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FNI Climate Policy Perspectives 1 October 2011

Japan after the Quake:Prospects for Climate Policy

Alexandru Luta



FNI Climate Policy Perspectives 1 October 2011


Alexandru LutaPhD CandidateTokyo Institute of [email protected]

The triple calamity of 11 March 2011 has dealt a serious blow domestically to the credibility of the Japanese nuclear industry, putting the country’s energy policy in flux.

The severe impact on the country’s infrastructure, the unwieldiness of its bureaucracy and thechaotic political situation preclude Japan’s energy policy from explicitly re -orientating itself before the middle of 2012, but political consensus seems to be emerging that the country’smid-term pledge on emission reductions will need to be curtailed.

The bill on renewable energy passed under Prime Minister Kan marked a step in the right

direction, but was shallow and politically opportunistic. Its future impact on policy isuncertain.

With other policy instruments on climate proposed by the Democratic Party of Japan toothlessor abandoned, Tokyo’s ability to engage in significant mitigation activities domestically is inquestion.

Opposition to a second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol remains firm; Japan willcontinue to pursue bilateral mechanisms outside the UNFCCC framework.

Given its frail domestic policy and a stated readiness to act internationally outside multilateralframeworks, Japan’s promise to carry out significant mitigation activities even in the absenceof a clear and comprehensive post-2012 legal instrument should be viewed with a critical eye.

The Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) is an independent, non-profit institution engaged in research on international environmental, energy and resource management politics. Perspectives is an independent service enterprise that works inconsultation with the private sector as well as governments and NGOs in realizing and enhancing instruments in theinternational greenhouse gas market. FNI exercises quality control and editing of the papers, but the views expressed arethe sole responsibility of the authors.



F N I C L I M A T E P O L I C Y P E R S P E C T I V E S 1

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During COP-16 in Cancún, Japan’s firm rejection of a second commitment period to theKyoto Protocol (KP CP2), ‘under any circum-stances and conditions’ in the words of nego-tiator Arima Jun1, came as an unpleasant joltto other negotiators – yet it cannot be said tohave been unexpected. Japan’s share of worldgreenhouse emissions, along with that of theAnnex I countries covered by the KP, has beensteadily decreasing. Tokyo has also long beendisenchanted with the US rejection of the

Protocol, and has refused in turn to join CP2,which would not bind its other main economiccompetitors, the emerging economies, to limittheir ballooning emissions.

To take Tokyo’s strong words as mere post-uring and to believe that the looming post-2012 gap will eventually compel Japan tochange its position would be a mistake. Most

Japanese policymakers are of the firm opinionthat the KP is in fact blocking the creation of anew, more effective instrument on climatechange. While some Japanese may concede acertain lack of diplomatic tact, there is clearconsensus on the spirit of the Cancún state-ment.

The tragedy of 11 March has not changed thisstance. Japanese negotiators still stand bytheir Copenhagen pledge: to reduce GHGemissions by 25% from the 1990 level by theyear 2020, conditional on a ‘fair and effectiveinternational framework in which all majoreconomies participate’. When confronted witharguments that the divide separating the

major economies makes such conditions un-realistic, Japanese negotiators have offeredassurances that their government wouldcontinue its activities to cut emissions even inthe absence of a global deal. Before the earth-quake, Tokyo’s dedication to an expansivenuclear programme gave some credence tothis claim; however, the political storm thatarose in the wake of the Fukushima accidentinvites closer examination of the Japanesepackage of mitigation policies.

1 Names are given in the Japanese order, with family namefirst. Hepburn Romanization is used.

This paper examines this package in light of developments since the summer of 2010. Thepicture that emerges is that of a fractiouspolity, too absorbed with short-sighted in-fighting to develop a coherent and effectivedomestic strategy on climate. Meanwhile,

Japan seems to be trying to channel its global-level efforts away from the cumbersomemultilateral framework and towards untesteddirections. This gives rise to concerns aboutTokyo’s ability to contribute meaningfully to

climate change mitigation in the midterm – whether domestically or abroad.

Immediate impacts of the naturaldisaster

The unprecedented earthquake that struck Japan on 11 March 2011 reached magnitude 9and triggered a tsunami wave that reached asmuch as 40 m at its highest point, sweepingas far as 10 km inland. As of the middle of

July, the government reported 20,662 deadand missing. This is undeniably the worstcatastrophe to befall Japan since the SecondWorld War.

The earthquake severely affected the count-ry’s energy infrastructure. It took some 24.8GW of generating capacity offline, of whichapprox. 11.3 GW nuclear, with the most ser-ious accidents occurring at the now notoriousFukushima Daiichi (‘Number One’) plant runby Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO). This parti-cular incident alone led to the evacuation of

over 200,000 people. The event was event-ually rated highest on the International AtomicEnergy Agency’s nuclear and radiologicalevent scale. The sheer scale of incident, com-pounding a natural catastrophe of historicproportions, reduced the reputation of Japan’snuclear power industry to tatters, especiallywhen it became clear that TEPCO had ignoredrepeated warnings, from both domestic andinternational sources, to take precautionarymeasures at the Fukushima plant.

TEPCO is now facing damage claims expected

to rise to the vicinity of 10 trillion yen (ca. EUR89.4 billion), against a net asset value of 2.5trillion yen (ca. EUR 22.3 billion). A special law




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had to be passed to keep the company fromlegal bankruptcy, with the Cabinet on June 14formally taking the decision to take overTEPCO’s management ‘for a certain time’ – said to mean at least 10 years. The govern-ment also agreed to set up a state-backedinstitution to help TEPCO provide compen-

sation to those affected by the accident.

To make matters worse, fears soon emergedthat a summertime gap might emerge be-tween peak demand and maximum availablesupply. To make up for the shortfall, emerg-ency gas-fired generators were leased fromabroad; factory in-house generators weremarshalled into feeding power into the grid;and an administrative order was issued to thebusinesses in the Keidanren (Japan BusinessFederation) to come up with voluntary met-hods for reducing their peak consumption by15% from the previous year.

Sensing a shift in public opinion, Prime Mini-ster (PM) Kan Naoto ordered an unrelatedpower utility, by means of a ‘request’ entirelylacking any legal basis, to shut down thenuclear plant at Hamaoka. This plant wasthought to have a 90% chance of being struckby a Fukushima-like disaster within the next30 years. Further, in an unexpected move,Kan also requested on 10 May that the count-ry’s Basic Energy Plan (BEP) be revised ‘from

scratch’, in order to place much greater em-phasis in Japan’s energy strategy on energyefficiency and on renewables.

Japanese politics: shooting itself inthe foot?

After the June 2010 premiership transitionfrom the ineffectual Hatoyama Yukio to Kan,the DPJ has seen its ability to govern progress-sively dwindle. The party had long sufferedfrom an internal split over an alleged cor-

ruption scandal involving its powerful law-maker Ozawa Ichirō, which grew only worse inthe time prior to the earthquake. The oppo-sition, in control of the Upper House since July2010, pressured Kan to force Ozawa to testifyin the Diet about his scandals, aggravating analready dangerous intra-party rift. This forcedthe Cabinet to fight a two-front war, bothmaintaining crumbling party unity and ap-peasing the uncooperative opposition parties.The two largest of these the Liberal Demo-cratic Party (LDP) and its de facto ally theClean Government Party (CGP, also known asNew Kōmeitō), refused to engage the DPJ inconstructive law-making, instead demanding

early elections and the resignation of seniorfigures at every opportunity.

In May the LDP and CGP capitalized on thegrowing discontent that relief and reconstruct-tion efforts in the disaster-affected North-Eastwere moving slowly and that information

about danger levels was difficult to come by.They tabled a no-confidence motion againstthe government, but their hopes of co-optingthe group of disaffected Ozawa allies in theDPJ were met by a deft last-minute promise byKan to resign on his own – in his own time.

After a tense summer, the last of Kan’s con-ditions for resignation was fulfilled when a billon renewable energy was finally passed on 26August. It remains an open question whatadded value his replacement, Noda Yoshihiko,

Japan’s sixth PM in five years, can bring. The

new administration has merely re-shuffled thesame senior DPJ politicians into new Diet andCabinet functions. The most salient feature of intra-DPJ politics is how different politiciansrelate to Ozawa.

Sooner or later, Noda will have to find a wayto balance public’s intense dislike of nuclearpower with the pressures from the businesscommunity to defend the stability of thecountry’s power supply. There is little to indi-cate that anybody has given serious thoughtso far about how to mitigate this tension. Onthe contrary, while the DPJ tried in 2009 toenhance policymaking by concentratingpowers related to it in the hands of the Cabi-net, the trend now seems to be to increase therole of the party. This is bound to subject theendorsement of policies to factional infightingand contribute little towards solving Japan’smany serious problems.

The DPJ was swept into power after success-fully marketing itself to the public in contrastto an incompetent LDP and an out-of-touch

corps of civil servants, but has since provenunable to produce policy effectively. It reliesinstead on image management, continuouslyproducing new initiatives as the popularity of a previous one diminishes or a new politicalhurdle becomes evident. Examples include thesecond round of budget reviews to cut waste-ful spending under Hatoyama, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership under Kan, both of whichwere introduced when the respective admini-strations’ approval ratings started flagging.To that list can be added Kan’s stance onrenewables. The presence of multiple voices

within the DPJ speaking in favour of restarting Japan’s nuclear power plants as soon as pos-sible show that its politicians are currently




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unable to make up their minds about where Japan’s energy policy ought to be heading.

Energy policy in flux

While Kan’s support ratings turned sour by

the end of the summer, his basic policy direc-tion did not. His decision to shut down Hama-oka was supported in May by 71.2% of thepublic and even gained praise from somenotable industrial CEOs. In June, 74% of thepublic also agreed that Japan’s nuclear re-actors ought to be gradually dismantled. Fewdecisions by earlier prime ministers everachieved such levels of support.

And yet, Japan is heavily reliant on nuclearpower, which supplied up to 30% of its elec-tricity in 2009, or 11.5% of its total primary

energy supply (TPES). The second revision of the BEP is explicitly meant to increase Japan’sreliance on nuclear power to 53%. Yet whilethis is to be achieved by increasing Japan’snuclear capacity by 14 reactors by 2030 andincreasing their rate of operation to 90% (a 30percentage point improvement on currentlevels), only 19 of Japan’s whole complementof 54 reactors were in operation as of early

July 2011, due to a combination of emergencyshut-downs and delays in reactor restarts. Theformal power of local assemblies to give the

green light to nuclear projects has led tocomplications. Between mid-May and early July, permits for restarts and licenses forconstruction of new reactors were refused infour different prefectures, whereas OsakaCity, the topmost shareholder of KansaiElectric Power, invited the company to con-sider halting its nuclear activities. Without asolution to the stalemate between the localand central level, by April 2012 all of Japan’snuclear reactors might go offline, with poten-tially extremely severe consequences for thecountry’s economy.

This is particularly relevant for the promotionof renewables. ‘Natural energy sources’ (solar,wind and biomass) and geothermal accountedfor only 0.4% of Japan’s TPES in 2009. Giventhe strong opposition to nuclear power andthe very long road to the 20% share of renew-ables promoted by Kan in May, maintainingthe stability of Japan’s energy supply poses aformidable task.

It is not entirely clear yet who will be draftingthis new BEP. Typically this matter has been

entrusted to the Agency of Natural Resourcesand Energy (ARNE) of the Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry (METI); however, now the

National Strategy Office under the Cabinet andthe Energy and Environment Commission,both headed by Minister Furukawa Motohisa,can be expected to weigh in. Furthermore, inlate August, the National Atomic and Indus-trial Security Agency (NISA) was detached fromMETI and integrated into the Ministry of En-

vironment (MOE) in an attempt to correct forthe agency’s idiosyncratic role of both pro-moting and overseeing nuclear power ope-rators. This potentially gives MOE a voice aswell. In any case, given the crowded field andthe intensely political nature of the issuesinvolved, the actual drafting may well takeplace far removed from public view, as hap-pened in the case of the 2010 BEP as well.

Complicating the matter is the government’sapparent decision to settle TEPCO’s debts byselling off its transmission grid. This reopensthe long-simmering question whether all of

Japan’s 10 regional power utilities, in effectvertically integrated regional power monopo-lies, should be forcefully unbundled. Thesepower utilities have long opposed allowingrenewable energy to be fed into their trans-mission lines, on the grounds that frequencyfluctuations might affect the overall stabilityof their energy networks. Conversely, voicesfavouring renewables typically also call forunbundling as well. The utilities, wieldingformidable political influence, have naturally

been opposed to this type of forced assetstripping for two decades, but the sheer scaleof TEPCO’s reparations budget has nowturned the tables on them. However, as withthe other aspect of energy policy reform, thedetails are unclear – especially as to whetherthe other utilities will face unbundling as well– and the discussion seems more politicalthan objective and orderly.

Domestic climate policy: disjointedand weak

Soon after gaining power in 2009, the DPJtried to create a framework for Japan’sclimate-related policies and measures in theform of a Basic Law on Global Warming. Uponenactment, this bill would have anchored

Japan’s Copenhagen pledge domestically,decreeing that three policy instruments – amandatory nation-wide emissions tradingscheme (ETS), a carbon tax, and a feed-intariff (FIT) for renewable forms of energy – beimplemented, and that a plan be compiled tocoordinate the government’s actions toachieve the pledge.




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This law became trapped by the DPJ’s politicalmisfortunes in Diet committees and has notyet been passed. In late 2010, as it becameobvious that the DPJ was unable to pass anyof its signature policies, opposition fromindustry intensified against the most high-profile climate-related policy instrument, the

ETS. Two weeks after Japan’s forceful state-ment in Cancún, the DPJ capitulated, effect-tively postponing implementation of the ETSsine die. Moreover, the carbon tax, to be char-ged starting October 2011 and gradually rais-ed during the coming years, turned out tosimply involve replacing a pre-existing tax onoil and coal. Raising petrol prices by less than1 yen (0.8 eurocents) per litre, it has littlepractical impact. Whether the new renewableslaw, passed in the final days of the Kan ad-ministration, will actually increase the share of

renewables in Japan’s energy supply is stillunclear.

An FIT had been proposed on the very last dayof the LDP regime in 2009, but it targetedonly small-scale solar power. The new lawexpands the scope of the FIT to other formsof renewables as well, but it continues toallow utilities the right to refuse to purchasepower if they deem it potentially damaging totheir transmission infrastructure. While theactual tariff will reflect generation costs, itsactual level and the duration of the power-

purchase agreements will be subject to yearlyreviews, with no exact implementing regulat-ions expected before 2012. Furthermore, ahost of regulations (city planning, waterrights, access to national parks, buildingcodes, etc.) still need to be reviewed in orderto make it easier to obtain permits for settingup renewable energy generation facilities.Since the central government has made nodiscernible effort to revise these regulatoryhurdles in a systematic manner, the effect-tiveness of this instrument remains uncertain.

Meanwhile, other possible avenues for miti-gation policy beyond those initially proposedby the DPJ remain practically off the politicalradar. A particularly egregious example, re-medying the poor insulation of the country’shousing stock, suffers from the complete lackof relevant building codes.

The climate package crystallizing in Japanseems therefore not only weak, but, in the ab-sence of a Basic Law, also uncoordinated. Withthe emergent de facto moratorium on nuclearexpansion, this raises questions about Japan’s

ability to reduce emissions by 25% from their1990 level by 2020, as specified in its Copen-hagen pledge. Thus far, Japan has not office-

ally changed its stance, but there are severalindications that the pledge will be revised.Already during the Bangkok climate talks inApril 2011 Minamikawa Hideki, AdministrativeVice-Minister of MOE, admitted that the matterwould, as a highly political issue, probably betaken up by the Diet.

Senior decision-makers privately admit thatrecent events make Japan’s pledge look in-creasingly unsustainable. Public opposition tonuclear power is especially worrisome. Shouldall nuclear be shut down, projections for

Japan’s emissions in 2020 jump up by 230 Mtof CO

2(19% of 1990). Another 5 percentage

points are expected if the nine planned plantsfail to go on-line. However, without a new BEPit is ultimately not possible to run the project-ions required for evaluating Japan’s post-Fukushima pledge.

This new BEP will need to strike a balancebetween the still relatively expensive renew-ables and nuclear power, which had beenpraised until recently for its cheapness. Yetwith clean-up costs potentially spiralling to asmuch as 6–20 trillion yen (ca. EUR 54–178billion) and the still unsolved problem of where to store Japan’s spent nuclear fuel,arguments for the cheapness of nuclear powerappear weakened. METI has announced thatthe new plan might be available by mid-2012.

This is an earliest possible date, as Japanesedecisionmaking requires consultations with awide range of stakeholders. Before that date itremains difficult to evaluate what changesmight intervene.

Assuming that the Diet passes the Basic Lawon Global Warming by that time, a new pledgemight be formulated by COP-18. With method-ologies on carbon sinks after 2012 up to theCOP, as well as the uncertainty surroundingcarbon markets and a still evolving domesticpolicy package, planning how to meet that

pledge might have to wait for 2013. Thecountry’s past reliance on UN-backed carboncredits would indicate that Japan will leanheavily on market mechanisms to meet evenits diminished pledge.

Unyielding position internationally

While the fate of their pledge is unclear, thestated ultimate goal of Japanese negotiatorsremains unchanged: to establish a new global,comprehensive, fair and effective framework,

in which all major economies would partici-pate. Furthermore, while quite happy withcertain elements of the old Protocol, such as




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the use of flexibility mechanisms or the re-porting system, the negotiators’ disinterest inKP CP2 is genuine. Pointing to the ballooningemissions of developing countries, Japanviews discussions on extending the old Proto-col as draining efforts away from establishinga more effective arrangement.

Non-Japanese negotiators should recognizethat prospects for change are slim. Japanesediplomatic history reveals a fondness for rigidconditional offers coupled with a dislike of negotiating bluffs. Japan’s positions are typi-cally close to its actual strategic goals, leavinglittle room for bargaining. This is because thestubborn infighting between Japanese mini-stries easily spills over into the internationalarena, limiting the set of tactical manoeuvresavailable to the delegation to what all theconcerned ministries have agreed to endorsein advance. Changing positions in response tofluid negotiations is not typical of Japanesebehaviour. Furthermore, despite the fractiouscompartmentalization of the Japanese corpsof civil servants, all the ministries involved inclimate negotiations – MOFA, METI and MOE – uniformly endorse their country’s stance andare unlikely to break ranks. Finally, with theUS completely uninterested in the KP, andwith Russia and Canada flatly refusing to joinCP2, it is difficult to see why Tokyo should seeitself as diplomatically isolated at this point. If

anything, having laboriously crystallised anegotiating position, Japan is likely to refusesteadfastly to compromise unilaterally untilother parties have made concessions first.

Acknowledging the sterility of discussing theform of the legal instruments, Japan believesthat the only meaningful contribution to thenegotiations is to engage in constructive dis-cussions on the items listed in the CancúnAgreement – technology, finance, capacitybuilding, flexibility mechanisms, MRV andICA, etc. Bristling against what it perceived as

attempts by developed countries to fruitlesslyrevisit the Bali Action Plan, Japan viewed theApril 2011 meeting in Bangkok as ‘shockinglyunproductive’. The slow pace in Bonn in Juneled to further disappointment.

For a country so heavily reliant on offsets formeeting its emission target, the slowness of KP’s flexibility mechanisms to generate cre-dits has long been a source of frustration – and an increasingly serious concern given thescale of cuts required by 2020 and the uncer-tainty surrounding the future of nuclear power

in Japan. MOE, METI and the Ministry of Agri-culture, Forestry and Fisheries are conductingover 30 feasibility studies on institutional

designs of new flexible mechanisms (NAMAs,REDD+, etc.) in various developing countries.

Japanese project planners would like to sub-mit their ideas from these feasibility studiesto the discussions on new flexibility mecha-nisms in Durban. However, consensus seemsto be developing that, should the COP not

accept such suggestions, Japan would have nooption but to pursue other avenues, such asbilateral offsetting mechanisms, which Japanis already actively preparing with a number of countries.

On a visit in Tokyo in late February 2011,UNFCCC Executive Secretary ChristianaFigueres mentioned three aspects of thesemechanisms that required further clarification:the methodologies to be employed, thecredits’ fungibility, and the avoidance of double-counting. Furthermore, while Japaneseproject developers insist that bilateral projectswould be subject to third-party verificationaccording to standards already being imple-mented in Japan (ISO14064 and ISO14065), itis easy to see how cutting out the UN middle-man might open the door to moral hazard inthe form of green-washed ODA and FDI. It willrequire a significant diplomatic effort to re-assure the other parties that Japanese verifierswill evaluate in unswerving and impartial goodfaith Japanese projects that generate Japanesecredits (and potentially even Japanese profits)

towards a non-binding Japanese pledge. Thesuccess of this effort is likely to depend onthe manner in which other Annex I Partiesformulate their own bilateral initiatives.

Executive Secretary Figueres criticized Japanfor ignoring domestic developments in China,India, Brazil and Indonesia, but Japan ultimat-ely seeks some form of formal parity betweenits obligations and those of emerging econo-mies. Without apparent progress on MRV andICA, the danger that Japan might go as far asto exercise a veto on a COP decision for a pol-

itical extension of the KP cannot be dismissed.Past experience would indicate that Tokyowould compromise on this crucial point only if pressures revealed that an anti-Japan coalitionwas about to emerge and that obstinacy wasno longer a safe policy. However, while waryof developments in the EU, Japanese decision-makers currently deem this unlikely and seemdetermined to stay the course.

Conclusion

Despite their common intransigence on Kyotosecond commitment period, Japan should notbe put into the same basket as Russia and




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Canada. While the Canadian pledge is a netincrease from 1990 and the Russian is a netincrease from today, the Japanese pledge is inline with IPCC recommendations. Beyond that,however, observers should maintain a criticalview on Japan’s promises to engage in miti-gation up to 2020.

While Japan’s assertions about the effective-ness of the Kyoto Protocol are entirely valid,its resolve to abandon the world’s single bind-ing legal instrument on climate change invitesclose scrutiny of its promise to continue miti-gating. So far Japan has not put forth anythingbeyond its conditional Copenhagen pledge. If China and the US, perhaps also India, are notbrought into some form of global deal, Japanreserves the right to decide freely how muchof its emissions it will cut. This will not be-come clear for at least one more year, untilthe country’s new Basic Energy Plan has beenformulated.

Furthermore, without a Basic Law on GlobalWarming and a plan coordinating domesticpolicy instruments, just how Japan means toachieve its abatement goals remains unclear.So far, all the climate policy instruments push-ed by the Democratic Party of Japan, relyingon economic stimuli that would ultimatelyraise energy costs, have been rendered inef-fective by opposition from powerful stake-

holders. Energy policy remains therefore theonly channel through which Japan’s GHGemissions could be cut.

There can be little doubt that a political waywill be found to restart most of the country’sidled nuclear plants, but it is difficult to inferanything beyond that. Stakeholders seem tohave bunkered down around their respectivepositions and are talking past each other on agreat many pivotal issues: the economic po-tential for renewables in Japan, the desirabilityof changing the country’s energy mix, or its

role in fighting climate change internationally.Historical examples from other policy areasshow that when particularly severe internalwrangling persists, Tokyo’s ability to contri-bute to international negotiations in a con-structive manner suffers.

It is incumbent on Japanese politicians of allparties to agree in a mature manner on a wayforward, as it is on them that revising theregulations on the FIT, unbundling the powersector and passing the Basic Law on GlobalWarming all depend. As long as they remainpreoccupied with short-sighted infighting,

Japan’s climate policy will remain subject tounpredictable political winds in the Diet. Withministries lacking consensus and politiciansunable to exercise leadership, climate legislat-ion will remain ineffective and incoherent, andclimate diplomacy cumbersome.

That Japan takes its international pledgesseriously is beyond dispute. However, as longas their country’s contribution on the internat-ional level remains untested, with its pledgeabout to be reduced and its domestic policypackage looking weak, Japanese decision-makers will have to work hard in order tomaintain credibility and trust in the UNFCCCforum.

Acknowledgements

FNI Climate Policy Perspectives would like to acknowledge Kristian Tangen for his contributions to this paper.

About the author

Alexandru Luta Luta is a PhD Candidate at Tokyo Institute of Technology. Alex has worked at theFinnish Institute of International Affairs and as a freelance advisor to Thomson Reuters analysing

Japan's domestic and international climate policies for the last four years. His PhD focuses on theinfluence of domestic political institutions on theintroduction of renewable energy capacity inelectricity markets in Japan.

© Fridtjof Nansen Institute, P.O.Box 326, 1326 Lysaker, Norway / www.fni.no andPerspectives, Baumeisterstrasse 2, 20099 Hamburg, Germany / www.perspectives.cc

October 2011 / ISBN 978-82-7613-630-2Cover photo: The devastated port city of Onahama in Fukushima prefecture. By Yasuo Osakabe (29 March 2011)

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