flood 2011 part 1

The Great Flood of 2011: Accountability and Governance Issues

1

Angthong Province Source: http://blogs.voanews.com/photos/2011/09/16/september-16-2011/

Bangkok Source: The Nation, Rangsit and Nonthaburi residents rally for help,

November 16, 2011

Minburi Market Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/nationphoto/show-new.php?id=1&pid=12012

Ramon C. Sevilla, PhD.

APTU Thammasat University

March 18, 2012

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/nationphoto/index.php?pid=12012

2

“The primary cause of flooding was very

high rainfall. The following graphs compare the

2011 monthly totals (January to September) with the 30-

year averages for those months.

In Chiang Mai the nine-month total was

140 percent of the average; in Lamphun

196%; in Lampang 177%; in Uttaradit

153% and in Phitsanulok 146%.

These are only a few locations (and all of them from

lowland sites – rainfall is heavier at higher elevations) but

they give a clear indication that 2011 was an

exceptionally wet year and that

this has been widely spread across

the Chao Phaya catchment.”

1. High rainfall (from tropical storms)

What were the causes of the floods?

3

Source: http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2011/10/19/thai-flood-

cause-revealed-rain/

* Source: The Nation, “Lethargy over water woes will hurt govt”, October

11, 2011

Bangkok had 3 metres of rain in 2011 -

triple the usual amount according to

Deputy BMA Governor Pornthep

Techapaiboon.

Source: Khanittha Theppajon, Olarn Lertrattanadamrongkul, “48 hours:

Deadline Bangkok”, The Nation, October 18, 2011

From 2008, the country recorded plentiful rain above the 30-year average compiled by the

Meteorological Department. *

4

Two Tropical Storms:

Nok-Ten late July 2011 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nock-

ten.A2011207.0230.250m.jpg

Haima June 24-26, 2011 Source:http://typhoonwatch2011.blogspot.com/2011/06/cyclo

nic-activity-in-west-central_15.html

//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6f/Nock-ten.A2011207.0230.250m.jpg

5

"Our agency told the Royal Irrigation Department [RID] in July, before tropical storm

Nok-Ten hit the country, there would be abnormal weather this year, and the RID

should treat this year's flood with crisis measures not just normal measures,"

according to Deputy director of the Thai Meteorological Department (TMD), Somchai

Baimuang.

LIMITATIONS OF TMD FORECASTING:

TMD can now forecast weather only for 24 hours and with an accuracy of only 79 per

cent. It relies on a super computer that was installed 10 years ago for these

predictions.

Source: The Nation, “Govt should have tacled flood crisis earlier: experts”, October 3, 2011

Warned the Royal Irrigation Department in July 2011.

What happened after that?

http://www.tmd.go.th/index.php

6

“The Royal Irrigation Department was damned for its

dam water mismanagement, and for keeping the water

level close to the brim despite the prospect of heavy rain

that comes with the La Nina phenomenon.” Source: Sanitsuda Ekachai, “Drowning in prejudice”, Bangkok Post, Nov 4, 2011

2. Dam Water Mismanagement

But according to says Sutat

Patmasiriwan, the Governor of the

Electricity Generating Authority of

Thailand (EGAT), unusually heavy

rains, not dam mismanagement, was

the main factor behind the severity of

this year's floods.

Source: Bangkok Post, Egat chief says dams 'not to blame'

Cause was 'heavy rain, not mismanagement‘, November 3, 2011.

7

2a. Ministry of Agriculture takes responsibility for

delaying the release of dam water

On November 10th, 2011, Agriculture

Minister Theera Wongsamut

acknowledged that the government

made the controversial decision to

delay the release of water from the

country's major dams “so that farmers

could harvest their crops first”.

Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/I-ordered-a-delay-in-the-

release-of-water-from-dam-30169695.html

8

- as for the 3rd crop: in a Facebook statement by Finance Minister Thirachai

Phuvanatnaranubala, the flood crisis would have been less severe if the number of rice

harvests had been reduced from three to two this year, and the water released after the

second.

2c. Minister of Agriculture Theera blamed weather forecasting as

“problematic” because the Meteorological Department can only

forecast one week in advance. Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/I-ordered-a-delay-in-the-release-of-water-from-dam-30169695.html

2b. Minister of Agriculture miscalculated on the 3rd crop use of

water.

2d. The water gushing from the dams was blocked from being

diverted to the Tha Chin River in the west. - As a result, the Chao Phraya River was the only way that the water could flow down.

-The water was also prevented from flowing to Prachin Buri in the east, leaving it to

overflow into the central region and then Bangkok.

- The water could not be diverted to Min Buri either.

Source: The Nation, “Day by Day, Waiting on Judgement Day”, November 4, 2011

9

3a. The irrigation authorities, blamed flood control failure on

local communities who built self-protection dykes and destroyed

flood walls at the cost of other communities.

3b. Irrigation authorities also complained about the lack of water

pumps to do their work. Source: Sanitsuda Ekachai, “Drowning in prejudice”, Bangkok Post, Nov 4, 2011

10

Source: The Nation, “Govt should have tacled flood crisis earlier: experts”,

October 3, 2011

Sam Khok, Pathum Thani water up to doorknob ! Source:

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/nationphoto/show.php?id=1&pi

d=11474

Result: Heavy Flooding in many areas

11

By September 29, 2011 this

picture captioned “Front

row seats in the wet”

appeared in Bangkok Post.

Tourists get wet feet as they watch a

royal barge procession rehearsal at the

flooded Nagaraphirom public park by

the Chao Phraya River in Phra

Nakhon district of Bangkok, with the

main pagoda of the Temple of Dawn

in the background yesterday (Sept 28,

2011). PAWAT LAOPAISARNTAKSIN

Source:

http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/258767/landslid

e-kills-family-of-5

12

As the flood moved downstream, it brought on a new

polarization, the conflict between ‘wet and dry partition’* as

people began to stand up against evidence of unfair sharing of

burdens. (civil disobedience)

More than 400 people from Nakhon

Nayok tore down a sandbag

embankment because they said it was to

blame for their homes, roadside stalls

and farms being under water for more

than a month.

The embankment, they alleged, was

constructed to protect the Pathum Thani

economic zone at their

expense.

Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/national/Suffering-Nakhon-Nayok-locals-tear-down-sandbag-em-30166319.html

* Source: Bangkok Post Opinion, Lost in Flood, Information, November 15, 2011.

13

More than 500 flood victims in Chai Nat yesterday demolished sandbag walls that officials had

erected to limit the amount of water flowing into neighbouring Suphan Buri province.

"We have lived with floodwater for a month now. We can't put up with this any longer," said a flood

victim who identified herself only as Kung.

She and her comrades at first closed the Wat Sing - Uthai Thani Road in Mueang Chai Nat district to

force officials at the Phon Thep Irrigation Project to come out and negotiate with them. However,

after the officials refused to come out, the local flood victims simply demolished the sandbag walls.

"The first floor of local houses are flooded. Have you thought about people whose houses have just

one floor? Three locals have drowned. Our children are suffering from athlete's foot," Kung said.

WET SEASON WOES - Chainat

Source:http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/Angry-Chai-Nat-flood-victims-destroy-sandbag-barri-30166084.html

14

The success of any urban area in

keeping the flood waters at bay would

appear to depend on its level of

infrastructure and its downright

refusal to flood it as a “kaem ling” (a

retention pond) so that water from

upstream can drain faster. This is the

case of Suphanburi, where the

political strongman of Suphanburi

(Mr. Banharn) is reported “to have

kept the keys of all watergates in

Suphan Buri and does not allow

anyone to open a single one to allow

run-offs from the upper North”.

Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/politics/The-

suffering-continues-as-politicians-play-game-30166957.html

“Maybe if Banharn Silapa-archa was the

prime minister, the flooding situation might

not be as bad as it has been this year.”

Source: The Nation, The suffering continues as politicians play game, October

6, 2011

Can Mr. Banharn keep Bangkok dry?

15

Flood 2010 &

Flood 2011

PM Abhisit Vejjajiva in Korat,

October 18, 2010 Source: http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9530000147315

PM Yingluck Shinawatra in

Sukhothai, August 13, 2011 Source: http://www.prachachon.org/board/index.php?topic=24651.0

Lopburi Muang District (BP 27/9/2011)

16

An aerial view shows flood-ravaged areas in Bang Rakam district of

Phitsanulok province. How can flood waters drain away if the water

level in the Nan River remains high? Source: http://www.posttoday.com/

“The problem is the lack of an integrated effort. As authorities in one province seek to prevent their province

from floods, other provinces are affected,” the PM said.

She lamented that her government did not know how to drain all the flood water, given that it was now

literally almost everywhere. Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/national/Bt40-bn-needed-for-longterm-solution-PM-says-as-mo-30166223.html

PM Yingluck requests money for integrated water management (?)

no details given!!! (see next page) panic mode! panic, panic!

Bt40 Bn needed for long term solution, PM says, as more rain looms The Nation, September 27, 2011

Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra yesterday

said the government would likely need to

spend more than Bt40 billion on integrated

water management, which should prevent

extensive flooding in the future.

“It will be a long-term solution,” she said.

Yingluck blamed the lack of integrated efforts for

the current widespread flooding, which had

already caused 158 deaths and left 3 people

missing.

The floods continue to rage on in 23 provinces,

affecting the lives of 1.92 million people.

17

18

"Make the checklist and see if you've followed them," she said, referring to preparation and

prevention, and response and recovery.

Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/national/PM-calls-for-more-early-warning-systems-30166405.html

PM calls for more early-warning systems THE NATION September 29, 2011 10:30 am

Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra on Sept. 28th instructed all

governors to implement the "2Ps 2Rs" in fighting off disasters in

their provinces

Too Late!!

19

ACCUSATION:

Democrat MP Apirak Kosayodhin accused the Yingluck government that while

it set up the Flood Relief Operations Command (FROC) in October 2011, it had

done nothing else since the flooding began in August.

Source: “MPs clash over crisis response”, Bangkok Post, November 25, 2011

RESPONSE:

Natural Resources and Environment Minister Preecha Rengsomboonsuk said

Bangkok was flooded because the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration

(BMA) was not prepared to handle run-off from the North as its drainage

system was for rainwater only.

Source: “MPs clash over crisis response”, Bangkok Post, November 25, 2011

After the flood, in a parliamentary session

discussing the government’s performance:

20

According to Smith Dharmasarojana, former director-general of the

Meteorological Department, and Pramote Maiklad, former director-general of

the Royal Irrigation Department:

• last year's flood crisis was not an accident but the

result of mismanagement by up to 20 state agencies

. "Do not say the flood was an accident," Mr Smith said. "It was not an

accident. Do not say that nature punished us. It is clear that what caused the

flooding were mistakes by state authorities.“

Mr Pramote:

"Thailand today does not have a system to drain floodwater or water run-off

into the sea," he warned. "We do not have a feasible plan either. What we

have done in the past was drain run-off into natural waterways and canals dug

in the reign of King Rama V.“ Source: Bangkok Post, Yingluck sets up new flood committees, February 29, 2012

Two experts say: Flood was not an accident

21

• Thirachon also alleged that some politicians

ordered RID officials not to open sluice gates in

certain provinces so that farmers could finish

harvesting their paddy. The rice fields should have

served as water catchment areas in order to protect

the industrial estates.

• Mr Theerachon insisted that BMAl worked to its

utmost capacity to open sluice gates and water pumps

to protect the capital.

Source: Bangkok Post, 'Amateurs' blamed for flood damage, January 17, 2012.

Thirachon Manomaipiboon

Bangkok Deputy Governor Photo Source: Pattaya Today, All districts in Bangkok still ‘at

risk’, November 2, 2011

BMA blames the flood on “amateurs” • BMA Deputy Governor Thirachon Manomaipiboon blamed the government for

appointing inexperienced amateurs in the FROC to manage last year's floods for

ignoring the advice of experts and causing damage far greater than there should

have been.

• Khlongs 1-13 were originally designed upon engineering principles used for over a

hundred year to drain water from the North into Bang Pakong river in Chachoengsao

province.

• But the FROC ordered Khlong Rapeepat, Khlong Rangsit Prayoonsak and Khlong Hok

Wa to be closed which prevented water from flowing into BMA’s downstream floodway,

Mr Theerachon said.

22

Thirachon’s accusations are

serious.

Why is there no move to conduct a serious

investigation?

23

1. Bangkok is located in the flood plain near the mouth of the

main river.

• Bangkok (BMA) therefore blocks the runoff from the north

2. Flat Terrain (slope gradient small)

• In Western Bangkok, Seri Suparathit of the Rangsit University Centre on

Climate Change and Disaster, explained that opening the gates at at Khlong

Mahasawat (east-west) and Thawee Watthana (north-south) at 1 metre could

worsen floods in Thon Buri unless more pumps are deployed.

Source: Opening sluice gates higher 'problematic‘, Bangkok Post, November 21, 2011

• In the Western part of Bangkok, it is difficult to push water to the sea as most

canals ran parallel to the coast, according to PM Yingluck.

• Drainage system in the West not as good as in Eastern Bangkok

Source: The Nation, “PM hopeful but governor fears a second wave”, November 1, 2011

Let us try to understand the hydrological characteristics of

Chao Phraya River flood plain. Drainage Problems: Runoff must

be drained fast, but……..

24

Source: Flood Mitigation and Management in Bangkok Metropolitan Area, Power Point Presentation by Vichai Somboon and

Surat Jaroenchaisakul, Department of Drainage and Sewerage, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, no date.

“A river basin is an area of land drained by a river and its tributaries. “ Source: http://www.geography.learnontheinternet.co.uk/topics/rivertheory.html

Bangkok is part of the Chao Phraya River Basin

25

Source:

http://sammyboy.com/showthread.php?10

3116-Latest-flood-map-at-Bangkok-its-

serious.....

Chao Phraya River

Basin Flood Plain

A flood plain is an area near a

river or a stream which floods

easily. Source:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Floodplain

How do we know this is a flood

plain?

• by looking at the pattern of

flooded areas, Oct 18 2011

flood

• Bangkok is part of the flood

plain.

26



27

Coverage of 2.5 to 3 meter dike along river and canal. Protection up to +2.5 MSL



28

General Principle in draining Bangkok – low water level in canal



29

General Principle in draining Bangkok – high water level in canal



30

In the 2011 flood, Chao Phraya River water peaked October 15th at 2.29 metres

against the 2.5-metre flood barrier height. Source: The Nation, The worst apparently over: Agriculture Minister,

October 16, 2011

Note: the elevation

of some areas and

roads in Bangkok.

Flood wall, 2.5 to 3

meters high (MSL).

Protection against

100 year flood.

31

Source: https://www.facebook.com/bkk.best#!/photo.php?fbid=293601957324105&set=o.186357484732609&type=3&theater

32

Cross-section of Bangkok showing elevations

Source: http://2bangkok.com/forum/showthread.php?4014-Flood-of-2011-wrecking-havoc/page4

33

3. Long drainage canals that also narrow in width, make

drainage more difficult. • Khlong Thawee Watthana, north-south canal, is about 36 kms., making it

hard to drain floodwater flow due to its length, and further down to Phetkaseam

Rd, the canal width is reduced from 30 to 20 metres, restricting the waterflow even

further. Shrinks further to 5 meters wide at its “tail”.

• drainage is slow and dependent on pumps

Source: The Nation, “Town planning law to be amended”, November 16, 2011

• Khlong Mahasawat is also very long about 36km. It is even harder to

expedite floodwater to Tha Chin and Chao Phraya river as it is a horizontal

canal. Source: Opening sluice gates higher 'problematic‘, Bangkok Post, November 21, 2011

Therefore upstream areas may benefit from opening the

sluice gates higher but lower stream areas will flood

depending on RID and BMA pumping capacity.

34

4. Blocked khlongs: On the eastern side of the capital, three major canals

had been dredged, and work was underway on four more. On the western side,

where floodwater is flowing through the Tha Chin River, the river's winding

character made it necessary to dig shortcuts to speed up the drainage.

• Canals blocked by water hyacinths, shortage of pumps, bottlenecks (e.g.north

of Hok Wa Lang Canal) Source: The Nation, “Weeds, lack of pumps hinder flow from city”, October 25, 2011

Emergency nature of

preparations for flood

drainage!!! Many

khlongs lack regular

maintenance. Source:

http://antoniuni.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/img_0185-

fs.jpg

Photo copyright Antoni P. Uni

antoniuni.wordpress.com

35 Source: https://www.facebook.com/bkk.best#!/photo.php?fbid=182368461848261&set=o.186357484732609&type=3&theater

Khlongs filled with rubbish

36

5. Slums built on banks of canal further block water flow in

khlongs.

- Close inspection has uncovered that many structures have been built illegally on

26 waterways in eastern Bangkok, leading to estuaries being redirected or blocked

altogether .

- thus it takes a long time to drain the floods

- the Chuad Ta Thim canal in Bang Na

district seems to have disappeared

altogether and has been replaced by a

luxury housing complex.

- many golf courses and apartments have

allegedly been illegally built on canals,

not to mention several slums along the

riverside

- Suvarnabhumi Airport and several roads

are also allegedly blocking waterways

and water catchment areas.

Source: The Nation, “Many city canals 'illegally blocked‘”,

November 4, 2011

The Nation (2011), “Blocking water not the answer, says AIT

expert”, October 18.

37

Ban Klong Sala Daeng, Samut Prakarn Source: http://www.bangkok-daytrips.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/saladaeng_1a.jpg

Where’s the khlong?

38

• "Housing estates have gone up and

blocked floodways”. "There's

encroachment on canals, too." (Senator

Decha Boomkhum, deputy chairman of the

committee on settlements and town

planning.)

• Even Suvarnabhumi Airport in Lat

Krabang could be regarded as blocking

eastern Bangkok's natural waterways,

(Suphot Tovichakchaikul, deputy

permanent secretary of the Natural

Resources and Environment Ministry )

Source: The Nation, Town-planning law to be amended, November 16,

2011

Source: The Nation, Suvarnabhumi 'will be safe', November 2, 2011

39

6. Water pushing boats – does it help speed the flow in Chao Phraya, Tha

Chin and Ban Pakong Rivers. Launched by PM Yingluck on Oct 15th, 2011.

Saturday. (Smith Dharmasaroja thinks this is impractical) Source: The Nation (2011), “PM offers assurances on 'worst floods in history”, October 16.

Source: The Nation, “Experts play down risk to Bangkok”, October 13, 2011

Source: The Nation, “PM enlists more Army help”, October 17, 2011

Source: The Nation, Chao Phraya armada planned to rush river water out to sea,

October 9, 2011

40

Water Management Strategy

sketch by HM the King Source: Bangkok Post, “Heeding His Majesty’s Advice”,

December 1, 2011

Source: The Nation, Bangkok kept on edge, October 12, 2011

Compare the two:. HM’s strategy will

work only if the floodways are free,

not blocked with “development”.

Land Use Controls as well as proper

planning of city growth expansion

need to be strictly implemented and

followed.

7. Flood Prevention Plan for Bangkok

41

Flood Prevention Strategies in Bangkok

The BMA has employed structural and non-structural measures.

Structural measures include the Polder System that prevents inflow from outside the

polder through the construction of flood barriers such as dykes, earth embankments,

roads and railways. Other structural measures to discharge water out of the polder –

such as pumping stations, water gates, tunnels and sewers, improvement of drainage

canals and the construction and/or improvement of ponds and wells for temporary

retention basins – have been employed primarily in the densely populated areas of the

BMA. Bangkok invested heavily in its water drainage infrastructure after 1983 when

major flooding hit the city. (Source: Bangkok Post, Canals built to take localised floods, October 30,2011)

42

The unit directly responsible for flood management in Bangkok is the Department of

Drainage and Sewerage (DDS) of the BMA. The DDS initiated the construction of a dike

in the eastern part of the BMA. The dike is about 72 kilometers in length and

constructed in cooperation with the BMA, the RID, the Department of Highways and

State Railway of Thailand. Another project is the nearly completed 77kilometer flood

barrier along the Chao Phraya River. The RID also currently manages 20 retention ponds.

Source: IDS (2007), Governance Screening for Urban Climate Change Resilience-building and Adaptation strategies in Asia: Assessment

of Bangkok City, Thailand , August, p. 11

Non-structural measures are mostly utilised in suburban or agricultural areas and

include urban land use control, establishment of forecasting and warning systems and

emergency service teams

• Land Use Control has largely been ineffective in Bangkok

Besides the RID, the BMA cooperates with a number of other concerned agencies to

gather information for decision-making. Table 1 displays the activities of concerned

agencies in cooperation with the BMA for flood prevention and control especially during

the flood events.

43

See land use plan of BMA 2011

Source: http://cpd.bangkok.go.th/db/doc/khetmap/comprehensive-city-plan.zip (downloaded February 15, 2012)

BMA Comprehensive Plan 2011

Where are the floodways?

Rural and Agricultural

Conservation Zone

Hey, that’s where I live!!!

44

Source: Bangkok Post, Floodways key to keeping capital safe NEXT CITY PLAN

CREATES DRAINAGE ZONES IN EAST, WEST , November 20, 2011

Hey, that’s where I live!!!

45 Source: (IDS (2007), Governance Screening for Urban Climate Change Resilience-building and Adaptation strategies in Asia: Assessment of

Bangkok City, Thailand

46

8. In order to drain the flood from upstream there must be close

coordination between RID and BMA. This is a complex system

that due to fragmentation

of control, no agency

understands completely.

No single authority to

control the entire system

of flood gates and pumps

for the system to work

efficiently. For example,

Source: Bangkok Post, Popular blue whales battle a sea of misinformation about crisis, October 30, 2011

• according to RID the BMA

has the capacity to dispose of

10 million cubic metres per

day (in eastern floodways) to

detour runoff from the north

via the Bang Pakong River in

Chachoengsao) depending

on the two sluice gates under

the RID's control at Nong

Chok and Prawet Burirom

canals. Source: The Nation, Irrigation dept defends

closure of sluice gates, October 27, 2011

47

Evidence of BMA blocking water from Pathumthani

1. Overflowing canal in Pathumthani . "The Hok Wa canal has risen one metre

above its banks," Suchat Janchang complained yesterday. Lam Luk Ka

district chief Panuwat Jenprasert said if Bangkok authorities continued

blocking flood waters, then more than 18,000 rai of the local farmland would

be submerged sustaining huge damages. "Some of them have been flooded

for nearly a month now," he said.

Source: The Nation, “Bangkok escapes wrath of floods”, September 22, 2011

2. In the heavy rains of 2010, Pathumthani residents Klong 6 to 14 were

inundated. They blamed the BMA for closing the floodgates of Klong

Luang Phaeng and Klong Phra Ongchao Chaiyanuchit, so that BMA areas

downstream will not get flooded.

Source: The Nation, “Homes flooded in Angthong as river rises”, Sept. 19, 2010.)

48

The importance of water basin

management capacity.

“Experience has shown that piecemeal or ad hoc approaches

are at risk of causing significant adverse impacts elsewhere.

For example, flood embankments protect one area by

aggravating the flood in another area. Water uses and hazards

need to be addressed holistically for the water basin to

maximize benefits.” Source: ADB,JICA, WB (2010), Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, Synthesis Report, September. P.95

49

“the various state

agencies in charge of

flood control are at odds

on how to proceed. Each

of these many agencies

has its own regulations

and mandates and each

is eager to protect its

own turf, so getting

information about flood

control in Thailand

entails a lot of ''shopping

around''.” Source: Bangkok Post (2010), Flood Control

planning awash in bureaucracy, November

14.

Flood Control Organizational Structure

50

The Plan to drain the floodwater: FROC’s strategy

Background: Before we discuss the FROC’s strategy, let us study

the following maps to understand water flow.

กรงุเทพฯ

อ่าวไทย

สภาพน ้าหลากและการระบายน ้า

สนามบนิ สวุรรณภมู ิ

+6.5 +6.0

+4.0

+3.0

+5.0

+3.0

+2.0

+1.0 +1.5

+1.0

+0.5

+0.75

+0.4

พืน้ทีน่ ้าท่วมซ ้าซาก

อา่งทอง สระบรุ ี

กรงุเทพฯ

ปทมุธาน ี

สมทุรสาคร

ปราจนีบรุ ี

ฉะเชงิเทรา

ชลบรุ ี

อยธุยา

นนทบรุ ี

นครนายก

สมทุรปราการ +0.8

52 Source: http://la-cour.eu/filer/flodding_thailand_2011/maps/322706.jpg

Spreading Disaster

of massive runoffs

from the north,

threaten North

Bangkok and West

Bangkok

53

Source: http://www.student-weekly.com/101011/72.jpg

It was difficult to

control the runoff

because Pathum

Thani villagers

forced authorities to

open sluice gates to

release flood water.

The overflow then

flooded the upper

Rangsit area and

then moved closer

to Bangkok’s

northern boundaries.

Source: Bangkok Post, More areas at

risk due to lack of organization,

November 6, 2011

54

Source: http://poleshift.ning.com/profiles/blogs/thailand-bangkok-

627-bangkok-communities-under-water

The Last Barriers

to protect Bangkok

55

Source: The Nation, City fate rests on

barriers, October 19, 2011.

Another view of

emergency barriers

(sandbags) put in

place.

56 Source: Bangkok Post, BMA tries to protect city's heart, November 9, 2011

Last hope to prevent

water from reaching

Victory Monument.

57 Source: http://www.bangkokpost.com/media/content/20111103/326025.jpg

58 Source: http://www.thaitravelblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/floodareabangkok_2.jpg

Flood Prevention

Walls and drainage

tunnels of Bangkok

59

Bangkok’s

Flood-Prone

Areas

Source: Bangkok Post, Evacuation plan readied

City close to losing last line of defence , October 13, 2011.

52

Final Path of

Water in the West

to the sea. Source: http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/264872/

61

The Plan to drain the floodwater: FROC’s strategy

• There are three outlets for the northern run-off. East, through Bang Pakong

River. West, through Tha Chin River, and through the Centre, via Bangkok's

canal system into the Chao Phraya.

• The east and west of Bangkok is the responsibility of the central government

(RID). The Pheu Thai-led government said they have been letting the water

through, but there was too much of it. However, the Democrat-led opposition

claimed that the government hadn't been letting the water through.

• Bangkok is the responsibility of the BMA, controlled by the Democrat Party.

• Governor Suhumbhand reports (Oct 7) that BMA “has already opened 90%

of its water sluice gate”. The city can drain 1 million cubic meters per day to

the sea but at this time it was difficult to speed up draining as the water levels

in all waterways in the city are very high. Comment: why? From rain? Source: Bangkok Post, Flood waters bear down on capital, October 8, 2011.

62

Source: Bangkok Post, More areas at risk due to lack of organization, November

6, 2011

Source: The Nation, Bangkok kept on edge, October 12, 2011

63

Source: The Nation, Can Bangkok make it?, October 14, 2011.

The huge

amount of

flood water

that needs to

be drained: 16

Billion cubic

meters and the

capacity of

floodways.

How much can

BMA canal system

add to this if utilized

properly?

16,000 m M 3

64 Source: The Nation, Experts play down risk to Bangkok, October 13, 2011.

Low Tide

High Tide

65

• On Wednesday, Oct 19, PM Yingluck asked BMA Governor Sukhumbhand to

open the flood gates of all Bangkok canals. Two days before, Monday, Oct 17,

the water level in Bangkok's canals was very low. There was also low tide in the

Chao Phraya. Boat operators at Saen Saeb canal had to cancel operations

because of low water level.

• The governor replied (Oct 19) that they had to remain closed in anticipation

of rainfall. Why? Were the BMA pumps not working? Why not pump all the water out of

the khlongs?

• The BMA's strategy was to construct flood walls to divert the northern run-

off from Bangkok.

Did BMA’s failure to open the gates as instructed cause unnecessary

damage?

• On Thursday, Oct 20, Governor Sukhumbhand appointed Dr Pramote

Maiklad as the BMA's adviser on the flood situation. Pramote advised

that all water gates should be opened and the floodwater allowed to flow

through the canals of Bangkok into the Chao Phraya and out to sea but it

should be carried out carefully and the situation closely monitored

afterward.

• by doing so, Bangkok would help provide an outlet for the huge mass

of floodwater in the north of the capital

66

• On Thursday October 20, Sukhumbhand succeeded in convincing all that

Bangkok flood gates were opened to help ease floods in the north of Bangkok. It

was hours later that they found out they were closed. Perhaps Sukhumbhand may

have given an order but the officers failed to comply?

Source: The Nation, “Reflection on floods: The mirror has two faces”, October 24, 2011

• On Friday, Oct 21, PM Yingluck invoked the provisions of the Disaster

Prevention and Mitigation Act (2007). This Act gave the prime minister full

authority over the crisis. Those who refuse to follow orders can be prosecuted for

negligence of duty.

• On Oct 21, MR Sukhumbhand said the flood gates had been open all the time,

but added they they could not be fully opened as he had to protect Bangkok from

flooding . On Oct 24, it was reported that its sluice gates were only about halfway

open because the city wants to manage the flow of floodwaters. ???? Source: The Nation, “Expect to be flooded for a month, MP tells Bangkok”, October 24, 2011

• The decision meant that that floodwater from the inundated provinces north of

the capital did not have a major outlet. The governor said his responsibility was

Bangkok, not the provinces. He continued with the strategy to divert the northern

run-off to the east and west. Source: Bangkok Post, Mismanagement political intrigue? Cruel fate?, October 30, 2011.

67

• But on Oct 26 high tides pushed up the water level in the Chao Phraya.

• The window of opportunity was closed.

Source: The Nation, Curbs on water in Thon Buri, Nonthaburi, Samut Prakan, October 30, 2011

• On Friday, Oct 28, water being released into Bangkok's canals coupled

with high tides caused the Chao Phraya to overflow its embankments.

Source: Bangkok Post, Mismanagement political intrigue? Cruel fate?, October 30, 2011.

Overflowing Chao

Phraya River due to

high tide at Sanghee

Bridge

68

Government Response to Floods:

1. Thailand does not have a long operating disaster management

organizational infrastructure. In 2002, the Department of Disaster

Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) (Ministry of Interior - MOI) was

established as the principal agency for disaster management coordination

among all agencies concerned at all levels (see next page diagram*). Source: Panya Consultants (2009), Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, Final Report, Main

Report, March, pp. 5-8 to 5-11.

Comments:

• does the DDPM have any power? The organizational structure looks

extremely complicated.

• what experience has been gained since 2002 to streamline (improve the

efficiency and effectiveness) of DDPM?

• the lines of authority and chain of command are not clear. (see next page).

• where is the Emergency Operation Centre for Flood, Storm, and

Landslide? Where is the FROC?

• The issue of clear authority and chain of command as well as its legal

force is an important planning issue when designing organizational

structures!! (Someday, some of you will be helping design organizations.)

69

Procedurally, there is a tradition of

• overlapping water management authority,

• no coordination in planning and implementation

among the different water related agencies.

• “In a crisis, the result shifts from inefficiency to utter

chaos.”

Source: Bangkok Post, What Water Management?, October 21, 2011

71

2. PM Yingluck sworn in August 10th, 2011 as the newly elected Prime Minister.

• Toured flooded provinces beginning August 12, assigned cabinet members and

members of parliament to visit affected people, pledged support to local administration

organisations.

• The 24/7 Emergency Operation Center for Flood, Storm and Landslide was set up on

August 20 under the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Department of the Ministry of

Interior to coordinate warning and relief efforts. Interior Minister Yongyuth Wichaidit

was appointed as the head of the Emergency Operation Center. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Thailand_floods

• The RID issued a warning of disaster as storms came in September and October.

• 28 out of 33 big dams showed more than 80 percent capacity.

• RID alerted farmers and authorities in Central Region and lower North to organise an

early rice harvest to save crops.

• Hydrology and Water Management Office declared a red alert – a highest critical level 3

– on water management on September 5th, 2011 but the government did not

acknowledge the crisis at hand.

• First week of October, Bhumibol Dam opened its emergency spillway for five

consecutive days. Source: The Nation, “Lethargy over water woes will hurt govt”, October 11, 2011

72

• Early morning Thursday October 6th, run-off was approaching Ayutthaya .

Between saving the Asian Highway or the Rojana Industrial Estate, Transport

Minister Sukumpol Suwanatat took swift action to save the country's electronics

hub.

• If the Rojana industrial estate is flooded, others such as the Map Ta Phut

Industrial Estate would suffer a downstream effect because it is a key

supplier of industrial parts to the other industrial estates, according to

Science and Technology Minister Plodprasop Suraswadi.

Source: Bangkok Post, Highway sacrificed to protect industry, October 8, 2011.

• On Friday, October 7th 2011, PM Yingluck appeared on national TV to inform

the public of the flood situation and formed the National Flood Relief Centre

(FROC) led by Justice Minister Pracha Promnok. The centre, activated on

Saturday October 8th, took over Yongyuth's 24/7 Emergency Operation Centre

for Flood, Storm and Landslide.

Source: The Nation, “Lethargy over water woes will hurt govt”, October 11, 2011

73

Asia Highway

Source: The Nation, October 7, 2011.

74

3.0. The implementation of The Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007

on October 21, 2011 gave the Prime Minister the full authority over state

officials around the country, including the BMA (Article 31) . However, it

did not render the FROC any more effective because its provisions were not

fully utilized by the Prime Minister.

• Those who refuse to follow orders can be prosecuted for negligence of

duty. The prime minister becomes director of the relief operation. Source: Bangkok Post, “PM invokes natural disaster law”, October 21, 2011

• The central government via FROC by issuing a disaster warning for the

capital could have taken control (but did not) over the BMA’s sluice gates

to coordinate flood control and drain run-off into the sea in the most

timely and efficient manner.

• In past cases of disaster, provincial governors were the main enforcers

of the law. Source: The Nation, Powers and limitations of Disaster Act, October 22, 2011

75

• as mandated by the disaster law, all relevant agencies must comply with

uniformity to the FROC, such as the issue of opening sluice gates to regulate

the water flow.

Source: The Nation, PM steps up control, October 22, 2011

• The act has a more limited mandate than the emergency decree. The

disaster provisions apply mainly to civilian officials and the prime minister is

obligated to issue a separate order to involve the military in flood control.

Source: The Nation, Powers and limitations of Disaster Act, October 22, 2011

• under Section 31 of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act, any person

is prohibited from disrupting the authorities' disaster management works and

gives powers to local administrative officials to remove or destroy any

structures that obstruct disaster control operations. Did FROC use these

powers effectively to remove obstructions like slum housing along khlongs,

and arrest anyone destroying sandbags? Is there legal backing to FROC’s

powers?

Source: Source: Bangkok Post, “Gov’t makes barriers off limits, Public prohibited from interfering in relief work”, October 24, 2011

76

4. Establishment of the FROC (Flood- Relief Operation Command)

4.1. main purpose was to enable representatives of numerous government

agencies to work in an “integrative approach” to the flood problem.

• It is an ad hoc (a reaction to the flood crisis), not proactive organization. A

Task Force (temporary arrangement). The disaster caught the government

completely by surprise and “showed it lacked sufficiently constructive

forethought involved, long before any suggestion of an impending flood

scenario.”

Source: Bangkok Post, Crisis management versus political expedience, November 9, 2011

4.2. By this time floods have ravaged 28 provinces and affected the lives of more

than 2.69 million people. The death toll from the disaster has reached 252. PM

Yingluck supervised overall flood-relief operations, Justice Minister Pracha

Promnok has been named director of the Flood-Relief Operation Command and

Science and Technology Minister Poldprasop Suraswadi, the Chief of Operations.

• IS THIS THE JOB OF THE PRIME MINISTER? Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Flood-war-room-set-to-swing-into-action-30167143.html

77

4.3. Lack of suitability and lack of experience of FROC officials in disaster

management. Everybody was new to the job.

• When PM Yingluck Shinawatra informed the country in a national televised

address on Oct. 7, 2011, she admitted her government was almost at its wits'

end dealing with the disaster. Source: Bangkok Post, Flood waters bear down on capital, October 8, 2011.

• Pracha Promnok is a Police General and Minister of Justice and Party Chief

Advisor of Peau Paendin, while Plodprasop Suraswadi was former director-

general of the Department of Fisheries, former director-general of

Department of Forestry, former director of Chiang Mai Night Safari and

former director of the National Disaster Warning Center. Source: http://www.antithaksin.com/BlankForm.php?Aid=0802027

• Tirachai Wuthitham, secretary to Justice Minister Pracha Promnok, who heads

FROC reported that the FROC never had a systematic plan to battle the crisis

and has simply tackled problems as they have arisen on a day-to-day basis. Source: The Nation, Aide to Pracha admits lack of planning at FROC, November 20, 2011

• PM Yingluck and other officials did not heed recommendations from advisers

or was late to implement them, which aggravated the intensity of the flood

crisis. Source: Bangkok Post, “Crisis response exposes leadership failure”, November 3, 2011

78

4.4 “Panic mode” disaster management

• on Sunday October 9, PM Yingluck demanded the governors of ten

provinces under severe flooding to come up with comprehensive measures

for dealing with the situation by 6 pm Monday, October 10th.

• comment: how can they possibly do this when this is the first time a

flood of this magnitude occurred in recent years? Do these provinces

have disaster management planning capacity?

Source: The Nation, “PM demands 10 provinces to submit comprehensive flood measures by 6 pm”, October 9, 2011

• Former Pathum Thani

Governor Pheerasak

Hinmuangkao fainted under

the weight of stress a few

days after he was transferred

to the post of Interior

Ministry's inspector general.

Source: The Nation, Pathum Thani's ex-governor faints

from stress. October 26, 2011

79

• But: according to the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act, B.E. 2550

(2007), Section 56: all Provincial Governors and BMA Governor "shall

finish the formulating of the Disaster and Mitigation Plan in accordance to

this Act within two years after this Act is enforced" (i.e., by 2009).

• Comment: Did these plans exist? From the way the crisis has

unfolded it seemed: there were no plans, there were no provisions for

coordination (especially with BMA).

Source: Bangkok Post, “ Canals Built to take Localised Floods”, October 30, 2011.

80

4.5 FROC internal organization was chaotic

4.5.1 Politics over expert knowledge: flip-flopping between optimistic and

pessimistic forecasts on scope of Bangkok flooding and lack of advanced

information about areas at imminent risk of flooding.

Source: Takeshi Fujitani (2011),” Experts, officials disagree on scope of Bangkok flooding”. November 2,

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/south_east_asia/AJ2011110216346

4.5.2 Lack of clear information: “Since the start of the flood crisis in July,

the authorities: FROC, City Hall and bureaucrats did not give the public a

clear picture of what was going on, the possible courses of action, which

ones they would choose to implement and why.”

• it created a widespread sense of anxiety, confusion and uncertainty

Source: Bangkok Post Opinion, Lost in Flood, Information, November 15, 2011.

• there was no warning from the government or local authorities that

floodwater in Bang Bua Thong district would rise to more than 1 metre,

leaving no time for many residents to prepare for the flooding. Source: Bangkok Post, Govt slammed for lack of boats, relief , Furious residents claim response was too slow, October 21, 2011

81

• examples of conflicting information: When the Nava Nakorn Industrial

Estate was flooded on Monday, October 17th, FROC spokesman Wim

Rungwattanajinda told people to evacuate in seven hours, but Pol Gen Pracha

said that moving belongings to high ground should suffice. This left the

public confused.

• Bangkok residents were relieved to hear that the capital was declared safe,

with massive floodwaters moving past on Sunday, October 16th. On Monday,

they were told Bangkok was actually still at risk.

Source: Bangkok Post, Govt wrestles with telling truth or lies about floods, October 19, 2011

• a senior official spoke of "secret" plans relating to the handling of flood

that cannot be revealed. As a result, people lose faith in the pronouncements

of politicians, regardless of their political affiliation.

Source: Bangkok Post Editorial, Bangkok Not Waterproof, October 22, 2011

• BMA Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra backtracked from his vow that the

capital could escape massive flooding, saying he never promised the capital

would not be inundated.

Source: The Nation, “Evacuation centres ready: city officials”, October 10, 2011

82

• When Ban Prao floodgate in Pathum Thani's Sam Kok district was not going

to be finished on time, Minister Plodprasob, FROC’s chief of flood relief

operations announcement on TV on Thursday evening October 13th, that people

in those northern Bangkok districts should start moving their belongings as

flood water as high as one metre could be heading towards these districts caused

widespread panic. Justice Minister Pracha Promnok, FROC Director had to

come out to allay fears, telling the media that no evacuation order had been

issued, or even suggested.

• PM Yingluck defended Plodprasob's "good intention", but FROC stated

that public announcements concerning the flooding were to come from

Pracha alone.

• BMA Governor Sukhumbhand then told Bangkokians to listen to flood

updates concerning the capital from him only. Source: The Nation, Conflicting updates cause flood of confusion, October 15, 2011.

• in the place of unified command, you end up with a contest of power which

creates more uncertainty.

Asked by reporters whether the people should listen to the FROC or the BMA,

the Minister Plodprasop said, "I am 176cm tall, but the governor's not as tall as

me. "I am taller so people have to listen to me. What do you expect my response

to be?" Source: Bangkok Post, “All districts in Bangkok still 'at risk'”, November 2, 2011

83

• Bangkok businesses say unclear and inadequate flood information is

making it harder for them to make preparations. Both the FROC and the

BMA have failed to provide clear forecasts about how much water could

arrive in the capital and when, said Chai Srivikorn, president of

Ratchaprasong Square Trade Association.

Source:Bangkok Post, “City firms decry information gap”, October 28, 2011

84 Source: The Nation, Conflicting flood info frustrates private sector, October 28, 2011

Source: The Nation, October 16, 2011

Did Big Business know

something that the rest

of the public didn’t

know? Note the

height of sandbag wall

around office buildings

at Silom Road!!!!


85

• “infantalizing” the public by keeping them in the dark because the

government fears that telling the truth might cause panic.

• An ABAC poll showed that the FROC had failed in credibility. On a scale of

0 to 10, FROC scored only 3.6, reflecting growing public impatience with the

government's approach to the crisis.

• Sources at the flood relief operation centre at Don Mueang airport said that

concerned ministers and authorities were at loggerheads about how to deal with

the floods.

• Some wanted to tell the truth to the public, while others thought playing it

close to the chest was the best policy. The conflict between Science and

Technology Minister Plodprasop Suraswadi and Justice Minister Pracha

Promnok is a case in point. Mr Plodprasop's recent flood alert was retracted by

Pol Gen Pracha, head of the flood relief centre, who thought that telling the

truth would hurt the government's image. Source: Bangkok Post (2011), “Govt wrestles with telling truth or lies about floods”, October 19.

86

4.5.3 Lack of systematic opeational procedures caused more chaos and

frustration.

Protesting residents at Don Muang claimed they were told by their local MP,

Karun Hosakul, that the government's Flood Relief Operations Command

(Froc) had consented to their demand to make a hole in the big bag flood

barrier and release some of the water occupying their homes – but FROC

denied it gave permission.

People gather at the big bag barrier in Don

Mueang on Nov 13, 2011

Source: Bangkok Post, Messy handling of big bag floodwall protest,

November 14, 2011

87

4.6. Failure of FROC to secure cooperation of BMA

4.6.1 BMA was uncooperative from the very beginning. BMA officials started to

join the team at FROC only in the second week. Source: Bangkok Post, “Drainage system not up to task”, October 30, 2011

• Before issuing the disaster warning for Bangkok (Disaster Mitigation Act of

2007), Yingluck chaired a high level meeting to assess the situation, particularly the

runoff heading toward the capital. BMA Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra was

absent. Source: The Nation, PM steps up control, October 22, 2011

• In the early part, Bangkok Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra insisted that his

administration was capable of managing the situation in the capital and told the

Pheu Thai-led government to focus its attention elsewhere. Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Flood-war-room-set-to-swing-into-action-30167143.html

4.6.2 BMA’s reluctance to open water gates in the eastern part of the city to drain

floodwater out to the sea, caused the flood crisis in the Central Plains to ease only

slowly.

Source: Bangkok Post, “Yingluck says city ill prepared for floods”, October 12, 2011

88

• Asked if the refusal to open the inner canals (BMA) would affect the water

level in Khlong Rangsit, MR Sukhumbhand said Khlong Rangsit was not his

responsibility but the government's. !!!!!

Source: Bangkok Post, “Latest plan to save Bangkok Published”, October 20, 2011

• Acknowledgement by FROC Chief of Operations, Plodprasop that FROC and

BMA were not cooperating well enough in terms of watergate management so

that drainage from flooded upstream provinces can be speeded up into the Gulf

of Thailand.

Source: Bangkok Post, “Scared City Folk Prepare for the Worst in Bangkok”, October 9, 2011

4.6.3 BMA contradicting FROC. Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra,,said he

did not believe information from the government-run Flood Relief Operations

Command (FROC) indicating that the flow of water from the North was

slowing.

Source: The Nation, “PM hopeful but governor fears a second wave”, November 1, 2011

89

4.6.4 Lack of unified command. Yingluck seemed not to want to exercise

control or have a direct confrontation with BMA over water management.

In response to Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra's move to use the Disaster

Prevention and Mitigation Act 2007 and order for the BMA to open watergates so

that flood water can be let through to the sea, Sukhumbhand said the government

had not notified the BMA to open watergates 100 per cent but had let the agency

exercise its own judgement.

Source: The Nation, “Bangkok water gates not fully opened: Governor”, October 23, 2011.

4.6.5 Continued bureaucratic approach in doing things. For example to secure

more pumps from RID, BMA sent a letter to the wrong ministry therefore taking a

long time to arrive plus causing interagency misunderstandings. Source: Bangkok Post, “Dispute over pumps for Thon Buri”, November 4, 2011

• Chart Thai Pattana advisory chairman and former prime minister Banharn Silapa-

archa in a press conference advised BMA governor to phone the RID chief directly

if the BMA urgently wanted more water pumps.

Source: Bangkok Post, Sukhumbhan advised to phone RID, November 5, 2011.

90

The conflict between the central government and the Bangkok

authority heightened yesterday when the governor and the chief of

the irrigation department engaged in a war of words during a

meeting on flood control.

Source: The Nation, Irrigation dept chief slams governor over accusation, November 5, 2011.

91

The Nation cartoon making fun of Yingluck’s

indecisiveness Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/nationphoto/show.php?pageid=6&id=30&pid=11884

92

4.7 Failure to understand hydraulic properties of entire system of canals.

• City Hall’s reluctance to open water gates in the eastern part of the city to

drain floodwater out to the sea caused the flood crisis in the Central Plains to

ease only slowly. BMA Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra, explained that

he decided not to fully open the water gates for fear that it would cause

severe flooding in Samut Prakan province, not just to safeguard the capital.

Comment:

• was he overly cautious because of poor operational procedures and

coordination with non-BMA agencies? Source: Bangkok Post, “Yingluck says city ill prepared for floods”, October 12, 2011

• In fact: canals in Samut Prakan have been ready to receive flood water

drainage from Bangkok for almost three weeks but little volume of water

was discharged from Bangkok's watergates. Samut Prakan, the last area

before flood water flows to the sea, has 9 pump stations and could drain

about 40 million cubic metres per day of water into the Gulf of Thailand.

Source: The Nation, “Samut Prakan ready to take Bangkok overflow : experts”, October 22, 2011

93

• Pramote Maiklad, a former director general of the RID, said the BMA might

be confused about how water flows and urged the Bangkok administration to

work closely with RID, which knows which gates should be opened or closed. (comment: BMA may not understand hydraulics of entire Chao Phraya basin since it takes care only

of BMA drainage.)

Source: The Nation, “Irrigation dept defends closure of sluice gates”, October 27, 2011

Source: http://www.thailandqa.com/images_03/IMG_4206.jpg

Source:

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/admin/specials/nationphoto/photo/r

kZ7Ouw.JPG

Pumping Station in Samut Prakarn

94

พ.ต.ต.เสงี่ยม ส ำรำญรัตน์ Source:

http://akecity.blogspot.com/2011_11_01_ar

chive.html

• In Min Buri district, Pol MajGeneral Sangiam

Samranrat, an official from the PM's

SecretaryGeneral Office, said they would not lift

the sluice gate by two metres as demanded by

Bueng Kum residents, because he needed three or

four days to inspect downstream Saen Saeb Canal.

Comment: 4 DAYS!!!!! DOES NOT UNDERSTAND

HYDRAULICS SYSTEM OF CANALS Source: The Nation, Evacuations ordered in Bueng Kum as floods approach BKK's inner

areas, November 8, 2011

Source:

http://thaiwhoiswho.blogspot.com/2011/12/blog-

post.html

95

4.8 FROC did not fully enforce the law on violators.

• Expressways became parking lots as are thousands of cars illegally double parked or even

triple parked on the expressway to escape the flood in Bangkok.

Source: Bangkok Post, When Bangkokians Panic, October 20, 2011.

• The warning: “Any car parked on the expressways will be detected by the CCTVs and

will be moved away consequently” was not implemented because the announcement came too

late when thousands of cars were already parked on the expressways. Source: http://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news.php?id=255410230018&tb=NEWS&return=ok

Source: http://xba.xanga.com/7dfe0421c5c35279368166/b222546455.jpg

Source:

http://www.demotiximages.com/sites/default/files/imagecac

he/large_610x456_scaled/photos/894553.jpg

Source: http://asiancorrespondent.com/67712/thailand-floodwaters-reach-outer-bangkok/

"The motorists are breaking law," Pol Maj Gen Panu.

96

4.8 FROC did not fully enforce the law on violators (continued).

• FROC did not penalize Pheu Thai MP Keng Karun who was

accused by Pak Kret district chief Wisit Phuangphet for demolition of a 1

kilometre section of clay wall near an intersection where Prapa Canal

meets Chaeng Wattana Road, letting in flood water. Karun denied this. Source: The Nation, “Boundary guarded as canal secured further”, October 22, 2011

• no strict monitoring of prices of essential goods during

floods. Although the Commerce Ministry yesterday had

announced 16 additional price-controlled goods,

including flashlights, life vests, water pump, drinking

water, toothpaste, sand and sandbags, and small boats. Source: The Nation, Bt325-bn rehab budget approved by Cabinet, October 26, 2011.

• Commerce Minister Kittiratt suggested people

should refuse to buy eggs which are sold at inflated

prices.(8 baht each) and buy other food

items instead. !!!!! Source: Bangkok Post, Kittiratt: No shortage of essentials, October 28, 2011.

Hoarding and panic buying in Bangkok.

Empty shelves at Tesco Lotus Source: http://digitaljournal.com/img/2/7/7/2/0/3/i/9/7/0/o/tesco.jpg

97

The basis for enforcing the law disappeared when the

government could not relieve people’s sufferings. Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/nationphoto/show.php?pageid=5&id=30&pid=12040

98

4.8 FROC did not fully enforce the law on violators. (continued)

• The law stipulates 7 years in prison and a 10,000-baht fine for anyone caught

ripping off their fellow flood victims! The Department of Internal Trade had arrested

34 shop owners for failing to display price tags on their products. Despite such a high

number of arrests for the heinous crime of not having labels, profiteering went on.

Source: Bangkok Post, How to lose a flood in ten days, November 12, 2011.

• Khlong Phraya Suren sluice gate

dispute. Who broke the law? Sangiam

or Sukhumbhand? Residents reportedly

heard the governor agreeing to open the sluice

gate at one meter wide, but BMA didn't do

anything. Pol MajGeneral Sangiam Samranrat of

the PM's Secretary General Office thus got the

letter in which Pracha asked for BMA

cooperation and filed a complaint at the Sai Mai

police station before joining others to open the

sluice gate. Sukhumbhand said he will sue

Sangiam. Sukhumbhand denied the Froc request

because it will flood Sai Mai and Bang Khen

districts. Source: The Nation, Governor and protesters lock horns, November 30,

2011

Bangkok Post, Sukhumbhand denies Froc request to raise sluice gate,

November 29, 2011

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Tension-over-sluice-gates-ease-

30171015.html

99

4.9 Politicization of relief distribution

• Accusations over red shirt areas being favored in relief supplies and MPs

attaching their names/pictures to relief goods even if these were from public

contributions. Source: The Nation, “Spat over flood relief supplies”, October 26, 2011

• Froc allowed red shirt partisans, apparently directed by Don Muang MP

Karun Hosakul, to subvert the aid. A truckload went out with the banner,

"With Love From Pol Lt Col Dr Thaksin Shinawatra." Source: Bangkok Post, At the mercy of our politicians, November 1, 2011

• Within FROC, politicians of various shades clash over priorities and areas

that should get aid first. Source: The Nation, Children's games continue despite emergency, November 10, 2011

100

Source:

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/nationphoto/show-

new.php?pageid=0&id=1&pid=11879#.Tq6luGxVRvw.facebook

Natthawut denies red shirts being favoured, says

MPs not claiming credit for supplies Source: The Nation, Spat over flood relief supplies, October 26, 2011

SUPPLY DEMAND

Flood victims reach out for relief supplies

handed out by authorities in Saphan Mai market,

Bang Khen district.

Source: Bangkok Post, Residents threaten BMA staff, October 31, 2011

101

LOTS OF DEMAND FOR RELIEF GOODS

Officials try to keep order among

residents of Saphan Mai, Bang

Khen district, as they emerge

from flooded side sois after

hearing relief trucks were arriving

with supplies of food and water.

Source: Bangkok Post, Angry residents complicating

flood control, October 31, 2011

The residents of Saphan Mai, Bang

Khen district, have been stranded in

their homes for more than a week.

Source: Bangkok Post, Residents threaten BMA staff, October

31, 2011.

102

By contrast - Japanese victims of March 2011

earthquake/tsunami lining up for relief assistance.

103

4.10 The government FROC was hampered by lack of sandbags and pumps.

• all government agencies were running out of sandbags for floodwalls. PM

Yingluck announced that the government would buy all the sandbags

available in the market.

Source: Bangkok Post, “Yingluck says city ill prepared for floods”, October 12, 2011

• FROC could not provide

more pumps to BMA since

most water pumps were

already in use. FROC

orders more pumps from

other provinces but these

were not enough to cover 60

requested pumps. It takes

about 4-5 days to buy from

abroad. Why not order more

pumps?

• FROC asks if private sector

can sell/rent to FROC. Source: Bangkok Post, Please don't destroy Big Bag,

November 5, 2011

Source: Bangkok Post cartoon, October 13, 2011

104

• As a result, the government was criticized for slow response during

emergencies, as shown in the lack of boats for evacuation and relief, no

warning given in the case of Bang Bua Thong.

Source: Bangkok Post, “Govt moves to protect inner city, Govt slammed for lack of boats, relief, Furious residents claim response was too slow”,

October 21, 2011

Source: Bangkok Post, “Govt moves to protect inner city, Govt slammed

for lack of boats, relief, Furious residents claim response was too slow”,

October 21, 2011

The situation in Nonthaburi's Bang Bua Thong and Pak Kret districts was critical October 20th,

as a massive volume of water suddenly flowed into the municipality area and markets, inundating

hundreds of vehicles and causing residents to flee their homes.

Source: The Nation, Flooding in Bang Bua thong, Pak Kret hits critical levels,

October 20, 2011

105

Source: Deluge surprises

Bang Bua Thong, October

21, 2011

Source: Bangkok Post, PM takes

charge of flood crisis, October 22,

2011

Source: Bangkok

Post, Outside the

flood walls, October

19, 2011

Bang Bua

Thong

flood

chaos

2011

106

Source:

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/admin/specials/nationphoto/photo/

tzE6Ycs.jpg

http://www.bangkokpost.com/multimedia/photo/262376/bang-

bua-thong-flooded

107

5.0 FROC capitulates to BMA? Flood Relief Operations Command announced

on October 23 that all parties in the government sector agreed that floodwater

from Bangkok's northern outskirts had to be drained through canals in the eastern

districts of the capital and Samut Prakan province into the sea. Source: Source: Bangkok Post, “Gov’t makes barriers off limits, Public prohibited from interfering in relief work”, October 24, 2011

• was this due to BMA’s reluctance to share the flood burden?

• “If Bangkok is crippled, the economy will be crippled. If the economy is

crippled, who will suffer most? Certainly not big businesses, but the

ordinary people, the workers, the people who send their money home to the

provinces.” BMA Governor Sukhumbhand rejected criticism that flooding

north of the city was made worse because city officials waited too long to

open Bangkok’s canal system. Bangkok and its vicinity account for about

half of Thailand’s industrial output, according to government statistics. Source: Daniel Ten Kate and Suttinee Yuvejwattana, ‘Mob Rule’ Threatens Bangkok’s Business Areas With Floods, Governor Says, Nov

1, 2011 (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-01/-mob-rule-threatens-bangkok-s-business-areas-with-floods-governor-says.html)

• Information and Communication Technology Minister Anudith Nakornthap

yesterday said the government has to save the heart of Bangkok which is densely

populated and housed important economic areas. Its protection would speed up

rehabilitation of other parts of the country. Do you agree? Source: Bangkok Post, “Latest plan to save Bangkok Published”, October 20, 2011

108

• Why did PM Yingluck not exercise her power based on the Disaster

Mitigation Act? Why does she sound subservient to BMA Governor

Sukhumbhand?

•Asked about a criticism that the BMA was too selfish for designating

Nonthaburi as a water retention zone to spare Bangkok from floods, PM

Yingluck said she did not want to say so.

• “I would like to ask for mercy (kwaam songsan?) and cooperation

from the BMA to consider which sluice gates could be wider open to

help ease hardships of the people affected by the flooding. The nature of

water is that it must have a way to go. But if its way is blocked, the

water draining would not be possible”, she said.

Source: The Nation, Yingluck denies she is shedding tears, October 28, 2011

Source:

https://www.facebook.com/

bkk.best#!/photo.php?fbid=

10150423415466118&set=

o.186357484732609&type

=3&theater

versus

109

• or was it because FROC believed that BMA was the only one that knew

how to operate its internal canal drainage system?

When asked why Bangkokians remained dry at the expense of Nonthaburi,

Yingluck said she wanted people in Bangkok to cooperate and let the flood

water to be directed through their areas. She said she had told FROC to

discuss this issue with both sides and find solutions. She also urged the

BMA to look at the overall picture and find ways to drain the water, adding

that the government had no information about the BMA's drainage

system and capacity.

Source: The Nation, Yingluck wants everyone to cooperate, November 24, 2011

Comment : But what does cooperate mean???? That others are willing to

suffer and not complain when not adequately compensated?

110

The Nation cartoon making fun of the conflict between

Yingluck and Sukhumbhand. Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/nationphoto/show.php?pageid=6&id=30&pid=11851

111

Source: The Nation cartoon, October 18, 2011

Source: The Nation cartoon, October 11, 2011

Some are more dry

than others.

• as a result of the government's plan

to sacrifice outlying areas to save the

inner city, communities clashed

increasingly with central authorities,

both from the Bangkok Metropolitan

Administration and the Royal

Irrigation Department. Source: Sanitsuda Ekachai, Development that leads to

destruction, Bangkok Post, November 3, 2011

112

Source: Bangkok Post cartoon, November 4, 2011

And whose interests was the government protecting?

"I pay the same tax as the people in Bangkok, why didn't they think of me too?" said a teary-eyed

Wanpen Rittisarn, in Bang Pahan, about 100 kilometres north of Bangkok. The 41-year-old had

to abandon her home after it was inundated by two metres (six feet) of water, seeking the relative

safety of the nearby town, which has now also been overrun by floodwaters.

Source: Amelie Bottollier-Depois, Bangkok's neighbours shoulder flood burden

Oct 8, 2011 http://www.mysinchew.com/node/64817?tid=10

Where is EQUITY?

113

The floods have:

“underlined Thailand's urban-rural divide which has underpinned a broader

national polarisation and conflict since Thaksin's departure. Downstream

provinces were awash in order to divert waters away from central Bangkok. The

Thai capital was kept mostly dry at the expense of its surrounding areas. If

Bangkok shares some of the flooding, economic damage will mount but a sense of

equality and justice will prevail. When the floods go through the capital, they will

find faster release into the Gulf of Thailand.” Source: Thitinan Pongsudhirak(2011), The politics behind Thailand's floods. The Guardian, October 21, 2011

(http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/21/thailand-floods-bangkok )



flood 2011 part 1

Government & Nonprofit