final report: joint assessment mission (jam), the humanitarian crisis created by the displacement of...

7/30/2019 Final Report: JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION (JAM), The Humanitarian Crisis Created by the Displacement of Sudanes

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JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION (JAM)

2008

The Humanitarian Crisis Created by the Displacement of

Sudanese Refugees and Internally-Displaced Persons in

Eastern Chad

September 9-17, 2008

WFP UNHCR

With the participation of CNAR, FAO, UNICEF, USAID/OFDA, the

Embassy of France, and Feed the Children


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................................................ 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.......................................................................................................................... 3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......................................................................................................................... 4

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................ 4RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES..................................................................................................................... 4METHODOLOGY.......................................................................................................................................... 6

BASIC FACTS.............................................................................................................................................. 7

THENATURE OF THE CRISIS ....................................................................................................................... 7POPULATION............................................................................................................................................... 8GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................. 11

PROTECTION........................................................................................................................................... 11

COHABITATION AND COMPETITION .......................................................................................................... 12GENDER.................................................................................................................................................... 13CHILDREN ................................................................................................................................................ 14

SHELTER ANDNON-FOOD ITEMS.............................................................................................................. 14PERSONS WITH SPECIALNEEDS ............................................................................................................... 15REGISTRATION ......................................................................................................................................... 15RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO PROTECTION ..................................................................................... 15

FOOD AID AND FOOD SECURITY....................................................................................................... 17

ACCESS .................................................................................................................................................... 18UTILIZATION ............................................................................................................................................ 20FOOD AID ................................................................................................................................................. 21SELF-RELIANCE........................................................................................................................................ 22IN SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................ 22RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................ 23

HEALTH, NUTRITION AND WATER & SANITATION.................................................................... 24

HEALTH.................................................................................................................................................... 24NUTRITION ............................................................................................................................................... 25WATER AND SANITATION......................................................................................................................... 26RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................ 27

LOGISTICS................................................................................................................................................ 28

THE PIPELINE ........................................................................................................................................... 28ACCESSIBILITY......................................................................................................................................... 28STORAGE .................................................................................................................................................. 29COMMODITY QUALITY CONTROL............................................................................................................. 29COORDINATION ........................................................................................................................................ 30RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................ 30

PARTNERSHIPS, PLANNING AND OTHER ISSUES ........................................................................ 31

APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................................

MEMBERS OF THE MISSION ...................................................................................................................... 33MISSION ITINERARY ................................................................................................................................. 33PEOPLE/ORGANIZATIONS ENCOUNTERED................................................................................................. 35REVIEW OF PREVIOUS JAMRECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................... 37LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................... 42MAPS........................................................................................................................................................ 44


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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Refugee Populations in Eastern ChadTable 2: IDP Populations in Eastern Chad

Table 3: Average Levels of Food Consumption (Refugees, IDPs, Host Populations)

Table 4: Planned Road Rehabilitation Projects

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A multi-agency team of fifteen persons visited six refugee camps and two IDP sites ineastern Chad over a period of eight days (not including a de-briefing in Abech). Giventhe scale and scope of the humanitarian crisis in that part of the country, it was not the

intention of the team to collect detailed statistical information already gathered and

documented in a number of surveys, investigations and assessments carried out by

UNHCR, WFP, UN agencies and NGOs. With extremely limited time and a broaduniverse of persons affected by the crisis, the team only sought to validate and provide

real-time context to available information. It also hoped to identify recent trends or

tendencies, as well as capture key stakeholders perceptions of short and medium-termprospects.

What the JAM found was a large, complex problem which is rooted in insecurity ineastern Chad and in the Darfur Region of Sudan. Over 245,000 refugees and over

180,000 IDPs temporarily reside in close proximity to much smaller host populations,

some for up to five years now. International humanitarian assistance has stabilized the

situation; but that stability is precarious. Cohabitation among different ethnic/tribalgroups, competition for scarce natural resources (notably water, agricultural and grazing

land, and fuel wood), and already weak livelihoods among the host population have

contributed to heightened levels of frustration, tensions and even violence.

Persons who met with the JAM were unanimously of the opinion that the current

environment of insecurity which has brought about massive displacement will not besolved in the coming months - maybe even years. More pessimistic observers fear that

the situation will worsen, and with that, the scale and scope of the crisis of displacement

in the region will increase. Basic humanitarian assistance will be required by refugeesand IDPs for the foreseeable future.

The JAM noted that the humanitarian crisis should not be strictly segmented into refugee

and IDP humanitarian problems, in addition to host population development problems.The three are inter-related. Their solutions are to be found through a combination of

humanitarian and development/early recovery approaches. As the length of displacementcontinues, more attention and resources will need to be focused on livelihoodsapproaches that involve higher levels of beneficiary participation and ownership,

gradually replacing, in part, general distribution of food and non-food items.

Particularly among IDPs, but also among refugees, the overwhelming desire was for

livelihoods opportunities and education for the children affected by displacement. But

above all, everyone affected by the crisis in the east awaits peace and security.


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The mission extends sincere thanks to colleagues in WFP and UNHCR who provided the

team with logistical, organizational and information support. Without the cooperative

and creative air support of UNHAS and AirServe the mission would not have been able

to cover the territory required.

UNHCR, WFP and NGO field staff at camps and sites, were invaluable in organizing

informative meetings with representatives of beneficiary populations. Special thanks isextended to all local authorities and NGO colleagues who gave the team their valuabletime for briefings and insights, running right up until, and sometimes beyond, the

important breaking of the Ramadan Fast.

INTRODUCTION

Rationale and Objectives

In fast changing emergency operations such as the EMOP, annual assessments are

recommended by the MOU agreed to between WFP and UNHCR, especially if

circumstances change significantly during the period. The last Joint WFP/UNHCR

Assessment Mission (henceforth referred to as the JAM) was conducted in October2006. The 2006 JAM concluded that WFP, UNHCR and NGO partners were, at the time,

committed to the development of self-reliance among the Sudanese refugees although it

was recognized that prevailing insecurity and possible further relocation of refugeepopulations would have necessarily complicated and prolonged the process. A gradual

approach to the adjustment of humanitarian assistance was recommended as the most

appropriate response.

Since then, the security situation in eastern Chad has deteriorated quickly and very

significantly. Internal displacement has ballooned from approximately 38,000 IDPs in

June of 2006 to approximately 180,000 in September, 2008. There are currently over170,000 IDPs in Dar Sila, Ouaddai, Assongha, and Salamat. The Sudanese refugee

population has noted an increase at the beginning of 2008 with new arrivals from Darfur

of whom some 6,000 have been installed in Mile and Kounoungou camps. The Refugeepopulation is around 245, 000 at end of August 2008 (source UNHCR).

All the while, a prolonged presence of large displaced populations, may be fueling inter-

communal and inter-ethnic tensions with the smaller local population. To this effect, thevulnerabilities of host populations would need to be assessed alongside those of refugees

and IDPs in this complex inter-related humanitarian situation.

Throughout the report reference will be made to displacement and displaced

populations. In those cases, the terms are used generically to refer to both refugees and

IDPs in their condition of being temporarily forced to live away from their villages of


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origin. When situations or issues are particularly relevant to one group or the other, they

will be explicitly referred to as either refugees or IDPs.

The JAM, jointly organized by UNHCR and WFP with the participation of UNICEF,

FAO, OCHA, the GOC, interested donors and implementing NGOs, had as its objectives:

1. Review the status of2006 JAMrecommendations and make updated and morerealistic recommendations for 2009 in light of current conditions and future

prospects;2. Assess the quality, quantity, timeliness, appropriateness and targeting of food and

non-food assistance and make strategic recommendations on what measures

should be taken to ensure that refugees basic needs are met so as to avoid placingthem in a position of eroding/depleting coping mechanisms to the point of making

them ineffective or of undertaking undesirable coping strategies that are harmful

to the welfare of the environment and the host population;

3. Similarly assess the situation facing IDPs along the same lines mentioned above,

paying particular attention to how their prolonged displacement is affecting theirlivelihoods, food security and coping mechanisms and how those may impact on

those of the host populations;4. Review current strategic and operational initiatives to promote self-reliance

among refugees, IDPs and targeted vulnerable segments of host populations to

determine what new measures might be taken and what continuing assistance isrequired from the GOC, UN and NGO development agencies to maximize levels

of sustainable self-reliance pending a definitely and lasting solution leading to the

return of refugees and IDPs to their places of origin;5. Assess WFP compliance with Enhanced Commitments to Women (ECW)

including refugee womens active participation with regard to both food and non-food sectors, including overall camp management;

6. Review food entitlement monitoring systems including Food BasketMonitoring, and results of Post Distribution Monitoring and IP reports noting

concerns over possible extortion of food in exchange for services on the part ofrefugee sub-group leaders and sharing at the distribution site. Review role of

Food Committees and consider possible recommendations for enhanced

performance of committee members in their capacity as monitors;7. Review achievements attributable to programs of support to Refugee-affected

Host Communities, along with continuing challenges, and future strategies;

8. Review the prospects fordurable solutions, given the current political climate inSudan and within Chad, offering a prognosis for possible repatriation of refugees

and IDP returns in the coming 18 months.


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Methodology

The list of core members of the mission, itinerary and persons/organizations met arefound in Appendices 1-3, respectively.

Preparations were begun by WFP to organize a multi-agency team of concernedprofessionals in mid-August, 2008. Confirmation of participation by invited

organizations occurred very close to the planned date of initiation. To facilitate/lead the

exercise, WFP contracted an external consultant on 26 August 2008, who arrived in Chad

on 6 September after completing contracting, security clearance, air travel and consularformalities.

The mission members came together for the first time in Abeche to organize their specificmethodology and focus of review. Four areas of focus were established:

Protection Food Aid and Food Security Health, Nutrition and Water & Sanitation Logistics

To ensure that womens voices and opinions were not lost in mixed groups, efforts were

made to organize separate discussion groups with women. In those cases, questions on

all four areas were posed to both mens and womens groups. Team members divided

themselves between the two gender-based focus groups by self-selection. In all campsand sites, large groups gathered to meet the mission. Not surprisingly, the men tended to

cede the word to their leadership (Chef des Chefs) and perhaps one or two others.

Discussions with women, on the other hand, proved to be a wide-open, spirited free-for-all, resulting in wide participation.

While an rather extensive list of issues/questions were developed on the basis of the fourareas of concern, the team quickly realized that the number of refugee camps (hereafter

referred to as camps) and IDP sites (hereafter referred to as sites) to be visited

throughout the eastern region over just nine days of field work would permit too littletime to address so many questions. It was agreed that the JAM should not pretend to

attempt to gather detailed information that was already included in secondary sourcessuch as institutional monitoring reports, assessments and investigations. The JAM would

seek to confirm information offered in those sources as well as accounts of the extent towhich respondents basic needs were being met either through means of self-reliance or

through external assistance, determining where quantitative and qualitative gaps existed.

The exercise would assess trends since the last JAM and also stakeholder sentiment goingforward.


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In Goz Beida, Koukou, Iriba, Bahai, Guereda, and Farchana, the mission met with

representatives of NGO partner organizations for their situational and operationalinsights. They also provided useful validation of information and requests gathered from

refugees and IDPs. Since no time was available to meet with representatives of host

communities, the NGO representatives filled in some of the gaps. Courtesy visits were

also made to local authorities in each location to obtain their take on the situation as wellas possible perspectives trends.

Debriefings were organized with U.N. agencies and NGO partners in both Abeche andNDjamena upon conclusion of the field portion of the mission. Draft findings and

recommendations were presented. However, in both meetings it was stressed that the

JAM team considered the information as drafts, based upon the limited time they had tocompare notes, analyze information and debate the merits/viability of particular

recommendations, which would be further refined on the basis of questions, comments

and suggestions brought up in the debriefings.

The JAM occurred during the rainy season which made road access to the Goz Amerrefugee camp from Koukou impossible (impassable wadi) and flight scheduling

problematic. Weather and logistical constraints adversely affected how the exercise wascarried out as flight delays and weather cancellations forced the team to split up on

portions of the trip to Iriba, Bahai and Guereda. Delays cut into time that was available

for visiting camps and speaking with representatives and beneficiaries. Seasonal timingalso affected how the JAM was conducted. The Ramadan fast made afternoon sessions

particularly time-sensitive and even made full participation in end-of-day wrap-ups

difficult to schedule.

BASIC FACTS

The Nature of the Crisis

The crisis confronting the eastern region of Chad has been brought about by the

confluence of two situations. One is the overspill of the Darfur conflict in Sudan whichhas resulted in the presence of over 245,000 Sudanese refugees located in twelve camps

since 2003. The second is a surfacing of internal political disputes which have evolved

along ethnic and tribal lines, entailing several armed rebel groups, resulting in armedaggression against the Government of Chad and its infrastructure. Chad and Sudan

mutually accuse each other of giving protection and material support to each others rebel

opponents, who, according to the accusations, use each others territory as safe havens

from which to prepare attacks.

Internal conflict has weakened the capacity of government entities in the east, particularly

those providing public security and justice, resulting in an environment of lawlessnessand impunity. Banditry and violence have prospered in that environment, leading to

several waves of internal displacement, the most recent being in mid to late 2007, leaving

an over 180,000 persons displaced in locations of relative security. The same insecurityadversely affects humanitarian response in the region.


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At its core, the crisis is one of insecurity. Only a political solution which ends theconflict in Sudan will result in the repatriation of refugees back to their homes of origin.

In Chad, IDPs who were interviewed expressed that only a real and lasting state of

security will motivate them to return permanently to their home villages. Though

recently there have been a small number of spontaneous IDP returns, and somehouseholds have begun to send members back to villages of origin temporarily to

cultivate, those cases do not yet appear to represent a permanent movement among the

majority of displaced. In this regard, a robust and effective EUFOR and MINURCATmilitary presence would be helpful and could offer some hope, though it would have to

prove itself sustainable until a lasting political solution brings about peace in the area to

convince all IDPs to return to their homes.

While humanitarian programming could, at first glance, be simplified by taking a

pragmatic approach of analyzing and responding to the problems of refugees, IDPs and

local host populations separately and on their own merits, an imbalanced response could

unintentionally give rise to other serious problems. The causal dynamics in play are quiteinter-related and will require integrated approaches, particularly as humanitarian response

transitions toward creating greater levels sustainable self-reliance.

It should be stated from the outset that no prospects for resolving the armed conflicts in

Sudan and Chad appear on the horizon at this time. On the contrary, renewed rebelactivity is anticipated during the up-coming dry season (mid-October through April).

Under these conditions, neither refugees, nor IDPs in appreciable numbers, are expected

to return permanently to their villages of origin during 2009, barring a major military orpolitical breakthrough.

Population

Sudanese refugees are settled in 12 camps, located in the regions of Wadi Fira, BET,Ouaddai, and Dar Sila as follows:


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Table 1: Refugee Populations in Eastern Chad1

CAMP POPULATION

Wadi Fira Region

Touloum

Iridimi

Am NabakKounoungou

Mile

Sub-Total : Wadi Fira Region

23,297

18,113

16,69618,305

16,960

93,371

BET RegionOure Cassoni 27,250

Ouaddai Region

Farchana

BredjingTreguine

GagaSub-Total: Ouaddai Region

20,555

31,07316,402

20,07588,105

Dar Sila RegionDjabalGoz Amer

Sub-Total: Dar Sila Region

16,09120,656

36,747

TOTAL REFUGEES 245,473

Internal displacement to 2005 and has increased over time in response to growing internal

armed conflict. Since 2006, the displaced population has grown from approximately38,000 persons to an estimated 179,000 at the end of 2007. Unlike in the case of

refugees, IDPs are not registered according to strict and systematic protocols for the

purposes of protection and assistance. However, UNHCR and partner organization havecarried out a registration and profiling exercise in 2007, which is in the process of being

up-dated in 2008. IDPs are not settled in closely administered camps, but rather have

settled in relatively loosely knit communities or sites close to towns or villages wherehost communities reside. They are free to move and integrate with their host

communities to the extent possible. Therefore, precise statistics on IDPs are not

available, but are gathered on the basis of a patchwork of data supplied by individual aid

organizations in accordance with their particular programmatic and operationalfocus/needs.

IDPs have settled in some 30 sites. Only two sites are located in the northern Wadi FiraRegion. The significant majority of IDPs are settled in Dar Sila Department, around the

towns of Goz Beida, Koukou-Angarana, Dogdore and Ade. Present estimates using

1 UNHCR refugee registration figures as of September 2008


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December, 2007 data along with recent September, 2008 census/profiling information

from four sites, IDPs were located as follows:

Table 2: IDP Populations in Eastern Chad2

SITE POPULATION

Wadi Fira RegionKekerkeAbdi

Sub-Total : Wadi Fira Region

8705,856

6,726

Ouaddai Region

Assounga Department

ArkoumGoundiang

Alacha

Adre/Moroske/Hile DjedidGoungour

GoundoDar Sila DepartmentArde

Karoub-Tawa

Daguessa

DogdoreAradibHabile

Gourounkoun

Sanour(September 2008 census)

Koubigou

KolomaGanachour(September 2008 Profiling-provisional)

Gassire (September 2008 Profiling-provisional)

Kerfi (September 2008 Profiling-provisional)

Djorouf al Ahmar Department

Haouich I&2/Amtalata 1&2 / Binedir/ Wizine/MirerIdeter

Ardo/Badine/Maka/Al Kouk/Mishegue

Sub-Total: Ouaddai Region

13,6242,280

5,856

4,4009,147

2,500

8,688

875

600

27,50011,40628,804

12,466

648

6,248

7,3741,883

16,5054,500

8,0431,592

5,386

180,325

TOTAL IDPs 187,051

The presence of temporary settlements of refugees and IDPs have affected the lives of anestimated 700,0003

local residents in communities located near those settlements. Theeffect of internal displacement is overwhelmingly felt in Ouaddai Region, and most

especially in the Department of Dar Sila. More than 24% of the regions estimated

population presently finds itself displaced. The effects of population pressure are

2 WFP Beneficiary Lists as of September 20083 December 2006 population estimate based on last official census adjusted by 2.5% annual growth


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particularly heavy in sub-prefectures where large temporary settlements compete for

natural resources.

Geography

The eastern regions have a sahelian climate to the north and sahelo-sudanese to the south

of the Ouaddai Region. The year is divided into rainy and dry seasons with annualrainfall ranging from 400mm to 950mm as one moves north to south. Livelihoods and

productive capacities therefore vary according to the availability of water and arable land.

Land suitable for agriculture ranges from about 1% of land in the north, to 10-15% in thecentral areas around Adre, south of Abeche and Am Dam to more than 30% in the Dar

Sila4. Even where favorable amounts of arable land is available, it is still apt to be of

weak composition (sandy and lacking in organic nutrients) and productivity.

PROTECTION

Protection from insecurity is an issue of overwhelming importance to refugees, IDPs and

local host populations alike. Each, however, is affected in somewhat different ways or

degrees according to their location and particular socio-political situation.

At the time of the JAM a relative calm existed in the region. The annual rains made

wadis un-crossable and roads impassable, prohibiting rebel movements. Periodic patrolsin the vicinity of camps, sites and villages by the European peace-keeping force, EUFOR,

have contributed to a sense of security. CNAR Gendarme patrols in the refugee camps

and even the presence of escorted humanitarian convoys on the roads may contribute to

an enabling environment and a sense or perception of relative security among thepopulation.

EUFORs mandate expires on March 31, 2009. It is not expected, at this time, to be

renewed. In its place is anticipated a U.N. peace-keeping force under MINURCAT. Notenough is known at this time about the planned size, make-up and mandate of the U.N.

force. Uncertainty in this regard adds to the sense of insecurity.

Yet, while Chadian rebel groups (AN, UFCD, UFDD and UFFD) have not targetedcivilians and humanitarian organizations as such, their aggressions against the GOC, its

institutions of authority and infrastructure have created an environment lacking in law

and order, in which banditry, impunity and violence thrive. Physical attacks and rapewhile working in fields or collecting firewood were cited by refugees and IDPs, alike, as

daily risks, especially among women.

4 Source: GTZ and Regional Delegation of the Planning Ministry. January 2005 as cited in the WFP VAM

Food Self-Sufficiency Survey, December 2007


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While doing its best within the scope of its mandate and the scale and nature of its

composition, EUFOR is unable to patrol with the frequency and coverage necessary topacify all of eastern Chad. It is not a police force so it is unable to detain and investigate

crimes associated with banditry. In turn, there are very serious voids in terms of Chadian

ability to provide public security and justice in the area. The CNAR Gendarme is

woefully under-manned, under-resourced and inadequately trained. Consequently theyare unable to respond to all security needs of the refugee population in an adequate

manner. Meanwhile, an anticipated MINURCAT-DIS police force to replace the

CNAR Gendarme is very slow in being fully deployed. Traditional authority as a meansof resolving conflict has been weakened by displacement and rivalries with state

authorities over jurisdiction.

The insecurity around Guereda seems to be worsening inside and outside of the camps.

Tensions between local Tamas and refugee Zaghawas is running high. Armed groups

were reported to be circulating inside and outside of the camps with seeming impunity,

thus compromising the civilian and humanitarian nature of the two camps. Movement of

armed groups in/around camps was also reported in Iriba and Bahai. Increasing levels ofmutual recrimination are occurring between hosts and refugees involving livestock theft

on the one hand and beatings and rapes on the other. The Oure Cassoni camp, inparticular, is precariously close to the international border to ensure adequate protection

in accordance with international standards.

IDPs in Dar Sila also report inter-communal and inter-ethnic tensions and clashes with

Arabs. IDP representatives with whom the mission member met frequently voiced

strong disappointment with the effectiveness of Chadian armed forces to ensure theirsecurity.

Aid workers, too, are experiencing mounting insecurity. Incidents involving carjackings,

armed robbery and even murders occur with troubling frequency. It goes without saying

that humanitarian operations could be adversely affected as a consequence. While

security escorts contribute to ensuring the physical integrity of humanitarian workerstraveling to certain camps and sites, at the same time they complicate logistics and

effectively cut down on the amount of time aid workers can actually spend working in

those locations.

Cohabitation and Competition

Very large displaced populations living in close proximity to considerably smaller hostpopulations are competing for limited natural resources. At the outset, it has been

encouraging to observe the levels of hospitality and solidarity shown by hostcommunities to their displaced neighbors. But over time competing needs are

adversely affecting the livelihoods of all concerned. Frustration leads to tension and

tension flares into conflict.


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Local authorities reported that they are attempting to mediate resolutions to disputes over

land, water and firewood. However, the pressures are great and the solutions limited.They recommended that aid be directed also toward the needy of host communities as a

means of easing tensions. Improving health centers and potable water sources were cited

as local needs that merit solutions. Also improving livestock support, such as vaccination

campaigns, and income generating activities would be welcomed.

It was brought to the attention of the JAM that frustration is being manifested among host

populations, particularly youth, over the observed influx of workers from outside ofeastern Chad to work in UN and NGO operations. Clearly, this poses a dilemma for the

humanitarian community which has a responsibility to ensure that competent staff are

employed for the purposes of efficient and effective operations. While the shortage oftrained professionals, skilled support staff and laborers is beyond the immediate control

of aid organizations, it is in the best interest of promoting peace, stability and economic

well-being in the area to find means to mitigate the frustration. Programming which

contributes to the development of the host population should be factored in to the

assistance package provided in the region in a way that offers a sense of balance in theeyes of the local communities. In this regard, Food-For-Work, Micro-credit, and skills

training may be considered as possible quick responses.

Gender

Women and girls suffer particular insecurity. The number of reported rapes seems to

have dropped in recent months. However, women report that they still fear SGBV whenthey leave their camps and sites in search of firewood or to cultivate fields. The acts are

attributed to male members of the host communities. While refugees are prohibited from

collecting firewood outside of their camps and are provided supplies of fuel for cooking

by UNHCR and its partners, the quantities available are reported to be insufficient.Moreover part of firewood collected by refugee women is sold on the market, as one

source of household income. Promoting greater fuel efficiency through provision of fuel-

efficient stoves as well as the provision of alternative energy sources for cooking arecited frequently by beneficiaries and NGO partners as important elements of solutions to

the problem of female security as well as household livelihoods. Fuel efficient stoves

projects are underway and some pilot initiatives involving alternative energy sources arebeing conducted.

Though not specifically brought about by displacement, under-aged marriage, frequentlyat 13-14 years of age, was reported in conversations with women in all camps and sites.

Female circumcision continues to be practiced and domestic violence, particularly againstwomen, was reported.

UNHCR and its partners are working with camp leaders and the camp population to raise

awareness against forced marriages, especially involving under-aged girls and of the

traditional practice of female circumcision. Needless to say, these are longer-terminterventions whose impact will likely be manifested gradually.


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Children

When refugees and IDPs discuss issues of child protection, they overwhelmingly sited

education as their primary concern. Refugee children are provided a reasonable level of

primary education within the mandate of UNHCR. Diplomas awarded to pupils are still

not recognized by educational authorities in Sudan, a concern weighing on the minds ofrefugees as they envision their eventual return to their homes of origin. UNHCR is

negotiating with the authorities concerned, but has yet to obtain assurance of recognition

or validation. Of immediate concern, however, is the fact that infrastructures need to bemaintained/repaired and the number of classrooms expanded.

IDPs, on the other hand, do not receive guaranteed education, but are assisted through thelimited efforts of NGOs. Lacking classrooms, sufficient qualified teachers and adequate

teaching materials, the level of instruction to IDPs is not provided on the basis of a full

curriculum, but rather encadrement up to the level of third grade. Where someeducation is provided, absenteeism is a problem as children help their parents in the fields

or with the collection of firewood. The provision of school feeding was suggested as away of attracting children to attend class regularly.

Both refugees and IDPs reported recruitment by rebels and the Chadian army. While

recruitment is officially reported to be voluntary, there are many who believe that

coercion is involved. Refugees, in particular, suggested that the availability of secondaryeducation could provide youth with a constructive alternative to being recruited or to

succumbing to illicit activities. Due to the limited secondary educational opportunities in

the east of Chad, access for refugees will remain difficult and will also be problematicdue to the language constrains (English vs French)

Shelter and Non-Food Items

While some refugees, mainly those in the northern camps, are living in tents they weregiven upon their arrival, others have constructed semi-permanent shelters using a

combination of mud bricks, thatch, plastic sheeting and other available materials. IDPs,

in general, have greater access to local materials and have built their houses out of thetraditional mats with straw thatch roof. Refugee tents are showing the wear of years of

use. Many require repair and even replacement. Refugees are being encouraged to build

their own shelters using locally available materials, although some cite poor soil forbricks, as well as scarce wood and thatch as reasons why the international community

should continue distribution of shelter materials. While, these may be more easilyobtained around the southern camps of Jabal and Goz Amer, most refugees constructtheir shelters out of straw due to the availability of this commodity.

Distribution of jerry cans/water conservation kits and kitchen sets has not been systematic

and refugees requested replacement of these items.


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Persons With Special Needs

It was brought to the attention of the mission that improving the lives of persons with

special needs among all three populations (vulnerable segments of the population such as

widows and female-headed households, households with handicapped, aged or sick

dependents and families with numerous children under 5 years of age) require more thanjust basic assistance. With limited income-generating possibilities, there is a need for

new or strengthened mechanisms to identify who among the populations have special

needs, assess the type and quantity of those needs, and attend to them.

Registration

Refugees are registered and controlled in accordance with systematic protocols whichprovide for ID cards and ration cards. IDPs, on the other hand, are not formally

registered in a systematic fashion, but are listed as beneficiaries by individual NGOs for

the purposes of participating in programs of assistance. UNHCR, in concert withconcerned NGOs has carried out profiling exercises at IDP sites for the purpose of up-

dating IDP population figures. The latest exercise took place in September, 2008 and still

being finalized. Despite the concerted effort, data may not prove to be entirely reliable

owing to the fact that censuses were not conducted in all locations on the same day.Also, due to the seasonal timing, some IDPs may have gone uncounted while temporarily

back in their home villages tending to their planted fields.

It was reported in some camps that some households have managed to obtain multiple

ration cards while others have not been issued one. A case in point involves a number of

households in Farchana who refused to transfer to the less crowded Gaga camp in order

to remain united with their family members. Such situations oblige families with rationsto share them with those without ration cards.

On a final note, refugees on more than one occasion requested special IDs or traveldocuments that would permit them to circulate freely throughout Chad and even abroad

in search of employment and education for their children.

Recommendations Relating to Protection

In light of the findings and identified needs, the members of the JAM recommend the

following:

1. On behalf of the humanitarian community, that OCHA and UNHCR, in concertwith the UNCT, advocate for an intensification of EUFOR patrols, to the extent

that resources permit, around refugee camps and IDP sites, as well as areas wherethe two groups gather wood and plant during the duration of its mandate in Chad.

Similarly, they should advocate with DPKO that a successor peace keeping force


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be deployed with sufficient strength to provide adequate levels of patrols in the

countryside.

2. That the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), in concert with the members of theUNCT, advocate for increased humanitarian escort capacity in accordance with

the operational requirements for providing efficient and timely humanitarianservice.

3. That UNHCR advocates before MINURCAT that the latter expedite the trainingand full deployment of DIS in and around refugee camps. In addition that it

advocates with the DIS and Chadian military authorities for their commitment to

respect and safeguard the civilian and humanitarian character of camps and sites.

4. That UNHCR develops and implements capacity-building programs that energizeand strengthen refugee mixed committees (conflict resolution, elders, vigilance

and child protection committees) that have roles to play in protecting rights,

maintaining order and resolving conflicts. Likewise, that such committees beestablished where they do not yet exist, particularly in support of IDP-host

community relations. In this latter case, OCHA should take the lead in adaptingthe model(s) employed among refugees to the IDP context and promoting its

adoption by IDP representatives, local authorities and traditional community

leaders.

5. That UNHCR, in concert with UNFPA and NGO partners, reinforces existingprograms and plans/implements new programs, where such are lacking, toincrease awareness and controls against SGBV in camps and sites.

6. That UNHCR, in collaboration with CNAR, regularly carries out periodicverification of refugees residing in camps, to recognize births, deaths and

spontaneous arrivals, ensuring that mechanisms are in place to provide timely

issuance of ID cards and ration cards on the basis of that up-dated data.

7. That UNHCR, in concert with the UNCT and concerned NGOs, reinforcescoordinated monitoring, investigation, documentation and advocacy for cases ofunder-aged and/or coerced recruitment in camps and sites by the Chadian army

and other armed elements. In addition, that the HC use the findings to advocate

that the GOC and MINURCAT/DIS take the necessary actions to correct theidentified situations and ensure that similar cases do not occur.

8. That UNHCR, in concert with NGO partners, maintains and reinforces a systemand procedures for monitoring IDP movements from villages of origin to sites,

carrying out regular profiling updates for the purpose of maintaining accurate

demographic information on legitimate IDPs.


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9. That OCHA and UNHCR, in concert with NGO partners, establish and regularlyup-date a harmonized list of IDP beneficiaries for the purposes of humanitarianassistance.

10.That UNHCR, in concert with NGO partners, maintain and even expand

(resources permitting) its program of distribution of fuel efficient stoves to allrefugee households as well as provide alternative energy supplies for cooking

among refugee households. Similarly, OCHA in concert with UN agencies and

NGO partners and within the scope of the food security cluster, should initiate andexpand similar programs for IDP and host community households.

11.That UNHCR and UNICEF continue negotiating with Sudanese authoritiesrecognition/validation of school diplomas issued by schools conducted in refugee

camps in Chad.

12.That UNHCR, within the scope of UNCT programming and through the good

offices of the HC/RC, advocates for feasibility analysis and planning to increaseopportunities for secondary education for IDP, their hosts and refugee

populations.

13.That UNHCR and UNICEF, in concert with NGO partners, plan and implement aviable programme to provide school uniforms or appropriate clothing to childrenof targeted vulnerable refugee families as a means of promoting/ensuring school

attendance.

14.That UNHCR, in concert with NGO partners managing camps, finalise theassessment of shelter conditions in camps, and develops a plan/project forreplacing/repairing those units found to be deteriorated due to age and wear, with

refugee participation.

15.That UNHCR and WFP, in concert with NGO partners (within the scope of theProtection or Food Security Clusters) establish and implement a system and

procedures for periodic assessment/up-dating and data base documentation of

refugee, IDP and host community households that should be categorized asvulnerable or having special needs so that they might be accurately targeted

for appropriate assistance as warranted.

FOOD AID AND FOOD AVAILABILITY, ACCESS AND

UTILIZATION

At the core of living is the ability of a person or household to maintain a livelihoodthat meets, at the very least, ones ability to subsist. While food, along with water, is

fundamental to survival, living with a modicum of dignity requires more. To this


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effect, refugees and IDPs food security must be viewed in a broader context which

takes into account livelihoods in general.

Displacement has disrupted the livelihoods of refugees and IDPs, though to different

degrees, as a result of their social/political status in Chad as well as the productive

opportunities afforded to them by the environment in which they find themselvesdisplaced.

Availabili ty and Access

Access to food entails both the production of food for consumption as well as the

ability to buy food. Access to arable land for cultivation is limited for both refugees

and IDPs, though that available to refugees in the northern camps is far more limitedand of much less productive capacity. Refugees and IDPs to the south in Dar Sila

benefit from more favorable agricultural conditions, but more of it is already

cultivated by the local host population. Between 17%-19% of refugees in the Gaga,Farchana and Treguine camps report that they have acceptable access to land. 28%in Djabal report the same. Among IDPs, 35% report having had access to cultivable

land. Most cultivate no more than 1 hectare in grain.5

While the host populations have been generous in ceding part of their land to the

displaced, many (62% according to an Oxfam-Concern World Wide survey)6

report

that they compensate the owners either in cash or in kind. IDPs in Goz Beida andKoukou acknowledged there was more demand for land for the present planting

season and that locals seem to have either kept more for their own production or have

increased the amount they ask as rent. From 10,000 to 20,000 FCFA per hectare was

cited by respondents in Djabal and Koukou, respectively. While it is difficult toknow with certainty if the figure represents an exaggeration, it is rather safe to

assume that the law of supply and demand would bring about some degree of rent

increase. Also, local hosts have taken note that IDPs have received some food aidassistance and seeds while at the same time benefiting from the borrowed land. It

stands to reason that owners of the land would be interested in benefiting indirectly

from some of that assistance. IDPs acknowledge that land scarcity/cost has compelledmore male heads-of-households to take the risk of returning temporarily to their

villages of origin to cultivate their old fields. The above mentioned Oxfam-Concern

survey acknowledges that 40% of their respondents are making that move.

Local authorities acknowledged in all meetings that they are engaged in trying toallocate land to both refugees and IDPs. The authorities confirm that arable land is in

short supply and that the rental price that owners ask for the right to cultivate it hasdoubled over the last two years. Clearly, ecological realities and market forces under

present conditions do not favor IDPs finding sustainable solutions on their own. A

5WFP VAM Survey of Food Self-Sufficiency. December 2007

6 Concern World Wide and Oxfam-GB. Evaluation of Food Security in IDP Sites and Host Villages of Goz

Beida and Kerfi. May 2008


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solution lies well beyond humanitarian food and non-food assistance. An injection of

broader level assistance to subsidize a viable plan of temporary land-sharing amonghosts and displaced might assist local political and traditional authorities negotiate

acceptable arrangements that benefit all parties. This, however, requires a scale and

scope of analysis that surpassed the terms of reference for the assessment mission.

According to IDP respondents in Goz Beida and Koukou, with this seasons favorable

rains they expect to be able to harvest enough grain to meet their needs for about four

months. This compares favorably to 2007-2008 reports that grain harvest would lastno more than three months. Refugees in the north can count on much less, if

anything, from their own production.

Beside the amount of available land, other factors that limit farmers ability to grow

more grain is a lack of sufficient quality seed for planting, lack of technical advise on

crop care and pest control, lack of tools and equipment and weak market

opportunities.

To fill the food gap and meet other essential needs, refugees and IDPs engage in

income-generating activities (IGAs). Their main sources of income among refugeesare day labor and petty commerce, followed by the sale of firewood and food aid.

The sale of agricultural produce supplies, on average, less than 10% of refugee cash

income. IDPs also cite day labor as their primary source of income, followed by thesale of firewood, the sale of agricultural produce and petty commerce the latter

three contributing around 15% of income each.7

With greater numbers of IDPs making greater efforts to generate income from the

sale of firewood, straw for thatch and fiber for mats, the prices in the market for thoseitems is tending to fall, consequently eroding their purchasing power.

Most cash income is used to buy food (either to supplement the food aid package or

to compliment it with vegetables, spices, fresh/dried meat and fish, tea, etc.). Thenext major expense cited by both groups is for milling of grain. While persons with

whom the mission spoke did not offer specific amounts of income earned, secondary

sources have indicated that more than 50% of refugee households earn less than 5,000FCFA per week (USD 11.16). IDP households surveyed report weekly income which

averages between 3,500-7,000 FCFA (USD 7.80 15.60).8

As has already been noted as a protection issue, large refugee and IDP populations

are putting serious pressure on natural resources to the point of adversely affecting

the livelihoods of all three segments of the population and creating a source of tensionand even conflict.

The cost of milling is worth additional note in light of how it weighs on household

income and how it could affect the utilization of food aid. IDPs and refugees, alike,

7 WFP VAM Survey of Food Self-Sufficiency. December 20078 Idem.


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stated that they pay for milling in-kind with from 30-50% of the grain they bring for

milling. IDPs acknowledged that the cash charge for milling is 100 FCFA per koro(USD 0.09/kg). At first glance the in-kind price seems excessively high perhaps an

exaggeration. Yet when viewed in relation to the price of grain in the market which

ranges from 100 FCFA around the time food aid is distributed to 250 FCFA in the

days leading up to distribution it would take a 1 koro of grain to cover the 100FCFA cash cost of milling one koro of grain right after distribution.

The same problem was noted in the last two JAMs of 2004 and 2006. The latterrecommended increasing the cereal ration by 50g/p/d to compensate for loss in

milling; while in 2006 providing hand-operated mills in all camps. Subsequently,

hand-operated mills were found to be inappropriate for milling hard grains and theuse of mechanical mills was offered as an option. The mill solution took into account

refugees, but at the time the IDP problem had not reached the level it is at today.

Utilization

According to a survey of food consumption carried out in as part of WFPs December2007 Food Self-sufficiency Survey among the refugee, IDP and host populations of

eastern Chad, the majority of all three groups possess, on average, limited to poor

levels of food consumption (58.2%, 58.9% and 57.8%, respectively) . The averagelevels of consumption are summarized as follows:

Table 3: Average Levels of Food Consumptions (Refugees, IDPs, Host Population)

Population Poor Consumption Limited Consumption

Refugees (12 camps) 22.3% 35.9%

IDPs (5 sites) 33.4% 22.5%

Hosts (7 villages) 24.2% 33.6%

Consumption levels were determined on the basis of a nutritional quality of products

consumed as well as the frequency they are generally consumed. Those householdsclassified as having poor consumption usually consumed only one or two meals per

day, with grain being the predominant component of the diet. Protein and

micronutrients from animal and vegetable sources vary according to each households

access to external food aid, its own production and capacity to purchase from IGAs.

Refugees and IDPs sell portions of their food rations in order to pay for milling or to

buy other food items to vary their diets. When maize was distributed as the grain

portion of the ration, many recipients sold it to buy sorghum and millet, which aremore to their liking.

While food distributions are provided to refugees on the basis of the actual registered

beneficiaries in each household, those rations are occasionally shared with

households which do not possess a ration card for one reason or another. IDPs rationshave been provided on an average assumption of a 5-person household. Those


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households with greater numbers of dependents must use their own resources to fill

the gap or rely on other families to share some of their rations.

Food Aid

During the past year WFP programming called for monthly General Food

Distributions (GFD) to refugees. In view of their relatively better livelihood options,IDPs received GFD for four months in order to carry them through the lean period

before harvest and to ensure that farmers conserved seed rather than consumed it.

The daily individual ration of 425g of cereal, 50g of CSB, 50g of pulses, 15g ofsugar, 25g of vegetable oil and 5g of salt was composed to provide 2,100

Kcal/person/day.

Since the beginning of 2008, pipeline constraints kept WFP from being able to bring

the required quantities of supplies through either the Libyan or the Cameroonian

corridors, forcing distributions to often be less that the planned package. Cereals andsalt were the products that were most often in short supply. Refugees received toppriority in receiving regular monthly distributions at the highest levels that supplies

would permit. IDP distributions suffered more irregularity. Therefore, refugee

beneficiaries received from 1,700 to 2,000 Kcal/p/d. Full ration distributions havebeen restored since September, 2008.

Refugees report that their ration generally lasts a maximum of 20 days while IDPsreport theirs lasting only 10. As alluded to above, reduced basic food ration

distribution, milling costs, sales to purchase complimentary food and essential non-

food items and sharing of rations with unregistered families readily explain the reason

for the short fall. As reported in Oxfam-Concern and World Concern livelihoodssurveys, IDPs report sometimes using food aid to repay debts to market vendors.

A problem of unregistered households was raised in all camps. Also somehouseholds have been able to obtain multiple ration cards. Among IDPs, the

existence of multiple beneficiary lists, managed separated by NGOs in accordance

with their programming and operations lends itself to potentially worthy beneficiariesfalling through the cracks or others collecting multiple assistance.

IDPs acknowledged that limited food stocks should be targeted to those householdswith the greatest need. Representatives spoken to are not resistant to targeted

distribution and would be cooperative in carrying out a fair targeting process.

Refugees and IDPs were in overwhelming agreement that maize is not their cereal ofpreference. In fact beneficiaries are more inclined to exchange maize for sorghum or

millet on an even exchange. Otherwise, all other commodities in the food basket are

generally accepted.


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Finally, it was noted that Food Basket Monitoring (FBM) and Post Distribution

Monitoring (PDM) was undertaken in only six of twelve camps; and in thoselocations, only up to June, 2008. Lack of budget was cited as the factor that kept

NGO partners from monitoring. Similar monitoring was not carried out with regard

to the limited distributions to IDPs.

Self-Reliance

Under the present condition of demographic pressure on scarce resources and the

current security situation, it is not reasonable in the short run and within the scope ofhumanitarian response that sustainable solutions for IDP self-sufficiency in grain and

overall livelihoods self-reliance be achieved. Nor can continued ecological

degradation continue without seriously affecting the livelihoods of host populations.

Some NGOs have begun started planning and implementing projects of a transitional

nature along the lines of community development. Mostly in areas of livelihoodsdevelopment and soil & water conservation, their methodologies call for communityparticipation and some form of counterpart investment on the part of the

beneficiaries. Some NGOs are becoming concerned that prolonged free GFD is

stifling willingness among IDPs participate in projects designed to address longer-term needs.

While IDPs will not reap the long-term benefits that many community developmentprojects should generate, they could be motivated by Food-for-Work (FFW) or Cash-

for-Work (CFW), to join in infrastructure development projects alongside their local

hosts. Such shared involvement might serve to ease some tensions rising between the

communities. Transitions from free humanitarian assistance to more structureddevelopmental assistance are not smooth and easy. Success in this regard will require

a unification of targeting criteria, messages to beneficiaries and strategies by all

concerned aid organizations as well as interventions by specialized developmentactors.

In Summary

Though refugees have developed certain coping mechanisms based limited IGAs,

they are, and will continue to be, dependent on food aid for a significant part of their

subsistence for the foreseeable future.

Even though the mission did not see indicators that a food crisis exists or is

foreseeable for the coming months among IDPs, it did note that moderate to very high

vulnerability exists in many households. While agricultural production and IGAsmay meet their cereal needs for several months, a food deficit during the course of the

year is quite certain. While coping mechanisms should be factored in to the quantity,

make up and timing of assistance provided, it will be important to avoid obliging


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IDPs to draw upon their coping mechanisms to the point that they are fully depleted

or rendered ineffective (i.e. selling off what few small animals they might own; ordeforesting to the extent that resources are no longer available). IDPs will require

food aid and non-food aid assistance in the coming year. Aid organizations must be

in a position to anticipate food security improvements or food crises. PDM along

with periodic livelihoods surveys will be important tools for such early warning andtargeting.

Recommendations

16.That WFP continue providing GFD rations to refugees with an energy value of2,100 Kcal/p/d. Food aid to IDPs, either in the form of GFD or Food-For-Workshould be determined in terms of timing and level through a targeted approach

based on food security analysis.

17.That WFP, in concert with partner NGOs, and within the scope of the FoodSecurity Cluster, carry out and periodically up-date systematic assessments of

IDP vulnerabilities for use in targeting.

18.That WFP maintain the same food package as presently provided, utilizing wheat,sorghum or millet as the grain component. Corn/maize should not be used as it is

not accepted by eastern beneficiaries and would be more likely to be sold.

19.That UNHCR should finalize a draft strategy and business plan for providingappropriate grain mills to refugees (including technical and economic viability

analysis) for joint technical review with WFP. Since this recommendation is stilloutstanding from an earlier JAM, planning and implementation should be taken

without delay. WFP should stand ready to finance and procure sufficient mills to

fulfill the business plan.Both organizations should consider taking measures to extend whatever viable

solution is provided to refugees to IDPs as well, seeking the necessary funding

from donors as required.

20.That WFP increase the size of the cereal ration, as an interim measure pending asustainable solution, to off-set losses to beneficiaries through milling.

21.That UNHCR, WFP and concerned NGOs within the scope of the food securitycluster, review and negotiate consensus criteria and methods for designing andimplementing general relief, income-generating and other communitydevelopment activities among refugees, IDPs and host communities so as to avoid

contradictions in purpose and results among assistance activities and to foster, to

the extent possible, conditions favorable to livelihoods development.


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22.That WFP and FAO, in concert with UNHCR and NGO partners, and within thescope of the Food Security Cluster, lead a process of design and planning of soiland water conservation projects, including elements of reforestation within the

scope of community-based livelihoods development implemented by partners

supporting refugees, IDPs and host populations.

23.That UNHCR, in concert with WFP and partner NGOs, launch capacity-buildinginitiatives to energize and support Mixed Committees in taking charge of

finding and carrying out solutions for the proper management of natural resourcessuch as water, wood/trees and land for farming and grazing among refugee and

host populations. WFP and UNHCR should carry out similar initiatives among

IDP and host populations. In both cases, the participation and support of localauthorities, along with specialized development actors should be obtained.

24.That FAO, in concert with line ministry partners and NGO partners, plans andimplements reinforced vaccination campaigns for livestock in refugee, IDP and

host community areas.

25.That WFP, in concert with OCHA, UNHCR and NGO partners, resumeimmediately regular Food Basket Monitoring and Post Distribution Monitoring in

all refugee camps. Such monitoring should be extended to distribution programs

for IDPs and host community populations as well. WFP and partner NGOsshould ensure that adequate resources are called for in MOUs and those resources

should be duly allocated to ensure implementation

HEALTH, NUTRITION AND WATER & SANITATION

Health

A system of health care managed by specialized NGOs has been in place in all refugee

camps since their establishment. Services are regular and awareness-building andeducational campaigns appear to be having positive effects on the health status of

refugees. Morbidity is generally attributed to respiratory infections and diarrhea,

understandable given shelter and sanitary conditions in camps. However, morbidity and

mortality rates are considered within acceptable standards set by WHO, attesting to thefact that appropriate medical attention is available.

One temporary weakness in the system presently exists in two camps in Iriba, whereMSF-Luxembourg suddenly withdrew due to threats made by ex-local staff. The sudden

departure of two expatriate doctors and one expatriate nurse has, for the moment, left

health care in the hands of one nurse in each camp which UNHCR put in place as atemporary measure in agreement with the Ministry of Health.

There have been health management changes in the Bredjing and Farchana camps, aswell. MSF-Netherlands ended its activities in Farchana in July and SCF-UK suddenly


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withdrew from Bredjing following the murder of its country director in May. MSF

handed over its activites in Farchana to a local NGO partner, CSSI, and in Bredjing, IRChas taken over the health sector.

While primary care in the camps is adequately provided for by current services, second

level reference services for refugees residing in camps around Farchana and Bahai areproblematic owing to the distances between the camps and reference facilities. Both the

distance and the insecurity faced when traveling that distance pose problems for timely

care.

A new Health Information System has been put in place in the camps through the

coordination of all concerned partners. It is expected that it will facilitate a standardizedanalysis of data and a more systematic/coordinated implementation of appropriate

actions. One exception is in Iriba, where MSF-Luxembourg maintains its own

information system.

IDPs can have access to health care through the state health structures operating in thevillages/districts where they are currently residing. The system is being strengthened in

Goz Beida by programs being implemented by several NGOs, including COOPI, MSFFrance, and MSF Holland. Health posts established with provisional infrastructure

operate in the larger sites in Dar Sila by NGOs. Those in Assongha (Alacha, Goudiang

and Arkoun) are served by MSF Holland, which operates mobile clinics serving thosesites from 1-3 times per week. Despite weakness common to the health care system in

general, the health conditions of IDPs are found to be within international standards rated

acceptable under the circumstances.

Among all populations, the Expanded Program for Immunization (EPI) has achieved an82.5% mean coverage for measles across all camps. According to a recent nutritional

survey conducted by UNHCR, EPI coverage is 94.6% for measles in all of the eastern

refugee camps. Similar acceptable levels of coverage were reported in September for

three IDP sites (Gassire, Dogdore and Gouroukoun) by Accion Contre le Faim (ACF).Coverage in the former two sites was 83.9% and 87.5%, respectively on the basis of

vaccination card confirmation and mothers testimony. Gourounkoun lagged at 64.3%

coverage. HIV/AID awareness and education programs are implemented amongrefugees, IDPs and hosts. Yet, information is not being collected in a way that will

provide camp and site-specific data on HIV infection rates.

Some camp health centers are still housed in buildings that were built during the

emergency phase as a temporary structures. The materials used (notably, plastic

sheeting) do not stand up to the test of time and require frequent replacement.

Nutrition

The nutritional status of refugee children ages 6-59 months has diminished since 2006 tolevels that are no longer considered normal according to WHO standards and require

close follow up. Overall Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) for all camps in July/August,


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2008 stood at 12.3%.9

Eight out of twelve camps exceeded the warning point of 10%

GAM (the other four ranged from 8.6% to 9.9%). Highest levels of GAM were recordedamong 18-29 month old children many of whom are undergoing premature weaning

due to their mothers being pregnant.

Most recent nutritional data from a survey conducted by ACF in three IDP sites in mid-September, 2008, shows more acceptable levels of 4.7% in Gouroukoun, 5.8% in

Dogdore, but 10.1% in Gassire. This compares to May/June, 2007 data showing

extremely high levels of GAM among IDP children. The timing of the latter surveys(coming in the wake of major multiple displacements) and methodological weaknesses

are cited as reasons for the alarmingly high levels reported. More recently, an increase in

programmed assistance to IDPs, including improved opportunities for day laborassociated with projects under implementation, and a relatively recent 90-day lean

period/seed protection GFD by WFP in all sites may well have contributed to a

stabilization of nutritional status.

Active nutritional screening, in effect in all camps since 2005, has not fully covered allchildren from 6 to 59 months. Some children who should be enrolled in selective feeding

programs are falling through the cracks, as evidenced by the spike in GAM levels among18-29 month old children. It was also noted that attendance at MCHN centers experience

declines during planting and harvesting seasons. This may be the result of mothers

taking their children with them to the fields or leaving them with other family members(most likely grandparents) who are less inclined to bring the children to the selective

programs.

Education programs to promote effective weaning have been initiated in the camps but

reproductive health education still represents further challenges, evidenced by the factthat nearly 60% of mothers bringing children to selective feeding programs are pregnant.

It was noted that the Maternal-Child Health and Nutrition program with its supplemental

feeding has been temporarily suspended in two of the Iriba camps since May 2008 owingto the departure of MSF-L. Also, nutritional programs managed by MSF-Netherlands

have yet to undertake treatment of malnutrition according to national protocols.

Water and Sanitation

The provision of potable water to refugees and IDPs appears to be under control, thoughthe average amount provided is still below the Sphere standard of 15 liters/p/d.

Deliveries to refugees average 13 liters/p/d, the same amount provided on average toIDPs.

Although the existing water and sanitation systems are designed according to emergency

models, long term and sustainable solutions are being developed by UNHCR and

9 UNHCR/UNICEF/NGO Nutrition Surveys. July-August 2008


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UNICEF in concert with the Ministry of Environment and Water in partnership with

CARE and Oxfam.

Sanitation proves to be a continual challenge in all camps. Particularly in the Farchana

camps, many communal latrines are full, open and generally un-hygienic, resulting in

their abandonment by refugees. A new orientation has been initiated to establish familylatrines intended to replace the community latrines established during the emergency

phase. UNHCR and its partners note that this will take time and requires the active

participation of the beneficiaries.

Irregular and/or insufficient distribution of soap to refugees contributes to less-than-

proper hygiene practices. Likewise, jerry can distributions have not kept pace with theirdeterioration over time.

Recommendations

26.That UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA and WHO produce more awareness-buildingand educational material in the language(s) and adapted to the culture of refugees

and IDPs, particularly in the areas of: exclusive breast feeding practices, hygiene

and sanitation; weaning practices; female reproductive health; HIV/AIDS; andnutrition.

27.That UNHCR, in concert with the Ministry of Health and NGO partners,gradually replaces all health center infrastructures constructed with temporary

emergency materials with permanent or semi-permanent buildings.

28.That WHO, in concert with the Ministry of Health, study the feasibility of, planand implement a project to upgrade the infrastructure and strengthen the technicalresources required to make the Health Center at Hadjer Hadid a referral point,

particularly for emergency obstetrics and pediatrics.

29.That UNAIDS and UNICEF, in concert with UNHCR, WFP, the Ministry ofHealth and NGO partners, intensify awareness-building and prevention activitiesin camps and sites, with particular attention to developing appropriate means of

gathering information on the incidence of HIV/AIDS in camps and sites as a first

step toward effective targeting of health, nutrition and psycho-social services.

30.That UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF, in concert with NGO partners, plan andimplement an enhanced nutritional screening system in camps, IDP sites and hostcommunities based on the target of achieving full coverage of children between 6and 59 months of age.

31.That UNICEF, in concert with WFP, UNHCR and NGO partners, plan andimplement enhanced supervision and technical assistance to nutrition centers

operating in camps, sites and district hospitals.


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32.That MSF-Netherlands, with the support UNICEF, implement national protocolsfor the treatment of malnutrition in the nutrition centers it operates.

33.That UNICEF plan and implement capacity-building activities in support of local

NGOs which have replaced MSF Holland.

34.That UNHCR and UNICEF plan, budget and execute regular distributions ofsufficient quantities of soap, jerry cans and plastic sheeting to refugee householdsand vulnerable IDP and host community households.

35.That UNHCR and UNICEF, in concert with NGO partners, intensify planning andimplementation of family latrine construction projects in all camps with active

refugee participation, but most urgently in Farchana camps.

36.That UNHCR and UNICEF, in concert with NGO partners, technically assess

current water management practices for all purposes in camps and sites,respectively, and design/propose an enhanced conceptual and technical strategies

that will contribute to meeting the target of ensuring 15 liter/p/d of potable water.

LOGISTICS

The Pipeline

The food aid pipeline from funding source to beneficiary is a long, multi-faceted process

that involves multiple actors in numerous countries with different procedures and

operational time frames. Any one actor/process/incident has the potential of being a keyrate-controlling factor. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that WFP plan andmanage the pipeline with the full timely cooperation of all actors along the action chain.

It is by now recognized that the time from Call-Forward to arrival of food shipments atEDPs in Chad is at least six months. Timing is also crucial so as to ensure that enough

stock arrives in country before the closure of roads during the rainy season. WFP has had

in place a plan for pre-positioning sufficient commodities which has been carried outreasonably well. During the course of the operation commodity shortages has resulted in

distribution at times being reduced by up to 20% of planned levels.

Accessibili ty

Roads

As a regular course of its logistical operations, WFP has assessed road conditions and has

identified several choke points, particularly involving rainy season deterioration or

blockages at wadis. This is particularly the case in southeastern Chad in the Goz Beidaarea.


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The following road rehabilitation projects are currently planned:

Table 4: Planned Road Rehabilitation Projects

Road Donor/ProgramGoz Beida Koukou Goz Amir

Goz Beida - Kerfi

European Union

Programme dAppui a la Stabilization

Abeche Goz Beidaw/ bridge over Ouadai Bata

Swiss Development Agency/Ministry of Infrastructure

Oum Hadjer - Abeche Chinese Cooperation(underway: completion in 2010)

Air Operations

The poor condition of airstrips has been noted in all field offices visited by the mission,

resulting in inaccessibility of most sites during and after rainfall. It should be particularly

noted that Koukou was cut off for a period of more than a month during the 2008 rains.Also in the case of Koukou, UNHAS flights are not authorized to take off and land from

that airstrip due to flight security caused by trees located too close to the ends of the strip.OCHA has been negotiating the necessary authorizations to cut down the trees to

specifications, but such has yet to be granted.

Some humanitarian users expressed an opinion that rotations to all field offices are notalways regular or are not adequate to meet operational needs that change over time or at

particular moments in time. Users also suggested that some form of simple shelter at

each strip would shield passengers awaiting flights from very harsh sun.

Storage

Food is stored in Rubbhall/Wiikhall tent warehouses. It was observed that not all tents

were erected on top of foundations. Without an impermeable foundation, commoditiesare placed at serious risk of water damage during the rainy season.

It was also noted that the Kounougou warehouse was not yet protected by perimeter

fencing.

Presently, warehouse keepers carry out their record keeping inside the tent warehouses.

These can become very hot during the peak of the dry season. Such conditions do not

represent a work environment conducive to efficiency.

Commodity Quality Control

In several warehouses visited, grains were noted to be infested. Fumigation is generally

required during the rainy season when warehouses are full and when the heat combined

with humidity increase the risk of food stocks infestation. In Chad, poor fumigation


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service availability and quality of service by local providers represents a continual

challenge.

The problem had been identified on a timely basis by warehouse keepers, but fumigation

could not be carried out for lack of the appropriate pesticide. The delay was due to a

glitch in the procurement chain and compounded by some confusion over whether theproduct in question could be flown in under international airline safety regulations. The

issue was favorably settled and fumigation was anticipated soon after the JAM.

Questionable cases have been noted of bags arriving from Libya underweight or partially

filled with sand. Port survey reports indicate that the bags in question were discharged in

good condition. The precise circumstances involving the cause/source of the problemwas not known at the time of the JAM, though WFP has dispatched a logistics officer to

investigate the matter in Libya and along the transport route to try to determine the cause

and an appropriate solution.

In some warehouses spoiled/contaminated food was noticed as still stored in the samelocation as sound supplies.

Coordination

A Logistics Cluster was formally activated in Chad at the beginning of 2008. Its aim is tooptimise the use of logistics resources available with concerned organizations by

providing a platform of information sharing and operational coordination for enhancing

predictability, timeliness and efficiency of the logistics response.

Fortnightly meetings are held in Abch and monthly meetings take place in Ndjamenaunder the lead of WFPs logistics cluster focal point.In order to reinforce the logistics cluster and provide a stable and sustainable service to

the humanitarian community, WFP has launched in September 2008 a Special Operation:

An inter-agency fleet of trucks will be set up to address the most urgent needs. The use of

these trucks will be managed by the logistics cluster according to the priorities defined bythe group.

An interagency Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA) to provide a comprehensiveoverview of all logistics related activities in Chad is being coordinated by WFP and is in

the process of being finalised.

Recommendations

37.That WFP continue to structure its fund-raising strategy and actions to generatethe necessary resources on time to be able to make commodity call-forwards six

months ahead of required commodity arrivals for full distribution.


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38.That WFP lobby for timely road rehabilitation implementation and monitorprogress.

39.That WFP, in concert with OCHA, lobby concerned actors to completeplanned/required air strip maintenance as quickly as possible.

40.That UNHAS periodically conduct reviews of user requirements and factor themin to flight rotation planning.

41.That WFP/UNHAS construct simple low-cost structures for accommodatingpassengers awaiting humanitarian flights at field office airstrips.

42.That WFP budget for and finalize work underway to construct foundations for alltent warehouses where they are lacking.

43.That WFP finalize work under way to construct a perimeter fences around all

warehouses where they are lacking.

44.That WFP construct cost-effective offices outside separate from the tentwarehouses.

45.That WFP should procure and maintain adequate stocks of pesticides so as tofumigate infested products on a timely basis once a problem is noted.

46.That WFP conclude its investigation into the problem of under-weight/tamperedbags arriving from Libya and take the necessary corrective actions as warranted

by its findings.

47.That WFP should implement in a timely manner the agencys standard proceduresfor the isolation and disposal of spoiled food.

PARTNERSHIPS, PLANNING and OTHER ISSUES

WFP and UNHCR have engaged in an annual Joint Plan of Action (JPA) in 2008 on thebasis of the findings and recommendations of the last Joint Assessment Mission. The

JPA has been regularly reviewed in quarterly coordination meetings of WFP and

UNHCR staff. In addition, monthly

final report: joint assessment mission (jam), the humanitarian crisis created by the displacement of...

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