conclude that hygiene sessions have been
useful. However, it takes time for the people to change their habits. Changing of the behaviour needs
long term interventions with on-going monitoring and support.
According to the senior engineer of TMA no handing over certificates of the water schemes had been
signed, which officially is required and demands a visit of an TMA engineer to the water system to
inspect the quality of the works. But also other NGO’s had not yet done so. In practice the water
schemes will have to be maintained by the village communities. Considering the importance which
they give to the water availability and their high participation in the rehabilitation works, it might be
expected that they will do so.
The quality of the rehabilitation works of the waters schemes seems to be good. No complaints were
heard from the beneficiaries neither the authorities.
3.1.4 Shelter programme
Also the shelter projects achieved its objectives in terms of outputs to be delivered. But there were
doubts about the timeliness of the intervention. There were great delays in the start-up of the
programme and later on in the execution of the project. Several times the deadline for finalisation of
the project had to be adjusted. Finally the project was completed at the end of November 2011.
The rapid needs assessment done in early August 2010 identified shelter as one of the priority needs.
But no proper follow-up had been given until October when the programme officer for Pakistan from
HQ’s visited the programme. It was decided to use the shelter design of the CRS shelter as the basic
design but to adjust it to provide a more durable solution, i.e. semi-permanent housing. A re-
assessment was done of the shelter needs in the Shangla district by Cavish also taking into
consideration the Union Councils already covered by the shelter project of CRS. On the basis of this
assessment the number of shelters to be constructed was reduced from 1000 to 750. Further delay in
writing the project proposal was due to the long time it took to have a final agreement on the precise
shelter design and the BoQ (Bill of Quantities), which were prepared by the Acting Head of Mission
who was an architect. The project proposal was submitted and approved in November 2010.
The local Shelter project team was recruited in December and they started in January with a more
precise assessment of the beneficiaries in the villages which were included for Phase 1 of the
20
programme. New Project Facilitation Committees (PFC’s) were formed or they made use of the PFC’s
which were already formed by the WASH programme.
Actual construction of new shelters started at the end of March 2011. It was explained that a major
reason for the delay were problems with the suppliers. A first supplier couldn’t satisfy the demand,
after which a second supplier had to be searched for. Problems with suppliers, timely deliveries and
supplies of all components of the shelter packages, were a major reason for delays throughout the
implementation of the programme. Except a decline in the production in the months July and August,
explained by serious problems in the delivery of supplies (July) and on the occasion of Ramadan
(August), the construction of new shelters proceeded at a regular pace. But because of the late start
of the programme, for example at the end of August 2011 only 507 shelters had been constructed
against the target of 750 shelters, the Shelter team had to work under great time pressure all along
the implementation period of the programme.
Figure 1. Data on construction and deliveries of the Shelter programme
During the initial assessment phase of the programme (August – October 2010) there have been
coordination problems with CRS, also implementing a large shelter programme (832 HH’s) in Shangla
district. The Head of Office of CRS in Shangla told us that he was surprised when he heard in October
that Cordaid also planned to construct shelters and that he had opposed it. CRS had already done the
identification of beneficiaries in 9 UC’s and feared duplication. At field level in Shangla the two
organisations were both claiming rights on UC’s for the implementation of their shelter project. It
was solved when the matter was brought at the level of the field offices at national level but the
country director of CRS acknowledged that this was done too late. At national level it was decided
that one of the UC’s (Kuzkana) would be handed over to Cordaid while in the UC Shahpur it would
take the villages where CRS hadn’t yet conducted the registration of beneficiaries. Once this matter
was settled coordination between the two organisations posed no more problems although at field
level a certain animosity could still be felt.
The project staff faced many problems in the selection process of the beneficiaries for the shelter
programme. At first the PFC’s were asked to establish a list of beneficiaries eligible for the
programme. It was found that many of the beneficiaries on those lists were not matching the criteria.
A first check of the lists was done at the field office by the staff, including the social mobilizers who
were recruited from the UC’s. On the basis of their knowledge of the communities a first re-
assessment was done. Approx. 20% of the names on the lists (total: 2532 HH’s) could be removed in
21
this phase because they were clearly not eligible (examples: two brothers from a same family,
families from neighbouring villages, families with minor damages of their houses). Thereafter a
second assessment was done in the villages by the staff of the Shelter team accompanied by
members of the PFC’s. A total of 1995 families from the beneficiaries lists were assessed at this phase
of which 723 HH’s were finally found to be qualified as per the criteria of the programme.
We concluded from the discussions with the project coordinator and the M&E officer of Cordaid that
the assessments process was done thoroughly although it was a time consuming and difficult
process. Meetings were organised in each of the villages to explain once more the criteria. In case of
complaints the project coordinator himself went back to the villages to discuss the matter within the
community. But complaints about the selection procedure continued resulting in letters to the DCO
(District Coordination Officer) which were investigated, two court cases, threats of the local staff and
accusations of bribery which were also investigated and found to be unjustified. In one of our village
meetings a group of persons with complaints and accusations turned up. After the meeting we
visited ourselves the house of one of the persons declaring that he was eligible but had not been
selected, and a house of a family that was accused of paying bribery to get selected. In both cases we
found that the selection criteria had been properly applied.
A main problem in the selection process was the establishment of the beneficiary lists by the PFC’s. It
proved to be very difficult for the members of the PFC’s to withstand social pressure and to exclude
families which were not eligible. Later on in the programme, which was implemented in five phases
each time starting with the assessment process in the new villages, it was decided not to ask
anymore the PFC’s to establish the list of beneficiaries. Instead the process started right away with
the assessment at village level by Cordaid’s project staff assisted by the members of the PFC’s. It was
said this made it easier and reduced the number of complaints. In the interview with the CRS head of
office we found out that they had followed this procedure from the start of their shelter programme,
based on lessons learned from the shelter programme after the earth quake where they faced the
same problems, i.e. village committees who couldn’t withstand social pressure.
Cordaid had classified the potential beneficiaries in two groups, Category A and B.
• Category A criteria were: - a flood/rains affected HH a with fully damaged house owned by
them; - beneficiary used the damaged house as his first home / not as commercial property; -
should be a married person with a normal family structure; widows and widowers with
unmarried sons or daughters qualified also; - he/she did not rebuild their house and was not
covered by another NGO for provision of shelter, - was living with a host family or in a rented
house; - had either own or donated safe and stable piece of land to build shelter.
• Category B criteria covered groups which were considered less urgent: - a flood/rains affected
HH with partially damaged house. HH’s who hadn’t lost their house but were living in unsafe
shelter due to land settlement/weak structures were also eligible; - a flood affected HH who was
already covered by another NGO but the received shelter was not enough for this family
considering its size and social norms (for example if a couple having young or mature kids are
sharing single room or shelter or young brothers and sisters are sharing single room etc.); - a
family who had migrated after floods due to house damages and now wanted to come back; - a
person (married) who had a partially damaged house but was not able to repair it due to certain
reasons, for example widows and disabled persons.
Cordaid started the shelter programme for the Category A beneficiaries but after their needs were
fulfilled included also Category B beneficiaries. The criteria for Category B were less unambiguous
compared to the Category A criteria and therefore the selection process was more at risk to be
contested by non-beneficiaries.
At the end of the programme it became difficult to identify enough beneficiaries eligible in the
original area of operation (4 UC’s). In order to solve this and in order to construct all 750 shelters and
latrines, as initially planned, Cordaid increased the geographical area by including one more UC
22
(Damorai) that was affected by the floods and where CRS had already built transitional shelter. Here
134 houses were built in the last phase of the programme (many of them Category B beneficiaries) In
addition 23 shelters were built at the premises of schools to be used as additional class rooms and 4
shelters were built at BHU’s to expand their facilities instead of building more shelters for HH’s.
There were doubts among the project staff about the relevance of the programme as an emergency
response especially in its later phases. Many of the beneficiaries especially the less vulnerable, also
those belonging to the Category A, managed quite well having found shelter either by renting or
staying in a relative’s house. Through inclusion of Category B beneficiaries many social cases could be
assisted but the real urgent cases were already assisted6. Apparently the needs assessment had
overestimated the needs (the figure shifted from 1200 HH’s in August 2010 to 1000 HH’s and later
750 HH’s in October) or had not taken sufficiently into account the shelter programme of CRS. It was
said that also the late implementation of the programme had implications. The urgency right after
the floods was not felt anymore and people began to play a game just to benefit of free hand-outs.
In the village meetings, on the question whether the beneficiaries preferred the shelters of good
quality as built by Cordaid or would have preferred lower quality houses as built by other agencies
but built in time (before, during or just after the winter), the answer was that they choose for the
houses of Cordaid although they were built late. But in a CRS settlement occupied by beneficiaries
which all came from a village (130 houses, mosque, school) that was completely washed away, the
beneficiaries choose for the CRS houses. They were delivered in time when they lived in dire
conditions in overcrowded houses of host families or even under plastic sheets in the mountains.
We conclude that the programme was relevant but the response should have been timelier and the
number of shelters should have been smaller. In the end the target of 750 shelters became an
overriding goal casting doubts on the relevance of the programme in its later phases7. The decision to
substitute some shelters for the extension of schools and BHU’s was certainly a right one.
The houses were of good quality, well insulated, and the beneficiaries were mostly extremely happy
with them. But critical remarks were made regarding the appropriateness of the shelter especially
among the women. All the women interviewed highly appreciated Cordaid’s shelters. It was a
primary need as their houses were destroyed by the flood. The women said that the shelters were
strong and also big enough to accommodate a small sized family. However the shelter did not include
a kitchen and the women were in a dire need of it. Also, the latrine is not attached with the shelter
which raised the question of protection and privacy for them.
“The shelter does not provide “aman” (privacy and security), latrines are not attached and
we feel exposed” . “There is no separate kitchen with the shelter, I cook in the shelter”
Conclusion: The quality of the shelter is good but the design of the shelter has to be culturally
appropriate to ensure safety and privacy for women. Also, there should be provision of a kitchen
with the shelter to facilitate women8.
Programme effectiveness9
All objectives, in terms of outputs, as defined in the project proposal have been achieved, but with
major delays.
6 The project coordinator estimated that 40% of all beneficiaries belonged to Category B and 60% to Category A
7 The materials for the last 700 shelters had also been ordered all in once. This restrained the flexibility of the
project for an adjustment of the output targets as it required renegotiation of the contract with the supplier. 8 There have been discussions on the construction of a kitchen and of the latrine directly adjacent to the
shelter. Construction of the kitchen was rejected for budgetary reasons, and of the latrine for sanitary reasons. 9 Final report Pakistan, Shelter & WASH Rehabilitation Shangla (2010 floods). Reporting period 01/08/2010 –
30/11/2011
23
Specific objective: 750 Disaster-Affected Households in Shangla District live in appropriate semi-
permanent shelters and use latrines.
Result 1&2: 750 households have constructed semi-permanent shelters and household latrines
• 723 semi-permanent shelters with proper insulation are constructed.
• 723 latrines have been constructed alongside shelters. A Post Occupation Evaluation was
conducted by the M&E section in October / November 2011 among 83 beneficiaries. Results
show that, while 43% of the beneficiaries didn’t have a latrine before, by now 90% of them
say that they use the latrines.
• 23 classrooms have been constructed on school premises in flood-affected villages
• 4 rooms for different functions (waiting room, delivery room, OPD treatment room) have
been constructed on BHU premises in flood-affected villages
Result 3: Beneficiaries, skilled and unskilled construction, masonry and carpentry workers have
increased capacity to construct semi-permanent houses and community PFCs are actively involved in
the implementation of the project.
• 236 skilled and unskilled workers have received vocational training in construction masonry
and carpentry. They were able to construct semi-permanent shelters and identify critical
points in construction
• 66 PFCs were involved in the facilitation of the shelter construction project, particularly
through the assessment process of beneficiaries, the monitoring of progress and the
containment of conflict
3.2 Cordaid’s shelter programme in Kohat
Because of the tight time schedule the evaluation team couldn’t visit Kohat district. So, we depend
for our assessment of the programme on the information collected in the interviews with the senior
programme and administrative staff of Cordaid Islamabad, the PM for Kohat - who had joined the
programme in August 2011 - , and the meeting we had with local staff of the Shelter team of Kohat.
Cordaid also implemented a Health and a WASH project for IDP’s in Kohat district alongside the
Shelter programme. The first project was not included in our assessment as they were not part of
the Flood Response Programme.
As funding was not fully utilised in the Health and Wash programmes in Shangla, it was decided at
the end of 2010 to propose also a shelter programme in Kohat. In August 2010, Cavish had already
done a rapid assessment in Kohat; the region was then qualified as mildly affected by the floods. In
December/January a reassessment was done by Cavish and local Cordaid staff. Two more UC’s were
included in the programme as the re-assessment showed that the project budget would not be
completely utilized in the three UC’s which were initially selected. The results of the detailed
assessment in the 5 UC’s indicated that 77 houses were damaged beyond economical repair, 115
houses needed major repairs and 15 houses minor repairs. In the final proposal, submitted in January
2011, construction of 60 new shelters and repair of 110 houses with major damage and 15 houses
with minor damage was planned.
A senior engineer was recruited end of December 2010 and a project officer end of January 2011.
However, the project experienced major delays with as a result that the construction works didn’t
start until August 2011. A major effort has been made since then resulting in completion of the
project in November 2011.
Reasons for the long delays were among others:
• End of January the project started up. Repairs of the houses required individual designs and
calculations of the materials needed for each house, what took two months.
24
• In April, there were serious problems with one of the social mobilizers who threatened the other
staff, set some of its local comrades up against Cordaid and accused Cordaid in a local
newspaper. He was one of the first staff members recruited by the project and, belonging to an
influential family, felt passed by when the junior engineer got the position of project officer. It
was said that these tensions caused major delays throughout April and May.
• In June, the tender for material supplies for the 60 new houses had to be renegotiated since a
delivery schedule has not been appended to the contract.
• The new houses had to be constructed on safe locations in view of the risks of future floods. The
beneficiaries had to obtain new land and legal documentation. In July, it appeared that proof of
land ownership had stalled.
• In July, the tender for the 125 houses to be rehabilitated was in process. First building materials
were delivered in August.
Kohat as well as Shangla had UN security level 4. It means that UN staff was not allowed to go into
these regions. INGO’s often make their own decisions based on their assessment and knowledge of
the local situation. The government didn’t give a permit, an NOC (Non Objection Certificate), allowing
international staff to stay overnight in Kohat District. Day trips were allowed but no field visits. In
Shangla district permission was given to stay overnight in Besham, where the shelter/WASH team
had its office. Thus both in Shangla and Kohat, expatriate staff could not be stationed on location.
Monitoring of the projects was done through regular (weekly / biweekly) visits to the districts. But
while in Shangla expatriate staff could stay overnight, in Kohat the expat staff had to return on the
same day to Islamabad and could not visit the field. It means that the expat staff could spend at
maximum 4 hours at location and only at the field office.
Such conditions require good project management, a very competent team of local staff and proper
monitoring tools adapted for ‘remote monitoring’. It appears that the local project manager was not
strong enough to properly guide the programme, to solve problems and to manage his team. Also
the monitoring system –required was micro management by the PM (expat), proper tracking sheets
etc. to be able to control the process – appeared to have major defaults. The last PM, employed in
August, installed a GPS system with cameras on the building sites to be able to check the progress of
the works. And he had the good fortune that the former M&E officer resigned in August and he could
recruit a new one who performed very well and really controlled the works.
The Head of Programmes and the PM for Kohat, both employed since August 2011, of Cordaid had
major doubts about the relevance of the shelter project. Especially the repairs on the houses were
considered as beyond what was normally done in an emergency response programme10
.
All construction and rehabilitation works, i.e. 60 new shelters and repair of 110 houses with major
damage and 15 houses with minor damage, were completed at the end of November 2011.
3.3 CRS Programme Sindh
CRS has worked in Pakistan for more than 50 years in development and disaster response
programmes. It responded in 2009 to the IDP crisis in Swat Valley, to the October 2008 earthquake in
Ziarat (Baluchistan), the July 2007 Flood Response in Turbat (Baluchistan), the October 2005
earthquake in KPK and AJK. It has a well established country office in Islamabad and can draw on
human resources and expertise from its regional office in Asia. Lessons learned from previous
working experiences in Pakistan (and worldwide) can be incorporated in new emergency response
programmes and local staff working elsewhere in Pakistan for CRS could be transferred to Sindh.
10
HQ’s also raised doubts, in April / May 2011, whether the shelter project should still be executed because of
its late start. But at that time the Field Office insisted on its realisation.
25
It was found that the programme in Sind was very well structured, from the early phase of the needs
assessments and programme design to the actual phase of programme implementation. Four needs
assessments were conducted, a rapid assessment of nearby areas of Sindh in mid-August, a rapid
assessment of Jacobabad in late September, a WASH assessment in Jacobabad in October, and a
seed assessment in Sindh in September. The assessments were conducted by experts from the
regional and national offices in collaboration with the local staff of CRS in Sindh and its partner
organisations. The needs assessments were of good quality looking for appropriate solutions and
programme design adapted to the situation and cultural context.
The project interventions of CRS were timely done. In the two villages we visited people returned to
their villages in October / November. Immediate repairs of the damaged hand pumps had been done.
NFI’s distributions took place from November in conjunction with the distribution of shelter
materials. In both villages the beneficiaries had received seeds (cash & voucher) for the Rabi season
which had been distributed in time. They had received transitional shelter (not funded by Cordaid) in
January/February respectively February/March. The last phase of the programme consisted of the
construction of new water systems executed in June/July. Rehabilitation of the irrigation
infrastructure (cash for work) was done in June, just in time for the Kharif season.
The local senior staff we met at the sub-office in Jacobabad District had all previous experience in
disaster response programmes of CRS. For example the Program Manager Agri/Livelihoods had
worked in voucher and grant programmes implemented by CRS in response to the IDP crisis in Swat
Valley in 2009 and 2010. The Programme Managers WASH (expat) and Shelter had worked before for
CRS disaster response programmes respectively in Sudan and elsewhere in Pakistan.
CRS implemented the programmes in collaboration with three local partner organisations, namely
GSF (livelihood, WASH), RDF (livelihood, shelter) and YAP (shelter, WASH). For their partnership an
on the job-training model has been developed. For all programme components (shelter, WASH,
livelihood) 65 – 70% of the total staff was employed by the partners and 30 – 35% was employed by
CRS. CRS provided the project officers/project managers and the partners recruited the field officers.
The staff of the partner organisations received short trainings on M&E and a project orientation
training. During the implementation phase each week started with a planning session for the field
activities. Initially the CRS project officer and the field officers of the partner organisations went
together into the field until the field staff could be entrusted to work more independently. CRS
Programme Managers visited the offices of the partner organisation almost daily to coordinate and
exchange experiences and information. The partner organisations which we met (GSF in Sindh; ROAD
in Shangla) appreciated the approach. They missed the experience in emergency response
programmes and didn’t have the capacity to implement programmes on this scale. It was a good
learning experience and they felt that they had strengthened their capacity to implement in future
such type of programmes by themselves.
CRS Pakistan developed this partnership approach recently. In development programmes CRS
normally mostly works with local partner organisations as implementing partners. But after the
earthquake of 2005 CRS didn’t have the time to select partners and implemented the projects itself.
Thereafter it was decided that also in emergencies CRS should try to develop the capacity of
partners. Since partners lack the technical expertise neither have the capacity to implement large
scale emergency response programmes this particular approach was developed. Gradually
responsibility is handed over to the partners. For institutional strengthening of the organisations in
Sindh the partners also received trainings in M&E, human resources and financial management. The
CRS coordinator for partnerships in Islamabad said that the partners also receive training in strategic
planning. CRS aims at developing strategic partnerships with the partners. GSF in Sindh will continue
the partnership with CRS in the next phase of the programme.
CRS followed an integrated approach to ensure the programme had a real impact and the victims of
the flood were properly assisted enabling them to recover from the floods. They were assisted with
26
NFI’s, shelter, water and the cash & voucher agricultural programme. We also concluded that the
assistance had a large impact in the villages covered by the programme but at the same time one can
observe neighbouring villages which have received little assistance. According to the DOC of
Jacobabad approx. 40% of the flood victims hadn’t received yet any adequate shelter assistance. This
can create resentment and conflicts. According to the country director of CRS it had also been
decided therefore reason after the floods of 2011 (Sindh) that CRS would spread out its assistance
over a larger area instead of concentrating on fewer villages. Also the cash & voucher programme
provided for seeds and inputs only for 1 – 2 acre while an average famer cultivated 7 -1 2 acres, thus
assuring a larger coverage.
The villagers whom we met prioritised the construction of the new water systems as the intervention
that they had appreciated most. Next to water, shelter and the cash & voucher system were
appreciated almost equally. Also all beneficiary women much appreciated the water schemes. It has
made their lives easier. The supply of clean drinking water to the door steps has reduced their work
burden. Also, the quality of the water is considered to be good. That may result in reducing the water
born diseases. As the women said:
“We used to carry water from faraway places. We get exhausted and our heads had wounds
for carrying water persistently. We thank you for the gift”. “There is one hand-pump for eight
households; the water is enough for us”. “Before this water, we had many skin diseases but
no itchy skin now”.
CRS has spent a considerable amount of time on community hygiene session –five weeks per village.
All the women (and men) in focus group discussions recalled the hygiene sessions as follows:
“Keep drinking water covered”. “Wash hands with soap after using toilet”. “Keep animal
shelters clean”. “Clean your teeth with dentonic or neem miswalk (the twig of neem tree)”.
“Now diarrhoea and malaria have reduced because of cleanliness”
Hygiene practices such as use of soap, clean surroundings and tidy shelters were observed in the
village that had received a new water system and thus also benefited of the five weeks hygiene
promotion sessions, in contrast to a next village that we visited where the people had not benefited
of hygiene sessions (only emergency repair of hand pumps had been done). We conclude that
hygiene promotion sessions combined with the supply of clean drinking water has made a significant
difference in promoting the good hygiene practices among some of the beneficiary communities.
Programme effectiveness11
Objective 1: Targeted families have access to non-food items to meet their immediate hygiene and
shelter needs.
• 2650 NFI / hygiene kits containing a plastic woven sleeping mat, plastic bucket, mosquito net,
bamboo for the mosquito net, a jerry can, cotton cloth, towel, nail clipper, lota12
, polyester
rope, body soap, and laundry soap were distributed.
• At each of the 78 distribution sites, NFI/Shelter staff conducted trainings with beneficiaries to
teach them how to properly use the items they received in their kits.
Objective 2: Flood-affected households have sufficient quantities of clean water to meet their
essential household needs.
• With Cordaid funding, CRS reached 27 villages in two Union Councils in District Jacobabad
with water supply scheme interventions, including boreholes, new hand pumps, new
pipelines, and water storage tanks/reservoirs
• 382 hygiene promotion sessions for men and women, on use of clean water, safe excreta
disposal and hand washing. The sessions took place over a period of five weeks per village.
11
Source: CRS Final report to Cordaid. 12
Used for personal sanitation.
27
Objective 3: Flood-affected farming households have resumed farming.
• In the Rabi season, 259 beneficiaries received vouchers to be redeemed for wheat seed,
fertilizer and vegetable seed, with a total value of 176 USD. In addition they received a cash
grant of 50 USD for the cultivation costs of tractor rental.
• In the Kharif season, 3492 beneficiaries were assisted. Four commodity packages were
offered out of which the beneficiaries could choose. The packages cost were on of average of
213 USD. The amount of the cash grant was increased to 95 USD in anticipation of the needs
for fuel for pumping water from the tube wells as the primary crop for Kharif season is rice.
• In addition a cash-for-work program was started to rehabilitate irrigation schemes (45) and
one link road. 46 CfW schemes were completed, taking on average 5-8 days, in which 1033
individuals were hired.
Objective 4: Flood-affected households live in locally-appropriate shelters that provide the basis for
disaster recovery.
• The project provided 10,000 plastic sheets, which made possible the construction of 2,500
transitional shelters, using 4 sheets per shelter.
3.4 CRS Latrines project in Shangla, Kohistan, Swat districts.
CRS started its shelter/latrine project in early October 2010 with the construction of a demonstration
shelter, in the presence of the regional advisor for shelter. He assisted the Shelter team in the final
design. Construction of the shelters/ latrines started in November prioritising first the HH’s whose
houses and land had been completely washed away. By January 2011, materials for 1,514 latrines
and bathing spaces had been distributed. By this time, 995 households had built their shelter and
latrine, 43% of the final project target of 2300. End of March 2011 all shelters / latrines had been
constructed in Shangla district while the entire project was completed at the end of June 2011.
Latrines/ bath space have been built directly adjoined with the shelters. The women were happy
about the provision of the latrines adjacent to the shelter as it ensured their safety and privacy.
Running water was available in the latrines.
CRS has sensitized male beneficiaries on the importance of hygiene in a short session at the
distribution site of the shelter materials when they came there to collect these. The men were
instructed to educate their wives and families to ensure the family hygiene. In the village that we
visited this seemed to have worked quite well as was evident from the cleanliness of the shelters and
the latrines. The men said they had passed the information to their wives.
CRS worked with local partners ISWDO (Indus Social Welfare Organization) based in Kohistan, ROAD
(Rural Organization for Awareness and Development) based in Shangla, and LASOONA based in Swat.
With ROAD the same system of on the job training was practiced as explained above for CRS-Sind.
Also they were satisfied with this approach. ROAD will continue to work with CRS in an agricultural
livelihood programme. ISWDO had already worked before with CRS in Kohistan. Their staff was
working more independently for the implementation of the shelter programme.
3.5 ODP & TWO Programme
ODP and TWO are partner organisations of ‘Mensen met een Missie’ one of the constitutional
member organisations of Cordaid. Immediately after the floods they collected funds and goods, food
items and clothes, to assist the flood victims although at a modest scale. TWO organized also medical
camps in two districts. To raise funding they contacted their donor organisations such as ‘Mensen
28
met een Missie’. The last one referred them to Cordaid. In first instance there were requests from six
local partner organisations. Cordaid asked them to prepare a joint proposal as it would be too
complicated to deal with several small proposals and organisations. Four of the partners got
excluded because, as ODP said, they didn’t have sufficient experience or were not from the area
directly affected by the floods, thus lacking a proper network and knowledge of the area.
The first proposal of the consortium of ODP & TWO was submitted at the end of August / early
September. Discussions went on with Cordaid HQ’s for further clarifications. The contract between
Cordaid and the consortium was finally signed in the second half of October. Re-assessment of the
needs and registration of the beneficiaries was done after signing of the contract. The distributions of
NFI’s, food packages and tents took place from Nov. 15th
till Dec. 17th
by ODP and Nov. 23rd
till Dec.
27th
by TWO. Four medical camps were organised by TWO between Dec. 12th
and Jan. 7th
. Part of the
project was implemented by ODP through local NGO’s which were active in the different districts,
knew the social context well and had their local staff or volunteers working in the area. These local
NGO’s were only paid for their transport costs. They received one day training before the project
started on assessment and distribution methods conducted by ODP. ODP monitored their activities.
We visited two villages that were assisted by ODP, through their partners, and met with
representatives of another village in the office of ODP. Due to our limited time we couldn’t visit the
field with TWO, but had a meeting with some of their staff members in the ODP office.
The distribution of NFI’s by ODP had been a blanket distribution. The distribution of the tents also,
but because of the small number of tents available they were distributed per extended family. Each
family, often consisting of several HH’s, received one tent except those families whose houses were
not destroyed. In the villages that we visited only (few) brick houses were not washed away.
The distributions seemed well organised. Village committees were established including women.
Each family received before the distribution a token and it was reported that the distributions
proceeded in an orderly way. The beneficiaries stressed that the distributions were fairly done. Each
HH entitled for the assistance had received it. Both TWO and ODP encouraged the women to collect
the relief items personally, also to ensure that widows and female headed households got the
support directly. As a result, many women came to the public places and distributions points, got an
opportunity to interact with diverse people and had access to information.
The beneficiaries said that the provision of the tents came at an appropriate time when they had
recently returned to their villages and most people hadn’t rebuilt their houses yet. At our visit some
of the tents were still used as many families hadn’t reconstructed their houses completely, i.e. the
number of rooms was still too small to accommodate all family members. We had some doubts
about the timeliness (and consequently the relevance) of the provision of food packages. In two
villages the beneficiaries said that they hadn’t received any assistance from any other organisation
after their return, but one village had received food rations from WFP during a nine month period
starting from December / January.
ODP and particularly TWO seem to be well established organisations working in the fields of human
(women) rights and peace building. Also the local NGO’s that implemented a (large) part of the
programme for ODP seemed well organised. But they had little (ODP) or no experience in emergency
response programmes. Apparently this was one of the reasons that the assessment of the project
proposal by Cordaid HO’s took such long time. Local NGO’s have a comparative advantage at the
early phases of an emergency when the international organisations haven’t arrived yet, or to reach
isolated locations that are not assisted by the international agencies. At the moment that the project
could finally be implemented (Nov. /Dec.) other organisations, such as WFP, had already arrived;
duplication of assistance became a risk. Due to the large scale of the disaster and the limited
response capacity of the national government and international agencies, apparently the assistance
of ODP and TWO could still fill gaps, i.e. assist villages that were not served by other organisations.
Their assistance was still relevant.
29
TWO hired a local consultant with expertise in emergency response programmes who assisted them
in all phases of the programme - the project design, writing of the proposal, orientation training to
the staff for the assessment process and organisation of the distribution, monitoring of the
distribution. Cordaid didn’t provide technical support to the partners. The M&E officer of Cordaid
visited ODP & TWO in mid-October, but apparently this had more the character of a field visit. The
financial administrator of Cordaid visited ODP in early November, mainly to explain Cordaid’s
financial reporting system.
ODP received also emergency response funding from Misereor-Germany (Sept. – Nov. 2010 and
Febr. – March 2011) and Norwegian Church Aid (Febr. – March 2011). TWO received assistance from
Diakonie Katastrophinhilfe (DKH). DKH provided training to TWO on the Code of Conduct, the
distribution chain, project writing and disaster risk reduction. For a second phase, distribution of
agricultural inputs, the project coordinator of DKH was a member of the procurement committee; he
assisted in meetings with vendors and was present at distributions. At that moment DKH had
established an office in Punjab (Multan).
To facilitate the administrative work for Cordaid the partners were asked to submit a joint project
proposal and to work as a consortium, in which ODP would be the lead agency, i.e. the direct contact
for Cordaid HQ’s and responsible for reporting. ODP was still in favour of this arrangement, saying
that they did provide necessary support to TWO for revisions of the project proposal and through
monitoring of their operations. TWO reported that the arrangement was burdensome and
characterised by misleading instructions, lack of communication and unnecessary extra exercises
instructed by the lead organization.
Programme effectiveness13
Overall objective: To launch an emergency response intervention for the relief and early recovery of
2500 flood affected families of 6 districts in Southern Punjab by providing them food ration, essential
kitchen item, hygiene kits, emergency health assistance and tents.
• 300 beneficiaries received tents and 700 beneficiaries received two monthly rations of food
packages containing wheat flour, daal chana, sugar, salt, rice and tea (ODP).
• 1500 beneficiaries received a food package, NFIs and Health Hygiene kits (TWO).
• 4 medical camps were organised where 2430 patients were received (TWO).
P
Photo 3: Tents distributed by ODP
Photo 4: Women waiting for distribution of
relief items
13
Source: Project Completion Report. November 2010 – January 2011. Flood relief in flood struck areas in
Punjab.
30
4 Overall Assessment of the Programme
4.1 Cordaid’s performance.
4.1.1 As Implementing Agency
The multi-sector emergency response programme in Shangla district and the shelter programme in
Kohat were completed at the end of November 2011. All output targets were achieved. But
especially the shelter projects experienced considerable delays requiring several times an extension
of the project. With additional funding received from Caritas Germany the related extra staff
expenditures could be covered.
Relevance
The response of the health team in Shangla district immediately after the heavy rains at the end of
July 2010 - resulting in floods, landslides and damage due to the rains - was highly appreciated. It
was a timely response and responding to the immediate urgent needs for medical assistance. The
health team could respond timely due to their presence in the district with a team of medical staff
and mobile medical units (MMU). Also the distribution of NFI’s, together with the local partner
Cavish, responded to an urgent need of the victims of the disaster.
Infrastructure (roads, bridges, school and health facilities) were heavily damaged, as well as houses
and water systems. Cordaid decided to concentrate on rehabilitation of shelter and water systems as
well as to expand its existing health programme for IDP’s. Rehabilitation of water systems was found
to be a top priority for the beneficiaries. They used to have operating systems with water delivery
points into their houses. Due to the damages after the floods they were forced to fetch water from
faraway and probably contaminated sources. Shelter needs were also a top priority but apparently
the needs, in terms of number of houses needed to assist the urgent cases, were overestimated.
This resulted in the last phases of the shelter programme in selection of beneficiaries whose living
conditions, although they were vulnerable or living in poor housing conditions, were not easily
distinguishable from the conditions of others.
The health programme could ensure proper medical assistance (coverage, medicine supplies,
consultations) during the project period and strengthened the capacity of the health services in the
district (provision of furniture & equipment and hydro power station at DHQ, trainings,
establishment of DHI system) and certainly responded to needs. However it can be classified rather
as a development oriented programme, since the causes of a weak and poorly performing health
infrastructure are of a structural nature, than as an emergency or early recovery response, except in
the first few months after the disaster. Also the rehabilitation of health facilities damaged due to the
heavy rains or the floods was relevant as an emergency response activity.
There were major doubts about the relevance of the shelter programme in Kohat, especially
regarding the repairs on the houses with major or minor damages which were considered as beyond
what was normally done in an emergency response.
Appropriateness
The houses in Shangla district are of good quality, well insulated and thus well adapted to the
climatic conditions in winter and summer. Also their quality guarantees that they can last for at least
5 – 10 years. But the design of the houses and the positioning of the latrines were considered less
appropriate. Construction of the latrines not directly adjacent to the houses doesn’t ensure safety
and privacy for women. Also, it was said that there should have been provision of a kitchen.
31
Effectiveness
As already mentioned before all output targets have been achieved, but with considerable delays.
The programme duration had to be extended several times. The actual shelter construction works in
Kohat were launched in August 2011. The first shelters in Shangla were erected at the end of March
2011, while in early August still some 150 shelters had to be constructed. This has put great stress on
the shelter teams to complete all houses.
In August 2010, Cordaid had defined an intervention strategy based on an early emergency response
such as the provision of emergency shelter, provision of WASH services to temporary settlement
areas, i.e. camps, provide affected households with water purification tablets, jerry cans etc.
However, when it became clear that most affected families found refuge with host families or could
rent temporary housing, the programme strategy shifted towards early recovery interventions, i.e.
provision of semi-permanent shelter and rehabilitation of water systems. The existing health
programme for IDP’s was expanded.
• Cordaid had received early funding from UNICEF for its WASH programme, also initially for an
early emergency response but it could be renegotiated and the emphasis shifted to the
rehabilitation of water schemes (50). This programme could be started in October/
November 2010 and was completed in March 2011. Thereafter an additional 30 schemes
were rehabilitated with funding from Cordaid, which were completed in September 2011.
• There were major delays in the implementation of the shelter programmes. Main reasons for
the delays in the in Shangla were the late start-up and problems with procurement and
supply of materials during project implementation. The decision to start-up a shelter
programme in Kohat was taken in December 2010 when it appeared that funding of the
WASH and Health programmes would be underutilised. In Kohat, besides procurement and
supply problems also problems with land property rights for the new shelters and weak
programme management at field level explain delays.
The first shelters in Shangla were completed at end of March 2011 and the last ones in
November 2011. This was not a timely response for the beneficiaries who were living in dire
housing conditions after the floods, either in overcrowded houses of host families or in very
poor temporary shelters.
• The activities of the health programme were implemented according to plans and the
targeted outputs have been achieved.
Programme management
In August 2010 when the floods occurred the senior expat staff of Cordaid consisted of a programme
coordinator / head of mission, an administrator / head admin. finance, and a programme manager
for the health programme in Shangla. In September a new administrator was appointed and the
expat staff got strengthened with the recruitment of a logistics manager, an M&E officer and a
consultant WASH responsible for the start-up of the health /WASH programme in Kohat. But the
contract of the programme coordinator/ head of mission ended in October.
At Cordaid HQ’s the recruitment process had started in time for a new programme coordinator; it
was planned that there would be a hand-over with the departing programme coordinator. But finally
no suitable candidate could be found or no agreement could be reached on the financial conditions.
Therefore the health programme manager was asked to act as programme coordinator. Apparently
he was overburdened and didn’t have the experience required to upscale the programme. Finally an
ad-interim programme coordinator was recruited in December 2010.
Besides the late recruitment of the Programme Coordinator there has also been a great turn-over of
most of the expat-positions. Because no head of mission / programme coordinator could be found
for a permanent position, the post was held by two experts changing positions for periods of
respectively 2 months and 4 months. The positions of Logistics Manager, Shelters-WASH Manager
32
and Kohat Manager were held by three different persons during the programme implementation
period of 16 months. The position of M&E officer was held by two persons in the period Sept. 2010 –
April 2011. After April there was no replacement because of problems with the visa application for
the person recruited for this post was. It was said that all these personnel changes had a negative
effect on the continuity of programme’s management.
There was a kind of a vacuum in the programme’s management in the period September – October
2010. The programme staff in Cordaid’s field office in Islamabad didn’t succeed to give a proper
follow-up to the new programme strategy as defined at the end of August 2010. Only after the visit
of the project coordinator for Pakistan at HQ’s in mid-October, programme preparations got again on
track. A new adjusted project proposal was written for the WASH programme funded by UNICEF.
Coordination meetings took place with CRS for the shelter programme in Shangla and first steps were
made for the shelter and programme design. Consultations for the definite shelter design between
HQ and field office took however still weeks. The project proposal was submitted and approved in
November /December.
Further delays in programme implementation apparently were related especially to problems with
procurement and suppliers. Programme staff also accused the dual management structure adopted
by Cordaid as one of the causes for the delay. The administrative/financial department reported
directly to its counterpart at HQ’s, not to the Programme Coordinator / Head of Mission. The logistics
department fell under the responsibility of the administrative department. Tenders and the
procurement process took too long and the programme staff had no control over it. In January 2011,
it was approved that the logistics department would report directly to the Programme Coordinator.
According to the programme staff hereafter the procurement process could be accelerated; the
Administrator doubted that it had such results; tender procedures had still to be followed as before
and it is inherent to the process that this takes time.
Complaints were also heard about the approval process for expenditures. Expenditures were not
approved by the Finance department after they had done a budget check, but these decisions were
not well communicated to the programme staff (PM’s). The Finance department also decided
sometimes to block a purchase even when the order had been signed by the PM, the HoM and the
Administrator, thus causing delays for the execution of the programme. The local project team of
the shelter programme in Shangla was described by all persons we met as very competent; we came
to the same conclusion. On the contrary the quality of local project management in Kohat was
defined as weak, especially the project manager. Because of the security conditions – Shangla and
Kohat district were both classified by the UN at security level 4 – expatriate staff could not be
stationed in the district. To manage the programme they depended on short weekly / biweekly visits.
In Kohat the programme manager returned on the same day, leaving some 4 hours to meet with his
staff, and was not allowed to visit the field. In such conditions one depends very much on the quality
and trust in the staff. Apparently recruitment of local staff in Kohat had shortcomings. The H.R.
manager of Cordaid explained us that in the recruitment process one interview was held with the
candidates. He thought that an additional behavioural assessment of the finally selected candidates
should be part of the procedure. The local field staff of Kohat recommended that the whole project
team should be recruited at the same time, starting with the selection of a project manager, before
the start-up of the programme as had also been done in the shelter project in Shangla. In Kohat, the
social mobiliser had been recruited and started his activities - he participated in the needs
assessment study and the selection of beneficiaries – before the other project staff had been
recruited. When he was not appointed as project coordinator as he expected, he created problems
for the other staff members and Cordaid and finally resigned.
It was also said that management by ‘remote monitoring’, as was the practice in Kohat, required an
appropriate monitoring system and tools (tracking sheets etc. ), which was not in place when the last
33
PM for Kohat arrived. Also new technology was used; the last PM installed a GPS system with
cameras on the building sites to be able to check the progress of the works14
.
There have been major problems (conflicts) with the selection of beneficiaries in the shelter
programme in Shangla. Reasons for it have been discussed in par. 3.1.4. The selection process was
done by teams of an engineer and a social mobilizer. The social mobilizers received trainings before
starting their job. But later on there was no supervision of their performance, i.e. especially their
process facilitation skills. Recruitment of a senior social mobiliser to supervise their work and give
feedback on their performance, is recommended.
Needs assessments
A rapid assessment was done in early August 2010 and re-assessments were done for the shelter
programmes in Shangla and Kohat, respectively in Oct. /Nov. 2010 and January 2011, conducted by
the local partner Cavish and local staff of Cordaid. But no in-depth needs assessment was done as a
follow-up of the rapid needs assessment. Coordination with other NGO’s (CRS Shangla), partnership
with local NGO’s, needs of vulnerable groups (livelihoods), the objectives of an emergency response
health programme are some of the issues that were not adequately addressed. Through a systematic
needs assessment such issues could have been identified.
We also have doubts about the quality of the re-assessments done for the shelter programme. The
Shangla needs assessment consisted of a large survey. A smaller sample and a less detailed
questionnaire would have served the purpose to collect the data necessary for an appropriate
project and shelter design. Later on it appeared that the needs for new shelter were not well
assessed, which was also the case for the Kohat shelter project.
Coordination
Cordaid participated in the cluster meetings for Health, WASH and Shelter at national (Islamabad)
and provincial (Peshawar) level. In Shangla district it participated also in the coordination meetings
that were headed by the DCO. Cordaid participated as well in the meetings of the Pakistan
Humanitarian Forum of NGO’s and in the meetings of the Caritas International network. However, it
was observed that at the start of the programme coordination at field level (Shangla, shelter) was
lacking; competition and claiming of rights on intervention areas seemed overriding concerns.
Although at first the CRS office in Shangla was opposed to the shelter programme of Cordaid fearing
duplication, the intervention was later welcomed - after an agreement was reached on the regional
division of the programmes - because CRS didn’t have the capacity to cover all shelter needs.
Sustainability
The shelters in Shangla district were of good quality. It was expected they could sustain for at least 5
– 10 years. The gravity water systems don’t require too much maintenance, except at source level,
and seem to be of good quality. It is expected that the large participation of the beneficiaries in the
rehabilitation works will result in a feeling of ownership. The communities themselves will have to
maintain the systems.
It was assessed that in the programme design of the health programme sustainability of the
programme had not been taken into consideration sufficiently. The programme succeeded in
assuring proper medical care in its intervention area during the project period. But the causes for the
weak performance of the health structures are structural in nature and they couldn’t be resolved in
14 The possibilities to make use of a GPS system were explored early in 2011 but disregarded because its use was prohibited. Only in Sep/Oct 2011 a calculated risk was taken because GPS cameras were found on the local market. But there was always a danger of these GPS cameras causing a security problem with the government.
34
the one year project duration period. Fortunately, a new exit strategy could be defined due to the
readiness of Maltheser International to continue the project, initially for 9 months but they expect to
be able to obtain longer term funding (2 – 3 years)
4.1.2 As Funding Agency
Cordaid funded the programmes of two different types of partners, CRS which is a very experienced
INGO and two local NGO’s ODP and TWO that had little or no experience in emergency response.
Cordaid could rely on the quality of the project designs and project implementation of CRS. CRS had
no critical remarks regarding Cordaid as a funding agency. Approval of the project proposal and
transfer of funding was done in time and the reporting requirements were not exaggerated.
On the contrary the final approval of the project proposal of ODP&TWO took considerable time,
because of the request of Cordaid to submit a joint proposal, to work together in a consortium, and
the long process of revisions of the project proposal. In the meantime the local partners had lost
their comparative advantage, i.e. being able to react quickly at the early phases of an emergency. A
quick response on the part of the funding agency is difficult to reconcile with the demand for
procedures and formats assuring accountability. A quick response can be realised only when it is
based on trust and/or the funding agency has the means to realise a quick assessment of the
organisation, its implementation capacity and the quality of reporting, and is able to provide
immediate technical support if needed. This would have required involvement of Cordaid’s field
office. However partner contracts and relations were managed and monitored directly by HQ.
Cordaid didn’t provide technical assistance to ODP and TWO, except for a visit of the Administrator
to instruct them on the reporting formats of Cordaid. The programme in Pakistan didn’t have a
component for capacity building of local partners in order to strengthen their emergency response
capacity or for disaster risk reduction. It was explained that this hadn’t been considered as it was
known that Cordaid wouldn’t continue its presence in Pakistan after the closure of the flood
response programme. Another reason was that the Field Office didn’t have the capacity, in
September / October 2010, to provide technical support (see: above, paragraphs on programme
management). Therefore it was decided to leave the management of the ODP/TWO programme
directly with HQ. We consider that more could have been done if a partnership strategy had been
developed with technical support provided by the field office. (See also: par. 4.4.1)
The consortium arrangement, which facilitated the work for HQ, didn’t work out well at field level.
Such arrangements should be reconsidered in future programmes.
4.2 CRS Performance
Relevance
Sindh was the province that was most affected by the floods. In addition Sindh (and Punjab) were
less covered by assistance of international NGO’s compared to KPK, because many INGO’s were
present there to assist in the IDP crisis. Thus the decision of CRS to open a new sub-office in Sindh to
start-up an emergency response programme was certainly relevant.
The integrated programme responded to the needs of the population for emergency response (NFI’s,
plastic sheets, repairs of hand pumps), early recovery (transitional shelter, restoring agricultural
production) and development (new water systems). It could be questioned however whether the
choice for an integrated approach, without doubt having a large impact for the beneficiaries‘ villages,
was appropriate in view of the fact that a large part of the population in Sindh had not received
appropriate assistance. According to the DCO of Jacobabad, 40% of the flood victims in his district
hadn’t received yet proper shelter.
35
Also the latrines programme in Shangla, Kohistan and Swat districts was highly relevant: - a majority
of the families had a latrine before the floods15
, - the environment offers few opportunities to
defecate in hidden places and to protect the safety and privacy of women, - and lastly of course to
prevent diseases.
Effectiveness
In Sindh as well as in Shangla, Kohistan and Swat, the targeted outputs have been achieved and
mostly in time. The construction of shelters / latrines in Shangla started in November 2010 and was
completed in March 2011. In Sindh, NFI’s and plastic sheets to provide emergency shelter had been
distributed after return of the beneficiaries to their villages, cash & voucher had been distributed in
time for the Rabi or Kharif season, cash-for-work schemes for the rehabilitation of irrigation schemes
were completed before the start of the Kharif season (rice cultivation). The new water schemes had
been constructed later (June / July 2011), but earlier on repairs of damaged hand pumps had already
been done.
Programme management
The CRS programme was characterised by a well-structured approach. Initial needs assessments
were conducted to design the intervention strategy, followed by assessments for each of the sector
programmes. In the programme design needs of women and vulnerable groups were dealt with.
There were proper M&E systems also to assess the impact of the programmes. Lessons learned in
other programmes were incorporated in the program designs. CRS implemented the programmes
together with local partners and had a well-developed partner strategy.
CRS has the advantage that it has a long presence in Pakistan (> 50 years). Its country office in
Islamabad is long established and has a good knowledge of the local market, suppliers etc. The
programme could draw on technical support from its regional office, for the needs assessments and
during programme implementation. Finally, since CRS has been implementing emergency response
programmes in Pakistan since 2005, it could recruit local staff with prior experience also in the
different sector programmes. Also the expatriate staff that we met had already a longer experience
with CRS and had prior experience in CRS emergency response programmes.
Partner strategy
In past emergencies in Pakistan CRS was implementing the programmes itself. To strengthen the
emergency response capacity of local partners it was decided that also in emergencies CRS should try
to work with them as implementing partners. It developed a special approach based on ‘on the job
training’ and close supervision in the initial phase but gradually handing over responsibilities to the
partners (See: par. 3.3.). it was assessed as a very good approach by us and the partners.
4.3 Performance of ODP and TWO
Relevance
In general we assessed the intervention of ODP and TWO as relevant. But we were not sure if there
were no duplications of assistance, although it was said that ODP and TWO targeted villages that
hadn’t received assistance from other agencies. But there was a long time between the initial
assessment and the final distribution, although a re-assessment had been done in October 2010, and
the situation had changed, i.e. more international organisations had become active in the region.
15
On the contrary, in the CRS programme in Sindh it was decided not to construct latrines since the people
were not accustomed to use latrines.
36
Effectiveness and programme management
The project was well managed. Procedures to assure involvement of the beneficiaries were well
applied. Village committees were established including women that assisted with the registration of
beneficiaries and on the day of the distribution. The distributions proceeded in an orderly way. The
beneficiaries stressed that the whole process of beneficiaries’ registration, the hand out of tokens
and the actual distribution was transparent. They assured that the beneficiaries’ selection and the
distribution had been done honestly. The distributions were organised within a month and the
number of NFI’s, hygiene kits, tents and food packages distributed was according to planning.
4.4 Cross cutting issues
4.4.1 Respect of Sphere guidelines and Code of Conduct
In all project proposals and final reports reference was made to the Sphere standards for the
different interventions (NFI’s, Shelter, Water, Health, Agricultural livelihoods), stating that these
guided the intervention. We didn’t check it systematically in the field but no example draw our
attention that clearly violated minimum standards.
A standard that was difficult to put into practice in the shelter programme was that the houses
should be disaster resilient. Efforts have been made, for example in Kohat where all new shelters had
to be built on new sites to reduce the risks of future floods. In Shangla where landslides occur
frequently measures were taken in the Cordaid programme to reduce erosion on the shelter sites
and along the boards of the rivers shelters were shifted to a safer place. But to build real safely
beneficiaries would have to look for completely new locations. People are attached to their
properties and it was difficult to obtain new land sites.
One of the articles of the Code of Conduct states that it should be attempted to build disaster
response on local capacities. Local staff was employed and materials were purchased locally, but in
the Cordaid programme no efforts had been made to identify local NGO’s16
having the capacity to
assist in implementation of the projects. The health programme worked with the local government
structures and had the objective to strengthen their capacities. We would expect at least that the
programme had developed a strategic vision, in the needs assessments or in the project proposals,
regarding the involvement of local NGO’s. On the contrary CRS has developed a well-defined strategy
and approach to work with local partners and strengthen their capacities.
4.4.2 Cost effectiveness
A few data were collected to compare the costs of infrastructure constructed by CRS and Cordaid,
and the costs of the cash & voucher schemes of CRS Sindh. Although the costs are difficult to
compare as they depend on materials used and the quality of the infrastructure, they give an
impression of the costs of different interventions and a price / quality comparison can be made for
the shelters in Shangla.
The costs of the shelter depend primarily on the costs of the materials. In Sindh with a hot climate in
summer and moderate climate in winter relatively cheap houses can be constructed that are yet
appropriate for the local conditions (walls of reed mats). In the winter climate of Shangla better
materials have to be used for insulation. For the Cordaid shelters in Shangla better materials are used
for insulation compared to the CRS shelters.
16
The health programme worked with Cavish, but this is a national NGO based in Islamabad. Cavish didn’t
employ staff from Shangla district. It closed its sub-office in Shangla after its contract was finished.
37
The water schemes of Cordaid in Shangla are gravity schemes and the water is connected to the
houses. For the water schemes of CRS Sindh boreholes are drilled and in the villages hand pumps are
installed (scheme 1) or storage tanks are constructed with water points in ad adjacent hangar
(scheme 2). The composition of the cash & voucher schemes were different in the Rabi season (1)
and the Kharif season (2).
Table 5. Average costs of infrastructure and cash & voucher scheme
Cordaid Shangla CRS Shangla CRS Sindh
Shelter 174.000 Rps. / € 1482 116.130 Rps. / €984 43.000 Rps / € 364
Latrines 16.000 Rps. / € 137 19.500 Rps. / € 165
Water schemes 218.026 Rps. / € 1.813 1. 276.400 Rps. / € 2260
2. 314.100 Rps. / € 2662
Cash & voucher
scheme (per HH)
1. 19.185 Rps. / € 163
2. 26.150 Rps. / € 222
4.4.3 Gender and vulnerability issues
Women as well as men benefited of the different projects for shelter, WASH, health and agricultural
livelihoods. The water projects supply clean water for all but had a particular impact for women
reducing their work burden as they no longer have to go to faraway places to fetch water.
Cordaid’s health programme gave particular support to the women. Lady Health Visitors (LHVs) were
recruited in the four BHUs (Basic health Units) supported by the programme, who were led by the
lady doctor of the DHQ. There was a lack of female health staff in the BHUs. Many women in this
culture are not allowed to see a male doctor and therefore could be denied the medical care. The
tradition of observing purdah and being confined to the house is very strong, and women have less
access to medical facilities. The LHV’s reached out to provide health care to women and children.
“LHVs identified the women who were anemic and provided them with the multi-vitamins and
supplements. Pregnant women were provided with nutritional supplements such as Fefol-Vit
and Folic Acid etc. Pregnant women were given Tetanus Toxoid vaccinations as well.
Cordaid provided also delivery kits and labour room equipment to four BHUs and the District Head
Quarters Hospital (DHQ) as well. Equipment has been provided to the Community Midwifery School
(CMS) at DHQ also.
All the women interviewed highly appreciated Cordaid’s shelters. It was a primary need as their
houses were destroyed by the flood. However, the shelter did not include a kitchen and the women
were in a dire need of it. Also, the latrine is not attached with the shelter which raised the question
of protection and privacy for them.
In the cash & voucher programme of CRS Sind vegetable seeds were provided to the women. The
beneficiaries said that the seeds were of good quality and the yields were higher than before.
However, some of the women said that their land was not yet fully cultivable as flood had damaged
it. Therefore the crops production was still not up to the mark. Women said that they need additional
livelihood activities to meet their family needs.
“We want to earn some cash income by sewing clothes and selling embroidery shirts but we
do not have means and ways to do it” “We need sewing machines. Some of us had machines
but they are damaged in flood”. “We lost our cattle and chickens in flood and some were
stolen while we were away. ..we need some support to buy livestock”.
38
The request for additional livelihood support was a recurring theme in discussions with the women.
It was concluded that the agricultural livelihoods alone cannot help women get enough income to
meet their family needs. They need additional sources of livelihoods to raise their family income.
There was no livelihood component in the Cordaid programme. It was found that especially widows
and the needy women were in high need of additional support in terms of livelihood.
“I have got shelter but I have lost my land in flood. I had two sons, both have died
unfortunately. My husband has also died. I am left with one daughter. There is no way to
make a living for me. Give me something to rebuild my land so that I can grow crops again”
In the CRS programme particular attention was given to more vulnerable groups such as widows. In
the cash for work projects the village committees were given the responsibility to identify such
needy people. They were given light tasks but received the same payment as other workers.
“I was making food for the workers during the reconstruction work and I was paid Rps. 300
per day. I worked for 11 days and got Rps. 3300. I bought shoes and clothes for my children”.
In the programmes of Cordaid and ODP & TWO insufficient attention was given to the specific needs
of vulnerable groups. They benefited from the projects like the other beneficiaries but no additional
support was given to them. There was equality but no equity. For example in one of the ODP villages
there was a very poor family who was still living in the tent. The tent which had been the only shelter
for them for more than a year now, was almost damaged. The man was sick and was unable to
make any living for his family of five. He said that he had sent his 8 years old son for work to make
some living to meet the basic survival needs of the family.
The project proposals commit clearly to address the needs of the vulnerable. However, in practice
it was observed that the needs of the weaker groups have not been given any particular attention.
5 Recommendations
Assessment of the performance of Cordaid as an implementing agency has shown weaknesses. If
Cordaid wants to continue to act as an implementing agency these weaknesses should be addressed.
Therefore the following recommendations are formulated
Recommendation 1:
To strengthen its capacity as implementing agency in emergency response programmes
Cordaid should consider how to improve its capacity to recruit qualified staff in a timely
manner. Establishment of a roaster of experts is one of the options.
Recommendation 2:
Cordaid should review its needs assessments procedures and tools for emergency response
programmes. Joint assessments with other INGO’s, in particular with other members of
Caritas International, should also be considered to benefit of the capacities of other
organisations and to facilitate coordination.
Recommendation 3:
Cordaid should consider if it has developed adequate guidelines for the implementation of
programmes in high security risks areas, regarding recruitment procedures for local staff and
tools for ‘remote monitoring’.
39
Further recommendations.
Recommendation 4:
Cordaid should review its policy for partnership with local NGOs, either as co-implementing
partners or as self-implementing partners, in order to improve its contribution at capacity
building of local NGO’s. Formulation of a partner strategy should be an integral part of the
needs assessment process, as well as the identification of the needs for technical support and
how these can be addressed.
Recommendation 5:
In future emergency response programmes Cordaid should pay special attention to the needs
of vulnerable groups and seek ways to assist them to assure equity (instead of equality).
Recommendation 6:
Recruitment of (a) senior social mobiliser(s) should be considered in programme’s where
social mobilisation is an important programme component in order to assure proper support
of local field staff.
40
ANNEXES
41
Annex 1. Terms of Reference.
For the evaluation of the Floods Response 2010. Pakistan
1. Operation to be evaluated
Name: Cordaid Flood Response Pakistan 2010
Amount: 5 million Euros
2. Introduction
At the end of July 2010, heavy rains caused catastrophic floods across large sections of KPK and
Baluchistan, as well as parts of Punjab and Azad Jammu and Kashmir provinces of Pakistan. Flash
Floods hit the Northern Areas of Pakistan and swept away people, houses, bridges, land, crops
and livestock. In mid-August, as two waves of floodwaters traveled down the Indus, the situation
in southern Punjab and Sindh deteriorated, with communities flooded on either side of the river
and its tributaries. Over 1,700 deaths were reported countrywide and an estimated 20 million
people – and one-fifth of the country’s land mass – were affected by the disaster, described as
the worst flooding in living memory. Hundreds of thousands of people in Sindh fled from existing
and anticipated floodwaters. These families lost many possessions when they fled and lacked
basic household goods such sleeping mats and hygiene supplies. As flood waters receded and
displaced people began returning home, they found their communities, assets and homes
destroyed, that their water pumps have been damaged or washed away, and that their summer
monsoon crops are ruined.
An SHO Campaign was initiated in the Netherlands and Cordaid Mensen in Nood contributed to
the campaign raising funds for an 18 months Flood Response Plan in Pakistan.
Cordaid had been operational in Pakistan since the Earthquake in 2005 and the following IDP
crises following the military campaign by the Pakistan army in the Swat valley in 2008. At the
time of the floods Cordaid was implementing a health program and an education program in
Shangla District as well as starting up a WASH-Health intervention in the Kohat District. Cordaid
worked with its local partner Cavish in the various projects.
Based on an early assessment of the floods and an assessment of Cordaid and partner capacity a
strategic plan was put in place. For the flood response Cordaid decided that it would implement
Emergency Response and Early Rehabilitation activities directly in the geographical areas where
Cordaid was already operational. This meant that in Shangla District Cordaid initiated a Health
project, a water and hygiene project, a shelter and sanitation project and a NFI project. In Kohat
Cordaid initiated a shelter project as well. Other affected areas would be covered through local
and caritas Partners. This resulted in a project with ODP and TWO in Punjab focusing on Food,
NFI’s, Tents and Medical Care. With the Caritas Partner CRS two projects were initiated; first a
latrine construction program in Kohistan and Swat (KP Province) and second an integrated
program in Northern Sindh focusing on NFI’s, Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods. In total 8 projects
were funded with partners and Cordaid.
A detailed list of projects is attached in Annex I
42
A large part of the projects were funded with SHO funds. Other sources of funding included UN
agencies UNICEF and WHO as well as Caritas Partners CAFOD and Caritas Germany. Furthermore
Cordaid funded part of the activities through it Mensen in Nood (People in Need) funds and
through project Adoptions. The total value of Cordaid’s Flood Response is around 5 million Euro
3. Consultant’s Role
Evaluation of Humanitarian Aid is of great importance to Cordaid not only because of
considerable amounts of money earmarked for this purpose, but also due to its constant efforts
to improve humanitarian operations and best utilize the funds placed at our disposal. During the
course of the mission, whether in the field or while the report is being drawn up, the consultant
must demonstrate common sense as well as independence of judgment. S/he must provide
precise and direct answers to all points in the terms of reference, while avoiding the use of
theoretical or academic langue.
This evaluation is commissioned by Cordaid HQ. The Consultant is hired by the Cordaid HQ office
and will report to the Senior Program Officer of the Emergency Aid Team for Pakistan.
4. Purpose of the Evaluation
This evaluation is set up to measure the performance of Cordaid in the 2010 flood response
program. Within this evaluation the consultant will look at the overall performance of Cordaid
HQ, Cordaid Field Office Pakistan and Cordaid Partners (CRS and ODP-TWO).
The purpose of the evaluation is set out under points 4.1 to 4.8 below
4.1 To assess the suitability of the operation and the level to which it has been carried out
4.2 To assess the degree to which the objectives pursued have been achieved and whether the
means employed have been effective
4.3 To quantify the impact of the operation in terms of outputs
4.4 To analyze the Cordaid’s role as coordinator and donor as well as Cordaid’s role in Pakistan
as an Implementing Agency.
4.5 To analyze Cordaid’s partners performance as implementing agencies.
4.6 To analyze the link between relief and rehabilitation in the flood response and development.
4.7 To check if the principles contained in the Code of Conduct and SPHERE guidelines have been
respected (see also annex II, SHO Quality Pro-Forma)
4.8 To formulate precise and concrete recommendations to improve the effectiveness of future
operations in Pakistan and for Cordaid globally.
Program Goal
Flood affected families have fulfilled their basic needs and have access to basic services
Result 1 Flood Affected Households live locally appropriate semi-permanent shelters
Result 2 Flood affected households use latrines and bathing facilities
Result 3 Flood affected communities have sufficient clean water for daily use.
Result 4 Flood affected communities receive basic medical care and medicines
Result 5 Flood affected households restarted livelihood activities
Result 6 Flood Households have sufficient food to meet their daily requirements
43
5. Specific Evaluation Objectives
The evaluation report must cover the issues set out under points 5.1 to 5.14 below.
5.1 Brief description of the humanitarian context: the needs identified, the political and social-
economic situation and any possible disaster preparedness activities.
5.2 Analysis of the assessment process and needs identification process.
5.3 Analysis of the relevance of the operation’s objectives, of the choice of beneficiaries, and the
deployed strategy, in relation to the identified needs.
5.4 Examination of the coordination and coherence:- between Cordaid, Caritas Partners, donors
and local partners as local authorities.
5.5 Analysis of the effectiveness of the operation in quantitative and qualitative terms.
5.6 Analysis of cost-effectiveness of the operation.
5.7 Analysis of the efficiency of the running of the operation. This analysis should cover:
• The planning and mobilization of aid
• Operational capacities of Cordaid and partners
• The strategies deployed
• Major elements of the operation such as: staff, logistics, maintenance of accounts,
selection of beneficiaries, suitability of the aid in the context of local practices
• Management and storage of merchandise and installations
• Quality and quantity of merchandise and service mobilized and their accordance with
the contractual specifications.
• The systems of control and auto-evaluation set up by Cordaid and partners
5.8 Analysis of the impact of the operation. This analysis should be based on the following non-
exclusive list of indicators, bearing in mind that the consultant might well add others.
• Contribution to the reduction in human suffering
• Creation of dependency on humanitarian aid
• Effect of humanitarian aid on the local economy
• Effect on the incomes of the local population
• Effect on health and nutrition practices
• Environmental effects
• Impact of humanitarian programs on local capacity building
5.9 Analysis of the integration of gender issues (social, economic, and cultural analysis of the
situation of both men and women) in the operation
5.10 Analysis of the measures taken to assure the security of aid workers , both expatriate and
local, means of communication placed at their disposal, specific protection measures,
emergency evacuation plan
5.11 Verification if the principles contained in the Code of Conduct and the SPHERE guidelines
have been respected.
5.12 Drawing up of “lessons learnt” in the context of this evaluation with recommendations on
how lessons learnt could be transformed in operational and/or organizational improvements.
Elaboration on some of the objectives mentioned above can be found in Annex III
6. Working Methods
To accomplish this task, the consultant needs to make use of information from different sources
available at Cordaid, via its local office, via services of the HQ office, via partners in the field, via
aid recipients and via local authorities and international organizations.
The consultant will work with a local (female) consultant which will be hired through the Cordaid
Field Office. The consultant will submit a work plan for the evaluation to Cordaid HQ based on
the information provided in this ToR. The consultant will analyze the information and incorporate
it in a coherent report that responds to the objectives of this evaluation.
44
7. Phases of the Evaluation
7.1 Briefing at Cordaid HQ with the personnel concerned for 1 day at which additional
documents necessary for the evaluation will be provided
7.2 Mission to the area: the consultant must work in close collaboration with Cordaid’s staff in
the field, Cordaid’s partners and other stakeholders
7.3 The consultant will devote the first day of the mission to the area concerned to preliminary
and preparatory discussions with the senior management team of Cordaid
7.4 The last day of the mission to the area concerned will be devoted to a discussion with the
senior management team and key Cordaid partners on the observations arising during the
evaluation
7.5 The draft report should be submitted to the Cordaid senior program officer in The Hague 2
days before its presentation and its discussion during debriefing
7.6 Submission of the final report final which should take into account any remarks which may
have been raised during the debriefing
8. Consultant
This evaluation will be carried out by an expert with both considerable experience in the
humanitarian field and in the evaluation of humanitarian aid. This expert must agree to work in
high risk areas. Solid experience in on or more of the following fields is required; Health, Shelter,
WASH, Livelihoods, Food and Nutrition
9. Timetable
The evaluation will last 25 days, out of which 15 days will be in the field. It will begin on the 14th
of November and end on the 9th
of December with the submission of the final report.
A suggested itinerary can be found in Annex IV
10. Report
10.1 The evaluation will result in the drawing up of a report written in English of a maximum
length of 30 pages including the evaluation summery.
10.2 The evaluation report is an extremely important working tool for Cordaid. The report format
appearing below under points 10.2.1 must be adhered to.
10.2.1 Cover Page (title of the report, period of the evaluation mission, name of evaluator
10.2.2 Table of Contents
10.2.3 Executive Summery
10.2.4 Main Body (the report must start with a description of the method used and must be
structured in accordance to the specific objectives formulated under point 5.
10.2.5 Annexes
• List of people interviewed and sites visited
• Terms of reference
• Abbreviations
• Map of the operational areas
10.3 The report must be written in a direct and non-academical language
10.4 the report shall be submitted in soft copy (PDF and Word)
11 Annexes
Annex I List of Projects
Annex II SHO Quality Pro-Forma
Annex III DAC Criteria
Annex IV Suggested Itinerary
45
Annex 2. List of persons interviewed and sites visited
Participants Male Fe-
male
Position Organization Place visited Method Date
1. Nikola Buljugic 1 Logistic & security
Manager
Cordaid Islamabad Interview 20/11
2. Jim Mason,
Ron Langford
Shane Mathews 3
Head of Mission,
Head of Programmes,
Head Admin. Finance
Cordaid Islamabad Briefing 20/11
3. Joe Maina 1 PM Health Cordaid Islamabad Interview 21/11
4. Marten Treffers 1 PM Shelter Islamabad Interview 21/11
5. Ivano Marati 1 Former Acting HoM Islamabad Interview 21/11
6. Muhammad
Maroof
1 Project Manager Cavish Islamabad Interview 21/11
7. Ayub Sajid 1 CEO ODP Multan Interview 22/11
8. ODP staff 5 1 Management &
operational staff
ODP Multan Group
meeting
22/11
9. Beneficiaries 20 25 Beneficiaries ODP Qayampur
Muzafar Garh
Group
discussion
22/11
10 Beneficiaries 5 5 Beneficiaries ODP .., Muzafar Garh Group
discussion
22/11
11 Muhammed
Saleem
1 Social organizer ODP Qayampur
Muzafar Garh
Informal
discussion
22/11
12 Nazim Baluch 1 Prog. Manager Sanjh Foun-
dation
Muzafar Garh Interview 22/11
13 Naveed Iqbal
Kamran Khan
Daim Iqbal
1
1
1
Accounts manager,
Pc livelihood,
M&E officer
TWO Sargodha
Multan
Group
interview
23/11
14 Meeting
participants
4 Beneficiaries ODP Rajanpur Multan Group
discussion
23/11
15 Cicely Klarke
Amber West
1
1
Head of office
M&E and partnership
support coordinator
CRS Sindh Sakkur Interview 24/11
16 Khan Zada
PO Shelter
PO WASH
1
1
1
PO livelihood
PO shelter
PO WASH
CRS Sindh Jacobabad
Mubarakpur
Group
interview 25/11
17 Women
beneficiaries
16
18 Male
beneficiaries
25 beneficiaries CRS Sindh
J.abad village
Sardar bux
Group
discussion 25/11
19
Women
beneficiaries
14
20 Male benefic. 20
beneficiaries CRS Sindh J.abad Village
Abdul hakim
khoso
Group
discussion
25/11
21 Households/
Women+ male
beneficiaries
4 4 beneficiaries CRS Sindh J.abad village
Nazeer ahmad
khoso
Group
Discussion
25/11
22 Sajid Jamal Abro 1 DCO Adminis-
tration
Jacobabad Interview 25/11
46
23 GSF staff 8 3 Livelihood project staff CRS Sindh Jacobabad Group
discussion
26/11
24 Joel Deal 1 PM GSF Cordaid Jacobabad Interview 26/11
25 Shane Mathews 1 Admin& Finance
Manager
Cordaid Islamabad Interview 27/11
26 Philip
Khorassandjian
1 Prog. Manager
Kohat
Cordaid Islamabad Interview 27/11
27 Cordaid Kohat
Team
4 1 Project staff Cordaid Islamabad Group
discussion
27/11
28 Shakeel,
Khurdshid
1
1
PC shelter,
M&E officer
Shelter/WASH
Cordaid Shangla Interview 28/11
29 Aman 1 PC health Cordaid Shangla Interview 28/11
30 Dr. Anees 1 Senior medical officer Interview 29/11
31 Dr. Farida 1 Gynecologist Interview 29/11
32 Staff nurses 3 Staff nurses
District Head
Quarter
Hospital Alpuri, Shangla
Interview 29/11
33 Mohamad Ayaz 1 DCO Adminis-
tration
Alpuri, Shangla Interview 29/11
34 Laiq Shah 1 Senior engineer TMA Alpuri Interview 29/11
35 Women
beneficiaries
11 beneficiaries
36 Male
beneficiaries
20 beneficiaries Cordaid Derai
Group
discussion
29/11/
11
37 Women
beneficiaries
15 beneficiaries
38 Male
beneficiaries
15 beneficiaries Cordaid Burshat
Group
discussion 30/11
39 Dr. Saidul Abrar 1 Medical officer BHU Kuzkana 30/11
40 Women
beneficiaries
13 beneficiaries
41 Male
beneficiaries
15 beneficiaries Cordaid Shahpur
Group
discussion 30/11
42 Nasrullah Khan 1
43 Fazal Mehmud 1
Head of office.
Education manager CRS Besham Interview 30/11
44 Women
beneficiaries
4 beneficiaries
45 Male
beneficiaries
10 beneficiaries CRS Damouri
Group
discussion 1/12
46 ROAD office
staff
5 ROAD office staff CRS Shahpur Group
discussion
1/12
47 ISWDO staff 3 Program staff CRS Bisham Group
discussion
1/12
48 Junaid Ahmad
Jadoon
3 Manager HR Cordaid Cordaid Islamabad Interview 3/12
55 Saleema Munir
Jack Byrne
1
1 Partnership manager
Head CRS CRS Islamabad Interview/
Debriefing 3/12
Total 197 118