Fiscal Dictatorship and Congress’ Undermined

Power of the Purse

The Reality behind the

“Power of the Purse”

Fiscal Dictatorship

The 1987 Constitution accords the Congress “the power of the purse” checks and balances, a divergence from the Marcosian

authoritarian power over the budget.In practice, however, legal restrictions prevent

legislature from exercising this power. Ironically, most of these restrictions are inherited from a

Marcosian statute – the Presidential Decree 1177 by Aquino’s Revised Administrative Code of 1987.

The integrity of our budget institution is highly vulnerable to rent-seeking prospects for an overtly powerful president.

Fiscal Dictatorship

1. The Power of Impoundment – Contained in Section 38, Book VI of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code (RAC)

2. The Power to Reallocate “Savings” – Contained in Section 39, Book VI of the 1987 RAC

3. The Power to Line-Veto – Contained in Article VI, Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution

4. The Power to Reenact Budgets – Contained in Article VI, Section 25(7) of the 1987 Constitution

5. The Power to Unilaterally Contract Loans – Contained in Article VII, Section 20 of the 1987 Constitution

6. The Automatic Debt Servicing Provision – Contained in Section 26(B), Book VI of the 1987 RAC

1. The Power of Impoundment

Contained in Section 38, Book VI of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code as derived from Section 43 of Presidential Decree 1177,

Ensures that the President can refuse to allocate the money that had been appropriated by Congress.

General Appropriations Act includes prohibitions of impoundment in the General Provisions, but the executive can always impound.

In the past, this was done to “tame the deficit” and to reach fiscal balance, at the expense of its promised expenses.

2. The Power to Reallocate “Savings”

Contained in Section 39, Book VI of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code as derived from Sections 44 and 45 of Presidential Decree 1177,

Empowers the President to channel savings to cover deficits of other items in the budget.

When the powers to impound and to reallocate savings are combined, it is tantamount to a power to realign appropriations itself.

The power also incentivizes artificial generation of savings which can be reallocated elsewhere. For example, the FDC has pointed that the Arroyo administration had been borrowing more than it should, and reporting the excess as savings.

3. The Power to Line-VetoContained in Article VI, Section 27(2) of the 1987

Constitution, which is similar to Article VIII, Section 20(2) of the 1973 Philippine Constitution,

Guarantees the power to veto specific items of the budget while retaining the others.

Since it is the executive which proposes the budget via the DBM, the executive can simply veto changes that had been made by Congress on its proposed budget.

While Congress can override the presidential veto as stipulated in the Article VI, Section 27(1) of the 1987 Constitution, the onus of ensuring that the budget they appropriated remains legislated is shifted back to the Congress.

4. The Power to Veto leading to a Reenacted Budget

Contained in Article VI, Section 25(7) of the 1987 Constitution, which is similar to Article VIII, Section 16(6) of the 1973 Philippine Constitution,

Shields the executive from exhaustion of funds should the Congress refuse to come up with the budget.

Reenacted budgets allow the government to save money. The 2005 budget’s reenactment allowed the Palace to save as much as P135 billion.

The Arroyo administration operated under three budget reenactments during its seven-year term – in years 2001, 2004, 2006.

5. The Power to Unilaterally Contract Loans

Contained in Article VII, Section 20 of the 1987 Constitution, which is Article IX, Section 15 of the 1973 Philippine Constitution

Allows the presidency to raise as much money as (s)he can, using future revenue-generation capacity as collateral. Loans are simply a tax levied on future generations,

as they will be beholden to pay it later when the payments are due.

There is a requirement to submit a Congressional report, but submission of a report is neither a request for Congressional approval, nor even a semblance of consultation.

6. The Automatic Debt ServicingContained in Section 26(B), Book VI of the 1987

Revised Administrative Code, as copied en toto from Section 31(B) of Presidential Decree 1177,

Responsible for the fact that for all post-EDSA governments, from 1986 to 2008, debt service for interest payments alone already averaged around 25.72% of the national budget, severely compromising the Congressional “power of the purse“. Unfortunately, Congress cannot increase the budgetary ceiling

(Article VI, Section 25(1)). The level of borrowings too, is effectively set by the

amount of principal amortization to debts which are to be “rolled over”, They are not part of the budget but instead deducted from

new “financing” of the government.

Consequences of an “Executive Budget”

Provisions combine to create an executive-biased budget which concentrates all fiscal powers in the hands of the president.

Impedes on separation of powers and compromises checks and balances. Discretion lays the conditions for corruption. While corruption may not actually happen, the suspicion

alone that it can, withers away the confidence on the integrity of the budget process.

More difficult to respond to legitimate social interests. Centralization limits bottom-up transmission of social needs

Fiscal Dictatorship = A Malacañang-controlled HouseNo surprise that legislators gain most by

aligning themselves with the incumbent President. House elections have almost always resulted in an

overwhelming administration victory. Even if the president running for reelection

lost, his party would still win the House; Where presidents were elected from the opposition,

by the next poll, their minority would be an overwhelming House majority.

Fiscal Dictatorship = Weak Political Parties

We have a case of a concentrated fiscal power contributing to make political parties weak.

The control of resources inevitably has impact to the development of political parties. Because the President can cause the immediate release or

delay of IRA, PDAF and other local funds, local officials switch parties after each presidential election.

Looking at the profile of dominant political parties, we will find out that they are the start-up parties of winning presidential candidates, like LDP of Aquino, Lakas-CMD of Ramos, PMP of Estrada, and just recently, KAMPI of Arroyo.

“…the House is so adaptable, so pliable, so dependent on the presidency’s patronage powers that it ends up supporting whoever occupies the Palace — until, that is, the presidency passes on to someone else.” – Manolo Quezon

Maraming salamat!

Freedom from Debt Coalition. #11 Matimpiin Street, Brgy. Pinyahan, Quezon City, Philippines 1100. http://www.fdc.ph. mail@fdc.ph. +63(02)9246399 (telefax). +63(02)9211985.