financing under asymmetric information 3th set of transparencies for tocf
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FINANCING UNDER ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION
3th set of transparencies for ToCF
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INTRODUCTION2 types of asymmetric information
I.
investors / insiders among investorsLEMONS WINNER'S CURSE
Issue of claims may be motivated by insurance project financing, liquidity need
Asymmetry of information about
value of assets in place, prospects attached to new investment, quality of collateral.
level riskiness
Two themes:(1)market breakdown
(2)costly signaling
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Asymmetric information may account for a number of observations, e.g.,:
negative stock price reaction to equity issuance (and smaller reaction during booms),
pecking-order hypothesis (issue low-information-intensity securities first),
market timing.
Asymmetric information predicts dissipative signals (besides lack of financing), e.g.:
private placements, limited diversification, insufficient liquidity, dividend distribution, excess collateralization, underpricing.
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MARKET BREAKDOWNII.
Privately-known-prospects model
• Wealth A = 0, investment cost I.• Project succeeds (R) or fails (0).• Risk neutrality, LL, and zero interest rate in economy.• No moral hazard.
Two borrower types
either pR > I > qR (only good type is creditworthy)
or pR > q R > I (both types are creditworthy)
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Symmetric information benchmark
Cross subsidy:
• • Not incentive compatible under asymmetric information.
Asymmetric information
Overinvestment if bad borrower is not credit worthy.
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Measure of adverse selection
Counterpart of agency cost under moral hazard
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(1) Market timing
Good borrower can refuse to be financed. Hence pooling only if:
Extensions
Financing feasible when ( m + ) R I.Adverse selection parameter smaller in booms ( large).
(2) Negative stock price reaction and going public decision
Entrepreneur already has an existing project, with probability of success p or q.
Deepening investment would increase probability of success by
Financing?
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Separating equilibrium (only bad borrower raises funds)
Negative stock price reaction upon issuance.
(3) Pecking-order hypothesis (Myers 1984)
“information sensitivity”
(1) internal finance
(2) senior debt
(3) junior debt, convertible
(4) equity (“last resort”)
Entrepreneur’s cash
Retained earnings
Information free?
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Payoff in case of failure is now RF > 0Payoff in case of success is RS = RF + R.
Max {good borrower's payoff}s.t.investors break even in expectation
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Unlimited amount of collateral
RESPONSES TO THE LEMONS PROBLEMII.
COSTLY COLLATERAL PLEDGING
PRIVATELY-KNOWN-PROSPECTS MODEL
No moral hazard
probability p or q
good type
bad type
R0
Pledge value C ( < C )for investors
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SYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Assume both types are creditworthy they don’t pledge collateral.
Allocation is not incentive compatible under AI.
Define
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ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Separating allocation:
and
Both constraints must be binding 2 equations with 2 unknowns
Note: safe payment
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DETERMINANTS OF COLLATERALIZATION
Positive covariation collateral-quality of borrower (NPV)
more collateral
SEPARATING ALLOCATION UNIQUE EQUILIBRIUM IF
where
Z: conditional on Suppose (to the contrary) q small, then no need for collateral.
p fixed, more collateral
(agency problem )
Z: MH story reverse conclusion! Collateral boosts debt capacity (MH: bad borrower defined as one who does not get funded if he does not pledge collateral).
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General idea: good borrower tries to signal good prospects by increasing the sensitivity of his own returns to the privy information reducing the investors’ claims’ sensitivity to this information.
LOW INFORMATION INTENSITY SECURITIESIV
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ARE LOW INFORMATION INTENSITY CLAIMS
ALWAYS DEBT CLAIMS?
No:
LOutcome M H
“good type”(higher expected returns)
“bad type”
Suboptimal risk sharing Leland-Pyle 1977. Underpricing. ST financing, Monitoring (certification).
OTHER SIGNALING DEVICES
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APPENDIX 1
Hard to have separation:
PRIVATELY-KNOWN-PRIVATE-BENEFIT MODEL WITH MORAL HAZARD
Only borrower knows BA=0
bad type's utility good type's
Model
Outcome
Probability : BL
Probability 1 : BH
BH > BL
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Assumptions
(Only "good type" gets financed under SI)
Pooling. Define by
investors lose money
Only possibility:
no lending (breakdown)
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lending possible
BEST EQUILIBRIUM (for borrower) :
Cross-subsidies
where
"Reduced quality of lending" (relative to SI)
reduced NPV.
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(generalizes to n types)
2 types
Contractual terms (possibly random) : c
Example: c = Rb
b probability b probability 1-~
APPENDIX 2
CONTRACT DESIGN BY AN INFORMED PARTY (ADVANCED)
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etc.
Example : privately-known-private-benefit model
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c tailored for b
tailored for
ISSUANCE GAME
Borrower offerscontract
Investors accept / refuse
(If acceptance) borrower exercises option
Remarks:
can be "no funding"
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DEFINITIONS
Note: first and third necessary conditions for equilibrium behavior.
is
INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE IF
PROFITABLE TYPE-BY-TYPE IF
PROFITABLE IN EXPECTATION IF
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Interim efficient allocation= undominated in the set of allocations that are IC and profitable
in expectation.
Remark: profitable type-by-type is not "information intensive" (is "safe", "belief free").
LOW INFORMATION INTENSITY OPTIMUM (LIIO) FOR TYPE b:
Payoff where c0 maximizes b’s utility in set of allocations that are IC and profitable type-by-type:
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Similar definition for
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Lemma: LIIO is incentive compatible.
Proof: Suppose, e.g., that Consider solution of LIIO program for b:
Intuition: same constraints for both programs.
BORROWER CAN GUARANTEE HIMSELF HIS LIIO.
(1) Issuance game has unique PBE if LIIO interim efficient
(2) If LIIO interim inefficient, set of equilibrium payoffs = feasible
payoffs that dominate LIIO payoffs.
PROPOSITION
not LIIO for after all.
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SYMMETRIC INFORMATION ALLOCATION
ASSUMPTION: (very weak): MONOTONICITY / TYPE:
solves
and similarly for
(always satisfied if not creditworthy, for example).
SEPARATING ALLOCATION
must get at least this in equilibrium
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PROPOSITION: under monotonicity assumption
Proof:LIIO= separating allocation
IC by definition (note could offer )
Type b can get the separating payoff: offers
Type can get offers which is safe for investors.
both types prefer (at least weakly) separating allocation to LIIO.
LIIO
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with
PROPOSITION: under monotonicity assumption
Optimum of this program:
SEPARATING ALLOCATION (LIIO) IS INTERIM EFFICIENT IFF
Consider
constraints satisfied for
separating equilibriumimpossible
constraints satisfied for ' > .