folly of fools

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Deceit, Deception, and Strong Opinions:

Trivers on This, That, and Almost Everything

but Biology

A review of

The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human

Life

by Robert Trivers

New York, NY: Basic Books, 2011. 397 pp. ISBN 978-0-465-02755-2.

$28.00

Reviewed by

Johannes I. (Hans) Bakker

The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Lifeby Robert Trivers

is about the logic of deceit in human life. It is based on the idea that a great deal about

everyday life could be explained much better if we paid more attention to the ways in which

we human beings tend to deceive others and even ourselves. We seem to do so not only in

our personal lives and as citizens, but even in our professional lives. It is certainly true that

this book is provocative, as Richard Dawkins is quoted as saying on the book jacket. But it

is not a work of broad science or deep scholarship; there are other books that teach far more

about biology (Bell, Futuyma, Eanes, & Levinton, 2011). There are interesting comments on
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biological topics, but there is no systematic effort to support the central thesis with

biological evidence.

Trivers offers all kinds of interesting arguments about a diverse range of topics,

ranging from aerial bombing, apes, and the benefits of strong outbreeding for African

Americans, to insects, false memory syndrome, male infanticide, and Zionism. But the

general biological theory does not really help to explain most of the subjects in a truly

scientific manner. Is it true that the logic of deceit and self-deception can contribute to a

possible explanation for many aspects of human life? Yes, of course. We should never

ignore the possibility that we lie to ourselves. Nor should we forget that collectivities, such

as nation-states or corporations, sometimes (perhaps frequently) distort the truth.

However, to attempt to explain just about everything human on the basis of deceit and

deception is a kind of monocausal determinism that makes the notion of a logical

explanation of social behavior (and social action) seem entirely elusive or perhaps

redundant. If the biology of deceit explains most of the things that we study in the social

sciences, then most social scientists have been wasting their time for at least a century. Onthe other hand, if the biology of deceit does not explain almost everything, then Trivers is

making exaggerated claims.

Trivers rarely engages with any significant social science literature outside of a select

subset of psychological research articles. For example, he shows no awareness of the vast

literature on popular culture (Rojek, 2012). The intriguing information he uses to try to

support the general idea of deceit as THE monocausal determinant of just about everything

is anecdotal information, often mixed with basic historical facts. This is not a monograph

that reports research results, inside or outside of the lab. It is also not a work of carefully

nuanced, well-documented scientific theory. Hence, I question whether the life scientists

cited on the book jacket actually read the whole book.

The Folly of Fools is not a work of true scholarship or even an excellent presentation

of basic scientific ideas to a wider audience. Instead, it is a motley assemblage of opinions

on this, that, and just about everything but biology. One does not learn very much about

molecular biology or genetics. There is no extended discussion about the descent of human

beings. There is no exploration of ecological theory and the importance of the natural

environment. There is not even very much about Darwin or neo-Darwinism. There is no

defense of the modern evolutionary synthesis against contrary minority scientific opinions or

fundamentalist Evangelical nonscientific theories such as creationism.

The book does tend to illustrate the idea that it is often difficult for someone who isutterly convinced of the truth of his or her position to even begin to explore other paradigms.

Trivers does not attempt to do much more than present one aspect of the life sciences to the

general public. In a popular book of this kind, meant for a broad audience, it is not

uncommon for a well-known writer to make assertions that might not easily be accepted in a

major scientific journal such asNature orScience, or even a less prestigious journal such as

The ScientistorScientific American.


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For example, if a reputable scientist makes some off-the-cuff remarks about false

historical narratives related to such topics as the failure of mass aerial bombing during the

Vietnam War, Zionism, the (Armenian and Jewish) Holocausts, or Gaza and the

PalestinianIsraeli conflict, then we usually just ignore such comments as a bit of self-

indulgence in an otherwise useful book; after all, the author is not a professional academic

historian. But when the ratio of solidly acceptable scientific and/or historical assertions to

bold conjectures and speculative assumptions becomes extreme, the result is a book like this

one.

Apart from some short summaries of the results of some biological research projects

concerning insects and a few interesting discussions of matters commonly found on blog

sites, most of what is said by the author is misleading, one-sided, or wrong. Social

psychologists will, for example, find that Trivers does not seem to believe that self-

presentation and self-perception are much more than the product of deceit and self-deceit.

Hence, all one can obtain are ill-defined variables that are poorly measured (p. 316).

Luckily, this era [in social psychology research] is coming to a close, with newmethodologies that access unconscious biases directly (p. 316; Greenwald 1980;

Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Greenwald,

Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). The Implicit Association Test may be a step in the

right direction. That must be a relief to social psychologists everywhere.

On the other hand, it is unlikely that we will really be able to access unconscious

biases directly in any empirically relevant manner. The functional magnetic resonance

imaging (fMRI) research that provides a better operationalization of certain neurobiological

processes may be a step in the right direction (Klein et al., 2003; Kovalev, Kruggel, & von

Cramon, 2003). But most fMRI findings are tentative, and they do not provide direct access.

Valid measurement of the kinds of variables Trivers emphasizes may be a long way off.

The title of this book is The Folly of Fools. The idea seems to be that unless one is a

mathematician, a natural scientist, or, at the very least, a life scientist, then one is a fool.

Even the natural and life scientists get it wrong sometimes, but, it is argued, the social and

social psychological approach to social science is almost invariably incorrect. Trivers

maintains that we are all deceiving ourselves. But he does not base that argument on a deep

study of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche, Stirner, Marx, Kierkegaard, Sartre,

Derrida, Foucault, or other relevant thinkers. He has seemingly chosen to not mention a host

of thinkers who have examined epistemological problems directly relevant to his main

theme. He seems to be ignorant of giants in social science such as Jrgen Habermas(Ungureanu, Guenther, & Joerges, 2011).

Trivers says we are fooling ourselves in trying to create a social science, but there is

very little actual discussion of anthropology, sociology, or economics. The social science

that Trivers advocates is one that is based almost entirely on his own rather idiosyncratic

personal version of the theory of natural selection, a theory he feels many biologists have

gotten wrong for quite a long time. He argues that biologists need to learn that the basic unit


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of natural selection is the individual organism and not the social group. He contends that

there is no such thing as altruism among bees or bonobos. Trivers does not even accept

Wilsons (1994) general viewpoint.

Richard Dawkins states on the book jacket that Triverss Darwinian theory of self-

deception is arguably his most provocative and interesting idea so far. If that is true, then

earlier ideas put forward by Trivers must be sorely lacking. As mentioned, his theory is

provocative, but it is probably also largely incorrect. If anyone is fooled by this book, he or

she will find out that reducing everything to natural selection is a strategy that cuts both

ways. How can we know that Trivers himself is not lying to us? Why does he not reveal

when he is almost completely ignorant of a topic?

Trivers uses evidence in an unsystematic manner. He marshals information as if it

were conclusive evidence, a bit like a lawyer arguing a brief. His offhand comments on

parenting seem better suited to a blog. He makes assertions about group dynamics that

would not pass muster in a refereed journal article. He frequently makes assertions about

topics such as religion that cannot possibly be anything other than conjectures. There is nosustained discussion of the function of world religions to provide the basis for nonkin

societal legitimate authority (Weber, 1968). He does not really attempt to even begin to

survey the relevant literature on the sociology of religion or political science. He does not

adequately cite the literature for the disciplines he discusses (e.g., general psychology, social

psychology, history).

Trivers often uses homey examples concerning his own personal dishonesty with

others and with himself in order to give the general thesis an air of authenticity and honesty.

But the anecdotal evidence does not amount to anything more than a set of suggestive

hypotheses. He claims that his version of biological evolutionary theory can unravel the

riddles of human life to an extent that no other paradigmatic position can possibly do.

Although, according to Trivers, biologists themselves have not always gotten their

interpretation of Darwin right, particularly when writing about altruism, at least the modern

evolutionary synthesis has a solid-enough basis in molecular biology and genetics that it can

be seen as clearly connected to chemistry and, in turn, physics. Hence we can have what E.

O. Wilson, following William Whewell, has called consilience (Wilson, 1998). (Whewell

was the first person to coin the termscientist. Previously scientists had been known as

natural philosophers or men of science.)

Trivers (p. 316) is fundamentally incorrect in his assertion that deceit and self-

deception have had a significant retarding effect on disciplines with more social content.He uses the termsocialto not only mean humanly social but indeed the social aspect of all

animal species. Examples are drawn from entomology and ornithology for biological social

theory. Hence, biology is also flawed, but not nearly as severely as anthropology,

psychoanalysis, psychology, economics, sociology, and political science.

Trivers relies on a kind of scientism that is rarely defended anymore in print. The

author says that the social sciences should in principle be based on biology, whereas


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biology is based on chemistry, chemistry is based on physics, physics is based on

mathematics, and there you have it (p. 306). Yet there is no advanced mathematics in this

book, either.

Trivers says that religions hold a recipe for self deception (pp. 282283).

Nevertheless, religious practice appears to be correlated with health. At the same time,

religions are also correlated with disease. His speculative theory ofparasite loadis

interesting. Trivers argues that when there is a high degree of human loss of life due to

parasites, then we will find many more religions (and languages) than when the parasite load

is low. Parasites also help to explain ingroup deceit and self-deception. This may be

especially true of the polytheistic religions, but with monotheism came additional forces of

self-deception associated with global conquest and a single, dominant spirit (p. 280).

It is well known in comparative religious studies that there is no simple evolution

from polytheism to monotheism, despite the 19th-century belief in such unilinear

evolutionism. Trivers mentions at the outset that the chapter on religion (Chapter 12) is

very tentative: He does not really know very much about polytheism or the great Easternreligions (p. 277). He does not consider the idea that death due to parasites has been part of

the human condition throughout human evolution (not to mention before). If his theory were

correct, then there would be little reason for Protestant denominations to remain divided in a

world where the parasite ratio is very low.

The Folly of Fools is a provocative and often-stimulating book, notable for what it

omits as well as for what it includes. But this book would not be a good textbook for

students. If it is cited in an academic paper, it will hopefully not be to bolster a position with

an argument by authority. Trivers has been a creative and innovative thinker, and this book

gives some indication of his important gadfly function, but we will have to wait for a more

theoretically grounded, empirically based monograph to be able to fully evaluate the

scientific part of the contribution.

References

Bell, M. A., Futuyma, D. J., Eanes, W. F., & Levinton, J. S. (Eds.). (2011).Evolution since

Darwin: The first 150 years. Sunderland, MA: Sinhauer Associates.Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history.

American Psychologist, 35, 603618. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.35.7.603

Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual

differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test.Journal of Personality
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PsycCRITIQUES

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Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the

Implicit Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm.Journal of Personality

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Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann, E., & Banaji, M. R. (2009). Understanding

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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 1741. doi:10.1037/a0015575

Klein, S., Smolka, M. N., Wrase, J., Grusser, S. M., Mann, K., Braus, D. F., & Heinz, A.

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Kovalev, V. A., Kruggel, F., & von Cramon, Y. (2003). Gender and age effects in structural

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Rojek, C. (Ed.). (2012).Popular culture: Critical concepts in media and cultural studies.

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Ungureanu, C., Guenther, K., & Joerges, C. (Eds.). (2011).Jrgen Habermas. London,

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Weber, M. (1968).Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California Press.Wilson, E. O. (1994).Naturalist. Washington, DC: Island Press.

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