flaws and challenges of eu policy on burma (mizzima news)

7/30/2019 Flaws and Challenges of EU Policy on Burma (Mizzima News)

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Flaws and challenges of EU policy on BurmaMonday, 02 August 2010 17:36 Javier Delgado Rivera

(Mizzima) No credible international actor deems the forthcoming national elections in

Burma as anything other than a mere act of pretence. Judging by the European Unions(EU) latest statements on Burma, Brussels is no exception. Last February, the European

Parliament (EP) concluded that under the present conditions, elections in Burma cannotbe free or democratic. In this vein, the EP called on Naypyitaw to take without delay the

steps needed to ensure a free, fair, transparent and inclusive electoral process.

The ultimate desire of the EU is to see a political transition in Burma in which a

democratically elected civilian government takes over from the current repressive rule of

the junta. In order to push the Burmese military to get this process underway, the EU has

since 1996 opted to go down the road of renewing and strengthening restrictive measuresagainst Burmas ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and its cronies.

The ruby success and the trade embargo spoilers

In reaction to restrictive election laws announced in March by the military regime, last

April EU foreign affairs ministers extended by another year targeted measures against thejunta. Sanctions are largely designed to curb the juntas acquisition of military equipment

and services, as well as to weaken business interests vital in fuelling the generals

suffocating hold over the country. The restrictions include visa bans and asset freezes for

key junta figures, their families, individuals associated with the generals, members of thejudiciary and enterprises linked with the countrys top brass.

In particular, the EUs ban on the import of Burmese gems regardless of where they aretransformed, in conjunction with a similar U.S. initiative, has arguably prompted the

closure of roughly 50 ruby mines. Although the true impact of this setback on

Naypyitaws finances cannot be fully ascertained, Ivan Lewis, former British Secretary ofState for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, underlined that the [mining] sector played

a particular role in sustaining the military and their grip on power.

The above may well embody the sole substantial payoff of the EUs Common Position on

Burma the official designation of Brussels restrictions-based policy towards the

estranged Southeast Asian country. In fact, for over 14 years EU sanctions have achieved

little to nothing in terms of forcing Burmas military dictatorship to open up. As an

example, Piero Fassino, EU Special Envoy for Burma/Myanmar, has been unable to getpermission to visit the country since his appointment in late 2007. In light of such plain

disregard for the calls of the EU, chances are an EU request to send an exploratorymission to Burma in the build-up to the countrys elections remains likely to be ignored.

A further, and similar, example was the EUs recent cancellation of a high-level visit toBurma after the junta rejected its petition to meet with opposition leader Aung San Suu

Kyi. If Burmese authorities do not even allow EU representatives to meet the detained
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Suu Kyi, there is not much hope that Naypyitaw will pave the way for Brussels to nose

around in the run-up to voting, let alone on polling day.

As asserted by the European Parliamentary Caucasus on Burma, a grouping of Members

of the European Parliament critical of perceived weak EU policies on Burma, other EU

measures, such as the decision to take away Burmas Generalised System of Preferencetrade status (back in 1997), visa-bans and the freeze of some 70,000 Euros in assets, are

more symbolic than effective. Burmas generals long ago transferred their assets to

financial safe havens such as Switzerland or Liechtenstein non-EU states. Moreimportantly, the resulting lessened trade links between the EU and Burma have not hit the

junta in any significant way, as the Burmese military is far from relying on European

investment to drive and boost revenue. By trading and investing in Burma with little or

no restraint, countries such as China, India, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore decisivelyspoil any EU intentions of debilitating the economic muscle of the military regime.

Aware of such a decisive hindrance to EU policy on Burma, last February the EP urged

the governments of China, India and Russia to use their economic and political leveragewith the authorities of Burma/Myanmar.

The EP call, however, proved to fall on deaf ears. In early June, Chinese premier Wen

Jiabao went to Burma to meet Senior General Than Shwe and other leaders of the junta.

On this official visit, Wen Jiabao signed a series of cooperation agreements with thedictatorship, deals devised to heavily invest in Burmas natural resources. The EPs plea

went on to call on governments to stop supplying the Burmese regime with weaponry

and other strategic resources. But the EUs nonexistent leverage on China was

evidenced once again when in mid-June Burma watchers brought out the news of a recentpurchase of 50 Chinese fighter jets by the generals.

The EU will keep failing in its efforts to encourage substantial reforms in Burma unlesskey international and regional players agree on a common stance towards the repressive

junta. As this does not seem likely to happen any time soon, if ever, the current EU line

of promoting democracy in Burma is cursed to trip over the same stone again and again.

Perils and promises of policing out of the box

Nonetheless, the EU still has room to manoeuvre if it is to streamline its approach toNaypyitaw. As pointed out by Renaud Egreteau, Research Assistant Professor at Hong

Kongs Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, one of the main flaws of the EU

investment ban lies in its non-retroactivity. This implies that all EU companies alreadyinvesting in the country prior the 1996 launch of the EU Common Position on Burma are

not affected by the ban. For instance, this allows French oil giant Total to keep on feeding

Than Shwes dictatorship with massive revenues. The EU should look to bridge this gap,although Paris would certainly pull its weight to remove such a proposal from the table.

Given the poor performance of EU policy on Burma, European policymakers and

officials would be better off if they seriously consider the revision of their Common


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Position. Yet, two paramount obstacles fly in the face of such a recipe. First of all, the EU

does not really know what else can be done beyond regularly renewing its targeted

sanctions and stating its exasperation towards the lack of compromise by the Burmesejunta. Secondly, it may prove all too burdensome to come up with a rethought out policy

on Burma and have the EU agree on it. The varying, and in some case competing, tones

existing amongst the 27 EU member states would make any attempt to revitalise theEuropean position on Burma an insurmountable challenge.

Regional alliances, certain flaws in EU policy on Burma and the complexity of the EUdecision-making process are not alone in hindering the effectiveness of the European

approach to Burma. Brussels must also realize that the junta sees no gain from giving in

to EU appeals for democracy and human rights. As University of Canberra's Dr.

Christopher Roberts rightly pointed at the June 24th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, the EUhas not placed benchmarks for the removal if its sanctions. If Brussels seeks to persuade

the Burmese generals to listen up, it may at least contemplate the incorporation of some

incentives in its sanctions-based policy.

Any such carrots must aim to ease the repercussions that sanctions on trade and

investment in Burma unfortunately do have on ordinary Burmese. Such incentives couldcome in the shape of a progressive launch of non-humanitarian aid and development

programs, both currently suspended by the Council of the EU. The arrival of such aid

may well entail the emergence of new business opportunities for a number of juntaassociates. This would in turn prompt the interest of the generals cronies in not allowing

for the aid to be taken away, thereby unleashing a wave of opposition to the repealing of

political gains.

Needles to say, EU incentives should only be entertained once the junta displays solid

steps towards the irreversible democratisation of the country. However, regretfully, this is

not what is happening in Burma in the run-up to this years general elections.

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Gathering Date and Time: September 24, 2010 and 9: 45 am
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flaws and challenges of eu policy on burma (mizzima news)

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