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FMFRP 12-31

Marine Corps Aviation:Amphibious Warfare, 1940

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 140 123100 00

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380-0001

11 June 1990

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-31, MarineCorps Aviu[ion: Amphibious Warfare, 1940, ispublished to ensure theretention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended[o become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals.FMFRPs in the 12 series are a special category: reprints of historicalworks which are not available elsewhere.

2. SCOPE

This reference publication was written in 1940 at Headquarters, U.S.Marine Corps. It was approved for use as a text within the Marine Corpsschools. The purpose of the volume was to provide a tentative doctrinefor the employment of aviation units in amphibious operations to beu>ed primarily as a reference for staff and students of the Marine Corps.The text deals specifically with the employment of aviation in the sup-port of landing operations and in the defense of advanced bases. Thepublication is an excellent source of what the status of airpower inamphibious operations was in 1940. This is an excellent resource pub-lication.

3. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

M. P. SULLIVANMajor General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commander for WarfightingMarine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

DISTRIBUTION: 14012310000

INTRODUCTION

The purposeof thistext istoprovicle otentmtire doctrine for the employment ofavixt ion units in amphibious operations,to be usecl primarily as n reference fol’staff ancl stuclents of the Mmne Corpsschools.

This text cleals specifically with the enl-ploy;nent of aviation in tbe support oflanckg operations ancl the clefense ofaclwmcecl bases.

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.

MARINE CORPS AVIATIOX

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

.

T.’G5LE OP CONTE>-TS

P.U’,TOrm

AVIATION 1>- L.$NDING OPER.\TIOXSPagO

(M:]ptpr I, General Considerations ____________________________________3–13Swriou 1. Intrfjtluctimk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .._ 3

2, Compositio]l nn(l Strength of the .Iir For(L>________________ 43. Movenleut to [he lheiltcu of’Ol)eu:lti,)lls-------------------,. 84 Air B;ISes_______________________________________________ 105. Responsil)ility for .Iir S~ll]lJ(jrt___________________________ 136. Air Rx’omm i+an(e w SllrI)rise________–___________–_____ 15

Chapter 11. Preliminary Air operations ----------------------------- 16-?2Section 1. (+el]er:ll_________________________________________________ 16

2. llecl)ll]ltli>s~lllce__________________________________________ 17J. Reduction of H(,>tile Det’wses--------------------------- 21

Chapter III. .Iir Support During Debarkation ------------------------ 23–28section 1. Gellt,r:ll Figl]r(,r ~lll)I~(lrt_-..____ ._. _... _... - . . .----------- ~?

2. .>ir .lttil CIi IIf S{lrf[)ce objective+------------------------- 225::, T:lctictll l/{c:{tlli:]i..tlLlce--__----_ .-._ . . . . . .._--. _________ 2s

Chapter IV. .Iir Sopport During Ship-to-Shore I1OTemend------------- X%XS+,cti(]u 1. I.-igllter Stll)I) rr-__-– -–––––– .––––. .–– . . . . . ..______ . ..– –._ 29

2. .>ir I<et.t)~l[\t]i..:illt.e. _ . . . .._. _... _._. _._ . . _______________ 31. . . ..:3. B:ltt, e lI]>.l{,ll ------------------------------------------- ..,,>.,”

4, Sp:,{.i;,l ~o],,l):]r ]Ii..i, )t\s _________________________________ 35Chnpter Y. .$ir Support During the .Idvance Inland . . . . . . . ..--. . . . . . . . 3!3-40

.+VI.ITION 1>- DEFEN-SE OF .$Df-.$X-CED BASES

Chapwr VI. General Considerations .-.. _.-. ----- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43-53Section 1. Intr(xl(tctiotl _________________ --------------------------- 43

2. Comlwsiti(m :~r](lUr;anizntioli ~~t’il)e .Lir Force.–––. .-. ____ 45:3. I{wpollxil)ility for .Iir Defense. __-_... -------------------- 494. .~irtlrolue I:~fLttir~,lll(,llts_. ___. .__. ------------------------ 50.7. C"c)l]]]kl\ltiicati#)ll------------------------------------------- 53

Chapter \-II. Air Operations During the Reconnaissance Phase ---------- 34-53Swtiou 1. Str~ltwical ltt'c(,]lllniss:lllcc'------------------------------ 54

‘2 T:ictic:ll 11(.~!)tll):li.>al)c[’---... _.- . . . . . . . . . . ..–--. -.-... __ ~:-.3. Fighter S{IIJIJ,)rr. - . . . . ..--- . .._ . . . . . .._ . . .._-__ ._.. ______ 584. Di-lwitit)u uf tlw Air Strikiilu Ft)rce-.. ---------- —----- 59

Chapter VIII. Air Operations During Alert Phase..- . . ----------- ..- 60-6SSection 1, Rec,)l)ll:lis.;il)(e 31i+siolis --------------------------------- 60

0 OffensiYe Coud):u 31is>ifl[ls_______________________________ 63-.3, Figl]ter Di,[~,)sitil,~ls_____________________________________ 66

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VIII

L’ageChapter IX. Air Operations During Final Defense Phase -------------- 6$75

~e~ri,)[] 1. (~eL~Pr:,l_________________________________________________ b~~, Recon]missancc lIissions _________________________________ 703. Fighter sLlpport_________________________________________ 724. Air .Ittaclr of Surface C)hjcvYi\-es_________________________ i-l

APP12XD1CES

Appendix.\. Types of .4viation Orders _________________________________ 7!I–I):;Purpose aml Scope________________________________________________ 79General Fornls ____________________________________________________wSample Or[lers____________________________________________________ M

Appendix B. Characteristics of Aerial Bombs ________________________ !14-112Purpose of -k~)pel}dix______________________________________________Classes of Bombs ------------------ --__ ---______ —_________________Demohrlon Bt~n]bs-------------------------------------------------. .

.>rmor Piercing Bonlt]s--------------------------------------------I’ragrnenratiou BonIbs_____________________________________________Chemiccd Boulbs--------------------------------------------------Practice BUnIIJs___________________________________________________Parachute Type BoIIIhs____________________________________________Xeecl of Diflerent Size Demolition Bombs_____–_____________________Tactical Principles in Selection of Bon]bs ___________________________Effectiveness of Demolition Bombs Against Specified C)bjectiYes

(table l)-------------------------------------------------------Bon]b Craters itables 2ancl 3)-------------------------------------Depth of Water Peuetratiou (toble 4)------------------------------Blast EtYecton Reinforced Concrete (tnble 3)-------------------------Data Relative to Effectiveness of Demolition Bombs in Operations

Against Personnel (tables 6and 7)-------------------------------Summary (table S)------------------------------------------------

Conclusion -----------------------------------------------------------

!1494949{9697!3<s9$

!J9:,~

99104106106

107109111

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MARIXE CORPS AYI.ITIONT

A31PHIBIOUS W.4RF.ARE

PART OiYE

Aj-I.ATION IN LASDING

OPERATIONS

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PART OXE

AVIATION IN LANDING OPERATIONS

Chapter I—GENERAL COXSIDERATIONS

Section 1. Introduction.2. ~oullwsitio]~ond ~trw~rll of the Air Force.3. Moreme!l[ to the TI]enter of Olwr:ltions4, .kir Bnses.

5. Re>pull>ibility for Air Su~~[Jort.6, .\ir Rwonuai,s>al)ce w. Surprise.

SECTION1

1. Introduction.—Air operations in support of troop landingsfollow gener:dly the principles previously outlined in the tlctics flncltechnique of [he separate classes of ml-iation. Such differences asexist are col]cerned nlaillll- with the det:lils of operating from car-riers or temporary ad~anced air bases. mn~lwith the special type ofair support required in the actual seizure of a bexchheacl. The prin-ciples of air warfare are not changecl: they are merely adapted torrieet special situations. Obl-iously. gre:lter difhculty of coordinationwill exist by reason of the limitations impused by carrier operations,or by the necessity of opemting from distant land bases. In eithercase the air units c:]n employ only part of their inherent endurancefor tactical purposes, the remzincler being necessarily expencled inthe launching. rendez~ous. concentration, ancl individual lanclings ofcarrier airplanes? and in covering the overwater clistances to andfrom objectives in the case of distant shore-based units. To over-come these hnndicaps the attacking air force must have an initialnumerical superiority great. enough to permit partial concentrationsto be effective against the clefencler’s entire air strength. The prob-lem of transporting air units to the scene of operations in such amanner as to permit their effective use upon arrival may well be a.major task: particularly if the distances inl-olvecl are beyond flyingrango of the aircraft, ancl no carriers are. available. The problemsof transportation and prol-ision of aclequate air bases will Lwuallytranscend any operational difficulties contemplated-given properbases, aviation will be able to furnish support for the landing. Onceashore with airdromes established within the beachhead, air opera-tions become comparatively simplified, tie~erting to the normal prac-tices of land warfare.

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COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH OF THE :MR FORCEPtrlgraph

Genert~l------------------------------------------------------------ ___ 2 -Fightiag U[lits-------------------------------------------------------- :3Attack .kvit~tiul1------------------------------------------------------- 4Reconn:lissfince Unir. . .._. .-____ --.-- .- . . _____________________________ .?B()lnbers ______________________________________________________________ 6Utility AJ-i:lti()l). .--- . . . ..-___ ._.. --.. _________________________________ 7Sllmmary of Strellgrl) ------------------------------------------------- s

2. General.—.ln air force chargwl with the responsibility of slIp-porting a landing sho[lltl colnprise largely tho>e classes of aviationwhich are best adapted to gaining. lllilillt :Iilling. and exploiting airsuperiority. It m[lst be particularly strong in combat aviation, witha preponderance of fighting ancl attack Imits, in orcler to nelltra]izethe hostile air menace and effecti~-ely redllce the enemy’s beachdefenses.

3. Fighter Units.—.$ strong force of figl~rer units sl~ould be thefirst consicleration, e~en though such provision is at the expense ofother types. .\ir superiority over the transport, arel is an absoluteessential before troops can be delxwlcecl: the ship-to-shore movementin Sma]l boats requires adequate air support if the troops are to renchtheir object ives. Such x concentration of highly ndl~erable targets asnecessarily ctttends a landing operation will in~-nriably invite aviolent reaction from enemy aviation, ancl unless fidequate friencllyfighter units we ~milable in the air to intercept such attacks thelanding scheclule will be badly disrupted and serious casualties in-curred, Fighting aviation is the only effective clefense against thishostile air menace. Troop antiaircraft discipline will avail littleagainst boat strafing airplanes; nor will such antiaircraft artilleryand machine-gun fire as can normally be brought to benr from thetransport group serve to deflect. a cleterminecl dive-bombing attack.To ensure a successful clebarlmtion tincl lancling, enemy air units musthave been previously clestroyed, or fighter support over the transportand beach areas must, effectively cleny these ctreas to enemy airplanesIn either event, fighting ariatio~l nl{lst be employecl en masse; to so .employ it implies that it must be avail~ble. ‘Therefore, the provisionof aclequate fighter strength should be giren first priority. A groupof four squadrons is considered the minimum necessary for a majorlanding operation; more vi-ill be often necessary when operating fromcarriers or clistant kmcl bases.

4. Attack Aviation.-Attnck aviation is second only in importanceto fighters. For offensire operations against hostile air bmes, anti-aircraft installations, troop concentrations! ancl particularly againstbeach defenses, attack aviation is an extremelj- formidable and effec-

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ti~-e WWIX)lL. Ill additio~~ to tllow targets normally assigned thisc1:]>5of avi:ltion. tile teclllli(~(le of l:lll(ling operations requires thatattack (mits be eml)l{)yed to >tl”afe tile lXWCI1clefelwes ahead of thead~ancillg boat JYareS~lllrillg tile period Iwtjveell the lifting of navalg(~lltire :~l~cltl~e act~ml I:}])dil)g of the troops. .$ series oi strafing

attacks l~ill be l~ecew:ilr to prolwrly till in this time gap in thesu[)portillg tires whed(lle. each att~lck requiring at least one divisionof airpla]~es per landing beach. Tl]e required llmuber of attacksqu~~drons to be lw1(l in re+erve t’or beac!l straling tasks should bedetermil]ed ml this b:~sis. (’(lllsideri]lg the air force and counter airforce nlissions which may be previously or currently flow-n by the~tt:]~li group. a]~d tile comequent losses expected prior to D dayoperations. tl~e initial strength in attack units should be at leasttwice tlmt required for beach strafing missions. While other typesof combat al-iation might be used in an emergency for beach strafing,such airpIanes hal-e only approximately one third of the combatefficiency against attack objectives ns C1Othe regular attack units, andwould require three times the force with col~sequent ticlclitional lossesfrom ground fire. Obviously such substitution shoulcl never bep]anned when the composition of the air force is being cletermined.A group of three or four attack squndrons is considered an appro-priate force forma jorlalldillg operations.

5. Reconnaissance Units.—(a) Reconnaissance aviation shotdclbe provided i]] s\d3icientstrength for the nomml reconnaissal~ce andbattle missions incident to the landing ancl subsequent, operationsashore,. Consicleration shoulc~ be given to the possibility of employ-ing naval patrol units a]lcl carrier base,l scouts for ~ll~lcll of t]le

initial clistant reco]~lmissance: and to the utilization of battleship anclcruiser obserwtion airplanes for spotting nawl gunfire. If SLIChnawlu nits are avzilable~ the number of Marine reconnaissance squadr-ons might posibly be reduced in fa~or of additional combat ~via-tion. In an~- event, it is considered ~clvisable that all tacticalreconnaissance and battle missions in direct support of the lanclingbe performed by Marine reconnaismnce sq~~aclrons,and this should bethe minimum basis for determining the initial strength ancl numberof units to be inclucled in the air force. It should be borne in minctthat a small reconnaissance unit free to operate cml secure a greatcleal of information, mhile a much larger force, inadequately pro-tected by combat zviation: may be mmble to accomplish its missionin the face of hostile air opposition. Reconnaissance units S11OU1C1becarefully balanced with combat a~iation. ancl not inclucled in the airforce merely because they fire available,

(b) Past exl)eliellcel l:~ssllol~-]~t}l:~t oneobsem-ation sq:mclron canprovide the necessal’y tactical reconnaissance ancl battle missions for

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a force the size of an fir!ny di~-isif~n,pcw~-idwlatleqll:lte .gener:ll fightersupport is available> :lnd IIo conll}:~t mi>siolls will lx required of theobservation squ:ldroll. Tile ])unlber of l’ec(]ll~~:~is>:~llc’eLlll(llmttle mis-sions required by the Fleet l[ari]le IJorce. or a niajou sllbdivisionthereof> Whi]e engaged in :L ]Xlldillg olwmtion nuly be gt’eatly inexcess of those rcqllired ot’ :111obwrrati(~ll xiua(lroll Ollerati]lg overa division front on land. lf the Force lon(ls 011L1si]lgle beach, or t}vosmall contiguol~s bC:LC]\eS.one sqLmdrcIIInI:Lj- be stdlicient: on theother h:Llld a SilllLllt~ll~OllSlmldi]lg 011 fl btm(l front will reqllirelllOLY!thilll One SqLl:Khllll fOL’ COILtilllLOtl>OptWUiOllS d~lt’ill~ D chLy.T’J~o squadrons should sutlice for this type of lan(lillg where IIigherunits pt’ovic]e for distnnt reconnaissa]lce ancl air force missions. J.fno higher echelon exists: ml aclclitionfil squadron lllLISt be prolricled.If the lkrine reconnaissance units must operate from clistant.bases,the number of airplanes shoLdd be comespoldingly increased. Inorcler to provicle for rensoll:lble contingencies? three reconnaissancesquachons of eighteen nirplflnes etch are coll>iderecl necessary forF]eet Marine Force operations.

6. Bombers.—The provision of M:lrine dive-bombing units willdepend LIpon the availability of naval pfltrol bombers and carrierdive-bomber sqnaclrolLs. Ifntl\-albon]bing ullitsxre arailable for theprelinlinary opemtions, 31:~rine c~i~-ebomber. l~eed be pro~-ide(~ onlyas .1 supplement for attack ariatlon clurln+: the actw~l lancling opera-tions for use against sucl~ preci~ion targets :ls a[tack avimtion cmnnoteffectiwly engage. Tl]e two dive-bontbillg s,lua(h”ons at pre~en[ in-cluded in Fleet 31arine Force al”iation w? L’OlkiCkL?Clsufficient fortl~eseslll>l>le]~~el~t:lryt>tsli.s. If. l~o\]-e~er.ll~]ll{~~-t~lsq~l:\clro]ls;~reavail-able, additional lIarine scltmclrons will be required for the importanttask of reclucing hostile defenses prior to the landing. ~-ncler sLIchconditions a bombing groLtp of four sclLmdrons n-o[Lld probably benecessx.ry for a nmjor ol-erseos opemtion.

7. Utility Atiation.-~-tilit~- tr[~llsports oftl~ela~lclplane type willbe of little use until one or more beachhencl airdromes have been estab-lishecl. Amphibizn types shoLdcl be pro~-idecl for air force rec~uire-ments. Utility aviation is classecl as an auxiliary, ancl its inclusionin the ]ancling force proper shoLdcl not be at the expense of moreimportant classes. Such units not actually requirecl for the lanc~ingS11OUIC1be loadecl for later clischarge at the bench after airclromefacilities become available.

8. Summary of Strength.—(o) The exact proportion of etchclass of al-iation included in the lir force for Llllcling operations\vill vary with conditions and expectecl hostile resistance. Types ofbases a~-~ilable. wl~etl~eraclvzl~cecl shore bases. ctirrierbtises. or both,wi]l greatly influence the composition of the fo~ce to be embarkecl.

7

Asitle from t:lctical colhi[ler:ltions. however, it is likely Ilut :~vail-ability of mlits v-ill ttlw:lys be tlw determining iactor. Substltlttionof types. while tacticxllv unsoun~l: nMY be necessary ill order toproride [he proper Ilmne;ictd strength. -

(A) The numerical superiority of the attacking air force overthe defenders must be at least three to one, preferably five to one.To nttempt a l:t]ldillg wi~ll less strengt]l illvitcs ~lefe:lt of tile ~ltt:lck-infg :~ir torte ill [let:~il, l~-itll subseqllellt f:tilurc of tile entire opern-tion. Locwl co]ltrol of tile air over the l~~~]cliny arei~ al~d geneml airsuperiority over tile theater of oper~ltiolls ~lre esselltinl to sllccess.The air force nlust be entilely competent in con~l)ositioll. etluipment,size, an(l efficiency to pro~-i~le this me:tstlre of stlpport.

8

Stxmox 3

MOVEMENT TO THE THEATER OF OPERATIONSI’(ll:lgr;lllll

By .~ir --------------------------------------------------------------- !)Embarked on C;lrriers ________________________________________________ 10.4board TransImrts_. ._. ------- ----------------------------------------- 11Commercial ShipllleIlt ------------------------------------------------- 12

9. By Air.—Airrraft should be flown to tbe tl~eater (Jt’c,peratiollsvhenerer clistance and tile sittmtion will pelmit. .kir units so trans-ported from their home bases arrire in the minimum of elap>ed timewith less haznrd of damage en routemand are rwdy for immediateaction, if necessary, npon arri~:d. This met hod presupposes ~~-ail:tblebases within the theater of operations. an(l nMy require numerousrefuelin~ bxses along the route. If sufficient territorial or friencllyforeign Iancl bases zre noc a~-ailable for tile necessary refueling stops,it might be practicable to statiol~ c:~rriers nt il~ter~als along the over-water route. The use ot’ carriers for this purpose does not neces-sarily require that airplanes of tbe reg~llar carrier group be disem-barked, as they can usually be stow-e~lbelow (Iecli, rearranged on cleck,or placecl in the air cluring tile periofl required for resen-icing theMarine squaclrons.

10. Embarked on Carriers.-Should the distance to tbe tl~enter

of operations preclude tl~e transport:~tion of ai~ units by fliuht, orif there be no suitable lanolin: fields a~-ail:lble upon arrival. it maybe necessary to transport tlw landing force nircraft aboard clrriers.This rnethocl has many :~dvantages. both from the tactical and logis-tical viewpoints. Supplies and equipmem can be c:~rried abr,ar(l forsustained operations; making tile air force in{lepende]lt of shore basesfor the initial operation-. In this manner tile ground u]li[s maybe fully supported during tile seizlwe of tile beachhead and in sul)-sequent opemtions ashore pending tbe prep:ir:~tio~~of suital)le lmnclbases.

11. Aboard Transports. —Sll~~\ll(lneitll~r of tile Precerling metbcxlsbe practicable. x11(1tl}e tactiml situation permit. airc~~ft may bepartially clisnlantle(l. wings llld control sllrfaces ligl]tly crated. fuse-lnges wmpped with \I-aterprf~of nmteli[~l and l:tshe~l do}~-ll as deckloads on transport: or (ca]g~) wsse]s. Other a~iatiol~ nlateri:ll nulybe carrie(l as cal.go in tlw holds. Tl~e l>relxlr:lti~luof a~-iation matte-rinl for such sllipnlent req~lires wrera 1 (1:1~-~time :111(1must be cnre-fully supervised by ariation Tecllllical perwnnel. Tbe time al~(lefiortreqllirecl for clelmrlmrioll will depen{l uptjli tile arail:~bility of c1OC1<Sand ligl>ters at tile unlo:ldil)g l)oint. ~“n(l?r tile most fa~orable CO1]-ditions, tile time reqllired for debalkat i~)ll,assellll)ly, an(l te$t of ail-plflne.5sl]ould not greatl:- exceed forty -t~ighr lm~lrs. .l limitetl nllnl-

‘3

ber of airplanes may be nhtde available !vitl~ill twelve hours if alandi~lg field or suitable lmrtl beach is ;I1-ailable nearl+-. ~-n(lerfavorable con(litions tr:tnsports or other navill ~essels might ser~-etemporarily as tenclers for tbe operatiol~ ot’ seaplanes or amphibianscarried abuar(l. The transportation of air anits partially disassenl-bleclll:ls obviotls ]llilit:lry sl~ortcoInillgs, allclisgeller:~lly t’easiblp ol~l>-wlwre supporting ctrrier-bnwd a~-i:ttion will be o~-ail:lble for prelim-inary air operations.

12. Commercial Shipment. —.lir1]1anes (lestined for orerseasshipment, when tllltcco]ll~)[ll~ie(l by a~intion persomlel. sl~ould becrated and stowed abonr(l sl~ip in the usu:ll commercial nlanner.Commercial shipment is tile least clesirable method when airplanest~re to be placed in operation immedi:~tely upon arrid~ since un-fa~orable conditions at the port of debarkatiol~ may ent:lil muchdelay in mlloa(ling and :~ssen~bly. Under the best conditions sever:d

days would be required to place the air units in operating condition.Obviously this method of shipn~ent should be restricted to replace-ment spares. or to the stocking of an aclvanced nir base for contem-plated future operatio]ls. It can be usecl only when the port ofdebarkation is reasonably secure from enemy action.

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SECTIOX-4

11

1 may not permit the di~ersion of carriers for the sllpport of landingoperations of secondary inlport:lnce. 111the secol~(l place. c:~rriers :ue

1 extremel~ vulnerable to attack from hostile slwface cratt and sllore-basecl a~lation. N-awl conunanclers are properly rellwtallt to riskthese vessels awny from Fleet protection. especially when within easybombing range of l~ostile shore-basecl air ul~its. Should a carrier. orcarrier clivisioll, assigned to support a lancling be effectively attackecl

I prior to or clurillgthe nctmll l:ulding, it is wry probable that a con-1- siderable percentage of the attacker’s aircratt would be immediatelyI destroyed. or at least, lwntralized, thus changing the b:llallce of air

power materially. L-nless almiliary snore bnses are within operatingrac]ius, major casualtie.~to one or more of tile :~ttacker’s carriers mightwell cause abandolmlellt Of t]le l:lll~ling. It can be readily seen thatdependence LIponcarrier-based aviation alone for the support of ltincl-illgoper~ltiolls isgellertllly unsouncl practice. and that whenever pOS-

sible supporting sl~ore bases shoLdcl be estnblishecl and used by thamajor part. of the attacking air force.

15. Tender Bases.—For opemtions from sheltered waters. certlintypes of Marine aircraft can be equipped with floats Incl operated asse:lplanes. Reconnaissance and horizontal bombing units so equippedmight be employecl in certain situations to wpplemellt lancl- or carrier-based aviatio]l. Aircraft teilclers. or other suitnble vessels, COLddbe.emplo>ed as [loatiug ba>es in the operation of s1lc1lunits: and it isconceivable tlmt tile possibility of employily tel~der-basecl air unitsmayl~ave to be considered in the plans for a l~~l~clil~gol]er:itioll. Floatseaplanes. l~owever. are generally inferior in performance to lancl-planesof dle sallletyl>e. :lll(ltellcler-btise(~ tlllits reqtlirelllore time forreserricing between flights. l~”eighec-1agaimt these disadvantages isthe conlparative ease of prol-icling suitable lancling facilities for sea-pl~nes. Generally speaking, tencler-basecl seaplane units are to beconsidered only as a supplement to the Iancl-basecl air force: to beemployecl in those localities where lancling fielcls cannot be pro~-iclecl.

16. Advanced Air Bases Ashore.— (a) When time permits, andsuitable terrain is available within operating raclius: air-base facilitiesshoLdcl be set up ashore prior to the initiation of actual operationsagainst a clefenclecl object i~-e. ‘Ile establishment of sLlcha base has thefollowing important acl~antages:

1. Makes possible the initial employment of all aviation with theexpeclition, inducting aircraft which hare been shippecl knocked clownin cargo vessels.

2. Facilitates a cletailed and intensiye reconnaissance of the enemyclefellses, and favors a tlloroL@ ancl well-planned series of offensiveair operations designed to recluce these clefenses: without inclwringthe risks inciclent to carrier operations.

3. Enables the Marine :~ir units to utilize their maximum strengthfor the support of the landing tltt~l~li.relieving to the wne extentnaval carrier-biased units for normal Fleet missions.

4.. .M’orcls opportunity for concealment and dispersion of aircrafton the ground.

(b) Supporting air b:lses should preferably be located within onehour% flight of the objective, in orcler to permit airplanes of limitedenchwmce~ such xs fighters: to oper~te for a reasonable time in thecombat area. For the final sta:es of the lancling it is very clesirableto have a base of some sort not more than fifty miles clistant. Ifthis be impracticable carriers S11OU1CIbe made zvailable for reservic-ing and renrming in order tlmt continuous air support may beproviclecl.

(c) The physiccd characteristics of hmd bases for landing forceair units are similar in most respects to those requirecl for normalland warfare. The air base proper may, and normally does, includen number of separate airdromes, or landing fielcls, so clispersecl as topermit proper concealment of nircraft at rest. Hangars and otherlarge structures are not contemplated for such air bases; stlpply anclmaintenance facilities, ancl the personnel; will usually be housecl intemporary structures or under canvas. The actual lancling fields orrunways, however, must be of substantial constriction to meet therequirements of constant operltion.

(d) The tactical requirements of a supporting air base demnnclthat all-weather day and night operation of aircraft be possible. De-fensive considerations require that main airdromes be so located mto take ac~~-antageof antiaircraft installations guarding other bmefacilities, and that auxiliary :mcl alternate airdromes be provicled forclispersion ancl emergency operation of all air units. An island base.for example, might have auxiliary and alternnte airdromes locatedon adjacent islancls. SO fixecl rule can be given as to the nlunber oflancling fields mhich should be provicled, as questions of availableterrain ancl time avnilable for their preparation will usLmlly go~-ern.Where possible. how-ever, it is desirable to have a main airclrome foreach group: and an auxili:lry airclrome for each squaclron of the~oup. Alternate nirclromes, in addition to this recommenced nlini-mmn, shoLdclbe provicled if at all possible.

(e) Temporary airdromes and a(lvanced lamling fielcls should beestablished viithin the beacldlead area as soon as sufficient clepth ofterrain hm been gainecl to obriate the possibility of aircraft andinstallations being subject to hostile artillery fire. Facilities SILO1l](lbe progressively incremecl to permit of eventually basil~g the entireair force nearer the objective for the support of the aclrwce inlan{l.

I

SECTIOX 5

RESPONSIBILITY FOR .$IR SUPPORTParng-mph

Control and Comm:~l)rl _______________________________________________ 17

Organization of Xa-ral Atttick Force .$~-i:]tiou __________________________ 18Marine Units Support Ltllldillg ---------------------------------------- 19

17. Control and Command.—The responsibility for all air opera-tions inciclent to the seizure of z benchheld, inducling preliminaryoperations for the reduction of hostile defenses. rests viith the Com-mantler, hTaral Attack Force. All narnl nvintion available, as wellm those air units of the Fleet Marine Force m-hich can be placed in

fLlll operltmg status. mdl norm;~ll~- be utilized for tile initi:ll airoperations. The activities of these two forces will be coordinatedunder the senior air commander, Naml or Marine C’orp:: who willmake dispositions ancl assign missions in nccorchce with the clirec-tive of the Conmlander: Naval Attack Force. The Commnnder,Fleet Marine Force, vi-ill ustmlly exercise no clirect control over tl~eair units of his commancl until a substantial beachhead has been~~inecll or Lmtil such time as they may be released to him by theSaval Attack Force Comnxmcler.

18. Organization of Naval Attack .Aviation.— ( a) The organiza-tion of the supporting air force w-ill be in accordance with currentnaval doctrine. When cwrier divisions we included: task organiza-tions will be listed by carrier grollp=. in which instmce the FleetMarine Force grotlps, if shore based. or on separate carriers, will begiven appropriate task assignments. If Marine squadrons are sepa-rately embarked on carriers as part of the carrier group! they willordinarily be includecl in the t~sk assignment of that group, The aircommander may elect: how-everl to group squadrons by classes, re-gardless of normal group organizatiml: placing all the fighting avia-tion, for instance, under a single commancler. and all the reconnais-sance aviation in one task groL~p: etc. SLich a, procedure simplifiesthe issuance of orclers ancl is tactically soLmd. Where there is achoice of methods! tactical grouping by cl~sses is consideredpreferable.

(b) Task assignment~ shoLdd consider the special training andeqLlipment of the Lmits listecl. Naval sqLmdrons may be expected tobest perform those clLlties involving orer-water scoL~ting. the attackof hostile naval vessels. ancl the clefense of the naval oper:Lting areaagainst hostile aircraft. 31wine squadrons -wilI LISLla]lJ-be detailedfor obsem-ation missions o~-er land, for nttnck a~intion operations,for bombing defensive shore installations, ancl for the defense of theship-to-shore morement against hostile avintion. ‘This suggesteddivision of tasks, while advisable: does not inclicate the LmsLlitabilit.y

14

of either NawLl or Marine squadrons for other assignments. Eitheris generally capable of performing all the missions appropriate tothe class, v-hether opt’rating over land or sea areas, except tkmt N’awlscooting squadrons ore not. trained for land reconnaissance andbattle missions.

(r) Situations ll~:~ycol~ceivi~blyocc[lrin \\-l~icl~F1eetl[aril~e Forceaircrnft may be unable to participate in the initial air opetytions dueto lack of bases, nnd thus require th:~t all preliminary air missions beperformed by l~a~-~1-c~~rrier-baseclx~iation. The use of Fleet air unitsfor these tasks should be consiclerecl. however, as a temporary emer-gency cli~-ersion from normal missions with the Fleet, ancl reliefshouldbeeffected asra~)icllyashfaril~e units can be put into operation.

19. Marine Units Support Landing.—While Naval air units mustusually be callecl upon to execute many of the combat air missionsconducted during the preliminary phase of the kmding operations,tactical reconnaissance ancl the air support of the actL~allanding isthe normal function of Fleet Marine Force aviation. Every effortmust. be made to make Marine units a-iailable for these ser~-ices. Ifsuitable land bases connot be provicled. cnrriers should be ~ssigned,e~-en though this entails temporary remoral of the regulxr carriersquadrons. The specizl equipment and training of Mnrine air unitsfor ]ancling operations is of no avail if their employment mLlst waitfor the seizure of a beachhead and subsequent preparation of air-dromes ashore. Any plan which does not provide for full use ofavailable Marine squadrons during landing operations is tacticallyLLIISOLI1lC1.

15

SECTIOS6

.MR RECOYN-.MSS.+NCE VERSL-S S~R1’RISE

16

Chapter II—PRELIMINARY AIR OPERATIONS

Section 1. Cknercd2. Reconnaissance,3. Reduction of HI,stile Defenses,

SECTION 1

21. General.—.~ir operations eonductecl prior to tl~e execution of -a landing may he di~idecl into two distinct ~llases: recolm:]iss:llkce:lctivi ties: and reduction of hostile clefenses. Reconnaissance is nor-

nlally tile first mission :lttenlptecl, altllo@ tile l~ostile sitwltion nl:kyrequire that reconnaiswnce be execntecl in force: in wl~icl~ case oflensiveact ion by con~l>,~t a~iat ion -n-ill be init iat ecl simlllt:meolIsly with tilereconnaissance phase.

17

SECTION2

RECOX>-AISSAXCEParagrap[]

Intro<lIlccic~ll --------------------------------------------------------- ?~Str:ltegieal (,DistalIt) Reconu;tiss~ll] ce ___________________________________ .$0,

Reconnuiw:~uce in Force ---------------------------------------------- 24‘Jhetical (Clote) I{ecoll[~aiss~~ llce -------------------------------------- 25Elements of Illfor]]littiol] ______________________________________________ 26Methods ------------------------------------------------------------- 27

Orders for Air Recolln:~issi~uce ---------------------------------------- -S,>.

Dissemiw~tion of I1lforlll:~tioll ------------------------------------------ 29

22. Introduction. -Prplil~lilltlr~- airrec()llll;~iss[ [Ilc'eof tllel}rc)l)()se(lthexter of operations is ?.x:ml at tile earliest pkible elate. At first.,while tile attacking force is yet a considerable distance from its ol3jec-tive, this mission isclassed xs strategical reconnaissance. Asthed is-tance between the opposing forces decreases: the air mission clevelopsinto tactical reconnaissance. In ally o~’erse~~slllovel~~elltwhich has forits ultimate mission the seizure of an ad~-anced base: the necessity forobtaining cletailed military information increases m the clistance tothe tentatively selected landing area is demeasecl. One tlight cannotbeexl]ectecl toacql~ire ~~lltl~elleeclecl illforl~latioll. The situation willusually require repeatecl flights to permit the flow of information toprogress in logical sequence from the collection of general topcvgraphicand hydrogrmphic clata tc~the procurement of detlilecl militory in-telligence. The broad outlines of the information picture are firstclrav-n by strategical reconnaissance; tncticml reconnaissance sketchesin the details. l’l~e difference between strategical ancltactical recon-naissance is not soniuch a ditierenceof methocl. but of time zndspzce,and the amount of cletail sought.

23. Strategical (Distant) Reconnaissance.—(c) Initial attemptsat air reconnaissance will Nsually be made by long-range patrol sea-planes. operating singly or in small formations. The great radius ofoperltion and endumnce of these craft make them the icleal agent foroverwnter and coflstal scouting; and their facilities for accuratenavigation and long-mnge radio communication permit them to oper-ate for limited periocls independently of surface units, if necessary.Their chief clisadyantage is vulnerability to air attack and antiair-craft fire, clue to their comparatively slom speed. large size, and limiteclserrice ceiling. Patrol seaplanes on distant reconnaissance missionsattenlpt to a~oicl detection ancl conseqL~entinterception by taking ad-vantage of w-eatherconditions or approaching clarkness. The informa-tion -which they will be able to secure will ~-ary with the opposition en-countered, but will be generally limitecl to photographic observationnnd mapping activities orer coastal or idancl regions.

—

(6) For iIdan(l rwonl~ai~sance. l)itl’tiL’llllll’lT-l~-lwre lllore (letailedinformation is sought, anL’LIYllere air ol)po~itio)l is exl)e(rtxl. t]lesmaller. slvifter, Scollt lan(lpla IIes sII(Iu1<l be flihpatchul. ‘rhoincrease(l sec{lrity agail~~t ll(hstile attack enjoyed by tho scout is,llowewr, It the eq)ense of re(luced operating r:l(lius. The Scolltlandl)lane {Ill distant rec{,nll:litsallce mi+iol)s :11>0llses t?vel’y sllb-terfuge to ZYOICIdetection. coIlsIs“ teut with the perfornlal)ce of [heassigned mision.

(C) (kllt>l’ill]y S1)eLlkill:. all distant recolllmi.-~:lllce nliwiol]s areinitially attenll)ted by single ;Iircraft or pairs. ;~-l~icl~have a betterdl~~n~~ to L~Y(JjL~hostile ~ir UlliI. thilll l\-oUl(~ la~~P~ fOl’m:ltiOns. &?~-eral airplmnes may well be disp:ltchecl at illter~-~ll. on tlw same nli;.sion; at least one of them may then be expectwl to retl~rl~ withthe requirecl information.

24. Reconnaissance in F’orce.-l\”hen it i> apparent that singleairphmes are unable to complete reconn:~isson~e nlissions in theface of strong hostile air resi>[,Ince or heayy anria ircraft fi~e. rw]rtmust be had. to a ‘:reconnai+:~l~ce in force.:; .k reconnaissance unitof sufficient size ( tlsu:llly a sqtla{lron ) is e.5corrwl 1))- a shit able forceof fighters. x]](1 accompanied by a striking gr~tup of bon~b+ns. attack

airplanes, or both. Tile striliiny oroup attacks the hostile ai;(lromes.5and antiaircraft instflll ations. n-bile the esri ,Ytinu f$yhters ell,~:!~{ethe defending aircraft and prel-ent interference wi~h tlw Yecon~u\is-sance unit. During the result:lnt melee it is expected that tl~e reconn-aissance will ‘oe sLlccewfully completecl. In a maneuver of tl~issort the reconnaissance squadron is the base unit: all othem coordin-ate their actions with its mol-enlents. lVhile tlw Wilting grotIpenclen~ors to create as much IMI-(OCas possible w-it]] the ~rollnclill~tall~~tiolls, and the eScO~th~ fi~h[(?l’s try [0 .:h(JO[dC)Wllthe llMX-imum number of enemy airplane:. the comn~ancler: of these Lmit+must not permit themsel~es to be direrted from their prinlaly nlis-sion of the molnent-tile support of the reconllai:sance sqLIadroII.

25. Tactical (Close) Reconnaissance.—once the landing force iscommitted to actit>))against a particular area, tactical reconnaisw I]ceof the selected Iallding beaches. [heir seaward appr( ,ilches, and con-tigllolls l:tn(l arw~ is begun. C{)llce]ltratioll of aeli:~l acti;ity orer

any particular sector is to Le aroi( led: tl~e reconntliswnce shouldbe conducted over a broad front anll so disguised in the general :liroperzt ions as to prel-ent the ellenly from cleducing the tactica 1 inten-tions of the attacker. It is entirely possible. with modern plloto-gr~phic equipment. to ~ec~~re clet:lile~l illfollll:ltioll of a l(wfllity

without flying clirectly over it at low altitucle. Tl~erefore, tacticalsurprise is not necessarily sacrificed by the nativities of t:lctic:dreconnaissance airplanes.

19

(b) GenerallY speaking, tactical recolumissance begins cluring’ thelater wages of the preliminary phw?, LIsLm]lytL’0111 D–4 to D–1 (lays:and is continuous thereafter throughout the landing operation andthe subseq(lent ndvxnce inhmcl. A further cliscwsion of tile subjectwill be found uncler the he:ldings cle~otecl to subsequent plmes of thelanding operation.

26. Elements of Information.—By vi-h:~te~-ermeam preliminwyair reconnaissance is accomplishecl~ certain elements of enemy infornla-tion ml~st be securec{. These elements will be listed according to cle-sired priority i!l the appropriate intelligence annex an{l clisseminateclto all air units. Number and priority of elements listecl will of coursevary with eac]l situation, but will include some or all of the following:

1. Hydrography ancl topography of beaches2. Defensive install:ltions.3. Troop clispositiom.+. Heavy artillery positions.5. Locatiou of airdromes ancl air units.6. Roacl net and communication facilities.7. Xa~-al clefense forces.

27. Methods.—Air reconnaissance may be photogr~phic, visual,or: as is customary, a combination of the two. Photographic observa-tion is to be preferred, CLSit furnishes an accurote, cletctiled, apcl per-n~al~eutrecwcl of the enemv sittlation that may be stuclied at leisure.It htLsthe clefect, however: of showing conc{itions only as they existat tile n:onlellt of exposure. L-ncler mlf:~rorab]e weather conclitions,photographic reconnaissance is not alnays pmcticable. and 111114neces-sarily be suljplemented b:- visurd observation. ~-i~L~alob~ery~~tion,on

the other hancl, is general]y restricted to lower altitLlc~es,dLLeto T’iSi-bilitv conditions. The chief advantage of -iisual recommissance is thefaciiity with vihich a rnpiclly moving situation can be olxervecl andconstantly reported by rnclio.

28. Orders for Air Reconnaissance.—Orclers for air reconnais-sance d~ould be clear, brief, ancl specific; limitecl to a stntement ofthe mission, the area to be coverecl, time inl-ol~-ecl. ancl any specialinformation clesirecl. The cletails of conducting the recolmaissmcecome witlliu the province of the air commander mLc~s11oL1Ic1be left tohis cliscretion. The orc~er, usually in the form of ml annex, shoLdclinclucle:

1. h~ission, expressec~ in terms of information soL@lt.2. Relative importance of elements listecl.3. Area to be co~erecl.4. Time by which information must be avaihtble.5. Conternplatecl action of main commancl cluring the recon-

naissance (for clistant. missions).

Q1

~[.:(’TI()>- :)

RED~CTION OF HOSTILE DEFE>-SESral’i:<rapll

Geller:ll --------------------------------------------------------------- w

I?isl]ter Es,(, rt-------------------------------------------------------- 31

Ho>tilc, .lir F[Jrc( . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ..-~~

(]tl]~r o~jecti,-e. for .Iir .ltt:lcl:________________________________________ 33

30. General.—Il~for1~l:~ti(~1~.g:~ille{l t’Yolll alr re~,t)llll:ll>.?tlllceMld

otlwr soltrces (luring the preliminary periwl will probably reve:ll suit-aMe objectives for bonlbing an(l attack ariatiol] units. tilt Llestlwtionof which 7YoLdtlgwtly facilitate the :lctll:ll lall~lillg and seizllre ot’ aLeacldleilcl. (’ollsi(leratiol] sl~ould be gil-eu to o systematic plan forthe redllctioll 0+ tl~ese objeclil-es by air attack. either during ‘:recon-lu~iss:~llcein t’f)r~’e”’opera tiom. or as l)urelv oii’ellsil-e malleu~-ers con-ducted sllllw~~lellt to recolm:lissallce flights. Repeated attacks willpL’olxd$’ 11Pllecwsary. :u](l >1101L1c1be contill~lom (Ip to the tinle of:i~ttlt~lIal~dillu. Objecti~-es S11OU1C1be assigne(l the variom units in..wcorclance n-itll their c:tpabilitiw.

31. Fighter Escorts.—Air :/tt:(rlis against h{}stilegrolulcl inXalla-tions ma}- be expected to bring :~1.milta Yiolellt re:lction fro]n tl~edefending fight~rs. This will often be tl~e first ol)portunity thefittacker Ivill ha~-eto redllce this force> so it is collsi(lerecl imperat.iwthat a :tr{}l~g fighter escort accompany the :lir-~trilcing grolll~. wllen-ef-er figl~ter olwr:ltillg r:lllge permits. an(l thus be in positiou to engagetile defeud?rs with mlperinr forces

32. Hostile .Iir Force.—The hostile tiir force. whererer found:will be tile first. priority objecti~e for all preliminary air offensives.Tllisfolcer epreselltst llegreatest potential threat to the attacker. andits l~e~ltrtlliz~ltiollnlll~t be acconll)lisl]ecl at. villatever CON, The initial

air superiority of the attacker nlust be exp]oited to tile linlit clurin~this phase. P;lrricLtl:trc:lre]]lllst be t:lkell to seek out and clestruy airtlllitsol~c(>llce:lle{l air-clromes: air-base facilitiesof a pernlanent naturenlust be made tmtenable: and aircraft in fli~llt nlwt be interceptedand constantly lktrassed by a superior fi:hter force. In short. inten-

si~e counter-air-force operations nlust preeecle the arriyal of tile X-avnl.Mtack Force intlletrallspot’t areas; otherwise. e~-en arenmcllt of thelmsti]e ~ir force nmy be able to serioLwly inlpede the lancling.

33. Other Objectives for Air Attacks.— (({ ) After the hostile airforce has been Ileutralizecl: consideration earl be gi~-en to the elinlina-tion of the next most important threats to the success of the landiug.These ilt’e listed below ill tile usual order of priority:

1.~.

3. .

Heayy gw emplacements.Fortifications of :1 permanent nature.~ritiml poiuts ill lines of collll~lllllict~tio~lsinlan(l.

45.

.>-.3.

.+11{ ATT.*CK OF sURF.$CE OBJECTIVESr,:rfigr:lph

I Gelit'r:ll -------------------------------------------------------------- 37It Hostile Airdromes ------------------------------- --------------------- 3S

Lkttl,ldc(l Henry (;~~r],-------------------------------------------------- ~~)

sllblll:lviJ1es_____.-_. __. . . .._-. .---_ ._. _.. -. . . ------------------------ 40

t

!

.,

I

~12CTIO>’ 3

fT.$CTIC.IL RECON>-.+ISSAN”CE ,

Chapter IV—AIR SUPPORT DURING SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT

FIGHTER SUPPORTL’:lragrapll

Geuwol S1ll)l]ort______________________________________________________ %Spe~i:ll S,~l]port ------------------------------------------------------ 44

43. General support. —(+ncral Nlpport OT-~l’t]lP tL’:lllSpOt’t ~1’~:1con[illues duriug the shil)-to-sllore l))ol-ement. After the initial de-lmrlmtion the transpflrt~ nl(wt remain in tile zlre:l 10 unload reserves:eq~lipment, and sllpplies. TIleir protection ilg:lillst air :lttacks is thusinoperative, although once tile troops haw g, ,tte~l tlw:ly in the >nllll

b~jots [Ile transports are no longer first prioriry torgk for hostilea~-iatiol~. It is generally acl~-is:lble to i~ssigll one fighter task groupthe mi:sion of gelleml support orer the tran~l)ort an(l beacl~ ore~ls:with instructions to pay- particdw attention to the boat gro(lps aldto friendly :~ir operations in the vicinity of the beaches. If the pre-linlilkiry air operatio]~s lla~-e beeu successful. this :lrrangenlent mill

notmlally lJrovicle ndequ:~te protection. Tile entire ~re:~ between tile

tramiwrts ttncl t lle beach is mall f roln all nir viel~point ~ :Ind onefiglltill~ group of three or four squa(lrons sl]oulcl lhl~-e no p<lrtic’L&lrdifficulty in co~eriu~ it effectil-el>-.

Q. Special Support.—If~ however, the hostile air strength hasnot been effectively nelltrdlzed, it may ke nwezmry to provi(le zspecial fighter force for the close-in protection of the small boatsand l:m(lil]g troops. such mforce would ako prol-i(le incidental sup-port to friendly aircraft: particularly beach-=tr:lfing units: operatingo~-er the lancling beaches; bllt would be restric[e(l to the immediatearea of tl~eboat gronl)s. Hostile combat :~riation must be kept awayfr(om the boats and landing be:~ches ttt all costs. e~;en if it recl~~iresthe presence of the entire tighter force 011Speciill support. Troopsin ml:~ll bo:~ts or on congested beaches at the moment of landi~lg areparticularly vuh~erable to mir attnck; the enemy tnay be expected tonmke serious attenlpts to reach such lucrati~-e t~lrgets, employingsndl units ill a series of contimous low-21titude surprise assaults.~ucl~ att:~cks, approaching o~-er favorable rolltes from inlmld~ n-ill bedifficult to detect and intercept, and will require tile pllysic:ll inter-~-e]]tion of fgl~ters between the hostile attack units ancl their objec-ti~es. This n~e:~llstl)at an echelon of fighter: must operate at c(uu-pillatil-ely lcJJvIltitllcles over the landing troop=. preporecl to etiect a

30

-.

31

32

?--,

33

BATTLE MISSIONSI’mrwgrnph

TIIC l.;ui(le ,lirl)lti\ie.. _. _______________________________________________ 43

TtIc Artillery .\irlJl:~l~e ________________________________________________ 49

ThP C’OUIJIMN(l .lirpl:llle ----------------------------------------------- 50

48. The Guide Airpkme.-( a ) Speci;ll in fnntry airpl:mes may berefluired cluring tlw sllipto-slmre mowment for tbe purpose of guid-ill,g lxmt wa~e: tllrollgll sl]olce or poor ~isibilit~ to tile ploper l:lnd-ing be:iche.s. O]lP [Ii]pl:llle will be rcql]irecl f~)r each beach, and itKould be well to ha~-e n relief airljlane in the :Iir re:ld~- to t:lke overin tl~ee~wnt of t c:mmlty.

(3) The guide airplane may fl:- continuomly in m elliptical coursejust in rwr of the boat unit beilug guided. Wllell it becomes evidenttlmt the lx)tlt lillit’s cmme must be changed in or(ler to kand on tilede.sig]~:ltd beaLl]j the nirpla ne shoul~l fly close to the guicle boat Xnclsignal tile necessar~- cllan:e b~- dilll)in: the right or left wing, e:whdip illclicntin: a clmnge ill di;ectioll of five degrees to right or left.-$ more posit i\-e,although mow lu]zarclous, metbod is for the guicle:1irplalle to fly :t sbutt le course perpen{licul:~r to the desigmltecl bexch,p:~+ing (lirectly o~er tile guide bo:lt each time. thus showing the boatofficers tile proper CO1lLWto follow. R>ldio c(~l~~l~~lll~icatiol~m:ty sup-pleme)lt this l)rocedure: in fact it is highly desimble tlmt unrestrictedt\Yo-\raycol~ll~~(lllic:~tiol~be est:Iblishecl between the g~licle airplwexncl the bo:~t group conmllnclers.

(r) ~Vhen t],e troops ]m~-e.]al~decl: or if no guide is required byre:~soll of ,good ~isibility, the g(lide airplane re~-erts to its norm:dstatus of illfal~try airplane for tlmt organiziltion. ancl contil~ues toprovide intensire recommissallce of the brittle zone inlmediztely inre:~r of the beach line. Tl~e reconnsiwmce nirpl~nes which havebeen operatin: in these sectors nlay then shift their attention to mxt-ters ill the ilnnledinte Ye:lr areas.

49. The Artillery Airplane. —l”ornmlly, battleships and crL~isersof the fire-support groups mill proricle their own spotting Xirplznesfor observation of nnd gun fire during the ship-to-shore movement.Other vessels participating in the action may require that Mmine air-craft be cletailecl for this cluty. Methocls of spotting nmYal gLIn fire011snore targe~ areas clo not clitler materially from normal practicefor het~-y Iancl artillery. Griddedmaps are furnisl~ed the artilleryobservers who report the fall of shots b-y raclio. ob~ioLlsly, thismethocl of fire control reclLlire=at least one nirplane for efich firing

“snip.50. The Command Airplane.—One or more tacticnl amphibians

sho~lld be made a~-~ilable to tl~e li~ncling force conun~nder for conl-

. .

34

.-—,

35

SECT-IO>-4

SPECIAL COMBAT MISSIOXSParagaph

Sn,{~ke Screel]s -------------------------------------------------------- 51Beach Strafing ------------------------------------------------------- ~~

Bombing Rear-.\retL Obj~ctives ---------------------------------------- 53

51. Smoke Screens.— ({~) Smoke l:tid and nl:lillt:l ine{l by ~lirplanesmay be emplo~-wl to :l(l~-alltage ull(ler cert:lill colltlitions for collcenl-ing the approach of tl~e small lm:~tsancl tl~~lsrwlucillg the fire effec-tiveness of the ?.wacll clefellxh. If used, it s11oL11{1be put clown notlater th:lll tile time at \\-llicllthe lwdilg wares :Irlile ~rit]lin effectiver:ulge of automatic we:lpons. :l~ld maintained in slltlicient Yolume tob]incl tl~e bench defenses :ultl obser~-ation posts until the le:~dingwayes have di.senlbarked and organized for :Ittack. hoke is laid111V:lrloLIsways :

1. By dropping a li~le of smoke bonllx p:lrallel to the bench Lmd infront of t.l~efirst boat w:~~-e. Airp]:lnes nmy ncc(on~plish this frommedium altitudes.

Q. Bv Q r~~illg f~,lm ~lll~]:e tanks at }011-altitudes: repe:ltillg aS. -P .necessary to maintain a screen ill front of the boats,

3. By sprayiug from smoke tanks mtslightl> higher mltitucles, thusforming a smoke blanket orer the small bo:~ts to pro~ide antiair-cm ft concealment.

4. By bombing or spmying the obser~-ation posts anc~ beach cle-fenses, le:lving the appro:~ching boats in the clear. This will usL~dly

be tl~e most effimcious method, as it does nor interfere -with propernavigation of the boats.

(b) Smoke missions may be executed ~~ith all types of airplaneswhich are equipped to cwry the smoke tmdw~ or the smoke bombs.This is primarily an ntt~ck mission, however, and tittack airplanesshould be used when nvailable. Low-flying smokers, unless wry fastand high]y maneuverable: provicle gooc~ tnrgets for every clefensivemachine gun on the bench. which is of course o souncl ar=munentforthe, employment of the f~lst attack airplane. The use of smokebombs to form the initial curtain avoids much of this exposure toantiaircraft fire, ancl will usually be advisable.

(c) Smoke Izicl by airplanes during the approwh to the beachmay also find other uses of a tactical nature, such as to:

1. Concm I the main effort.2. Camouflage a chemical attack.% Screen the flanks of leacling units: while entering x bay or cove.4. Blind searchlights and antiaircraft batteries.5. Cover o simu]atecl lancling or clenlonstratiou.

36

(d) Smoke, prol)erl~ elul)lo:-td. i- :ln etiecti]”c t:lc[i~:ll :lid. It is,

however, :1 Sollrce of potentit~l d:lllger to the c:ll’t’lt+-s or’ 1111.liillt’~1~lSerl:~s~i~l,l ~~1~,1ly~:ltl~er~ll~lly~ lI1:LYreqllil,e clr:~~tic~llteriuio]l Of

operation pl:llls li-hich :tw clepenclent lll)on smoke for their efYwtire -ness. If the L1.+c[of snlokr i> contempl;]re(l ill 2 gi~-en ~illl~ltion. (lt’ti-nite pl:ms nlus~ be nl:l(le in orxler Ihdt tile :L1-i:ltil)11Ill)ir%Cotlcel’l]edlmty meet tl~e m~~t~rielrqllilenlellts ;In(l l}LITPtllr Slll(lke oirpl:lmsrea(ly in the :Iir lt tlw (Ie:igl:ite(l till)e :In(l plnce. m-lwthw or” notsmoke will be used nllht l)e decide[l 1)~-the 3-:\l-:\l -ittll{’!i Forcecommander.

(e) The pilots of the ~nlolie :lirpl:l]]es s11ouI(1be giwn wl~~ider:~blediscretion M to tile exact tiu~e al~,l pl:lce to put llown the sn~o]iescreen. They are in much better p[.)sition to judge tile effect of wind,rrnd the progress of the boat grollp~. than is the Force conlln:~n(leror any of IIis stnil on the conl]nalld ~ewl. Therefore. (J,r(lersforltkying SlllOlie should specify time :)ntl space witl~ reference to themovement of the forces to be screene,l. Only speciillly tmined pilotsare employecl to lly Sill Olie: the}- 511ou1(1be tactically compe[ent tojudge the proper time and place to start operations.

52. Beach Strafing.— (a) Dtlrillg the ship-to-shore mo~-enlentthereoccurs m Yery critical per-iocl, beginning wheu the l)o~lts tre mbouteight hundred to a tllolw~nd y:uds {oil,sl;ore and contin~lin: until thetroops h;t~-e grine~l a foothold on the beach. The n:~Y:Il gun tiremnst lift to targets inlancl; tile troops themsel~es cannot fire accll-rately from bents. Conseqnentlj, tile be~lcll defen(lers nmy be nble tobring a very effective smxll nyn)s fire to be[~r on the bo:lt lia~-e> mith-out fe:lr of effectiJ-e immediate retilli:ltion, >’a~al lmmbardrnent ofbench clefenses. however effecti~-e. cannot be expected to nentrxlizeor clestroy all the machine gum which mty be sited at or ne~r the\r:lter)s eclge. Even o mall n~l]nl)er of s}lch g~lns properl}- ilirecteclmight be able to work hal-oc with the ILul(ling troop..

(b) Up to the present tinle. o]]]y one effecti,-e sllppr,rtir]g memurehas been tle~-isecl--an intensire strafing of the bench clefvnses byrtttack aviation. Dnring the four or fi~e minutes which the boatsreqnire to rei~ch the ljertcb xfter nn~al glln fire lifts! succe:sire eche-1011sof ltt:lck al-irttion sweep low o~er the benches pomllel to the

shore line. relefl~iw wachllte frwlnel~t~~tioll bolnbs in trail nndspraying tile entire mea -with machine gun bullets. l’<) ntrempt ismacle to stril{e indivitlllal targets: [he entire beacl~ rrre~ is smotheredby fire. Echelons follow each other nt trbont thirty second illtermls,the lmt echelons ~~orliing further inlnncl ns the boats appro~ch thebeaches and into the danger rn(lills of the bombs. The n~ln~bel’ofairplanes ill eacl] echelon may vrr~- from three to nine. deljending

--— —,

3’7

up{)ll the witlth of tl)e +tlil) to !w ctl\-erctl. E:ICIIwtii)ll of three air-plallw cowrs :(1~etfcctive \\-i,i[ll ,) f :~lx,ut two !I{II1(lL[’(1oll~l tlventy -fi~(? yllrd~: tile lollg[]l of t]le :lll?:l C(ll”ere(]~-it]l I’)))ebol~)b lo~llling isa.l)ollt fo[ll’twll llulldl’e(l y:u’(1>. ‘rhe veqtlirwl force can be deter-nlined for :lnv {~il-ell situ:ltion I)v uw of tlwe tigtlre>.“=

({) Tllc cx~lct tinlc~ to be,gi]l :Ieui:il be:lc’1~ stmtilly slloulcl not beprewribed in :ltll-:lnce. but -Ilulll<l allrays be left to tile (liscretioll otthe group or sqtmdr~)n conmlt~ll(ler clmrgetl mir]~ tl]e n~ission. Hewill be ill lmsition to Ob>er~-e tlw progws of tile boats> tile nlo\-e-mel)ts of tile firing vessels. :lncl t,:lll Iisually :ll~tici~)iltethe cessittion orliftil)g of 1}:1}-:t]g~nfire w t]l:lt t]le leadil)g e~heloll ut :lttaclc airl)lanescan be ill positi~)n to open fire ol~ tile beach defelmx inlnwliately. Inor(ler to accoml)lid~ tl~is, tile a[t:~clc Imit will re~l({ezn)[[s oil one flankof the lallclilly beach Olltside {~t’eti’wti~-e antiaircraft r:lnge but withinsight cO~~t:l~t(Jf tll~ bo;lt ~~olll)>. Ecllclons will I)le:lli ~lwtlyfrom theCircling folnla( ion in s~wce:si{,ll :It the pwscrilwl interral, sweel) onceover the objective, and eflect :1rendezl-o{ls with :Ile Parel)t unit whileen ro~lte to the base for rearn~ill:.

((l) Bench Strafitlgt to be eifccti~e. nl~lst be ~l(~lleby attmk air-planes specially equipped for the tilSli. Lo>>+ fr( ~nl small-arms tireand antiaircraft n]:lchille-gull })0ttw’ies must be expecte~l even whensl)ec[l~ ill exce~s of t]y(j lIt IIIdrd n]iles per llollr :It altitlldes of lessthan ol~e l~lill(lle{l fwt are {I(,mi. It’ this task is :~ttenlptecl by slower:Iirpla)le.s. 1]()[ eql)i[)~)e{l with ]);ll;lc!ltlte lmnll~- ;In(l conseqlwntly re-stricted to Iwmbil)g :~ltitutlcs in exce>s (Jf eight ll\uldred feet, failuremay result dlle to excessire casLl~altiesfr(Jm gt’o[md fire and hostilefighters; allcl to the inabili[y of tl)ese substitute types to properlycover xttack lJbjecti~-es. Tl~ree sq[mdrons of sco~lting airplanes, divebombers, or fighters are wquired to apl)roximate the results obtainedin befich strating by one ~~ttfi~li +tm(lron. 1SUU 1 ~ diversion of tlle~etypes fronl normal missions will seldom be possible or acl~-isable anclshould be considered onl~- as a last resort. The prol-ision of regularattnck sqLmdrons for beach strafing purl)o:es may well be considerednmndatory.

53. Bombing Attacks Against Rear Area Objectives.—(a) Dur-ing tile ship-to-shore mo~-ement the di~-e bombing squadrons continueto stay ill the air, preptwed to attack targets of opportunity in theirnrneclinte rear areas. Hostile field artillery CCnclantiaircraft gunpositions, concentrations of reserres, critical points on lines of com-munications, trains ancl troop columns, are proper objectives for cli~-ebombers while the troops ccre.getting ashore. In other worcls, duringthis short periocl, the bombing units rencler close support to thegrouncl forces, supplementing the naval gunfire os is expedient. The

3s

yJ

40

56. Air Reconnaissance .--As previously l.wou&t ollt, air recoil-naissnnce is coldhuous during u landing operution. The recolmais-snnce imcl battle missions assigned during the aclwnce inluntl tlo notchange appreciably from those prel-ioudy flown: except that more4attention slioulcl 110~~ be given to clistuit. reconnaissance of hostileinterior areas, ilid to probuble routes of advance into enemy territory.

5.7. Air Force Missions. -Khen lhe troops are well est~~l~lislwclashore, the air force a5 a whole. may turn its attention from nhionsof close support to normnl air force 0flensiYe missions deep iido eiwinyterritory. The point to be stressed here is the reversiou to normumissions at the earliest practicable time. Daring the struggle to getashore, the striking components of the air force are properly employcclas mobile artillery in the close-combat support of the ground units;.to so coixinue their employmei~t during the uclruiice inluncl is genernllyinadvisable, except in the absence of field artillery.

33. Airdrome Requirements.-Temporary airdromes and ad-vanced landing fields sl~oulcl be established ashore ns soon as the hid-ing force has gthed physical possession of the necessary terrth.Tentative sites will hve been selected during preT-ious air reconnnis-sance. The prelxuxtion of suitnble fields slloulcl be uccomplisluxl with-out delay? in order that resewicing :wcl communication facilities inaybe ndlable to snpl~orting uirwaf t. These temporary uirclromes mnybe espmiclecl Inter into aclwncecl air bases, ix required. Aclwlceclhiding fields u-ill be progressiT-ely established 8s the troops aclwice!so that reconnaissance squ&oiis performing battle missions may harelanding facilities in the near ricinitF of the supported un&‘s com-mand post. The more elaborate air base facilities are not establishedso close to the combat. zone for obvious reasons.

59. Air Ground Communications .-Iii orcler that the landing forcecommnncler mny be. promptly ,zciT-isecl of the situation aslloreY allinfaatry units slloulcl be especially enjoined to cooperate with theinfantry rGrplsnes in repohng their front-line locations exactly bymeans of panels, wherever so requested by air obserwtion tenms.This information, in the form of sketches or marked maps, shodcl bedropped 011 the conmlnncl t.ransport~ and to the senior officer nslmre atfrecpent intervals.

I

,-

3LARINE CORPS .4YI.$TIOX

A~lPHIBIOL”S WARF.%RE

P.4R1 TWO

AWATIOX 13 DEFENSE OF

ADI-.SCED BASES

(41)

I

*I

!

—

AVIATION IN DEFENSE OF ADV.\XCED BASES

1.

Chapter VI—GEXERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Sectiou 1. Introdu(,tion.:) (?ompwitio]l of the .$ir Force,

3. Re-I)onsibility for .iir Defense,

4. .lir(lrome Rwl(zircn~enrs.

5. Culll]~(l]]ic:ltions.

SECTION- 1

44

-kJ

SECTIOX- 2

COMPOSITIOX .IN-D ORG.\ N-IZ.\TION OF THE .~IR

Geller:ll -----------------------------------------------------

FORCEP:u’<lg’clpll

61Rec(jl)l):iissa]lce Uuit<.. . . . . ___ . __ . . . ____________________________________ I?2

Striking Ul]its--,----------------------------------------------------- I;:3

Fightiug U]]ith ------------------------------------------------------- t;4

.4uxiliwy L~llits ------------------------------------------------------ 6.3

To+ Org-:uliz:~tio]l of the Air Force------------------------------------ (I3

61. General.—For the defense of an advancwl base dl follr clt~,,esof twtical fl~iltion nre essenti:~l. The proportions of eilch class willdepend upon the geography of the base -with reference to accessibilityto enemy attack; its proximity to other friendly lmcs; and the nlilx-imlun prolmble effort of hostile air ancl surface nttiwks which mustbe withstoocl. An effort should be m:lcle to prol-ide o balancecl :~irforce insofar as the a~-ailability of units v-ill permit. Substitutionof types is always unclesimble. but may become necesmry in orcler tosec[we aclequate numerical strength, The most modern types ofn:lvol tlircraft will nlways be with the c:wrier di~isions of the Fleet:and it may \~ell be tlmt the air forces assigned to the clefense ofb:~ses may not. be idetlly eq(~ipped. Considemble ~-ersatility oftactical employment nmy therefore be a necessmy evil. nnd units nl:lyfrequently h:t~-e to be employecl on missions for which they me inl-perfectly suitecl. In planning the air defense of a bnse suit~~blet:-pesshoulcl be providecl for the rarious missions insofar M they Ire nwil-able: s(lbstitution SI1OU1C1be accepted only as n lost resort. In nnye~-ent there must be enough nircroft to pro~-ide I reasonable defense,which means th;~t if less efficient types are pro~-ided. ~dditionfil lmitswill be Ilecesstry.

62. Reconnaissance Units.— (a) Patrol Seaplanes.—As any ad-~-~mceclnad base must of necesity be Iocnted near lnrge water a~eas:the importance of pntrol senplfine scluaclrons for distant reconnais-mnce is ob~-ious. Tl~is clnss of a~-iation: when opemtin: from tenclerb:~ses. is imlepel~clent of shore basing facilities. nnd has the necewryoperating rmge and conununicntion facilities for strategic:d scoutingo~-er nreas se~-eral hunclred miles removed from the ad~-mced base.The nbility of these crnft to remain in the nir for long flights. ctnclto opernte from aclw~ced floating bases, is an invnhmble reset whenfnced with the necessity of recolmoitering all sea and coastal areaswithin a rnclius of some sel-en or eight hunclred miles: any pfirt ofwhich areas nmy contnin enemy air or mrfnce forces. N“ithoutpatrol squ:ldrons these arei~smnnot be ndequ:~tel} reconnoitered: theprorision of such squnclrons M x component of the base air force isth~ls essential. IIMwl(lch m n(>pt~trol sq~l~~clrt)l~s:lre pro~-i(led in tile

46

~h~ine ~o[ps ;lptY)ll:lllti(h:\] ot’::(l~iz;ltio)~,” t]lPJ’ Illllst l)p :L+ig’llt’(1 k)nl

tlw Fleet for tlli~ (ltlty. .1 I]lininlllnl of t]v~~ M1(M,I~OIMbll(jul(l beamihtble for tile a~-erage :}IIVMWM1base.

(?) ) Scouting Units.—’llle Ilrilllar:- t+ulction Of scollti]lg [lnits inbase defense op~r:~tions is to l)ro~-itlt close rpcollll;liss:~ll(:e O+ t]ie :lreainlnle{li:~tely s[~rro[lllclilly tile I>:l>e.to a radius e(~lli~l to tile owrlligllt

stealnill~ (lisrance of major lI:\\-:ll T;e5wls. ‘This is geiwl:~lly takento be apl)roximxtely one lIU1l(ILW1:Il]d eighty nlilesj or +)nwtllily overone llot~r>s tligllt tiule for tl]e l:~te-t type sco~[t lantll)l:~ne. OIle p:[irof Scolltillg airpli~lles can c(~wr o w.[or ot twenty clegrees to thisclistance 011 one flig]lt of :~lN)Il[ [Ilree ]lotIYs. Two squ:i(lrolw :~retherefore required to c{)~er t.l)e ell[ire area of tile scollcill~ circle forOllf?search. If tlw base is w situarwl that, onl~ part of tl~e wo[ltingcircle nee(l be col-ered. the mini]lltln] scol~ting force may be reflttcedaccordingly.

63. Striking Units.—(a) Types.—L-ncler this classiti(,aticm is in-cl~lded all the types designwl for the atta(l< of surfilce objectives:att~lck avintion. bombing tl~i:~tioll. and possibl~ torpedo [Illits.

(A) Attack CTnitS.—.ittacli ;t~-iari{~n is par~icularll- suitzble xncldesirable for inclusio]l in tile b:aw air force. For tile attack of air-crxft on carrier decks: transport. troops ill small bo:~ts~ etc., noother class of a~-iation can :lppro:lch it> etiiciency. It has s~dlicientradius of action (,400-500” mile>) to ena~le it to accon]p;lny bombers>or act il~clel>el~clelltl}-. againit hostile naval objectives w-bile tile enemyis yet olltsitle the operating radill> of his carriei’-basecl aircraft. Itsformidable fireIlolrerll-olll(lll~lre atno>t devastating etlect on troopsdeb:~rking from tra]~sports, crowded in small boats. or wl~i]e gtining

a precarlo~ls foothold ashore. .i gl’ollp of four Ittack Sml.adlmnsshould be sllfficient for the defense of an a(lWlllCe(~ base: holf thatnumber might perhaps pro~-e barely aclequate.

(c) Bombing Aviation.-1l~ cumputillg the number of bombing

units to be inclucled in the air force. due consideration sl~ould begiren to the capabilities of the patrol sqnadrons wl]en used asbombers. Jloderll patrol seaplanes are ~-ery effective long-range,

hea~y bombers. .\t the conclusion of the reconnaissance phase the

patrol unit swouldbe available for bombing missions, an(l thus formthe nucleus of an air stril<il~g force. ln aclclition, ho-we~-er. clivebombing units are necessary in base defense operations. The hori-zontal patrol bombers, bein: more vulnerable to fighter attack ancl

the fire of antiaiwraft batteries. Ire best utilized for ni@t nttacksof naval objectives. l?or clay attack. especially against precision

tm~ets~ the clive bombers are superior within their r:ln~e. They arealso more useful ~urin~ the final clefense phase for the attlCk Of

47

transports, sul)portingf-esse]s. SUM]] bo:it.<. etc. ~k minimum of ~ll”Q

di~-ebo:~~l)il~gsqll:~clrol~s sllolllclbel)rovi~letl for thebase i~ir force.(d) Torpedo Aviation.—.ls a sltl)plenlellt to bombing ari:~tion,

torpedo squadrons. it’ a~-ailable. could be utilizwl during the alert andfinal defense phases t’or tl)e attack of t~lnsl)orts allcl slll)porting ves-sels. As tl~is class prol)erly belolp to the striking force of Fleeta~-iationj the incl~wion of torl)e(lo units ill :1 base air fo~ce nmy beconsidered exceptiolml.

64. Fighting Units.—The n~leq~late air ~lefense of an advance(lbase J\-illsllggest that ilp~)roxinlatel~- fifr~- percent of the base airt’orce consist of figlltil~g tlnits. I.ack of :1 u+l)orting net :u’ound anislan(l base. for inst;llk’e. I\”illrequire that protection for base facili-ties be provided by tl)e air patrol sj->ten). a methml very wastefulof tiyl~ter strength. Ill or(ler to mamtain ol~e squaclron ]n the aircontinuous! during~lay]igbt 11OIWS>tl~ree :(lmldrol]s must be assignedto tile mission. Chw +ua~lrol~ in the air cannot be considered acle-quate protection for a nmj(~r naval base: two squa(lrons are scarcely

suficient force for the task. Six sguadron: o+ tigl!tel’~ may then beconsidered the minim(lm necessary to provide collLlnuous generalsupport over the base facilities. Two a(lditional squadron= mightwell be considered uece+ar~- for special support in connection with~trll:ln~ force nllss]o~~s. ~llus a millilnllill of two four-squaclron.gIollps of fig]ltil]: :1~-i;ltio]l migl~t be considered necessary to properly

balance abaseair fvrce. N-o snch fwceis i~~-:~ilableil~hytt~’alaviationat the present tinle. nor woulcl it ever liliel}- be available fov the cle-fense of an ldwmced base. Tile defender mustus{lally accel)t some-thing less than adequate protection and encleavor by clever tacticalemployment to compensate for l~ck of strength. On this premisethen, one groupof fightingaviation maybe compelled to C1Othe workof tw-(). In such a c:\se,reasol~able protection should be afforded themostrital xreas of tbebase: for this, nothing Iess than tllrep sqlmclrwlscan be considered adeq~mte.

65. Auxiliary Units.—In xclclition tothetacticals quadrons,z baseair force will require certain auxiliaries such as utility squadrons,service and headquarters units, ancl possibly attached ground Lmitscomprising engineer! motor transport, and commtLnication troops.The construction, maintenance, ancl sL~pply of dispersed airdromes,the establishment of road ancl wire communication facilities. ancl theprovision of antiaircraft clefense and ground security, will reqLtirethe services of a well organized ground force. quite beyond the capa-bilities of aviation personnel. In this connection it shoulcl be re-membered that the primary dLlties of aviation personnel’ are concernedwith keeping tactical units in the air ; in mrtime all their energies

\vill be expended to this encl. Proyision d maintenance of air kefacilities conle within the prorince of appropriate gwmcl lmits.Whether or not these units are attnched to the air force is relatiwlyunimportant, so long w alley are made a~-aiktble for the tasks at lmnd.

66. Task Organization of the Air Force. —Whaterer the peacetime aclmini~tratire organization n):[y be, it is deemed ad~-i~:]ble toOr:qllize the base air force into ]lOmOyenQOLIStactical groIIl)s in or(ler

to facilitate operations and simplify the issuance of orders. Etchgrol~p ~vi]] ]l:~re z ]n~in fli~clronle Tith SLICIIalternate and a[lxiliary

airdromes as may be :ll-ailal)le for assignment, Each group will be

;issigned a commander and snitab]e staff; and vi-ill l]:~ve attnclle(l toit a lleac~q[larters :In(] ~er~ice Sq~lfiLl~O1l.Such an air force as cle-scribecl might be giyen a task organization m follows:

TASK ORGANIZATION.Reconnaissance Group, Colonel B.

V-MS-1VMS-2VP-7 (Navy)VP-9 (Navy)

Fighting Group, Colonel C’.VMF-11VMF-19VMF-21VMF-!X?

Striking Group, Colonel D.VMA-1

VM.I-2

T’MB-1YMB-2

—

49

SECTIOX 3

RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIR DEFENSELkrograph

Ceutral CoIltrt,l__. ______-_ . . ..-_ . . ----------------------------------- 67.kuthority of .iir Cotllll]i]l]{Ier. . ..__. ..- .. . ----------------------------- 6S

67. Central Control.—Il~ or(ler that the most etlecti]-e ~~se maybe nlacle of the air force assigue~l for th~ defense of :111ad~allcecl ba>e,its commantl nllwt be centralize~l and control vested in that lle:\d-quarters mhicll is resl)olwible for tlw gener:ll con~lllct of tile llefel~se.

Tile defensil-e forces of z base may consist d l~av:ll silrt’i~ce vessels,Ji:l rinc units nshore. and possibly Army troops. All of these units

l)lay lmre originally had air units attaclw~l. If S(J. such aiu units~vil1 become a part of the base air force un(ler tile clim.~t colnnmn(l ofIl)e senior air commamler. Tactic:ll control of the base air force isa t’ltnction of tlw bate conm~al~tler. wlm ~~ill norllullly be a flag of-ficer of the Xary. Conunanclers of subordinate sllrf:lce units willnave no aviation attached, b~~t will be supported as deemed neces-sary. Only through stlch centralized control of :111al-ail:~ble avia-tion may the rel:lti~e iml>ortance of the ~:lri(~ll. mis~ion~ be cleter -IIlilled and economic:~l alignments nm(le.

6S. Authority of the Air Commander.—Tlw plal)s for i~ir sul)portnltlst be s~lficiently flexible to IIIOW the air conmla~~cler consider:lble

ill(lepelldence of nction in their :wtllal execution. His :~[~tllority inthis respect should be limited only by ~Weller:ll in~tructions. which

should incltlde definite missions nrr:mged ill onler of priority. Tl~eI:llmching of air attncks under rigicl and tixe~l plans is ~lllsound.Targets are often fleeting. mdnerable one m(olllent an(l strongly pro-tected the next! changing with such ropidity that nlolne]ltous deci-sions must frequently be made on the spot if fllll a{l~a llti~ge is tobe taken of the opportunities offered. Often the air conmmncleralone may be in ~’lose touch with such n rapidl}- moving sitll ation;his authority to act. pronll)tly should not be restricted. To m lessere.xtellt, It may be necessary to dele::lte a limited freetlolll of actionto the conmlander> of nl-i;tion tnsk groupsj or e~-en 011 occnsion tosquadron commanders.

AIRDROME REQL-IREMENTSRlr:lwlpll

M: II1l .\lr(ir(>ll)cs ______________________________________________________ 6!}

Ausili;lry .~ir(lr()]llt~s ------------------------------------ ______________ ’70

Illmmy .\ir[lY()l~~t>s___________________________________________________ 71

Admncal Lan(linq Fiel(ls ______________________________________________ 72In~poyt:\lkfe of Di>pcrsi(]u ;l(l(l (;(~n((~:tlmi,llt______________________ ______ 7:;

beginning of the nlert phase, in order thlt deSiglJilttld units ln:l~sl~ii’t tlwiu bases of oper:ltion ~~itllollt (Ielay. Radio :tnd telephonem>lll)cwtions mllst be n~milable to facilitate command all[l tactical

(“ollrl’ol. Limitwl nlessin: and ql~artering f:tcilities are desirnhle forthe crews of :lircrnft u-hicll mny IN operating from these fields.

( J ) Normally but one squwlron is assigned to an auxiliary oir-dro[ue. Each group will be assigned :tuxiliary xirclromes -within thes:])~~~gener:ll :lye:l i~l or(ler to facilit:~te t:ictic:ll oper:ttiolls. Alter-

nate airdrom+ wllell flr:tiluble: are also assigned to each squadron,or to the groIII) for further assigmllent. m needed. Fighter airdromes:lrc so located as to cu~-er tlw lnest li!it’lY :li~ rOUtPS Of :ll)l}rO:l~ll tOthe :lclv:lllce(l b:~se, al~cl to facilit;lte the rapid assembly of units o~-erthe areas to be protected. Bomber airdromw must be located on tt[XX)c~MM(] or 11:11-ig~ljle~v[lterw:ly to facilitate the ll:lnclling Of heavyenmterial. ‘/Ile airdromes of 13;mbing ancl attack units sbolllcl belocated well inl:~nd where possible, for purposes of concealment anddispersion. .$uxilizr~- airdromes for scouting airplanes may belle:tre~ the beach to facilitate eoordinatioll with the patrol squadronsof the Yecolm:li>sance group. Auxiliary se:lplane ?.xtses are estab-lished in sheltered I\-lters about the base for the clispersion of patrol

Seaplal)es and ~ltilit~ amphibians.71. Dummy _Airdromes.-One of tl~e most effective means of con-

cealing the location of aircroft on tbe grouncl and confusing theellenly :lir forces ns to their loc:~ticm, is to construct a number of

(Imnnly ilirdrol~les. l)art ial 1}’concealed and camouflaged. Hostiie ob-servation airplnnes l~ill illl-ariably spot these, and sub.<equent air

attacks may be expected. A little ingenuity in the use of (llmlmy orLll]serriceable lirplanes mill add to the rellistic appe:lrnnce of I fakeairdrome and ca~we all over e:~ger enemy to be coml)letely deceivecl,and his :Ittelltit}n clil-erted from the red airdromes. l>ortable haug:trs

may be. erected: an(l ground crews clirected to taxi olcl airplanesnrouud tl~e field :~t interl-:ds. or if the ]anding surface permits, phtnes]Iuiy be flowl~ in and out of the field at inter~-als.

72. Advanced Landing l?ields.-~llere possible, advanced land-

ing fiel(ls will be established ne:w the command posts of brigncles, andsnlaller units which may be clef ending separate sectors. Ad\-ancecllan(ling fieltls or set~i]l:me facilities may also be established on aclja-cent islands or other clistant terrain in order to extencl the raclius ofIctioll of air units. lmrticularl~- reconnaissance aircraft. These Id-ral~ced lallfli~]g field> \vill normally be provided only with skeletongrollnd crews :md limitecl fuel supplies.

73. Importance of Dispersion and Concealment.— (a) The geo-graphical loc:ttion for an aclvoncec] base will not gener~lly provicleunlimited terrain for the construction of landing fields; nor will such

52

location always permit of ide~ll dispersion for flirdromes. hTel’erthe-less, every effort mLM be made to clisperse the defending air Lmitsand conceal them while on the grouncl.

(b) Generally spwking, dispersion is effected by clistribLltin.g L1.units on auxiliary airdromes. and by further provlcting these unitswith alternate airdromes to which they can slLift operations at inter-vals. Airplanes are indil-idLmll}- clispersed on the airdromes so thntconcentrated tnrgets are newr presented to hostile aviation. con-cealment is effectecl by the use of natural cover; supplenlente{l bycamoL~flage. Camouflage consists of paintilLg individual aircraft toreclLlce overhead visibility. and the constrl~ction of overhead coverfor revetments containing nircraft. Canloutlage also includes theemployment of dummy zirdromes and clumrny aircraft to drawhostile fire, ancl the construction of dumm~ obst:~cles o~L~ctual rlln-vwys ancl landing mess to hide their iclentlty from hostile air obser-vation. The proper application of ciunoutlage technique S11OUMbesupervised by tmined engineer:.

(c) The restricted areas nornmlly awilnble t’or the passil-e defensemeasures oL~tlined above tend to ne~Lt.udizeany lmlfwzy attempts atdispersion and concealment. became the enemy is able to concentratehis efforts over the most liliel~- locations for airdromes. Drasticmeas~Lresshould be taken to nmke clispersion and concealment effec-tive; ctunouflag edisciplinemustbe strictly obser~ed. The hostile airflorce maybeexpected to be g-reatlysL~perior in strength to that, ofthe defenders, mnd its fir,t objectire will be the location and clestrL~c-tion of the clefender)s fiiwaft. The survival of the base air forceuntil the final clefense pbwe will depencl almost entirely upon theefiecti~-eness of passive defense nleasLmes dLwing tl)e preliminaryhostile air operations.

53

COMMLTXIC.$TIOXSI’arogxph

Air-ground and Iut@rl]l:~ne Co[llnl~]llic:tti[]11_____________________________ 74Groond Comm[luicatiol] ------------------------------------------ _____ 75

74. Air-ground and Interplane Communication.—The standardairplane raclio equiljnlellt and prmwl~ire. s~lpplemellted by the usunlmethocls of vis~lal collllllllllic:ltif)ll. will slltlice for base defense airoperations. All zirplanes are now ‘equipped with raclio and the crewsare -well trained in its me. Radio control of air operntiolls is noY-mal proceclure: and reciuires no particular cliscussion here.

7.5. Ground Communication.—(c) The dispersion of air units onwiclely sc:~tterecl nirdromes introduces x serious problem in groundcollllll~lllicatioll. It mill be necessary to estzblish an acleq(mte vi-irenet (telephone, telegraph> teletype ) between nir force he~clquartersxnd the various air~lromes. The controlling factor in est~blishinggrouncl commmlicatiol~ facilities between P.ir force mlits is the ~-its]necessity for speed in the clissenlilmtion of information nncl orders.lYith the current high speeds of aircraft, a matter of n few seconclsmay well mean the clifference between interception of a hostile airraicl or failure to estlblish contact. Raclio collll~lt~l~ic:ttiollS11OLMnot. therefore: be deljencled Llpon entirelyl e17en though avnilable.To facilitate the is.w:mce of orclers nnd the rapid assembly of units intl~e air, the air force and task gt’o~ip comnmnclers must be able toeffect instantaneolls cmltact with subordinate Conmlanclet’s withoLLtthe necessity of cocling or clecoding messages. The teletype is themost effective instrument for air force grouncl collllllllllic:ltiolls. asformal orders can be issuecl simultaneously to LLIIair units concerned,with little or no danger of hostile interception or interference. Re-sponsibility for the installntion and maintenance of wire lines to airforce headquarters, ancl between the variom airch-omes, rests with theForce signal collll~l~ll~iciltiol~sofficer. Air force communication per-sonnel man svritchhoarcls ancl instruments, and are responsible forinstallation ancl maintenance of local airclrome circuits.

(b) Local airclrome telephone circuits shoLdclbe provicleci as neces-sary to facilitate operations nncl administration. The various air-drome activities mill be clispersecl about the perimeter of the lmndingfielcls a considerable distance ttpart. Messenger communication be-tween airclrome headquarters, squaclron offices, orclnance, engineering,ancl opemting crews N-OUIC1be impracticable. There is no point inproviding rapicl semice to the airclrome switchbowcl from outsicle,unless provision is also made for the equally rapid internal disselni-nation of such information ancl orclers.

54

Chapter WI-AIR OPERATIONS DC-RING THE RECOX>’AISSANCEPH.\SE

Section 1. Strdte:<i(al l{~c(jl]t];liss:irl[,e.2. ‘Ikctical Rewnlmissauce.3. Fighter Support.4. 13ispositii)u of the Air Striking Force.

~I:CTIOS 1

STRATEGICAL RECOXNAISSAXCEPm:lglaplr

General -------------------------------------------------------------- 7(}The P:ttrol Pl/I]]----------------------------------------------------- ii’

l’he ‘scenting PloI1___________________________________________________ 7s

76, General.— (u) Disti~nt (w mtegical ) air reconnaissance froman advanced base is clesigne(l to prwent tile surl}ri>e approach of :luenemy force within striking clistance. ‘1’Ilis implies security a~ainst,air surprise as well as surface surpris~. and collseiltlelltly entails thesystematic search of all areas within ~-llicl~ an ellem~- air or na\-albase might exist. For an isolatecl isl:~]~llbase this reql~iren~entwol~klnecessitate tile search of the entire :lre:l of the circle described aboutthe clefended base to a distance of ~e~-e~alhllndred nliles, SLlcl~ atask will be beyontl tile capabilities of the reconnai+ance force nor-mally available: it mtiy be possible to .earch old> those distant areasin which the presence of enemy force. is most l~lvbable. V-shall; acareful intelligence study will elinlinate much of tile area wh]ch‘might be occupied by enemy lmses an~lwill cletermine the most likelyroutes of approach for hostile. forces. thus collserl-illy air reconnais-sance strength for intensive ol)el,:ltioll~ oyer partic~llar danger zonesSurface sco[ltillg forces will be u~etl wllerel-er pf,ssible to s~lpplementair reconnaiwlllce. ancl tbe activities of these agencies cuordinatecl toprevent dllplicat it;n of eff(~rt.

(3) Tile base conm~ancler will allot areas for air ald surfacereconnaissance, inflicting if nere~>:lry tile distance to ~t-llicl~aircraftIVI1lsearcl~~tile freqllency of t]le nlis..it~n~, and tile p:lrtic~dar in fur- -mation sought. Tl~is inf orlnation will ~lmally be c(,ntained in theintelligence nnnex. to wllicl~ nulv I)e :lppen(lecl a lxltr{)l plan and ascouting plan. Tl~e air commal~der ~vill normally be callecl upon tosubmit such plans for approt -all or to mid in their prel)ar ation. Thecletails of execution are always left tc~ the air conunallder.

77. The Patrol Plan.—(a) The search of distant sea and coastalareas is normally assigned to patlvl squadrons. If this class is notavailable, long range hmclplane scm{t+ must be utilized for distantreconnaissance. The patrol plan is a graphic cliagranl imposecl ollappropriate charts, which indicates the sectors flssi:ned to each

—

patrol Sqlladroll. These sectors may be geometncnl in pattern forsea areas, or they nmy co Llform to coastx 1 olltlines of the mainl:ln(l

or Cbaills of islands. Tile radii of tile sectors shoul(l not greatly ex-ceed sel-en 11oII(lre(l n~ilcs-two (l:~ys ste:uuing time for troop coll-Yoys, allcl opproxinlately equal to the m:tximum opelwting r:tdii ofhostile land Ixwe(l bonlbers. Tl\e ilmer limit of the patrol sectors

corresponds to tile (ollter linlit of’ the scouting circle. ]~llicll is de-scribed with a nldills of appr{lxinlate!y one htmdred and eightymiles flwm tlw bi~se. 1]1 assigning hectors to patrol units. cllw con-sicler:]tioll SIIOUIL1 be ,giyell to tile ph}-s.ic:ll limitations of the equip-

nlellt an(l persol}nel. Altllougll the aircraft can renmill in tile airfor periods greater than twenty-four hours. claily missions shouldnot gre:ltly exceed eigl~t hollm. if long continued ol)erntions are

contenlplated. T]le technique of searcl~ing a sector is determined

by the sq(indron collunander ill accordance with est:lblished naval(loctrine. Usuall)- the sector is subdi~-ided by the squadron com-mander allcl sLmll subsectors assigned to incli~idual airplanes or sec-t ions as conditions warrant.

(J) Patrol sea~,l:l)les eng:l:ecl on distant reconnaissance missions~~-ill not ordil~:lril:- cilmy bombs as their weight gweatly recluces the

r;l(lills of action. 5illgle patrol smplanes. or small formations. arerery mdllerable to fighter attack an(l antiaircraft gun fire. To riskNlch :ltt:LCkS dllri]lg d:lYlight lll:ly LW[l]t ill 10SS Of tile :lircr:lft and

coilseq~lent failur~ ‘. .

of tile reconnaissal~ce mlssmn. However. occa -siolls m:]y arise l~-]lere a form of ~earcll-attack is ~tdrisable. S1lC1l.forinst;lnce, as the search for a hostile aircmft earl.ier. E~-en so. single:~ircraft woIIld ]lot be enll)loye(l for such a task: less than adiyision a:aillst me defell(led objectiye woldd hare smnll chance ofSucet?ss. Geller:~llJ- spea!iillg. then. it is preferable to separ:Lte thereconnaissance and bonlbillg fLulctiolLsof p:atrol al-iation.

78. The Scouting Plan.—To supplement the acti~-ities of patrolaviation> or lol)g-range scouts; and to relieve them of the responsi-bility for strategical reconna lssnnce of areas within the range ofsnore-based aircmft? a scouting plan is drawn up and issL~eclto thescout in.g units for execution. ~-SLml]y, this plan includes Ill the seafire:k within one hundred and eig~l~tymiles raclius of the base. orthe overnight steaming radius of a hostile fifteen-knot con~oy. ‘Anappropriate sector is assignecl each squaclron: which in turn sub-cli~ides the sector for assignment to individual airplanes or sectionsof two airplanes E;lch such subsector covers an arc of twenty de-grees for avernge col~ditions of ~-isibility. Thus emch squaclron cancover three hundred ancl sixty cle.grees by single airplwles, or oneIIundrecl and eighty clegrees if airplanes are clispatched in pairs.During the reconn~Lissancephase these sectors are searchecl claily, the

56

aircraft leaving the outer limits fit dusk. Thescoutingplan, duringthe perioclof strategical reconnaissance , is but WI adclitiomd memureof security; the patrol units are expected to discover the enemy longbefore he enters the scouting zone. Scouting missions may, therefore,be somewhat less freq[lellt allc1less il~tensive than they -will be duringthe alert phase.

SECTIOX 2

57

[5s ,

FIGHTER SUPPORT f1~:,1’:!<,llpt?

llltro(lllrtil~11-_.___. _-.. --. --. _. . . _____________________________________ wGenuml SllI)l]{]rt______________________________________________________S1Special SIII>I)t-Jrr------------------------------------------------------- S2 .

I59

60

Chapter VIII—AIR OPERATIOA-S DL-RING .4LERT PHASE

&ctioD 1. Reconnaissance Mis~io~~mI

2. Offensive Combat Missions.3. Fighter Dispositions.

SECTION 1

REcohrN.%Iss.4h-cE 311s510ssParlgraph

GeIleral --------------------------------------------------------------- 85Tracking Hostile Co I)voy ----------------------------------------------- 86

lItlint:lillillg Se:lrcll ---------------------------------------------------- 87

Tactical Reco]][l:~iss:l] ]ce_______________________________________________ SS

Air Force YIissiolls ____________________________________________________ so

Secondary Combat Missions ------------------------------------ -------- 90

85. GeneraL-When air reconnaissmwe has discowrd tl~e ap-proach of an enemy force within striking distnnce of an advanced base,the alert phase may be said to begin. Recomlaissance is il~tensifiecl;air striking forces are alertecl for offensi~-e missions: figl~ting unitsinitiate continuous daylight air patrols over tile vital xreas of the lxwe.4411base activities are placed on 1 ‘“contact inmli~lent’>scheclule. ancldefensive works are mannecl. Precautions :tg:~inst hostile air r:~idstake precedence over all otl~er activities. as the enemy will undol~btedlyTrececle his hmdillg attack b~- prelimilmrl- ~ir operations.

86. Tracking Hostile Convoy.— (a) Contnct once having beenestablishec~with I hostile convoy; erery effor[ will be made to maintainsmn-eillance. Aircraft discovering hostile n:~~-alunits mill endearorto remain out of ~-isibility range of the ship=. repolt immediately byrnclio the size, composition, speed. and course of tile hostile force. thencontinue tracking until relie~ed. Similar dcJctrine applies to the clis-corery of a land air base: except, that greater clifficulty will be experi-enced in maintaining surveillance without detection. In any eventthe report must be made ancl acknowledged before further action istaken. It may be prudel]t for the aircraft to ch-aw away from theimmediate vicinity of the enemy until this is accomplished.

(b) t’pon receipt of a contact report at air force headquarters. theenemy position, track, and speed are plotted without clelay. ancl thebase commander duly notifiecl. Relieving aircraft are immediatelydispatched to the scene and continuous radio contact maintained withthe trackers. Usually two aircraft, one on ench flank of the hostile -force, will be sufficient for the purpose. llore than that will prob-ably result in detection ancl clestruction by hostile figl]ters. Contact ismaintained throughout the hours of darlme:s: if conditions permit.If lost cluring the night a sufficient recolmaisance force mllst l)e flis-patched to insure gaining a seconcl cont:lct without delay. Patrol

61

llnit~ \\-ill he utilized for tracking until the hostile force comes within[he operatil~g rticlius of scouting airplanes> after whicl~ most of the~atrol seaplanes }rill normally be diwxted to bombing missions, leav-i)lg all fllrtlwr tactical reconnaissance to the scouting squadrons.

87. Maintaining Search.—Tl~e discorery of one enemy con~-oydoe snot justify the abandonment of strategical scouting in other areas.‘here may be more than one hostile force approaching. The patrolplan remains effective until it is apparent that all enemy units harelleell discovered, or the imminent approach of an attacking forcereqltires the utilization of all patrol squadrons for bombiny missim~s.

88. Tactical Reconnaissance.—(u) As soon as a hostile convoy islel]orte{l~ the scouting units begin covering their assigned sectors t!vicedaily: ancl contilllle this schedule until the hostile force has actuflllyentered tl]e scouting circle. At this time the scouting force may par-t ial ly abandon those sectors not likely to cent nin enemy forces. andconcentrate on nmintainillg an intensiye recommissance of the located

enemy forces. T-nits not requirecl for the initial missions should beheld ill concealed reserl-e for employment during tile final clefensephase.

(/}j It is in~perati~-e that tactical reconnaismnce airplanes reportexactly the nlmlber md classes of transports, supply ships, ancl sup-porting combat vessels comprising the hostile force. They should par-ticldarll- ende:tyor to locate and rnaintfiin contact with the enemy cnr-riers. which might nornmlly be expected to operate at some distancefrom tile nlain body. A sharp lookout must also be kept for the ap-proack of cletached forces, raicling parties> and submarines. Airplaneson antisubmarine pztrol will carry bombs; other reconnaissance planesmay be so armecl at this time if considered advisable.

(c) The entry of the hostile convoy into transport areas shoulcl bereported l\-ithOLlt dekyj in orcler that air attacks may be ]auncheclat the proper times. This will usually entail night reconnaissance anclthe liberal use of observation flnres. How-ever, there is no longer anyoccasiol~ for attempting secret observation of the enemy once he iscommitted to action. N-igllt contact should not be particularly clificultto maintain during favorable ~~eather when the hostile conyoy isWithin a hunclred miles of the base.

89. Air Force Missions.-Scouting units will be employed in con-nection with independent air force missions to locate proper objec-tives, maintain tl~em uncle: survei] lance: guicle strikillg forces to theirtargets by radio or beacon flares, ancl provicle illumination for nightIttacks. Scouting airplanes may also accompany Such forces to photo-~rapll results of bombing attacks. Better results will be obtainecl if}ne scouting unit is assigned solely for air force reconnaissance, othernits being assigned as necessary to support surface forces.

90. Secondary Combat ~lissions.—.iltllo~lgl~ nloderll scout bonlb-els fire effectit-e Stril:illg JYe:Lpolw their enlployllwl~t as p:wt of thestrikin~ force dllring ilw alert plla~e should be Iinlitwl to se*rch-zttac]c missions vr]lile on ;u)tis[lbn}ilrille piltrol. Tile l~llmlwr of strictlyreconlmissance missions to be perfornled will probobly occt~py the

Ml time of at lewt two swutillg sqnadrons. As loil: M bombing -ancl attack units :Ire ill opemtion: the wsignment of t~ttacl: missionsto sco[~ts will Seldolil be justified. Rwonnnissance must :ilw~ys havepriority. .,

63

OFFEXSI\-E COMIMT MISSIONSr:ll’:1:1’zpll

GelIcr:\l ------------------------------------------------------------- 91Emplo~mmt of B/)ll]t)ers----------------------------------------------- 9213n]pl,,jn]],,ntof .>tt:![l~ .kvi:tti(]rl ---------------------------------------- 93

91. General.— ((7) Tlie mrly otlensive employment of the i~irstrili-ing force nm~-depel~d ulmn its trrengtl~ with relation to the minimlmlre~~uilenwl~tsfor lmse det’ellse. If :1suficiellt margin of strengh exists,the air strikil~g force s1l{J(llc1en(leaYt)r by nll nleans to get in the firstblo\Ys01]all approacl~illy ~lien~y.pwticularly it’ thut enemy is depencl-in<s011c:lrrier-hosed a~-ifirion to s(lpport his l:mding attack. ‘The baseair force will us(lally l]af-e SLlperiorradill~ ot’ :~ction. as compared withcarrier-based aircraft, and tllw nMy have tlw opportunity to l~eutralizethe lwstile Iir force before it colues within eti’ectire r:ulge of the base.Otl~er lucrative targets will be the tral]sports and supply ships chwingtheir approach to the trnnspor[ :~re:ls. As this apprctacll will normallybe made d~lring daduless. contilluo!w lligllt attacks can be made with-out fexr of the hostile fighters. The ei~enly v-ill have macle his finalplans ancl clispositions for [Ile }amling; ~Uq- material casuz]ties whichnmv be inflicted upol~ hinl at this tinle w-ill cause serious confusionand delny.

(h) Priority of objectives for the striking force (luring tile alertphose is M follolvs:

.iircraft C:uriers.I.and .Air Bases.Transports.Sapply Vessels.Combatant Vessek.

Initially, the striking force should concentrate on the enemy nir bases.wl~ether floatil~g or on shore. During the fil~al approach to the trans-port area attention should he shiftecl to the. transports and other un-armored \-essels. ~$rmorecl combatnnt ships are secoudary objectives:is long as more wlnerable taugets exist. The importance of concertedair attacks is worthy of double emphasis; the air striking force shouldnever be mlduly dispersed on all excessive number of missions, butobjectives ShOUM be taken one at a time in the orcler of their inl-portallce. Seconclary objecti~-es are nlways assigned. in the erellt thatprimary targets cannot be locnte(l or reached.

(c) If the defenclil~g air force is numerically weak, the base conl-mander may feel obliged to forego any offensive air operations cluringthe alert phase. Such striking forces as are available are then held inconcea]ecl reser~-e> nncl not placed iuto operation until the beginning

64

of tl~efind defel]se plwe. Such a course INNthe aclvanrage of surpriseag:~inst al) ellel)ly ~y]l~ m~l~ ]~~~~-el]et~llIu]]e(] into :1 false sel~se of

security by his fhil~we to disco\-er L\IIyair Striking units. S\llpYiseattaclis latu)checl agail)st trallq)ort: duriug debarkation woul(l seri-ously impwle an(l delay tlw progres of the Iandilly. it’ not entirelydisrupt the operation al~~lforce -witl~(lrawal. Tlw. diwlvantaye ofsuch a course lies in tile pmsibility that tile enemy air i’t)rce nlily locateancl destroy the defending air units 011tl~eir airdromes. tll~usdel)rivil~gthe base clefellse tit a most val~~abiewe:ipo~~befoxe it is brollgl~t intouse. Tl~e qllwtioll of v-lwtl~er or 110[[(l enll>lo)f all ilift’rior ail s[rilc-ing force pl’ior to tlw find def’e]lse l)lla:e callllot be alls\Yerecl(loglilali-cally; the base conmmnder n~(lste>tillxltp tIIe situation al]d decicle forhimself in each instance.

(d) Even though the air three is to be med o!fensi~-e]) cl,llil]g lhealert. period, it is always ilw\tmbel~t\l~>o]lthe air conlul:lnder to (w]~-sider holding out certail] unils in re+me. to assure the arail:lhility ofa Striliin: force durin~r the final (lefe:lse phase. ‘i’Ile>e Imit+ :lre (lis-persed anfl concealed and Sholllcl not be operatetl prit~r to the arrivaIof the hostile convoy in the tlallsporr ~ll”ea. The effectiveness of theirattacks will depell(l lal’ge]y upol~ tile surprise factor iurol\xxl. Tl~enumber of units to llcjld in reser~e will T-ary with eac>l~situation ;perhaps tile minimum reql[iremellr wo[i]d be twtj :~tt,~cl<squadron>,or their equiwlellt in other types.

92. Employment of Bombers.— t,1j Patrol Bombers.— ( 1) Thepatrol bomber, or the .krmy t?-pe of Iong-rallge horizolltnl bomber,will usually be the il~itial welpon to be wed against ml attacking force.These aircraft are effecti~-e [11)to 0 bombiltg ra(lius of eight or Ilillehundred miles. Distant air ba:es. or aircraft carriers ~vitl~all LLp-proaching convoy, will be tlw illiti:ll objectives assigned this class.Other naval objecti~-es should be cowidered of a secondary nature forlol~g-range missions, m the hazard: inci(lellt to such operations arejustifiable only when ol)portullity exi>ts to deal the enemy :L tellingblow. The vulnerability of i~ircraft carriers is, ho~~e~er. suflicielltincentive for even the most conserrati~-e ail conllnall~ler. l~llen suchhostile objecti~’es are reported within range, patrol bombers shoLllctbe dispat checl against them. The technique of such operatiol]s iscovered elsewhere; it will sLd%ceto stare here that. six patrol bon~bers.is considered the minimum effecti~-e force” to clispatch against ol~e air-craft carrier, ancl that ~ttLLCkSwill not’]iutll~ be hl[lnclled under co~erof twilight or clarkness. The daylig]lt attack of a calrier, surroundedby a corclon of vessels armed with antiaircraft batteries. and protectedby its own fighter force, is hardly within the capabilities of a smallunit of patrol bombers, unsllpported b;- other types.

(2) If any patrol-bomber units renmin ill action after the initia~offensi~-e operations, they mzy be usecl against tile L1~illsports clllring

66

SECTIOX 3

FIGHTER DISPOSITIOXSL’ar:lxraph

Intro(lllcrit~,, __________________________________________________________ 94Geuer:ll S[ll]l)(jrt _______________________________________________________ @

special s(lllp(lrt ------------------------------------------------------- 96

94. Introduction.-( ~1) Fi,vl~ting nvi:ltit)n m-ill bP c:llle,l Ilpf)n forits nmxinl[lm effort clllrillg t}~e filert pb:lw. 1311enlyair :~tt:~cksumybe exlje~ted with inrre:lsing it~tel~~ity clllliny {I]is perio~l. as tlw l~ostileair force m-ill lln(lollbte(ll~- seek to materially re(l{lce tl]e defenses

prior to tlw arliv:~l of tile tr:llisl~,)rts otl’sl~ore. It’ SIIC1]attack> :Ire tobe i~lterceljte(l. figl]ter unit> IIltlst Hla illt;:in col~st:~nt vigil:~l~ce, par-tic~ll:~rl> ~llwill~ tl]ose dail)- lwriod+ whicl~ ole nu)st favorable for thelaullchill,g of :lir att:lcks. If tile ha>e is loc:~tetl 011 z sm:lll isl:lnd, or

tilt? 11x?of :I{lj:lccut terr:lill for warning IIer inst:~llations is restricted,tile illtewel)tioll of IIostilt air att:lclf~ Iwcollle> :1 fornli(l:lb]e t:kk. Theavelwge tigllter strength :1.wsigllecltile defell>e of a b:lse J\-ill prob:lb]ybe il~:~(le(l~latr to entire])- prevent deterniil~e(l att:tcks by a sllperiorforce: tile best thxt c:ln & hoped for [Ill{l?r expecte~l conditions ofb:~se tlet’ell:e is to be able to serious]y interfere witl~ tl~e ~ccur:~cy oftile IIo.+tile bolnbi]~,g :111(1to inflict st[cll casu[llties on tile elleuly airforce LISto Liscollrnge fur[ller etfnrt.j ag:til~:t tile vit:~l ill’(2fl> of tile base.

(h) In extren~,, c:wes. wl,ere the available figl~ter force is l~o~,elesslyo[ltulunbered by tile escort il~g enemy fighters. t!le b:lse conm]:ln~ler nlayclirect that plelil}liuar: oir raids be entirely unoppwed ill the :Iir,resem-iny tile sn~a]l deienclillg fighter force for oper:ltiolw d{lring thefinal defell.~e phase. .S(Lcl~a dr:l~tic co[lrse of action is not. ho\\-ever,generally reconlllieildwl. It le:lres tile base inst:~ll:ltions parti:llly atthe nlercy of hostile lYii\ti(’,11,tlel)el~tlillg n]wn t]ie effectiveness of theantiaircraft defenses; al!d doe~ l~ot g~lar:lutee tlw presence of theclefe.uding fighters durin: the final clefense phase; due to the proba-bility th,~t they \~ill be tliscowrecl mld destroyed on their airdromes.

95. General Support.— (a) The prim:~rY mission of ciefensivefighter a~-iation is the proY i>ion of general :\ir sul)port for the baseinst:d]atiolls. T]le techniql [e Llsedto prol-ide such sltpport will depend

,.upol~ the locatlon of the base. bllt JY1lllU nm>t ctises be restricted tothe ail-patrol method. If contilluoLw day]ight patrol is to be n~ain-t:~ined, but one-thircl of the a~-ailable fighter strength will be effective;if activities :~rerestricte(l in part to early morning and late afternoonpatrol.<, one-half of the :Lv:lilab]e strengtl~ c:ln be pli~cecl in the air.lluch will c{epenc} upon known enemy nlethock of con(luctin: airatt2ck5.

(b) E\-ery effort should be mnde to provide as n]an: aircraft report-ing st:~tions as possible: Lltilizing ~essels of the local nwral defense

67

force, detached posts on aclj:lcent islands. antiaircraft warning instal-lations, etc. Obviously. if con<litions permit, a complete aircraftwm-ning net that would permit tbe employment of grol~nd-aleyt tacticswoldd be most desimble. Even :1portidly complete warning systemcovering certain ~pproaches will be of great assistance to tlw fightingwoul) comma rider. Tile air-p: ~trolmethod of clefendin: ml area iseexcessi~el)- wasteful of fighter strength. nnd will seldom insure com-plete l)mtectioll against air fltt:lcks. .lny prrirision thxt c:~nbe madeto permit the lxlr{ial enlployment of :Iir-alert or ground-alert methoclsIYill greatly increase tbe efficielwy of tile defending fighter force.

(c) Tl~e area assigl~e(l the figl~til~g group to protect S11OUMbe re-stricted to tlw vital base an(l :\ir force installatiol~s. It will be in~-]Jossible to plori(le protection. except incidentally, to outlying stationsor defensive positions: tile dispelsit)ll of tighter units ol-er a large areawoul(l completely defeat their ]lrinlar:- function. Points more thanten miles apart c:u~not be adeql~:~tel)-defended by a single fightinggYOUIJoperating ol~ tile air patrol sy>tem. Therefore: the clefendeclare:l sl]ould be l’estricted to that tli:lmeter. if possiMe.

(d) Defi~~it~ clivision of rcspollsibilit~ between the fighter unitsan(l tl~e al~tiaircraft defense force must be cletermined by the basecon~nlalldel al](l i)~lblislle(l to :]11concerned. The norm:ll ~rea to bea~siglle{l tile :lllti:li~cr:lft bt~tteries is tll:lt part of the bnse area lyingwithin tile circle of battery positiol~s, the fighter force being usuallyassigl~ecl al] the area outside of this circle. In otl~er words: when theellelily bolnbel’s al”l’il-e over tile gun batteries, the defending fighterssl~olil(l withtllxw and permit tile gtms to engage the enemy. Theiigllter~~l~:~ytllell reel~~~get]le ellellly clllrillg llisv-itll(lr:lwal, if SLICh

:LCti(JN app~ars advisable. It is generally in~practic:~ble fOr bothclefending agencies to be enga:ed si~l~lllt:llleo~~sly.

96. Special Support.—(~/) Protective escort nlissions for the airstrikil~g~ll~itsl:~:~ybe collsidere(l a: secondary tasks for the base fighterforce. GeIleral]y spe:lking. such employment of defending fighterswill be rare. The reql~irenlent~ of base defense -with a limiteclfighter force will seldonl permit tile dispatch of fighter units on dis-tant nlissiolls.. If more tbfin nn adequate force is n~-ailable for basedefense, howe~er. fighter unit= n)ay be assignecl air force missions ofescorting bomber and attack units to and from their objectives. Suchemployment is obviously clesirable. eren thoLlgh seldom practicable,aml N-oulcl greatly increase the efficiency of the striking force. The

tel~llJtatioll tosellcl fighters llollgoll irlll)ortallt offexlsire mission swillalways exist: and the air force comn~ancler w-ill often be faced witha clilemma in this respect. Decision must be basecl on the existing

situation, which LIsually will inclicnte that the fighters should remainover” the base installations.

6s

69

Chapter IX-–.$IR OPER.iTIONS DURING FINAL DEFENSE PHASE

SECTIO>-1

97. General. —\\’l~enthe elle]l~y succeetls in establishing hilluself inhis tral~sport are+ his air supretnacy may lx conceded. Hostile pre-liminary OIJI?IlltiOnS wi] 1 in :111l)r(}babilit,y have reduced t]~e clefendingair force to coilll)arati\-e i[ll~]otellcy: ;+Ilch units as renmill in existencewill ha}-e been seriously flecinmtcdj and their operations hindered bysuperior forces of hostile ti<ylltelw,(i]dess they have been entirely ill-opemtive and w cleverly collcealwl dllring the alert phase m to evadediscovery. ‘Ille wrldllct of tlt’f’,~l]~i~-eair ol)erxtiolls tluril~g the filmldefense phase will. tlleret’(jrc. he fl:ll[gllt witl~ great dificulty, requir-ing inll~rO\-is:ltiol)of Illtlt(.ri:l]. stc:llt]~ of ol)elation. rrrldclever tactical

pl:umillg. S~lch air stlcllytll :ls is left tll~ defender nlust be conseryedfor expell(litllre ~l(llillg tlu,w cll[ci:ll peric,~ls lvl~en the attacking forceis most l-illllel:tble. R(Jcollll~tis5itli(e Ivill nornlall)- be limited to tac-tical al}<lbattle lili>si{llls: al] air nlis~io!ls r~otof a combat n:lture mustbe red[lced t{) tile l~liliill]ull]. 111>Ilort. air olwr:ltiolls cluring the finaldefense phase :ile (lc’vote~lelltirel~- to close s[lppolt of the b:lse defenses..\ll :Iircraf’t not otllerwiw enll>lo>e(l JYl]icll are caljab]e of offensi~-eoperations agail]st >Ilrfacc objectil-w \\-illbe so used: regardless of type.The maxinlum air effolt l]~ll~tbe expended to prel-ent hostile troopsfrom securing n foothold on the bench.

70

RECOXX-.IISS.4NCE IIISSIOXSI’al’:lm’apll

Distant Rec()!]l,}~iss:i~) ce_______________________________________________ 9s .Tacric:~l Reco]l])i\is>:i l]ce ----------------------------------------------- 9(J

Brittle llissio]ls _______________________________________________________ 100

98. Distant Reccmnaissance. —Once tlw euel~~yforces I\i\\-eclosed .in on the baset the necessity for distant air rewnnaiwxllce ill mostcases ceases to exist, Every amilab]e re(’olltl,ti>s:ll]ce :Iirl)lalle will beI’eqtlired for CIOSe-511ppoL’t nlisioll:. Tile ~lis]hitc’11of sIIc1l ilircraft ondistmlt missions of any sol’t at tl~is time Iv;]] be seldon~ justified.

99. Tactical ~econnaissance.—( a) I)uring debarlmtioll and thesnip-to-shore mo~ement of tl~e ellenly, tactic:~l recollllai>sal]ce is CWn-cerued mxinly with cletermilling the hostile n)oill and Secondarj- efforts,allcl the early cletectiol~ of feints or tlemollstmtiolls. Tlie Ilunlber au{ltype of vessels in each t ransl)ort zrea ! tile nuulbe~ and location of sup-porting combat vessels, and tile location of l~lcrative target> for air?ltta&S sllOLlldbe ~epo~te(] h> LVl(liO as S001111ST“isibility peLIUi[S~C-Cluate air obsen-at io]). Tile progress of debarkatiol~ and tile moJ-e-n),~nts of snmll-lmat w-al-es toward tile beoclle~ are nlatteus of ritalwncern to tile shore defense conmulnder: colltilluolls and ral)id air-gw~lncl comrilunication is Iiecessary if l~e i> to be kept plol)erly in-forme{l of the situation, >“0 nttempt is nlacle at this tillle to separate

the functions of tactical recolll~aissalwe all(l infantry col]tact. Tlwairplanes assigned to tactic:~l reconllaisallce mis~iolls Ieport all enemyacti~ities until CLlal~dillg lMs act~mlly been effected, Tile n~m~ber ofairplanes necessary to keep in tile :Iir wi] 1 depend Llpon many tictors,]Jllt the de shoLIld be to dupliclte missions whereyer possible. Theca~ml]ty rnte of reconnaissance aircraft is apt to be extrenlel~’ highduring this phase.

(b) After the enemy 11:1sgi~inecl :in initial footlwld ashore. tocticalre~~onnaissance becomes more properly concerned with the sllip-to-slmre moveu~ent of resen-es al~cl sllpplies: and the possible approach -of reinforcements. The sea areas between transports and beqcl~es nowcontain the hostile lines of cmnmunicatiol~ and cor~esponcl to theinm~ecliate rear areas in lancl warfare. The observation of front-line -troops is a fllnction of the infnntry airpl:tne : therefore, when frontlilws hare beeu establislle(l in sl~ore combat, normal assigmnel~ts of[ecmmaissance aircraft will prewil.

180. Battle Missions.— (f<) The Infantry Mission.—Inf antry

missions shoultl take tile air just before tile lea(ling hostile boat w~lvesreacl~ tl~e bencl~es. and will be continuous tbere:lfter d~lrillg the action

~{>llore. Tl~e assig~unent of infantry airplanes will normallv be oneIO each brigade or sector comnml~clcr, as cleemed a(lvisable.

71

(L) Command N!issions.—Coll]l~~:~~l(lairplanes will be made avail-able to the pril~cipal defense he:~d~lu:~rters at the beginning of thefhl:d llcfense phase allcl ~~ill remail] so :~ssigned dllrillg tile existence ofthe Shore Ilet’el~se ~orce. L-tility aml}hibians :il~d otlwr nontactietiltypes should be utilized for these nlissiol~s wheIl possible.

(c) Artillery Airplanes.—$uit al)le spotting :Iirl)lanes will be

nmde available to the base clefel)se [~rtillery conm~al~(ler prior to thetirriv:d of tlm hostile tr:lllsports wirllitl range. slwll a>siglunent to

,- reluain ill effect so long as tile ~~ir~)l:mes are needed. Air sl)ot ~~illnormal]y be limited to heayy and n~wlillnl biltteries. and the numberof slmttilly airpl:tlles reqtlested S]NNII(lbe held to the minimum requireclfo)r tile accurate (Ieliver> of l(jng-rallge fires.

72

FIGHTER SL-PPORTPlr:lgraIh

Geueml SLllJpc~rt-._._.. -..-- ..-. ._.. _.-_. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101Special S(lpI]ort -------------------------------------------------------- lVJ

Fighters Against Surfitce Ol)j(,(:tives _________________ __________________ 103

101. General Support.—It is higl)lj. (lesir:[ble that gwneral tighter.

. .support be mamtallled o]~er the vltill Law Illwall:ltiolls {Iul’illu tl~efinal defense pl~ase. il~wflr as tlw Ten)ailiillg figl~ter Nrellgti; willpermit. Hostile air superiority nlay be so prol]cJ\uNwli~t tlli~ [inle,

.,

hovrel-er, as to rell(ler illefl’ective all~ attenlllt to llm~i(le gell[)r:i[ airclefense of any considerable area. The t:lctical >itlmtiot) ()]) tl)e gwli]]dmay be such as to reqt[ire the concel)tl:ltiol) ot’ all al-nilal)]e tifll~terstrength over criticnl areas occtlpied b}- units of tile FIlore Jdiknwforces. The higher con~nN~l~deYmlder ml~i(ll tlie ail force i. ~erl-il)gmay be cdlecl upon to (lecide ~~l~icl~activities :Lrrto t)e giyel) ~)ri(]rityin the matter of fighter support : .sel(loll~ If-ill [Iwre be el\oLLylltigl~terunits available nt this time to protect tile elltil~ base :\re:i. It’ ge]leralsupport is to be Llttemp[e(l. tl~e tighl in: grolll) (wlil]ll:ll)(ler sI),)(ll(I begil-en consicletable latitu(de ill order tll:it nlnxiiuun) protectiol~” Hl:~ybegiven to those actil-itibs n)(mt mlnerable t[I oil. atta(k.

102. Specia] Support.—( a) Sl)ec)ial ti:hters\lpl)ort of the airStl,il<illg force in tile surprise attack of tr:~lwlmr[: an(l sn)xl] boat- {i-illgreatly increase the ef~ecti~enw+ oi’ S11(’11tlttil(li>. ;111(1!5110111(1he 1)~0-

vided. If the hostile fighters defending the tr:~ll,>~)(,rtare:ls c:~l) bec]efleCte(] ~lIc\ pre~-entecl from inter felil]g ~vitll :ltt[lck Nl)d bmbin~

units during the wry short perio(l of tin)e nece>~ar~-fol’ tile Striliiligunits to complete the :~ssfiult: tl~e results to be obtaine(l will justifythe sacrifice of part of the escorting figl!ti!)g force ill con)bat a:ninstsuperior llmnbers. It s11o(1Ic1be remembered tllt~t fkolll tlw sta]~(lpoil~t

of tiir clefense the period of hostile clebarkation is tl]e crucial mon~entin the lancling attack; erely possible etfort should be nlade at Ii~istime to strike the enemy an effective blo\v in or(ler to disnlpt hislanding. Even a single fighter squa(lron (J!~ewolt mission m:~y quitepossibly provicle enough interference to petmlit the striking force to .,reach its objecti~-es.

(b) Special fighter support will also be a(l~isable over the beachdefenses clLwing the time tl~e hostile l:lllding boats aue approaching .close to the beaches. It is xt this time tlmt tile eliemy ~lir force n-i]lmost probably attempt to strafe the beach defenses with attnck andlight bombing aircraft. Such attacks nlllst b? intercepted al](l blokenL~pbefore they can reach their objectives. As tile normal con(lllct ofstrafing attacks is by successive echelons sweeping O1OU: tlw be~~ch.

73

x) )I)ll:ttilt’clekl)(lily fighters be l)rep:lred to attack by echelons,1 (Jngtlgillg e:lcll hf)stild :Itt:lcliillg unit ill [lull.

. . .I ( f ) Ill l>l:llml~]g sl)eci:tl s\~plx)rt for the various actl~ltles on aIillle-schefll[le b:~si:. ct)lkider:ltion nlllst be given to the linlited lull-thr(]tt]e el~flllrallce of figl~tillg pl:~nw a]]il to tl~eir very short :~~itil}~ble(olllbar time. Tile t’(lel endurance at full throttle may not greatlyexcwcl one llo(ir. aIl\l the combtlt tinle-or the endurance of the am-IIlunitioll sul)ply-\\-ill I1(Kexcw.1 tell minlltes. Fighters Tvitll enlpty

;- :lnlnll~llitioll bows ale ohrif)llsly of 110 defensive value. Times oftal+ofi for tile\-ario\ls sul)l)ort n~issiolls lll~lst!tllerefore:be scheduledill co{)r(lil~:itil~ll \\itl) the lllost prob:~blp times of anticip:~tecl combataction.

103. Fighters Against Surface Objectives.—While tlw hostile airft)rcr i> l)lwellt in strength and actiw. the use of organized fighterlll~its f{}r the >~tt:\Cli of surface object ii-es will never be justified.Fiyllter> lt,ade,l IVitll bombs lose much of their characteristic per-f(,rmal}ce :Isfi,ylltins.- l)hnes$ :lnd n~Llstjettison the bomb load beforeellg~lgi)lg ill air colnl>ar. The few units available for base defense~~il1norn~:~ll~-be so l~ea~-ilyeng:~gecl in :lir combat with superior enemyft)lces as to l)reclllde all colLsiclermtiolLof cliverting them to groL~ndattorli. The pr:lctice of so wing fighters in pemcetime nmnetLvem]ea(k to erroneous conclusions w to their availability for such missionsdm’lng :1 m-au. Tile only possible justification for such usilge is asn la-t resort when renmallts of rario~~s LLnitsare consolidated intoprorisiolml OtttlCli gt’olll)s. If the nmnber of fighters is so redL~cedthat they can no ]onger provide etfectire air Supportt they mny thenbe pooled with the odd attacli, bombing. ancl scoL~tairplanes renminingin ser~ice. loacled ~~ith bombs. and the entire provisional groupexpended in a final effort to check the hostile admllce.

74

AIR .\ TTACK OF SURFACE OBJECTI1-ESf

l’,lr:lm’1,>11Gel]ernl -------------------------------------------- ___ 1(1+.Itt:]cl< of Trall,<l)()rrs __________________________________________________ 1().1Att:lck of Slllnll D();lts _________________________________________________ I(i[iClose bupl:(,rroftk:I(hDei’el)>eI’])ir+___________________________________. 1(17 .(lose SIIUlklrtof lI”itlldr;iw:ll,. :11){1(’(,llllt{,r:] tt:l(.lc ------------------------- 10,<

75

— -r

MARINE CORPS .A1’IATION

.4NIPHIBIOUS WARFARE

~

APPENDICES

(77)

—

.%PPEXDIX .1

TYPES OF .$VIATIOX- ORDERSP:lragr~il)lr

Purpose :111(1sc()l)e ---------------------------------------------------- 1

GeneriLl F()r[]]s _______________________________________________________ 2

Sample Or(lers ---------------- _______________________________________ 3

1. Purpose and Scope.—(// ) ‘Ilis :~l)pel~tlixis illtentlecl as a guidefor the ibnnulaticm of :i~-iation ,,rder... It presupposes n vrorking

linowledge of the general techlliqlle ,~f ordel’ writi:lg. Skeleton formsare given for the variolw types of or(!em. corre>pollclillg generally in

arrangement to the forms prescrilwl f{~l’ wrf:lce units. As an a&li-tion:~l guide] there are inclllde[l sample or(lers :1+they \J-OLll{lactuallybe written.

(b) Any of tile type olclers outlined may be iwed in the form ofan Aviation Annex to the Operutioll Order ( Plfin j of a higherechelon of command, merely b} the substitution ot’ proper hemclings andendings. The body of the ~~-iatioll order nee~l not be changecl whenissued as an a~mes, although for the ~alie of bre~-ity the body of thefinnex might well include only pertinent extrxcts of paragraphs 2 nnd 3of the aviation order. Ayiation annexes are gener:dly issued withoperation orclers of a unit tl~e .>izeof the Fleet Marine Force, or aNaval .ittack Force, haying at le:~st n group of ariation attached.A brigade or similar unit, with an ~ttacheil obsemation squaclron, cloesnot usually issue all aviation amwx. bnt includes 211 instructions toa~-iation in the proper subparagraph of the brigade operation order.

2. General Forms.—( a) Form for an Air Force Order.—

TitlePLACE OF ISSUEDote ancl Hour.

File NotationsSECRET (CONFIDENTIAL) (RESTRICTED).

Operation Order (Plan)

YL O. ------------

Maps:Charts:TASK ORGANIZATION.

(a} Task Group Title, Rank and Xarne of Conunancler.

(Conlposition of Task Group.)

(79)

so

(XoTE.-T;Lsli ,)rx:li,iz;lri,)l) ,, IaJ- Iw omittwl !Vl,el, nnit. euil)l,,yetI aleregularly assigned to the organization and nre employed uuder Wgalar

commanders, prol-ided rhnt the or(ler does not lo. e in cl:lrit.r tIr c(lucisenws

by such omission, )

1. Information.(a) Enemy.–(1) Surface.—A statemem it~ :eneral terlns of tile lo{.atitm.strength, Ind situfltion of the enemy surface forces thilt atlwtthe plan. When the order or plan provides for operatiom againstsurface components of the enemy> such w hostile reserves. troopsin movement? fleets. carriers, transports. lines of collllllllllicatioll,.anclsLIpply estabhdmlents, show the known characteristic’s of tileobjective. Refer to Objective Folders, F–2 Reports. and O1)er-ation Mxp or Overlxy as applicable.(2) Air.–I.ist strength. composition. an,l location of l,ostile airelements: and antiaircraft defenses. Give details of l~ostile air-craft reporting serl-ice, ancl type of hostile resistance to be ex-pectecl (activities of euemy fighter units. etc.), referring whelkpertinent to F–2 Report and Operation Mnp or Overlay.(b) Own Forces.—(1) Surface.–Mission, plan, ancl tasks of ndjacent friendlyforces of the some echelon, ancl general measures prescribed b~-immediate superior for cooperation and security. Incliczte co-operation expected of antiaircraft units. Refer to OperationMap or Overlay.(2) Air.–Give general scheme of employment of supporting nirunits (Fleet carrier cli~-isions: shore based units: Army units),nncl air units whicl~ are being Supporte(l, I.ist genernl opera-tions of other frienclly air units in area. Describe location ofany new airdromes or landing fielcls not pre~iously plotted.Give necessary details concerning frienclly aircraft reportingservice. Refer to Operation Map or Overlay.

2. Decision of Commander.—State briefly and clearly the gen-eral task of the whole force for meeting the situation coveredby the Operation Order (Plan). the general methods to beemployecl in execution; and: if clesirecl: the purpose of the oper -ation. To convey clearly the will of the commander. such ofthe following details of maneuver as are applicable to thwoperation of the ai~ force as a whole. SI1OU1C1be given:

Route Out.

I

Applicable only ~~!)enair force operates

Route Back. in one formation.

Time of assuming condition of readiness (1. 2, 3), or time oftake Otf. (If air force olwrates from one :tirdrome.)Rendezvous: Inclucle time, place: formation, and altitude.IVhen applic:lble include same clata for higher particilmting

units. (only used vihen air force operates in one formation.)Time of Attack. ( ll”hen no rendezvous has been prescribed,

ancl when the air force is to make a coordin:tted attack.

Initial Point.

1

When air force is to attack as

Direction of Attack. one unit. )

Method of Attack. Scllel]le of maneuver. ( Ely grotip column,echelon of squadrwls. etc.). Give details of coordination whenrequired.Maneuvers after Attack.—Rally by groups, or by squadrons,etc. Illstruc+ions for subsequent attacks, reservicing, rearm-ing. etc.Rendezvous after attack ( Rally ).—Applic~ble only when aiKforce is to rendezvous in one fwnmtion. May be omittecl ifpwperly co~eretl Lmder ..31:tneL~versafter Attack,” see above.

3. (a) Title of Task Group (a), followecl by a statement of thep~incipal task. minor ttl~li~. and cletailed instlLlctions for tileTask GroLip listed. InclLlde clirections as to c[x~peratioll anc~secLwity; collection find clissemination of informatiml obtained,reference to Intelligence Annex (for reconnaiss:~nce Llnit~1 ; ~mltto be sLlpported; armament and fL~el to be cmried. w-hereal)plicable.(~j Title of Task Group (b), followed by a sLlbparagLILphofsimilar sL~bstanceand arrxngernent as iu (u) abo~e.(c) List in appropriate numbered subparagraphs instructionsapplicable to two or more Task GroLlps, or to the entire Corn.m~lnd. which are necessary for coorc~ination bL~tdo not properlybelong in another sLlbpaLxgraplL. InclL~cle particLdm’ly nleas-LLresfor cool) erationj seclwity, and the collection ancl dissenlina-tion of information, which do not properly belong in abovesLlbparagL’aphs. List special ground clefensive measures, sL~chas cmnoLdlage. dispersion, and concealment of aircraft, etc.Specify special reports to be renderecl, and meas(wes to be takenin preparation for next mission or task.

4. Refer to Administrative Order (Plan) by number m-henissued(or to Logistic .bnex). When neither of these is issL~eclgivenecessary instructions concerning logistic arrangements for theoperation. InclL~c~esLlpply of fuel, ammLmition, bombs, etc.;instrLlctions concerning trains! tratlic, personnel, and evacLlationof ilLjurecl presonnel ancl clamagecl mat6riel.

5.

tllelw)f,

(Si:l)wl by co]m~]:lnder or

Annexes:

A. ( Xame)

B. do.Distribution:

)(3) Form for; Wing Order.—@[ler~fOr~ CfJllll)OSitI? lTill~. SllCh 21S-~iI’CUlft. Fk[ ~~tl~illt? l? OI’L’P.

will be written l~sLl:L]]yas all :lir force or~ler, P:lr:lgl:lpll 2 (/1) istherefore applicable in all respects to tile V“il]g Ordel.

(e) The Air Fo]ce or Wing order nxty be i~~mxl ;I.s LIII annex tothe opelztion Orcler of n lligller echelon of ccmlman(l. Sllbstitlitehendillg :~nclendiny :1s follows:

ANXEX ---- TO OPERATION ORDER NO. ____

FLEET MARINE FORCE (NAF)

AVIATION

File 2i-otat~ous. Title. .Snl)le as(Of parent otliw.) Place. j)nl’ellt

Date an(l Ho~lr. 1tjr( er.

* * * * * * *-4 .

Slgll:lture.

(Force con]l)li~ll,ler or C. of S.)

—_ __ ___ __ __ __

..-

1.~.

3.

4.

5.

84

TASK ORGANIZATION (ll]:~y be on~itte~lnt>r)m~lly).

1. Information. -Gi\-e a brief slml]ll:lry Of pertinent enemy anclfriendly information. s(uface an(l ail.. refeJring to F–2 reportwl~ere applicable. Refer partic~llarl> to antiaircrat’t co(l~xlr-ation and the Aircraft Reporting Service.

2. Decision of the conln~a]l~ler. St:~te t]le grcJLl]]nlissif)ll in gene-

ral terms. Include such of the follo\\-ing details of thescheme of nlalleu~-er which may be con~lllon to fill ~quailronsof the group particilmting in the operation:Route Out:Route Back:Time of: Stations. t~[xi-o~lt. 01’ t:~ke-oti ( ~~llel~all wlua{lr(ms

are on the same airdronle. )Group Assembly: InclIItl~ l]lave. time. i~ltitu(l?, :i]ltl forn]:l -

tion. When applicable. list inlnlediatel~ followiny thel~~elllbl~ of :Lll higher pill’tici~jating units. (T1-ing or Air

Force. )Group Initial Point: 11’hell a~~~)r{,l)ri,~te l~lere(le ~ro~~l~ ini-

tial point by tl~e initial point ot’ lli,gher particil):ltill: llllirs.If necess:u’y follow bj- s(lt[:~(lrf)]li])iti~~l l)oints,

Axis of Attack: (For ljomhing or :~ttscl; groIIp.)

Method of Attack:Maneuver after Attack:Rally: Include place al~<lft,rl}~:~tit,li. Tile gr{J\ll) r~llly is

followed by the rally of lligl]er lxlrtiripnting units whel]appl”opri:lte.

Landing Instructions: (If netessary. I3. (a). (b). (c), Instrllttioll> to tl](’ sqlladums of the group. A

separate lettered subparagraph is assigned to emh squadronwherein is containe~l tile sq(ladroll lnission: al)propriate ptlrtsof the scheme of nla]lell~er (when not shown in paragrtipll2; assignnlent of tnrgets: anmlllllition. bonlb. an(l cllenlic:llloadings when tl~ese are not identical for all sqLIadrons.(2) Contains in~tructions Applicable to two or moresquadrons which do not properly belong in the above sub-paragraphs, inclLlding w-hen pertinent:(1) InstrLLctions concerning ammunition, bomb. :md chemical

loadings when these are identical for 011squadrons.(2) Special measures for groLlnd defense.(3) In&rLictions regarding rendition of special or nonroL~tine

reports.(4) Instructions regarding the operation of airdrome rLm-ways-(5) Instructions covering preparation for the next mission.

--!

85

-1. ,l(llllillistr:ltiv(’ instr(lctions not l)reviously :Ulllounced: orcllal)ges in existily itlstructiolls co~-erillg lmtters of supply,evacuntic)n: traffic. tmim. airdromes. :Illd personml. Whenan a(lnlinistmtive order is issued refer to it by llmnber.

5. (a) Plan of Signal Communication.Refer to signal amexes or ilustrllctiulls as applicable.(b) Command Posts.(1) Air(U’ ) Positit)ll of grolll) conml~]ncler.(0’ ) Ilesigl~tltion of dep([ty.(?) Ground. —St:\te I(watiiln u-l~ell llecess:]ry. inclu,lillg sup-

porte(l (}Ysporting air illl(l yY)IIIIC] m)its, tile yv(lp ism-

ing the order. :m(l the sqlladron of the grollp (,it’ on 5epa -mte airdromes).

Signature.Rank.Title of Comm:lncl.

(Signed by Gro~lp Conlmnl\der or Executive.)

tions. is given belo~v :

—— ——— .—. —— —— .— —— —— .—— ——

>-:lnle of Squadron.PLACE.Dote ancl Hour.

FLIGHT SCHEDULE :(Times inclusive.)

I II

Special instructions tofrequencies

86

ccxnbat cre\Ys. Amlament (Ietnil>. lla(lio

By olllerof (s([(111. Conmlander).

R:mk,Sigll~t~lre:

Sq\iadron Flight Oficer.

assure coo[m:ltion with Supportil): or sup- -portalair or +~lrface-ll]lits. or when prescrilxvl by nigher :Iutllority,the squatlron s11oII1c1issue a fornlal operation order sin]illr ill formto the group orcler.

3. Sample Orders.——~ile ~. (//) An Air Force Order.—< .$ir l?orce. (131 NuI;) ~~tt:lul< I?orce.

SECRET. ” “ . HOXOL[-L1-. T. H.

Operation Order 1 Jline --------

so------------ 1.llap~: Hawaii. .Oallli. etc., 1:20.000. * * *

Charts: Hawcii:ln Islands. * * *TASK ORGANIZATION.

(b) Cardiv Two,

CV-LI’F4.VS41.1“s-+2.I’B4.

(c) Fleet Marine Force Wing,’ Brig~dier Gener:l] X.

First Morine Aircmft Group.Secontl l[nrine .lircraft Group.

1. (a) (1) Surface.—llepartmental intelligence analysis incli- -cates the strength of the enemj- garri:on on HAN”.$11 to benbout 10.000 troops> incl\lding 1 1(;” gun and 2(} 6“ n:l}-alguns, whicl~ force is estinmtecl to consist of:

***

::, * *

See F-? Report ancl Situation Map. .lnt~es -------(2) Air.—Enen~~- a~iation on H.\N’.\11 is helie~e,l to coilsistof*** located on airdromes at * * *.

87

(b) Cardiv TWO, opera[ing initially from an area north of31.\C”I. will rwolmoiter the isl;ln(ls of the H.lW.\II.lNC~ROI~P enst of O.IHI-. lnl~-ing particlllilr :~ttentioll to tilelociLtiol~ :~11(1de~tr[lctiol~ of hostile ~ir bases on M.klU al~(lH.\\Y.III: ;I]ltl to tile llwiitioll of hostile sllblnarilw a]lclother lla’.-al claft ill this a]ea, * * * Begillllillg 011D_~ &,J. * * * Ji-il] l)ro~-it.le ,gelleral Stll)port for theTr:mq)oh (;1’0111).(c) Fleet Marine Force Wing, operating initiallY fromI?leet .$ir Bt(se, l) J.2.iRL H.iR130R, aI~d fr,)n~ N“HEELERFIELD, will rwonn[Jiter H-lW.111, beginl~illg * * *,with pilrticlllar refel”ellce to locating anrl attacking majorfortifictltiol~s. heill-y glll~ emplacell)ents. trool) concentra.tmtiolm a]lfl slll)l)ly e>t:li)lisl}lllellts. Be.ginlling ol~ D–:3 day,

88

Annexes:***

Distribution:

‘“A”’

Ot%cial:

“x”’Lie~ltenant Commander, USX.

Flag Secretary.

(~) A Wing’ Order.—File So_________ Aircraft lying. Fleet l[i~ril)e Force.

SECRET. Fleet Air Base. PE.iRL H.4R130RI ‘l’. H.

Operation Order 4 J~u~e ________________________________

h’o. 1.lL~ps: H;~waii: Oahll,etc. 1:2(10.WO * * *.

Charts: HawaiianIslancls * * *.

TASK ORGANIZATION.

(a) Reconnaissance Group, Colonel “.>ir One.”

VXs-1.V3LS-2.VJLS-3.

89

ColoIIel “Air Two.”’

( ,1) Utility Group. I,it[ltenallt Colonel ‘-B.’”

T7M,J-I.T“MJ-2.

1. (Z) ( 1) Surface.—* * ‘{.See F–? Relmrt al)d Sit{wtioll YLlp.,See objecti~-e Fol(lels. * * *<(?) Air.–-I; nemv fiyl~ter ol)l)ositiol:” e n c o u n t e r e (1 overOI’O1.1”” P’r. illl{l KIZ.\HOI.E PT. indicate * * * twodei’el~si\-e s[l~la(lrons b:lsed oli HAJYAI1. -\ir l)l~otographsindit:lte existellt,e Of bon~billg or itttack (Il)its on ail’(lronlcs at-*S:* Ifostile ol)~erl-atioll” planes sig!~te(l over I) L\-11(.) XI) H~.\l) 01] 4 ,JIIIM? * * *.(7)] ( 1 ) Surface.—rlle J?leet J1arine Force. olwlxting as a

part of tile ( Ell:lllli) .lttack Force, will execute Ianclings onH.\ JT.111 ol~ I) and D–1 days. (See R-3 Oper:~tions Mapan(l NIIF Olwration Or(ler >-o. 1.)

( 2 ) Air. --~arflivs (he ml TWO will provide ad~litional airs~lljport for the lan(linrs ( See Air Force, (Blank) AttackForce, (Ipelatioll Orde~ ~o. 1.)

2. This ~~il~g will support the Fleet Marine Force in the land-ings on HAJYAII by executing air reconnaissance ancl combatsupport to cover the actual landings,

Condition Three of retcdiness will be assumecl at 0001,5 Jlme. D clay will be announced by dispatch.

* * * * * * *

3. (a) Reconnaissance Group, o p e r a t i n g initially from

lTHEELER FIELD. \\-illexecute distant recolumissance mis-sions over HAWAII. beginning at 0500, 5 June. Pay par-ticular attelltiou to tbe location of heavy gun batteries,fortifications, troop concentrations * * * ancl to the loca-

iNLITE.–-nderer Task orgi~uizariou, subparagraph (d ). Vtility Group.l%is gI’oIIp will kw iwludwl ill To~!i Org~]nization. only if WYl tactically.

90

tions of suitable landing beaches between OPOLU” PT. andKEAHOLE PT. Be prepared to support Striking Group on (

call. Provide for shift of base to KAHOOLAWE on signalfor further operations in direct support of the landing*** Comply with pertinent provisions of Annex __.__.,Intelligence. t(b) Striking Group, ol?erating initially from present air-

dromes on OAHU, and supported as may be necessary bythe Fighting and Reconnaissance Groupsl will execute offen- 1sive missions a~~inst those objectives listed in Objective Fold- t

ers “A)> and “B” (appended), and such other suitable objec-tives as may be subsequently reportecl by the ReconnaissanceGroLlp. Initial preliminary offensive missions will begin at0500, 6 June, anc~ continue until objecti~es are neutralized.Be prepared to shift base to KAHOOLAWE on signal forfurther operations in direct support of the lanclings.

* * * * * * *

(c) Fighting Group, operating initially from the Fleet

Air Base, PEARL HARBOR. will be prepared d~wingthe preliminary air operations to provide special support forthe Reconnaissance and Striking Groups on call. Provicle forshifting base to KAHOOLA.WE on signal for further opera-tions in clirect support of the transport groups and lnndingforces.

* * * * * * *

(d) Utility Group will be preptirecl to execute normal mes-

senger, transport and ambulance missions on call. Sup-port the Reconnaissance GroLLp dlLring the lanclingsby provision of command amphibians in the transportarea * * *.(a) (1) Antiaircraft defense of the KAHOOLAWE air

base will be conducted in accordance with Annex --__,Artillery. Group commanders will arrange necessarydetails of coordination with the AA commander.(2) * * *.(3) * * *.

4. See Administrative Plan No. ---- (if applicable).

* * * * * * *

A ten day level of supplies will be maintained at theKAHOOLAWE air base from 1200, 5 June.

* * * * * * *

-,

91

5. (a) See Annex ----~ Communications.* * * * * * *

(b)(1)

(~)

Annexes:****

Distribution:

Command Posts.

Air Force, (Blank) Attack Force, CV-3.FMF Wing, WHEELER FIELD.Reconnaissance Group, WHEELER FIELD.Striking Group, LUKE FIELD.Fighting Group, Air Base. PEARL HARBOR.(Blank) Attack Force, OIiLAHOM.\.Fleet Mmine Force, PEARL H.ARBOR.

By Command of Brigadier Genernl ‘-X.”,,y,,,

Colonel [-SMC,Executive Oflicer.

**

“’A.”Official:

“z.”Lieutenant-Colonel I-SMC,

Operations Officer.

(e) A Group Order,

File No----------------- Striking Group. FMF WinglSECRET. L~’KE FIELD, OAHU, T. H.

Operation Order 5 June __-_$ 1200.h-o. 1.

Maps: Hawaii, I: 20,000, * * *.Charts: Hawaiian Islands * * *.

TASK ORGANIZATION (May be omitted for Group).

1, (a), (1) Surface.—Enemy forces lmve been located onHAWAII at * * *.

Heavy gLul emplacements ant{ fortifications exist at * * *.Supply establishments have been photographed at * * *.See F–2 Report and Situation Map, and objecti~-e folders “A”and “B.:> For details of enemy antiaircraft defenses and Air-craft Reporting Net see special Situation May (appenclecl).(9) Air.—.$t least two squnclrons of hostile fighters of the

low-wing monoplane type are defending the installa-tions on H.IWAIL For details of tactics employed see F-2Report.

* * * * * * *

(b) (1) Surface.—The Nleet Marine Force, s~lpporte(l b:- tl~ecombat vessels of the (Blank) Attack Force. will exec[~te lal~d-ings at * * * ol~ HAITAII. beginning * * *.(2) Air.—The .lir Forcej ( Blank) Attack Force. \~ill pro,-i,legeneral air support for the (Illal&) .lttack Force and \-esselsof the transport group during tile approxch to H-il~”.!II. . ‘-$ircrzft Wing, Fleet Marine Force. will reconnoiterHAWAII, initiate oflensive missions against the hostile cle-fenses, ancl provide close air support for the lxndings. See . IF–3 Operations Map * * *.

2. This Group. supported by T-lIF–II and T“31F–IQ. n-ill initi-ate offensive air operations ~gainsr the defenses of H.IN”AIIon 6 June ---- by attackin~ the objectives specified ill Objec-ti~e Folcler”A” ancl “B.”

Route Out: DI-lMOX-D HE.iD—L.l.A~- PT. —C.lPEK.%E.i-KE.\HOLE PT. —Ol)jecti~-es,

Route Back: Direct.Time of Take off: 0300.6 ,Jllne,Group Assembly: DIAM03-1) HEAD. 0;320. 2t)~o0feet.

right eckelon of sqLIaclrons, YII.\-12 YM.\-?, T“MB-1, VMB-?.

Group Initial Point: IiE-lHOLE PT.Axis of Attack: Objective .“-1””!l]’ 31ag.

Objecti~-e ‘-B’” 30C Msg.Maneuver after Attack: 130nlbers withdraw il~di\-icl-

unlly at low altitude direct to Rally Point. Attacksquadrol~s execute 180C turn ancl procee~l to RallyPoint.

Rally: KEAHOLE PT., 2,000 ft.. group javelin forn~a-ticm (See sketch attache(l).

Landing Instructions: I.an{l in or[ler of take oil * * “.3. (a) VMB-1, wpportecl by T“31A-1, will attnck objecti~e .;.}”’

with 100 ib. demolition bombs: repea[ ing attacks as necessayyto expend bomb load and acconlplisll neutralization. Sec-ondary objective: * * *(b) VMB-2, snpportecl by I’3L-2, will attack objective *“B”with 500 lb. bonlbs. Secondary objective: Supply Baseat***.(c) VMA-1 will SU])pOt’t YM3-1 in the attack of objective‘6A)’ by neutralization of hostile .$.1 defense at * * *.(cl) VMA-2 will suppol’t T-MB-2 in the attack of objective‘6B” by neutralization of hostile -\.\ defenses at * * *.(m) (1) Emergency refueling at K.%HOOLAWE a’t direc-tion of Group Comnmncler only.

4.

5.

93

Bomb loaclings for Attack Sqll:~c[rom::30 h. fr:lgnlenttltioll 1)01111)s.-i. p. machine gun mllnLL-

nit ion. One section in each squ:ulro]l will carry smoket~llli~ in lien of bollll}>.All Imits flwl to cap:~city.

(b’) (1) GroIIp Comminderin l–~lB–l.Deputy Colllmiln(ler, Wijor ‘“~-M-l-l.’-

(3 Group CP. LUKE FIELD.Fighting Grolll). Fleet -\ir Base. PE.lRL HARBOR.

B:- order of Colw]el ‘-G.:’“F”

Lieutenant Colonel, ~-SMC.Executi\-e Officer.

Annexes:******

Distribution:

“B.”Official:

u~~.’,

I@jor I-SMC,Oper:\tions Officer.

94

.\PPENDIx B

CHARACTERISTICS OF AERIAL BOMBSI’fimmxntt

Purpose of .\ppeuclix _________________________________________________ -Classes of Bombs ----------------------------------------------------Demolition Bombs ----------------------------------------------------Armor-Piercing Bo[nbs ------------------------------------------------Fragmentation Bombs ------------------------------------------------Chemical Bombs ______________________________________________________Practice Bombs -------------------------------------------------------Parachute Type Bombs -----------------------------------------------Need of Different Size Demolition Bon]hs ------------------------------Tactical Principles in Selectiou of Bombs------------------------------Effectiveness of Demolition Bombs Against Specified Objectives ( table 1) -Bomb Craters (tables 2 and 3) ----------------------------------------Depth of Water Penetration (table 4) _________________________________Blast effect on Reinforced Concrete (table 5) --------------------------Data Relative to Effectiveness of Demolition Bombs in Operi~tions

Against Personnel (tables 6 and 7)----------------------------------Summary (table 8)---------------------------------------------------Conclusion ___________________________________________________________

123456799

101112

1314

151617

1. Purpose of Appendix.—The purpose of this appenclix is to de-scribe briefly the bombs employecl by bombing and attack ~~-iation,and to provide a general working Lmowledge of their capabilities.Since no proper assignment of txsks can be rnacle -without such knowl-edge it is essential that commanders be thorougldy familiar with thepower, effect, possibilities, and limit ations of these agents of destruc-tion available to aviation.

2. Classes of Bombs.—Bombs tnny be classified as follows:Explosive:

Demolition.Armor-piercing.Fragmentation.

Chemical:Incendiary.Smoke.Gas.

Inert:Practice.

3. Demolition Bombs.—(a) The clemolition bomb is designed forthe destruction of material object.i~es. The destructive effect of thisbomb is produced by the cletonation of its high explosi~-e content,and varies with the quantity of explosive cent ained. The majorityof service demolition bombs are of the “thin-walled” typej whichsacrifices stren~tih of casing (and consequent. penetrating power) forincreased explosive capacity.

—

95

(b) Sizes.—Demolition bombs in use by the .lrn~y ancl XaYy, re-spectively. differ somewhat in size, weight. and explosive content.During peace-time operations. Marine aviation normally ?mploysbombs furnished by the Xavy: under the stress of ni~tiOnal emer-gency. Marine units mxy be supplied with bombs from Army stock.For this reason a brief description of the bombs of both semices isEiven. The following is a tabulation of the most common sizes withreference to actual weight find explosive content:

Size (pound)

loo_. ._-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .loo-. .- . . . ..-- _-. . . . . . . .boo--------------------500. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .500. . . . . . . --------------600-- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1,000-------------------1,000-------------------1,000-------------------1,100-------------------2!000------------------

(Pounds).4rmy ._. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112Xavy (}IKI-3) ----------- 116>“a~~- (MKIV) . . . . . ..-...l 119.5.$rmj-- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295Xavy (111{111-1 )... . . . . . . 475.5xaYy(MK Ix)----------- 491.Irmy -------------------- 600Xa\->- (MK III) ----------- 973A-avy (.ll T V) ------------ 976Xavy(MK IX). -- . . . . . ..- 9S8.4rm>--------------------- 1, 140.4rm>------------------- 2, 000

Explosivecharge(TNT)

(Pottnds)656554.5

162.340323322509771731605

1, 130

(c) Body Characteristics.—Depencling upon the shapeof body,demolition bombs are known w+ “streamline” or “cylinclrical.”Although the “stre~mline:” form creates less air resistance duringdescent, the ballistic characteristics of the two are, for practicalpurposes, the same. l~odern development tends to-ward the “cylin-drical” type becanse of reclncecl cost in manufacture and greaterstrength of casing.

(d) Strength of Bomb Cases.— Against, certain targets instan-t.ane.ouscletonation on the surface is required. Against others, deto-nation must be delmyed until after the bomb has penetrated thesurface. of the target. Orclinarily. the bomb fuze determines theexact moment of this detonation: and, whether instantaneous ordelayecl, it is imperative that the bomb case be intact at the time,in order that the maximum effect of the explosion mwy be obtained.For this reason. the strength of the average demolition bomb case iswch that it will not only withstand the shock of impact, but willpenetrate an “unprotected” surface to the maximum diameter of thebomb without breaking.

—

96

\, I Fuzes.—Tlw b{)I~iljfum is Nl~~ecl~:~~]ic:~ldevice to init.i:~te deto-

n~lti~,l~. I)cn]tJlitio[~ bt)]~ll)~ of tlw 300-poulld cl:~ss, imcl alx)~-e, h:l~-ehotll nose u1lL1t:lil fuzes, ,Snltlller bombs hw only tl~e no+ fuze.Fuzes >Ire class itie~l as to ~vlwtller they nre instontaueous or

cIel:\\-e~l ill their :t~’tiol~. .L[l illst:int:llleous fllze is designe(l to giveimmetli:lte exl)lositJll ul)oll inlp:wt: while tilt? (lelity ftlze is (le$igl]~(l

to I)erlllit 1)(’lletl:ttion of tile t:tlget I)ef{)re exl)loclillgt llebolllb. Bothtj-pe~ ;Ire e(lllil)I)e(l with :Irn)illg (lerice~ wl)icll :IIION-%ufe” droppilgfrom :Ilritu(les ul)clel 4.000 feet.

4. .+rmor Piercing Bombs. —Tl~is is a sl)ecial type of bonlb de-signe(l t,) pierce t:]rgets prt)tected b]- :Irnlor ~)lilt(?. Tile LN311111l]][lst

be (lro~)pe{l fronl lligll :Iltitudes to ntt:lill the ~-elf)city llece+[~ry t’orpenecr:~tiol~: :~n~l. to il)s[lre penetr:lti~)n witllt)ut bre:tl:ing: tlw wfil]sof tile honlb nlust be of Itllllsu:ll strenglh. ant{ consequent tbicinless.This necessitt~tes. for N giyen size bomb. o reduction in explosil-econtel~t: ~~u(lreslllts in :1 much less effective IIetonation tht~n tlh~t ofthe il~-elnge ‘Lthin-wolle(l.. type bomb of tile mme size. The 1,000 -polil~tll-ilrjl)(,nll).31k 111 (see table. par. W),isthenen rest approxi-m:ltion of the armor piercing bomb. Forther c]evelopment :~ppenrssusljended. :1~ it is belie~.ecl the thin-wa]led demolition bonlb is

c:lp:lble of destroying nny t~lrget.5. Fragmentation Bombs.— ({I) Description.—The fm~nlenta-

tion bonlb ]Yeiglls t~l)l)loxilllzttely 30 pound:. nnfl 11:1,smn explosiwcontent of 4.66 l>(,u1]c1>of T>”T. The bomb body consists of Llcylin-

dric:ll steel tube o~-er wbith is fitted a number of steel rings. Thetube c:lrrie> the explosive: while tbe rings fornl the muterial for frag-merit. -. 011 detonnt ion the rings break into nbout 1.400 pieres. Thebonlb is titte(l witl~ only one fl~ze. which is insmncnneow Lindcarrieclin tile nose.

[ 3 ) Explosive Eff ects.—Tlle fol lowing are Il(,tes con~l)iled fromArn]j- tests with reg:lr(l to tile explosive etiects of 30-pound fr:~g-mentmtion bonlbs:

1. B1~lst effect : at one foot comp:lres fnl-ol’~ibly with 100-pounddemolition bomb :~t three to four feet. Bl:~st effect by clirect hitis T-cry effective on tanks. trucks: etc.

2. Percentage of hits l\-ben clropped with parachute, permittingbomb to strike vertically (bose(l on low pnnel tests). Tlrgets plnceclat V:lrying distnnces from point of impact, M shown:

Feet: PerrcHt_ 10033 ---------------------------------------------------- 86

66 --------------------99 ---------------------------------------------------- 43

1:2 ---------------------------------------------------- 25163 ---------------------------------------------------- 18

97

3. 31axil))um danger ra(lius froni fm.gnlents: 500 ynrds.(r) Targets.—The followil)g are consi,lerecl as proper targets for

fr:lgnlellt:ltioll lmlnl)s: Alirpl:ulw. small open boats, Se:lrclllights,tl’UCliS, artillery tr:tc’tors, personnel. animals, and other torgets easilydestroye(l b~- fm~ments.

6. Chemical Bombs.— ({~) Definition.-lle chen]icnl lwn~b is theinstrnnlel~t to be enlploye~l when it is necessary to apply chemicalagents to all ol)jecti l-e fl~)nl high altitudes. .\ltl~ou@l chemicalbonlbs weigliing fr{)n~ 2S to 32 pounds ( depending on filling) areavailable to t~ttt~Cli aviation for low altitude bombil~g, it is mltici-patecl that chenlical spray \vill u>ual]y tt~lie prececience orer bombsfor this type of lvork. Hence tile cliscmsioll container in this paLYL-

gRIpII \\-ill be linlited Solely t{) tl]ose bombs contelllplatecl for use bybombing aviation. L

(b) Description.—Ill appearance the chemical bonll) closely re-sembles tl~e delnolitiol~ bomb. since it is essential that bith have thesame ballistic characteristics. ~-nlike the demolition bomb, how-ever, it needs only a nlean5 of expelliwg its contents upon impact;and the bomb c:~se neecl be DO stronger than necessarr to containthe chenlical :Igent until th:lt time.

(c) Tin-Can Bombs.—There has recently been cle~-eloped a newmethocl of distributing chel~lic:lls from aircrnft. One-gallon tincontainers fillecl with the desirecl chemical are placecl 0]1 bomb racksor corried inside the airplane:. When c:wried inside the airplane,they are fed through a cl~ute to insure even clistrilmtion. TheyslloLlld be tlropped from low a]titudes ill order to insure accuracyancl avoid Llnclue clissipatioll of the chemicals. On impact thesecontainers break. ancl eoch cctlltaminates an area of ab(mt 10 yarckin rlclius.

(d) Incendiary Bombs.–Innsn~uch M it has been founcl thatdemolition bombs have a nlnrked incendiary effect, in adclition totheir power of explosiol~. furtl~er cle~elopment ofa bomb for solelyincendiary purposes ha: been wspellclecl.

(e) Smoke bombs.— (1) White phosphorus.—Closely aliin to anincenclia ry bomb is the white phosphorus bomb, since particles fromthe Iltter, when falling upon easily con~bL1stible material, willqLlickl}- caLlse fires. BILt vihite phosphorLLs has other, ancl more im-portant. fm]ctions. It cre:~tes casualties when particles strike menand anim~l>. It is also o:le of the most effective screening agents;and for this renson is classed as a smoke bomb. From an aviationviewpoint, white phosphorLw bombs fincl their primary use in thecreation of obscuring smoke C1OL1C1Sfor protection of aircraft againstantiaircraft fire. They may thm be enlployecl against antiaircraft

—

98

batteries with a two-fold purpose in mind. i. e.. to blind tlw b:lt-teries~ and to cause casualties to the personnel maiming them.

( 2) Water Impact Smoke Bomb.—llis is N floatil)~ bo~nb (le-signed by tl~e NTavy for producing n snloke screen at or near tile stwfaceof the water. It weighs apl)roximately 50 pounds. and couminsapproximately 28 pounds of smoke mixture. It col~sists, in brief,of an aluminum nose casting which carries a pyrotechnic smokecharge, :i hollow wood float which provides lmoyancy> four fills$and a valve cap. ‘1’Ile nose of the bomb carries a water irnp:~ct fuze.Impact with tile water operates the firing mechanism in the nose:which, acting through a primer: a time fuze. and a quick match,initiates the action of the smoke mixture. The bomb emits a densewhite smoke for about three minutes.

(~) Gas Bombs.— (1) General.-Gas bon~hs me {le~elcjlxvl in CmI-

junction with the Chemical Warfare Service. Such bombs n]a~- befillecl with any type of chemical agent. Anlong tile n~ost con~monfillings are tear gas and mustard.

(2) lfl~stard.–~lllst:lrd bombs are used to create cas~mlties a,t,,,ngmen and animals; and are usecl tig:linst sLlch targets as: air(lronles:installation or areas whic]l have been clamaged by destructivebombardment ancl which must be repaired; collll~l~lllic:~tioll cel~ters:sLlpply centers; AA battery positions; railroad yards: defiles; bridgeapproaches; poi.hts where troops are assembled for motor. rai]~or water transportation; decks of small or commercial vessels. andaircraft carriers. It will be noted from the above list, that manj- ofthe targets are equally appropriate for attack units.

(3) Tear Gas Bombs.–Tear gas bombs are used for harrasingeffect where high concentrations are desire(l over limited areas.

7. Practice Bombs.—This type of bomb is used to gi~e bombingpersonnel the requisite training in bombinwloading bombs on airplanes.

~; an~l in handling all(l

8. Parachute Type Bombs.—The most recent development, in thefragmentation and smaller chemical bombs, for use by attack nria-tion, is the parachute type bomb. Instead of the fin assembly ofthe orclinary bomb, this type has a parachute fitted to it. AS thebomb is released from the airplane, the parachute opens and ~rmsthe bomb. This action of the parachute also serves to retard thebomb in its clescent. Because of this latter fmture. this type ofbomb has made it possible for airplanes to bomb at greatly reducedaltitudes without f em of being struck by fragments from their o ii-nbombs. Whereas the minimum safe altitude for dropping bombwithout the parachute is 800 feet: the minimum safe xltitude withthe parachute is 65 feet. This 10]v altitude of release insures greateraccuracy in bombing, and like~rise reduces exposure to hostile anti-

— -,

99

nirct-aft fire and pursuit ayiation. Parachute bombs can be carriedsuspended vertically on internal bomb racks and horizontally onexternal bomb rncks.

9. Need of Different Size Demolition Bombs.—Since the powerof a clemolition bumb varies with its explosive content, it is possibleto design bombs for >pecific type missions. Obviously! z bomb whichw-ill destroy a strong massive objecti~-e \\-ill also destroy a lightfragile objecti~-e. Howerer$ that bomb is so hen~y that no @eat num-beu could be carried on one flight. It would therefore be a waste ofpower and of effort to employ a bomb heavier than necessary todestroy the objective. It is also desiroble to keep the number of sizesof bombs to a reasonable minimum coiwistent -with economy of powerilll(l effort. The resulting compromise is represented by the varioussizes of (lemo]ition bombs pre~-iollslv described.

10. Tactical Principles in Selection of Bombs.— ( a) X-ever use abomb heayier than that necessary to accomplish the desirecl results.It is better to carry ninny bombs of the proper size, and thus obtaina high probability of hitting and destroying the objecti~e$ tlmn tocarry a hezvier bomb than necessary with the resulting reductionin the probability of hitting the target and applying more powerthan necessary to destroy it.

(V) .Al\~aysuse a bomb of sufficient size to accomplish the clestruc-tion clesired. If a 600-pouncl bomb is requirecl, two 300-poundbombs will not accomplish the same destruction.

11. Effectiveness of Demolition Bombs Against Specified Ob-jectives.— (a) GeneraL-The data tabulated in this paragraph arebased 011practicaltestsconductedin thisand h foreign countries,

and on cleductions by the Ordnance Department: United States .4rmy.These data. while conservative. have not been entirely supported byresults of practical tests. A’evertheless. they indicate reasonable ex-pectations of the results which may be secured from bombing opera-tions. and may be elllplo~ed with a reasontible degree of reliancefor tactical purposes.

(b) Navy Bombs.—Owing to the lack of specific data on thecapabilities of Savy bombs (listed in par. 3b). these bombs are notconsidered in the cliscussion which follol~s. Howe~er,. in orcler toarrive at some workable figures for their employment: It is believedthat a process of deduction may be resortecl to. Thus: where a h~avybomb has a TXT content corresponding to that of an Army bomb,it may reasonably be expected to have the same explosi~e effect and,consequently. the same destructive cnp~bilities. (See par. 3a.) Forpractical purposes, then. it can be assumecl that. the 100-pound Navybomb has the same destructive powers as the 100-pound Army bomb;tile 500-pound J“a\’Y bomb, the same as the 600-pound Arnly bomb;

100

—

—_

2

E 6

s

103

I

I —-.,,,

Bomb (pOulKl)~ Dr[)tl] of Di:iill(,t(,r

crater ilt Slllfllcc!

Il’c’d

9131720~‘2

20

27

3745

5

7101317

I50

1

Ihrth dis-placed

CIL,y[ls.-4

10172847

3070

1703?(J

600

(b) Craters in Solid Rock.—The following table shows cratersthat hare been obtained in solid rock. which v-as clescribecl bygeologists as ‘hGr:~nite-porpllyry.” While there is no positive infor-mation arailable relative to the harcll]ess Or ability to resist pene-tration of this rock compared -with reinforced col~crete, this txblenmy prOYide a gllide in the selection of the proper tJ{)nlb to attaclkmassive, hew~-i]y armored installations thllt may be constructed inthe future.

105

,-

,) I,,, I

I

I

,—

I

_.E0E

!,, ,

,,

,,,

OcooOcccCoot*- +- +- u7-

,,,,!!,

,,, ,

,,, ,

,(, ,

,,, ,

,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,, ,,,, ,,,(I

,,, ,

,,!,

!,, ,

,,

OdooCooo..00

-- --- m-N-

106

13. Depth of Water Penetration.—The follom-ing table outlinesthose clistances below the surface of tl~e water :It whicli sewrxl typesof demolition bombs equipped with delay f~uws will cletonare w-henreleased from various altitudes. In cleternlining tl~e probable re-sults to be expectecl in attacks against a particular ship. ilanl. OY ?reservoir. for example: the table will in(licate that pnrt of tlu+target .!which w-ill recei~e the greatest, blast effect. From the commuctionof the target at that particular point. tlw (Ie:tructive w$lllts nlaybe estimatecl.

Table 4.—DEPTH OF WATER PEN’ETR.\TIO\- W-ith 0.10 sec. delay fuze

.Mtitucle of release (feet) 300 ! 600 1,100 2,000, pounds polmds powi. pl)llllds

I

I Feel : Ftef Feet FCCi2,000 ._.. _--- . . . . . . . . . -------~ 24 2Ij 2s 304,000-. - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...-.1 33 \ :33 37 39

6,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...1 37 :jg ,42 .!3

8,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 43 4(; .jo

10,000- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...! 41 +1; .>0 ,>412,000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...! 43 1~ ,-)3 .-)7

14. Blast Effect on Reinforced Concrete.—Tlle t:tble ,’II{jR-11 ill

this paragraph contains clata pertinent to tl]e selection {Ii ai)l)rt~-priate bombs for operations against dam:. l)iers. moles, (I()!:!i+. ;illflother massi~e objecti~es, Eoch of the. bomb. ii>tecl cttl~hla.t tlliolyl~

a reinforced concrete w-all of the tlliclnles; Il(ltw.1opl)t~~i~e if tl~ebomb deton:ltes close alougside the wall. The diameter of rlw holeblastecl is approximately twice the thicln~ess of tbe wall. The hl:lsteffect of a bomb cletonating below the water and alcmgsitle a talgetsuch 0s a clam or reservoir? is augmented by l~ydraulie pre~sure.If the thickness of the target at that clista~~cebehm the surface ofthe n-ater where cletonation occlws is NOgle:iter than ap])roximatelytwice that which can be penetrated by the blast effect of tile bolnb,the forces of blast etl’ect ancl hyclra[dic pwssute shmdd be suchas to cause similar clamage to that resultil)g from coniplere })elle-Iration. that is, collapse of the” structure abo~-e tl]e place at whicl~detonation occurs, This table, in conjunction with table :3. may ‘be usecl, for example, in estimtting the probable results of tlle Nttackof a clam. If a 2,000-pounc] bomb with a O.10-wconcl clela?- t’llze isdropl>ecl from an altitude of 12,000 feet, it n-ill (letonnte 57 feetbelow the surface of the water. The construction of the p~~rticldartype of dam will inclicate its thiclwess at this distance below the

107

water level. If the thickness of the particular dam at this pointis apprcminmtely 25 feet. the bomb detonating alongside the WZIIon the water side shoulcl blast out n portion of the clam with thepmbobility of resulting collnpse of the structure above tlli~t point.

Table 5.—BLAST EFFECT OX REINFORCED CONCRETE W.4LL

IType of bomb Thie,:ys of ~ Dianieter of

(pound).

I hole blasted

( ,

(Feet) ~ (Feet)600-------------------------------------------- S. 6 17.21,100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 , 20. s2,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3 24.6

15. Data Relative to Effectiveness of Demolition Bombs inOperations Against Personnel.—

Table 6.—HORIZONTALD~XGER R.\DI~S BOMB FR.4G}1ENTSMaxiu]um danger

radius of frngmentsfrom point ofdetOnatiOnl

Bo]nb (WUII(l) :100300

I

Ym’ds~w, _______________________________________________ 1. OC)O

1.0:0 J2.000 _- —____________________________________________ 2,000

(a) Relative Ineffectiveness of Fragments.—The abo~e table in-dicates the clistnnce atwhich a fragment from a detonated bomb casingwill disable a man. The above distances are approximate md indicatethe radius in which a bomb casing fragment is tmveling with suffi-cient energy (60-foot-pouncls) to cause casualties to persolmel. It. isnot intended to convey the impression that 100 percent cmsuzlties willbe obtainecl within the danger raclius. The percentage of personnelthat will be hit at ranges of 500, 1,000 ancl 2,000 yarcls is ~-ery small.The Ordnance Department, in contlucting the Low Panel Test withkneeling silhouettes to determine the percentage of panels perforatedat varying distances from point of detonation of the 30-pcmncl fragm-entation bomb. arrived at the following figures:

Percent10 meters ___________________________________________________ 100

20 ]]leters ____________________________________________________ S630 xneters --------------------------------------------------- 4340 nleters --------------------------------------------------- 2?550 meters ___________________________________________________ IS

108

These figures nmy be interpreted to meai~ that mi[hin IO metersfrom the point of detonation 100 percent casualties may be expected;within 50 meters, 18 percent casualties are expected. The assumptionthat the percenta~e of casualties I-aries inverse]; with distance isroughly correct. The statement that fragments oi demolition bombsmay be dangerous xt a point as dist:u~t as 2.000 yards is included inthis text to serve as a guide in pe:~cetime safety requirements. The -probability of obtaining casualties cm personnel at such it distonce isinfinitely small.

When it is appreciated that the fragments fronl clem,)lition bombs -are much fewer tl~anthose of fragmentation bombs? weight for weight,the percentage of Cil~UILltiesis C~IISide~ilb]y less with the we of c~enlo]i-tion bombs even :tt shorter rwdii.

Therefore, this cliscussion will serw to emphasize the point thatdemolition bombs sl~oL~ldl~ot be employed in the attack of troops orof animals. The fragmentation bomb is best suited ;O sucl~ missions.The superior fragment:ltion of such bombs -will greatly outweighany zdvant ages which nmy. theoretically. result fron~ tlw ilwrea~eclblast effect of demolition bombs in the vicinity of tlw point ofdetonation.

Table 7.—BL.WT EFFECT OS PERSOX>-EL

Bomb (I)OIUICIS): F#.?tl~o____________________________________________________ 44)

3m ---------------------------------------------------- X56oo ----------------------------------------------------- 75

l,lm ___________________________________________________ 91)2.o@)--------------------------------------------------- 10)

(b) Relativ-e Ineffecti~7eness of B1ast Effect.-Ex~)eril~~e[lts ll:z~reindicated that the blast etlecc res}dting from the detormtiol~ of TNTis at any given point approxinl:~[ely clirectly proporrimml to theamount of tile explosive {Ietonxted. Hen-ever, it is further indicatedthat the blast effect’ for any given amount of TN-T is inverselyproportional to the square or cube of the distance from the pointof detonation. ‘The radius of etyectiveness resulting from blast isvery limitecl. This may be nppreciatecl by reference to Table 1wherein it is note(l tht the dan$yr radius in which bombs must, deto-

nate to achieve destructive rwl~lts on nmt&iel objectives is quite small.The above table, reviewecl in conjunction with Table 6. will enl-.phasize further the fzll:lcy of employin~ demolition bombs agoinst

109

16. Summary.— (a) Use of Demolition Bombs.—Denlo1itionbombs should be employed solely agtinst mat6riel objectives. Whilecasualties to personnel ancl animals may result from the destructionof rnatdriel objectives, this is purely incidental. Demolition bombsshouhl not be employed against bivouacs or troops concentrations

* with the prinlary object of destroying personnel, nor shoulcl theybe employec~ against light mat6riel objectives which are susceptibleto destruction by fragmentation bombs. Fragmentation bombs dis.

. tributed over an occupied airdrome should result in greater damageto the zirpinnes thereon than that achiered by demolition bombs.Demolition bon}bs may be employed properly against airdromes ofpernmnent. construction upon which may be founcl brick, steel, andccncrete hangaw. workshops. warehouses, and living quarters. Amission agoinw suc]l fin objective would involve destruction of thepermanent construction.

(3) Buildings.—Demolition bombs me particularly efficaciousagainst tl}e a~-er:lge factorv or w-arehollse. The 100-fi demolitionL&lb has been proven effe~tive for the destruction of sL~chtargets.The most effective destruction is securecl by a clirect hit, although ahit adjacent to m builcling m~y procluce very material damage.The blast effect of a bomb which detonates after penetrating a build-ing may be expected to cause extensive destruction to machinery,equipment. supplies. and the structure of the builc~ing itself. Thedelay fuze is clesirecl for two reasons: when a bomb strikes a roof,the-dama:e is far greater if it penetrates well into the builclingbefore detonating: when a bomb misses a bllilcling by a small amount,,the mining effect obtained by delay fuzes may undermine the struc-ture and cause the collapse of certain members.

(c) Lines of Communication.—Rail lines of communications areappropriate targets for demolition bombs. The m~xinmm amountof damage is secured if a train is hit, as the wreck of a trzin, togetherwith the destruction of rails and the formation of a crater, will in-crease the delay inciclent to clearing the right of way and repairingthe damage. A bricl.ge is the most effectire point of attack of anyparticular line of communication as its reconstruction nmy requireweeks. Reconstruction in the face. of continuing attacks may be im-possible. Therefore. demolition bombs used a~~inst rail terminalswhen quantities of rolling stock are present and against briclges willmost effecti~-ely clestroy lines of communications. To indicate theresults which ma-y be anticipated in the attack of rail lines, a briefr&um6 of tests conducted by the British in 1918 are outlined. Bombsof 25- ib. 50- W? 112-W, and 230- ti~ sizes were droppecl on railroacltracks. Extracted from the reports are the following typical results:

110

Table 8.—EFFECTOX R. MLROADTR~CIQGE

Bomb(lb.)

2.5

50

112

230

—.

Amountof explo

sive

Po und.q12.5

21

28

100

Point ofhit

3 feet fromcel]terof track.

Center oftrack.

Center oftracli.

Cellter c,ftrack.

lltitude Crater dimen-Of

releasesions

Fed2.000 10 feet x 6 feet x

10 feet.

2, 000 14 feet s 7 feet s

h-otes

.

Searest rail ClIt.

Other rail t)el,t. Stinlbers destroyed. .

Radius ri],g thruw] 611 feet. feet. Outer rsiL

be],t. I]lrwr rail

thrown 70 yards.

2.000 9 feet s 6 feet x O[le rail cut, the other9 feet. beut. 9 timbers de-

stro>-ed.2.000 22 feet x 9 feet s One rail t]rokeu at fish

80 feet, plate and w’hoierailthro~vrl 40 vards.Other rail irokenin timee places. 13tinlbers destroyed.

e~ent of a direct hit being registered on the permanent ~~i~~- with a112-pouncl bomb, the da]nage >() caused cm us~lal 1~-be made goocl bya party of ten men in fronl one to one and one-half’ hours. Themaximum damage caused by a direct hit with a 2:30-pound bombwould take tw-o to tlmee hours to repair with ten men am ilable. Thefigures are the result of actual operations and based on the assump-tion that the materials for repair are at hand. The above figuresdo not include the tilliJlg of the craters but just sufficient repair workto m~lke passage of a trainpos>ib]e. The British Air Ministry is

further of the opinion that in the attack of railwa;s the resultantdelay is due chiefly to the 10SSof time incident to bringing up mate-rials and men to effect tile necessary repairs :In{l that it is notunreasonable to suppose th:~t at least six huurs N-OUICIbe lost in bring-ing up the materials and lilen necessary to carry out the repairs inthe event of a direct hit by a 2:30-pound bomb. In the alx,ve figures.n.o account is taken of the disorganization of trafic ;ind colgestjon oftrains produced by the delay. It dlou]cl be noted that in comp:wingthe results achieved with wartime bombs with the probilble resultswhich might be secured by the present type of bombs, the effects ofthe 230-poulLd bomb rather tlmn the Ilf?-pound bomb more l~earlyapproaches the .lltleric~m 1(10-pouncl bomb. The :tn~oulIt of explosive

111

contai!led ill the .imeric:tn 100-pouncl demolition bomb is 65 pounclsas against only ~~ ~}(,{,11({5,Jf exl>]osil-e in this particul:lr British

1k?-pouml boml).

(d) Underground Objectives.—t-ndergroilncl rail~~zys, Subwxyslsewers, w:~rer ;Ind g,ls nltlin~, underground electric telephone, and

-1~ by clelayed :~ction demolitionpower lil~es c:ln be d:lnlagefl ~eriom~honll]s wl~i~ll l~i[ in the streets nbore them. Stucly of the constructionof subwap for ~-el~ic[d;~ror mil traflic iudicates thot no cliflicultyv-ill be enu~llllterwl in cnusing considemble clestruction to a subwayshould a direct bit be ~ecurtxl. subwuy roofs axe ordilmri]y ~bouttwo feet thick. There is l~~uallybut al)o~~tfive feet of soil abore thesubway rOOf. It i~ppt,tlrs that the 600-pollnd denl(>lition bombequipped with a del~l~-fuze will penetrate to the sub~wy e~-ell if oneof tbe rimf beams i> nit, with Jeton:ltif)n occurring very close to theroof. The re~uIting detomltion should collop>e the sllpports within:1 It).fot)t r:l(li~ls of Tile [j~Jl)-l)OLuldbonlb. tlllls ct[ving in tile r{mf fora consiller~ll}le ~~reii. .~ (jl]()-polln(l Ijonll) landing :~lt)l~gsideor witllil~ten feet of tbe reti~ining wa11swill c:~llse colltllht’ ot’ :~greet lx)rtionof the w:lli. Ij(l{)-polln(l bt)l~lb~lalldillg :~lol~gtbe tullllel exit> sllold(lcut out support a]ltl retiiilling walls, re~~llting ill :1 c:lye.il~ +~lfi~iel~t

to st,>p trnf!ic until reptlired. L-ndergrollnd water nl~cl g:l~ nl:li)lswithin tell feet frolll tile surfoce of tbe grottlld >Il{)ul(l be (lestroyed\vitll little ~litficulty by (lsing 600-po~ilNl bol~~bs. Hits witl)in titleel~feet of tl~e nl:~ills :ile re{lllire(l. 111the e:-el)t tllt~t )nxills are withinfire feet fr~)nl the sllrf~lce. :)o@pOllIld bOlllb5 sIIo(lI(l :~cl~iere the{lalli~lge required.

(e) Naval Vessels. —Ptktest5cmried out in tbiscountry find inEl~glz\~I(lhave l)lwwI1 col~c,lusively tlult Nll t}-l)e> of n:~v:tl ~-essels canbe either -ullk by denlolition bonlb~, or so seriollsly d;ll)):~ge(l as torender Chenl inetfectil-e. .Iny I-essel without a protective deck callbe easily destroyed by demolition bombs, eitherby clirect bits or byhits ill tl~e woter clme to the \-essel’s sicle. Lxrge-ty-pe clemolitionbol~ll)s striking l~it~~~l~e>sels~~-l)icl~l~:~~elle}~~-ilyprckected decks willcolllpletel~ del)l{)li~ll tbe ~UperStrUCtUre of SUCh Ve%ek. If hits areobtt~ined close to gun turret>. t.bese turrets willbe rendered ineffective.It is clifficwlt to believe that any type of battleship now aflmt colddlong continue its pltwe iu the battle line if subjected to se~eral hitsby large cap:lcity boml~s. e\Tenthough the protectif-e deck itself werenot penetrated.

17. Conclusion. —From this brief study of the capabilities ofaerial b{]nlbs. it is npp:~rent tl:i~t in orcler to obtxin best res(dts fromairb~lt~~bilrcllllelltthere n~ust be a c:~reful selection of wenpons for theobjectire. The aeri~ll bomb is inherently a vre:lpon of grent destruc-tive power when properly applied; it is comparatively ineffective

112

when poorly placed; or when the capacity of the bomb is ill suitedto the task at hand. The proper application of the bomb to theobjective is a matter of air marksmanship and of concern only to theavittor; the selection of proper sizes and types of bombs to accom-plish the degree of destruction sought is a matter of interest. to allofficers who may exercise tactical control over attached or assignedaviation unik~.

.