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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GORDON R. SULLIVANGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

MILTON H. HAMILTONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army06965

As we go to press with this issue, the eveningnews leaves me aghast at the suffering, starvation,and disease in Rwanda. The Air Force is trying itsair-drop version of Biblical manna from heaven. Ihope it works. But I’m getting that sinking feelingthat some policymaker is about to inform us thatnothing short of Americans on the ground is goingto keep that last horseman from coming on linewith famine, pestilence, and death in some apoca-lyptic column of fours. Is it just me, or do we seemto be railing against forces we cannot control?

Most of the people who are paid to think in thisArmy will quickly tell you that thisis the way things are going to befor a long time into the twenty-first century. All you have to do iscount the number of times thephrase “Operations Other ThanWar” (OTW) pops up in the pro-fessional journals — this one in-cluded — and the focus of cur-rent military thinking will be clear.It would be easy to be dupedinto believing that these OTWmissions are somehow safer,less challenging, than the classic defense of theFulda Gap so many of us cut our military teeth on.But that would be a grave mistake. Humanitarianaid missions, where you are literally standing be-tween millions of starving people and their nextmeal, can get you killed if you are anything lessthan vigilant. Peacekeeping missions, which mightmore accurately be labeled war-keeping missions,since they always seem to occur where there is no

peace, can be deadly for the soldiers who takethem lightly. The simple fact is, just because the S2can’t produce an order of battle, and just becausesome classic Saddamic opponent isn’t maneuver-ing an organized force against us, doesn’t meanwe are in less danger. It usually means we are atgreater risk. It will take all of our soldier and leaderskills just to stay alive and fulfill the missions wereceive.

Given those likely impending missions, if you’restill operating on the belief that the Forward Edgeof the Battle Area (FEBA) is a line drawn across

the battalion front, you’d betterwake up. They haven’t changedthe field manual to reflect it yet,but Somalia veterans will tellyou that nowadays the FEBA isa circle drawn around you.

As we have since 1888, AR-MOR will continue to preparemounted warriors for the im-pending confl ic t, whatevershape it may take. In this issue,and the Nov-Dec issue as well,

we will examine some of the lessons learned inSomalia — not that our next challenge will be thesame — but it will likely be similar. Our writersspeak not from theory alone, but from experience.As mounted soldiers who will probably find them-selves working more closely than ever with dis-mounted troops in fluid circumstances, it will profitall of us to heed their advice.

— J.D. Brewer

First With The Most

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-94-5

Editor-in-Chief MAJ J. D. BREWER

Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS

Commandant MG LARRY R. JORDAN

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

Disclaimer: The information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head-quarters, reconnaissance squadron head-quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with respqnsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below. to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

September-October 1994, Vol. CHI No.5

Features

6 Armor History and Operations in 1944 (6th AD) by George F. Hofmann, Ph.D.

12 The Reserve Tank Company Organizational Readiness Exercise by First Lieutenant John A. Conklin

14 Rest for the Weary by Captain Patrick J. Chaisson

19 Reducing Gun Recoil: Differential Recoil Systems by Don Loughlin

26 Peacekeeping With Light Cavalry by Lawrence G. Vowels and Major Jeffrey R. Witsken

31 The Scout Vehicle by Lieutenant Colonel John C. Woznick

35 Full Circle: The Armored Cavalry Platoon by Brigadier General Philip L. Bolte. U.S. Army, Retired

38 Assault Gun Battalion 96 by Major Martin N. Stanton

44 What's Your Next Move?: The Ins and Outs of the Armor Enlisted Assignments Process by Sergeant First Class Michael R. Laney, Captain Joel C. Williams, Master Sergeant Curtis C. Brown. and Master Sergeant Joseph S. Woytko

47 Armor Officer 2000 by Major Douglas J. Morrison

49 The Green Tabbers of Force XXI by Lieutenant Colonel (P) Martin E. Dempsey, Armor Branch Chief

Back HMMWV Scout Update Cover

Departments

2 Letters 2 Contacts 4 Commander's Hatch 5 Driver's Seat

52 Books

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USPS 467-970

A New Tank: Time to Begin able, but as pointed out, certainly merits study from all sides.

upgraded M60A3s and not the M1 A 1. Our Army would have won, but with greatly in-creased casualties. Thanks to leaders and managers of vision over 20 years ago, that war was fought with the best tank in the world; but how long will it remain so? I think the Army finds itself today where it was in 1970 - at a time to make the hard decisions and continue with improvements to the current tank (M6QA 1 then, M1 A2 now); but at the same time, to look to the future, and to again speak with one voice and develop a revolutionary new tank for the year 2010 and beyond. To do this, the Army's leadership must recognize that it cannot make do by continually improving

Dear Sir:

J.B. Gilvydis' article in the May-June 1994 issue of ARMOR is a good think piece for our Army's leadership and its would-be combat developers and tank designers. I read it with great interest as I have been an admirer of J.B.'s work, and his prede-cessor Cliff Bradley's, for the past 30-plus years. From a technical standpoint, what is said in the article is right on target. Whether or not a two-man crew is in our Army's future scheme of things is question-

The article's summary is the real think piece. If our Army is to have a new tank anywhere in the foreseeable future in to-day's environment of very reduced bud-gets, it has to get its act together and speak with one voice and not as many "tiny empires" so aptly described in the article -"But if the tank community continues to function in its fragmented, semi-inde-pendent way, we will fail to achieve the re-quirements projected here for an effective tank in the year 2010." Had the Army not spoken with one voice through the 1970s, it would have fought DESERT STORM with

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question.s concerning doctrine, training, organizations. and equipment of the Armor Force.)

u.s. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL Commandant MG Larry R. Jordan

Assistant Commandant BG Lon E. Maggart

Chief of Staff, Armor School COL Fred A. Treyz III

Command Sergeant Major CSM Ronnie W. Davis

Armor School Sergeant Major CSM Henry F. Hurley

16th Cavalry Regiment COL Don Elder

1st Armor Training Brigade COL Henry Hodge

Directorate of Combat Developments COL Edward A. Bryla

NCO Academy CSM Stephen R. Morgan

Reserve Component Spt Div LTC Bennett l. Mott

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ARMOR - September-October 1994

the M1; it must start today defining the re-quirements for a new tank; it must bite thebullet now and set the tough dollar, techni-cal, and schedule priorities and adhere tothem through development and into pro-duction against an established fieldingdate; and most important, the Army musthave the courage of its convictions to staythe course. Otherwise, it could find itselfoutgunned on an early 21st Century battle-field. As J.B. Gilvydis says, “Presently, noone organization is responsible, no one or-ganization is accountable for the actions orlack of them in their tiny empires. We lackthe authority to plan, coordinate, and over-see all tank-related work. Which way wewill choose to go is up to us. Will it be withthe soldier, the Army and the country, orthe tiny empires?”

It has to be with the soldier, the Army,and the country. Let’s fix it now!!!

STAN R. SHERIDANMG, USA, Ret.

Naples, Fla.

The Four-Man Crew Works,Don’t Fix It!

Dear Sir:

On reading Mr. Gilvydis’ article in theMay-June ARMOR Magazine, I am quiteimpressed with his academic background.However, I think he is missing some impor-tant practical considerations.

Mr. Gilvydis says that four-man tankcrews are a thing of the past. He wants toadd more equipment, and give us fewerpeople to work on it with. I do not think thisis a good idea. I don’t want an autoloader,and I feel safe in saying most of my con-temporaries don’t either. He talks about thetanks of France, the former Soviet Union,and Japan, and their autoloader-equippedtanks. Are these really countries that wewant to emulate in tank design? The Sovietdesigned tanks in Iraq didn’t seem to betoo impressive to me.

Mr. Gilvydis also talks about the loadertaking other crewmen’s jobs — wrong. Youhave to have a loader. If the loader getsknocked out, most TCs will move to theloader’s station and load/TC from there. Ifthe gunner is knocked out, the TC gunsfrom the TC position. If the driver isknocked out, the gunner replaces him. Afour-man crew means versatility.

About the gunner — with all the fratricideincidents we have had, is it really wise toturn pulling the trigger over to a computer?I don’t want to be on any battlefield wherea computer is calling the shots. I want atrained human gunner identifying and con-firming his target, so fratricide doesn’t be-

come a bigger problem than it is. What ifthis “computer gunner” breaks? Have wejust lost the complete use of one tank?

Mr. Gilvydis talks of the shrinking man-power pool, and cites this as a reason togo to a two-man vehicle. Then, in the sameparagraph, he talks of plans to use a “splitcrew pool” with four-men assigned to eachtwo man tank. Either we have four men fora crew or we don’t. Which is it? How do weswap out these crews in a battle? Blow awhistle? I also like his idea about gettingthe infantry to help us work on our vehi-cles. First, they will not do it. The infantrywill have missions of their own, which, I amfairly certain, will not include working onour vehicles; and second, they don’t knowanything about a tank. It takes months oftraining to turn a crewman into a compe-tent mechanic. We don’t have time to trainevery infantryman in the Army to be a tankmechanic. Any tanker waiting on someoneoutside his platoon (or company, at best) isgoing to be waiting a long time.

Mr. Gilvydis also speaks of giving the in-dividual tank commanders the ability to“watch a whole battlefield panorama andbeyond” and “watch it from many differentelevations and directions.” I am telling youthere is such a thing as too much informa-tion. While our TCs are trying to figure outwhat they are seeing, somebody with athird grade education and a Korean Warsurplus bazooka is going to punch histicket for him. With the possible exceptionof the company and battalion commanders’vehicles, TCs don’t want or need to knowwhat is going on outside of their area ofinterest, and worrying about it could getthem killed.

Has anyone considered the effects ofEMP on all this neat gee-whiz gear? I don’tknow a great deal about it, but it strikes meas a definite point to be considered.

I have probably missed more points thanI have covered, but the bottom line is this:Four-man crews work very well. They allowfor flexibility, self-recovery/repair, security,and even a moderate amount of crew rest.

I don’t have all the degrees Mr. Gilvydishas, but I do have one very important thing— experience.

SFC JOHN M. LOCKE5/17 Cavalry

Korea

The Two-Man Crew —A Step in the Wrong Direction

Dear Sir:

Congratulations on the May-June 1994ARMOR. It was a very thought-provokingissue that will probably generate a lot of

discussion over the coming months. J.B.Gilvydis’ article, “A Future U.S. Main BattleTank for the Year 2010 — A New Vision,”although very interesting, is anything butnew. Discussions concerning the futureU.S. main battle tank have been going onfor some time. Apparently, in his haste tojump on the reduced-tank-crew band-wagon, he missed the key issue about the“two-man crew station.” While reality maydictate the replacement of a human loaderwith a reliable automatic device, the re-placement of the gunner is another matter.What Mr. Gilvydis has failed to recognize isthat the addition of the gunner’s responsi-bilities to the demands of the tank com-mander does not replace the gunner; it re-places the tank commander. That seemslike a high price to pay. Before anyone de-cides that “the tank will not suffer at all”when it is designed around a two-mancrew, they should listen to all those experi-enced NCOs and officers who continue tosay that such an advancement would be astep in the wrong direction.

Also, I would like to add some facts tothe important discussion concerning “Armorin the 21st Century” by MAJ Harold Spur-geon and Stanley Crist (ARMOR, January-February 1994) and more specifically theletter by A.J. “Beau” Bergeron that ap-peared in the May-June 1994 issue. “Black-listing” or being “barred from Fiddler’sGreen” is probably not required. Bergeron’scomments dealing with Armor’s inability to“really participate in a force projection strat-egy because we cannot rapidly deploy!” areold generalizations. While in a DESERTSTORM-like deployment, the time requiredto get a large enough force deployed iscritical, in the post-DESERT STORM world,large heavy force deployments are becom-ing less and less likely. The new reality willinclude (at least initially) small-scale rapiddeployment of heavy forces — as was thecase of the deployment to Somalia.

The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)deployment of Task Force ROGUE to So-malia is a classic example for the future.Alerted on 4 October 1993, the division andthe 2d VANGUARD Brigade readied anddeployed the Immediate Ready Company(IRC) consisting of four M1A1s, four M2s,two M113s, and 68 personnel. The divi-sion’s IRC was wheels up at N+1 daythrough N+3 days aboard seven C-5As.The remainder of Task Force ROGUE’s air-l i f t deployment, the Div is ion ReadyForce/Fly Away (DRF/FA), consisting ofC/3-15 IN(-) and a Task Force C2 and sup-port package was wheels up at N+3 daysthrough N+5 days in 14 C-5As.

While just about everyone would agreethat making the heavy force more deploy-able is a necessity, the doomsayers needto keep the rapid deployment of Task Force

Continued on Page 50

ARMOR — September-October 1994 3

The mounted combined arms team,while predominately armored and mech-anized, has components from across theentire force, to include light or dis-mounted elements. In the same way, wefind armored elements operating withinthe overall concept of Dismounted Bat-tlespace. These forces, drawn from otherthan the predominate type combat ele-ment present, bring a very necessary ca-pability and addition to the force. Thisenables the commander to perform veryspecific tasks that the bulk of his forcesmay be ill-suited to conduct. The opera-tional value and rationale for a light-heavy and heavy-light mix of forces hasbeen borne out in training conducted atthe Combat Training Centers and dur-ing our recent operational experience,ranging from JUST CAUSE and DE-SERT STORM to operations in Somalia.

The synergy and additional capabilityproduced by such task organization andforce pairing have been repeatedly dem-onstrated. This approach to organizationfor combat, combined with tremendousadvances in Battle Command and situ-ational awareness due to digitization andother applications of technology, em-power the commander to employ com-bat power in ways never envisioned.

The Force XXI commander of thenext century must not only have theskills necessary to use advanced tech-nology, but must be developed andtrained to operate on the more complexand specialized battlefield associatedwith either Mounted or DismountedBattlespace. We may even find that, de-

pending on the nature of the conflictand the battlefield, the bulk of the op-eration could be conducted within theBattle Dynamic of Depth and Simultane-ous Attack. While the requirement formaneuver forces is unquestionably nec-essary for decisive victory in the over-whelming number of cases, there couldbe those instances where the battle maybe predominately indirect and preci-sion long-range fires. Conventional ma-neuver elements might play a support-ing or enabling role.

In each case, the ground commander(I include Army Aviation as part of theground combat regime) must under-stand the full relationship between allforms of combat power and the desiredeffect on the enemy. He must relateavailable combat power, in whatevervariety, to the enemy, to the ground, andto the mission and objective. A tradi-tional, branch-based approach to train-ing for this form of warfare is not ade-quate beyond the lowest tactical levels.The combined arms commander mustpossess skills much more involved withintegrating forces than with displaying aparticular branch expertise.

The emerging requirements of 21stCentury battle drive us both to speciali-zation and to versatility in our forcesand our commanders. While the tankeror infantryman must be able to operatewithin Mounted or Dismounted Bat-tlespace, or in support of the Battle Dy-namic concerned with depth, simultane-ity, and fires, we should not expectthem and their leaders to be equally

proficient in all. Rather than attemptingthe near impossible task of training ourwide variety of mounted forces — ar-mor, light armor, cavalry, mechanizedinfantry — to operate equally wellwithin all the Battle Dynamics, weshould focus the training of units andthe development of commanders withcross-training as necessary. While mosttank battalions would focus on operat-ing within Mounted Battlespace, theywould be capable, with additional train-ing, of contributing within DismountedBattlespace. Specified units should beidentified for training necessary to pre-pare them for early entry and the pre-dominately dismounted fight. Unitsequipped and trained as light armor orcavalry could be earmarked for thisrole. The same approach could be takenwith infantry, engineers, and otherforces. Current warfare is too complexto train infantrymen, engineers, or tank-ers to the same level of proficiencyacross all possible contingencies andeach Battle Dynamic.

The training and professional develop-ment needs of leaders and commandersin the future must be tied to the BattleDynamics in which they will predomi-nately operate. Like so much else asso-ciated with Force XXI — the Army ofthe next century, leader developmentwill require new and innovative ap-proaches. Not only will leaders requirenew and additional skills, the trainingestablishment must take new approach-es to preparing that combined armscommander.

The Combined Arms Commander:New Challenges and New Approaches

MG Larry R. JordanCommanding General

U.S. Army Armor Center

4 ARMOR — September-October 1994

COMMANDER’S HATCH

The Expert Infantry Badge and theExpert Field Medical Badge both sig-nify excellence, and are awarded on thebasis of proven skill, performance, andtechnical and tactical competence. Inaddition, soldiers who earn the EIB orEFMB are authorized to wear a badgeon their uniforms and receive ten pro-motion points. While some soldiersmay not be fully aware of its existence,the Armor Branch has a programwhich identifies quality performers: theExcellence in Armor (EIA) program.While there is currently no badge forEIA, the EIA soldier can receive 50promotion points toward SSG, as op-posed to only ten for the EIB andEFMB.

The Excellence in Armor programwas proposed by the Armor Center toDepartment of the Army in May 1984.The program was approved as a pilotin July 1984, and due to the success ofthe pilot project, the EIA program wasapproved for full implementation inOctober 1987. Since its inception, over3,100 active and 800 reserve soldiershave been enrolled.

Soldiers in the rank of PV1 throughSFC may be enrolled either during OneStation Unit Training (OSUT) or attheir duty station:

• Drill sergeants recommend OSUTsoldiers in the tenth week of training,based on performance, motivation,and leadership potential. They areconfirmed by a battalion-level boardchaired by the battalion/squadroncommand sergeant major. The soldierwill then be officially enrolled in theprogram when he graduates and meetsthe following minimum standards:APFT of 230; weapons qualificationof sharpshooter; passes all armorcrewman tests, Armor stakes, and endof block test; and has a high school

diploma or the equivalent. DuringOSUT, the EIA soldier will receivemore than 50 additional hours of train-ing, compared to his peers.• In Armor/Cavalry units, soldiers in

the rank of PV1 through SFC may berecommended for enrollment by theircompany/troop commander and ap-proved by the battalion/squadron com-mander. The criteria for unit enrollmentare: a commander’s subjective evalu-ation of the soldier’s tactical/technicalproficiency, leadership potential, andmotivation; passing the CTT andTCCT/SCCT I test; and qualifying ontheir individual weapon as a sharp-shooter. (A qualifying score on theSDT will become a standard in FY95for NCOs. The previous SQT standardwas 90.)

The EIA program provides partici-pants several benefits that offer an in-centive for exceptional performanceand help lead to their retention. Themost important of these are:

• OSUT commanders can advanceup to 10 percent of each OSUT classto PV2 upon completion of the BCTphase and an additional 10 percent toPFC upon completion of the MOS-specific phase. EIA designees receivethe advanced promotions.• A SGT(P) may receive 50 addi-

tional promotion points toward SSGby passing the TCCT/SCCT II with ascore of 70. A soldier must be enrolledin EIA to take the exam.• All senior NCO promotion boards

are briefed that EIA identifies an Ar-mor soldier who is a “cut above.”• Probably the most important in-

centive, and the one that receives theleast attention, is simply the improvedmorale from recognizing a soldier whois an outstanding performer. In addi-tion, the message is reinforced that out-standing performance may result in ac-

celerated performance, a powerful mo-tivator.

But, the real question for Armor lead-ers is: Why should I support the pro-gram? The primary answer is the sameas the goals of the program: To filltank/cavalry vehicle commander’shatches with bright, highly motivatedsoldiers whose performance is consis-tently outstanding, and to provide in-centives which will lead to the reten-tion of quality NCOs. But the EIA pro-gram will not survive and provide thebenefits to units and to the ArmorBranch unless it is fully supported byleaders in the field. Armor leaders havefour primary responsibilities for EIA:

• Identify and challenge incomingEIA soldiers.• Establish and support a unit EIA

program.• Accelerate SPC/SGT/SSG promo-

tions for EIA enrollees. (If the EIAsoldier does not warrant acceleratedpromotion, he is probably not EIAmaterial.)• Maintain quality in the program by

enrolling quality soldiers in EIA anddisenrolling soldiers who no longermeet the EIA standards.

EIA is your program, and with yoursupport we will maintain a quality EIAprogram that will begin developing Ar-mor leaders to guide the Armor Branchinto the 21st Century. I encourage youto contact the Office of the Chief ofArmor at Fort Knox for more informa-tion on EIA.

The POCs for the program are SFCBerg and SFC Solomon at DSN 464-3188/5155 or commercial (502)624-3188/5155. They can also be reachedby writing to: Commander, U.S. ArmyArmor Center and Fort Knox, ATTN:ATZK-ARP (EIA), Fort Knox, KY40121-5000.

The Excellence in Armor ProgramDepends on Leaders’ Support


CSM Ronnie W. DavisCommand Sergeant MajorU.S. Army Armor Center

Introduction

The commander of the famous ThirdArmy in Europe during World War II,General George S. Patton, Jr., said thatthe 6th Armored Division and itsleader, Major General Robert W.Grow, was among his best. He wroteGeneral Grow: “Much of the glorywhich the Third Army has achievedhas resulted from the gallantry and en-ergy you and your division have dis-played from Avranches to the MuldaRiver.” Patton’s chief of staff addedthat the “Super Sixth” was one of themost dependable divisions that servedin the Third Army during the driveacross France and Germany.1 Therewas no doubt that the 6th Armored Di-vision achieved one of the most splen-did divisional records of the war. The“Super Sixth” was continuously in ac-tion since committed to combat on 29July 1944, except for a period of lessthan two weeks. Its history was one ofaccomplishment and determination.Very few matched the durability of itsleader and troops. At the U.S. ArmyArmor Conference in May 1971, anumber of veterans from the 6th ADmet as usual with their former com-mander. “He meant business, but hetreated us like a father and always

looked after his boys,” one veteranstated as he spoke for the group.2

The citizen soldiers who composedthe majority of the division, and theReserve and National Guard officerswho commanded them, proved them-selves determined fighters. Grow had avery basic philosophy on staff selec-tion: he wanted no yes men — only of-ficers who were professionally capable,with good, firm personalities to dealwith commanders. He wanted only re-serve officers who were not likely to beplucked out by higher commands.When he became division commanderin 1943, he had the sad experience oflosing the Regular Army staff to corpsand higher headquarters. Grow did notwant a similar shifting of staff person-nel when the division entered combat.So it was that his staff remained intactthroughout the duration of the Euro-pean campaigns.3

It is the well trained and determinedsoldiers, not a set type of organization,that wins battles. However, organiza-tion provides a framework withinwhich soldiers are able to fight moreeffectively by taking advantage of eachother’s skills and weapons. The 6th ADwas organized like all other armoreddivisions, with the exception of the 2d

and 3d. Within the standard organiza-tion, the several components (battal-ions, companies and platoons) could begrouped into a variety of formationsdesigned to carry out prescribed mis-sions with due regard to enemy,friendly forces, terrain, weather, logis-tics, fatigue, combat losses, and tacticalair support. A background analysis ofthe manner in which the operationalskills of the division were grouped intocombat commands and task forces willassist the reader to understand the ac-tions that have been described. There-fore, the thrust of this paper will be toevaluate the development of militaryleadership in respect to organization,operational skills, and tactics by exam-ining the military education and condi-tioning process of the 6th AD com-mander.

Leadership Development andExecution

On the political side Grow, early inhis career, came in contact with the fu-ture Supreme Court Judge Hugo L.Black. Both served in the same regi-ment in 1918, Grow as young lieuten-ant and Black as a captain and adjutant.The controversial Black, a populistdemocrat who would join the KKK in


Armor History and Operations in 1944The 6th Armored Division Experience in the European Theater of OperationsA Study in Leadership Development and Execution

by George F. Hofmann, Ph.D.

Light tanks support the 66th Infantry during 3d Army maneuvers at Fort Benning in April 1940, when armor doctrine was still developing.

1923, taught Grow by bad example notto mix politics with military discipline.4

A philosophy of life also acts to moldleadership. Grow did not believe in thesuperstitions and pagan formalitiescherished by the churches. He believedin an all-powerful force, a supreme be-ing not of human form that was theprime mover of human life. To Grow,life itself was everlasting but the indi-vidual was not immortal. To be sure,he was not disturbed about the prospectof his existence ceasing with death; allone had to do was his best. Death incombat was a way of life for the pro-fessional soldier. However, this attitudetowards life was not reserved for gen-erals. Many GIs and officers — as thedeath rolls of the 6th Armored Divisionindicated — accepted the horribledeath that came with combat.5

General Grow was influenced byGeorge T. Denison’s History of CavalryFrom the Earliest Times with Lessonsfor the Future, especially the last twochapters that dealt with morale andcommand. One sentence impressedGrow when he attended the CavalrySchool in the 1920s: “A cavalry gen-eral should be possessed of a strong in-ventive genius, and be self-reliantenough to strike out a new line andadopt reforms where he sees them nec-

essary.”6 He was not impressedwith the School’s bible, R.M.P.Preston’s The Desert MountedCorps: An Account of the Cav-alry Operations in Palestineand Syria, which argued thatthe horse-soldier was morevaluable in “modern warfare ashe had ever been in the past.”7The future role of the horse-sol-dier, Grow believed, wouldchange due to advances intechnology, especially with thearrival of a new mount, thetank. He did read the works ofBritain’s foremost military his-torians, General J.F.C. Fullerand Captain Basil Liddell Hart,during the inter-war period, butwas not greatly influenced bythem. Grow did admire bothfor their heavy emphasis ontanks and on armored warfare,but he did not think they un-derstand cavalry “as we did” inthe American environment. Atthat time he began to realizethe value of combined arms inthe cavalry’s role, which would requirean adjustment to meet future combatsituations. The future 6th AD com-mander believed that the function ofcavalry was to fight mounted, dis-mounted, or both at the same time, andnot act purely as a screening or recon-naissance force until the main branchesof infantry and artillery came up anddisposed of the enemy, as professed bythe U.S. Army General Staff at thetime.8

Grow was even more heavily influ-enced by the teachings of Major Gen-eral Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., known as“The Father of Armor.” Unfortunatelyhis untimely death in August 1941 pre-vented Chaffee from seeing the resultsof his labor. His foresight and experi-ence in organization and employmentof the mounted soldier were created onpaper and then brought into being asthe Armored Force in 1940, an integra-tion of branches and services that wasorganized into a new integrated combatarm, Armor. Its origins early can betraced to the 1930s at Fort Knox,where the first U.S. mechanized cav-alry went through numerous growingpains. Out of the early chaos of ideas,doctrine, and obsolete equipmentemerged a team capable of fighting onnew mounts. It was during those leanyears that the future CG of the 6th ADcame under the influence of Chaffee,and later applied his doctrine of organi-zation and command skills to the divi-sion. Like his mentor, Grow believed

that the mission of cavalry was to fight,not the generally accepted view beforeWorld War II that the mission was re-connaissance and security. For a caval-ryman who was not mesmerized by thehorse, it allowed for greater flexibilityof mind and opened the window tofresh ideas that only the more fore-sighted military man, not engrossed inmilitary traditionalism, could apply.9

Grow professed to be a “cavalryman”not a “tankman” nor a “horseman.”During the 1930s the cavalry was un-dergoing a more fundamental change,due to the inability of the horse to sus-tain itself on the battlefield, and be-cause it was an ineffective mount formodern weapons, a fact not acceptedby many older cavalry officers. Briga-dier General Daniel Van Voorhis, acavalryman with foresight and imagina-tion who commanded the MechanizedForce in 1930-31, and Chaffee, plusmany younger open-minded officers,believed the cavalry had to develop abetter horse. The tank offered onemeans for a soldier to fight mounted,but that was not enough, since a caval-ryman must be able to fight bothmounted and dismounted. Therefore,there must be a mount or mounts thatwould enable the cavalry to carry outall its missions. This demanded a vari-ety of mounts of which the tank wasone, an essential one, but not the soleone. The Army needed an Infantry armthat could fight dismounted and a Cav-alry arm (Armor) that could fight


MG John K. Herr, the last Chief of Cavalry, onhis private mount, Star Witness, a grandson ofMan O’War.

MG Robert W. Grow saw himself as a caval-ryman, rather than a horseman or a tank-man.

mounted as well as dismounted. Com-mand headquarters were not to be ad-ministrative with fixed units but func-tional in order to mix units as the com-bat situation required. This was the ba-sic thinking at Fort Knox that influ-enced Grow.10 Also during the 1930s,Van Voorhis, Chaffee and another cav-alryman, Bruce Palmer, were involvedin bringing artillery to the mechanizedcavalry. It was not until Major GeneralJacob L. Devers, an artilleryman, re-placed the deceased Chaffee in 1941that the Army achieved the high stateof development of self-propelled artil-lery. At first, Devers had consideredthe tank as actually a form of artillery.

So, the main thrust at Fort Knox dur-ing the lean years was aimed at devel-oping an arm capable of fightingmounted, independently. Unfortunatelythere was such a diversity of opinionthat the basic problem was obscured byhorse-oriented soldiers and the tradi-tional branch chiefs. The last Chief ofCavalry, Major General John K. Herr,had initially supported the estab-lishment of a mechanized cavalry divi-sion. Strangely, after the 1940 Germanblitzkrieg, he had changed his mindand refused to mechanize the horseunits. These were very difficult timesin developing a handle on a perceivedmission because of branch oppositionto the establishment of an armoredforce. The Chief of Infantry, MajorGeorge A. Lynch, argued that the Ar-mored Force had only asked for a fieldforce headquarters and not a separatearm; that the infantry and tank battal-ions in Chaffee’s Armored Forceshould be returned to infantry control.General Herr argued that there wasnothing in the accomplishment of anArmored Force that “could not havebeen accomplished equally well or bet-ter through established agencies of theWar Department.” He based his argu-ment on the 1920 National DefenseAct that denied the establishment of aseparate tank corps.11 Eventually, thepseudo-separate arm was called the Ar-mored Force because of an apparentobjection by General Lynch to usingthe word “mechanized” in the title. Asimilar objection was raised by GeneralHerr; he objected to the word “tank” inthe title.12 General Devers, who re-placed Chaffee, believed tanks carriedtoo much dead weight because of theircomponent parts, maintenance, weap-ons system, and ammunition. He opined“that we should go to wheels if possi-ble.” It was tried, but the experiment

failed.13 Even the head of the ArmyGround Forces, Lieutenant General Les-ley J. McNair, became a critic of thearmored organization and found its me-chanical and personnel composition toomuch of an expensive military invest-ment.14 It was quite evident that, inspite of the changes brought about byadvanced technology and its effects ontactics, the opponents and the traditionalchiefs were rejecting any fresh ideasthat threatened their parochial thinking.Because of their fixation on traditionand branch bureacracy, their militaryperceptions became archaic.

There is no doubt that peer influencehad an effect on molding Grow’s lead-ership. During the 1920s and 1930s, theArmy was small and provided the op-portunity for officers to become wellacquainted and learn from one another.At the Command and General StaffCollege and War College many of theleaders of World War II developedpeer union. “When you play bridge,golf, softball, handball, and ride horseswith people, as well as see them inclass, you get to know them prettywell.” “My class,” Grow said, “turnedout a large number of general officers.This was very important in World WarII — now it is not as easy with thelarge Army.” One of the results of thisclose peer union was that it threw himinto contact with the officers whowould develop and lead the armoredand infantry divisions of World War II.He viewed Patton as “the leader whosummed up the principles of leadership

by his actions, good and sometimes notso good, but who got results — vic-tory.”15

Grow was basically a cavalryman, buthe realized, as did many of his peersstruggling through the “lean years” atFort Knox, that a new mount had ar-rived. Coupled with a young cavalry-man’s flexibility of mind and a phi-losophy on life, a new mount, andChaffee’s influence, the mold was set.

In the advance across Brittany toBrest between 1-8 August 1944, the6th AD proved the soundness of cav-

alry tactics of maneuver, firepower,daring, and speed; only the mountswere different. The successful exploita-tion was due in no small part to theplanning and support of supply, ord-nance, and evacuation service. Thespeed of the division prevented theGermans from coordinating their de-fenses, except in Brest. When possible,the division bypassed centers of resis-tance; this tactic was effective becausethe 6th AD was more mobile than theGermans, and it was a waste of menand time to engage a strong defense.The rapid movement of the 6th ADusually provided automatic flank pro-tection and only when the divisionhalted was flank protection required.The deployment of the division wasfast and wide, and the combat com-mands were positioned according to thetactical situation. For example, basedupon the principle of reinforcing suc-cess, Grow several times shifted his


LTG Patton greets MG Grow as he arrives at a meeting at Nancy, France in late 1944.

Reserve Command from the route ofone column to another, depending uponwhich combat command was makingthe greatest forward progress. Since theBrest campaign was the 6th’s first cam-paign, and the commanders and unitslacked combat experience, Grow pre-ferred to keep organization simple byutilizing a standard organization ofthree balanced combat commands withno switching of tank, infantry, or artil-lery battalions to meet tactical situ-ations. The assignment of artillery bat-talions to columns had the effect of re-stricting the artillery commander’s abil-ity to direct massed fire support. Ingeneral, the Brest campaign did notgive a true picture of the best way touse a flexible armored division, actingalone in exploitation deep in enemyterritory.16

Usually all armored divisions wereused as three striking forces: CCA,CCB and CCR, each having its owntactical headquarters. Generally, eachcommand had one tank, one infantry,and one field artillery battalion, plussupporting units. Most of the armoreddivision commanders set up a perma-nent or semi-permanent combat com-mand (in the heavy armored divisions,the 2d and 3d, the regimental organiza-tion was retained). This resulted in afixed organization, in contrast to Chaf-fee’s concept of a flexible organizationconsisting of a combat command head-quarters to which could be attachedany number of battalions or other unitsrequired for a particular mission. Thecombat command was never designedfor administrative control, or to havepermanent or fixed units assigned. The6th was the only armored division thatconformed completely to Chaffee’s ba-sic idea. Only during the Brest cam-paign did the 6th adhere to a stereo-typical organization; each commandhaving one tank, one infantry, and onefield artillery battalion plus supportingunits.

The 6th Armored Division adhered toChaffee’s concept of two strikingforces (CCA and CCB), a reserve com-mand (sometimes referred to as CCR),an artillery command, a trains com-mand, and a reconnaissance squadron.The Reserve Command, as Grow pre-ferred to call it, was charged with con-trol of all combat units not assigned toCCA or CCB, with the exception ofthe Recon Squadron. Although notmanned or equipped to carry out exten-sive combat missions, the ReserveCommand had the ability to undertake

a combat mission of limited extent,usually defensive. However, its mainrole was to furnish combat units to re-inforce one or both combat commands.An exception to the use of the ReserveCommand as an attack unit was duringthe Gremecey Forest counterattack on1 October 1944. Both combat com-mands were in the line and Grow,heavily pressed by Patton, had to usethe reserve offensively. Artillery wasnot assigned to a combat command un-less it was on a de-tached mission.After Brittany itwas kept under theDivision ArtilleryCommand, witharmored field bat-talions in directsupport of combatcommands or ingeneral support,thus enabling thedivision to massfires when neces-sary. This was par-ticularly importantfor fire directioncontrol since addi-tional artillery bat-talions were usu-ally attached to thedivision.17

According toGrow, many of thearmored divisioncommanders ofWorld War II didnot understandChaffee’s concept.But the importantfact remains thatAmerican divi-sions, both armored and infantry, hadsuccess; thereby proving that the typeof organization is not the deciding fac-tor, but rather the degree of trainingand the degree of understanding thatexists between the combat commandsand their commanders. Years later, Lieu-tenant General George W. Read, Jr.,who commanded CCA and later wasmade assistant division commander,would say: “Our success was due pri-marily to the fine training we had un-dergone, aggressive leadership and theall-around team effort from top to bot-tom....”18

After the 6th AD moved to the Lor-raine area at the end of September1944, greater flexibility in organizationwas developed. No regular assignmentswere made and combat commands var-

ied anywhere from one to six battal-ions, depending upon the mission. Inorder to make flexibility work, it wasnecessary that both combat commandswork exactly under the same SOP, andthat both combat commanders beequally well acquainted with all battal-ion commanders. A combat commandon any one day might consist solely ofits headquarters and headquarters com-pany, as one extreme, while on the fol-lowing day it might have two, three,

six, eight, or any number of battalions,separate companies, or even platoonsassigned to accomplish a specific mis-sion. Thus it can be said that, eventhough both systems — CCA, CCB,and CCR vs. CCA, CCB, and ReserveCommand — proved successful, theflexibility inherent in the 6th AD pro-vided a more prompt and effective re-sponse than did a more rigid form.First, full advantage was taken of thesituation (weather, terrain, enemy posi-tion, strength and action, plus the dis-position of friendly units) by assign-ment of appropriate units to each com-bat command. Second, individual bat-talions and smaller units were readilyrelieved when suffering from fatigue orcombat losses. Third, elements of theReserve Command were used to rein-force success; and finally, the Reserve


BG George W. Read, Jr. commanded CCA of the 6th Armored. Heattributed the unit’s success to training, teamwork, and good leader-ship.

Command was utilized as a combatcommand if the situation so indicated,as occurred in February 1945 at the 6thAD’s Our River crossing. The ReserveCommand also assumed the defensiveafter the two striking forces reachedtheir objectives.

The organization could also causedisadvantages. All units, down to theplatoon, had to be well trained to worktogether with other units under a singlestandard operating procedure. The or-ganization also required exceptionallywell trained and active staff at all lev-els to avoid confusion and assure thateach element was in the proper place atthe proper time with full understandingof its mission. Due to the pre-invasiontraining and lessons learned in combat,plus excellent staff work, many of thedisadvantages were avoided. Also, itgoes without saying that, in addition toan able command, staff organizationand training, success demanded thateach soldier know his job and that ofhis immediate superior. All had to beimbued with the highest degree of con-fidence, comradeship, and the will-to-win. This the 6th AD had in abun-dance. The division never had a moraleproblem.

A brief description of the charac-teristics and method of operations ofthe division staff, battalions, and sepa-rate companies will help to understandthe part each played in the success ofthe 6th Armored Division.19

The division headquarters companyprovided the administrative, supply,and service personnel and the local se-curity for both forward and rear eche-lons of division headquarters. The for-ward echelon included the divisioncommander, assistant division com-mander, their aides, the liaison officersfrom subordinate and adjacent head-quarters, chief of staff, assistant chiefsof staff G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, divi-sion surgeon, Signal and Engineer offi-cers. (The latter also commanded the25th Armored Engineer Battalion andwas usually represented by an assistantdivision engineer.) The division chemi-cal officer and military government of-ficer joined the forward echelon whenappropriate. G-1, G-4, and the divisionsurgeon rotated between forward andrear echelon as the situation demanded.Forward echelon was located, both onthe march, in combat, or in bivouac, asfar forward as practical to facilitatecommunication and personal contactwith combat units. The division com-mander or the assistant division com-

mander, their aides and, from time totime, officers from the G-2 and G-3sections, constituting an advance party,kept in close personal touch with themain effort during combat. At the sametime Grow or his assistant CG kept inradio touch with the division commandpost where the chief of staff, in touchwith all units through radio, wire, orliaison personnel kept the commanderinformed and issued orders as directed.If necessary, the chief of staff could is-sue orders on his own, in accordancewith the plan. The magnificent commu-nication facilities provided by the146th Armored Signal Company rarelyfailed to keep all commanders and staffpersonnel in touch.

The headquarters commander, withthe security platoon, was charged withmoving, locating, and protecting the di-vision command post as directed by thechief of staff. During rapid advances,this frequently took the party under fireas they sought a forward position in an-ticipation, usually proven justified, ofcontinued advance.

The rear echelon was under control ofthe division trains commander formovement and security. The latter dutyoften fell to the band, as well as themilitary police platoon. In addition toheadquarters and headquarters com-pany of division trains, the followingsections of division headquarters, con-stituting the rear echelon, were nor-mally present: the adjutant general, in-spector general, division chaplain, spe-cial services officer (including gravesregistration), postal officer, finance of-ficer, provost marshal and, when notwith the forward echelon, the militarygovernment officer and chemical offi-cer as well as attached specialty teamsand Red Cross field directors. Therewas, obviously, constant interchangebetween forward and rear echelons,particularly between G-1 and G-4 sec-tion personnel. The rear echelon movedless frequently than the forward andwas billeted in more permanent shelterwhenever practicable, as was fitting totheir duties.

Conclusion

The doctrinal point held by theUnited States Army Ground Forcesduring most of World War II was thatthe primary role of tanks was for pur-suit and exploitation. During its drivethrough the Brittany Peninsula during1-8 August 1944, the 6th Armored Di-

vision’s success in exploitation andpursuit was due to traditional planningthat dictated equal positioning of thetwo striking forces, Combat CommandA and B, with R in reserve, each hav-ing its own tactical headquarters. Usu-ally, each command had one tank, onearmored infantry, and one armoredfield artillery battalion. During the Brit-tany campaign, the divisional com-mander preferred to keep the traditionalorganization, three balanced combatcommands with no switching of tank,infantry, and artillery battalions orother organic units from one combatcommand to another. In general, thedrive to Brest did not give a true pic-ture of the best way to use a flexiblearmored division, acting in exploitationand pursuit deep into the enemy’s terri-tory. This type of organization was incontrast to Adna Chaffee’s idea of aflexible organization, consisting of acombat command headquarters thatcould have attached any number of bat-talions or other units required for a par-ticular tactical mission. Grow, who wasinfluenced by Chaffee, developedgreater flexibility in organization afterthe Brittany operation. No regular as-signments were made, and each combatcommand became a striking force thatvaried in strength from one to six bat-talions, depending upon the tacticalmission and its constraints. In order tomake the flexibility work, Grow madesure that the three combat commandcommanders worked under the sameoperational procedures and wereequally well acquainted with all thebattalion commanders. Though bothsystems proved successful, the flexibil-ity inherent in the 6th AD provided fora more prompt and effective responseto the conditions of combat than didthe rigid form. The result was that the6th AD became one of two of Patton’smost dependable and effective combatdivisions during operations in the ETO.

General Grow realized that therewere many differences in the methodof organization; however, the 6th ADwas the only one in which Chaffee’sbasic ideas on organization, tacticalplanning, and operational skills werecompletely followed. The essence ofChaffee’s ideas and Grow’s leadershipallowed complete flexibility in execu-tion. During exploitation missions,which the 6th AD frequently carriedout, it was Grow’s established rule thatrapid deployment be initiated by amounted column, followed usually bycombined mounted and dismounted ac-tion supported by artillery.


To Grow, there was no substitute forbattlefield mobility because it allowedthe commander to retain the initiative.His early tactical philosophy, whichbegan at the Cavalry School, was thebeginning of a background of profes-sional development and judgment thatwas open to new ideas. This providedmental resilience, allowing him toadapt quickly to changing military cir-cumstances.

Footnotes

Note: The majority of historical informationpresented above was taken in part from GeorgeF. Hofmann, The Super Sixth. History of the 6thArmored Division in World War II and Its Post-War Association (Louisville: 6th Armored Divi-sion Association, 1975). The copyright is heldby the 6th Armored Division Association, Pub-lisher. Permission has been granted.

1“Organization and Tactics” in The ArmoredForce Command and Center, Study No. 27,Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946,Record Group 407, National Archives, p. 42;Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), pp.421, 425, 610, 773; Ltr., Patton to Grow, HQThird United States Army, 25 Apr 45, GrowFiles in possession of author; and Hobart (Hap)Gay in Verbatim Record of Trial, Grow Files,p. 240.

The records of the 6th Armored Division arelocated at the National Archives in the AdjutantGeneral’s Files, Record Group 407, Suitland,MD. There are approximately 130 boxes. Thesedocuments served in part for Hofmann, The Su-per Sixth. In addition to the numerous docu-ments that were copied from the archives, cor-respondences from veterans, and other docu-mentation pertaining to the 6th Armored Divi-sion’s history was placed with the U.S. ArmyMilitary History Research Institute (USAM-HRI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa. The units’ historiesprepared shortly after the war are now locatedin the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor,Fort Knox, Ky.

The other armored division that had an out-standing record and considered by Patton one ofhis best was the 4th.

2Author’s notes, 14 May 71, Fort Knox, Ky.,Grow Files.

3Ltr., Grow to author, 26 Jan 73, Grow Files.4Ltr., Grow to author, 19 Feb 72, Grow Files.5Interviews, author with Grow, 5 May 72, 6

May 73, and 27 Aug 73.6Denison, A History of Cavalry (London:

Macmillan and Co., 2nd ed. 1913), p. 447.Denison, a Canadian, won Czar Alexander II’saward in 1877 for producing this best book onthe history of cavalry.

7Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps (Lon-don: Constable and Company Ltd., 1921), pas-sim.

8Ltr., Grow to author, 19 Feb 72, Grow Files.9An interesting life’s sketch depicting Grow’s

role in the development of cavalry mechaniza-tion can be found in his “The Ten Lean Years:From the Mechanized Force (1930) to the Ar-mored Force (1940),” Unpublished MS, 1969.Copies of the MS are on file at the USAMHRIand the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor,Fort Knox, Ky. In 1987, ARMOR Magazine fi-nally produced a four-part edited book-lengthseries of “The Ten Lean Years,” which de-scribed Grow’s account of the cavalry’s declineand the creation of the Armored Force. Also seeGeorge F. Hofmann, “Tactics vs Technology:The U.S. Cavalry Experience,” ARMOR (Sep-Oct 1973): pp. 10-14, and Mildred H. Gillie,Forging the Thunderbolt. A History of the De-velopment of the Armored Force (Harrisburg,Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Co.,1947), pp. 20-40.

10Ltr., Grow to author, 15 Apr 73, GrowFiles; “Prelude to Armor” in The ArmoredForce Command and Center; and Grow, “TheRole of Armor,” ARMOR (Jan-Feb 62): pp. 30-31.

11“Redesignation of Armored Force” in TheArmored Force Command and Center, p. 108,and John K. Herr, “Editorial Comment,” Cav-alry Journal (May-Jun 46): pp. 35-40. As lateas 1953, retired General Herr nostalgicallycalled for remounting one horse cavalry divi-sion. See John K. Herr and Edward S. Wallace,The Story of the U.S. Cavalry, 1775-1942 (Bos-ton: Little Brown and Company, 1953), pp.258-259.

12“Initial Structure” in Armored Force Com-mand and Center, p. 9.

13Remarks by General Jacob L. Devers, Ret.,64th Annual Meeting of the United States Ar-mor Association, 30 Jan 53, Fort Knox, Ky.,p.12.

14Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer,and Bill I. Wiley, The Army Ground Forces:The Organization of Ground Combat Troops(Washington: GPO, 1947), pp. 334-335.McNair’s solution to combat German tanks andthe blitzkrieg was to develop an antitank doc-trine, which by the end of the war proved inva-lid. See Christopher R. Gabel, Seek, Strike, andDestroy: U. S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrinein World War II. Leavenworth Papers No. 12,Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Commandand General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,Kan., Sep 85, passim.

15Ltr., Grow to author, 2 and 19 Feb 72,Grow Files.

16Ltr., Grow to Blumenson, 26 Apr 45,USAMHRI, p. 4. In this correspondence Growcomments on Blumenson’s manuscript dealingwith the Brest campaign that eventually evolvedinto chapter XX in Breakout and Pursuit(Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 343-347.

17Ltr., Grow to Editor of Military Review, 12Sep 45, Grow Files, and Grow, “Mounted Com-bat: Lessons from the European Theater,” TheCavalry Journal (Nov-Dec 45): pp. 35-36. The4th Armored Division, with rare exception,fought with two Combat Commands as strikingforces. Interviews with COL Jimmy Leach,USA, Ret.

During World War II, armored divisions wentthrough six reorganizations, however, the estab-lishment of light armored divisions in 1943 wasone of the most efficient. This type of organiza-tion was employed by the 6th, 4th, and theother armored divisions, with the exception ofthe 2d and 3d. The Reserve Command wasoriginally intended “as a means of controllingthe division reserve while on the march.” How-ever, in the European Theater of Operations, ar-mored divisions “habitually utilized the divisionin three combat commands.” See “Organizationand Tactics,” in The Armored Force Commandand Center, pp. 29, 35-36.

18Ltr. Read to author, 5 Feb 73, USAMHRI.19The methods of operations are covered in

Hofmann, The Super Sixth, pp. 437-443.


Dr. George F. Hofmann is a busi-nessman, historian, lecturer, educator,and author who served in the U.S.Army (Armor). He holds a BS degreein business administration and a Mas-ters degree in education from XavierUniversity in Ohio, and a masters inAmerican history and a Doctorate,concentrating in diplomatic and mili-tary affairs, from the University of Cin-cinnati. In addition, he completed apostdoctoral research program at theUniversity of Cincinnati College ofLaw, concentrating on U.S. constitu-tional history and military law and jus-tice. He is a field faculty advisor forNorwich University’s graduate pro-gram in American and Modern Euro-pean History at Fort Knox, Ky. Cur-rently, he is a lecturer in History at theUniversity of Cincinnati. A number ofhis articles and book reviews have ap-peared in ARMOR, Army, MarineCorps Gazette, Military Affairs, Journalof Military History, and the Journal ofthe Royal United Services Institute forDefense Studies (RUSI). He is a con-tributing author to the Dictionary ofAmerican Biography, and Volume III ofthe Marine Corps University Perspec-tive on Warfighting; and the author ofThe Super Sixth: A History of the 6thArmored Division in World War II andIts Post-War Association, and the ColdWar Casualty: The Court-Martial ofMajor General Robert W. Grow.

This past summer our unit, A Com-pany, 1-163d Cav, had the opportunityto be the first combat unit in the Mon-tana National Guard to undergo anOrganizational Readiness Exercise orthe infamous ORE. On a cold, snowyweekend, our soldiers boarded a C-130 in Butte, Montana, flew 700 milesto Gowen Field, Idaho, and accom-plished their mission — they passedtheir ORE. This article is a ReserveComponent perspective of how totrain for an ORE, the phases of theORE, and the implications the OREmay have for the Army.

TrainingFor a Reserve Component armor unit

to succeed during an ORE, the com-mand group is going to have to evalu-ate the unit training program, trainingstandards, and the actual training.

The training program should be de-signed as explained in FM 100-25 andFM 101-25. The command cell of theunit should ensure that platoon-levelcollective tasks are derived from theunit’s Mission Essential Task List.These platoon-level tasks should, inturn, be supported by crew-level col-lective tasks, which in turn are sup-ported by common tasks. The unitwill need to ensure that crewmen ateach position are assigned appropriateMOS-specific and supporting com-mon tasks. And it is critical that theunit’s CS and CSS elements are notleft out of this procedure.

The unit command group then needsto ensure that the training schedulesfocus on required tasks and emphasizethe platoon-level tasks, crew-leveltasks, and common tasks. I wouldsuggest designing the training sched-ule to build upon itself, starting withcommon tasks and then integratingthem into crew-level and platoon-levelcollective tasks later in the trainingyear.

The actual training has to be to theArmy’s task, condition, and standard,which cannot be compromised andhas to be ruthlessly enforced. The

training also needs to be conducted bythe first-line leader appropriate to thelevel of training being conducted.This fosters crew integrity, promotesquality of training because it allowsthe tank commander to train his crewand the platoon leader to train his pla-toon to the standard he wants, and en-sures that the chain of command is al-ways used within the company.

Finally, NCO and officer profes-sional development is a very criticalpart of training in the Reserve Com-ponent armor force. This training willset the standards for the company offi-cers and NCOs in the unit, and de-velop the cohesiveness and doctrinalknowledge required to fight and ac-complish the unit’s combat missions.This cohesiveness and knowledgeshould radiate out into the unit, givingthe enlisted man the opportunity totrust the people who will lead theminto battle.

I stress the fostering of a fight-and-win mentality during training. TheORE team should be looking for theunit’s desire to defend its nation andits ability to do so. If dedication toGod, country and duty do not exist inthe unit, I feel that the unit will neverbe of much account.

ORE Phase One:The Compliance Phase

The compliance phase is the firstphase of the ORE, and generally takesplace on the two days just prior to theORE IDT weekend.

This phase evaluates the unit’s abil-ity to maintain files, records, andequipment to ensure that the unit’sequipment and men are ready for de-ployment. The subcategories of thisphase include personnel qualification,personnel records, training manage-ment, supply management, mainte-nance, security, and MOB files/OP-WAR plan. Let us look at each ofthese categories briefly.

•••• Personnel qualification. The ma-jor concerns in this category are en-

suring the unit’s UMR does not con-tradict soldier personnel files.

•••• Training management. The ma-jor item units need to concern them-selves with in this category is design-ing training by the cross-walk proce-dure I will mention in this article un-der training.

•••• Supply management. Units needto ensure that all equipment is regis-tered on the unit’s property book, thatthere is no excess MTOE/CTA equip-ment on the property book, and thathand receipts are in accordance withArmy regulations.

•••• Maintenance. This is a very dif-ficult area in the Reserve Compo-nents. Unlike our active duty counter-parts, our vehicles are in three differ-ent locations and we are not the onlyunit that uses them. Therefore, ensur-ing all company vehicles are in oper-ating condition is extremely difficult,especially when your tanks are storedup to 800 miles apart and in two dif-ferent states! These conditions domake any maintenance evaluationmiserable, but there are areas Reserveunits can control. DD Forms 314 needto be filled out properly. Unit execu-tive officers have to take responsibil-ity and supervise the DA Forms 348,2404, 1970, etc. to ensure these arebeing filled out correctly, stored andused in accordance with update 13,and that the chain of command is be-ing used. This will take a lot of timewhich, in all likelihood, you will notbe paid for, but it must be done.

•••• Security. The important factor inthis category is ensuring that all posi-tions requiring security clearances areidentified on the UMR in accordancewith FORSCOM Regulation 300-3-5,that all soldiers have the required se-curity clearance, and that all securityclearances can be confirmed.

•••• MOB Files/OPWAR Plan. Unitsneed to ensure that they have viable,approved movement plans, workingload plans for all vehicles, currentalert rosters, and properly forecastedclass I, III, and V.

The Reserve Tank CompanyOrganizational Readiness Exerciseby First Lieutenant John A. Conklin


Phase Two:The Training Phase

The second phase of the ORE is thepart of the exercise that evaluates thesoldiers’ and crews’ level of trainingwithin the company. This phase in-cludes the APFT, CTT, weapons quali-fication, and PMCS. Before we dis-cuss each of these in detail, I wouldlike to take the time to explain whatthe ORE IDT entailed up to this phaseand describe this phase.

As soon as Company A reachedGowen Field, Idaho, we immediatelyreceived the mission for the thirdphase. During the night we set in mo-tion the troop-leading procedures toprepare for the third phase mission.While the officers and HQ personnelworked on this, the platoon sergeantsbegan to organize training for CTTand made sure the soldiers identifiedto take the APFT got some rest. Thecrews identified for tank gunnery(which was TT VIII on an M-COFT)practiced engagements and wrotedown all engagements on three byfive cards, which we always use. Dur-ing the second phase, we had soldiersall over post! It is a credit to the com-pany’s NCOs that all the soldiers wereat MATES forward in the Idaho desertby noon, preparing for phase three.Now, let us discuss the individual ar-eas of the second phase.

•••• APFT. This is another troublearea for the Reserve Component. Ourcompany is lucky in that many of itssoldiers are very active in the out-doors. Many are mountain climbers,fanatical skiers, rock climbers, andrunners (many run 20 K runs on mostweekends), so we do not have manyAPFT problems. However, we alsouse our physical training time to teachour soldiers how to eat, stretch, andwork out properly, instead of doingthe regular physical training an ActiveComponent unit would perform. Thisdoes not mean we don’t work out. Itmeans we train our soldiers how towork out and stay healthy while weexercise. During every IDT, the unitmaster of fitness trainer needs to iden-tify soldiers who need remedial physi-cal training, take them aside, set upworkout goals and a personal trainingplan. If your unit does train in thismanner, I feel that this should not bean area of concern during the ORE.

•••• CTT. To pass this area, unitNCOs must ensure their soldiers trainon the tasks the night before. This isnot cheating; it is simply training yoursoldiers to succeed. Remember, these

soldiers probably have looked at thesetasks only two or three times since thelast drill. The rest of the month theyhave worked another job (or two, orthree in many cases!) and dealt withtheir families.

•••• Weapons Qualification. Smallarms qualification has never been aproblem in our unit, but our crew-served weapons crews always have atough time qualifying. As an armorcompany, the ORE tested our unit’sability to operate the tank firing sys-tems and hit targets with it — notsmall arms qualification. This wasachieved by firing TT VIII on the M-COFT. I feel that, given the ReserveComponent’s limited training time andlimited equipment availability, thismay always be a problem. Units stillneed the resources to maximize thebenefits of home-station training.

•••• PMCS. This section of the OREevaluates the unit’s ability to performPMCS to the -10 standard. It is im-perative that all PMCS training isconducted with the -10 out, open, andin use by the crews while they per-form PMCS. All leaders, especiallythe XO and motor sergeant, must al-ways supervise the PMCS training. Iftraining is conducted in this manner,this section of the ORE will not be aproblem.

Phase Three:Collective Training

The collective phase tests whether aunit can perform its METL tasks. It isimperative that all personnel involvedunderstand that this is evaluated atplatoon level in the Reserve Compo-nent. This may seem somewhat strange— the company performs the mission,but is evaluated at platoon level. Thecommander has to ensure that thecompany is not given a NO GO in anarea because something was wrong atthe company level! This does makesense if one looks at the current pol-icy of training at the platoon level inthe Reserve Component.

To train for this phase, I would sug-gest enforcing the troop-leading pro-cedures, METT-T for mission analy-sis, and ACOKA for terrain analysis.This can be performed in training us-ing a variety of tools that the Army oryour creativeness provides to the unit.Our unit has made good use of themobile platoon SIMNET, Fire Com-mand Plus Exercise, walk-throughs,realistic training at a local trainingarea, and a sandtable with micro ar-

mor that the unit members bought andbuilt. All of these can be great train-ing tools if the planning is conductedin a realistic manner and doctrine isstudied and reviewed during AARs. Ifeel that if the unit trains this way, itshould pass the ORE.

During the mission the unit will beexpected to perform everything it willneed to perform in combat. Theseshould be: draw, load and PMCSequipment in a staging area; roadmarch; execute an AA; execute a for-ward passage of lines; perform amovement to contact; hasty attack;and defend an objective. The unit willhave to do these to the ARTEP stand-ards, which means that the unit lead-ers need to ensure all leaders’ tasksare met. Our unit’s command cell car-ries a library of manuals and regula-tions into the field, to include com-pany TSOP, battalion TSOP, FM 17-15, FM 71-1, FM 17-12-1, FM 17-12-2, ARTEP 71-1, FM 100-5, FM 100-25 and FM 101-25. They are oftenread and referred to, and I would sug-gest that if you do not do this now,you should start immediately. This li-brary will allow your soldiers to iden-tify the standard and the concept oftraining. With this knowledge andsome determination, the unit shouldbe able to train in a positive and pro-fessional manner.

If the unit understands doctrine, unitTSOPs, tactical planning, ARTEPstandards and how to perform as atactical unit, then the unit will pass. Iwouldn’t expect to pass everythingbecause of lack of training but to passthis phase is not unreasonable.

Changes the OREWill Have on the Army

In the future, I expect that the Armyis going to be forced to integrate anduse the Reserve Component inti-mately. I am convinced the ORE is astep in the right direction in doing so.However, all of us have a long way togo. When integration does fully occur,I feel the ORE and unit capabilitieshas and will show that the followingcriteria have to be attained uncompro-misingly in the Reserve Component:

WARNING: To those readers whohave weak veins, arteries or heartproblems please sit down. All readersmust understand what I am about tosay is cloud-forming, water-parting,ground-shaking — ideas many readers


Continued on Page 25

No human being knows how sweetsleep is but a soldier.

— John Singleton Mosby1

As most readers of Armor can attest,sleep in the field is a rare commodity.In even shorter supply is the knowl-edge and ability necessary for units tooperate continuously with-out exhausting theirtroops. Consider the fol-lowing fictional scenario:

War flares again in dis-tant lands. Task ForceBuzzsaw, part of the RapidDeployment Force, is air-lifted from its Statesidebase to Southwest Asia.The flight is 17 hours longand crosses nine timezones, but excitement andanxiety keep most fromsleeping. Upon arrival incountry, the tankers andinfantrymen immediatelyfall in on prepositionedfighting vehicles while TFbattle staff personnel be-gin hurried preparationsfor a road march to attackpositions.

MAJ Eisen, TF S3, blinksback sleep as he examinespossible routes forward. Inhis haste to finish theoverlay, MAJ Eisen failsto mark an important roadjunction with a checkpointcontrol measure. There’sno time to double-check his overlay,for the OPORD is due to begin in fiveminutes and graphics must be readyright now.

Meanwhile, TF personnel are slug-gishly finishing their prep-for-combatchecks before moving out. Though themorning sun is already blazing hot,the soldiers’ bodies tell them it’s stillnighttime. Tank commanders, worn

out and irritable, forget to make suretheir crews are drinking water. Thefirst heat casualties begin to occur.

By the time the tanks start rolling,the task force has been without restfor over 48 hours. On the road marchout, a Bradley driver falls asleep at hiscontrols, plunging his vehicle over a

cliff. All aboard are killed or badly in-jured.

Then real disaster strikes. A youngplatoon leader, bewildered by stress, fa-tigue and the featureless terrainaround him, makes a wrong turn atthe critical crossroads. The rest of thetask force follows his tank directlyinto a dug-in regiment of enemy ar-mor. The annihilation is total.

Army trainers examine the results ofthis disaster and finally rally supportfor sleep management programs be-hind the slogan “No More Task ForceBuzzsaws!”

Future battlefields “are likely to bechaotic, intense, and highly destruc-

tive” places.2 New technolo-gies, combined with adop-tion of the AirLand Battledoctrine, have greatly in-creased the tempo of mod-ern warfare. Advances intarget acquisition, commu-nications and sensor sys-tems mean our forces canfight longer, harder, andfaster than ever before. TheU.S.-led coalition provedhow deadly this combina-tion can be when it crushedIraq’s military forces after a100-hour ground campaignin 1991.

The relatively short dura-tion of recent operationssuch as DESERT STORMor the 1989 invasion ofPanama can be deceiving,however. There is no guar-antee that the next conflictinvolving American troopswill be equally brief. It re-mains imperative that unitscontinue to train for ex-tended periods of time.

Army doctrine recognizesthis need. FM 22-9, SoldierPerformance in Continuous

Operations, defines two distinct stagesof combat with respect to sleep man-agement:3

Continuous Operations (CONOPS).Combat continuing at high-intensitylevels for extended periods. Individu-als within a unit may have some op-portunity for sleep, though this sleepmay be brief or fragmented.

Rest for the WearyThe Role of Sleep Management in Combat Operations

by Captain Patrick J. Chaisson


Sustained Operations (SUSOPS).Unrelenting combat where soldiershave little or no opportunity for sleep.Within any CONOPS there are likelyto be periods of SUSOPS.

Units practice CONOPS and SUSOPSregularly at Combined Arms TrainingCenters like the NTC or JRTC. Unfor-tunately, the average Active Dutyheavy maneuver battalion rotates toNTC only once every three years. Re-serve Component forces get to experi-ence the pressures of prolonged com-bat operations even less often. The av-erage two-week Annual Training tourmight leave six days of field timeonce time is set aside for travel,equipment draw/turn-in and mainte-nance activities. Therefore, the experi-ence level of our soldiers, leaders, andplanners regarding sleep-deprivationand its countermeasures is not whereit should be.

Scaling the Wall of Sleep

What is the body’s reaction to sleeploss? More important, how can lead-ers maintain their soldiers’ ability tofight when forced to operate for longperiods without rest? Before we can ad-dress these questions, a few words arenecessary about the nature of sleep.

The Circadian Cycle. Humans op-erate on an “internal clock,” known asthe Circadian or Diurnal Cycle, thatinfluences behavior such as the desireto sleep.

Since most people are used to work-ing during the day and sleeping atnight, performance tends to be lowestfrom 0300-0700.4 It is during this“Circadian Trough” that alertnessmost suffers, as any TOC night-shiftveteran can attest. (See Figure 1)

Jet Lag. This occurs when individu-als rapidly cross time zones. Their cir-cadian cycles are not in synch withthe actual time, leading to low energy,sleepiness during the day, and poorjob performance. One study indicatesthat jet lag can reduce total unit effec-tiveness by up to 15 percent.5 Thosewho expect to begin combat opera-tions immediately after deploymentshould pay heed to these findings.

Sleep Inertia. Humans normallyawaken gradually. The state of disori-entation and sluggishness upon arous-

al is called sleep inertia, and usuallylasts 5-15 minutes. Personnel whohave just risen will not be fully alert,so leaders must consider sleep inertiain deciding when and for how longtroops may sleep.

Sleep Deprivation. Just how longcan individuals go without sleep?British studies found that a platoon oflight infantry kept alert with no op-portunity for rest becomes militarilyineffective after only three days.6 Cer-tain tasks degrade more quickly thanothers, with mental functions affectedmost by sleep deprivation.

Experiments conducted by the Wal-ter Reed Army Institute of Researchconcluded that soldiers receiving sixto eight hours of sleep nightly canfunction indefinitely. Four to fivehours of sleep will maintain accept-able levels of performance for five tosix days. However, less than fourhours leads to a rapid decline in per-formance, rendering individuals inef-fective in two to three days.7 Thus, ifsoldiers go without rest for more thanthree days, or get less than four hoursof sleep a night, they are in real dan-ger of collapse after the first 72 hoursof CONOPS.

Sleep loss is cumulative. Soldiersmay possess a sleep debt even afterseveral hours’ sleep. If an individualreceives five hours of sleep on onenight but only two the night before,he is still sleep-deficient and must getmore rest.

We must note here that people re-spond to sleep deprivation in very dif-ferent ways. Some soldiers’ perform-ance may degrade significantly after

as little as 18 hours awake. On theother hand, we have all heard storiesof that crusty old first sergeant whocould seemingly go without sleep fora week, provided he had his coffeeand cigarettes. Other factors, such asclimate, MOPP level, and even agealso may affect the individual’s toler-ance to sleep loss.

The Effects of Sleep Deprivation

Officers and NCOs need to recog-nize the physical signs of serioussleep loss. Among these symptoms arethe following:8

• Vacant stare - “glazed” eyes (theclassic “1000-meter stare”)• Blood-shot eyes• Pale skin• Body sways upon standing; sudden

dropping of chin upon sitting• Walking into obstacles and ditches• Poor personal hygiene• Very slow heart rate• Loss of interest in surroundings• Slurred speechAs mentioned before, sleep depriva-

tion takes its heaviest toll on themind’s ability to process and evaluateinformation. Those most affected bysleep deficiency, then, are soldierswho think for a living — fire direc-tion center crews, radar operators,leaders at all levels. See Figure 2 for asummary of effects.

Mood and Motivational Changes.Insufficient sleep can cause unit mem-bers to feel less energetic, less alert,more irritable, increasingly negative

Figure 1. Circadian Cycle from CACDA, Continuous Operations Study (CONOPS).


and sleepy. Prolonged sleep loss willsee a shift from negativism and irrita-bility to a sense of dullness and weari-ness.

Impaired Attention. Soldiers’ atten-tion spans shorten as they continue togo without sleep. Vigilance decreasesrapidly, resulting in the individualmissing or misidentifying critical sig-nals.

Short-term Memory Loss. Thosewho are experiencing sleep loss findthey cannot recall what they just saw,heard, or read. This makes it difficult(if not impossible) to learn new infor-mation, follow instructions or remem-ber recent decisions.

Failed Verbal Communication.Weariness, impatience, and limited at-tention spans can cause conversationsto wander. The sleep-deficient individ-ual has difficulty understanding or ar-ticulating messages. He frequentlymisinterprets information.

Lack of Insight. A sleep-deprivedperson often is unaware that his per-formance is inadequate. He may thinkhe is doing his job well, and angrilydenies criticism of his poor work.Judgment and self-awareness suffer.This false sense of self-confidence isincreased when units repeatedly usethe same scenarios and terrain in theirtraining exercises.

Safety. Tired soldiers make carelessmistakes. They seek shortcuts toproper procedures or skip them alto-gether. Lack of initiative caused by fa-tigue keeps leaders from checkingtheir troops’ work. After 72 hourswithout sleep, accident rates increaseby 50 percent.

Impaired Task Performance. Unin-teresting, repetitive, or complex tasksare seriously affected by sleep loss.The ability to encode and decode in-formation becomes severely degraded.Soldiers need more time to performcognitive tasks, like plotting grid co-ordinates. Individuals have difficultyreasoning logically and respond moreslowly to changing conditions. Theyseem as if in a daze.

Other Symptoms. Some peoplemay experience visual hallucinationsafter extended sleeplessness. Othersbegin to neglect such routines aschanging socks or filling canteenswhen water is available. Personal hy-giene deteriorates in sleep-deficientunits.9

Historical Perspectives

The crippling effects of sleep depri-vation can be made clearer through afew historical examples. In TheHeights of Courage, Israeli BrigadierGeneral Avigdor Kahalani describes

one incident that occurred during the1973 Yom Kippur War. He had fallenasleep next to his tank’s exhaust pipeand awoke the next morning withthird-degree burns on his thigh. Kaha-lani’s exhaustion was so complete thathe never felt the heat blistering hisskin.10

When combined with other combatstresses, lack of sleep can ruin a unitin short order. While fighting on NewGeorgia in 1943, the U.S. 169th In-fantry Regiment “cracked” after en-during three days and nights of relent-less harassment by a handful of Japa-nese infiltrators. Unit members shotand grenaded each other in alarmingnumbers until the regiment was finallyjudged combat-ineffective and sent tothe rear for a rest. Sleeplessness alsocontributed to the evacuation of 360troops from the New Georgia theateron July 10, 1943, due to “war nerves”— or combat fatigue.11

Leaders are especially vulnerable tofatigue, as is evident in this examplefrom the American Civil War. Duringthe Bermuda Hundred campaign ofMay 1864, Confederate Major Gen-eral Chase Whiting discovered aprime opportunity to strike the rearguard of Major General BenjaminButler’s Army of the James as itopened the Battle of Drewry’s Bluff.Whiting’s force of 5,300 veteransfound itself opposed by just two un-derstrength Federal regiments, yet theRebel general failed to press his at-tack and crush the enemy. Observersthought Whiting was drunk; in realityhe had not slept for three days andwas unable to think clearly enough toassess the situation correctly.12

Implementing a SleepManagement Plan

Sleep discipline used to mean goingwithout sleep for as long as possible.13Research has proved this theory obso-lete, as has experience at training cen-ters such as the NTC. We now realizethat humans need sufficient sleep ifthey are to remain effective in com-bat.

Sleep management plans are espe-cially critical for those involved incommand and control functions,namely leaders. In a combat maneuver

Effects on Mental Processes Tasks More Adversely Affected

Lack of concentration SustainedLapses of attention UnstimulatingReduced vigilance Work-paced activitySlowing of action SurveillanceImpaired short-term memory Inadequately learnedLoss of insight High workloadMisinterpretation Complex decision-makingVisual illusionsDisorientation

Mood Effects Countermeasures

Fatigue Rest periodsDepression Short napsIrritability Shorter work periodsLoss of interest in surroundings Rotation of duties

and events High state of trainingIncreasingly dominating Realistic training

desire to sleep Mental stimulationCross-checkingClear and simple ordersWritten instructions

UK’s Army Personnel Research Establishment, 1986

Figure 2: Effects of Sleep Deprivation


battalion, the sleep needs of scout andsupport platoon members also requireclose attention. These elements’ smallsize in relation to their mission oftenmeans inadequate opportunity for restduring CONOPS.

An effective sleep management planbegins well in advance of the opera-tion. The following hints can be usedin preparing soldiers for CONOPS/SUSOPS as well as maintaining theirability to fight once deployed.14

Pre-Deployment Phase: Unitsshould train on complex tasks to thepoint of “over-learning.” If responsesbecome almost automatic, they aremore resistant to stressful, fatiguingconditions. Cross-train personnel totake over other crew members’ tasks;rotation can give some troops a rest.

A high degree of physical fitnesswill lessen the feelings of fatigue as-sociated with sleep deprivation. Exer-cising frequently-used muscle groupsis especially helpful. Thus, tank load-ers should develop the upper bodywhile infantrymen need to march withpacks frequently.

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