94TH CONGRESS SENATE J REPORT2d Ssion f 1 No. 94-755

FOREIGN AN]) MILITARYINTELLIGENCE

BOOK I

FINAL REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEETO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

UNITED STATES SENATE

TOGETHER WITH

ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATEVIEWS

APRIL 26 (legislative day, APRIL 14), 1976

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

69-983 WASHINGTON : 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfficeWashington, D.C. 20402 - Price $5.35

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONSWITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, ChairmanJOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman

PHILIP A. HART, Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TennesseeWALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota BARRY GOLDWATER, ArizonaWALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, Ja., MarylandROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PennsylvaniaGARY HART, Colorado

WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff DirectorFREDERICK A. 0. SCHWARZ, Jr., Chief CounselCURTIs R. SMOTHERS, Counsel to the Minority

AUDREY HATRY, Cler of the Committee

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

(By Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committeeto Study Governmental Operations With Respect to IntelligenceActivities)

On January 27, 1975, the Senate established a Select Committee toconduct an investigation and study of the intelligence activities of theUnited States. After 15 months of intensive work, I am pleased tosubmit to the Senate this volume of the Final Report of the Com-mittee relating to foreign and military intelligence. The inquiry arisesout of allegations of abuse and improper activities by the intelligenceagencies of the United States, and great public concern that theCongress take action to bring the intelligence agencies under theconstitutional framework.

The members of the Select Committee have worked diligently andin remarkable harmony. I want to express my gratitude to the ViceChairman, Senator John Tower 6f Texas, for his cooperation through-out and the able assistance he has given me in directing this mostdifficult task. While every member of the Committee has made im-portant contributions, I especially want to thank Senator Walter D.Huddleston of Kentucky for the work he has done as Chairman ofthe Foreign and Military Subcommittee. His direction of the Sub-committee, working with Senator Charles McC. Mathias of Mary-land, Senator Gary Hart of Colorado and Senator Barry Goldwaterof Arizona, has been of immeasurable help to me in bringing thisenormous undertaking to a useful and responsible conclusion.

Finally, I wish to thank the staff for the great service they haveperformed for the Committee and for the Senate in assisting themembers of the Committee to carry out the mandate levied by SenateResolution 21. The quality, integrity and devotion of the staff hascontributed in a significant way to the important analyses, findingsand recommendations of the Committee.

The volume which follows, the Report on the Foreign and MilitaryIntelligence Activitie8 of the United State8, is intended to provide tothe Senate the basic information about the intelligence agencies ofthe United States required to make the necessary judgments concern-ing the role such agencies should play in the future. Despite securityconsiderations which have limited what can responsibly be printed forpublic release the information which is presented in this report is areasonably complete picture of the intelligence activities under-taken by the United States, and the problems that such activities posefor constitutional government.

The Findings and Recommendations contained at the end of thisvolume constitute an agenda for action which, if adopted, would goa long way toward preventing the abuses that have occurred in thepast from occurring again, and would assure that the intelligenceactivities of the United States will be conducted in accordance withconstitutional processes.

FRANK CHURCH.

NOTE

The Committee's Final Report has been reviewed and declassi-fied by the appropriate executive agencies. These agencies submittedcomments to the Committee on security and factual aspects of eachchapter. On the basis of these comments, the Committee and staffconferred with representatives of the agencies to determine whichparts of the report should remain classified to protect sensitive intel-ligence sources and methods.

At the request of the agencies, the Committee deleted three chaptersfrom this report: "Cover," "Espionage," and "Budgetary Oversight."In addition, two sections of the chapter "Covert Action of the CIA"and one section of the chapter "Department of State" have been de-leted at the request of the agencies. Particular passages which werechanged at the request of the agencies are denoted by italics and afootnote. Complete versions of deleted or abridged materials are avail-able to Members of the Senate in the Committee's classified reportunder the provisions of S. Res. 21 and the Standing Rules of theSenate.

Names of individuals were deleted when, in the Committee's judg-ment, disclosure of their identities would either endanger their safetyor constitute a substantial invasion of privacy. Consequently, footnotecitations to testimony and documents occasionally contain only descrip-tions of an individual's position.

Appendix Three, "Soviet Intelligence Collection and IntelligenceAgainst the United States," is derived solely from a classified CIAreport on the same subject which was edited for security considerationsby the Select Committee staff.

CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION -------------------------------------------- 1A. The Mandate of the Committee's Inquiry----------------- 2B. The Purpose of the Committee's Findings and Recommenda-

tions --------------------------------------------- 4C. The Focus and Scope of the Committee's Inquiry and Ob-

staclesEncountered --------------------------------- 5D. The Historical Context of the Inquiry --------------------- 8E. The Dilemma of Secrecy and Open Constitutional Govern-

ment ---------------------------------- 11II. THE FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERA-

TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES:AN OVERVIEW ----------- 15A. The Basic Issues: Secrecy and Democracy ------------------ 16B. The Scope of the Select Committee Inquiry into Foreign and

Military Intelligence Operations ------------------------ 17C. The Intelligence Process: Theory and Reality --------------- 17D. Evolution 61 the United States Intelligence Community ------ 19E. The Origins cf the Postwar Intelligence Community ---------- 20F. The Response to the Soviet Threat ------------------------ 22G. Korea: The Turning Point ------------------------------ 23H. The "Protracted Conflict" ------------------------------- 24I. Third World Competition and Nuclear Crisis --------------- 25J. TechnologyandTragedy ------------------------------- 26K. The 1970s ------------------------------------------- 27L. The Task Ahead-------------------------------------- 28

III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLI-GENCE ACTIVITIES ------------------------------------ 31

A. The Joint Responsibilities of the Legislative and ExecutiveBranches-Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances-- 31

B. The Historical Practice - - - - - - 33C. The Constitutional Power of Congress to Regulate the Con-

duct of Foreign Intelligence Activity --------------------- 38IV. THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE -------------------------------- 41

A. The National Security Council --------------------------- 42B. Authorization and Control of Covert Activities -------------- 48C. Providing the Intelligence Required by Policymakers --------- 61D. Advising the President on Intelligence Issues ---------------- 62E. Allocating Intelligence Pesources ------------------------- 65

V. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ------------ 71A. The Producer of National Intelligence --------------------- 73B. Coordinatorof Intelligence Activities ---------------------- 83C. Director of the CIA ----------------------------------- 94

VI. HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY_ 97A. The Central Intelligence Group and the Central Intelligence

Agency: 1946-1952 ---------------------------------- 99B. The Dulles Era:1953-1961 ----------------------------- 109C. Change and Routinization: 1961-1970---------------------115D. The Recent Past: 1971-1975----------------------------121E. Conclusion-----------------------------------------124

VII. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: STATUTORYAUTHORITY------------------------------------------127

A. Clandestine Collection of Intelligence --------------------- 128B. Covert Action --------------------------------------- 131C. Domestic Activities ------------------------------------ 135

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PageVIII. COVERT ACTION --------------------------------------- 141

A. Evolution of Covert Action ----------------------------- 143B. Congressional Oversight ------------------------------- 149C. Findings and Conclusions ------------------------------ 152

IX. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE -------------------------------- 163A. Counterintelligence: An Introduction --------------------- 163B. Current Issues in Counterintelligence --------------------- 171C. Conclusions----------------------------------------- 177

X. THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF FOREIGN CLANDESTINEOPERATIONS: THE CIA AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS,THE MEDIA, AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS ----------- 179

A. Covert Use of Academic and Voluntary Organizations ------- 181B. Covert Relationships with the United States Media --------- 191C. Covert Use of U.S. Religious Groups --------------------- 201

XI. PROPRIETARIES ---------------------------------------- 205A. Overview ------------------------------------------- 206B. Structure ------------------------------------------- 207C. Operation of Proprietaries ------------------------------ 234D. The Disposal of Proprietaries --------------------------- 236E. Financial Aspects ------------------------------------ 247F. Some General Considerations --------------------------- 251

XII. CIA PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE --------- 257A. Evolution of the CIA's Intelligence Directorate ------------ 259B. The Intelligence Directorate Today --------------------- 265C. The Relationship Between Intelligence and Policy --------- 266D. The Limits of Intelligence ------------------------------- 268E. The Personnel System _-------------------------------- 269F. Recruitment and Training of Analysts -------------------- 270G. The Intelligence Culture and Analytical Bias -------------- 270H. The Nature of the Production Process: Consensus Versus

Competition 271I. The "Current Events" Syndrome-----------------------272

J. Innovation-----------------------------------------273K. Overload on Analysts and Consumers --------------------- 274L. Quality Control -------------------------------------- 276

M. Consumer Guidance and Evaluation --------------------- 276N. The Congressional Role ------------------ ------------- 277

XIII. THE CIA's INTERNAL CONTROLS: THE INSPECTOR GEN-ERAL AND THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL ----- 279

A. The General Counsel ---------------------------------- 280B. The Office of the Inspector General ---------------------- 289C. Internal and External Review of the Office of the Inspector

General ---------- 303XIV. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE --------------------------- 305

A. Origins of the State Department Intelligence Function ......- 305B. Command and Control -------------------------------- 308C. Support Communications-------------------------------- 315D. Production of Intelligence ------------------------------- 315

XV. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE -------------------------- 319A. Objectives and Organization of the Defense Intelligence Com-

munity -------- ----------------------------------- 320B. The Defense Intelligence Budget ------------------------ 328C. Management Problems of the Defense Intelligence Com-

munity ---------------------------------------------- 341D. Agencies and Activities of Special Interest ----------------- 349E. Military Counterintelligence and Investigative Agencies 355F. Chemical and Biological Activities ------------------------ 359G. Meeting Future Needs in Defense Intelligence ------------- 363

XVI. DISCLOSURE OF BUDGET INFORMATION ON THE IN- PageTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY------------------------- 367

A. The Present Budgetary Process for Intelligence CommunityAgencies and Its Consequences ------------------------ 367

B. The Constitutional Requirement------------------------- 369C. Alternatives to Concealing Intelligence Budgets from Congress

and the Public------------------------------------- 374D. The Effect Upon National Security of Varying Levels of

Budget Disclosure---------------------------------- 376E. The Argument that Publication of Any Information will

Inevitably Result in Demands for Further Information--- 381F. The Argument that the. United States Should Not Publish

Information on Its Intelligence Budget Because No OtherGovernment in the World Does------------------------ 383

G. Summary and Conclusion -- - -_-- -- 384XVII. TESTING AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL

AGENTS BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY----- 385A. The Programs Investigated------------------------------ 387B. CIA Drug Testing Programs----------------------------- 392C. Covert Testing on Human Subjects by Military Intelligence

Groups ------------------------------------------ 411D. Cooperation and Competition Among the Intelligence Agen-

cies, and Between the Agencies and Other Individuals andInstitutions--------------------------------------- 420

XVIII. SUMMARY: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ------ 423A. Introduction------------------------------------------- 423B. General Findings------------------------------------- 424C. The 1947 National Security Act and Related Legislation.. 426D. The National Security Council and the Office of the President- 427E. The Director of Central Intelligence--------------------- 432F. The Central Intelligence Agency------------------------ 435

G. Reorganization of the Intelligence Community ------------- 449H. CIA Relations with United States Institutions and Private

Citizens------------------------------------------ 451I. Proprietaries and Cover------------------------------- 456J. Intelligence Liaison----------------------------------- 459K. The General Counsel and the Inspector General ----------- 459L. The Department of Defense---------------------------- 462

M. The Department of State and Ambassadors --------------- 466N. Oversight and the Intelligence Budget-------------------- 4690. Chemical and Biological Agents and the Intelligence Com-

munity ------------------------------------------ 471P. General Recommendations ----------------------------- 472

APPENDIX I: Congressional Authorization for the Central IntelligenceAgency to Conduct Covert Action------------------------------- 475

A. The National Security Act of 1947----------------------- 476B. The CIA Act of 1949--------------------------------- 492C. The Provision of Funds to the CIA by Congress------------ 496D. The Holtzman and Abourezk Amendments of 1974--------- -502E. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment--------------------------- 505F. Conclusion--------------------------------------------- 508

APPENDIX II: Additional Covert Action Recommendations----------- 511A. Statement of Clark M. Clifford-------------------------- 512B. Statement of Cyrus Vance------------------------------ 516C. Statement of David A. Phillips-------------------------- 518D. Prepared Statement of Morton H. Halperin ---------------- 520E. Recommendations of the Harvard University Institute of

Politics, Study Group on Intelligence Activities ---------- 524F. Recommendations of the House Select Committee on Intelli-

gence Concerning Covert Action ------.-------- 533G. Article from Foreign Affairs by Harry Rositzke: America's

Secret Operations: A Perspective ----------------------- 534H. Article from Saturday Review by Tom Braden: What's Wrong

with the CIA? ------------------------------------- 547I. Recommendations of the Commission on the Organization of

the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (theMurphy Commission) Concerning Covert Action --------- 554

VIII

APPENDIX III: Soviet Intelligence Collection and Operations Against Pagethe United States -------------------------------------------- 557

A. Introduction---------------------------------------- 557B. Organization and Structure----------------------------- 558C. The GRU------------------------------------------ 560D. The Scope and Methods of Anti-United States Operations by

the KGB and the GRU----------------------------- 561E. Eastern European Security and Intelligence Services -------- 561

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH--------- 563ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WALTER F. MONDALE,

GARY HART, AND PHILIP HART ---------------- 567INTRODUCTION TO SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATORS JOHN

G. TOWER, HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. AND BARRY M.GOLDWATER-------------------------------------------- 571

SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR JOHN G. TOWER ------------ 573INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER ----- 577SEPARATE VIEWS OF HOWARD H. BAKER, JR --------------- 594SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CHARLES McC.

MATHIAS, JR-------------------------------------------- 609ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER 615GLOSSARY OF SELECTED INTELLIGENCE TERMS AND LIST

OF ABBREVIATIONS ------------------------------------- 617NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CHARTS ------------------------- 634SENATE RESOLUTION 21 ------------------------------------ 636STAFF LIST ------------------------------------------------- 649

I. INTRODUCTION

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities has con-ducted a fifteen month long inquiry, the first major inquiry into intelli-gence sinbe World War II. The inquiry arose out of allegations ofsubstantial, even massive wrong-doing within the "national intelli-gence" system., This final report provides a history of the evolutionof intelligence, an evaluation of the intelligence system of the UnitedStates, a critique of its problems, recommendations for legislativeaction and recommendations to the executive branch. The Committeebelieves that its recommendations will provide a sound framework forconducting the vital intelligence activities of the United States in amanner wich meets the nation's intelligence requirements and pro-tects the liberties of American citizens and the freedoms which ourConstitution guarantees.

The shortcomings of the intelligence system, the adverse effects ofsecrecy, and the failure of congressional oversight to assure adequateaccountability for executive branch decisions concerning intelligenceactivities were major subjects of the Committee's inquiry. Equally im-portant to the obligation to investigate allegations of abuse was theduty to review systematically the intelligence community's overallactivities since 1945, and to evaluate its present structure andperformance.

An extensive national intelligence system has been a vital part ofthe United States government since 1941. Intelligence informationhas had an important influence on the direction and developmentof American foreign policy and has been essential to the maintenanceof our national security. The Committee is convinced that the UnitedStates requires an intelligence system which will provide policy-makers with accurate intelligence and analysis. We must have an earlywarning system to monitor potential military threats by countrieshostile to United States interests. We need a strong intelligence systemto verify that treaties concerning arms limitation are being honored.Information derived from the intelligence agencies is a necessary in-gredient in making national defense and foreign policy decisions. Suchinformation is also necessary in countering the efforts of hostile intel-ligence services, and in halting terrorists, international drug traffickersand other international criminal activities. Within this country cer-tain carefully controlled intelligence activities are essential for ef-fective law enforcement.

The United States has devoted enormous resources to the creationof a national intelligence system, and today there is an awareness onthe part of many citizens that a national intelligence system is a per-

2 National intelligence includes but is not limited (to the CIA, NSA, DIA, ele-ments within the Department of Defense for the collection of intelligence throughreconnaissance programs, the Inteligence Division of the FBI, and the intel-ligence elements of the State Department and the Treasury Department.

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manent and necessary component of our government. The system'svalue to the country has been proven and it will be needed for theforeseeable future. But a major conclusion of this inquiry is that con-gressional oversight is necessary to assure that in the future ourintelligence community functions effectively, within the frameworkof the Constitution.

The Committee is of the view that many of the unlawful actionstaken by officials of the intelligence agencies were rationalized astheir public duty. It was necessary for the Committee to understandhow the pursuit of the public good could have the opposite effect.As Justice Brandeis observed:

Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protectliberty when the Government's purposes are benificent. Menborn to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of theirliberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to libertylurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaningbut without understanding.2

A. THE MANDATE OF THE COMMITE'S INQUIRY

On January 27, 1975, Senate Resolution 21 established a select com-mittee "to-conduct an investigation and study of governmental opera-tions with respect to intelligence activities and of the extent, if any,to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in byany agency of the Federal Government." Senate Resolution 21 listsspecific areas of inqury and study:

(1) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency has conductedan illegal domestic intelligence operation in the United States.

(2) The conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelli-gence operations against United States citizens by the FederalBureau of Investigation or any other Federal agency.

(3) The origin and disposition of the so-called HustonPlan to apply United States intelligence agency capabilitiesagainst individuals or organizations within the UnitedStates.

(4) The extent to which the Federal Bureau of Investiga-tion, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other Federal lawenforcement or intelligence agencies coordinate their respec-tive activities, any agreements which govern that coordina-tion, and the extent to which a lack of coordination has con-tributed to activities or actions which are illegal, improper,inefficient, unethical, or contrary to the intent of Congress.

(5) The extent to which the operation of domestic intelli-gence or counterintelligence activities and the operation ofany other activities within the United States by the CentralIntelligence Agency conforms to the legislative charter ofthat Agency and the intent of the Congress.

(6) The past and present interpretation by the Director ofCentral Intelligence of the responsibility to protect intelli-gence sources and methods as it relates to that provision ofthe National Security Act of 1947 which provides ". .

2 Olmstead v. United State8, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).

that the agency shall have no police, subpena, law enforce-ment powers, or internal security functions. . .. " "

(7) The nature and extent of executive branch oversightof all United States intelligence activities.

(8) The need for specific legislative authority to governthe operations of any intelligence agencies of the FederalGovernment now existing without that explicit statutory au-thority, including but not limited to agencies such as theDefense Intelligence Agency and the National SecurityAgency.

(9) The nature and extent to which Federal agencies co-operate and exchange intelligence information and the ade-quacy of any regulations or statutes which govern suchcooperation and exchange of intelligence information.

(10) The extent to which United States intelligence agen-cies are governed by Executive Orders, rules, or regulationseither published or secret and the extent to which thoseExecutive Orders, rules, or regulations interpret, expand, orare in conflict with specific legislative authority.

(11) The violation or suspected violation of any Stateor Federal statute by any intelligence agency or by any per-son by or on behalf of any intelligence agency of the Fed-eral Government including .but not limited to surreptitiousentries, surveillance, wiretaps, or eavesdropping, illegal open-ing of the United States mail, or the monitoring of the UnitedStates mail.

(12) The need for improved, strengthened, or consoli-dated oversight of United States intelligence activities by theCongress.

(13) Whether any of the existinez laws of the United Statesare inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of en-forcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, toimprove executive and legislative control of intelligence andrelated activities, and to resolve uncertainties as to the au-thoritv of United States intelligence and related agencies.

(14) Whether there is unnecessary duplication of expendi-ture and effort in the collection and processing of intelligenceinformation by United States agencies.

(15) The extent and necessity of overt and covert intelli-gence activities in the United States and abroad.

In addressing these mandated areas of inquiry, the Committee hasfocused on three broad questions:

1. Whether intelligence activities have functioned in ac-cordance with the Constitution and the laws of the UnitedStates.

2. Whether the structure, programs, past history, andpresent policies of the American intelligence system haveserved the national interests in a manner consistent withdeclared national policies and purposes.

150 U.S.C. 403(d) (3) ; Appendix B, Senate Select Committee Hearings (here-inafter cited as hearings), Vol 7, p. 210.

3. Whether the processes through which the intelligenceagencies have been directed and controlled have been ade-quate to assure conformity with policy and the law.

Over the past vear. the Committee and its staff have carefullyexamined the intelligence structure of the United States. Consider-able time and effort have been devoted in order to understand whathas been done by the United States Government in secrecy during thethirty-year period since the end of World War II. It is clear to theCommittee that there are many necessary and proper governmentalactivities that must be conducted in secrecy. Some of these activitiesaffect the security and the very existence of the nation.

It is also clear from the Committee's inquiry that intelligenceactivities conducted outside the framework of the Constitution andstatutes can undermine the treasured values guaranteed in the Billof Rights. Further, if the intelligence agencies act in ways inimicalto declared national purnoses, they damage the reputation, power, andinfluence of the United States abroad.

The Committee's investigation has documented that a number ofactions committed in the name of "national security" were inconsistentwith declared policy and the law. Hearings have been held and theCommittee has issued reports on alleged assassination plots, covertaction in Chile and the interception of domestic communications bythe National Security Agency (NSA). Regrettably, some of theseabuses cannot be regarded as aberrations.

B. THE PURPOSE OF THE CoMMr=rEE's FINDINGS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS

It is clear that a primary task for any successor oversight committee,and the Congress as a whole. will be to frame basic statutes necessaryunder the Constitution within which the intelligence agencies of theUnited States can function efficiently under clear guidelines. Chartersdelineating the missions, authorities, and limitations for some of theUnited States most important intelligence agencies do not exist. Forexample, there is no statutory authority for the NSA's intelligenceactivities. Where statutes do exist, as with the CIA, they are vague andhave failed to provide the necessary guidelines defining missions andlimitations.

The Committee's investigation has demonstrated, moreover, that thelack of legislation has had the effect of limiting public debate uponsome important national issues.

The CIA's broad statutory charter, the 1947 National Security Act,makes no ppecific mention of covert action. The CIA's former GeneralCounsel, Lawrence Houston, who was deeply involved in drafting the1947 Act, wrote in September 1947, "we do not believe that there wasany thought in the minds of Congress that the CIA under [theauthority of the National Security Act] would take positive actionfor subversion and sabotage." 4 Yet, a few months after enactmentof the 1947 legislation, the National Security Council authorizedthe CIA to engage in covert action programs. The provision of theAct often cited as authorizing CIA covert activities provides for theAgency:

'Memorandum from CIA General Council Lawrence Houston to DCI Hillen-koetter, 9/25/47.

* . . to perform such other functions and duties related tointelligence affecting the national security as the NationalSecurity Council may from time to time direct."

Secret Executive Orders issued by the NSC to carry out covert adtionprograms were not subject to congressional review. Indeed, until re-cent years, except for a few members, Congress was not fully aware ofthe existence of the so-called "secret charter for intelligence activities."Those members who did know had no institutional means for dis-cussing their knowledge of secret intelligence activities with theircolleagues. The problem of how the Congress can effectively use secretknowledge in its legislative processes remains to be resolved. It is theCommittee's view that a strong and effective oversight committee isan essential first step that must be taken to resolve this fundamentalissue.

C. THE FOCUS AND SCOPE OF THE COMMI'TEE'S INQUIRY AND OBSTACLESENCOUNTERED

The inquiry mandated in S. Res. 21 falls into two main categories.The first concerns allegations of wrong-doing. The nature of the Com-mittee's inquiry into these matters tends, quite properly, to be akin tothe investigations conducted by Senate and Congressional committeesin the past. We decided from the outset, however, that this committeeis neither a court, nor a law enforcement agency, and that while usingmany traditional congressional investigative techniques, our inquiryhas served primarily to illustrate the problems before Congress and thecountry. The Justice Department and the courts in turn have theirproper roles to play.

The second category of inquiry has been an examination of theintelligence agencies themselves. The Committee wished to learnenough about their past and present activities to make the legislativejudgments required to assure the American people that whatevernecessary secret intelligence activities were being undertaken weresubject to constitutional processes and were being conducted in aseffective, humane, and efficient a manner as possible.

The Committee focused on many issues affecting the intelligenceagencies which had not been seriously addressed since our peacetimeintelligence system was created in 1947. The most important questionsrelating to intelligence, such as its value to national security purposesand its cost and quality, have been carefully examined over the pastyear. Although some of the Committee's findings can be reported tothe public only in outline, enough can be set forth to justify the rec-ommendations. The Committee has necessarily been selective. A yearwas not enough time to investigate everything relevant to intelligenceactivities.

These considerations guided the Committee's choices:(1) A limited number of programs and incidents were ex-

amined in depth rather than reviewing hundreds superficially.The Committee's purpose was to understand the causes forthe particular performance or behavior of an agency.

(2) The specific cases examined were chosen because theyreflected generic problems.

o50 U.S.C. 403(d) (5).

(3) Where broad programs were closely reviewed (forexample, the CIA's covert action programs), the Committeesought to examine successes as well as apparent failures.

(4) Programs were examined from Franklin Roosevelt'sadministration to the present. This was done in order topresent the historical context within which intelligence ac-tivities have developed and to assure that sensitive, funda-mental issues would not be subject to possible partisan biases.

It is clear from the Committee's inquiry that problems arising fromthe use of the national intelligence system at home and abroad are tobe found in every administration. Accordingly, the Committee choseto emphasize particular parts of the national intelligence system andto address particular cases in depth. The Committee has concentratedits energies on the six executive branch groups that make up whatis called "National Intelligence".

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.(2) The counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bu-

reau of Investigation.(3) The National Security Agency.(4) The national intelligence components of the Depart-

ment of Defense other than NSA.(5 The National Security Council.(6) The intelligence activities of the Department of State.

The investigation of these national intelligence groupings includedexamining the degree of command and control exercised over themby the President and other key Government officials or institutions.The Committee also sought to evaluate the ability and effectiveness ofCongress to assert its oversight right and respionsibilities. The agenciesthe Committee has concentrated on have great powers and extensiveactivities which must be understood in order to judge fairly whetherthe United States intelligence system needs reform and change. TheCommittee believes that many of its general recommendations canand should be applied to the intelligence operations of all othergovernment agencies.

Based on its investigation, the Committee concludes that solutionsto the main problems can be developed by analyzing the broad patternsemerging from the examination of particular cases. At the same time,neither the dangers, nor the causes of abuses within the intelligencesystem, nor their possible solutions can be fairly understood withoutevaluating the historical context in which intelligence operations havebeen conducted.

Individual cases and programs of government surveillance which theCommittee examined raise questions concerning the inherent conflictbetween the government's perceived need to conduct surveillance andthe citizens' constitutionally protected rights of privacy and dissent. Ithas become clear that if some lose their liberties unjustly, all may losetheir liberties. The protections and obligations of law must apply to all.Only by looking at the broad scope of questionable activity over along period can we realistically assess the potential dangers of intru-sive government. For example, only through an understanding of the

totality of government efforts against dissenters over the past thirtyyears can one weigh the extent to which such an emphasis may "chill"legitimate free expression and assembly.

The Select Committee has conducted the only thorough investigationever made of United States intelligence and its post World War IIemergence as a complex, sophisticated system of multiple agenciesand extensive activities. The Committee staff of 100, including 60 pro-fessionals, has assisted the 11 members of the Committee in this in-depth inquiry which involved more than 800 interviews, over 250executive hearings, and documentation in excess of 110,000 pages.

The advice of former and current intelligence officials, Cabinet mem-bers, State, Defense, and Justice Department experts, and citizensfrom the private sector who have served in national security areashas been sought throughout the Committee's inquiry. The Committeehas made a conscious effort to seek the views of all principal officialswho have served in the intelligence agencies since the end of WorldWar II. We also solicited the opinions of constitutional experts andthe wisdom of scientists knowledgeable about the technology used byintelligence agencies. It was essential to learn the views of these sourcesoutside of the government to obtain as full and balanced an under-standing of intelligence activities as possible.

The fact that government intelligence agencies resist any examina-tion of their secret activities even by another part of the same govern-ment should not be minimized. The intelligence agencies are a sectorof American government set apart. Employees' loyalties to their or-ganizations have been conditioned by the closed, compartmented andsecretive circumstances of their agencies' formation and operation. Insome respects, the intelligence profession resembles monastic life withsome of the disciplines and personal sacrifices reminiscent of medievalorders. Intelligence work is a life of service, but one in which thenorms of American national life are sometimes distressingly distorted

Despite its legal Senate mandate, and the issuance of subpoenas, inno instance has the Committee been able to examine the agencies' fileson its own. In all the agencies, whether CIA, FBI, NSA, INR, DIA,or the NSC, documents and evidence have been presented throughthe filter of the agency itself.

Although the Senate inquiry was congressionally ordered andalthough properly constituted committees under the Constitution havethe right of full inquiry, the Central Intelligence Agency and otheragencies of the executive branch have limited the Committee's access tothe full record. Several reasons have been given for this limitation. Insome instances, the so-called doctrine of executive privilege has beenasserted. Despite these assertions of executive privilege, there are noclasses of documents which the Committee has not obtained, whetherfrom the NSC, the personal papers of former Presidents and theiradvisors, or, as in the case of the Committee's Report on Alleged Assas-sination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, all classes of documentsavailable in the executive branch. The exception, of course, involvesthe Nixon files which were not made available because of court order.

It should be noted that in some highly important areas of its in-

vestigation, the Committee has been refused access to files or docu-ments. These involve, among others, the arrangements and agreementsmade between the intelligence agencies and their informers andsources, including other intelligence agencies and governments. TheCommittee has agreed that in general, the names of agents, and theirmethods of conducting certain intelligence activities should remainin the custody of a few within the executive branch. But thereis a danger and an uncertainty which arises from accepting at facevalue the assertions of the agencies and departments which in the pasthave abused or exceeded their authority. If the occasion demands, aduly authorized congressional committee must have the right to gobehind agency assertions, and review the full evidence on which agencyresponses to committee inquiries have been based. There must be acheck: some means to ascertain whether the secrets being kept are,in fact, valid national secrets. The Committee believes that the burdenof proof should be on those who ask that a secret program or policybe kept secret.

The Committee's report consists of a number of case studies whichhave been pursued to the best of the Committee's ability and which theCommittee believes illuminate the purposes, character, and usefulnessof the shielded world of intelligence activities. The inquiry conductedover the past 15 months will probably provide the only broad insightfor some time into the now permanent role of the intelligence commu-nity in our national government. Because of this, and because of theneed to assure that necessary secret activities remain under constitu-tional control, the recommendations set forth by the Committee aresubmitted with a sense of urgency and with the admonition that toignore the dangers posed by secret government action is to invite thefurther weakening of our democracy.

D. TiH HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE INQUIRY

The thirty years since the end of World War II have been markedby continuing experimentation and change in the scope and methodsof the United States Government's activities abroad. From the all-outWorld War between the Axis powers and the allies, to the Cold Warand fears of nuclear holocaust between the communist bloc and West-ern democratic powers, to the period of "wars of liberation" in theformer colonial areas, the world has progressed to an era of negotia-tions leading to some easing of tensions between the United Statesand the Soviet Union. In addition, the People's Republic of Chinahas emerged as a world power which the United States and othernations must consider. The recognizable distinctions between declaredwar and credible peace have been blurred throughout these yearsby a series of regional wars and uprisings in Asia, the Middle East,Latin America, Europe, and Africa. The competing great powershave participated directly or indirectly in almost all of these wars.

. Of necessity, this country's intelligence agencies have played animportant role in the diplomacy and military activities of the UnitedStates during the last three decades. Intelligence information hashelped shape policy, and intelligence resources nave been used to carryout those policies.

The fear of war, and its attendant uncertainties and doubts, hasfostered a series of secret practices that have eroded the processes ofopen democratic government. Secrecy, even what would be agreed byreasonable men to be necessary secrecy, has, by a subtle and barelyperceptible accretive process, placed constraints upon the liberties ofthe American people.

Shortly after World War II, the United States, based on its war-time experience, created an intelligence system with the assigned mis-sion at home and abroad of protecting to protect the national security,primarily through the gathering and evaluation of intelligence aboutindividuals, groups, or governments perceived to threaten or poten-tially threaten the United States. In general, these intelligence func-tions were performed with distinction. However, both at home andabroad, the new intelligence system involved more than merely ac-quiring intelligence and evaluating information; the system also un-dertook activities to counter, combat, disrupt, and sometimes destroythose who were perceived as enemies. The belief that there was a needfor such measures was widely held, as illustrated in the following re-port related to the 1954 Hoover Commission Report on governmentorganization:

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whoseavowed objective is world domination by whatever meansand at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game.Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply.If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing American conceptsof "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop ef-fective espionage and counterespionage services. We mustlearn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by moreclever, more sophisticated and more effective methods thanthose used against us. It may become necessary that theAmerican people will be made acquainted with, understandand support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

The gray, shadowy world between war and peace became the naturalhaunt for covert action, espionage, propaganda, and other clandestineintelligence activities. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk describedit as the environment for the nasty wars "in the back alleys of theworld."

Although there had been many occasions requiring intelligence-gathering and secret government action against foreign and domesticnational security threats prior to World War II, the intelligence com-munity developed during and after that war is vastly different indegree and kind from anything that had existed previously. The sig-

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nificant new facets of the post-war system are the great size, techno-logical capacity and bureaucratic momentum of the intelligence ap-paratus, and, more importantly, the public's acceptance of the necessityfor a substantial permanent intelligence system. This capability con-trasts with the previous sporadic, ad hoc efforts which generallyoccurred during wars and national emergencies. The extent and mag-nitude of secret intelligence activities is alien to the previous Americanexperience.

Three other developments since World War II have contributed tothe power, influence and importance of the intelligence agencies.

First, the executive branch generally and the President in partic-ular have become paramount within the federal system, primarilythrough the retention of powers accrued during the emergency ofWorld War II. The intelligence agencies are generally responsibledirectly to the President and because of their capabilities and becausethey have usually operated out of the spotlight, and often in secret,they have also contributed to the growth of executive power.

Second, the direct and indirect impact of federal programs on thelives of individual citizens has increased tremendously since WorldWar II.

Third. in the thirty years since World War II, technology has madeunparalleled advances. New technological innovations have markedlyincreased the agencies' intelligence collection capabilities, a circum-stance which has greatly enlarged the potential for abuses of personalliberties. To illustrate, the SALT negotiations and treaties have beenpossible because technological advances make it possible to accuratelymonitor arms limitations, but the very technology which permits suchprecise weapons monitoring also enables the user to intrude on theprivate conversations and activities of citizens.

The targets of our intelligence efforts after World War II-theactivities of hostile intelligence services, communists, and groups asso-ciated with them both at home and abroad-were determined bysuccessive administrations. In the 1960's, as the civil rights movementgrew in .the country, some intelligence agencies directed attention tocivil rights organizations and groups hostile to them. such as theKu Klux Klan. From the mid-1960's until the end of the Vietnam war,intelligence efforts were focused on antiwar groups.

Just as the nature of intelligence activity has changed as a result ofinternational and national developments, the public's attitude towardintelligence has also altered. During the last eight years, beginningwith Ramparts magazine's exposure of CIA covert relationships withnon-governmental organizations. there has been a series of allegationsin the press and Conoiress which have provoked serious questions aboutthe conduct of intelligence agencies at home and abroad. The Water-gate disclosures raised additional auestions concerning abuse of powerby the executive branch, misuse of intelligence agencies, and the needto strengthen legal restraints against such abuses.

While the evidence in the Committee's Report emphasizes the mis-guided or imnroper activities of a few individuals in the executivebranch, it is clear that the growth of intelligence abuses reflects a moregeneral failure of our basic institutions.

See the Select Committee's detailed report on "Intelligence and Technology."

Throughout its investigation, the Committee has carefully inquiredinto the role of presidents and their advisors with respect to particularintelligence programs. On occasion, intelligence agencies concealedtheir programs from those in higher authority, more frequently it wasthe senior officials themselves who, through pressure for results, createdthe climate within which the abuses occurred. It is clear that greaterexecutive control and accountability is necessary.

The legislative branch has been remiss in exercising its control overthe intelligence agencies. For twenty-five years Congress has appropri-ated funds for intelligence activities. The closeted and fragmentaryaccounting which the intelligence community has given to a desig-nated small group of legislators was accepted by the Congress as ade-quate and in the best interest of national security. There were occa-sions when the executive intentionally withheld information relatingto intelligence programs from the Congress, but there were also occa-sions when the principal role of the Congress was to call for more intel-ligence activity, including activity which infringed the rights of citi-zens. In general, as with the executive, it is clear that Congress did notcarry out effective oversight.

The courts have also not confronted intelligence issues. As the Su-preme Court noted in 1972 in commenting on warrantless electronicsurveillance, the practice had been permitted by successive presidentsfor more than a quarter of a century without "guidance from the Con-gress or a definitive decision of the Courts". Of course, courts only con-sider the issues brought before them by litigants, and pervasive se-crecy-coupled with tight judicially imposed rules of standing-havecontributed to the absence of judicial decisions on intelligence issues.Nevertheless, the Committee's investigation has uncovered a host ofserious legal and constitutional issues relating to intelligence activityand it is strong proof of the need for reform to note that scarcely anyof those issues have been addressed in the courts.

Throughout the period, the general public, while generally excludedfrom debate on intelligence issues, nevertheless supported the knownand perceived activities of the intelligence agencies. In the few yearsprior to the establishment of this Committee, however, the public'sawareness of the need to examine intelligence issues was heightened.The series of allegations and partial exposures in the press and theCongress provoked serious questions about the conduct of intelligenceactivities at home and abroad. The Watergate affair increased the pub-lic's concern about abuse of governmental power and caused greaterattention to be paid to the need to follow and to strengthen the role oflaw to check such abuses.

Against this background, the Committee considered its main taskas making informed recommendations and judgments on the extentto which intelligence activities are necessary and how such necessaryactivities can be conducted within the framework of the Constitution.

E. THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND OPEN CONSTITUTIONALGOVERNMENT

Since World War II, with steadily escalating consequences. manydecisions of national importance have been made in secrecy, often bythe executive branch alone. These decisions are frequently based on

information obtained by clandestine means and available only to theexecutive branch. Until very recently, the Congress has not sharedin this process. The cautions expressed by the Founding Fathers andthe constitutional checks designed to assure that policymaking not be-

come the province of one man or a few men have been avoided on nota-

ble recent occasions through the use of secrecy. John Adams expressedhis concern about the dangers of arbitrary power 200 years ago:

Whenever we leave principles and clear positive laws we aresoon lost in the wild regions of imagination and possibilitywhere arbitrary power sits upon her brazen throne and gov-erns with an iron scepter.

Recent Presidents have justified this secrecy on the basis of "national

security," "the requirements of national defense," or "the confidential-ity required by sensitive, ongoing negotiations or operations." Thesejustifications were generally accepted at face value. The Bay of Pigsfiasco, the secret war in Laos, the secret bombing of Cambodia, theanti-Allende activities in Chile, the Watergate affair, were all instancesof the use of power cloaked in secrecy which, when revealed, provokedwidespread popular disapproval. This series of events has ended, forthe time being at least, passive and uncritical acceptance by the Con-gress of executive decisions in the areas of foreign policy, nationalsecurity and intelligence activities. If Congress had met its oversightresponsibilities some of these activities might have been averted.

An examination of the scope of secret intelligence activities under-taken in the past three decades reveals that they ranged from war to

conventional espionage. It annears that some United States intelligenceactivities may have violated treaty and covenant obligations, but more

importantly, the rights of United States citizens have been infringedupon. Despite citizen and congressional concern about these programs,no processes or procedures have been developed by either the Congressor the executive branch which would assure Congress of access to secret

information which it must have to carry out its constitutional respon-sibilities in authorizing and givina its advice and consent. The hind-sight of history suggests that many secret operations were ill-advisedor might have been more beneficial to United States interests had theybeen conducted onenly, rather than secretly.

What is a valid national secret? What can properly be concealedfrom the scrutiny of the American people, from various seaments ofthe executive branch or from a duly constituted oversight body oftheir elected representatives? Assassination plots? The overthrow ofan elected democratic government? Drug testing on unwitting Ameri-can citizens? Obtaining millions of private cables? Massive domesticspying by the CIA and the military? The illegal opening of mail?Attempts by an agency of the government to blackmail a civil rightsleader? These have occurred and each has been withheld from scrutinyby the public and the Congress by the label "secret intelligence."

In the Committee's view, these illegal. improper or unwise acts arenot valid national secrets and most certainly should not be kept fromthe scrutiny of a duly-constituted congressional oversight body.

The definition of a valid national secret is far more difficult to setforth. It varies from time to time. There is presently general agree-

ment that details about military activities, technology, sources ofinformation and particular intelligence methods are secrets that shouldbe carefully protected. It is most important that a process be devisedfor agreeing on what national secrets are, so that the reasons for nec-essary secrecy are understood by all three branches of government andthe public, that they be under constant review, and that any changesrequiring the protection of new types of information can be addressed,understood and agreed on within a framework of constitutional con-sensus.

The Committee stresses that these questions remain to be decided bythe Congress and the executive jointly:

-What should be regarded as a national secret?-Who determines what is to be kept secret?-How can decisions made in secret or programs secretly

approved be reviewed?Two great problems have confronted the Committee in carrying

out its charge to address these issues:The first is how our open democratic society, which has endured

and flourished for 200 years, can be adapted to overcome the threatsto liberty posed by the continuation of secret government activities.The leaders of the United States must devise ways to meet their respec-tive intelligence responsibilities, including informed and effective con-gressional oversight, in a manner which brings secrecy and the powerthat secrecy affords within constitutional bounds.

For the executive branch, the specific problem concerns institutingeffective control and accountability systems and improving efficiency.Many aspects of these two problem areas which have been examinedduring the Committee's inquiry of intelligence agencies are addressedin the recommendations in Chapter XVIII. It is our hope that intelli-gence oversight committees working with the executive branch willdevelop legislation to remedy the problems exposed by our inquiry anddescribed in this report. The Committee has already recommendedthe creation of an oversight committee with the necessary powers toexercise legislative authority over the intelligence activities of theUnited States.

It is clear that the Congress must exert its will and devise proceduresthat will enable it to play its full constitutional role in makingpolicy decisions concerning intelligence activities. Failure to do sowould permit further erosion of constitutional government.

This Committee has endeavored to include in its final public reportenough information to validate its findings and recommendations.Most of the inquiry and the documentation obtained by the Committee,particularly that concerning foreign and military intelligence, is ofa highly classified nature. Determining what could and should be re-vealed has been a major concern.

In a -meeting with President Ford at the outset of our inquiry inFebruary 1975, the Committee agreed not to disclose any classified in-formation provided by the executive branch without first consult-ing the appropriate agencies, offices and departments. In the case ofObjections, the Committee agreed to carefully consider the Executive'sreasons for maintaining secrecy, but the Committee determined thatfinal decisions on any disclosure would be up to the Committee.

The Select Committee has scrupulously adhered to this agreement.The Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving ForeignLeaders, the report on CIA activities in Chile, the report on illegalNSA surveillances, and the disclosures of illegal activities on the partof FBI COINTELPRO, the FBI's harassment of Dr. Martin LutherKing, Jr., and other matters revealed in the Committee's public hear-ings, were all carefully considered by the Committee and the executivebranch working together to determine what information could be de-classified and revealed without damaging national security. In thosereports and hearings, virtually all differences between the Committeeand the Executive were resolved. The only significant exception con-cerned the release to the public of the Assassination Report, which theexecutive branch believed would harm national security. The Com-mittee decided otherwise.

Some criteria for defining a valid national secret have been agreedto over the past year. Both the Committee and the executive branchnow agree that generally the names of intelligence sources and thedetails of sensitive methods used by the intelligence services shouldremain secret. Wherever possible, the right of privacy of individualsand groups should also be preserved. It was agreed, however, that.thedetails of illegal acts should be disclosed And that the broad scope ofUnited States intelligence activities should be sufficiently describedto give public reassurance that the intelligence agencies are operatingconsistent with the law and declared national policy.

The declassification working procedures developed between thisCommittee, the CIA and other parts of the intelligence communityconstitute the beginnings of agreed, sound and sensible methods andcriteria for making public matters that should be made public. Thisdisclosure process is an important step toward achieving the nationalconsensus required if our intelligence system is to enjoy essential publicsupport.

There is a clear necessity, after. thirty years of substantial secret ac-tivities, for public debate and legislative decisions about the futurecourse of our intelligence system. This report is intended to assist theSenate, the Congress, and the country in making the vital decisionsthat are required to be made in the coming years.

This section of the Final Report focuses on the departments andagencies engaged in foreign and military intelligence. The Commit-tee's findings, conclusions, and. recommendations in these areas canbe found in Chapter XVIII.

II. THE FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW

Permanent institutions for the conduct of secret foreign and mili-tary intelligence activities are a relatively new feature of Americangovernment. Secure behind two oceans and preoccupied with the set-tlement of a continent, America had no permanent foreign intelligenceestablishment for more than a century and a half. In times of crisis,Americans improvised their intelligence operations. In times of peace,such operations were not needed and were allowed to lie fallow.

Despite the experience of the First World War, Americans believedthey could continue this pattern well into the Twentieth Century. Themilitary services developed important technical intelligence capabil-ities, such as the breaking of the Japanese code, but the Americanpublic remained unaware of the importance of effective intelligence forits security. As a world power, the United States came late to intelli-gence. It came on December 7, 1941, when Japan attacked PearlHarbor.

That searing intelligence failure led to the Congress' first effort todeal with the necessity and complexity of modern intelligence. TheJoint Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack, after a sweeping in-vestigation, recommended in 1946 a unified and permanent intelli-gence effort by the United States-concepts ultimately embodied inthe basic charter for American intelligence, The National SecurityAct adopted by the Congress in 1947. However, neither the PearlHarbor Committee, nor the National Security Act addressed someof the fundamental problems secret intelligence operations pose forour democratic and constitutional form of government and America'sunique system of checks and balances.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities representsthe second major effort by the Congress to come to grips with intelli-gence problems, in particular the basic constitutional and structuralissues arising from a permanent secret intelligence establishment.While these problems were the subject of the investigation and arethe focus of this report, the Select, Committee wishes to emphasize thatit found much that was good and proper in America's intelligenceefforts. In particular, the capacity and dedication of the men andwomen serving in our intelligence services is to be commended.

This inquiry was not brought forth by an individual event such asa massive intelligence failure threatening the nation's security. Ratherit is the result of a series of occurrences adversely affecting the libertiesof individual Americans and undermining the lone-term interests andreputation of the United States. In effect, the Select Committee wascreated to deal with the question of whether our democratic system haseffectively governed in the crucial area of secret intelligence.

Mr. Clark Clifford, one of the authors of the National SecurityAct of 1947, told the Committee that:

The law that was drawn in 1947 was of a general natureand properly so, because it was the first law of its kind. Wewere blazing a new trail. 1

It has been the responsibility of the Select Committee to considerwhere this secret trail has taken the nation, and with this as prologue,to begin the task of charting the future.

A. THE BASIC ISSUES: SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY

The task of democratic government is to reconcile conflicting values.The fundamental question faced by the Select Committee is how toreconcile the clash between secrecy and democratic government itself.Secrecy is an essential part of most intelligence activities. However,secrecy undermines the United States Government's capacity to dealeffectively with the principal issues of American intelligence addressedby the Select Committee:

-The lack of clear legislation defining the authority for permis-sible intelligence activities has been justified in part for reasons ofsecrecy. Absent clear legal boundaries for intelligence activities, theConstitution has been violated in secret and the power of the executivebranch has gone unchecked, unbalaficed.

-Secrecy has shielded intelligence activities from full account-ability and effective supervision both within the executive branchand by the Congress.

-Reliance on covert action has been excessive because it offers asecret shortcut around the democratic process. This shortcut has ledto questionable foreign involvements and unacceptable acts.

-The important line between public and private action has becomeblurred as the result of the secret use of private institutions and in-dividuals by intelligence agencies. This clandestine relationship hascalled into question their integrity and undermined the crucialindeliendent role of the private sector in the American system ofdemocracy.

-Duplication, waste, inertia and ineffectiveness in the intelligencecommunity has been one of the costs of insulating the intelligencebureaucracy from the rigors of Congressional and public scrutiny.

-Finally, secrecy has been a tragic conceit. Inevitably, the truthprevails, and policies pursued on the premise that they could be plaus-ibly denied, in the end damage America's reputation and the faithof her people in their government.

For three decades, these problems have grown more intense. TheUnited States Government responded to the challenge of secret intel-ligence operations by resorting to procedures that were informal,implicit, tacit. Such an approach could fit within the tolerances ofour democratic system so long as such activities were small or tem-porary. Now, however, the permanence and scale of America's intelli-gence effort and the persistence of its problems require a differentsolution.

'Clark Clifford testimony, 12/5/75, Hearings, vol. 7, p. 50.

B. THE SCOPE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE'S INQUIRY INTO FOREIGN ANDMILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

The operations of the United States Government in the field ofintelligence involve the activities of hundreds of thousands of individ-uals and the expenditure of billions of dollars. They are carried outby a complex "community" of organizations whose functions interactand overlap. Because of their scope, the Select Committee could notdeal in depth with all aspects of America's intelligence activities.Instead the Committee focused on the principal organizations, theirkey functions and the major issues confronting the United States inthe field of foreign and military intelligence. In doing so, the Com-mittee sought to uncover the truth of alleged abuses by the intelligenceagencies and to ascertain the legitimate needs and requirementsof an effective future intelligence system for the United States thatcan function within the boundaries established by the Constitutionand our democratic form of government.

The Select Committee focused on five institutions:-The National Security Council (NSC), which on behalf of the

President, is supposed to direct the entire national security apparatusof the United States Government, including the intelligence commu-nity. As the senior policymaking body in the executive branch in thefield of national security, the NSC is also the ultimate consumer of thenation's intelligence product.

-The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who is charged withproducing intelligence which reflects the judgments of all of the in-telligence organizations in the executive branch. He is also supposedto "coordinate" the activities of these organizations.

-The Central Intelligence Agency, which houses the government'scentral analytical staff for the production of intelligence, but whichdevotes its major efforts to developing new means of technical collec-tion and to operating America's clandestine intelligence servicethroughout the world. In the latter capacity it carries out covert action,paramilitary operations and espionage.

-The Department of State, which is the primary source of intelli-gence on foreign political and economic matters, and as such is both acompetitor in the collection and evaluation of intelligence and a po-tential source of external control over clandestine intelligence activitiesof the Central Intelligence Agency.

-The Department of Defense, which is the major collector of in-telligence, the largest consumer, as well as the principal manager ofthe resources devoted to intelligence. It houses the largest intelligencecollection organization, the National Security Agency (NSA), and'the largest intelligence analysis organization, the Defense IntelligenceAgency (DIA).

C. THE INTELLIGENCE PRocESS: THEORY AND REALITY

These organizations, and some of their offshoots, constitute theUnited States intelligence community. In theory at least, their opera-tions can be described in simple terms by the following cycle:

-Those who use intelligence, the "consumers," indicate the kindof information needed.

-These needs are translated into concrete "requirements" by seniorintelligence managers.

-The requirements are used to allocate resources to the "collectors"and serve to guide their efforts.

-The collectors obtain the required information or "rawintelligence."

-The "raw intelligence" is collated and turned into "finished in-telligence" by the "analysts."

-The finished intelligence is distributed to the consumer and theintelligence managers who state new needs, define new requirements,and make necessary adjustments in the intelligence programs to im-prove effectiveness and efficiency.

In reality this pattern is barely recognizable.There are many different consumers, from the President to the

weapons designer. Their needs can conflict. Consumers rarely takethe time to define their intelligence needs and even if they do so thereis no effective and systematic mechanism for translating them intointelligence requirements. -

Therefore, intelligence requirements reflect what intelligence man-agers think the consumers need, and equally important, what theythink their organizations can produce. Since there are many managersand little central control; each is relatively free to set his ownrequirements.

Resources therefore tend to be allocated according to the prioritiesand concerns of the various intelligence bureaucracies. Most intelli-gence collection operations are part of other organizations-the De-partment of Defense, the Department of State-and so their require-ments and their consumers are often the first to be served.

Collecting intelligence is not an automatic process. There are manydifferent kinds of intelligence, from a radar return to an indiscreet re-mark, and the problems in acquiring it vary greatly. Information thatis wanted may not be available, or years may be required to developan agency or a technical device to get it. Meanwhile intelligence agen-cies collect what they can.

In the world of bureaucracy, budgets, programs, procurement,and managers, the needs of the analyst can be lost in the shuffle. Therehas been an explosion in the volume and quality of raw intelligence butno equivalent increase in the capacity of analytical capabilities. As aresult, "raw" intelligence increasingly dominates "finished" intelli-

- gence; analysts find themselves on a treadmill where it is difficult todo more than summarize and put in context the intelligence flowingin. There is little time or reward for the task of providing insight.

In the end the consumer, particularly at the highest levels of thegovernment, finds that his most imnortant questions are not onlyunanswered, but sometimes not even addressed.

To some extent, all this is in the nature of things. Many questionscannot be answered. The world of intelligence is dominated by uncer-tainty and chance, and those in the intelligence bureaucracy, as else-

where in the Government, try to defend themselves against uncer-tainties in ways which militate against efficient management andaccountability.

Beyond this is the fact that the organizations of the intelligencecommunity must operate in peace but be prepared for war. This hasan enormous impact on the kind of intelligence that is sought, the wayresources are allocated, and the way the intelligence community isorganized and managed.

Equally important, the instruments of intelligence have been forgedinto weapons of psychological, political, and paramilitary warfare.This has had a profound effect on the perspective and preoccupa-tions of the leadership of the intelligence community, downgradingconcerns for intelligence in relation to the effective execution ofoperations.

These problems alone would undermine any rational scheme, butit is also important to recognize that the U.S. -intelligence communityis not the work of a single author. It has evolved from an interactionof the above internal factors and the external forces that have shapedAmerica's history since the end of the Second World War.

D. EVOLUION OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITYThe evolution of the United States intelligence community since

World War II is part of the larger history of America's effort tocome to grips with the spread of communism and the growing powerof the Soviet Union. As the war ended, Americans were torn by hopesfor peace and fear for the future. The determination to return thenation promptly to normal was reflected in demobilization of ourwartime military establishment. In the field of intelligence, it wasclear in President Truman's decision to dismantle the Office of Stra-tegic Services, scattering its functions to the military departments andthe Department of State.

The Second World War saw the defeat of one brand of totalitarian-ism. A new totalitarian challenge quickly arose. The Soviet Union, amajor ally in war, became America's principal adversary in peace. Thepower of fascism was in ruin but the power of communism was mobil-ized. Not only had the communist parties in France, Italy, and Greeceemerged politically strengthened by their roles in the Resistance, butthe armies of the Soviet Union stretched across the center of Europe.And, within four years, America's nuclear monopoly would end.

American military intelligence officers were among the first to per-ceive the changed situation. Almost immediately after the fall of Ber-lin to the Red Army, U.S. military intelligence sought to determineSoviet objectives. Harry Rositzke, later to become chief of the CIA'sSoviet Division, but at the time a military intelligence officer, wasdespatched to Berlin by jeep. Although the Soviet Union was still anally, Rositzke was detained, interrogated, then ordered expelled bythe Soviet occupying forces. He managed, however, to escape his So-viet "escort" and arrive in Berlin. He described his experience to theCommittee:

We got on the outskirts of Berlin and yelled out "Ameri-kanski," and were highly welcomed. And as we went over theAutobahn the first basic impression I got, since I had known

Germany well before the war, was a long walking group ofGerman males under 16 and over 60 who were being shep-herded to the east by four-foot-ten, five-foot Mongolian sol-diers with straw shoes.

The Russians also had been looting. With horses and farmwagons they were taking away mattresses, wall fixtures,plumbing fixtures, anything other than the frame of thehouses.

We then made our way through the rubble of Berlin-mostwere one-way streets-identifying every shoulder patch wecould, and passed the Siemans-Halske works, in front ofwhich were 40 or 50 lend-lease trucks, on each of which was alarae shiny lathe. drill press, At cetera.

When we had seen enough and were all three extremelynervous, we headed straight west from Berlin to the BritishZone. When we arrived we had an enormous amount of ex-uberance and a real sense of relief, for the entire 36 hours hadput us in another world. The words that came to my mindthen were, "Russia moves west." 3

At home, the Truman Administration was preoccupied by the tran-sition from war to an uncertain peace. Though dispersed, and in somecases disbanded, America's potential capabilities in the field of intelli-gence were considerable. There were a large number of well-trainedformer OSS operation officers; the military had developed a remark-able capacity for cryntologic intelligence (the breaking of codes) andcommunications intelligence (COMINT): there was also a cadre offormer OSS intelligence analysts both within the government and inthe academic community.

E. THE ORIGINS OF THE POsTwAR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 4

With the experiences of World War II and particularly Pearl Har-bor still vivid, there was a recognition within the government that,notwithstanding demobilization, it was essential to create a central-ized body to collate and coordinate intelligence information. Therewas also a need to eliminate frictions between competing militaryintelligence services. Although there was disagreement about the struc-ture and authority of the nostwar i-telligence servi-e, President Tru-man and his senior advisers concluded that, unlike the OSS, thiscentralized body should be civilian in character.

The military resisted this judgment. Virtually all of America'scompeting intelligence assets were in the armed services. Then, asnow, the military considered an intelligence capability essential inwartime and e'qually imnortant in time of peace to be prepared formilitary crises. Thus, the services were strongly opposed to havingtheir authority over intelligence diminished. In contrast, factionswithin the State Department were reluctant to accept any greaterresponsibility or role in the field of clandestine intelligence.

Six months after V-J Day, and three months after he hsd dis-banded OSS, President Truman established the Central Intelligence

3 Harry Rozitzke testimony, 10/31/75. n. 7.' For an organizational history of the CIA, see Chapter VI.

Group (CIG). CIG was the direct predecessor of the CIA. It re-ported to the National Intelligence Authority, a body consisting ofthe Secretaries of State, War and Navy and their representatives. CIGhad a brief existence. It never was able to overcome the constraintsand institutional resistances found in the Department of State andthe armed services.

The National Security Act of 1947 1 was passed on July 26, 1947. TheAct included, in large part, the recommendations of a report preparedfor Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal by New York investmentbroker Ferdinand Eberstadt. Though largely concerned with the crea-tion of the National Security Council (NSC) and the unification of themilitary services within the Department of Defense, the Act alsocreated a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and a CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA). The powers of the DCI and the CIAwere an amalgam of careful limits on the DCI's authority over theintelligence community and an open-ended mission for the CIA itself.The power of the DCI over military and diplomatic intelligence wasconfined to "coordination." At the same time, however, the Agencywas authorized to carry out unspecified "services of common concern"and, more importantly, could "carry out such other functions andduties" as the National Security Council might direct.

Nowhere in the 1947 Act was the CIA explicitly empowered to col-lect intelligence or intervene secretly in the affairs of other nations.But the elastic phrase, "such other functions," was used by successivepresidents to move the Agency into espionage, covert action, para-military operations, and technical intelligence collection. Often con-ceived as having granted significant peacetime powers and flexibilityto the CIA and the NSC, the National Security Act actually legislatedthat authority to the President.

The 1947 Act provided no explicit charter for military intelligence.The charter and mission of military intelligence activities was estab-lished either by executive orders, such as the one creating the NationalSecurity Agency in 1952, or various National Security Council di-rectives. These National Security Council Intelligence Directives(NSCID's) were the principal means of establishing the roles and

functions of all the various entities in the intelligence community.They composed the so-called "secret charter" for the CIA. However,most of them also permitted "departmental" intelligence activities,and in this way also provided the executive charter for the intelligenceactivities of the State Department and the Pentagon. However, theintelligence activities of the Department of Defense remained withthe military rather than with the new Defense Department civilians.At the end of the war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to continuethe inter-Service coordinating mechanism-the Joint IntelligenceCommittee-which had been created in 1942. With the 1947 Act andthe establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a working level intelli-gence operation was created in the Joint Staff, known as the JointIntelligence Group, or J-2.

The structure created by the 1947 Act and ensuing NSCID's washighly decentralized. The task of the CIA and the Director of Central

6 See Chapter VII for an analysis of the 1947 Act.

Intelligence was to "coordinate" the intelligence output of all the vari-ous intelligence collection programs in the military and the Depart-ment of State. The CIA and its Director had little power to act itself,but the potential was there.

F. THE RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET THREAT

Immediately after its establishment, the CIA and other elementsof the intelligence community responded to the external threats fac-ing the United States.

-The threat of war in Europe. Following the war there was a dis-tinct possibility of a Soviet assault on Western Europe. Communistregimes had been established in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bul-garia. Czechoslovakia went Communist in 1948 through a coup sup-ported by the Russian Army. There was a Russian-backed civil war inGreece. And, above all, there was the presence of the Soviet Army inEastern Europe and the pressure on Berlin.

In light of these developments, U.S. policvmakers came to the con-clusion that outright war' with the Soviet Union was possible. The U.S.intelligence community responded accordingly. The CIA assumed theespionage task, running agents and organizing "stay-behind networks"in the event the Soviets rolled west. Agents. mostly refugees, were sentinto the East to report on Soviet forces and, in particular, any movesthat signalled war. The U.S. went so far as to establish contact withUkrainian guerrillas-a relationship that was maintained until theguerrillas were finally wiped out in the early 1950s by Soviet securityforces. CIA activities. however, were outnumbered by the clandestinecollection operations of the military, particularly in Western Euro-e,where the Army maintained a large covert intelligence and paramili-tary capability.

-Turmoil in the West. The Soviets had powerful political resourcesin the West-the Communist parties and- trade unions. Provided withfinancial and advisory support from the Soviet Union. the Communistparties sought to exnloit and exacerbate the economic and noliticalturmoil in postwar Europe. As the elections in 1948 and 1949 in Italyand France approached, the democratic parties were in disarray andthe possibility of a Communist takeover was real. Coordinated Com-munist political unrest in western countries combined with extremistpressure from the Soviet Union, confirmed the fears of many thatAmerica faced an expansionist Communist monolith.

The United States resnonded with overt economic aid-the TrumanDoctrine and the Marshall Plan-and covert nolitical assistance. Thislatter task was assigned to the Office of Special Projects, later renamedthe Office of Poliev Coordination (OPC). The Office was housed in theCIA but was directly responsile to the Departments of State andDefense. Clandestine support from the United States for Europeandemocratic parties was regardpd as an essential response to the threatof "international communism." OPC became the fastest growing ele-ment in the CTA. To facilitate its onerations. as well as to finance CIAespionage activities, the Con.'ress Passed the Central IntelligenceAgency Act of 1949, which authorized the Director of CIA to spendfunds on his Voucher without having to account for disbursements.

-Nuclear iveapons. The advent of nutlear weapons and the Sovietpotential in this field led to efforts to ascertain the status of the SovietUnion's nuclear program. By the time of the Soviet's first atomic explo-sion in 1949, the U.S. Air Force and Navy had begun a peripheralreconnaissance program to monitor other aspects of Soviet nucleardevelopment and Soviet military cacpabilities. As the Soviet strategicnuclear threat grew, America's efforts to contain it would grow inscale and sophistication until it would overshadow the classic tools ofespionage.

G. KOREA: THE TURNING POINT

The Communist attack, feared in Europe, took place in Asia. TheKorean War, following less than a year after the fall of China to theCommunists, marked a turning point for the CIA. The requirementsof that war, the involvement of China, the concern that war in Europemight soon follow, led to a fourfold expansion of the CIA-particu-larly in the paramilitary field. This period was characterized by effortsto infiltrate agents into mainland China, which led to the shoot-down and capture of a number of Americans.

The CIA's activities elsewhere in Asia also expanded. Instrumen-tal in helping Ramon Magsaysay defeat the communiist Hukbalahapsin the Philippines, the CIA also assisted the French in their losingstruggle against the Viet Minh in Indochina.

The failure to anticipate the attack on Korea was regarded as amajor intelligence failure. The new Director of the CIA, GeneralBedell Smith, was determined to improve CIA's estimating and fore-casting capabilities. He called on William Langer, formerly chief ofthe Research and Analysis section of the OSS, to come to Washingtonfrom Harvard, in 1950, to head a small staff for analysis and the pro-:duction of intelligence. An Office of National Estimates (ONE) wasestablished to produce finished intelligence estimates. ONE drew onthe.intelligence information resources of the entire U.S. intelligencecommunity and was aided by a Board of National Estimates composedof leading statesmen and academic experts.

By the end of the Korean War and the naming of Allen Dulles asDCI, the powers, responsibilities and 'basic structure of the CIA wereestablished. The Agency had assumed full responsibility for covertoperations in 1950, and by 1952 covert action had exceeded the moneyand manpower allotted to the task of espionage-a situation thatwould persist until the early 1970s.

Paramilitary actions were in disrepute because of a number of fail-ures during the Korean War. However, the techniques of covert mili-tary assistance in training had been developed, and the pattern of CIAdirection of Special Forces and other unconventional components ofthe U.S. Armed Forces in clandestine operations had been estab-lished.

In the field of espionage, the CIA had become the predominant, butby no means the exclusive operator. Clandestine human collection ofintelligence by the military services continued at a relatively highrate. The military also had a large stake in clandestine technicalcollection of intelligence.

Major structural changes in the intelligence community were

brought about by the consolidation of cryptanalysis and related func-

tions. Codebreaking is a vital part of technical intelligence collection

and has had an important role in the history of U.S. intelligenceefforts. The American "Black Chamber" responsible for breaking

German codes in WWI was abolished in the 1920s. As WWII ap-

proached, cryptanalysis received increased attention in the military.Both the Army and Navy had separate cryptologic services which

had

combined to break the Japanese code. Known as "the magic" this in-

formation sign