Reader in “Security Challenges in the Post-Soviet Space”

Security problems in the post-Soviet space

Topic 2. International consequences of the USSR collapse.

2.1 Consequences for the Soviet Republics2.2 Creation of the CIS2.3 Consequences for the relations with the West2.4 Consequences for the relations with the Third World

2.1 Consequences for the Soviet Republics

At the brink of the USSR collapse there have already been numerous signs that indicated that there could be a huge blood bath that would engulf all or most of the Soviet Republics. A bloody conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan had been waged since 1989. Since 1989 conflicts between Georgia South Ossetia and Abkhazia resulted in numerous victims and ethnic cleansing. Transnistrian conflict was ripe in Moldova. Chechen conflict grew in Russia. A civil war with the Uzbekistan and Russia involvement was waged in Tajikistan. And so on, and so, on.

The Soviet economy was in dire straits and could not longer provide for the basic needs of the population of the Soviet Republics. Peoples became very angry at their political leaders, mass meetings, demonstrations and strikes became widespread. The communist leadership in Moscow headed by General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev decided not to interfere with force in the conflicts. Moscow chose wait and see tactical approach. It’s finally dawned on the local Party leaders that they are left along by Moscow to deal with the hungry and angry populaces. In order to be able to tackle the problems the local political elites had to have powers to make rules and to act at will. But all major rules were still made in Moscow and it was Moscow leadership that still had all the powers (at least in the book). Leaders of some Soviet Republics started to act with complete disregard of the Moscow policies (Armenia, Georgia), others were bombarding Moscow with requests and demands (Azerbaijan, Tajikistan), some chose to sit and do nothing (Belarus).

The prevalent mood of that period was vividly described by Vladimir Isakov, member of the Belarus Supreme Soviet in 1990-1993: “The expectations were that once the USSR fell apart, an upsurge would begin. Grass would turn green in winter, everything would fall in place miraculously. But none of that happened. It turned out that someone had to do the reforms, and it’s a hard and laborious job, which no one was prepared for. Everybody was busy trying to grab a piece of the power cake, and after they were done, all the problems they began with were still there”.

2.2 Creation of the CIS

The leaders of the Slavic Republics of the USSR – Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine – decided to meet in Belarus, in hunting resort Belovezhskaya Pushcha on December 8, 1991, to resolve or at least mitigate the crisis that engulfed the Soviet Union. In his memoires published in Moscow in 2016 Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus Stanislav Shushkevich wrote: “I invited them to Pushcha to ask the Russian Federation to help us with oil and gas supplies so we would not freeze” ( СтаниславШушкевич. , Мояжизнь

. ., 2016). Although there was some discussion крах и воскрешение СССР Мamong the leaders as to how the USSR’s problems could be solved, it quickly became clear that the Soviet Union itself was the problem.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk made it clear that his country wanted out of the USSR – a position backed by a Ukrainian referendum, in which the public overwhelmingly voted to leave the Soviet Union. S.Shushkevich notes: “Gennady Burbulis [aide to Russian President Boris Eltsin] made a suggestion: would you undersign the words that “USSR as a geopolitical reality and a subject of the international law ceases to exist”. I was the first to say – I would sign!” [Ibidem].

Though the gathering in Belovezhskaya Pushcha was aimed at somehow change the situation in the Soviet Union for the better, no one there was really prepared to create an entirely new political entity. They had no administrative staff with them, so the leaders had to improvise. The director of Belovezhskaya Pushcha was ordered to get his secretary with a typewriter machine. It took her a long time to type the text of the Belovezha Accords because she was typing with one finger. Finally, two-page Belovezha Accords was written and signed by the leaders of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.

The Belovezha Accords declared the Soviet Union effectively dissolved and established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its place. Some doubts were expressed (especially, in Central Asian Republics) over the authority of the three leaders to dissolve the Union. According the 1977 Soviet Constitution the Soviet Republics had the right only to secede from it. Nevertheless, on December 12, 1991 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic ratified the Belovezha Accords on behalf of Russia and at the same time denounced the 1922 Treaty on the Creation of the Soviet Union. As it turned out the Belovezha Accords with all their legal and substantive deficiencies managed to provide for a peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Empire.

Between 8 and 21 December 1991 the three original signatories of the Belovezha Accords were joined by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. When Georgia joined in 1993 all of the former Republics of the USSR, except the Baltic States who always considered themselves occupied territories, had become members of the CIS. (Georgia withdrew in 2009 following its armed conflict with Russia over South Ossetia in 2008). The CIS Headquarters is situated in Minsk.

Topic 1. Security challenges inherited from the USSR

Twenty two years ago, the leaders of three Soviet republics - Russia, Ukraine and Belarus - signed an agreement which consigned the Soviet Union to history and marked the birth of new nations.

On December 8, 1991, in Belovezhskaya pushcha (Belarus) there was written and signed a two-page agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. This agreement, as it turned out managed to provide for a peaceful dissolution of the Soviet empire.

The agreement which declared the Soviet Union effectively dissolved and established the Commonwealth of Independent States in its place on December 8, 1991 is called “The Belavezha Accords” after the place where it was signed.   While doubts remained over the authority of the leaders of three of the 15 Soviet republics to dissolve the Union, according to the 1977 Soviet Constitution, Soviet republics had the right to secede freely from it. On December 12, 1991 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic ratified the accords on behalf of Russia and at the same time denounced the 1922 Treaty on the Creation of the Soviet Union.

The leaders of the USSR's founding countries – Ukraine, Belarus and Russia – decided to meet in Belovezha to resolve the crisis that engulfed the USSR. Although there was some discussion as to how the USSR's problems could be solved, it quickly became clear that the Soviet Union itself was part of the problem.  

Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk made it clear his country wanted out – a position backed by a referendum there in which the public voted overwhelmingly to leave.

Though the gathering in Belovezhskaya Pushcha was aimed at somehow changing the situation in the Soviet Union, no-one

there was really prepared for the creation of an entirely new political entity.

They had no administrative staff with them, so they had to improvise…

The director of the reserve was given an order, and he brought his secretary along with a typewriter. It took her a long time to type the text. She just typed with one finger on each hand.

The Belovezha Accords effectively brought about the end of the USSR.

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), community of independent nations established by the Belovezha Accords signed Dec. 8, 1991, by the heads of state of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Between Dec. 8 and Dec. 21, the three original signatories were joined by Armenia, Azerbaijan (its parliament, however, rejected ratifying its membership until 1993), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. When Georgia joined in 1993 all of the former republics of the USSR except the Baltic states had become members of the CIS. Georgia withdrew in 2008 (finalized 2009) following its conflict with Russia over South Ossetia. The headquarters of the CIS are in Minsk.

The organization was conceived as the successor to the USSR in its role of coordinating the foreign and economic policies of its member nations. The treaty recognized current borders and each republic's independence, sovereignty, and equality, and established a free-market ruble zone embracing the republics' interdependent economies and a joint defense force for participating republics. Strategic nuclear weapons, in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, were to be under the joint control of those republics, with day-to-day authority in the hands of the Russian president and defense minister. Later Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, signed the Lisbon Protocol and no longer possess such weapons. The CIS at first convened

only a council of the heads of state of its members, but in 1992 it convened a council of heads of government and a council of foreign ministers.

The republics' level of receptivity to integration with Russia has varied. All CIS nations now have their own currency, and most members have had occasion to criticize Russia for slow implementation of CIS agreements. Ukraine (which had a prolonged disagreement with Russia over the disposition of the Black Sea Fleet and remains wary of Russian power, particularly after Russia took sides in the 2004 presidential election), Turkmenistan (whose large gas reserves free it from dependence on Russia), Azerbaijan (whose oil reserves also allow for independence from Russia), and Moldova (which faced an insurgency in the Russian-dominated Trans-Dniester region) have been relatively inactive in the alliance, and in 2005 Turkmenistan became an associate member. Armenia (surrounded by the Muslim nations of Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey), Georgia (with separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (vulnerable because of its limited natural resources) accepted Russia's protection under a joint defense system.

In 2011, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine signed a CIS free-trade pact.

Sub-topic 1.1. Security challenges emanated from the administrative borders between the Soviet republics and autonomous regions (Nagorny Karabakh conflict, Tadjik cities in Uzbekistan, Uzbek enclaves in Kirgistan, …

It is an open secret that forming the Soviet Union in December 1922 Moscow introduced new administrative borders between the created soviet and autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts quite arbitrarily taking in mind a clear aim: not to allow these new administrative

units to present any challenges to Moscow policies. In the North Caucasus almost one million strong Alani people were divided in two named Karachai people and Balkar people and were put together with Cherkes people and Kabarda people respectively forming Karachai-Cherkes autonomous region and Kabardino-Balkar autonomous republic. Formal heads of these two new autonomous units were always taken from the people that constituted a clear minority. In half a million strong Karachai-Cherkes autonomous oblast the head always came from the Cherkes people numbered less then one hundred thousand but not from the Karachai people that was over four hundred thousand. Such distribution of power in a number of new autonomous entities clearly made its head more dependent on the Moscow support than on support of a majority of the local population. In performing such tricks Moscow sometimes found itself in very peculiar situations. For example, it attached two main Tajik cities of Samarkand and Bukhara to Uzbekistan and there was no city left to name it the capital of Tajikistan. So one of the Tajik kishlaks (villages) – Dushanbe – was arbitrarily made the Tajiks capital.

A recent border dispute in the Fergana Valley, the core of Central Asia, highlights the growing tensions in the strategic and contested region. Kyrgyz and Uzbek border patrol units were removed from the Ungar-Too area in Kyrgyzstan's Jalal-Abad region Oct. 2, 2013, after a two-week standoff over an alleged Uzbek border incursion into the area. Such incursions, coupled with ethnic tensions and sporadic violence, have become increasingly common in the Fergana Valley region, which is split between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

The valley has long been the population and agricultural heartland of Central Asia. It has also been one of the most unstable areas in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union due to several factors, including diverse and interspersed

populations, complex borders, dwindling resources and religious extremism.

The Fergana Valley is approximately 22,000 square kilometers (almost 8,500 square miles) of flat plains distinguishes itself from surrounding regions in Central Asia, where the terrain is made up of mountains, deserts and treeless steppes. It is also distinguished by its agricultural fertility, due to the Syr Darya River and its numerous tributaries -- water resources that are the subject of controversy in the region. The Fergana Valley is a major source of food for Central Asia. Its principal crops include wheat, cotton, rice, vegetables and fruit.

This agricultural productivity has made the Fergana Valley the most densely populated part of Central Asia; almost a quarter of the region's total population (14 million out of 63 million) lives in less than 5 percent of the region's total land area. While the population density of Central Asia as a whole is 40.8 people per square mile, in the Fergana Valley it is 1,600 people per square mile. It is also one of the fastest growing regions within Central Asia, experiencing a population growth of 32 percent in the last 10 years.

The Fergana Valley's population consists mainly of Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajiks. Correspondingly, the valley was split by Moscow among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with Uzbekistan taking most of it. However, each of the three countries in the Fergana Valley contains significant minorities of the other two ethnic groups. Further complicating this are several ethnic exclaves in the Fergana Valley, including the Uzbek exclaves of Sox, Shakhimardan, Chong-Kara and Jani-Ayil in Kyrgyzstan and the Kyrgyz exclave of Barak in Uzbekistan. There are also two Tajik exclaves -- Vorukh and Kairagach -- in Kyrgyzstan.

The reason for the complexity of the borders and ethnic distribution in the valley is historical. For most of its history,

the Fergana Valley existed under a unified political entity. In the ancient era, it was a part of a province of the Persian Empire, where it played an important role in the Silk Road trade from China to the Middle East and Europe. In the 13th century it came under the conquest of the Mongols and was incorporated into the Chagatai Khanate. Political boundaries shifted as Turkish groups and Islam spread into the region, but Fergana was always administered as a single unit. In the 18th century, this took the form of the Kokand Khanate, which included eastern Uzbekistan, southern Kazakhstan, and most of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The penetration of Imperial Russia into Central Asia in the 19th century once again shifted political control in the region. But the Fergana Valley remained intact, shifting to the Fergana province of Russian Turkestan out of the former Kokand Khanate in 1876.

However, the fall of the Russian Empire and the subsequent rise of the Soviet Union created profound changes in Central Asia generally and in the Fergana Valley specifically. The Soviets installed a national delimitation process that grouped the peoples of Central Asia into distinct nationalities, when in previous eras identities were largely based on clan, region or religion (Islam). The ethnolinguistic labels of Uzbek, Kyrgyz or Tajik were thus not widely used until the early 20th century, and clan ties and regionalism are still a major factor today.

Furthermore, borders did not exist in a modern sense, since much of the population -- particularly Kazakhs, Turkmen and Kyrgyz -- were nomadic, while people defined as Uzbek and Tajik were more settled. The Soviets forcibly settled the populations of Central Asia and established new borders in the region. These borders, designed by Josef Stalin primarily for administrative purposes, were also meant to prevent any future rise of a single political entity in Central Asia with the potential to challenge Moscow's power in the region. Due to its demographic and agricultural heft, the Fergana Valley was for

the first time divided among distinct political entities (in this case, the Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). However, that Moscow made division corresponded neither to the natural geographic features of the Fergana Valley nor to the new national identities attributed to the peoples of these republics.

These complex borders did not have much practical effect in the Soviet era, given that the entire region was under the centralized control of Moscow and was fully incorporated into the Soviet military-industrial complex, making the borders largely arbitrary in a political and economic sense. However, things changed dramatically in the Fergana Valley with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to a wave of nationalism throughout the former Soviet republics, including Central Asia.

Nagorny-Karabakh conflict was also inherited from the Soviet Union. The conflict erupted in 1988 starting with the Azeris who all were forcibly removed from Armenia where they lived for centuries and with the subsequent Armenian massacres in Baku and some other Azeri cities. The Nagorny-Karabakh independence itself was officially proclaimed by the Armenian Supreme Soviet during the USSR existence. At that time the Armenians in their desire to get control over populated by the Armenians Nagorny-Karabakh autonomous oblast relied mostly on themselves and the Armenian Diaspora. The Azeris, on the contrary put their faith in Moscow to maintain the existing territorial integrity. We all know the result. During the 1992-94 war Karabakh itself and the surrounding regions populated by the Azeries became part of unrecognized Nagorny-Karabakh Republic.

To much of the outside world, it is a “frozen” conflict that merits little attention. Skirmishes between the two sides are frequent, with hundreds, even thousands of ceasefire violations reported every month. Dozens of deaths and

injuries occur each year. For years, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, which is co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States, has been trying to resolve the conflict. But with negotiations hitting deadlock in 2011, the geographical scope of the clashes has spread to places far away from Nagorno-Karabakh.

The arms race between the two sides of the conflict continues. Oil-rich Azerbaijan’s defence budget for 2013 is $3.7 billion, almost one billion more than Armenia’s entire state budget. Armenia increased its own defence spending by 25% in 2013, to $450m. With the military balance shifting towards Azerbaijan’s capital Baku, each side’s rhetoric has changed. The Azerbaijanis talk increasingly of a military solution to the conflict; Armenians speak of a preventive strike.

Armenians increasingly refer to the Azerbaijani territories that its troops occupy adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh as “liberated”. The Armenian capital Yerevan has said it will re-open a refurbished airport in Nagorno-Karabakh for fixed-wing flights, claiming it would be a humanitarian move to improve the lives of the region’s inhabitants. Baku responded by threatening to shoot such flights down. 

There is only so much the outside world can do. Preventing the conflict from escalating is already an achievement, especially given the nightmare scenario that would draw in regional powers such as Russia, Turkey and Iran. Yet with the Minsk process looking distinctly tired, continued prevention (let alone conflict resolution) is not assured.Russia’s desire to assert its hegemony in the South Caucasus complicates matters further. Earlier this year, its relationship with Armenia grew frosty over Yerevan’s moves towards an association agreement with the European Union. When Serzh Sargsyan, Armenia’s president, rejected

Moscow’s alternative Eurasian Union, Russia increased the price of the natural gas it sold to Armenia, and delivered $1 billion worth of weaponry to Baku. On a trip to Moscow at the beginning of September, Mr Sargsyan bowed to the Kremlin’s pressure and reversed his decision, throwing Armenia’s European aspirations into confusion.

Protracted conflict has high costs for both countries, including hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, bereaved relatives and closed borders.

Sub-topic 1.2. Security challenges emanated from linguistic and cultural diversity (Transnistrian conflict in Moldova, Georgians against South Ossetians and Abkhasians…)

The violence in Moldova Transnistrian region broke out in the fall of 1990. The Transnistrian "Republican Guard" began to take over police stations, administrative bodies, schools, radio stations and newspapers. On December 13th, 1991 Moldovan police for the first time returned fire in defending the regional government building in the city of Dubossary. The clashes renewed on March 1st, 1992. All efforts among Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Romania to mediate the conflict failed. Moldova President Mircea Snegur declared a state of emergency on March 28th, 1992. However, the conditions took a sharp turn to the worse in May of 1992 as the government of Mircea Snegur made an effort to disarm the paramilitary formations and escalated into a full-scale civil war in the city of Bendery on June 19th, 1992. After two days' fierce fighting, the Moldovan units were driven out from the city by the Transnistrian "Republican Guard". Moldovan President Mircea Snegur declared on June 22nd, 1992 that "we are at war with

Russia". Combat action continued till July 21st, 1992, when a cease-fire agreement was signed in Moscow between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation on principles of a peaceful solution of the armed conflict in the Transnistrian region of Moldova. The agreement provided for an immediate ceasefire and the creation of a demilitarized security zone between the parties, 10 km left and right of the Dniestr river, including also the city of Bendery. The trilateral peacekeeping troops (5 Russian, 3 Moldovan and 2 Transnistrian battalions) began deployment on July 29th, 1992.

The agreement set out principles for a peaceful solution of the conflict, including:

Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova

The need for a special status of the left-bank Dniester region, and

The right of the population of the left bank to decide on its own future if Moldova were to reunite with Romania.

Short but bloody conflict resulted in more than 700 deaths, 1,000 wounded and 100,000 refugees. Council of Europe recognizes Transnistria as a "frozen conflict" region.

Causes of the Transnistrian conflict.

During the last years of the 1980s, the political landscape of the USSR was changing owing to Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of perestroika, which allowed political liberalisation at the regional level. The incomplete democratization was preliminary for the nationalism to become the most dynamic political force. Some national minorities opposed these changes in the Moldovan political class of the republic, since during Soviet times, local politics had often been dominated by non-Romanians, particularly by those of Russian origin. The language laws -- introducing the Latin alphabet for

written Moldovan -- presented a particularly volatile issue as a great proportion of the non-Romanian population of the Moldavian SSR did not speak Moldovan. However, some researchers insist that the problem of official languages in the Republic of Moldova, which has become an official cause for a conflict, was exaggerated and, perhaps, intentionally politicized.

On the 2nd of September, 1990 the Moldovan Republic of Transnistria (MRT) was proclaimed. On the 25th of August, 1991 the Supreme Council of the MRT adopted the declaration of independence of the MRT. On the 27th of August, 1991 the Moldovan Parliament adopted the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova, whose territory included Transnistria. The Moldovan Parliament asked the Government of the USSR "to begin negotiations with the Moldovan Government in order to put an end to the illegal occupation of the Republic of Moldova and withdraw Soviet troops from Moldovan territory".

After Moldova became a member of the United Nations (March 2nd, 1992), Moldovan President Mircea Snegur authorized concerted military action against rebel forces. The rebels, aided by contingents of Russian Cossacks and the Russian 14th Army, consolidated their control over most of the disputed area. The presidents of Moldova and Russia signed an agreement in July of 1992 which ended the conflict and established a "security zone" controlled by Russian, Moldovan, and Transnistrian forces. In October of 1994, the Moldovan and Russian governments signed another agreement whereby the Russian government agreed to withdraw the 14th Army forces from Moldovan territory over a three-year period. The Russian State Duma, however, has not approved the agreement and Russian forces remain in Transnistria. The presidents of Russia and Ukraine brokered an agreement in May of 1997 between the Moldovan and Transnistrian governments which ended the

civil war. Under the terms of the agreement, Transnistria would remain Moldovan territory unless Moldova decides to reunite with Romania. In this situation, Transnistria is guaranteed the right to self-determination.

Today the Transnistria talks follow a “5-plus-2” format, referring to the five principal participants involved in the negotiations – Transnistria, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the OSCE as mediators – plus the United States and the European Union as observers.

Although having a distinctive national aspect, the Transnistria region conflict can not be defined as solely an ethnic conflict. To the extent that the conflict surfaces in Western media, it is usually portrayed as a conflict between an enclave inhabited by ethnic Russians and the largely ethnic Romanian Moldova. However, this is just not the case. The approximately 4,5 million people in the Republic of Moldova, including Transnistria, consists of approximately 60% Moldovans, 14% Ukrainians, and 13% Russians, as well as other smaller groups like the Christian Turkish Gagauz. This is not very different in Transnistria, where Moldovans make up 40%, Ukrainians 28% and Russians 23% of a population of 500,000.

Many analysts are convinced that a key factor obstructing a settlement is the personal interests of the leaders of Transnistria and Moldova, Russia and Ukraine who profit from illegal activities that take place in Transnistria. These activities include illicit arms sales, human trafficking of women and girls and smuggling. One day, a cache of 70 surface-to-air missile launchers disappeared from a former Soviet stockpile and officials are unable to account for their whereabouts.

Perspectives for the Transnistrian conflict settlement

For most of the duration of armed dispute in Transnistria, the level of strategic interest was State and Regional. The conflict mostly concerned separatist movement of Transnistria and the Moldovan government and army. Today the conflict borders on a multilateral level of strategic interest because of the conflict settlement involvement of Russia, Romania, Ukraine, EU, and the US.

One of proposals for reconciliation of the conflict is a so-called Primakov Plan (dated September, 2000). It called for the creation of a "common state" made up of "federative and confederative" ideas but weighed heavily toward Transnistria's goals. Under this draft each side would be allowed to maintain its own constitution, legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, flag, coat of arms, and national anthem. Each would also have its own army, security police, and regular police that would not be able to operate on the other's territory without their consent. The common state would have jurisdiction over foreign policy, economic policy, and border guards with no internal customs.

At first both sides strongly denounced the plan, with Moldova saying it could not agree to the country's "federalization" and Transnistria claiming that any rapprochement must be between virtually independent states.

Moldova's viewpoint of solution: departing from previous plan to include Transnistria as a province of Moldova Chisinau now proposes forming a federation with Transnistria with conditionalities attached - retirement of the Russian army and demilitarization of Transnistria.

Transnistria now supports the idea of a federal state: two equal states and a common parliament formed by federative organs of power. Each state would have their own customs authority, army and departments dealing with licensing,

trade and industry. This is one of the most important point of negotiation for Transnistria, due to the fact that each time investors try to implement economical activities in Transnistria they have to suffer a double tax system, paying for exports and license two times: one toTransnistria and another one to Moldova that do not recognize the authority of Transnistria. Transnistria has also suggested that the official languages should be Russian, Moldavian and Ukrainian.

Ukraine proposed a seven-point plan in May of 2005 by which the separation of Transnistria and Moldova would be settled through a negotiated settlement and free elections. Under the plan, Transnistria would remain an autonomous region of Moldova.

Some of the Members of Moldovan civil society inspired by the EU position proposed 3D Strategy, a plan that provides specific policy recommendations for governments and multilateral organizations, and provides citizens with the opportunity to have input in the future viability of their country. The 3D Strategy calls for the implementation of three principles:

Demilitarization-withdrawal of the Russian troops and decommissioning of military plants and disarmament of the Transnistrian military and security forces;

Decriminalization-curbing and suppressing the rampant contraband, arms and human trafficking, and other criminal activities;

Democratization-ensuring a free flow of information and freedom of speech; implementing international human rights standards; and promoting rule of law.

The plan also recommends establishing an International Executive Council that would monitor progress toward

settling the conflict, and an International Civil Provisional Administration to help govern Moldova’s eastern districts. In addition, the 3D Strategy calls for assigning Tiraspol special status as a free economic zone with rights to self-government under a free-city model.

Abkhasian ConflictThe ethnic tensions that the Soviet political system in its pre-perestroika form had been able to muffle and contain (though not resolve) developed more freely and openly under the liberalized conditions of Gorbachev’s perestroika, especially in its second stage (from 1988 onward). Abkhaz and Georgian nationalist organizations were established, and massive demonstrations with ethnopolitical slogans became commonplace.

In December 1988 the Popular Forum of Abkhazia “Aidgylara” (the Abkhaz word for “unification”) was set up and soon became the main organizational vehicle of Abkhaz nationalism, although it brought together not only Abkhaz organizations but also organizations of Russians, Armenians, and other non-Georgian (and mainly Russian-speaking) groups. Its program demanded a Republic of Abkhazia, fully separate from Georgia, within a renewed Soviet federation. This goal was directly opposed to the main aim of all Georgian nationalist parties, which was a united Georgia including Abkhazia outside the Soviet Union.

On March 18, 1989, with the support of Abkhaz party and government officials, “Aidgylara” held its first mass public meeting in the village of Lykhny, the traditional sacred gathering place of the Abkhaz people. A week later, on March 25, in response to the Lykhny meeting, Georgian nationalist organizations convened a mass public meeting of ethnic Georgians in Sukhumi. Each meeting by one side provoked a counter-meeting by the other side. The increasingly tense though as yet non-violent confrontation in Abkhazia also

served to heighten nationalist agitation in Georgia as a whole. One of the main demands at the mass Georgian nationalist demonstration in Tbilisi on April 9, which attracted attention throughout the Soviet Union and the world when its participants were gassed and beaten by shovels wielded by troops under the command of General Rodionov, was that Abkhazia should remain within Georgia. The confrontation could not be expected to continue for long as such a level of intensity without spilling over into violence. The first violent clash between small groups of Georgians and Abkhaz occurred in Gagra as early as March 28, 1989. Large-scale violence, however, did not erupt until mid-July.

Fighting broke out in Sukhumi on July 15, 1989. The issue that triggered the clashes was whether the Georgian-language sector of the Abkhaz State University, which consisted of three sectors using Abkhaz, Georgian, and Russian, respectively, should be turned into a branch of Tbilisi State University (TSU). This seems at first sight a purely administrative question of secondary importance, for it did not affect the opportunity to study in any of the three languages. Many Abkhaz, however, feared that the new Georgian-language institution would divert funds from “their” Abkhaz State University and prove to be the first step toward closing it down. Live reporting in the media, and especially on television, may have further inflamed and spread the conflict. The fighting began when Abkhaz protestors who were laying siege to a building where entrance examinations were being held for the TSU branch found themselves in turn surrounded by Georgian counter-protestors. At this site the fighting did not involve weapons. However, as it spread into the neighboring district and drew in more people, self-made weapons made their appearance: in particular, a wooden fence round a local park was pulled apart and used to make sharpened sticks. When news of the fighting reached other

parts of Georgia, militias connected to Georgian nationalist organizations began to make their way into Abkhazia. What began as unorganized brawling between more or less equally matched crowds of local men started to acquire the character of a systematic pogrom conducted by large and well-armed Georgian forces, mostly from outside Abkhazia, against an almost defenseless Abkhaz population. Firearms were distributed to Georgian crowds, while Abkhaz passengers were pulled off buses and beaten up or killed. While there were a considerable number of deaths and injuries, the intervention of interior ministry troops, flown into Abkhazia from Russia by the central Soviet authorities, succeeded in restoring order and saving many lives, especially by blocking the advance into Abkhazia of more Georgian fighters.

In the aftermath of the traumatic events of July 1989, the conflict returned for a time to the level of non-violent political confrontation. On August 25, the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia adopted a declaration of state sovereignty, which the Supreme Soviet of Georgia declared invalid the next day. The declaration brought to a head a growing ethnopolitical division within the Abkhazian legislature, and on August 31 the dissenting minority, consisting mainly but not solely of ethnic Georgian deputies (with some Georgian deputies remaining in Sukhumi), reconvened in the Georgian Institute of Subtropical Agriculture in Tbilisi and declared itself the “real” Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia. Henceforth two separate and opposed bodies, one in Sukhumi and the other in exile in Tbilisi, would lay claim to the same title.

Another significant development at about the same time was the formation of an alliance of ethnopolitical movements called initially the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. (The word “mountain” was later dropped to allow movements of “non-mountain” peoples to join.) Although “Aidgylara” was the only member organization not based in

the North Caucasus, the confederation set up its headquarters in Sukhumi and also held its first congress there, on August 26. The congress adopted a declaration of solidarity with the Abkhaz nationalist cause. At least some of its supporters conceived of the confederation as a possible precursor to a new Mountain Republic of the kind that existed in 1917—1918. Abkhazia would be crucial to such a state as its sole outlet to the open sea. For the Abkhaz national movement, membership in the confederation represented a reorientation away from Georgia and toward renewed community with ethno-cultural kin in the North Caucasus. The confederation also represented a potential source of support in the event of armed conflict with Georgia (and when war did come such support was indeed forthcoming). By hosting the congress and demonstrating to Tbilisi that it had outside support, “Aidgylara” hoped to deter a Georgian invasion.

On November 14, 1990, the former Georgian nationalist dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia became chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia. (He won election as president of Georgia six months later—on May 26, 1991.) In December 1990 Vladislav Ardzinba was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia in Sukhumi.

Between October and December 1991 new elections to the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia in Sukhumi took place in several rounds. Gamsakhurdia and Ardzinba had come to a “gentlemen’s agreement” concerning the electoral system to be employed in these elections, which was based on ethnically defined territorial constituencies in accordance with pre-assigned ethnic quotas. This meant that in 28 constituencies only Abkhaz candidates could stand for election, in 26 only Georgians, and in the remaining 11 only members of third ethnic groups (Russians, Armenians, etc.). This system, which greatly restricted the real choices open to voters, was apparently acceptable to both sides of the

conflict because each side believed that it would be able to form a majority by allying with third-group deputies.

As it turned out, the Abkhaz side was right and the Georgian side wrong in this expectation. A few “third group” deputies took the Georgian side, but most supported the Abkhaz. One factor in this choice of orientation may have been that few members of “third” groups in Abkhazia had (or wanted to acquire) a good knowledge of Georgian, so they did not welcome inclusion in a Georgian state with Georgian as the sole state language. True, few of them knew Abkhaz either, but Russian—still used by everyone as a lingua franca—would almost certainly retain high status in an independent Abkhazia.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union there was a competitive struggle to fill the “legal vacuum” created by abolition of the Soviet Union. This took the form of a “war of constitutions” between the parliaments in Tbilisi and Sukhumi. In February 1992 the Supreme Soviet of Georgia voted to reinstate the constitution that the independent Georgian republic had adopted in 1921. In response, the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia in Sukhumi voted on July 23 (three weeks before the outbreak of war) to reinstate the constitution that the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic had adopted in 1925. These steps reflected a highly formalistic approach to politics on both sides, one that took no account of changes that had occurred since the 1920s. Each of the reinstated constitutions was regarded as unacceptable by the other side: the Georgian constitution of 1921 allowed for the autonomy of Abkhazia in only the vaguest of terms, while the Abkhazian constitution of 1925 affirmed the separate and equal status of Abkhazia as a Soviet Union Republic.

At the same time, there was a more down-to-earth struggle for control over the formerly Soviet “power structures” on

Abkhazian territory. The separation of Abkhazian economic institutions from their Georgian counterparts had begun in the last few months of 1991. For example, the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia decreed on August 30, 1991 that legislation of the Republic of Georgia pertaining to banking did not apply to Abkhazia, and in October 1991 it established a customs service and a State Committee for Foreign Economic and Inter-Republican Ties under its own control. However, only at the end of 1991, after the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, was this process extended from the economic to the military and security spheres. On December 29, 1991, four days after Gorbachev resigned as the first and last Soviet president, the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia passed a resolution claiming possession and control of all formerly Soviet military forces (including naval forces, civil defense, border troops, and internal troops) deployed in Abkhazia. In February 1992, a commission was set up to register citizens of Abkhazia, and strict restrictions were imposed on the migration to Abkhazia of people from other parts of Georgia. On March 5, 1992, a law was adopted that re-subordinated other bodies of state administration, including the Security Committee and the State Property Committee, to the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia. A corresponding institutional structure was formed, including the introduction of a system of compulsory military service modeled on its Soviet counterpart. Thus, in the course of these first few post-Soviet months the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia moved beyond verbal declarations into the sphere of real state-building. The process proceeded in a fairly smooth manner, with no more than a few minor skirmishes between Abkhaz and Georgian police officers.

It should be borne in mind that the same period witnessed the intra-Georgian civil war between the supporters and opponents of Gamsakhurdia (December 1991 – January 1992). Power in Tbilisi was taken by a Military Council, later

reconstituted as a State Council, which in March 1992 invited Shevardnadze back to the country to become its chairman. The intra-Georgian civil war continued in the form of fighting between the new regime and “Zviadista” insurgents in Megrelia, Gamsakhurdia’s home region in western Georgia.

According to two versions of Georgia’s war aims disseminated by the Georgian side, the intended purpose of the invasion was actually more limited than it appeared to be in light of subsequent events. In one version, presented later by Shevardnadze in a report to the Georgian parliament, the goal of the operation was to “ensure security of movement along the railroad connecting Russia with Georgia and Armenia [which passes through Abkhazia], the security of the main highways, and the security of objects of strategic importance”. As a rationale this was not at all plausible: first, armed train robberies had occurred in western Georgia but not on Abkhazian territory; and second, no attempt had been made to improve security along lines of communication in cooperation with the authorities in Sukhumi.

The second version was circulated unofficially and seems designed to whitewash Shevardnadze at the expense of other members of the State Council. It claims that Shevardnadze had intended to conduct a strictly limited operation to free Georgian officials who had been abducted by Zviadista (i.e., pro-Gamsakhurdia) insurgents in western Georgia and were being held somewhere in the Gali district in southern Abkhazia. Shevardnadze had allegedly telephoned Ardzinba to forewarn him of the operation and reassure him that its aims were limited; Ardzinba, for his part, denied that he received any such telephone call, nor is it clear whether the hostages were really being held inside Abkhazia. Unfortunately, the story continues, Georgian defense minister Tengiz Kitovani, who was commanding the

operation, had ignored clear instructions from Shevardnadze and proceeded straight to Sukhumi to suppress the secessionist regime, thereby covering himself with patriotic glory. Shevardnadze had not yet had time to consolidate his position in Tbilisi and so was unable to exert effective control over his unruly generals.

The column of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery that crossed the River Inguri into Abkhazia at dawn on August 14, 1992, was not the sort of force needed to find and free hostages or to protect lines of communication. Moreover, the thrust north along the coast road to Sukhumi was only one prong of a two-pronged operation. Equally important was the simultaneous amphibious landing near Gagra in the north of Abkhazia, which cannot possibly have been directed against train robbers or Zviadistas.

It makes more sense to view the operation as an attempted blitzkrieg to restore Georgian control over most or all of Abkhazia before the poorly prepared Abkhaz could organize effective resistance. The landing force in the north was to close the corridor between the sea and the mountains, which at Gagra is only a kilometer wide, so that supplies and reinforcements would not (or so they imagined) be able to reach the Abkhaz forces from Russia, and then move south to join up with the northbound column. Like so many other blitzkriegs in history, this one got bogged down, giving the adversary a chance to organize and turn the blitzkrieg into a war of attrition. The assumption that reinforcements could enter Abkhazia only along the coastal strip proved mistaken: volunteers from the North Caucasus came through the high mountain passes.

It seems that Kitovani’s conduct of the operation did thwart Shevardnadze’s intentions in one vital respect. Shevardnadze did hope to spare Sukhumi the ravages of war. His instructions, which assumed that Georgian forces

would approach the city simultaneously from the south and from the north, were that they should halt on the outskirts, surround Sukhumi but not enter or bombard it. An acceptable settlement would then be negotiated from a position of strength. By bringing the forces coming from the south into Sukhumi, Kitovani was acting against these instructions, but he had a military rationale for so doing. Unexpectedly strong Abkhaz resistance had held up the forces coming from the north, so the original plan to complete the operation with the encirclement of Sukhumi was no longer feasible.

It is widely held that the Georgian military intervention should be understood in the context of the “war of constitutions”—specifically, as a reaction to the reinstatement of the Abkhazian constitution of 1925. However, it is hard to see why this document should have been any more objectionable to Georgian nationalists than the Declaration of State Sovereignty that the Abkhazian parliament had adopted nearly two years before (on August 25, 1990). Both documents rejected Abkhazia’s incorporation into Georgia.

A much more important factor was the capture by the secessionist authorities in Sukhumi of control over the formerly Soviet “power structures” on Abkhazian territory. The rapid build-up of an independent Abkhazian military capability provided the Georgian leadership with a strong incentive to act against the newborn state without too long a delay, while they still had (or thought they had) decisive military superiority.

Nevertheless, there had apparently been no noticeable rise in the level of tension in Abkhazia during the period of the immediate run-up to war. No special preparations had been made to counter an invading Georgian force, and Kitovani’s column was able to proceed completely unimpeded along

the main road, meeting resistance for the first time only a few kilometers to the southeast of Sukhumi. On the day of the invasion, the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia was scheduled to meet to discuss a draft treaty of union between Abkhazia and Georgia. It is therefore clear that while the Abkhaz leadership can hardly have been unaware that there was a general military threat from Georgia, they had no expectation of its realization in the near future. One could presume that they viewed the “war of constitutions” as a way of establishing initial positions for subsequent bargaining rather than as a prelude to real war. They may have been misled by the conciliatory stance towards the Abkhaz that Shevardnadze had adopted in his earlier incarnation as Georgian party secretary.

Shevardnadze had returned to Georgia, at the invitation of the junta that had overthrown Gamsakhurdia, in March 1992—only five months earlier. The initiative for the Abkhazian operation may well have come from Shevardnadze’s military colleagues, especially Kitovani and Ioseliani, and Shevardnadze may not have yet felt himself in a strong enough position to oppose their wishes. Whether but for this consideration Shevardnadze would have vetoed the invasion is hard to judge. His instructions that Georgian forces were not to enter Sukhumi suggest that he may have had serious misgivings. Later, moreover, having achieved a stronger position, he did resist strong pressure for a second invasion of Abkhazia—though this time round, of course, he had the benefit of hindsight.

On the other hand, Shevardnadze was perhaps not too unwilling to be persuaded by his colleagues. Although the Abkhazian operation was not a direct consequence of the war against the Zviadists in neighboring Megrelia, it may well have been seen as a logical next step in the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity under the new regime. Probably—and here the condescending Georgian view of the

Abkhaz as a small and backward people no doubt played a part—none of the Georgian leaders anticipated that it would be a costly, prolonged, or indeed particularly difficult operation. Shevardnadze may even have seen a short and successful war against the secessionist regime in Sukhumi as a quick means of consolidating his personal authority.

Another motive for invading Abkhazia may have been to stabilize the domestic political situation by uniting Georgians against a common enemy. In particular, Shevardnadze may have seen the campaign against the Abkhaz as a way of ending the Zviadista uprising in Megrelia.

Persistent failures of perception and calculation on both sides greatly contributed to the escalation of the conflict and the outbreak of war.

On the Georgian side, the main perceptual failure was a tendency to underestimate the Abkhaz as an independent and potentially powerful actor with strong and deeply rooted fears and grievances. Corresponding to this tendency was a characteristic preoccupation of Georgians with the conflict between Russia and Georgia over Abkhazia, obscuring their view of the specifically Abkhaz-Georgian dimension of the conflict. Even many highly educated and sophisticated Georgians are remarkably ignorant of the history and culture of the Abkhaz. But as the prospect drew nearer of the collapse of the familiar political environment of the Soviet Union and of the loss of the protective umbrella of “the Center,” so did the old rationale for

caution lose its force. In July 1989, the assault of the Georgian nationalist militias had been halted by the timely intervention of the Center’s internal troops. What was in store for the Abkhaz once the Georgians had a strong army of their own and the Soviet Union was gone? The answer was obvious: whatever the risks of secession, they had to be taken, for the likely alternative was genocide. This fear strengthened the ethnic cohesion of the Abkhaz in support of the secessionist leadership.

Sub-topic 1.3. Security challenges emanated from the repressive politics of the Soviet regime (Crimea Tatars and Ukranians, Turk Meskhetians and Georgians…)

Crimea Tatars

Ukraine was of course not responsible for the 1944

Deportation of the Crimea Tatars to Central Asia (Lavrentiy

Beria’s NKVD, the Soviet secret police, organized the

operation). At least 50,000 Crimean Tatars still live in

Central Asia. 266,000 Crimean Tatars and 4,900 other FDPs

(Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans and Greeks) have

returned to Crimea. The FDPs’ share of the population in

Crimea, however, has risen more rapidly, to 13.8 percent,

because the overall population of Crimea has shrunk to

under two million. Higher birth-rates mean that the Crimean

Tatar population is still expanding at +0.9 percent per

annum, while the overall population of Crimea is declining

by 0.4 percent. 

Crimean Tatars already make up 20 percent of the school

population. However, only 3 percent of children are taught

in the Crimean Tatar language (though twice as many take it

as an elective). After half a century in Central Asia, most

Crimean Tatars are highly Russified; UNESCO categorizes

Crimean Tatar as an ‘endangered language;’ Crimean Tatar

media is under-developed, and the infrastructure of cultural

heritage is badly neglected. Place names were changed

overnight in 1944 and have not been changed back. Attacks

on Crimean Tatar mosques and cemeteries are frequent. The

Kebir Cami Mosque in Simferopol has been returned to

active use; the building of the future Central Mosque on

Yaltinskaya Street has been endlessly delayed.

The Crimean Tatars are not integrated economically. Unlike

before 1944, settlement in the southern coastal tourist zone

is minimal. Three-quarters of the Crimean Tatar population

is still rural. An estimated 75,000 FDPs are still living in

temporary, uncompleted homes without any basic

infrastructure. Between 8,000 and 15,000 still live in

‘unauthorized settlements.’ Conflicts over ‘squatting’

(samozakhvaty) are still frequent and often violent.

Unemployment is not as high as might be expected, but the

Crimean Tatars are highly dependent on self-employment.

They are entrepreneurial, but their small trading economy is

highly vulnerable in Crimea’s highly criminalized economy.

Various sources estimate that between $160 million and

$300 million has been spent in the national Ukrainian and

Crimean budgets on the reintegration of FDPs since 1991,

which is a substantial sum but still inadequate to the social

situation in Crimea. A donors’ conference has been mooted;

but the Ukrainian authorities have yet to approve it.

There is no real legal mechanism to define the status of FDPs

(the last attempt was vetoed by President Leonid Kuchma in

2004). A law on the ‘Restoration of the rights of deported

people on ethnic grounds’ was passed by the Verkhovna

Rada at first reading in June 2012, but is now stalled.

Bureaucratic hurdles and high transfer costs hinder the

return of remaining FDPs, particularly from Uzbekistan. The

1993 Bishkek Agreement regulating conditions for the

return of FDPs ran out in May 2013.

The Ukrainian authorities refuse to recognize the Qurultay,

which considers itself a quasi-parliament, and passed the

radical ‘Declaration of National Sovereignty of the Crimean

Tatar People’ back in 1991, which claims that ‘Crimea is the

national territory of the Crimean Tatar people, on which

they alone have the right to self-determination.’ In practice,

however, they are a under-represented minority. Currently,

they have only one national parliament member, and five in

the Crimean Assembly. Seats are more winnable at a

regional level – but Crimean Tatars still only hold around 10

percent of seats on Crimean local councils. Less than 5

percent of local administration officials are Crimean Tatars,

excluding the ‘Nationalities Ministry’ (Reskomnats ).

The Crimean Tatar leadership has supported political

compromises in the past. A one-off quota system in 1994-8

gave them 14 seats in the Crimean Assembly. A ‘Council of

Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People Attached to the

President of Ukraine’ was set up by Kuchma in 1999 and met

four times, but only once when Viktor Yushchenko was

President, in 2005-2009.

Overall, after almost 25 years back in Crimea, progress in

integrating the Crimean Tatars and other FDPs has been

frankly slow. Politically, this lack of progress might have

been expected to produce more of a backlash and the growth

of a more radical fringe. In fact, it is the relative unity of the

Crimean Tatar movement that stands out. This should be

borne in mind, as the administration of President Viktor

Yanukovych has been trying to create the opposite

impression, that the Crimean Tatar community is

increasingly divided and the Qurultay is only one voice

among many. Yanukovych’s people have their own motives –

a dislike of all independent political activity, the scramble for

votes before 2015, the need to secure the power of outsiders

from Donetsk in Crimea (where the group from

Yanukovych’s hometown of Yenakiyeve in Donetsk Oblast

are called the ‘Makedontsy,‘ the Macedonians ruling the

Greeks). 

The composition of the ‘Council of Representatives of the

Crimean Tatar People’ was changed unilaterally in 2010 (its

membership was cut from 33 to 19, only eight of whom were

now members of the Mejlis); leading to a boycott by the

Mejlis and the parachuting in of a Yanukovych loyalist,

Lentun Bezaziyev, to take it over in 2013. The Ukrainian

authorities have promoted rival and often more radical

groups: Milli Firka, Sebat, and the Crimean Tatar Popular

Front. Supporters of the Qurultay/Mejlis have been removed

from key positions in local government, including the

Crimean assembly’s commission for ethnic relations and the

Republican Committee on Inter-Ethnic Relations, which

oversees the FDP budget.

Little progress has been made for the reintegration of the

Tatars in political and economic life of the Crimea and there

has been regression in some areas. The tense relations of the

former FDPs and locals remain constant security risk in

Crimea.

Resettlement of Turk Meskhetians Georgia took responsibility to return Turk Meskhetians to their native territory in Georgia in March, 1988. It must be said that fulfilling of this obligation, along with other ones, is the way for Georgia for its integration in Euro-structures. This process should have been finished in 2012. Georgia asked for one more year and worked out certain documents and laws to activate this process and make legal base for it. Georgia spread the special form of request for Turk Meskhetians to make statement that they want to return to Georgia. These forms were examined and evaluated by different criteria. 5000 requests were received by Georgia up to years 2010-2011.

Turk Meskhetians speak mostly Turkish. Older generation did have genetic memory and little part of this generation is still alive. Some of them speak bad Georgian. Due to family traditions, new generations kept it too, but due to the propaganda reasons, they believe that they are exiled Turks. It must be said that name Turk Meskhetians is a common name created by the Soviet Special forces regarding the people who were exiled from Georgia. Mostly, they were Georgian Muslims; part of them used to view themselves as

Turks. They were ethnic Turks, Kurds and Muslim Armenians.

In 1980s some Turk Meskhetians settled in Georgia: one part in Ozurgeti Region in Guria and another – in Ianeti village and Samtredia in Imereti. In Guria they were housed among Georgians and after adaptation, they are real Georgian now. But in Imereti they were settled separately and the people of the old generation still belive that they are Turks. It is an interesting process and it should be viewed as a good experience. But it needs an appropriate policy. In that case this resettlement won’t cause Georgia any demographic and other problems.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute: Then and NowJuly 13, 2014 | 1111 GMT

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (L) and Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian(Photo by Francois Lenoir - Pool/Getty Images; Stephane de Sakutin/AFP/Getty Images)

Summary

There has been a burst of diplomatic activity in recent months over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Armenia and Azerbaijan have disputed for decades. Russia, the strongest power in the Caucasus, has become more engaged in the issue in light of Azerbaijan's growing leverage in the region, raising the possibility of a shift in this conflict. It is the changing positions of larger regional players such as Russia, Turkey, Iran and the United States, more so than Azerbaijan and Armenia themselves, that will drive the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the months and years to come.

Analysis

As Russia and the West continue their confrontation over Ukraine, there is a subtler yet potentially equally significant competition occurring in the Caucasus. While Georgia attempts to move closer to the West and Armenia strengthens ties with Russia, Azerbaijan has attempted to maintain a careful balance between the two sides. Azerbaijan thus serves as the pivot of the Caucasus, and the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh is a crucial aspect in shaping Baku's role.

The Historical Backdrop for the Conflict

Nagorno-Karabakh is a small yet strategic piece of territory located in the center of the South Caucasus region. Despite its small size (4,400 square kilometers, or about 1,700 square miles) and population (fewer than 150,000 people), Nagorno-Karabakh historically has been an ethnically and religiously mixed region because of its mountainous terrain and location at a crossroads between continents, although the population now is over 95 percent Armenian.

Nagorno-Karabakh, along with much of the rest of the Caucasus, was contested by the Ottoman Turks and Persians for hundreds of years. The emergence of the Russian Empire as a major player in the Caucasus during the 18th century culminated in Russia's annexation of the region, including Nagorno-Karabakh, in the early 19th century. The Russian Empire would be the dominant power in the region until the Russian Revolution of 1905 weakened the empire and the subsequent revolution of 1917 brought about its collapse.

Both of these periods marked significant turbulence in the Caucasus culminating in a war over control of Nagorno-Karabakh and the wider region in the midst of a vacuum created by Russian weakness and distraction. By 1921, the Bolsheviks had taken over the entire region, and the Caucasus was incorporated into the Soviet Union as the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in 1922. The Soviet republic was then reorganized in 1923 into three separate republics: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh was placed under the jurisdiction of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic by then-Soviet Nationalities Commissioner Josef Stalin. This redrawing of borders and territorial lines, which were designed to create territorial disputes among the republics in order to keep them weak, set in motion the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

With the introduction of the glasnost and perestroika movements in the late Soviet period and the easing of public discourse and political participation, Nagorno-Karabakh became one of the first and highest profile issues to come under dispute. Starting in February 1988, numerous public demonstrations were held in the Armenian capital of Yerevan supporting the incorporation of the majority-Armenian

Nagorno-Karabakh into the Soviet Republic of Armenia. Next, the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast Committee of the Communist Party held an unprecedented unofficial referendum to rejoin Armenia. Azerbaijan appealed to Moscow to condemn such actions, but when Moscow's response was slow and not to Baku's liking, ethnic violence erupted against Armenians in Azerbaijan and against Azerbaijanis in Armenia.

This violence quickly spread into a full-scale military confrontation in which all Azerbaijanis were expelled from Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to the territory's current Armenian-dominated ethnic balance. Armenian forces decisively defeated Azerbaijan in the conflict, leading to the de facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenian control of several provinces abutting Nagorno-Karabakh as a corridor into the region. After mediation by numerous external players including Russia, Turkey and Iran, a cease-fire was reached to end the conflict in 1994.

Geopolitical Alignments and the Elusiveness of Peace

With an end to the war, a formal peace process was launched by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1994, with Russia, the United States and France serving as co-chairs along with Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, 20 years and countless meetings and summits later, there has been no substantial progress made on a diplomatic solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There are fundamental geopolitical drivers for why this is the case.

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First and foremost is the participation and influence of regional power players in the conflict. Russia, Turkey and Iran have competed in the Caucasus for centuries, and this continues to be the case. The

participation of these countries, with their entrenched and often competing strategic interests, has been a significant component to the protracted dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

During the war in the 1980s, each country played complicated and sometimes contradictory roles. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan employed mercenaries during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, with fighters from Russia (including Chechnya), Turkey and Iran participating on both sides of the conflict. These countries also become involved in a more official capacity, with Turkey and Iran supplying personnel for training the Azerbaijani military, while Russia provided weapons, supplies and training for both sides. Notably, the war began while the Soviet Union was still nominally intact, putting Moscow in a very complex position. Soviet leaders initially responded to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in a law enforcement capacity as a means of restoring order, but the Soviet Union's internal weaknesses and divisions prevented definitive action from being taken to ameliorate tensions or overwhelmingly support either side.

The result was sporadic Soviet assistance to both sides, whether weapons for Armenia or tactical training for Azerbaijani soldiers. However, Moscow's support of Armenia grew once the Soviet Union had officially ceased to exist and the Russian Federation emerged. Moscow's support of Yerevan intensified further as the Armenian side gained the upper hand in the conflict. In the meantime, Turkey and Iran increased their assistance to Azerbaijan. Turkey closed its border with Armenia, and Iran created a protection zone within its borders for tens of thousands of displaced Azerbaijanis. Once Armenia captured Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding provinces, Yerevan came under increasing pressure from Turkey and Iran. Russia helped negotiate the cease-fire in 1994, but by then Armenia had decisively won the war.

Since then, the conflict has shifted to the diplomatic realm, with the Organization for Security and Co-operation's Minsk Group providing the official framework for political negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The United States became involved in the negotiations, and the best chance for a settlement emerged in the early post-Soviet period, when Russia was still weak and ties between Moscow and Washington were relatively warm. Indeed, Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian endorsed the Organization for Security and Co-operation talks, which advocated a phased approach to the settlement, including staged land swaps for political and economic concessions, in 1997. However, this was an unpopular move within Armenia and eventually led to Ter-Petrosian's resignation in an illustration of the degree of political polarization over Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, attitudes within Armenia and Azerbaijan have

only grown stronger. Armenia's last two presidents hailed from Nagorno-Karabakh and participated in the war.

For the next 12 years, negotiations continued over Nagorno-Karabakh, but very little progress was made. Sporadic attacks continued on the line of contact between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the two sides could not agree on even basic conditions for fruitful talks. However, the regional climate changed in 2009, when Turkey attempted to normalize ties with Armenia in exchange for an agreement between Yerevan and Baku over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. But because Turkey did not seek to establish an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan before talks on opening the Turkish-Armenian border began, Turkey's move strained ties between Ankara and Baku. This benefited Russia, whose position improved as a result of the increased tensions between Azerbaijan and Turkey and because Armenia strengthened its ties with Moscow once the Turkish rapprochement failed. Meanwhile, Iran saw tensions rise with Azerbaijan due to Baku's growing relationship with Israel. Iran has maintained a working relationship with Armenia, though Tehran has been relegated to a background role in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue because its primary interests are in the Middle Eastern theater.

Despite Moscow's leading role in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks, it has long been in Russia's interest to maintain the status quo of hostilities between the two countries. Since the war concluded, Russia has been in a strategic alignment with Armenia, including the presence of 5,000 Russian troops in Armenian territory. Russia also has a military presence in neighboring Georgia in the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The one country in the Caucasus that has remained outside Russia's orbit has been Azerbaijan, which has been able to use its sizable energy resources and diplomatic maneuvering within the region to create a balance-of-power strategy. But Russia's support of Armenia, including its de facto support of Yerevan's position on Nagorno-Karabakh, has kept Azerbaijan in check. Despite Azerbaijan's claims of being able to forcibly retake Nagorno-Karabakh and Baku's security buildup in this regard, Azerbaijan does not have the capability to confront Russia militarily over the territory.

The Future of the Dispute

This is not to say that the current state of the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh will last forever. As history has shown, Nagorno-Karabakh has tended to flare up at times of major upheaval in the wider region, particularly during periods of Russian weakness. This aspect is worth considering, especially as Russia is again experiencing major challenges in the former Soviet periphery, as can be seen in the crisis in Ukraine. Though Russia is on the defensive when it comes to Ukraine,

this by no means marks an impending collapse of the Russian Federation. Moscow retains significant economic, political and energy leverage over Ukraine -- and the same can be said for other former Soviet countries being contested by the West, including Moldova and Georgia. Russia also still boasts a network of loyal allies within the former Soviet space, including Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia.

However, Russia does face serious long-term challenges to retaining its powerful position in the former Soviet Union, particularly compared to its period of re-emergence as a regional power over the past few years. One country that could pose a particularly substantial challenge for Russia is Azerbaijan, which has positioned itself as a significant alternative energy provider to Europe via the strategic Southern Corridor route. Azerbaijan has also expanded political and security ties with the likes of Turkey, Israel and (still in a nascent form) the United States, increasing Baku's leverage in its dealings with Russia.

It is in this context that Russia has become more engaged on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue than it has in years, with Russian officials holding numerous meetings with officials from Azerbaijan and Armenia on the issue in recent months, indicating a possible shift in Moscow's position. But in order for Moscow to truly change its stance on Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia would need to weaken considerably, or Azerbaijan would need to become so vital to Russian interests that Moscow would change allegiances and confront Armenia, an unlikely prospect at this point.

However, the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh does not solely depend on Russia. Turkey's role is also important, especially as Ankara continues to court Baku into an informal alliance while continuing efforts to normalize ties with Armenia in a bid to boost its standing in the region. Turkey is not in as strong a position as Russia, but the United States' backing of Ankara's efforts could reshape regional dynamics. The extent to which Turkey's relationship with Azerbaijan grows, and to which both countries are supported by the United States, could change the way Nagorno-Karabakh is addressed, at least on a political level.

In a similar vein, the ongoing nuclear and broader political negotiations between the United States and Iran could give Tehran a freer and stronger hand to engage in the region. Iran has been the least influential of the regional players in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute over the past few years, but this could change if the current adversarial relationship between Tehran and Washington improves. Certainly with the changes occurring in the Middle East, this is not out of the realm of possibility. 

http://m.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.htmlHow the Ukraine crisis ends - The Washington PostHenry A. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977.

Public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation. But do we know where we are going? In my life, I have seen four wars begun with great enthusiasm and public support, all of which we did not know how to end and from three of which we withdrew unilaterally. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.

Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them.

Russia must accept that to try to force Ukraine into a satellite status, and thereby move Russia’s borders again, would doom Moscow to repeat its history of self-fulfilling cycles of reciprocal pressures with Europe and the United States.

The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for Russian freedom, starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709, were fought on Ukrainian soil. The Black Sea Fleet — Russia’s means of projecting power in the Mediterranean — is based by long-term lease in Sevastopol, in Crimea. Even such famed dissidents as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky insisted that Ukraine was an integral part of Russian history and, indeed, of Russia.

The European Union must recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe contributed to turning a negotiation into a crisis. Foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities.

The Ukrainians are the decisive element. They live in a country with a complex history and a polyglot composition. The Western part was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939, when Stalin and Hitler divided up the spoils. Crimea, 60 percent of whose population is Russian, became part of Ukraine only in 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian by birth, awarded it as part of the 300th-year celebration of a Russian agreement with the Cossacks. The west is largely Catholic; the east largely Russian Orthodox. The west speaks Ukrainian; the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other — as has been the pattern — would lead eventually to civil war or breakup. To treat Ukraine as part of an East-West confrontation would scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West — especially Russia and Europe — into a cooperative international system.

Ukraine has been independent for only 23 years; it had previously been under some kind of foreign rule since the 14th century. Not surprisingly, its leaders have not learned the art of compromise, even less of historical perspective. The politics of post-independence Ukraine clearly demonstrates that the root of the problem lies in efforts by Ukrainian politicians to impose their will on recalcitrant parts of the country, first by one faction, then by the other. That is the essence of the conflict between Viktor Yanukovych and his principal political rival, Yulia Tymoshenko. They represent the two wings of Ukraine and have not been willing to share power. A wise U.S. policy toward Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the domination of a faction.

Russia and the West, and least of all the various factions in Ukraine, have not acted on this principle. Each has made the situation worse. Russia would not be able to impose a military solution without isolating itself at a time when many of its borders are already precarious. For the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one.

Putin should come to realize that, whatever his grievances, a policy of military impositions would produce another Cold War. For its part, the United States needs to avoid treating Russia as an aberrant to be patiently taught rules of conduct established by Washington. Putin is a serious strategist — on the premises of Russian history. Understanding U.S. values and psychology are not his strong suits. Nor has understanding Russian history and psychology been a strong point of U.S. policymakers.

Leaders of all sides should return to examining outcomes, not compete in posturing. Here is my notion of an outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides:

1. Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe.

2. Ukraine should not join NATO, a position I took seven years ago, when it last came up.

3. Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility toward Russia.

4. It is incompatible with the rules of the existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. But it should be possible to put Crimea’s relationship to Ukraine on a less fraught basis. To that end, Russia would recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea. Ukraine should reinforce Crimea’s autonomy in elections held in the presence of international observers. The process would include removing any ambiguities about the status of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.

These are principles, not prescriptions. People familiar with the region will know that not all of them will be palatable to all parties. The test is not absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction. If some solution based on these or comparable elements is not achieved, the drift toward confrontation will accelerate. The time for that will come soon enough.

Read more on this issue:

Condoleezza Rice: The U.S. must lead again

Editorial: The West must resist Putin’s gambits in Ukraine

Zbigniew Brzezinski: How to respond to Putin’s aggression

Fred Hiatt: Making Putin pay

Anne Applebaum: Russia’s enablers in the West

Eugene Robinson: Who is the U.S. to criticize Russia’s actions?

EURASIAN INTERGATION AT THE CROSSROADS

A.M. BAICHOROV

Belarusian State University, 4 Nezavisimosti avenue, Minsk, 220030, Republic of Belarus

Author: Aleksandr Baichorov, doctor in political science, full professor, Department of International Relationsalbaichorov@mail.ru

For citation: Baichorov A.M. Eurasian Integration at the Crossroads. //Journal of the Belarus State University. International Relations, 2017, No 2, P.

The article provides an overview of the process of the Eurasian integration, analyzing its origins, problems and current tendencies. The following topics are addressed: the Eurasian integration as a reaction to the European integration and NATO enlargement, the Eurasian integration in the security field, stages of the Eurasian economic integration, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in the European context, conjugation of the EAEU with the Belt and Road Initiative of China, prospects of the Eurasian integration.

Key words: integration, Eurasia, Republic of Belarus, Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative, Customs Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization, NATO enlargement, economic integration.

ЕВРАЗИЙСКАЯ ИНТЕГРАЦИЯ НА ПЕРЕПУТЬЕ

А.М. БАЙЧОРОВ

Белорусский государственный университет, пр. Независимости 4, 220030, г. Минск, Республика Беларусь

Автор: Александр Мухтарович Байчоров, доктор философских наук, профессор кафедры международных отношений

В статье рассматривается процесс евразийской интеграции, анализируются его истоки, проблемы и современные тенденции. В центре внимания следующие вопросы: евразийская интеграция как реакция на европейскую интеграцию и расширение НАТО, евразийская интеграция в сфере безопасности, стадии евразийской экономической интеграции, Евразийский экономический союз (ЕАЕС) в европейском контексте, сопряжение ЕАЕС с китайской инициативой “пояса и пути”, перспективы евразийской интеграции.

Ключевые слова: интеграция, Евроазия, Республика Беларусь, Российская Федерация, Казахстан, Армения, Кыргыстан, Европейский союз, инициатива “пояса и пути”, Таможенный союз, расширение НАТО, Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности, экономическая интеграция.

Introduction

In the age of globalization when market forces heralded by the Transnational corporations (TNCs) and Transnational banks (TNBs) conquered every corner of the world economy the nation states are desperately trying to retain some control over the economic situation. And one of the most effective tools they invented was the tool of integration. Thus, one could conclude that globalization had become a foundation for the process of interstate economic integration. For the purposes of this article we would consider “integration” as a process of creating and maintaining close collaboration between previously autonomous parts of the system.

The European States started the integration process in the 1950s and eventually ended up inside the European Union as a product of economic and political integration. The North American States found themselves in NAFTA. The States of South-East Asia created ASEAN. By this article we would like to prove a hypothesis that the Eurasian integration was developing both as an answer to the economic needs and as a project to meet Russian Federation security interests.

USSR as a basis for the Eurasian integration

The first model of the Eurasian integration was, in fact, the Russian Empire. It is an interesting subject to determine what was the driving force for the Moscow State’s expansion to the East, West and South. Obviously it was not a search for the new markets because there were no large manufactured or agricultural surpluses in the Moscow State that would demand new markets. Most probably the Russians were looking for some geographical borders that would provide for their security needs. Finally, by the end of the 19th century these geographical borders were reached and Russia was properly secured by the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic Sea, the Carpathian Mountains, the Black Sea, the Caucasus Mountains, the Central Asian deserts, the Pamir, Tian Shan and Altai Mountains, by the Amur river and the Pacific Ocean.

With the exception of Poland and Finland the borders of the Soviet Union coincided with borders of the Russian Empire. Notwithstanding some difficulties, the Balshevicks managed to reinstate their control over the vast Eurasian space, rugged and sparsely populated. The Soviet centralized administrative economic system became a powerful tool to keep the different regions of the diverse USSR together. There was, of cause, a “socialist market” where main goods were produced in a Soviet republic using components brought from other republics and later distributed all over the country in an orderly manner (planned economy). The centralized economic system allowed to concentrate scarce resources for the fulfillment of main tasks of the national economy. It provided for the mobilization of labor and capital to build the socialist industrial base in mostly rural country.

All main political and economic decisions were taken by the top political leadership in Moscow and scrupulously implemented by the local Governments of the Soviet republics. The mobilization potential of such system functioned especially well during war time and allowed Stalin to claim victory over Hitler. The deficiencies of the system’s functioning became obvious during peace time. It was not able to satisfy the basic needs of the individuals. The quality of life in the Soviet Union was gradually falling behind the capitalist economies. The Soviet Union did not loose the competition with the West in the arms race, it was defeated in the competition for the consumer goods.

The USSR was dissolved in December 1991 but its heritage remained. And this heritage contained a number of tools useful for the persistence of the Eurasian integration. First of all, there was a huge network of cooperative economic relations tying the Soviet republics and different regions together. Secondly, there was the Russian language that allowed the local elites and businessmen talk to each other without interpretation. Thirdly, there was a cooperation culture that allowed the representatives of different peoples to understand each other, to respect the cultural and religious differences.

It is understandable that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union the local national elites wanted and tried to reestablish and strengthen the national identity of the union republics which became independent States. And, in parallel leaders of some autonomous republics of the USSR and autonomous regions (oblast) were trying to achieve a national sovereignty for their peoples. The latter lead to numerous identity conflicts, some of them became quite bloody ones. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the South-Ossetian and Abkhasian conflicts, the Chechen conflict, the

Nagorno-Badakhshan conflict, Transnistrian conflict and some others became real security problems for the most of the Newly Independent States created on the territory of the Soviet Union (NISs).

Due to these conflicts the Governments of the NISs became much more inclined to accept the integration ideas. With the exception of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Governments that chose the European integration embodied in the European Union, the Governments of other former Soviet republics toyed with the ideas of the Eurasian integration.

The Eurasian integration as a reaction to the European integration and NATO enlargement

The traditions of the Eurasian integration laid down by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union continued in different forms after the USSR dissolution. The Governments of the NISs started using the integration tool in order to develop the national economy and to manage the identity conflicts and other security risks.

The leaders of the EU and NATO at first were not ready to accept the East European post-communist States in their fold. US national security adviser Doctor R. Lake invented the Partnership for Peace Program to prevent these States from joining NATO. The idea was to create a format of military cooperation with NATO for those countries that had already had a tool of political cooperation in the form of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) since 1991. But this trick did not pay off. The Governments of Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania made up their minds and were adamant to join the Alliance.

The NATO and EU enlargements were for the most part not the result of a Western strategy but a reaction towards the Eastern European countries’ policies. Nevertheless, the enlargements that included all Central and Eastern European States posed a challenge to Russia in a situation when Moscow was trying to figure out a way to establish a security zone around the Russian Federation. In response to the European enlargements and in pursuit of its own security strategy Moscow created in 2002 the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and a loose Eurasian Economic Community within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Eurasian integration in the security field

The Eurasian integration in the security field was mostly driven by Moscow interested in surrounding Russia by friendly armies. This desire intensified after Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania pushed for the NATO membership. The CIS countries, whose armies were equipt with old Soviet weaponry, were also interested in enforced security cooperation. At the beginning of the 1990s most of the former Soviet republics did not have any financial resources to buy new armaments and pay high military salaries. They were in need to repair the Soviet weaponry of their armies, to purchase the munitions, etc. Therefore it was easier for Moscow, which promised to supply the armaments, to get those countries sign the Collective Security Treaty in Tashkent in 1992. Fearing the Moscow diktat the Belarus political leadership refused then to sign the Treaty. Nevertheless, it had to do this later on under the insistence of the Belarusian military and security elites.

In the 1990s the Russian Federation experienced enormous economic difficulties while trying to restructure the administrative economic system. It did not have any spare funds to assist the smooth functioning of the Tashkent Treaty.

The situation in security cooperation in the CIS area was somewhat changing at the beginning of the 2000s. The Russian Federation managed to implement most of the structural reforms and its economy started showing the signs of recovery. Faced with internal and external security challenges the Governments of some CIS States were looking for ways and means to strengthen their military capabilities. At this juncture Moscow made a proposal to reorganize the Tashkent Treaty and create on its foundation a new security organization, which would in some way resemble NATO. In September 2002 the needed intergovernmental agreements were signed in Chisinau and after proper ratification processes a new security organization came into existence. The Russian Federation, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan became its founding Member States.

The Moscow’s intention was to make CSTO a full-fledged regional security organization, which would be internationally recognized and used by the United Nations in conflict management. Unfortunately, this never materialized. NATO did not react to the CSTO appeals to establish bilateral ties. The NATO leadership did not want to uphold the CSTO international status by providing it with official recognition. The United Nations duly registered the CSTO as a regional security organization and all but forgot about it.

Today CSTO remains a valid security organization in the Eurasian area. Under the CSTO umbrella a number of activities take place. Military exercises in different military fields are regularly conducted. The cooperation between CSTO Member States in combating terrorism is developed. The supplies of military equipment and munitions are ensured. Obviously, the Russian Federation plays a pivotal role in the NISs’ military cooperation.

Stages of the Eurasian economic integration

If we focus on the Eurasian economic integration after the dissolution of the Soviet Union we could determine some stages of its development. The first stage (1991-2001) would be associated with the attempts to preserve the economic ties that existed in the USSR and to alter them by using the CIS institutional mechanisms. The second stage (2001-2010) could be associated with the creation and functioning of the Eurasian economic community (ЕврАзЕС). It was established in 2001 as a regional economic organization in order to facilitate the development of economic cooperation between the post-Soviet States and to promote the formation of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Area in the CIS. The Eurasian economic community included six members (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and three observes (Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine). The third stage (2010-2014) was mainly associated with the functioning of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. And the forth stage began in 2015 with the creation of the EAEU.

First results of the EAEU functioning were far from what had been expected. The positive economic dynamics that were characteristic of the Custom Union were replaced by the negative economic dynamics during first two years of the EAEU existence. In 2010 the volume of the mutual trade among the Customs Union Member States grew by 29,1%, and by 33,9% in 2011. In 2015 the trade between the EAEU Member States went down by 25,8% in comparison with 2014. Similar tendencies continued in 2016 [1].

Why was EAEU up for such a disappointing start? There were several objective reasons for that. We will mention just three of them.

Firstly, economic and political sanctions were installed against Russia in 2014 after Kremlin’s decision to take over the Crimea. Many investment projects of Western TNCs and TNBs became either frozen or annulled. It meant that for years to come Russia lost access to Western credits and

modern technologies. Foreign capital flew out of Russia and some Russian capital followed suit. International credits for economic development became much more expensive for the Russian companies and banks or became altogether unexessible.

Secondly, EAEU started functioning when the prices for hydrocarbonates in the international markets went drastically down. The price of oil went down at some point below 30 US dollars per barrel while at the beginning of the 2010s the price was well over 100 US dollars. As a result the Russian budget for 2015, which was calculated with a predicted assessment of 50 US dollars per barrel, became unrealistic. This lowered the purchasing power of the RF market and limited the volume of financial resources that Moscow could of used to support the EAEU project.

Thirdly, the Russian political leadership was sure that the Western sanctions would not be too detrimental for the country’s economy, that Russia could live through bad times by using ealier accumulated oil money. But when the price of oil went down the RF Government was too slow to readjust its economic strategy at such a short notice. Moscow tried to keep mostly unchanged the state appropriations devoted to the modernization of the armed forces and the social funds. In addition, the Russia’s budget had to accommodate some new big demands such as maintaining economic stability in the Crimea, supporting the Donbass separatists and waging war in Syria. Under these unforseen circumstances the EAEU project had to loose its priority for Moscow.

When Moscow is not able to devote proper resources to address the EAEU needs the political elites of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan often choose a strategy of survival on their own. As political scientist from Moscow State Institute of International Relations Kirill Koktysh puts it: “Old concept of EAEU died, and there is no new one. The EAEU was designed as a carbon copy of the EU. The dominance of four freedoms was proclaimed: movement of people, products and money. In practice this meant transfer of the resources from state to corporations. This plan did not work. And after the war of sanctions [against Russia] it became evident that the concept is not workable in principle. But the alternative one is yet to be suggested” [2].

EAEU in the European context

Before the Customs Union came into existence in 2010 the Republic of Belarus made an official proposal to the Russian side to jointly work on

formation of the common economic area between the Customs Union and the EU. It was understood in Minsk that the Customs Union and the European Union were natural strategic partners in the European continent with non-confrontational economic interests. And no political prejudicies can change this.

Belarus media often underlines that it was a Belarusian idea to form a common economic area from Lisbon to Vladivistok. In all justice I should say that this idea was simultaneously developed in Minsk and Moscow. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin elaborated on this idea for the first time in 2010 in his interview to German newspaper “Zuddoiche Zaitung”. In his article “New Integration Project for Eurasia – the Future that is Born Today” V.Putin wrote: “Economically logical and balanced system of partnership of Eurasian Union and EU can create real conditions for the changes in geopolitical and geoeconomic configuration of the entire continent and would have undoubtedly positive global effect” [3]. Before the presidential elections in RF in 2012 V.Putin made a proposal: “I again suggest to work for the benefit of creating a harmonic economic community from Lisbon to Vladivistok… Then we will get a common continental market trillions of euros worth” [4]. The official Russian position towards integration of integrations is also reflected in paragraph 56 of the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation signed in February 2013: “Main task for Russia as an undetachable organic part of European civilization in the relationships with the European Union is to move towards creation of a single economic and humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean” [5].

While Moscow was hurriedly assembling the EAEU in the beginning of the 2010s it had some geostrategic considerations in mind. Firstly, Moscow leaders assumed that being a head of the EAEU Russia could conduct negotiations with Brussels on a more equal footing, from a stronger geopolitical position. Secondly, Russia would participate in formulating the ground rules of integration of integrations. And finally, being the EAEU leader actively engaged in negotiating a common economic area from Lisbon to Vladivistok with Brussels Russia could become a real global player, whose interests would be taken seriously in Washington and Beijing. But Kremlin’s position during the Ukranian crisis of 2013-2017 put on hold all plans in this respect. As professor of St.Petersberg University Nikolai Mezhevich rightly noted “currently there is no “integration of integrations” but a struggle of integrations” [6, C. 56].

Nevertheless, the best practices of the European integration could be of

great value for the development of the EAEU. First lesson that EAEU could draw from the EU experience is as follows: most attention should be given to the institutions’ building. Only institutional system with proper checks and balancies can ensure smooth and non-discriminative functioning of an integrated body. Second lesson: the best way of conducting the institutions’ building is to follow the principle of subsidiarity meaning that most economic and political decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level of power, only the most disputed issues should be dealt with at the supra-national level. Author of this article is in complete agreement with Director of the integration studies of the Eurasian Development Bank Eugene Vinokurov, who noted that “a conservative approach based on subsidiarity principle should be applied for the development of political aspects of the EAEU” [7]. Third lesson: the creation of supra-national structures should be conducted with taking into account interests of all the partners. Fourth lesson: the transfer to the supra-national structures of new powers from the nation states should be made gradually with a thorough respect of the national positions and priorities.

The Eurasian post-Soviet integration that in reality started only with the establishment of the Customs Union lags behind the European integration. This fact has its pluses and minuses. The EAEU can avoid some mistakes of the EU and use its best practices. This is a plus. The EU project is quite successful, many European and non-Europen countries dream of joining the EU. In this situation the EAEU will have to prove once and again that it is no less effective than EU. And this is a minus

EAEU in the Asian context

It is well known that one hundred countries voted in the UN General Assembly in 2014 against the Russian annexasion of the Crimea. Moscow actively resists international pressure and the Western sanctions applied as a consequence of the Kremlin’s position during the Ukranian crisis of 2013-2017. At this juncture the Russian leaders had to find a powerful ally that could help to withstand the pressure. Right after the introduction of the Western sanctions in 2014 Moscow started to build closer ties with Beijing luring it with some consessions in Central Asia and bilateral relations.

The signing of the EAEU Treaty in May 2014 was assessed in China as an attempt of Moscow to shelter its interests in the EAEU Member States against foreign interference. In the light of Moscow’s refusal to creat a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Beijing viewed the EAEU creation as a part of the Russian policy to limit

the Chinese influence in Central Asia and in the markets of other EAEU Member States.

The signing of the EAEU Treaty coinsided with the intensification of the Western policy to contain the Chinese growth by using economic megapartnerships. In 2013 negotiations started on formation of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which would create a common economic area between the USA and the EU, and on the EU-Japan FTZ. In 2015 an agreement on creation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed by 12 countries of Asia-Pacific Region, excluding China. All these events were rightfully considered by the Chinese side as an attempt of Washington and Brussels to rewrite the rules of world trade behind the back of the WTO by using new regional integration schemes [8, C. 144-145].

To counter the Western policy of containment Beijing came up with a suggestion to bolster international trade by building extensive connectivity between the states and world regions. It was famous China initiative of economic belt of the silk road that later became known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Chinese President Xi Jinping made a proposal in Astana on September 7, 2013, to merge the potentials of China and the SCO to build an economic belt of the silk road from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean. Thus, from the very start the BRI and the EAEU looked like competitive initiatives.

In the framework of the BRI the development of six land corridors (belts) and two sea belts were envisaged. From the six land corridors three will pass through the landmass of the current SCO Member States and with India and Pakistan becoming Members five of the six economic corridors will pass through the Organization’s territory.

Beijing plans to transfer the BRI ideology and practice into the SCO area. For many years the Chinese have been dissatisfied with the SCO inaction in the field of economic cooperation and decided to put the SCO “economic component” under the BRI umbrella.

To withstand the Western pressure Moscow had to agree on allowing Beijing to enter the EAEU through the back door by signing on May 8, 2015, a Russia-China agreement on conjugation of the BRI and the EAEU. And one could just wander how Moscow could sign the agreement that involves the EAEU vital interests without proper consultations with its Member States.

Prospects of the Eurasian integration

Russia was and remains the main economic force in the EAEU. The fast development of Russia’s economy, if it happenes, would undoubtedly greatly contribute to the stregntherning of the EAEU. The growing Russian market would ensure the economic growth in other EAEU Member States. The prospect of easing the Western sanctions at present is deem but this could ultimately happen if Moscow stops supporting the Donbass separatists and her cooperation will be needed to counter serious global security threats like international terrorism or nuclear proliferation.

There is a good chance that international oil market will soon be stabilized. This will allow Moscow to better plan its economic development and to replenish its emergency funds. Accelerating economic growth in the USA, EU and some emergent economies would also increase the Russia’s chances to overcome the current stagnation.

Beijing would use the conjugation agreement for meddling in the EAEU affairs, especially in Central Asia. In the extreme scenario the SCO and the EAEU could become some decorative elements covering the massive economic offensive in the Eurasian region under the banner of the BRI. In this case not Moscow but Beijing becomes the main driving force of the Eurasian integration.

Conclusion

Unlike European integration the Eurasian integration develops itself not just as a multi-national but also as a multi-civilizational one. It involves muti-confessional Christian countries (Belarus), classic Eurasian countries like Kazakhstan (where young moslem leaders entered governmental program “Boshalak”, under which 80% of them attended universities in the USA and EU States), classic moslem countries with Asian culture like Kyrgyzstan, countries with Caucasian culture with a special sort of Christianity (Armenia), and finally Russia with its endless constellation of different cultures and religions.

Eurasian integration develops itself also as a multi-political one where each country so far keeps its sovereignity untouched. It was not accidental that Belarus and Kazakhstan insisted on inclusion of word “economic” in the title of the EAEU.

The Eurasian integration develops itself with a different speed in different economic spheres and with different speed of implementation of the Eurasian Economic Commission’s decisions in the Member States.

Moscow promoted the Eurasian integration in order to maintain control over the post-Soviet states’ markets. It would be much more difficult for the Russian economy to compete with Western and Chinese goods in the open markets. Some would say that there are still exist empirial intentions in the Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet space. Empirial or not but by forming the EAEU Moscow would like to play a role of regional hegemon in this space and to use the position of a EAEU leader as a tool to bolster its pretense to become a global player.

References

1. Внешняя и взаимная торговля товарами Евразийского экономического союза. (Eurasian Economic Union external and mutual trade of goods, (in Russ.). http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_stst/tradestst/time_series/Pages/default.aspx Access 02.03.2016.

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