florian bieber, consociationalism—prerequisite or hurdle for democratization in bosnia?

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Florian Bieber

Consociationalism – Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia?1 The Case of Belgium as a Possible Example

IntroductionToday, Bosnia Herzegovina is divided into two entities; both have become largelymono-ethnic areas, while at the same time belonging to a weak multi-ethnic state. Thepolitical system established in Dayton in 1995 and by the Washington Agreement be-tween Croats and Bosniacs the previous year seeks to strike a balance between recog-nising the realities on the ground, i.e. the division of previously co-existing nations,and creating a system of co-operation and an eventual return of refugees, potentiallyenabling their co-existence on the same territory. The political system institutional-ised in Dayton, through a constitution decreed by the international community and theUnited States in particular, resembles in many ways the brief experience with democ-racy in 1990-1991, while at the same time recognising the territorial division of thecountry. The schizophrenic nature of Bosnia is already reflected in the preamble of itsConstitution, which defines the people of the country as:

Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bos-nia and Herzegovina.2

Bosnian national diversity is clearly unique, but at the same time it is an oft-re-peated truism that 90 per cent of the countries in the world are multiethnic. Thus, nu-merous theories and concepts seeking to explore and facilitate such a diversity withinone country have been elaborated. Most Western European countries also have minor-ities and have consequently developed a range of methods for integrating them intothe state. These techniques range from assimilation, as in France, to far-ranging terri-torial autonomy, as granted to the Swedish minority on the Finnish Åland Islands.3

Here two countries, Belgium and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had and have sys-tems of governance which could be described as consociational democracies, will becompared.4 In the case of Bosnia, the focus will rest on the brief period of consocia-

1 The original version of this article was presented at the conference “Democracy and Hu-man Rights in Multi-Ethnic Societies,” held in Konjic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 5-10,1998.

2 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), preamble. On the ambiguity of this defi-nition see Várady, T: On the Chances of Ethnocultural Justice in Central-Eastern Europe– with Comments on the Dayton Agreement, mimeo.

3 For a theoretical evaluation of different means of regulating ethnic conflict, see McGarry,J and O’Leary, B. (1993): “Introduction: the macro-political regulation of ethnic con-flict,” in McGarry, J and O’Leary, B (eds.): The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation:Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflict, London: Routledge, pp. 1-40.

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tional democracy prior to the war in 1990 and 1991. However, the primary focus ofthe article is to examine the implications of a consociational political system for Bos-nia in the future. This concept has been largely developed by Arend Lijphart, a Dutchpolitical scientist, in an attempt to analyse plural societies, which are divided by reli-gion, language, ethnicity or even political ideologies. At the centre of his conceptstands co-operation between the elites representing their respective constituencies:

The first and most important element is government by grand coalition of the political leadersof all significant segments of the plural society. This can take several different forms, such asa grand coalition cabinet in a parliamentary system, a “grand” council or committee with im-portant advisory functions, or a grand coalition of a president and other top officeholders in apresidential system. The other three basic elements of consociational democracy are (1) themutual veto or “concurrent majority” rule, which serves as an additional protection of vitalminority interests; (2) proportionality as the principal standard of political representation,civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds; and (3) a high degree of autonomyfor each segment to run its own internal affairs.5

Belgium is one of these countries and has struggled for the last thirty years withthe problem of accommodating different linguistic/national groups. The example ofBelgium, and its most recent constitutional reforms in 1993, are of particular interestfor Bosnia for two reasons. Firstly, Belgium has established a far-reaching devolutionof power and institutional reform in recent years, a necessity for national accommoda-tion in Bosnia. Secondly, Belgium has been one of the few countries separating cul-tural and personal autonomy from territorial autonomy. This approach offers alterna-tives to the general territorial fallacy of modern nationalism and can provide for asuccessful tool for democratisation in Bosnia.

The purpose of this article is to examine the applicability of the model of a conso-ciational democracy to Bosnia. In order to achieve this, we shall examine Belgium asa “role model” of a plural democracy and point to elements of consociational exist-ence in pre-war and post-Dayton Bosnia.

1. The two cases

1.1. BelgiumIn Belgium, the period following World War 2 was shaped by the increasing linguis-tic and national awareness of the Flemish community, caused by its economic rise andthe decline of heavy industry in Walloonia. This triggered the national consciousnessof the French-speaking community in Belgium and has lead to numerous constitu-

4 I developed some of the ideas presented in this paper while comparing Bosnia with Leba-non – Bieber, F. (1999): Bosnien-Herzegowina und Libanon im Vergleich, Die historischeEntwicklung und das politische System vor Ausbruch des Bürgerkrieges [Bosnia-Herze-govina and Lebanon in Comparison. Historical Development and the Political SystemPrior to the Civil War]. Sinzheim: Pro Universitate Verlag.

5 Lijphart, Arend (1977): Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration. NewHaven-London: Yale University Press, p. 25.

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Consociationalism – Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia?

tional and legal reforms which have granted increasing powers to the Dutch, Frenchand German-speaking communities. These reforms have culminated in the far-reach-ing revision of the Constitution in 1993, transforming Belgium into a federal state.This reform further developed the two tracks of autonomy in Belgium. Some of thecentral powers were devolved to its three regions of Flanders, Walloonia and Brus-sels. This territorial federalisation is complemented by the cultural autonomy grantedto the three linguistic communities.6

The reforms changed the institutions, transferred powers and regulated the financ-ing of the regions and the protection of minorities. It was, despite the pressures frombelow, a federalisation from above, designed by the Belgian national elites, with thedelegation of the powers of the state – in line with the principle of subsidiarity – tosmaller units. The three regions were granted far-reaching competencies in the fieldsof economic policy, agriculture, environment and energy. Furthermore, the provinceswere allowed to conduct foreign relations and sign international treaties in thesefields.

Each region also set up its own council (parliament) and executive. The parliamentof Brussels is divided into Flemish and French speakers; in Walloonia, the council hasrepresentatives of the French community and Germans living along the eastern borderof the country; while the members of the Flemish parliament come from Flanders andBrussels. The latter is a merger of the regional (Flemish) and communal (Dutch-speaking) parliaments.

Independently from the regions, the three communities have received self-govern-ment in the fields of culture, education, media and individual welfare. Like their re-gional counterparts, they can conduct international and regional co-operation in thesefields. Only the German community cannot fully determine the usage of its language,due to its small size and the high number of French-speakers in German language ar-eas. All three communities possess their own parliaments: The Conseil de la Commu-nauté Francophone combines French-speakers from Walloonia and Brussels; the Ned-erlandstalige Gemeenschapsraad has merged, as mentioned above, with the Flemishparliament; while the German Rat holds deputies from Walloonia.

The main competencies remaining with the Federal State are foreign affairs, de-fence, home affairs and social welfare. In addition, the Federal State remains the maintax collector and, in consequence, the lower units are financed by the Federal State,not vice-versa. The lower House of Parliament is elected by the whole country ac-cording to proportional representation, while approximately one-third of the Senatereceives its mandate from the communal assemblies, with the majority being directlyelected. The reform also strengthened the 10 provinces and the municipalities.

6 For a history of the development of Flemish identity and the first reforms see Covell, M.(1993): “Belgium: The variability of ethnic relations,” in McGarry, J. and O’Leary B.(eds.), op. cit., pp. 275-295; Vos, L. (1996): “Nationalism, Democracy and the BelgianState” in Caplan, R. and Feffer, J. (eds.): Europe’s New Nationalism: States and Minori-ties in Conflict, New York-London: Oxford University Press, pp. 85-100.


Florian Bieber

The institutional network of Belgium has thus devolved considerable powers todifferent bodies. Consequently, there are six parliaments (not counting both chambersin the federal system) and executives in Belgium.7

1.2. BosniaThe political system in Bosnia, as in Yugoslavia as a whole before 1990, could hardlybe described as democracy, but it did possess several elements of consociationalism.The key, according to which jobs were distributed in the civil service and the govern-ment, can be seen as a forerunner of a consociational democracy. The division was1:1:1, which favoured Croats, who contributed less than 20 per cent of the population,and disadvantaged Muslims, who had over 40 per cent. In reality, Croats remainedunder-represented in many fields, in particular in the police and the army. The na-tional key was a deliberate attempt at what one would today call “affirmative action”with the aim of evening out inequalities. Some Muslims compared this system withthe national pact in Lebanon, fearing the institutionalisation of their under-representa-tion.8

The elements of consociationalism in pre-war Bosnia can be seen at the informallevel as well as in the institutions which came into existence with the elections in No-vember and December 1990. After the first free elections, the three national parties,winning an overwhelming majority, formed a grand coalition. The President of thepresidency was given to the Muslim SDA, while the Prime Minister was a Croat and aSerb became the President of Parliament – both unlike in Lebanon. The division ofpower was institutionally set by the presidency, modelled on the Yugoslav equivalent,consisting of two Muslims, two Serbs and two Croats, as well as a member of othernations. For the latter category, a member of the SDA, Ejup Ganić, was elected as a“Yugoslav.” Finally, all three nations were represented in the cabinet.

The new Bosnian Parliament had two chambers, instead of the previous three: thechamber of citizens (Vijece Gradanstvo, 130 deputies); and the chamber of communes(Vijece Opeina, 110 deputies). In the period following the elections, the Parliamentwas largely deprived of its power as the three ruling parties bypassed it, negotiatingand taking decisions outside of it.

As the coalition could not agree on a new Constitution, the old socialist one re-mained in force.9 Already before the elections, the first article of the Constitution de-termined Bosnia to be:

7 Delpérée, F (1995): “Le fédéralisme sauvera-t-il la nation belge?” in Rupnik, J. (ed.): LeDéchirement des Nations, Paris: Editions du Seuil, pp. 123-137; Roessingh, M (1996):Ethnonationalism and Political Systems in Europe: A State of Tension, Amsterdam: Am-sterdam University Press, pp. 184-186.

8 Reuter, J (1992): “Die politische Entwicklung in Bosnien-Herzegowina,” in Südosteur-opa 41, No. 11-12, p. 670.

9 On the coalition and institutional arrangement see Burg, Steve L (1997): “Bosnia Herze-govina; a case of failed democratization,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.):Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe, Cambridge andNew York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 122-141.



A democratic sovereign state of equal citizens, the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Mus-lims, Serbs, Croats, and the members of other nations and nationalities living within it.10

Despite the consociational features of Bosnia, the state institution functionedproperly for only a brief period of time before the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)withdrew from the coalition, established the Republika Srpska and engaged in con-quering and the ethnic cleansing of large parts of Bosnia, followed soon after by theCroatian Democratic Community (HDZ), with its establishment of Herceg-Bosna inHerzegovina. The central state authorities collapsed as a consequence and becamelargely dominated by the SDA.

It was only the Dayton Accords that re-established Bosnia, as a state exercisingcontrol over its whole territory, albeit with very limited competencies. The new Bos-nian state also incorporates elements of consociational democracy. The tradition ofthe presidency is continued under the Dayton Constitution, consisting as it does ofthree members, one Serb from the Republika Srpska, and one Bosniac and one Croatfrom the Federation.11 Thus, not only are other minorities excluded from running forthe highest office of the country, but Serb, Bosniacs and Croats from the “wrong” –i.e. from the non-majoritarian – entity are not able to be elected to the presidency. Oneof the two chambers of Parliament, the House of Peoples, with 5 members of each ofthe three constituent nations, functions along the same lines. The other chamber, theHouse of Representatives, is, together with the constitutional court, the only organ ofthe common Bosnian state which does not predetermine both the ethnicity of its mem-bers and their entity.12 Thus, the bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the attribute “Re-public” has been cancelled in the Dayton Accords), are based on ethnic representationand co-operation between the political representatives of the three constituent nations.

In order to avoid the exclusion of one nation, the 1995 Constitution has also insti-tuted a complex system of minority veto. The two Houses of Parliament have to en-sure the support of at least one-third of each ethnic group in every decision taken. Ad-ditionally, each nation can effectively block decisions which are “destructive of a vitalinterest.” The instruments of consociational democracy, which existed previouslylargely through informal checks, have now been institutionalised to a high degree.

2. Theoretical concepts of consociational democracyThe Belgian case clearly shows that, even in democratic systems, special and verycomplex mechanisms of minority protection have to be implemented. As DonaldHorowitz points out:

Much of what passes for usual democratic rules either does nothing about ethnic exclusion oractually fosters it.13

10 Quoted from Hayden, R (1996): “Constitutional Nationalism and the Logic of the Wars inYugoslavia,” in: Problems of Post-Communism 43, No. 5, 27.

11 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Article V.12 ibid, Article IV.


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Thus the need arises to offer a concept which ensures minority representation aspart of the democratic structure. The most convincing model so far conceptionalisedis that by Arend Lijphart, based on the case of Belgium and other country studies.

In his book Democracies, Lijphart describes key elements of a consociational de-mocracy, based on empirical studies. Consociational, or consensus, democracy is asystem of government attempting to bridge different groups in states with strongcleavages. These cleavages can be of a political nature, as in inter-war Austria (Social-ists-Christian Democrats), of a religious nature, as in the Netherlands until the 1970s,or, as in most cases, of a national nature. National differences tend to be more stableand cannot be altered in the way others can, so they require more than other cleavagesa particular political system. Consociational democracies are based on societies wherethe elites of the different groups co-operate and seek coalitions beyond the numericminimum necessary for gaining power. The two most frequently-quoted cases for rel-atively successful consensus democracies are Belgium and Switzerland.14

Lijphart mentions several demographic factors which facilitate consociational de-mocracy. First of all, it is beneficial to possess a balance between the cleavage groupsin which none has an absolute majority and the groups are of comparable size. He de-velops a list of stable and unstable constellations. Belgium, according to him, is stablesince the Flemish/Walloon division is supplemented by other cleavages, such as thespiritual families and the Bruxellesois. This creates a whole matrix of different groupswhich have comparable sizes with none of them holding an absolute majority.

In Bosnia, no nation possesses an outright majority, but the absence, or rather theweakness, of other cleavages which would cut across national lines exacerbates thenational divisions, making a consociational system more difficult to succeed. Thus theoutset is much less favourable for Bosnia than it is for Belgium. However, the otherfactor in terms of population which Lijphart mentions partly points in Bosnia’s favour.He points out that consociational systems tend to be more successful in small coun-tries, since they are easier to govern and possess less complex decision-making struc-tures. He also points to the greater danger of external threats for small countries,which might have a unifying effect.15 The latter point holds true for both Belgium andBosnia, but the external threat has not helped to unify Bosnia but has rather been thekey divisive factor between the nations. Altogether, the demographic starting point forBosnia is less favourable for the establishment of a consensus democracy than in Bel-gium, but this should not exclude the applicability of the concept in principle.16

13 Horowitz D (1993): “The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict. Democracy in Divided Socie-ties,” in Journal of Democracy 4, No. 4 , p. 28.

14 For the eight criteria of consociational democracy see Lijphart, A. (1984): Democracies:Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Ha-ven-London: Yale University Press, pp. 23-32.

15 Lijphart, A (1977), op. cit., pp. 60-61, 65.16 Switzerland also has a much stronger majority, the German-speaking population, but,

over time, alternative cleavages developed to compensate for them.



2.1. Executive powersharingThe concept of sharing power is at the heart of Lijphart’s concept. It signifies govern-ments encompassing broad coalitions of several parties representing a majority of thecleavage groups. Such power-sharing can be institutionalised or it can be part of a tra-dition. In the case of Belgium, this power-sharing takes two dimensions. On the oneside, there is the constitutional regulation of the equal number of Flemish and Wal-loons in Government while, on the other, the structure of the party system (see below)require coalitions which necessarily also encompass the different “spiritual families.”

The formal division between positions in government and in Parliament furtherheightens the inflexibility of the system. In addition, it reinforces national divisionsand places national identity over competence. In the case of Bosnia, it automaticallyexcludes members of smaller minorities from being elected to high office. The Bos-nian system, by prescribing the nationality of the members of the presidency, elimi-nates the option for Bosniacs, for example, to elect a Serb, or vice-versa. This mayseem unrealistic at the moment, but it does prevent voting across national lines in thefuture.17

Lijphart instead suggests an informal means of power-sharing between the differ-ent groups, which would facilitate adjustment over time and, hopefully, the elimina-tion of such divisions at some point in the future.18 This is not to underestimate thedangers of such an informal division of power which could be observed in Bosnia be-fore the war. The three national parties divided power between themselves in the nameof their respective nation, which could hardly be seen as a stabilising development asit sidelined other, more moderate, forces.

2.2. Formal or informal separation of powersLijphart points out that a successful inclusion of different cleavage groups requires aseparation of powers within the state, especially between the executive and legisla-ture. This level of independence works both ways. The government should be able totake decisions contrary to parliamentary opinion; likewise Parliament has to be ablenot only to endorse government decisions, but also act independently. The need toform coalitions makes the government more dependent on the parliament; at the sametime, the government is more separate from the parliament as in, for example, GreatBritain. Belgium has an informal semi-separation of powers, as do the other Beneluxcountries, Germany and Scandinavia. This assures sufficient independence for bothinstitutions.

In Bosnia, this is not the case. Due to the lack of parliamentary traditions in thecountry, the powers and independence of Parliament are limited and it is frequentlyabused by the very powerful executive as a body purely to endorse governmental deci-sions. Thus, even if the parliamentary representation of minorities improved, the lack

17 Várady, T: op. cit.18 Lijphart, A (1977), op. cit., pp. 147-150; Lijphart, A (1991): “The Power-Sharing Ap-

proach,” in Joseph V. Montville (ed.): Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies,New York: Lexington Books, pp. 507ff.


Florian Bieber

of power possessed by Parliament would not truly grant them access to the decision-making processes.

2.3. Balanced bi-cameralism and minority representationA successful integration of minorities and different national groups requires specialprovisions in the parliamentary structure. The way generally recommended by Li-jphart and other authors is a system of two houses of parliament and a guaranteed mi-nority representation within these chambers. Generally, one chamber should be basedon the proportional representation of the whole country, while the other should focusmore on the representation of regions, communities or other means of the guaranteedinclusion of different groups. This bi-cameral system also implies that both houseshave substantial powers, at least over the topics of concern for the cleavage groups. InBelgium, the chambers are the Senate and the Chambre des Deputes. Both havenearly equal powers, but the Senate cannot initiate laws. The Senate has some mem-bers nominated by the assemblies of the three linguistic communities, thus ensuringminority representation.

The new Bosnian institutional structure established a bi-cameral system within thewhole state and at the level of the Bosniac-Croat Federation. The Republika Srpska,on the other hand, only possesses a uni-cameral parliament. This system does ensurethe representation of all three nations, but it pays little attention to the members of theminority nation within each of the two entities. At the institutional level, both entitiescan be seen as largely ignoring the rights of the other – non-dominant – nations.

2.4. Multi-party systemIt is better to have several parties, rather than just two. A two-party system does notrequire coalition building and thus endangers the principal idea of including as large anumber of groups as possible. Belgium has 3 large parties (Christian Democrats, Lib-erals and Socialists). Due to their internal divisions according to language groups,they are actually six large parties, while there are at least two regional parties, makingBelgium an eight-party system. Also important is that these parties together constitutea balance. If one or two dominate and the others are more or less splinter parties, thiswould not necessarily ensure minority representation.

Bosnia clearly possesses several parties, but the predominance of the three largenational parties has, until recently, prevented effective coalition building between thedifferent partners. Within the entities, the national parties have largely monopolisedpolitical life and established themselves as state parties, frequently without a clear di-vision between state and party structures. The split in the Serbian Democratic Party in1997, and the recent split with the Croatian HDZ, are indicators of the development ofa true multi-party system.

2.5. Multi-dimensional party systemOf even greater importance than the number of parties in one system is their pro-grammes. Lijphart rightfully sees a necessity for parties to possess different cleav-ages, thus preventing a party system where one cleavage (nation, language) is pre-



dominant. A one-level system tends to increase confrontation and, in the case ofethnic minorities, to degrade elections into a population census (as in Bosnia). Purelynational or ethnic divisions tend to render co-operation and coalitions more difficultthan if other cleavages continued to exit. In Belgium, the division into the three maintraditional parties – Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals – has defused manylinguistic confrontations. As a result, not all issues of parliamentary debate have be-come determined by the interests of Flaams and Walloons, but other groups (class, re-ligiosity) could co-operate outside linguistic distinction.

This could obviously also develop in Bosnia, where non-national cleavages arelargely absent at the moment. The difference in Belgium is that the trans-communalparties developed first and then accommodated the different communities. In Bosnia,as elsewhere in former Yugoslavia, the traditional parties defined themselves primarilyby national criteria. The broadening of a party from one nation to several is muchmore difficult than the history of the development in Belgium. The notable exceptionin Bosnia has been the Social Democratic parties, which have made links across na-tional and entity lines to pursue an agenda of social justice and common policy to-wards multi-nationals. The experience of war has rendered this attempt very difficult.The success of a pluralist party system in Bosnia will require the further developmentof parties cutting across national cleavages, basing their programmes on a differentagenda.19

2.6. Other elementsThe voting system is of great relevance to successful consensus democracy. Only pro-portional voting allows for the just representation of minorities. Majority voting, onthe other hand, diminishes the powers of minorities and prevents coalition-building.In Belgium, a system of proportional voting is in place, like in Bosnia. Besides thesystem itself, the threshold for small parties has to be low, allowing small minorityparties to enter parliament.

As discussed above, autonomy for minorities in areas of their interest is a key es-sence in a functioning consociational democracy. Lijphart adds a general need for de-centralisation. Bosnia has been decentralised towards the entities, but while the Re-publika Srpska remains highly centralised, the Federation, on the other hand, has beendivided into ten cantons. Thus, the creation of local and regional institutions has to co-incide with a devolution of power and the implementation of subsidiarity as a govern-ing principle.

A written constitution is necessary to guarantee minority rights and also allow ad-justments according to new negotiations. Here Lijphart mainly refers to Britain,which still does not have a written constitution. This could also be applied to Bosnia,which does have one. Lijphart, when discussing written constitutions, primarily sees a

19 On the problem of the elections after the Dayton Accords and the continuing lack of over-arching, non-national cleavages see Shoup, P (1997): “The Elections in Bosnia andHerzegovina: The End of an Illusion,” in Problems of Post-Communism 44, No. 1, pp. 3-15.


Florian Bieber

necessity for constitutionally-enshrined rights and the rule of law. In the case of Bos-nia, the Constitution of the Federal State, as well as the Constitutions of the Federa-tion and the Republika Srpska, contain many contradictions and frequently do not re-flect political practice. The lack of a rule of law and adequate minority protection inthe Constitution could be interpreted as the absence of a written constitution. Thus inBosnia, reforms leading to consensus democracy would first of all necessitate a con-stitutional system which is adhered to and which is consistent with itself.

Another key feature of consensus democracy is the minority veto over issues of itsconcern. This usually covers competencies directly affecting the groups, as well asconstitutional changes. In Belgium, all the relevant competencies already lie with thegroups themselves while, even in the Federal structure, their votes count in the Senate.Furthermore, constitutional changes require a 2/3 majority, as well as the consent ofthe communities.

3. Problems of consociational democracy

3.1. BureaucratisationA frequently-raised objection to the creation of consensus democracy and its institu-tions – several parliaments, executives and administrative units – is inefficiency andover-bureaucratisation. These phenomena certainly create grave problems. The prob-lems are partly financial as they present additional costs to the taxpayers. In addition,the great fragmentation of the competencies between different bodies also leave cer-tain fields in the hands of different and, at times, competing bodies.20 An Americanauthor, highly critical of bilingualism, describes Brussels consequently as a ‘mess’:

Mail can take more than three days to reach one side of the city from the other. Mayors fightwith regional councils, which fight with federal officials, who fight with everyone. On oneblock in the city you'll receive only Flemish cable TV. Around the corner, you'd better speakFrench. The costs of maintaining this bilingual artifice are daunting. But when I asked repre-sentatives of the Flemish, Francophone, and Federalist parties if they were concerned aboutthe country's debt, more than 140 per cent of GDP, the replies boiled down to: ‘Translators arecheaper than guns.’21

His acknowledgement of the costs of federalism being preferable to conflict standsin contradiction to his previous critique, probably because the use of ‘guns’ seems un-likely to him. During periods of great tension in Belgium this did not sound quite soabsurd.22 When examining Belgium as a case study for countries in south-eastern Eu-rope, this seems, even more, a price one should be willing to pay.

By taking just the Belgium example to conclude that consociational democracy isinefficient would be short-sighted. The problems Belgium is facing – corruption,debts and an inefficient judiciary – might, in fact, have other roots than the increase in

20 “Belgium fights the demon,” Economist, 17.4.1993, p. 51; “Belgium: fading away,”Economist, 31.10.1992, p. 52.

21 Mosier, J: “Equal but Separate,” National Review, 19.12.94, pp. 22-23.22 One has only to bear in mind Northern Ireland before the recent peace accord.



the number of institutions resulting from the constitutional reforms of the last dec-ades. A comparative empirical study of economic performance in consociational sys-tems and less embracing governments has actually shown that the first system is moresuccessful:

The inclusive and accommodative nature of consensual constitutional structures tends to pro-duce more peaceful industrial relations than exclusive and majoritarian systems. Overall, thisarticle provides evidence that macroeconomic outcomes and industrial disputes vary system-atically with the type of consensual and majoritarian type of democracy.23

Therefore, the frequently-voiced argument that the problems of the political sys-tem in Belgium are directly related to its decentralisation cannot be maintained.

In a country like Bosnia, which has been struggling with inefficient administrationfor decades, consensus democracy certainly poses a particular challenge. Neverthe-less, in the case of Bosnia a devolution of powers could actually render the bureauc-racy more efficient. In Western Europe, the popularity of the term “subsidiarity” re-flects the recognition that decision-making is more efficient at the lower levels ofadministration. If this succeeds, there is no reason why consensus democracy, coupledwith a devolution of powers in Bosnia, should not make administration more efficientand co-operative for all its citizens.

3.2. SegregationThe territorial and cultural division of the different communities has not only reducedtensions between the groups, but has also greatly diminished the contact between theFlemish and Walloons. A significant example is the case of the bilingual Universityof Leuven. The Flemish students resented what they considered the privileged treat-ment of French at this prestigious university in the Flemish city of Leuven. Further-more, they feared an increasing influence of the French language in Flanders. This ledto violent protests in 1968 against the French-speaking students and faculty at theUniversity. The consequence was a division of the University and the move of theFrench University to Louvain-La-Neuve, a newly created university town close toBrussels. Not only the division of the library – every second book went to the newuniversity – reflects the extremes of the divisions.

The rights of each group might be better protected through separation, but it alsosegregates both sides and decreases interactions, between academics for example. Thecrisis surrounding Louvain also caused the split of the Socialist, Liberal and ChristianSocial parties in the subsequent decade.24

23 Crepaz, M (1996): “Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy, Political Institutions andTheir Impact on Macroeconomic Performance and Industrial Disputes,” in ComparativePolitical Studies 29, No. 1, pp. 4-25.

24 James, B: “In Belgium, Leuven-Louvain Split Speaks Loud,” International Herald Trib-une, 11.11.1997, p. 6; Covell, M (1993), op. cit., p. 286; Roessingh, M (1996), op. cit.,pp. 170-171.


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For different reasons, both groups – Walloons and Flemish – preferred the estab-lishment of uni-lingual regions rather than enforced bilingualism in the whole coun-try, as was the case in Flanders before the 1930s and as it is in the federal governmentand Brussels. The Flemish in particular saw bilingualism as an instrument of Frenchlanguage dominance. This argument may hold true, but the lack of trans-communitycommunication has eliminated many contacts and made it increasingly difficult forthose attempting to cross linguistic/national borders.

The separation of institutions can lead to a similar development as in Bosnia,where the governmental devolution of power to the communities has greatly reducedthe influence of those whose prime identification lies with the state and not with thecommunities. Even the elaborate separation of communities and regions in Belgiumcould not avoid that French speakers in Flanders and Dutch speakers in Walloonia arediscriminated against by the administration and have to learn the language of the othergroup in order to communicate with the branches of local government. By separatingregions and communities more clearly, i.e. by allowing the official usage of the otherlanguage in the whole country, this could have been avoided. When drawing the les-sons of Belgium for other countries, this problem has to be borne in mind. Any at-tempt to grant any community far-reaching rights should not lead to the voluntary seg-regation of the population, except for those who attempt the most to bridge thedifferences.

3.3. Blocked reform and decision-making

Lijphart concedes that consociationalism is not necessarily successful:

...[T]he Lebanese case shows that consociational devices at best do not have a great deal ofpotency in building legitimacy and stability. At worst, they may actually have exacerbated di-visions and hastened the collapse.25

As consociational democracies have to be more highly regulated than regular de-mocracies, there is a danger of rendering the system immobile and inflexible. Newelites are easily prevented from entering the political system and reforms are delayed.

As all groups possess a veto over key issues, the system can also be deadlockedand the unity of the state endangered.26 In Bosnia, this was the case with the referen-dum for independence from Yugoslavia, which was boycotted by the SDS, leading toa majority of Serbs not participating in the vote. A mutual veto is only acceptablewhen the state possesses institutions to seek compromises and to avoid situations inwhich such a veto can effectively block the functioning of the state. Such a system canbe achieved only when all groups and their representatives are fundamentally ready toseek compromise.

25 Lijphart, A (1977), op. cit., p. 233.26 ibid, p. 227.



4. Territorial versus cultural autonomyThe key element of the Belgian reforms is the dual tracks of cultural and territorial au-tonomy which supplement simple power-sharing at the federal level. Belgium hadcultural autonomy before federalism. The constitutional reform of 1970 initiated cul-tural councils made up in accordance with the membership of the two Houses of Par-liament. Their power extended to culture and education. Before the reforms of 1993,Belgium was characterised as a “communal state.” Belgium is a particular case sincethe communal and territorial institutions overlap greatly and the need for such a divi-sion is not obvious at first sight. It is a reflection of a long tradition of cultural auton-omy and the utilisation of diverse concepts of autonomy as a means to problem-solv-ing, thus diffusing complex issues such as Brussels.

It is also a reflection of the different concepts of nationhood in Belgium. Belgiumwas founded by popular uprising against the Netherlands, thus providing for a rudi-mentary national movement prior to the establishment of a nation state, like in Ger-many or in most central and east European countries. On the other hand, the greatpowers set the borders and gave the current state its shape. Within these borders, na-tionhood truly developed. This evolution of nation compares rather to the West Euro-pean model, as in France, England or the United States. Differences between theFlemish and Walloons have been present since the outset, but Belgium has managedto create a feeling of separateness of Walloons from France and the Flaams from theNetherlands. It is doubtful whether Belgium created one Belgian nation; instead, it atleast managed to create two separate nations: Walloons and Flemish. There are hopesfor a civic bilingual nationalism developing in Brussels, based on the European andmetropolitan character of the city.27

Cultural autonomy was used as a conflict-solving tool in Belgium before territo-rial autonomy was implemented. There are several advantages to cultural autonomy: itreduces the fears of the dominant groups (the Walloons in the Belgian case) of separa-tism, since cultural autonomy cannot lead to secession as easily as territorial auton-omy. Furthermore, a cultural autonomy of the different groups ensures co-existenceon the same territory, which manages to achieve an accommodation of communitiesin areas of high mixture, such as Brussels. Finally, it can offer rights to groups in areaswhere it would be highly unlikely for them ever to be able to achieve territorial auton-omy.

These factors particularly apply to Bosnia. The principle of territorial autonomywas misused during the war to expel the population of other national groups, but cul-tural autonomy might serve as a tool to ensure the rights of the national groups, whileat the same time preserving co-existence in the same city or village. Cultural auton-omy has been neglected in the Dayton Agreement as a tool for ensuring inter-ethnicco-operation. The Constitution guarantees a wide range of human and individualrights, but it makes no mention of the contentious rights in Bosnia: the cultural andpolitical rights of groups. The solution of the Dayton arrangement presupposes ethnic

27 Roessingh, M (1996), op. cit., pp. 144-147, 187-190.


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predominance (or even ethnic homogeneity) within each entity, thus rendering unnec-essary additional rights for the groups. This choice, a reflection of the political andmilitary realities at the time the agreement was negotiated, assures no rights beyondtheir individual human rights to refugees seeking to return to their respective homes inentities in which they are not in the majority. Furthermore, other groups in Bosnia,such as Roma or Jews, are deprived of any group rights and cannot even seek repre-sentation of their interests within either of the two ethnically-defined entities.28

Cultural autonomy has been most successfully implemented in non-east Europeancountries (Belgium, Finland and Switzerland), but the concept was developed duringthe Hapsburg Monarchy by predominantly socialist intellectuals, such as Karl Rennerand Otto Bauer. This non-territorial autonomy also draws heavily on the Millet systemof the Ottoman Empire. In this region of Europe, national diversity was much higherand less geographically delimited as in other parts of the continent, making non-terri-torial considerations highly desirable. Consequently, this concept is in no way alien toBosnia.29

The non-territorial approach to autonomy can be better targeted towards minori-ties in Bosnia, but minorities in times of mistreatment primarily opt out of territorialautonomy to protect their rights. Tibor Várady sees territorial autonomy as essential:

Territorial autonomy is also an indispensable prerequisite if one wants to give minorities atleast some control over their own lives and destinies. The idea of “cantonisation” has beenpresent since the very beginnings of the Yugoslav crisis, it poses no threat to state sovereignty,yet it allows a more just and efficient allocation of decision-making competencies.30

Thus even when cultural autonomy might be potentially a more successful ap-proach, territorial autonomy remains a powerful tool at a time of low inter-communaltrust.

5. Belgium as an example for Bosnia?The previous sections have shown that Belgium has established a unique system ofaccommodating different national/linguistic groups into its system. It fits into the con-ceptual framework of consociational democracy, which provides a theoretical frame-work enabling the transfer of this system to other countries. Despite the problems tobe encountered in Belgium, the system has generally been successful enough to envis-

28 Várady, T, op. cit.29 Hanf, T (1991): “Konfliktminderung durch Kulturautonomie. Karl Renners Beitrag zur

Frage der Konflikt-regelung in multi-ethnischen Staaten,” in Erich Fröschl, Maria Mesnerand Uri Ra’anan (eds.): Staat und Nation in multi-ethnischen Gesellschaften, Wien: Pas-sagen Verlag, p. 63-68; Coakley, J (1994): “Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Con-flict: The Strategy of Non-territorial Autonomy,” in International Political Science Re-view 15, No. 3, pp. 298-302.

30 Várady, T (1994): “Vojvodina – The Predicament of Minorities and Possible Solutions,”paper submitted to the Helsinki Commission, 27.4.1994.



age its “export” to Bosnia. Despite the internal criticism of the Belgian model, it hasbeen consulted already by outsiders:

When I asked a professor from the Federalist party, which takes a middle-of-the-road posi-tion, if he thought Belgium's method for dealing with the different ethnic/linguistic groupsshould be used as a model for a new united Europe, he nearly choked to death on his cr-oissant. But he noted that Israel has asked the Belgian government for help in managing di-versity on the West Bank.31

Arend Lijphart also examines the possibility of exporting the Belgian model andmentions a few possible problems. His analysis was made in 1977, long before thecurrent reforms, but his conclusions still stand today. His main point lies in the factthat a large segment of the co-operation between the communal elites is extra-consti-tutional and takes place outside existing institutions. This co-operation is not the re-sult of constitutional arrangements but is instead the product of the long-lasting tradi-tion of co-operation and democracy in Belgium. This phenomenon can be studied andattempted elsewhere, but it cannot be implemented from above, it takes time to de-velop and is largely beyond the reach of institution-building. There is even a danger inattempting to institutionalise such an informal network elsewhere. The threat lies inthe fact that the characteristics of the Belgian system developed as a result of a multi-tude of factors which cannot necessarily be found elsewhere. Such an institutionalisa-tion could possibly reduce the amount of elite co-operation, since it does not respectthe local prerequisites.

Lijphart mentions a different problem when exporting the Belgian system of gov-ernment. The monarch holds more constitutional powers than he traditionally uses.He can, for example, dismiss the Prime Minister, a right he is expected not to use.This, again, reflects the close combination of tradition and institutions. If a similar po-sition is granted to a monarch or president elsewhere, as was done in the former Bel-gian colonies (Congo, Burundi), this institution lends itself to autocratic rule.32 Thisshows that consociational institutions can only be meaningful if they stand in connec-tion with the heritage of the country.

The current problems with minority rights in Bosnia and the general distrust be-tween the nations living within the country makes the Belgian model and the conceptof consociational democracy seem hard to implement, but it is nevertheless importantto emphasise the culture of co-operation that does exist in Bosnia.

When applying the Belgium system to Bosnia, one has to separate the institutionalfeatures of this system from the informal Belgian agreements and traditions, whichwould need to be fostered at the same time as new institutions are being built in Bos-nia. The key institutional element, to recall, is the combination of cultural and territo-rial autonomy. Cultural autonomy was based on groups, while the federal structuresare purely regional and not exclusive to one group. The federal government, at the

31 Mosier, J (1994): “Equal but Separate,” National Review, 19.12.94, pp. 22-23.32 Lijphart, A (1977), op. cit., pp. 209-210.


Florian Bieber

same time, is also required to incorporate the groups’ interests. This establishes a sys-tem of checks and balances, prohibiting any single group from imposing its pro-gramme on others. For Bosnia, this would mean the creation of communal councils ofall the minorities with competencies in cultural and educational matters.

As for the informal elements of the Belgian experience, which are much more dif-ficult to transplant to Bosnia, three points stand out. First of all, the actors have to at-tempt to enter the political process and to articulate their programmes within the exist-ing institutional framework. The willingness to integrate a minority discourse into themainstream does not only require a readiness amongst the minority, but also amongstthe majority to allow the minority voice be heard in the existing institutions. In Bel-gium, the autonomist movement, by virtue of the democratic system and proportionalvoting, encountered no difficulties in entering the political areas. Instead, the dangerlay in these groups refusing to act within the institutions. In Bosnia, that danger is thereverse: of the majority not allowing minorities to enter the institutions, thus forcingthem to seek external means of expressing their programmes.

Closely combined with this point is the integration of national programmes withother mainstream political issues. The fall of regional parties in Belgium was a conse-quence of the “Big Three” taking up an issue and making it their own. This is obvi-ously feasible in cases such as Belgium, where the other cleavages have remainedstrong. In Bosnia, the parties have to develop programmes which focus less on na-tional differences and rather on alternative approaches to the economy, social affairs,education and other matters.

Finally, in Belgium regionalisation and autonomy have, rather by default than byvirtue, taken the path of a process and not of the attempt to achieve a single compre-hensive solution. Even after the most far-reaching reforms so far, in 1993, new negoti-ations are planned for 1999. The definition of minority and its inherent interests areever-changing. Just as much as nation-building is never finished, the relationship be-tween the state and its citizens, especially members of minorities, has to change andevolve over time. It would be misleading to strive for a solution which aimed at set-tling an issue once and for all. Instead, mechanisms have to be developed which allowfor permanent evolution and constant adjustment.

Altogether autonomy, especially non-territorial self-government, in combinationwith consociational democracy, offers the most promising perspectives for transform-ing Bosnia into a country in which the three nations can peacefully live together. Torecall Horowitz, hoping that democratisation in Bosnia can alone provide for suffi-cient rights for minorities is short-sighted.33 But, just as democracy cannot suffice,limiting one’s scope to national rights alone, without democracy and the rule of law,will hardly deliver results that are satisfactory. Only the institutional combination ofboth elements will ensure the co-existence of the three nations in Bosnia.

33 Horowitz, D (1993), op. cit., pp. 28-31.


florian bieber, consociationalism—prerequisite or hurdle for democratization in bosnia?

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