fiscal and financial crises · – o\en occurred with the failure of an important financial...
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FiscalandFinancialCrises
MichaelBordoandChristopherM.Meissner
CzechNa6onalBank,PragueMarch212016
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Introduc6on• TherecentEurozonecrisisinvolvedbothsovereigndebtandthebankingsystem.
• Debtcrisescombinedwithbankingcrisesarenotnew.
• IntheEurozonecrisis,athreatenedGreekdefaultfedintoabankingcrisisbecauseEZbanksheldlargeamountsofsovereigndebt.
• AguaranteeoftheIrishbanksin2008ledtoadebtcrisiswhichfedbackintothebanks.
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Introduc6on
• TheAsianCrisisof1997-98viaaguaranteeofbanksledtoatriplecrisis;debt,bankingandcurrency
• Triplecrisesalsooccurredinthe1890s
• Thepaperexaminestheinterconnec6onsbetweenfinancialandfiscalcrisesbasedonhistory,theory,andempirics.
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HistoricalOverview• FinancialCrisescanbetracedback100sofyears(Kindleberger
1987)
• Thenatureandoriginsoffiscalcrisesandtheirrela6onshiptobankingcriseshaschangedoverthelong-run.
• Bankingcrisesbeforedepositinsurancewerebankingpanics.
• Panicswouldpropagatethroughassetmarketsviafiresales.
• Bankingcrisescanoccurasaconsequenceofbankcreditdrivenassetpricebooms.
• Bankingpanicscouldbecausedbyshockstoshadowbanks.
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HistoricalOverview• BankingCriseshaveo\enspreadtomanycountries.
• Interestrateshocksinthefinancialcenterwaso\enthetrigger.
• AdvancedcountrieshadmanypanicsinthenineteenthcenturybeforecentralbankslearnedtobeLLRs.
• Withtheadventofdepositinsuranceandotherformsofguarantees,bankingpanicsbecamebankingcriseswhichwereresolvedbyafiscalrescue.
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HistoricalOverview
• Thiscreatedadirectlinkbetweenthebankingsystemandthegovernment’sbalancesheet.
• Costlybailoutscouldleadtofiscalimbalancesand,possibly,defaults.
• Guaranteescouldcreatemoralhazardwhichcouldleadtohigherbailoutcostsandriskoffiscalcrisis.
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HistoricalOverview
• Beforethe1930ssovereigndefaultshadbeenfrequent,especiallyinemergingcountries.
• Theyreflectedcapitalflowbonanzas(ReinhartandRogoff2009)andsuddenstops.
• Manyemergingcountrieswereserialdefaulters(Reinhart,Rogoff,Savastano2003).
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HistoricalOverview• CurrencyCriseswereafrequentoccurrenceofemerging
countriesthroughoutthenineteenthandtwen6ethcenturies.
• Advancedcountriesfacedthemduringthe1930sandunderBreeonWoods.
• Twinbankingandcurrencycriseshavealsooccurredsincethenineteenthcentury(KaminskyandReinhart1989).
• Causalitywaso\entwoways.Akeyconduitwasforeigncurrencydenominateddebt(originalsin).
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HistoricalOverview• Originalsin(foreigncurrencydenominateddebt)linkedbanking,
currencyanddebtcrisestogetherinthe1890s(BordoandFlandreau2003).
• Originalsincombinedwithgovernmentguaranteeslinkedthethreetypesofcrisestogetherinthe1990scrises.
• TherecentEurozoneCrisiswastheculmina6onofalonghistoryofdifferenttypesofcrisesandtheirgrowinginterconnec6ons.
• Theinterconnec6onsreflectedfinancialglobaliza6onandabeliefinthenecessityforgovernmenttosocializetheincomelossesoffinancialcrises.
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3.FinancialandFiscalCrises:Theory
• BankingCrises
• Thetradi6onalviewofabankingcrisiswasabankingpanicorliquiditycrisis.
• Itoccurredinacontagiousbankingwhenthepublicfearfulthattheirbankswillnotbeabletoconverttheirdepositsintocurrencyaeemptsenmasstodoso.
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BankingCrises• UnlessallayedbyaLLRtherealeconomywillbeimpactedbya
declineinmoneysupply,impairmentofthepaymentsystemandinterrup6onofbanklending.
• PostWWIIwithdevelopmentofasafetynetbankingpanicshavebecomerare.
• Insteadbankingcrisesinvolvetheinsolvencyofthebankingsystem.
• Unlikepanicswhicharebriefepisodesresolvedbythecentralbank.
• Abankingcrisisisaprolongeddisturbancethatisresolvedbythefiscalauthori6es.
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BankingCrises:Tradi6onalapproaches
• Monetaristapproach– FriedmanandSchwartz(1963)bankingpanicsareimportantbecause
oftheireffectsonmoneysupplyandhencerealincome
– Bankingpanicsoccurbecauseofalossofconfidenceinthebanksintheirabilitytoconvertdepositsintocurrency
– O\enoccurredwiththefailureofanimportantfinancialins6tu6on• Abankingpanic,ifnotpreventedbytheMA,willleadtomassive
bankingfailuresofotherwisesoundbanksforcedintoinsolvencybyafallinthevalueoftheirassets
• BankingPanics1930-33reducedMbytheMmul6plierandreducedrealincome
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BankingCrises:Tradi6onalApproach
• Debateoverwhetherbankingcrisesofthe1930swerereallyliquiditypanicsorreflectedbankinsolvencyasendogenousresponsetorecession.
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BankingCrises:FinancialFragilityApproach
• Minsky,Kindleberger,Fisher(1933)sawfinancialcrisesasanecessaryconsequenceoftheexcessesofpreviousboom.
• AccordingtoFisheranexogenousdisplacementini6atestheupswinginthecycle
• Thisleadstocreditfinancedinvestmentboom
• Theprocesscon6nuesun6lastateofoverindebtednessisreached
• Acrisiscanbetriggeredbyerrorsinjudgement—aMinskymoment
• Distressedsellingleadstodeclinesinassetpricesandthepricelevel
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BankingCrises:FinancialFragility
• Fallingpricesleadtodebtdefla6on…
• IntheCrisisof2007-2008theLehmanfailureviewedasaMinskymoment.
• BISviewfollowsthisapproach–keyroleforthecreditcycleingenera6ngcreditdrivenassetpriceboombustsandfinancialcrises.
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BankingCrises:BusinessCycleApproach
• Depositorsan6cipa6nganincreaseinnonperformingloansduringarecessionwilltrytoprotecttheirwealthbywithdrawingtheirdepositsprecipita6ngabankrun(Mitchell1941,AllenandGale2007).
• Gorton(1988):depositorsan6cipa6ngadeclineinincomeinanaeempttosmoothconsump6onremovefundsfrombanksbeforethebusinesscyclepeak.
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BankingCrises:Recentapproaches
• DiamondandDybvig(1983)– banksintermediatebetweendemanddepositsandlongterminvestments
– Possibilityofmaturitymismatch– Aruncanbetriggeredbyasunspotbecausera6onaldepositors,notwishingtobelastinlinerushtoconvertdepositsintocurrency
• ApaniccanbepreventedbyDIorLLR
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BankingCrises:RecentApproaches
• ExtensiveliteraturebasedonDD(1983)
• DD(1983)extendedtoincludefinancialmarkets(AllenandGale1998);bubbles,monetarypolicy(DiamondandRajan2001…),interbankmarkets(Bhaeacharyaandgale(1987);LLR(HolmstromandTirole(1998)
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BankingCrises:Informa6onAsymmetry
• Depositorscannotcostlesslyvalueindividualbankassetsandhencehavedifficultymonitoringbankperformance(JacklinandBhaeacharya1988)
• Apanicisaformofmonitoring
• Facedwithnewinforma6onwhichraisestheperceivedriskinessofbankassets,depositorsforceoutbothsoundandunsoundbanksbyasystemwidepanic
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FiscalCrises
• DebtCrises
– Adebtcrisisariseswhenfiscalauthori6esareunabletoraisesufficienttaxrevenueinthepresentandthefuturetoserviceandamor6zedebt
– AdebtcrisiscanbecomeabankingcrisiswhenitimpingesonthebankingsystemandacurrencycriseswhenitthreatensCBreserves
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FiscalCrises
• Bankingcrisescanfeedintodebtcriseswhenthefiscalauthori6esbailoutinsolventbankswhichthenincreasessovereigndebtun6litbecomesunsustainable.
• DebtCrisescanspillintobankingcriseswhenbanksholdsovereigndebt
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DebtCrises:Theory• EatonandGersovitz(1981).Fearoflossofaccesstocreditmarketsprevents
debtorsfromdefaul6ng
• BulowandRogoff(1989).Fearofsanc6onsexplainswhycountriesavoiddefault
• Debateoversanc6ons(ColeandKehoe,Eaton1996,KletzerandWright2000)
• Serialdefault(Reinhart,RogoffandSavastano(2003)persistenceindefaults• Countrieswhichwereserialdefaultershaddebtintolerance
• ReinhartandRogoff(2009)dis6nc6onbetweendomes6cdebtandforeigndebt
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FiscalCrisesandFinancialCrises• Akeyintegra6ngelementbetweenfinancialandfiscal
crisesinthepostWWIIerawasthewidespreadusebythegovernmentofguaranteesoftheliabili6esofthebankingsystem.
• Seminalar6clebyDiazAlejandro(1985).
• DescribesChileanliberaliza6onofdomes6cfinancialsystemandcapitalaccountinlate1970s.
• Thisledtoheavycapitalinflowswhichledtoincreasesinbankcreditandcreatedanassetpriceboom.
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FiscalCrisesandFinancialCrises• AmajorChileanbankfailurein1977ledtoagovernmentbailout.
• Thisencouragedmoralhazard
• In1982morebanksfailedandtheirliabili6esguaranteed
• Thismeantthatthegovernmenthadtakenonanewcon6ngentclaimwhichledtoagrowingfiscaldeficit
• TheCBfinancedthedeficitbyprin6ngmoneythisledtoaspecula6veaeackontheCBsreserves
• Amajorbankingandcurrencycrisisensuedinsummer1982followedbyadebtcrisisin1983.
• McKinnonandPill(1986)tellasimilarstory
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FiscalCrisesandFinancialCrises• TheJapanesebankingcrisisin1990wasprecededbyarealestate
andstockmarketboom,fueledbybanklendingandloosemonetarypolicy.
• TheBOJfollowedloosemonetarypolicya\erthePlazaAccordof1985.
• ThebustwastriggeredbyBOJ6ghteningtostemtheassetpriceboom.
• Thecollapseinassetpricescreatedbankinsolvency.
• ThebailoutcostsofthebankrescueincreasedtheDebt-to-GDPra6o,butJapandidnotdefault.
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FiscalCrisesandFinancialCrises• TheNordicfinancialcrisisof1991-1992involvedabankingcrisis,currencycrisisandlargefiscalbailouts
• Liberaliza6onofthefinancialsectorandcapitalaccountinthe1980sledtoabankcreditfueledassetpriceboom.
• TheEMScrisistriggeredthebustandcrises.
• LoanlossesinNorway,SwedenandFinlandwerehigh,butthefiscalresolu6onsdidnottriggerafiscalcrisis.
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FiscalCrisesandFinancialCrises• TheAsianCrisisof1997-98involvedbanking,currencyanddebtcrises
• Thecriseswereconnectedbygovernmentguaranteesandoriginalsin.
• TheAsianTigersborrowedabroadextensivelyinforeigncurrency.
• Theriskwithoriginalsinisthatifthecountryhasacurrencycrisisanddevaluesitscurrencyitwillhavetogenerategreatertaxrevenuesindomes6ccurrencytoserviceitsforeigndebt.
• Thisdepressestherealeconomyandincreasesthelikelihoodofaforeigndefault.
• Alsobanksfundedtheirloanswithforeignsecuri6eshencea\erdevalua6ontheycouldbecomeinsolvent.
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FiscalCrisesandFinancialCrises• TheAsianCrisisledtoThirdGenera6onspecula6veaeackmodels.
• AccordingtoKrugman(1998),theAsianbanksengagedinriskylendingontheassump6ontheywouldbebailedout.
• Theloanswerefinancedabroadinforeigncurrency
• Thecapitalinflowandbankcreditboomfinancedanassetboom,overinvestmentandacurrentaccountdeficit.
• Adevalua6onledtoafinancialcrisisbecausethebankswithforeignliabili6esbecameinsolvent.
• Dooley(2000)tellsasimilarstory.Heemphasizedtheliabili6esofthemonetaryauthori6esbackingthesafetynetasanalterna6veclaimantontheCBsinterna6onalreserves.
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FiscalCrisesandFinancialCrises• Burnside,EichenbaumandRebelo(2004)emphasizetheroleofgovernmentguarantees.
• Whenadevalua6onoccursthebanksdefaultontheirforeigndebtbutthegovernmentdoesn’thavetheresourcestopayforthebailout.
• ThiscanleadtoacurrencycrisesiftheMAprintsmoneyorafiscalcrisis.
• Corsen,Pesen6andRoubini(1999)tellasimilarstory.
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FiscalCrisesandFinancialCrises• TheEurozoneCrisis2010-2014
– ReinhartandRogoffprovidecomprehensiveevidenceonthelinkbetweenbankingandfiscalcrises
– Theyshowthatbankingcriseso\enprecededebtcrisesandthatthedebttoGDPra6oby86%inthe3yearsfollowingabankingcrisis
– Thisleadstoadowngradingofcreditra6ngandpossibledefault
– TheEZcrisisseemstofitthepaeernwell
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FiscalandFinancialCrises• Duringthe2007-2008crisismanyEuropeancountriesengagedin
expensivebondfinancedbankbailoutswhichincreasedthefiscaldeficit.
• EgIrelandwhichinSeptember2008guaranteeditswholefinancialsystem.
• Deficitsalsoincreasedbecauseofexpansionarygovernmentexpenditureandreducedtaxrevenues.
• AgainstthisbackgroundtheGreekgovernmentannouncementthatithadfalsifieditsbookssetthestagefortheEZdebtcrisis.
• ThethreatenedsovereigndefaultbyGreecefedintoabankingcrisis,
becausebanksinGreeceandotherfinanciallyintegratedEZcountriesheldlargeamountsofGreekandotherperipheralEZsovereigndebt.
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FiscalandFinancialCrises
• BoltonandJeanne(2011)modeltheinterconnec6onbetweensovereignriskandthebankingsysteminacurrencyunionwherebanksholdothercountriessovereigndebt.
– Governmentbondsservesassafecollateralandallowsbankstoincreaseleverage.
– Butthedefaultbyonememberspreadstotheothersviatheweakeningofbankporpolios.
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FiscalandFinancialCrises• Gennaioli,Mar6nandRossi(2014)modeltheinterconnec6onbetween
sovereigndefaultandthebankingsystem.
• Banksholdsovereigndebtascollateral.Adebtcrisisleadstoacreditcrunchandafallinrealincome.
• Acharya,DrechslerandSchnabl(2013)modelatwowayconnec6onbetweenfiscalcrisesandbankingcrises.
• Bankbailoutsleadtoanincreaseinsovereignrisk.Thisweakensthebankingsystem.
• EmpiricalevidenceonthespreadsbetweenbankCDSandSovereignCDSshowshowtheIrishbailoutledtothetransferofriskfromthebankstotothegovernment.
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FiscalandFinancialCrises• ModiandSandri(2012)showhowa\ertheBearStearns
bailoutinMarch2008spreadsincreasedincountrieswhichhadvulnerablefinancialsectorslikelytobebailedout.
• A\erLehmanfailedinSeptember2008spreadsincreaseddrama6callyincountrieswithhigherdebtra6os.
• Thena\erthefailureofAngloIrishbankinJanuary2009spreadsincreasedacrosstheEZreflec6ngtheincreasedvulnerabilityofthefinancialsystemsofallthemembercountries.
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EMPIRICSOFFINANCIALCRISESOVERTHELONG-RUN
Sec6onII
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DatasetsforFinancialCrises• Long-RunData
– Bordo,Eichengreen,Klingebiel,Marqnez-Peria(BEKM),1880-1997,21/55countries:banking,currencyandtwincrises
– Reinhart&Rogoff,mainlypost-1800withanincreasingsamplesize.70countriesinthe20thcentury:banking,currencyanddebtcrises
– Jordà,SchularickandTaylor(2011),17countries,1870-2011:bankingcrises
• RecentData– LaevenandValencia(2013),162countries,1970-2012:banking,currencyand
debtcrises
• Da6ngoffinancialcrises:leadingauthorsdisagreeonthedefini6onofacrisisleadingtodifferentconclusionsabouttheimpactandcausesofcrises.
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• Table1showsdefini6onsforda6ngvarioustypesofcrises.
• Thereisconsiderabledisagreementonthedefini6ons:e.g.forbankingcrises,authorsdisagreeabouthowmanybanksmustbeclosedorwhatsystem’scapitalmustbeimpairedforacrisistobeclassifiedassystemic.
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Crisesdefini6ons
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FinancialCrises:theHistoricalRecord
• Wecompareoutcomesforvariouschronologiesandacrossfour6meperiods
• Theclassicalgoldstandard(1880-1913);theinterwarperiod(1919-39);BreeonWoods(1945-1972);therecentperiodofglobaliza6on(1973tothepresent)
• Weshowthesampleprobabili6esofexperiencingafinancialcrisis
• Itiscalculatedasthera6oofthenumberofyearsinwhichthesetofcountriesinthesampleisinthefirstyearofacrisistothetotalnumberofcountryyears
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Figure1showsthesamplepercentageofcountry-yearobserva6onsforthefirstyearoffourdifferenttypesoffinancialcrises.
Figure 1c Twin Crisis Frequencies Three Datasets, 1880-2012 Figure 1d Triple Crisis Frequencies, Four Datasets, 1880-2012
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
1880-1913 1919-1939 1945-1972 1973-
Twin
Cris
is Fr
eque
ncy
(ann
ual %
pro
babi
lity)
Bordo et. al Reinhart & Rogoff Laeven & Valencia
Figure 1a Banking Crisis Frequencies 1880-2012 Figure 1b Currency Crisis Frequencies. 1880-2009
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
1880-1913 1919-1939 1945-1972 1973-
Bank
ing
Cri
sis F
requ
ency
(ann
ual %
pro
babi
lity)
Bordo et. Al.(21 & 55 Ctrs.) Reinhart & Rogoff (70 countries) Laeven & Valencia (161 ctrs. 1973-2011) Taylor (17 countries)
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
1880-1913 1919-1939 1945-1972 1973-
Cur
renc
y C
risis
Fre
quen
cy (a
nnua
l % p
roba
bilit
y)
Bordo et. al Reinhart and Rogoff Laeven & Valencia
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Crisisfrequencies
• Currencycrisesarethemostfrequenttypeofcrisesfollowedbybankingcrises,debtcrises,twincrisesandfinallytriplecrises
• Thereissomecoincidenceinthedifferentdatasetsbetweenthefrequenciesoftypesofcrises
• Figure1showsthatReinhartandRogoffandTaylordisplayahigherprobabilityofhavingabankingcrisisthanBordoetal.
• ReinhartandRogoffshowthattriplecrisesarenowmorefrequentthanintheearlierperiods,incontrasttoBordoetalthattheyweremorelikelybeforeWWII.
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Figure2showsthenumberofcrisesthatoccuraloneorconsideredwithothertypesofcrises.Asitcanbeseen,thecoincidenceofthethreetypesofcrisesismuchhighertodaythaninthepast.
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Figure2(con6nued)
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DisagreementandClassifica6onUncertainty
• Intable2,wecompare4differentdatasets.• Theaveragepercentageof6mesthatthecomparisonsagreeis0.43,excludingBreeonWoods,wheretheyallagree.• Otherreasonsfordisagreementincludethedemarca6onoftwincrisesandconflic6nghistoricalsources.
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PRE-WWI 1880-1913Bordo et. al. vs. RR
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/-1 yearNo crisis 681 17 0.33 0.38Banking Crisis 5 1121 countries (21 in Bordo et. al. & 70 in Reinhart & Rogoff)
1880-1913RR vs. Taylor
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/-1 yearNo crisis 533 16 0.36 0.55Banking Crisis 13 1617 countries (70 in Reinhart & Rogoff & 17 in Taylor)
1880-1913Bordo et. al. vs. Taylor
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/-1 yearNo crisis 538 20 0.30 0.41Banking Crisis 8 1217 countries (21 in Bordo et. al. & 17 in Taylor)
Bordo et. al.
Bordo et. al.
Taylor
Reinhart & Rogoff
% agree
% agree
Taylor % agree
Reinhart & Rogoff
INTERWAR 1919-1939Bordo et. al. vs. RR
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/-1 yearNo crisis 409 14 0.31 0.34Banking Crisis 8 10
1919-1939RR vs. Taylor
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/- 1 yearNo crisis 321 2 0.69 0.74Banking Crisis 9 2517 countries (17 in Taylor & 70 in Reinhart & Rogoff)
1919-1939Bordo et. al. vs. Taylor
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/- 1 yearNo crisis 323 5 0.65 0.87Banking Crisis 7 2217 countries (21 in Bordo et. al. & 17 in Taylor)
Bordo et. al.
Bordo et. al.
Reinhart & Rogoff
Taylor
Reinhart & Rogoff
Taylor
% agree
% agree
% agree
21 countries (21 in Bordo et. al. & 70 in Reinhart & Rogoff )
Table 2a Comparison of Leading Crisis Chronologies, 1880-1913 Table 2b Comparison of Leading Crisis Chronologies, 1919-1939
BRETTON 1950-1972WOODS Bordo et. al. vs. RR
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/- 1 yearNo crisis 539 0 1.00 1.00Banking Crisis 0 0
1950-1972RR vs. Taylor
No crisis Banking Crisis % Agree +/- 1 yearNo crisis 391 0 1.00 1.00Banking Crisis 0 017 countries (17 in Taylor & 70 in Reinhart & Rogoff)
1950-1972Bordo et. al. vs. Taylor
No crisis Banking Crisis % Agree +/- 1 yearNo crisis 391 0 1.00 1.00Banking Crisis 0 017 countries (21 in Bordo et. al. & 17 in Taylor)
Bordo et. al.
Reinhart & Rogoff
Taylor
21 countries (21 in Bordo et. al. & 70 in Reinhart & Rogoff )
Taylor
Bordo et. al.
Reinhart & Rogoff
% agree
POST-BRETTON 1973-1997WOODS Bordo et. al. vs. RR
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/- 1 yearNo crisis 1171 25 0.37 0.37Banking Crisis 9 20
1973-2010RR vs. Taylor
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/- 1 yearNo crisis 614 6 0.59 0.70Banking Crisis 7 1917 countries (17 in Taylor & 70 in Reinhart & Rogoff)
1973-1997Bordo et. al. vs. LV
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/- 1 yearNo crisis 1308 12 0.26 0.26Banking Crisis 19 11
Bordo et. al.
Reinhart & Rogoff
55 countries (55 in Bordo et. al. & 162 in Laeven & Valencia)
Reinhart & Rogoff
Taylor
49 countries (55 in Bordo et. al. & 70 in Reinhart & Rogoff )
Bordo et. al.
% agree
% agree
% agreeLV
Table 2c Comparison of Leading Crisis Chronologies, 1950-1972 Table 2d Comparison of Leading Crisis Chronologies, 1973-2012
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Table2(con6nued)1973-1997Bordo et. al. vs. Taylor
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/- 1 yearBordo et. al. No crisis 407 6 0.39 0.39
Banking Crisis 5 717 countries (55 in Bordo et. al. & 17 in Taylor)
1973-2011RR vs. LV
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/- 1 yearNo crisis 2520 24 0.26 0.29Banking Crisis 51 27
1973-2010Taylor vs. LV
No crisis Banking Crisis same year +/- 1 yearNo crisis 618 3 0.54 0.59Banking Crisis 10 1517 countries (17 in Taylor & 162 in Laeven and Valencia)
Taylor
Reinhart & Rogoff
LV
Taylor
% agree
% agree
% agree
70 countries (70 in Reinhart & Rogoff & 162 in Laeven & Valencia)
LV
Table 2e Comparison of Leading Crisis Chronologies, 1973-2012 (cont.)
Notes to Tables 2a-2e: Tables present cross-tabulations of banking crisis indicators for each of four sources (Bordo et. al., Reinhart and Rogoff, Taylor and Laeven and Valencia) in four periods. We restrict attention to the first year of a banking crisis for a country. In each entry we show the number of non-crisis country-years, and the number of country-years with a crisis in either of two datasets for the countries that are common to both datasets. The entry in row 2 column 2 of each table records the number of times both datasets agree. The last two columns provide a measure of the agreement between sources calculated as the percentage of all crisis-years dated within the period and the country sample in which the two sources agree. We provide this percentage for crises occurring in the same year and then allow for a one year-window to allow for small variations in timing.
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CausesofCrises
• Followingtherecentcrisis,anewconsensusviewhasassignedaprimaryvaluetocreditboomsasthekeydeterminantandpredictoroffinancialcrises.
• Butnotallthebankingcrisesaredrivenbycreditbooms.
• Amoresa6sfactoryapproachtounderstandingthedriversoffinancialcrisesrecognizesthatthemicro-structureofthefinancialsystemmaeersaswellascredit.
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CausesofCrises• Thereareseveralapproachestounderstandingthecausesof
crises:1 Earlywarningindicators(KaminskyandReinhart(1999))– Theycheckwhetheravariablesignaledabankingcrisiswithina12-
monthwindow.– Theythenfindthresholdswherechanges/levelsofthevariable
minimizethenoise-to-signalra6o.– Theyclassify16variablesasFinancialSector,ExternalSector,Real
SectorandFiscalSector.– Thebestpredictorsforbankingcrisesare:apprecia6onofthereal
exchangerate,equitypriceboomandthemoneymul6plier.– Recentresearch(Babeckýetal.(2014),Drehmanetal.(2012),
GourinchasandObspeld(2012))emphasizethefinancialcycle(domes6ccredit/GDP,equityandpropertyprices).
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CausesofCrises2 Logitanalysis(Demirgüc-KuntandDetragiache(1998))– Theyemphasizetheroleoffinancialliberaliza6oninenvironments
withweakregulatorycapacityandweakins6tu6ons.– Depositinsuranceandguaranteeleadtoregulatoryforbearanceand
crises.
• RecentresearchbyBussiereandFratzscher(2006),Babeckýetal.(2014),RoseandSpiegel(2012)findthattheearlywarningindicatorsbyKaminskyandReinhart(1999)donotholdupforrecentcrisis.
• IMF(2009)findsconsiderableheterogeneityacrosscountriesonthecausesofcrises.
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CausesofCrises
• RecentresearchbyCaballero(2014)findsthatcapitalinflowbonanzasandcreditboomsaresignificantpredictorsofbankingcrises.
• Insum,theliteraturefindsthatmanyfactorsinaddi6ontothegrowthofcreditcanexplainfinancialcrises.
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OutputLossesofFinancialCrises
• Mostoftheliteratureagreesthatcrisesareassociatedwithsignificantoutputlosses.
• Table3summarizestheliteratureontheimpactoffinancialcrisesonoutput.
• Outputlossisdefinedasdevia6onfromapre-crisispeakinoutputorapre-crisisoutputtrend
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OutputLosses• Thekeyissueiscausality.Realshocksmaycauseoutputto
declineleadingtoproblemsinthefinancialsector.• Butfinancialshockscangenerateoutputdeclines.• Bordoetal(2001)comparedrecessionswithoutfinancial
crisistorecessionswithfinancialcrises.• Theyfoundthatfinancialcrisesareassociatedwithhigher
outputcosts.• Jordà,SchularickandTaylor(2013)reportsta6s6callyand
economicallysignificantdifferencesbetweenoutputdownturnsassociatedwithfinancialcrisesanddownturnsnotassociatedwithfinancialcrises,evena\ercondi6oningonanumberofpredeterminedmacrovariables.
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OutputLosses• UsingcrisisdatesfromBordoetal,ReinhartandRogoffandLaevenandValenciaandoutputpercapitafromBarroandUrsua(2008)wecalculateoutputlossesindifferentperiods.
• Weuseonemethodologytocompareoutputlossesinaconsistentfashionoverthelong-run.
• Westudythecumula6vedevia6onofpercapitaGDPfromtheprecrisistrendlevelfromtheoutbreakofthecrisisto3yearslater.
• PrecrisistrendisgivenbytheaveragechangeinlogpointsofthelogofrealpercapitaGDPupto10yearsbeforethecrisis.
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0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Bordo et. al Reinhart & Rogoff Laeven & Valencia
Cu
mu
lati
ve D
evia
tion
fro
m T
ren
d
Ou
tpu
t, (
% x
100
)
58
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Banking Crises Twin Crises Triple Crises
Cu
mu
lati
ve D
evia
tion
fro
m T
ren
d
Ou
tpu
t, (
% x
100
)
Bordo et. al. Reinhart & Rogoff
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Banking Crises Twin Crises Triple Crises
Cu
mu
lati
ve D
evia
tion
fro
m T
ren
d
Ou
tpu
t, (
% x
100
)
Bordo et. al. 55 ctrs. 1973-1997 Reinhart & Rogoff 70 ctrs. 1973-2012
Laeven & Valencia (1973-2012)
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Banking Crises Twin Crises Triple Crises
Cu
mu
lati
ve D
evia
tion
fro
m T
ren
d
Ou
tpu
t, (
% x
100
)
Bordo et. al Reinhart and Rogoff
Figure 3a Output Losses for Three Varieties of Crises 1880-1913 Bordo et. al. vs. Reinhart & Rogoff
Figure 3b Output Losses, Three Varieties of Crises 1919-1939 Bordo et. al. and Reinhart & Rogoff
Figure 3c Output Losses, Three Varieties of Crises 1973-1997 (Bordo et. al.), 1973-2012 (Reinhart and Rogoff), 1973-2012 (Laeven and Valencia)
Figure 3d Output Losses from Banking Crises 1973-1997 Three Data Sets.
Notes to Figures 3a-3d: Output losses are claculated as the difference between the level of GDP per capita in the three years following a crisis and the extrapolated trend of GDP per capita. The trend is calcuated as the average growth rate in the 10 years prior to crisis. See the text for additional information.
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OutputLosses
• Lossesarelarge:1880-1913,3-6%;interwar,40%;postBreeonWoods,14-29%.
• Therangeoflossesreflectsdifferentsamplesofcountries,differentfiltersacrossthedifferentstudies.
• Figure4onnextslideprovidessomecountryexamples.
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2.4
2.6
2.8
33.
2
ln(G
DP
/PO
P.)
1902 1904 1906 1908 1910 1912year
Trend of ln(GDP/POP.) ln(GDP/POP.)
USA, Crisis of 1907
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
44.
2
ln(G
DP
/PO
P.)
1885 1890 1895year
Trend of ln(GDP/POP.) ln(GDP/POP.)
Argentina, Baring Crisis, 18902.
82.
93
3.1
3.2
ln(G
DP
/PO
P.)
1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936year
Trend of ln(GDP/POP.) ln(GDP/POP.)
France, Great Depression
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
33.
1
ln(G
DP
/PO
P.)
1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936year
Trend of ln(GDP/POP.) ln(GDP/POP.)
USA, Great Depression
Figure 4a GDP per person Actual and Counterfactual, USA, 1907 Figure 4b GDP per person Actual and Counterfactual, Argentina, Baring Crisis
Figure 4c GDP per person Actual and Counterfactual, France, Great Depression Figure 4d GDP per person Actual and Counterfactual, United States, Great Depression
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4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
ln(G
DP
/PO
P.)
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996year
Trend of ln(GDP/POP.) ln(GDP/POP.)
Sweden, 1991
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5
ln(G
DP
/PO
P.)
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006year
Trend of ln(GDP/POP.) ln(GDP/POP.)
Argentina, 1991
Figure 4e GDP per person Actual and Counterfactual, Sweden, 1991 Figure 4f GDP per person Actual and Counterfactual, Argentina, 2001
Notes to Figures 4a-4f: Data are underlying Bordo et. al except for Figure 4f. Data real GDP per capita for Figure 4f are from the World Economic Outlook database. Trend (counterfactual) line is calculated based on simple extrapolation of the average growth rate in the previous 10 years.
OutputLosses
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OutputLosses• Onesurpriseisthatoutputlossesseemtobelargerinthe
recentperiodcomparedtopre-WWI,despitetoday’smonetaryauthori6esrelianceonliquiditysupport,fiscalinterven6onsandotherpoliciestoremedythemarketfailuresassociatedwithfinancialshocks.
• Perhapsthepre-1914economiesweremoreflexibleandthefinancialsectorsmaller.
• Thelossestodayarelowerthanintheinterwarwhenpolicywascounterproduc6ve.
• Aninteres6ngavenueforfutureempiricalresearchistostudythesizeofoutputlossesa\erproperlyaccoun6ngforvarianceinpolicyac6on.
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Empirics:FiscalCrisesandBankingCrisesandtheFiscalCrisisTrilemma
• Recentresearchhasfocusedontheimpactofbankingcrisisontheprobabilityofadebtcrisis,especiallyinadvancedcountries
• AverageriseinthedebttoGDP(LaevenandValencia,2013)– allsystemiccrises=12%– advancedeconomies=21.4%.– Averageriseindebtduetobailouts,rescuesandguarantees=6%
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Empirics:FiscalCrisesandBankingCrises
• Tagkalakis(2013)empiricallyexaminesthefeedbackloopfromfiscalpolicytofinancialmarketsandbackinasampleof20OECDcountries1990-2010.
• Fiscalinstabilityleadstofinancialinstabilityandfinancialinstabilityleadstofiscalinstabilityviabailouts.– Riseindebt/deficitsdependsposi6velyonthefinancialsector
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FiscalTradeoffsFinancialDevelopmentandFinancialCrises
• Tagkalakis(2013)resultssuggestthepossibilityofatradeoffforcountriesalongthelinesofatrilemma
• Assumethatmostfinanciallydevelopedcountrieswillinevitablyfaceacrisisatsomepoint
• Twooutofthreechoicesmaybepossible
– Largefinancialsector– Debt-financedrescuesofthefinancialsectorduringafinancialcrisis
– Counter-cyclical/discre6onaryfiscalpolicyduringfinancialrecessions
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FiscalTradeoffs,FinancialDevelopmentandFinancialCrises
• Logic:acountrywithalargefinancialsectorwillbemorelikelytohavefinancialcrisis
• Ifsothegovernmentcaneitherprovidealargebailoutpackageanduseupfiscalspace
• Orelseitcouldreducethesizeofthebailoutanddevoteitsfiscalspacetodiscre6onaryfiscalpolicy
• Thesmallerthefinancialsectorthelessbindingwillbethefiscalconstraintssincethesizeofthebailoutwouldbesmaller
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FiscalTradeoffs,FinancialDevelopmentandFinancialCrises
• EgUSpost2007hadalargefinancialsectorbutitsbailoutwasrela6velysmallat4.5%ofGDP
• ThedebtGDPra6oroseby19%• VersusGreecewhichhadariseinthedebtra6oby17%but
amuchlargerrecessionandthefiscalbailoutcostswere27%(whichdoesnotincludetheexternalrescues)
• Theabilityofcountriestofinanceeitherabailoutorusediscre6onaryfiscalpolicydependsonthewillingnessofcapitalmarketstofunddeficits
• Thusthetrilemmaismoreapplicableforcountrieswhichhavebeeerdebtsustainabilityatthebeginningoftheircrisis
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FiscalTradeoffs,FinancialDevelopmentandFinancialCrises
• TotestthefinancialdilemmaweusedatafromLaevenandValencia(2012)for19bankingcrisesin18advancedcountriessince1970.
• Weusethefollowingregression:
• Discre6onisthechangeintheDebt-to-GDPra6ominusthera6ooffiscalcoststoGDP.
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ln Δ!"#$!"!"#!" = ! + !! ln Δ!"#$%& !"#$#!"!"#!" + !! ln Δ!"#$%&'"()!"!"#!" + !!"
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Results
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• Theresultssuggestthatthecoefficientsonthetworegressorsadduptooneandimplyatradeoffbetweenbailoutanddiscre6on.
• Figure5plotthepredictediso-lineatgivenlevelsofthechangeinthera6oofDebt/GDPaswellasthedataforthe18countriesand19crisesinthesample.
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Results
-5
5
15
25
35
45
55
0 10 20 30 40 50 60(Cha
nge
in D
ebt/
GD
P -
Fis
cal C
osts
/GD
P)
x 10
0
(Fiscal Costs of Bailout/GDP) x 100
Data D (Debt/Y) = 12D (Debt/Y) = 30 D (Debt/Y) = 20D (Debt/Y) = 45 D (Debt/Y) = 70
Figure 5 Fiscal Costs of Bailouts vs. the Rise in Government Debt/GDP from other Non-Bailout Costs, 19 Crises, 1970-2012
Notes to Figure 5: Data are from Laeven and Valencia (2012). Iso-lines are the predicted values for the debt to GDP ratio from equation (1).
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Results
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• Theriseinthera6oofDebt/GDPmatchesthedatarela6velywell.
• Weinteractedthefiscalcostsvariablewiththesizeofthefinancialsector(domes6cprivatecreditoverGDP).
• Theposi6veinterac6ontermimpliesthatcountrieswithlargefinancialsectorsdevotemoreoftheirfiscalspacetobailouts.
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Results
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• AunivariateregressionshowedthattheshareoftheriseintheDebt-to-GDPra6oaccountedforbybailoutswasaposi6vefunc6onofthesizeofthefinancialsector.
• Seefigure6.
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Norway
Belgium
Italy
Greece
Finland
France
Austria
Germany
LuxembourgNetherlands
United States
Sweden
Sweden
Ireland
United Kingdom
Denmark
Iceland
United States
Japan
-2-1
01
2
Shar
e of
Ris
e in
Deb
t/Y o
n ba
ilout
- log
it tra
nsfo
rm
-1 -.5 0 .5ln (domestic credit/Y)
coef = .7326351, (robust) se = .55373397, t = 1.32
Figure 6 Fiscal Costs of a Bailout as a share of the Rise in Debt-to-GDP vs. Size of the Financial Sector
Notes for Figure 6: Figure presents the predicted regression line/partial regression plot from a univariate regression of the share in the rise in debt as a percentage of GDP against the logarithm of the level of private domestic credit to GDP. We perform a logit transform on the dependent variable prior to estimation. Debt data are from Laeven and Valencia and the credit data are from IMF IFS.
Results
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• Therefore,asthesizeoffiscalbailoutsincreases,thediscre6onarycomponentofthefiscalresponseissmaller.
• Largefinancialsectorsnecessitatelargebailouts.Hence,ifcountrieshadsmallfinancialsector,theconstraintsondiscre6onaryfiscalac6onswouldbelessbinding.
Results
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Conclusions• Thehistoryoffinancialcrisesshowsacrisissomewhereinthe
worldabouteverydecade.
• FiscalandfinancialcriseshavebeenincreasinglylinkedtogetherbytheincreaseduseofgovernmentguaranteesofFIs.
• Toavoidthecostsofold-fashionedbankingpanics,governmentrescueshasledtomorevirulentmodernbankingcrises.
• Thisreflectsthegeneralphenomenonthat,whenthegovernmentintervenestopreventcostlyeventsfromoccurring,theneconomicagentsadjusttheirbehavioraccordinglyandusemoreoftheprotectedresourcethanisinthelong-runop6mal.
• Thereisatrade-offbetweenthecostsoffinancialcrisesthataccompanyfinancialdevelopmentandgrowthandthemoralhazardcostsofinsurance.
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Conclusions• Elimina6ngcrisesen6relyisnotdesirable,butlenngthemburn
outisalsonotideal.• Thetheore6calliteraturehasevolvedwiththehistoryofcrises.• Possibleques6onsforfutureresearchinclude:
– Whatdoweknowaboutop6malbankregula6on,macro-pruden6alpolicyandthepoli6caleconomyofresolu6on?Whatdoweknowaboutthemarketfailuresthatgenerateneedforsuchinterven6ons?
– Ifitishardtopredictfinancialcrises,canmacro-pruden6alpolicyandfiscalrulesbereliable?Empiricalresearchbasedoncross-countrypaneldatasetshasonlyjustbegunhere(e.g.Cerun,ClaessensandLaevenforthcoming).
– Whatroledoesfiscalspaceplayintheresolu6onphaseofsystemicfinancialcrises?
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Conclusions
– Isthewayinwhichresolu6onproceedsdependentuponini6alcondi6onsandotherins6tu6onalconstraints?
– Whatkindsoffiscalunionarefeasiblebotheconomicallyandpoli6callyinmonetaryunionandhowimportantarefiscalconstraintsundersucharrangements?Whatfiscalarrangementsarefeasibleandefficientinamonetaryunionfacingsystemicshocks?
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Conclusions• Oursurveyoftheempiricalevidencerevealcrucialdifferencesover
thedefini6onofcrisesamongtheleadingapproachesintheliterature.
• Thishasledtodifferentchronologiesoftheincidenceofcrises.• Thiscreatesproblemsforpolicymakers:whoshouldyoubelieve?• Pickingthewrongapproachcanleadtoincorrectpolicy
prescrip6ons.• Maybeweshouldhaveanindependentcrisisda6ngcommieeelike
theNBERbusinesscycleda6ngcommieee.
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Conclusions• Oursurveyalsoshowedgreatdifferenceinmethodologiesand
techniquesinthemeasurementofoutputlosses.• Butallagreethatcostsofcrisesarehighandgrowing.• Wes6lldonothaveaclearunderstandingofthemagnitudeofthe
impactofpoliciesintendedtomi6gatecrises.• Itisnotatallobviousthatcreditfinancedassetpriceboom-busts
(thefinancialcycle)isalwaysthekeyexplana6onforcrises.• Overemphasisonafewindicatorscanmisleadinganddangerous
forfinancialstability.• Wealsodonotfullyunderstandtheconnec6onbetweenfinancial
development,fiscalresolu6onsofcrisesandoverallfiscalgoals. 79