forests, food, and fuel in the tropics: the uneven social and ... research repository...
TRANSCRIPT
TSpace Research Repository tspace.library.utoronto.ca
Forests, food, and fuel in the tropics: the uneven social and ecological consequences of
the emerging political economy of biofuels
Peter Dauvergne and Kate J. Neville
Version Post-Print/Accepted Manuscript
Citation (published version)
Dauvergne, P., & Neville, K.J. 2010. Forests, food, and fuel in the tropics: the uneven social and ecological consequences of the emerging political economy of biofuels. Journal of Peasant Studies, 37(4): 631-660
Publisher’s Statement This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Peasant Studies on September 23, 2010, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/ 10.1080/03066150.2010.512451.
How to cite TSpace items
Always cite the published version, so the author(s) will receive recognition through services that track citation counts, e.g. Scopus. If you need to cite the page number of the TSpace version (original manuscript or accepted manuscript) because you cannot access the published version, then cite the TSpace version in addition to the published version using the permanent URI (handle) found on the record page.
Weextendthankstothreeanonymousreviewersfortheirextensiveandinsightfulcomments,aswellastoJunBorras,IanScoones,PhilMcMichael,JohnMcCarthy,andtheparticipantsoftheJPSworkshopon‘Biofuels,LandandAgrarianChange’(hostedbytheInternationalDevelopmentStudiesProgramatSaintMary’sUniversity,16-17October2009)forcommentsonanearlierdraft.WearegratefulforfundingsupportfromtheSocialSciencesandHumanitiesResearchCouncilofCanada.
Forests,food,andfuelinthetropics:theunevensocialandecologicalconsequencesoftheemergingpoliticaleconomyofbiofuelsPeterDauvergneandKateJ.Neville
The global political economyof biofuels emerging since 2007 appears set to intensifyinequalitiesamongthecountriesandruralpeoplesoftheglobalSouth.Lookingthrougha globalpolitical economy lens, this article analyses the consequencesofproliferatingbiofuel alliances among multinational corporations, governments, and domesticproducers.Sincemanymajorbiofuelfeedstocks–suchassugar,oilpalm,andsoy–arealready entrenched in industrial agricultural and forestry production systems, theauthors extrapolate from patterns of production for these crops to bolster theirargument that state capacities, the timing of market entry, existing institutions, andhistorical state-society land tenure relations will particularly affect the potentialconsequencesoffurtherbiofueldevelopment.Althoughtheimpactsofbiofuelsvarybyregion and feedstock, and although some agrarian communities in some countries ofthe global South are poised to benefit, the analysis suggests that already-vulnerablepeople and communities will bear a disproportionate share of the costs of biofueldevelopment, particularly for biofuels from crops already embedded in industrialproduction systems. A core reason, this article argues, is that the emerging biofuelalliances are reinforcing processes and structures that increase pressures on theecological integrity of tropical forests and further wrest control of resources fromsubsistencefarmers,indigenouspeoples,andpeoplewithinsecurelandrights.Eventhedevelopment of so-called ‘sustainable’ biofuels looks set to displace livelihoods andreinforceandextendpreviouswavesofhardshipforsuchmarginalisedpeoples.Keywords: biofuel alliances, global political economy, institutions, state-societyrelations,sustainability
Theglobalpoliticaleconomyofbiofuelshasbeenshiftingdirectionsince2007,asinvestments
inalternativeenergycontinuetogrow,aschainsofproductionandconsumptioncrisscrossand
deepeninnewregions,andasgovernmentsandcorporationsreassesseconomicprospectsand
politicalobstacles.Precedingthe2007foodcrisis,manyanalystssawbiofuelsasapathway
towardmoresustainabledevelopment,withthepotentialtosupportsmall-scalefarmers,
developruraleconomies,andreducegreenhousegases.Thiscautiousoptimismdampened
afterbiofuelswerelinkedtohigherfoodpricesanddeforestation,andasscientificstudiesput
intodoubttheircarbonneutralstatus,especiallythosederivedfromfoodcrops.Inresponse,
2
biofuelinvestorsandproducerslaunchednewalliancestoadvancetheindustry.Theeffectsof
thesenewpartnershipsandinterestsextendbeyondtheirimpactsonfoodpricesandsecurity.
Internationally,theemergingeconomicsofthebiofuelindustryarealteringrelationsamong
statesandbetweenstatesandindustry,especiallywithmultinationalcorporations(MNCs).1
Domestically,thesealliancesareaffectinglandtenureandlivelihoodsofdiverseruralgroupsin
waysthatmimicdestructivepatternsalreadycommoninindustrialforestryandagriculture.2
Thispaperexploreshowthisemergingpoliticaleconomyofbiofuelsisshaping
ecologicalchangeinruralcommunitiesintropicalforestregions,throughananalysisof
economicandpoliticalalliancesattheinternationalanddomesticlevels.Wearguethatthe
consequencesofemergingalliancesamongMNCs,governments,anddomesticcorporations
dependinlargepartontheinstitutionalstructuresofthestate,thetimingofentryintothe
biofuelmarket,andonhistoricalstate-societyrelations.Inmanycases,biofueldevelopment
lookssettofurtherwrestcontroloftheland–andproductsoftheland–fromsubsistence
farmers,indigenouspeoples,forest-dependentcommunities,3andpeoplewithinsecureland
rights.4Inlightofpastexperienceswhenintroducingnewtechnologiesandcommercialising
agricultureandforestry,weanticipatethateventhepromotionofso-called‘sustainable’
biofuelsbyemergingeconomiesoftheSouth(primarilylarge-scaleandcorporate-influenced
biofueldevelopment)willreinforceandextendpreviouswavesoflivelihooddisplacement.In
particular,wedrawonevidenceoftheeffectsonagrariancommunitiesoftheproductionof
cropslikesoy,sugarcane,andoilpalm(majorfoodcropsaswellasbiofuelfeedstocks),from
1 For a more detailed analysis of these changes, see Dauvergne and Neville (2009). 2 We use the term ‘livelihoods’ to refer to the activities of subsistence and income generation for individuals and households. See Scoones (2009) for a full discussion of the meaning and implications of livelihood perspectives in the development literature. 3 We use the term ‘forest-dependent’ to indicate communities that rely on forest products and livelihood activities, such as non-timber forest products (NTFPs) including cultivated and gathered seasonal foods and medicines. These communities may be agrarian, but rely to some extent on the forests to complement and buffer against fluctuations in other income-producing and subsistence activities (see Belcher and Schreckenberg 2007 on the effects of commercialisation of NTFPs on communities and especially poor households). In agrarian communities, landless families may have the highest dependence on forests. Santra et al. (2008) document the forest-dependence of farmers in south-west Bengal, noting that, on average, landless families visit the forest 6 days a week, while land-owning families’ visits are closer to 4 days a week; Vedeld et al. (2007) document the equalizing effects on local income distribution of ‘environmental incomes’ from forest products like fuelwood and fodder. 4 Insecure land tenure might be the result of a lack of formal title, but might also be the product of a government’s disregard for formal land rights (see, for example, Broegaard 2005 on perceived insecurity despite formal land tenure in Nicaragua).
3
whichweextrapolatetoreflectonwhatweseeasthelikelyunevensocialandecological
trajectoriesoffurtherbiofueldevelopment.
Toguideouranalysis,wetrackfourrelatedquestions.First,whataretheimplicationsof
emergingbiofuelalliancesforstatecontrolover,andbenefitsfrom,industrialdevelopment?
Second,incaseswherestateshaverelativelylittleinfluencewithinthesealliances,towhat
extentcanvoluntarycorporatepoliciestopromotesocialandenvironmentalresponsibility
offsetthelackofregulatoryoversight?Third,whichruralgroupsseemmostlikelytobenefitor
loseoutfromresultingeconomicopportunitiesandoutcomes?Andfourth,whatarethedirect
andindirectconsequencesforforests(andnearbyecosystemsandland)ofanemerging
politicaleconomyofhigherbiofuelproduction?
Ouranalysisproceedsinthreeparts.First,wereviewthechangingglobalarchitectureof
thebiofuelsector.WeoutlinetheincreaseinSouth-Southtradeandinvestment,the
emergenceofpowerfulstatesintheglobalSouth,andthesurgein–andbacklashagainst–
biofueldevelopmentoverthelastdecade.Wealsopresentadditionalillustrativeevidenceof
linksbetweenMNCsanddevelopingcountriestoreinforceourclaimsthatemergingSouthern
statesareactinginwaysthatechothepatternsofresourceexploitationbyNorthernones.
Second,weconsiderwhattheemergingbiofuelindustryimpliesforstates,particularly
theircapacitytoderivenationaleconomicbenefits.Examiningtherecentsurgeinpartnerships
linkingMNCswithlocalfirmsandgovernments,wedrawontheoreticalworkonstatestrength
(Migdal1988,Dauvergne1998a),statesizeanddevelopmentlevels(Krasner1976),timingof
industrialdevelopment(Evans1995),andtheinstitutionalbasisfortechnologyuptakeand
benefits(PelusoandVandergeest2001,AcemogluandRobinson2009),tosuggestlikely
trajectoriesofthesebiofuelalliancesacrosscountries.Basedonpastpatternsofdevelopment
andmultinationalinvestmentinagricultureandforestry,wearguethat,asthebiofuelsector
grows,itwillbecomemoredifficultforstatesandlocalcommunitiestoderivediffusepublic
(insteadofconcentratedprivate)benefitsfromproduction.Previousanalysessuggestthatthis
challengewillbemostpronouncedforstateswithincentivestoactpredatory,ratherthan
developmental(Migdal1988,Evans1995,Bates2008,PetrasandVeltmeyer2007).Further,in
theabsenceofstateregulatoryoversightandcontrol,voluntarycorporateinitiativesseem
4
unlikelytoprovidesubstantialenvironmentalandsocialprotection,giventhelimitedsuccessto
dateofcorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR)initiativesinrelatedsectorssuchasagrifoods(as
documentedbyUttingandClapp2008,ClappandFuchs2009).
Third,weevaluatethesubnationaldistributionalconsequencesofbiofueldevelopment.
Groupswithinastate,wefind,maystilltakeonasignificantburdeneveninstatesthatbenefit
intermsofstandardnationaleconomicindicators.Weconsiderthehumanandecologicalcosts
ofbiofuelsthroughalensthatcombinesTaylorandGarcia-Barrios’(1995)frameworkfora
socialanalysisofecologicalchange–modeledafterParayilandTong’s(1998)applicationofthis
framework–withananalysisofhistoricalandcontinuedexclusionbystatesofmarginalrural
groups.Webringwithworkonpeasantdifferentiation(e.g.,Byres2009)tounderstandthe
materialandsocialfactorsthatallowsomegroups,butnotothers,totakeadvantageofthe
opportunitiesfromemergingbiofuelmarkets.Aswithstates’differentialabilitiestocapitalise
onbiofuelsbasedontheirexistinginstitutions,thealready-establishedpoliticalandeconomic
resourcesofgroupswithinthestateprovideunequalopportunitiesforgroupstobenefitfrom
thesenewcommoditymarkets.
Wefocusinparticularontheframingofthedebateoversustainablebiofuels,arguing
thatitisbothpowerfulandmisleading.Therhetoricofsustainabilitycreatesadiscoursethatis
difficultforcriticsofbiofuelstochallenge,asitappealstowidely-acceptednormsandgoalsof
theinternationalcommunity.However,thewaysinwhichproductionistakenuptendsto
excludetheperspectives,interests,andlivelihoodsofmarginalisedcommunities,especially
thosewithinsecurelandtenure.Althoughtheycanbeproducedatasmall,localscale,crops
suchassugar,oilpalm,andsoylendthemselvesreadilytolarge-scaleplantationsandexport-
orientedproduction.Sincethesebiofuelfeedstockshavealreadybeendevelopedinthiswayin
theagriculturalsector,withsubstantialMNCcontrol,thediversionofcropsfromfoodtofuel
productionhaslittlechanceofchangingtheseindustrial-scalesystems(andtheevidenceto
dateindicatesthattheaddedincentivesforproductionareonlyintensifyingthesetrends).
Althoughbiofuelsdifferintheirecology,productiondemands,andmarket
opportunities,wenonethelessseeparallelprocessesofencroachmentofagriculturallandsand
plantationsintonaturalforestsbyproducersofmultiplefeedstocks,includingsugarcane,oil
5
palm,soy,andJatrophacurcas.5Consequently,weextendthegeneralbiofuel‘trilemma’of
foodsecurity,energy,andbiodiversity(astermedbyTilmanetal.2009)toincludeconcerns
aboutforest-dependentcommunities;wealsocontestsomerecentliteraturethatis
encouragingmoreopentradeasastrategytoenhancethepotentialforbiofuelstobring
equitabledevelopmenttopoorregions.
Inourconclusions,wereflectonthepotentialofbiofuelsasapathwaytomore
ecologicallyandsociallysustainabledevelopment.Investmentinbiofuelsiscertainlyproviding
someeconomicopportunitiesinsomedevelopingcountrieswiththepotentialtocatalyse
furtherdevelopmentinsomeruralareas.Globally,biofuelsalsohavethepotentialtohelpin
thesearchforsolutionstoclimatechangeandenergysecurity.6Wecaution,however,thatthe
opportunitiesareuneven,withsomestatesabletobenefitfarmorethanothers.Moreover,in
countriesthatcancapitaliseonbiofuels,evensmall-scaleproductionneedstoconsidervery
carefullytheeffectsonvulnerableforestcommunitiesandpeoplewithinsecurelandrights,
andtheconsequentdisplacementoflivelihoodandsubsistencepressuresontosurrounding
naturalforests.
TheemergingSouth-Southpoliticaleconomyofbiofuels
Ourpreviousresearch(DauvergneandNeville2009)foundthatbiofuelinvestmentandtrade
amongdevelopingcountriesisrepeatingearlierbiofuelrelationsbetweenNorthernand
Southerncountries.IncreasinglypowerfulSoutherncountriesareprovidingincentivestotheir
lessdevelopedcounterpartstoproducebiofuels,withvaryingenvironmentalandeconomic
repercussions.ThisSouth-Southpoliticaleconomyofbiofuelsispartofalargerpolitical
5 There are significant differences in what McCarthy (2009, 19) terms ‘commodity-specific factors’ of different biofuel feedstocks, where ecological characteristics vary by crop type and have implications for the ways in, and scale at which, they are grown, harvested, and processed. Moreover, regional and local differences exist in the environmental and social conditions in which these feedstocks are produced. Nevertheless, a growing number of studies indicate that in spite of these differences – across biofuel types and production locations – there are similar and considerable environmental and human costs, as well as opportunities, from biofuel development (see, for example, Hunsberger in this volume, for Jatropha in Kenya; Vel in this volume, for Jatropha in Indonesia; Wilkinson and Herrera in this volume, for sugarcane and soy in Brazil; Pye in this volume, for oil palm in Indonesia; and Franco et al. in this volume, for sugarcane and Jatropha in Mozambique). 6 Note, however, that there is some doubt that biofuels can achieve greenhouse gas emission reductions (see, for instance, Righelato and Spracklen (2007), and Pimentel and Patzek (2005) for discussions of various feedstocks) and that biofuels are replacing, rather than supplementing, fossil fuels.
6
economyoftheenvironment,inwhichmorepowerfuleconomiesaredeepeningrelationships
withMNCs.Thischangingglobaleconomicarchitecture,wefound,isaddingtoalready
unsustainableresourceexploitationandenvironmentaldegradationinmanydeveloping
countries.
Inthissection,webrieflysummarisetheseearlierfindings,explainingthebiofuel
industry,describingthesurgeofinterestinandrecentbacklashagainstbiofuels,andoutlining
theeconomicandpoliticalindicatorsofchangingSouth-Southbiofuelrelations.Thetrendsin
biofuelsarenew,andthustosomeextentstilluncertain.Wecandraw,however,onwell-
documentedpatternsofexploitationinrelatedindustries,suchassoyinLatinAmericaandoil
palminSoutheastAsia,toreflectonwhatoutcomeswemightexpectfromfurther
developmentofbiofuels.Ourargumentrestsinpartontheproliferationofpartnershipsamong
developingcountryinvestors,developingcountrybiofuelproducers,MNCsfromtheNorthand
South,anddomesticfirmsinthesedevelopingcountries,andsowepresentadditionalevidence
ofagrowingnumberofthesetransnationalpartnerships.Manyofthesealliancesareinearly
stages,andsoitremainstobeseeniftherewillbefollowthrough,buttheinitialcommitments
suggestnewsetsofinvestmentpartnerswithintheglobalfinancialsystem.
a.Thebiofuelcontext
Bioethanolandbiodieselarenon-petroleumbasedliquidfuels,derivedlargelyfromplantsand
plantoils.Dividedintocategoriesbasedonthesources,or‘feedstocks’,fromwhichtheyderive,
biofuelshavedifferingimpactsoncarbonemissions,foodcrops,andtheenvironment.‘First-
generation’fuelsareproducedfromfoodcrops,includingpalmoil,rapeseed,sugarcane,and
corn.Incontrast,thesourcesof‘second-generation’fuelsarenon-foodcrops,likeswitchgrass
andJatrophacurcas,ortheresidualinediblepartsoffoodcrops,suchasthehusksandstemsof
corn.‘Third-generation’biofuelsarederivedfromalgae.Whilefirst-generationbiofuelsarein
full-scaleproduction,second-andthird-generationonesarenotyetcommerciallyviableata
globalscale,althoughresearchanddevelopmentareprogressing.
Sourcesusedforbiofuelsvarybygeographiclocation,andlargelymapontopre-existing
agriculturalproductioninthoseregions:corn-basedbiofuelsaredominantintheUnitedStates
7
(US),sugarcaneinBrazil,rapeseedintheEuropeanUnion(EU),andoilpalminIndonesiaand
Malaysia.Biofuelsdifferintheinputsneededforproduction,and,consequently,theirtotalnet
energyandcarbonbalances.Thesevaluesdependongeographicfactors,agriculturalmethods,
theextentandtypeoflanduseconversionundertaken,alongwiththepesticides,fertilisers,
andtechnologyinvolvedintheirproduction(McCarthy2009).Thepotentialofbiofuelsto
mitigateclimatechange,andcontributetopositiveoverallchangedependonthesefactors,as
wellasonthepoliciesinplacetodevelopthem.
b.Biofuelpromotion:thesurgeandbacklash
Interestinbiofuelsasanalternativeenergysourcesurgedinthelate1990s,especiallyintheUS
andEU.Althoughbiofuelresearchanddevelopmenthadbeenunderwaythroughoutthe
twentiethcentury,particularlyinBrazil,aconfluenceofconcernsinthe1990soverclimate
change,energysecurity,anddecliningoilreservessparkedgreaterinterestinthepotentialfor
biofuelstocontributetocleandevelopment.Brazilquicklyemergedasagloballeaderinthe
sector,asithadalreadyinvestedconsiderablyinbiofuels,particularlythroughtheBrazilian
AlcoholProgram(Proalcool)inthe1970s.7
Supportforbiofuelsrangedacrossindustrialandenvironmentalgroups,with
agriculturalinterestsandmanyclimatechangeactivistsexpressingsupport.IntheUnited
Kingdom,forexample,amongthosesharingenthusiasmforbiofuelsintheearly2000swere
farmers,EUofficials,nationalandmunicipalgovernmentrepresentatives,theRoyalSocietyfor
theProtectionofBirds,FriendsoftheEarth,andGreenpeace.Agricultural,oil,andautomotive
lobbiesandcorporations,includingcornproducersintheUS,rapeseedproducersinGermany,
andMNCslikeArcherDanielsMidland(ADM)wereintriguedbythepossibilityofnewandvast
markets(Accenture2007,KurdusiewiczandWandesforde-Smith2008).Manygovernments
werekeenonthepotentialofbiofuelstomeetclimatechangecommitmentsandreduce
dependenceonforeignoil.Andnumerousenvironmentalactivistssupportedtheideaof
developingbiofuelsasanalternativeenergysource.7 See Moreira et al. (2005, 28-30) for a history of Brazil’s early investment in biofuels, including the quadrupling of sugar production from 1975 to 1986. Low oil prices in the late 1980s and early 1990s combined with the removal of government subsidies slowed the biofuel sector, but it was able to capitalise on its early progress when global interest surged.
8
Cautionaryvoiceswereheardatthetime,withgroupsincludingtheWWFandBirdlife
Internationalraisingconcernsthatdevelopingbiofuelswouldthreatenbiodiversityby
stimulatinglanduseconversion;somecalledforlifecycleanalysestoassessthetrade-offsof
water,soil,andenergyuse(e.g.,Pimentel2003,Punteretal.2004).Whilesupportwasbyno
meansuniversalorunqualified,therewasnonethelessconsiderableoptimismthatbiofuels
couldsimultaneouslypromoteecological,economic,andsocialgoals.Eventhosewith
reservationsabouttheunintendedeffectsofproduction–suchasthere-directionoffood
cropstofuel,ortheuseofgeneticallymodifiedcropstoincreaseyields–werereluctantto
coordinateresistanceagainsteffortstopromotealternativeenergy,particularlysincethe
promiseoflater-generationbiofuels,withseeminglyfewernegativesideeffects,couldnotbe
realisedwithoutsupportforthesectorinitsearlystages.
Thisoptimismandforwardmomentumcontinuedthrough2006.TheEUandtheUS
enactedpoliciestodevelopbiofuels,suchasthe2003BiofuelDirectiveintheEU.Bythen
analystswereanticipatingthatbiofuelimportsintotheEUwouldgrowasEuropeancountries
strovetomeettheirnewcommitments,sincetheavailabilityoflandlimitedtheprojected
abilityofmanymemberstatestobeself-sufficientinbiofuelsupply(Ringwald2006,5-6).
Thesedynamicschangedsuddenlyin2007,asspikesinfoodpricesledtoaglobalcrisis.
BiofuelsgarneredintensemediacoverageasthefoodcrisissparkedriotsinHaiti,Yemen,
Zimbabwe,andothercountries.Thesedemonstrations,called‘foodriots’bysomeand‘fuel
riots’byothers,putaspotlightontheconvergenceofmultiplepressuresonagriculturaland
financialsystems,withpurchasingpowerandfoodavailabilityaffectedbyfactors,including:the
risingpricesofstaplecrops,suchasrice,wheat,andcorn;growingpopulationsandincreased
incomesinemergingeconomies,suchasChinaandIndia;andmarketspeculationinfood
commoditiesfollowingthecollapseofhousingmarkets.
Duringthistimeuncertaintyalsobegantoincreasearoundtheenvironmentalbenefits
ofbiofuelsasmorescientistsraiseddoubtsaboutthenetcarbonfootprintofmanybiofuels.
ThejournalScience,forexample,publishedtwoinfluentialarticlesin2008indicatingthat
severalbiofuels–particularlythosederivedfromfoodcropsintheUS,Brazil,andSoutheast
9
Asia–incurredevenhigherenvironmentalcoststhantraditionalfossilfuels,creatingacarbon
debtratherthanacarbonsaving(ScharlemannandLaurance2008,Fargioneetal.2008).
Internationalorganisationsandgovernmentsrespondedtothecritiquesinvariousways,
withsomeundertakingtheirownanalysesoftheimpactofbiofuelsonfoodprices.These
yieldedwidelydivergentfindings.Estimatesoftheinfluenceofbiofuelsonfoodpricesranged,
forexample,fromalowof2-3percentbytheUSadministration(AP2008)toahighof75
percentinaninternalWorldBankdraftreportleakedtotheGuardiannewspaper(Chakrabortty
2008).Inresponsetotheseconvergingdoubtsaboutbiofuels,theEUmoderateditsearly
enthusiasmforbiofuelsbypostponingdeadlinesfordecisionsonrenewableenergyguidelines.
Eventuallegislation,adoptedinApril2009,requiredthatemissionssavingsandsustainability
criteriamustbemetbeforebiofuelscouldbecountedtowardrenewableenergytargets.
WhilemorecautiousinterestinbiofuelswithinEuropeloweredmarketgrowth
projections,itdidnotstifleallgrowthinthesector.Newpartnershipsformedtosupportthe
industry,withmanyseeingagrowingconsumerbaseforenergyintheemergingeconomiesof
theSouthasacriticalsourceofdemand.
c.GrowingSouth-Southinvestments
Evidenceofchangingrelationshipsintheworldeconomycomesinseveralforms.First,wecan
identifymacro-scalepatternsofeconomicgrowthinasubsetofdevelopingcountries,revealing
adivergenceamongcountriesintheglobalSouthandaconvergencebetweensomeofthese
developingcountriesandthoseoftheNorth.Second,wecantrackaggregatedpatternsof
investmentwithindevelopingcountries,showingthatthesourcesofforeigndirectinvestment
(FDI)nowincludemoredevelopingcountries.Third,wecanexamineparticularinvestmentsto
chartwhichcompaniesandcountriesareinvolvedinresourcedevelopmentandpartnerships.
Consequently,inourpreviousstudy(DauvergneandNeville2009),welinkedthegrowing
economicpowerofcountrieslikeBrazilandIndiawithdataontheincreaseinSouth-South
trade,notingthatforbiofuelstheseemergingeconomieswerejoiningdevelopedcountriesas
coreinvestorsintheglobalSouth.Inconjunctionwithreportsofnewbusinessventuresfor
biofuelsinvolvingsomeofthesedevelopingcountryleaders,MNCs,andthegovernmentsand
10
localfirmsofotherdevelopingcountries,weinferredthatsomeSoutherncountriesaretaking
onrolesinindustrialbiofueldevelopmentthathavebeentraditionallyheldbyNorthern
countries.
Drawingonphraseslike‘South-Southcooperation’and‘sustainabledevelopment’,
developingcountryleadershavecarvedoutanicheandattemptedtobuildacomparative
advantageinthesector,particularlyintermsofpromotinginvestmentin,andresource
extractionfrom,otherdevelopingcountries.However,aswelookedintothebiofuelalliances,it
becameclearthattheseleadershavenotsupplanteddevelopedcountryinvestorsthroughthis
framing,butratherhavejoinedandpartneredwiththem,withdemandfromdeveloping
countryconsumerssupplementingdemandfromtheNorth.
Tocapturemoregeneral,large-scalepatternsofeconomicgrowth,analystshave
highlightedanumberofemergingeconomies.KnowninvariousgroupingsasBRICand
BRICSAM,amongotheracronyms,theseincludeBrazil,Russia,India,China,SouthAfrica,the
ASEAN(AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations)states,andMexico;othercorecountriesin
internationalandregionalcontextsincludeTurkey,Egypt,Iran,andNigeria(Cooperetal.2007).
South-SouthFDIandtradeamongdevelopingcountrieshavesurgeddramatically,withtrade
increasingfromUS$577billionin1995tooverUS$2trillionin2006,withtradeamongSouthern
countriesoutpacingtradebetweendevelopinganddevelopedcountries(Sumner2008,
Supachai2008).Tradeagreementsamongdevelopingcountrieshavealsoproliferated;Brazil,
forexample,hasestablishednineseparateregionaltradeagreementswithinMercosur
(AntkiewiczandWhalley2006).8Brazil,takinganactiveroleinfurtheringtheserelationships,is
engagingincooperativeinitiativeswithotherdevelopingcountries(suchasIndiaandSouth
Africa)to,initspresident’swords,‘enhancepoliticaldialogueandeconomiclinkswiththeArab
World,Africa,andAsia’(LuladaSilva2007).
WhileSouth-Southtradehassubstantiallyincreased,thenewtradeandinvestment
relationshipsarenotlimitedtotieswithintheglobalSouth.Emergingeconomieshavetaken
strategicactiontoimprovetheirpoliticalandeconomicpositionsintheinternationalarena.
MNCshavealsoestablishedheadquartersintheBRICSAMcountries(Cooperetal.2007,681),8 Martin (2008) and Campbell (2008), for example, examine South-South linkages, particularly between Asian and African countries.
11
and,inthebiofuelsector,developedanddevelopingcountrieshaveformedpoliticalalliances.
DespiteearlyjockeyingfordominanceoverbiofuelmarketsbetweenBrazilandtheUS–the
primaryproducersofbioethanol–anddespitecontinuingcompetition,atleastfornowthetwo
countriesseemtohaveputasidetheirdifferencestopromotebiofuels.
Initially,Brazildidclaimthatitssugarcane-basedbiofuelswereeconomicallyand
ecologicallysuperiortoAmericanmaize-basedfuels.Theabsenceofgovernmentsubsidiesfor
bioethanolproductioncontributedtotheclaimedsuperiorityofBrazilianbiofuels,as,without
USimporttaxes,in2006USbioethanolcost$1.03/gallonwhileBrazilianbioethanolcost
$0.81/gallon(Moreiraetal.2005,29,Goldemberg2007).BrazilianPresidentLuladaSilva’s
statementataJune2008meetingattheFoodandAgricultureOrganizationistypicalofthe
rhetoricatthattime:‘cornethanolcanobviouslyonlycompetewithsugarcaneethanolwhenit
isshotupwithsubsidiesandshieldedbehindtariffbarriers’andfurtherthat‘somepeople
compareethanoltocholesterol…thereisgoodethanolandbadethanol’(LuladaSilva2008).
Sincethen,however,thediscoursehasshifted.Acollaborativeinitiativebetweenthe
twocountrieswasannouncedinlate2008,withtheUSDepartmentofStatereportingthat
‘ninepartnernations[are]tobenefitfromUS-Brazilbiofuelscollaboration’(USDS2008).South-
SouthrelationshipshavenotreplacedNorth-Southones,butinsteadhaveledtoanincreasing
numberof‘North-South-South’linkages,in‘triangular’projects.Theselinkageshavetangled
governmentsoftheNorthandSouthwiththeprivatesector,inpartnershipsthatspanthe
globe.Growingevidencesuggeststhatbiofuelsarefollowingthesametrajectoryasother,
related,agriculturalandforestryindustries.
EvidenceofnewSouth-Southdynamicsisfoundintheincreasingnumberof
partnershipsandinvestmentsthatinvolvedevelopingcountrygovernmentsandcorporations
acrossmultiplecountries.MauritiancompanieshavefundedbiofuelinitiativesinMozambique
andabioethanolprojectinthePhilippineshasinvolvedanIndianengineeringcompany.Biofuel
developmentinAsiaandAfricafollowssimilarinternationalpaths,withtheIndiaStateTrading
CorporationconsideringlandpurchasesinIndonesiaandSuriname;SouthKoreanand
SingaporeancompaniesexpressinginterestinotherAsiancountries’feedstockproduction;a
NigerianbiofuelrefinerydevelopedbyaconsortiumcomprisingtheAfricanDevelopmentBank,
12
astateuniversityofthePhilippines,andseveralNigerianbanks;andparticipantsin
Mozambique’sbiofueldevelopmentincludingPetrobras(Brazil),ENI(Italy),EnergemResources
(Canada),andtheCentralAfricanMiningandExplorationCompany.Morerecently,andalong
similarlines,theMalaysiancompanySimeDarbyplanstoinvestinoilpalmandrubber
plantationsinLiberia,andChinesefirmsareinvestinginoilpalmplantationsintheDemocratic
RepublicoftheCongo.
d.TheecologicalimplicationsoftheSouth-Southpoliticaleconomyofbiofuels
Manyofthenewalliancesrevealthegrowingeconomicandpoliticalstrengthofsome
developingcountries–suchasBrazilandIndonesia–ascorporationsandgovernmentsfrom
theseplacesextendtradeandfinancialrelationsinboththeNorthandSouth.However,despite
theemergenceofnewpowerfulplayers,thepatternsofenvironmentaldegradationandsocial
dislocationassociatedwithindustrialresourceproductionandextractiondonotappeartohave
changed,nordoestheinfluenceofMNCsintheseactivitiesappeartobediminishing.Beyond
theSouth-Southinvestmentsandtradeinbiofuels,MNCsareactiveinbothfinancingand
advocatingfortheindustry.Notably,agriculturalandchemicalcompaniesjoinedforcesto
promotebiofuelsintheUS,withArcherDanielsMidland,DuPont,Deere&Co.,andMonsanto
establishingtheAllianceforAbundantFoodandEnergyin2008.
Theenvironmentalimpactsoftheoilpalmindustryoffersomeindicationofthe
potentialharmbiofuelproductioncouldcause.Inpart,thisreflectsmoregeneraltrendsin
industrialproductionofagriculturalandforestrycrops;moreover,oilpalmiscurrentlyonlya
minorsourceofbiofuelfeedstock,butispoisedtobecomeamajorsourceinthenearfuture.
AlthoughcurrentlytheUSandBrazilproduceover70percentoftheworld’sbioethanol,and
theEUover60percentofbiodiesel(Forge2007,2,Davis2007),forbiodieselthisappearssetto
changeasIndonesiaandMalaysia,amongothercountries,increaseoilpalm-basedproduction
offuel.
Palmoilisusedextensivelyinthefoodsector,foreverythingfromdeep-fryingto
margarinetoprocessedcereals.Pesticidesandfertilisersusedinoilpalmplantationscan
damagetheenvironment,buttheecologicalimpactofdisplacingagriculturalactivitiesand
13
standingforestsoftenovershadowsthis(Donald2004).Inplacesliketheouterislandsof
Indonesia,whichhasahistoryofweakregulationoftheforestindustry(Dauvergne1997,2001,
Smithetal.2003,PinKohandWilcove2007),plantationcrops,likeoilpalmandrubber,are
typicallyplantedonlandthatcompaniesfirstclearedbyburningdowna‘degraded’forest.
Often,thisisanold-growthforestthatloggershavecombedoverseveraltimestotruckoutthe
mostvaluabletimber.Burningisacheapclearingmethodandaddsvaluablenutrientstothe
soil.Butitalsoreleasessignificantgreenhousegases,especiallyasfirescommonlyrageout-of-
controlandengulfvastareas,includingsettingonfireundergroundpeatmoss.Overthelast
fewdecades,forestfiresinIndonesiahavefrequentlyspreadasmotheringhazeoverMalaysia
andSingapore,contributingnotonlytoseverehealthproblemsforlocals,butalsoreleasing
millionsoftonnesofcarbonintotheatmosphere(see,forinstance,Dauvergne’s1998banalysis
offiresthatsweptacrossthecountry,destroyinghundredsofthousandsofhectaresofforest).
Whetheroilpalmisplanteddirectlyonnewlyclearedlandorsupplantsrubberproductionthat
firstreplacedtheforests,itcontributesto,oratleastfailstomediate,theenvironmental
damagecausedbysuchdeforestation.
Economicgrowthandnewchannelstoparticipateintheglobaleconomydoprovide
somebenefitsforpoorpeople.Investmentsfrommorepowerfuldevelopingcountriesintoless-
powerfulonesmayalsore-shapethedynamicsofglobaleconomicandpoliticalpowerinways
thatpromotegreaterequity.Nevertheless,newtechnologiesandindustriesruntheriskof
encouragingproducersandelitestoseizeshort-termprofitsoverlong-terminvestmentsin
environmentallyandsocially-sustainablepractices.Biofuelproductioninparticularseems
pronetodrivinguplandandfoodprices,whilecreatingincentivesforincreasedlanduse
conversionanddeforestation.Suchchangesseemtoaffectpoorercountries
disproportionately,shiftingthecostsofresource-basedindustriesontothemostvulnerable
countriesandcommunities.Addingtoalready-existingpressuresonthreatenedecosystems,
thisunderminesthepotentialofbiofuelstosupportbotheconomicandenvironmentalwell-
being.
Atthemacro-level,biofueldevelopmentdependsonthedynamicsoftheglobalpolitical
economy.Investments,marketspeculation,andconsumerdemandhavedriventhechangesin
14
conventionalenergyandinbiofuelprices,andthepatternsofpoliticalandcorporate
interactionsareinfluencingthefurtherexpansionofthesector.Withalready-highlevelsof
MNCinvolvementinproductionofcropslikesoybeansandplantationslikeoilpalm–andwith
soyandoilpalmrepresentingtwogrowingsourcesofbiofuelfeedstocks–weanticipatesimilar
futurepatternsinbiofuelsasforsoybeansandoilpalminthepast.Inthenextsection,we
examinetherelationshipsamongstatesandcorporateactors,toassesswhichstatesarelikely
tobenefitfromthecontinuedindustrialisationofbiofuelproduction.
Emergingalliancesofforests,food,andfuel
Thedynamicsandimpactsoftheglobalbiofuelindustryarestillemerging.Earlypatterns
nonethelessprovideuswithevidenceofthedirectioninwhichitiscurrentlymoving.The
politicaleconomyliteratureonthepatternsofinternationaltraderelationshipsforthe
developmentofnewtechnology,particularlyintheconstructionofcomparativeadvantagesin
production,alsoprovidessomeindicationofthetrajectoryofthebiofuelsectoratthestate
level.Moreover,althoughbiofuelsarearelativelynewtechnologyontheinternationalstage,
theprimaryandemerginglarge-scalefeedstocks–notablyrapeseed,sugar,soy,corn,andoil
palm–arealreadyinproductioninindustrialisedagriculturalandagroforestrysystems,and
thustheirdevelopmentpatternsoffervaluableinsightsintothelikelyeconomicdynamicsof
evenmoreproduction.9
a.Theintersectionofglobalandagrarianpoliticaleconomy
Agrarianpoliticaleconomyapproachesfocusonexplainingagrarianchangethroughthelenses
ofclassstruggles,peasantdifferentiation,scaleandintegrationofproduction,andeconomic
transitions(Borras2009).10Ouranalysisaims,inpart,toadddynamicinternationaland
institutionaldimensionstotheseclass-basedstructuralanalyses.Itsupplementsagrarian
politicaleconomyresearchbyfocusingontheimpactofstaterelationswithMNCsandother9 Similarly, in the specific case of Brazil, Novo et al. (in this volume) find that sugarcane-based biofuel production is usefully understood ‘in the context of the dynamics of other agricultural sectors’, including dairy farming and beef production. 10 For recent discussions of agrarian political economy, see, for example, Bernstein (2009) and Akram-Lodhi (2007). For other work adopting an agrarian political economy framework for analysis, see Martins (2002), Gropas (2006), and Saikia (2008).
15
states,andtheroleofcomparativeadvantagesinproduction,alongwithrelationsbetween
capitalholdersandlabourers.11
Theeconomicandsocialdifferentiationofthepeasantry–ofparticularconcernto
scholarsworkinginthetraditionofagrarianpoliticaleconomy(Borras2009)–interactswith,
andisaffectedby,theopportunitiesstatesseizeintheinternationalarena;theseopportunities
are,inturn,mediatedbystateinstitutionsandstate-societyrelations.Integratingclassrelations
andprocessesofunevenaccumulationintoglobalpoliticaleconomyanalyseshelpstoexplain
how‘theexploitationoftheruralpoor[is]intensifiedthroughlinkedcredit,labourand
commoditymarkets’(daCorta2008,2),particularlyastheenergysectorintersectswiththe
internationalfoodregimedescribedbyMcMichael(2009).
Usingcontextualisedanalysesofstate-societyandstate-corporaterelationships,and
comparingexisting,relatedsectors,wecandevelopusefulexplanationsofthepatterns
observedinthecaseofbiofuels.Thepoliticaldynamicswithinbiofuelalliances,discussedinthe
previoussection,illustratetheneedtoconsidera‘pluralityofauthoritydomains’(Aminand
Palan2001,568),inwhichstates,MNCs,localcommunities,andactivistnetworksareengaged
inmaterial,discursive,andsymbolicstrugglesoverpower.AsdescribedbyAminandPalan
(2001),thiscritical,or‘non-rationalist’,globalpoliticaleconomyassumesthatstatesystemsare
historicallysituatedandtransitory,state-marketrelationsareaformofpowerstruggle,and
institutionsreproduceandreinforcetruthandrationality.
Adoptingforthemomenttheframeworkofaunitarystate,weobservevariationinthe
timingandoutcomesofentryofstatesintothebiofuelmarket,withBrazil,India,andIndonesia
representingmajordevelopingcountryleadersinsugarcane,Jatropha,andoilpalm,
respectively.Theseleaderswerealreadyemergingpriortothesurgeininterestinbiofuels.A
seriesofinteractingcharacteristicsseemtocontributetotheirsuccess,particularlytheir
bureaucraticcapacityinagriculturalandforestryproduction,thetimingoftheiradoptionof
biofueltechnologyandinvestmentinbiofuelresearchanddevelopment,andthesizeoftheir
domesticmarkets.
11 This is, in many ways, similar to the approach taken in work on the concept of a ‘food regime’, which considers local food production and distinct food commodity crops in the context of the global political economy. See McMichael (2009) for a genealogy of the food regime analytic approach.
16
b.Statesize,developmentlevels,andtiming
Krasner(1976)arguesthatwhileallstatesbenefitintermsofnationalincomesfromopen
trade,smallstatestendtogainhigherrelativebenefitsfromsucharrangementsbecausea
higherproportionoftheireconomiesliewithintheinternationalsystem.Headdsthecaveat,
though,thattheyarethereforemorevulnerabletofluctuationsininternationalmarkets,and
havelesspoliticalpowergiventheybearhighercostsfromamarketclosure.InKrasner’s
account,smalldevelopedstatescanmorereadilybufferthesocialinstabilityofopentradethan
smalldevelopingones,becauseskilledlabourismoreeasilyshiftedintoothersectorsthan
unskilledlabour.Largestates,withproportionallylargerdomesticmarkets,havelessneedto
buffertheireconomiesfromtheinternationalmarket,althoughlarge,developedstatesdohave
theadvantageoverlarge,undevelopedonesofbeingabletoinvestinresearchand
developmenttooffsetthelossoftechnologicaladvantagesastradingpartnersgainnew
technologythroughmarketexchanges.
Krasner’sargumenttransfershelpfullytounderstandingbiofuelsandotheragro-
forestrycommoditymarkets,wheremoreinsulatedeconomies(withlargerdomesticconsumer
bases)buffertheuncertaintyofinternationalbiofuelmarkets.Whiletheinternationalmarket
maybehighlyvolatile,internalmarketsinlargecountriesmaybemorestable,particularlyfor
commoditieswithmultipleuses:sugarcane,soy,andpalmoil,forexample,arenotonlyofuse
forbiofuelproductionbutalsoinfoodproduction,and,currently,muchoftheconsumptionof
biofuelsisdomestic.Countrieswithsmalldomesticmarketsrelymoreoninternationaltrade,
andmayalsohavealessflexibleprocessinginfrastructuretoallowproducerstoshiftquickly
frombiofuelstofoodcommodities.Consequently,Brazil,India,andIndonesia,forinstance,
maybebetterpositionedthroughtheirexistinglevelsofdevelopmentandsizeoftheir
domesticmarketstotaketherisksofearlyentryintothebiofuelsector.
Moreover,internationally,BrazilandIndiaalreadyhaveprominentrolesindeveloping
andpromotingbiofuels.Morerecententrants,representingvariousdegreesofinvestmentand
interestinbiofuels,includeIndonesia,Malaysia,Cambodia,Mozambique,Tanzania,andthe
DemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC).Fromatimingperspective,theirlateentryaffords
17
producersinthesestatesaccesstoalready-availablebiofueltechnologyandpotentialinvestors.
Asnoted,somemayhavetheabilitytoextendalready-establishedfoodcropproductioninto
thefuelsector,asMathewsandGoldsztein(2009)documentforsoyinArgentinawherethe
highlydevelopedexistingagriculturalsectorcanbeextendedandadaptedtonewprocessed
outputsandwheretheexistenceofmultiplemarketsforthecropsbuffersagainstprice
fluctuationsforanysinglecommodity.
However,althoughtheremaybelatecomeradvantagesforsomestates,theselate
joinersarenowparticipatinginasectordominatedbyMNCsandintegratedintomass-scale
productionsystems,where,forinstance,overUS$1billioninFDIwaspouredintosugarethanol
productioninfiveAfricanstatesbetween2007and2009(Richardsoninthisvolume),with
corporateinvolvementincludingBritish,Brazilian,andFrenchcompanies,and,equally,theUS-
basedCargillisaleadexporterofrawsugarandsoybeansfromBrazil(Holt-Giménezand
Shattuck2009).Thisoperationalenvironmentmaybedifficulttonavigateforcountriesthatdo
nothavealreadywellestablishedindustrial-scaleproductionoffeedstockcrops.Consequently,
fromastate-controlperspective,Brazil,India,andArgentinahavesignificantadvantagesover
theirless-developedSoutherncounterparts,withlargedomesticmarketsandeitherhaving
alreadyestablishedastrongstateroleindevelopingbiofuelspriortothesurgeintheindustry
orhavingalternateestablishedmarketsforthecrops.Additionally,thecapacitytoadoptnew
technologiesandpromotenewindustrialsectorsisinfluencednotonlybysize,timing,andthe
developmentlevelsofstates,butalsobythebureaucraticstructuresalreadyinplace.12
c.Graftingnewcommoditiestoexistingmarkets:statestrength,institutions,andtechnology
adoption
Internationalmarketopportunitiesinteractwithnationalinstitutions,statecapacities,and
state-societyrelationsinwaysthatproducedifferentoutcomesacrosscountries.Migdal(1988,
277)identifiestheinteractionbetweenstatesandsocietiesasakeydeterminantofstate
12 A caveat should be added, though, that at the state level, immediate economic gains may not translate into long-term benefits. Richardson (in this volume) cautions (in the context of biofuels from sugarcane in least developed countries in southern Africa) ‘in terms of countries trading their way out of poverty, then, while static gains may immediately result for the national GDP [gross domestic product], the more beneficial – and pro-poor – dynamic gains may ultimately be sacrificed’.
18
strengthandgovernancecapacity,expressingdoubtaboutthepossibilityofchangingthe
structuralrelationsbetweenstatesandsocieties(tocreateastrongstatewiththecapacityto
controlsocietalbehaviour,forinstance)through‘newpolicies,managementtechniques,
administrativetinkerings,[or]morecommittedbureaucrats’.Similarly,Putnam(1993)cautions
thatinstitutionalreformalonecannotproducepoliticalchange,asbureaucraticandgovernance
structuresinteractwithsocialandpoliticalrelationshipsalreadyinplace,producingdistinct
outcomes.Thissuggeststhatananalysisofonlystateinstitutions–oronlysocietalandwithin-
stateclassrelations–isunlikelytoexplainfullythedifferenttrajectoriesofbiofuel
developmentacrossstates.Theinteractionbetweeninstitutionsandsocietalorganisationand
relationsiscriticalforanunderstandingoftheabilityofstates,atthenationallevel,totake
advantageofeconomicopportunities,suchasthedevelopmentofbiofuels.
Statestrength,involvingthe‘abilityofstateleaderstousetheagenciesofthestateto
getpeopleinthesocietytodowhattheywantthemtodo’(Migdal1988,xiii),involvesthe
dominanceofcentralstatesoverlocalstrongmenincontroloftheappropriationandextraction
ofresources,alongwiththeabilityofthestatetopenetratesocietyandregulatesocial
relationships.Statesaremorelikelytobeabletotakeadvantageofinternationalmarket
opportunitieswhentheyhavethecapacitytoregulatedomesticproduction.Wemight,
therefore,anticipatethatstrongstates(withestablishedbureaucraticandcoercivecapacities)
willbeabletobenefitfrombiofuelsmorereadilythanweakorfragmentedstates.Dauvergne
(1998a)qualifiesMigdal’sanalyticframework,however,suggestingthatstatesmayhave
differentialstrengthandcontrolacrosssectors;forexample,statesmayhavecontrolover
someaspectsofgovernance,inspiteoflosingcontroltolocalstrongmenintheforestrysector.
Consequently,stateswithstrengthintheagriculturalorforestrysectors(dependingonthe
commoditycrop)shouldbeexpectedtobenefit(atthenationallevel,althoughnotconsistently
attheindividualfarmerlevel)fromexpandingglobalbiofueldemand,whilestateswithoutsuch
sectoralcontrolmaystruggletoaccruethesebenefits.
AswiththerelationshipsEvans(1995)describesintheinformationtechnologysector,
wheretheinfluenceoflocalfirmsinpartnershipswithMNCsdiminishesovertime,wesuggest
that–ratherthantheequitablepartnershipsenvisionedinoptimisticappraisalsofbiofuel
19
development–thesealliancesarelikelytoincreaseMNCcontroloverthebiofuelsector.In
Evans’model,thecapacityofstatestoregulateprivatesectorpartnershipsisinitiallystrong,
buttendstoweakenovertimeaslocalfirmstradeupprotectionbythestateinexchangefor
greateraccesstothetechnologyandcapitaloftheirmultinationalpartners.Whilemanyofthe
corporateandstatealliancesforbiofuelsarenew,wemightanticipatesimilarpatternsgiven
theextentoftransnationalcorporatecontrolovertheagrifoodandforestrysectors.This
corporatecontrolisdocumentedacrossagriculturalcrops,with,forexampleHolt-Giménezand
Shattuck(2009)reportingthatADMandCargillcontrol75%oftheglobalgraintrade,and
McMichael(2009)notingthesesamefirms’rolesintheproductionofcorninMexico.Theshift
frompublictoprivateownershipandcontrolhasalsobeenobservedinIndonesia,with
McCarthyandCramb(2009)documentingthatby2006,79%ofoilpalmproductionwasfrom
privateestates(comparedtopredominantlystate-ledproductioninthe1980s).Evansidentifies
embeddedautonomyasaguardagainstthelossofstatecontrol,wherestrongnetworks
amonggovernmentofficialsandprivatesectorindustrialists–combinedwithcorporate
coherenceandstateindependencefrompatrimonialrelations–leadtotheabilityofstatesto
maintainregulatorycontroloverthesedomestic-internationalpartnerships.This
embeddednessdoesnotguardagainstinequalitieswithinthestate,butdoesmakestate-level
benefitsfromindustrialactivitiesmorelikely.
Evansdescribesnetworksofstate-societyrelationsthatoperateasinstitutionsthat
shapethetrajectoryofeconomicdevelopment.Similarly,VandergeestandPeluso(2006a,
2006b)demonstratetheroleexistinginstitutionscanplayintheconstitutionofforestry
regimes,byexamininghowthecharacteristicsofprofessionalforestryempires‘werespecificto
particularcoloniesandtechnicallyuncolonisedregions’(2006b,359),basedontheinteraction
betweencolonialandlocalsystems.Peluso(1996)providesspecificexamplesofthese
interactions,outliningthedifferingsocialandeconomicrelationsofDayakcommunitieswith
durianversusrubbercultivation,wheretheformerhasanextensivesetofsocialexpectations
andtraditionsassociatedwithownershipandsharedpropertyrights,whilethelatterhasno
suchhistory.Peluso(1996,537)explainsthat‘notallspecieshaveequalsignificanceinthe
economyorsocialfabric’ofthesociety.Institutionsoflandownershiprightsinteractwiththe
20
kindsofproductionstrategiesneededfordifferentbiofuelfeedstocks,andshapeeconomic
opportunitiesandoutcomes.
Sugar,forinstance,iscostlytoestablish,andthusiseconomicallymostefficientatlarge
plantation-scales(Richardsoninthisvolume),whileJatrophacanmorereadilybeproduced
throughoutgrowerschemesasitislesscapitalintensive(Arndtetal.2009).Consequently,
biodieselfromJatrophaismorelikely(thoughnotcertain)tobemorepro-poorthanbioethanol
fromsugar,asitcanmoreeasilybeproducedbysmall-scalefarmers(Arndtetal.2009).13
AcemogluandRobinson(2009,679)arguethat‘institutionsareapowerfulandautonomous
force,notsimplyanadaptationtopreexisting(orautonomouslyevolved)technological
conditions.Theyshape–asmuchastheyareshapedby–thetechnologicaltrajectoryof
societies’.Socialinstitutionsofpropertyrights,forexample,helptoexplainpatternsof
technologydevelopment,wealthaccumulation,andgenerationally-repeatedeconomic
inequality;theyintersectwithpoliticalecologytocontributeto‘thestrikinglydivergent
trajectoriesofmodernnationsinanagewheretechnologyislargelyglobalandisavailablefor
thosewhowishtoadoptit’(AcemogluandRobinson2009,679).Giventheglobalopportunities
forbiofuelsfromanumberoffeedstockcrops,theseinstitutionalargumentsprovideinsights
intothedifferentbenefitsrealisedbydifferentdevelopingstates.
d.Benefitingfrombiofuels:decentralisation,embeddedautonomy,andpredation
Decentralisationandstatefragmentationhavesomesimilarities,althoughtheformerisnot
necessarilyasignalofthelatter.McCarthy(2007,97)arguesthat‘participationthrough
decentralisationhasbecomeapolicytooltomakethestatemoreresponsiveandmore
adaptabletoregionalandlocalneeds’.WhilethismightseemclosetoMigdal’s(1988)politics
ofaccommodation,wherebystatescedecontroltolocalstrongmenforfearofbeing
overthrownandlackingthecoerciveoradministrativecapacitytomaintaincontrol,McCarthy
suggeststhatdecentralisationcanactuallymakestates‘morelocallylegitimate’(2007,97).
13 However, the potential for small-scale production does not necessitate its production at small scales: Jatropha can also be produced as a large-scale monocrop (see Achten et al. 2010 for a discussion of the potential benefits and concerns of this feedstock), and may in some places be emerging as a crop for wealthy rather than poor farmers (see Ariza-Montobbio et al. in this volume for an analysis of Jatropha production in India).
21
Ratherthanreducingstateoversight,decentralisationcanmakecentralstate
governancemorestable.Thetrajectoryofincreasedlegitimacyratherthanusurpedcontrol
connectstoEvans’modelofembeddedautonomy,wheresituationswithsemi-autonomous
governmentswithclosenetworktiestocapital-holdingelitesaremorereadilyincorporated
intoalegitimacy-enhancingdecentralisation,wherestateswithoutsuchsocialties–orwith
socialtiesabsentprofessionalisedbureaucracies–aremorelikelytoendupfragmented.
Wherestate-societybargainsoflegitimacybasedondecentralisationorembedded
autonomyhavenotbeenstruck,oraredisruptedbypoliticalinstabilityorothershocks,states
mayfaceincentivestoactaspredatorsofthefinancialrewardsofcitizens’activities,and
citizensmightturntoself-protectionfromthestate(seeBates2008).Ratherthanstates
accumulatingnationalrewardsfromindustrialproductionandtrade,thebenefits–ifrealisedat
all–willbetakenbyprivateproducers.
Consequently,whilesomedevelopingcountrygovernments–suchasBrazil,India,and
Malaysia–mightbenefitsignificantlyfromtheeconomicopportunitiesfrombiofuels,late-entry
stateswithlesscoherent,autonomousbureaucraciesandwithweaktiesbetweenthestateand
domesticelitesaremorevulnerabletoMNCinterests,asthe‘newallianceoflocal
entrepreneursandtransnationalcorporationsmakeithardertosustaintheoldalliance
betweenlocalcapitalandthestate’(Evans1995,16).Statesconfrontingpoliticalinstabilitymay
likewiselosecontrolofstate-levelbenefits,astheyturntoshort-termpredationattheexpense
oflonger-termgains.Thislossofcontrolinthepartnershipsdistancesstatesfromtheprocess
ofgoverningtheseindustries,therebycompromisingtheirability,asastate,toreapthe
rewardsofbiofuel-driveneconomicgrowth.
Additionally,corporatecontrolofindustrialdevelopmentcanhavesignificantsocialand
environmentalimplications,asstateslosethepowertoupholdstandards.Sincesoyandoil
palmaretwomajororincipientbiofuelfeedstocksindevelopingcountries–notablyBrazil,
Indonesia,andMalaysia–wecanlooktoexistingcontrolofthesesectorstoprovideclues
aboutthelikelyoutcomesofcorporatecontroloverthebiofuelsector.
e.CorporatepowerintheagrifoodsectorandthebufferingcapacityofCSR
22
ClappandFuchs(2009),examiningthepoliticalorganisationofwhattheycallthe‘agrifood’
system,revealahighconcentrationofcorporatecontrolovertheprocessesofagriculturaland
foodproductionanddistribution.Globally,thetoptenfoodretailerscontrolnearlyone-quarter
ofthefoodretailmarket.Thetoptenseedcompaniescontrolhalfoftheagrifoodseedmarket.
Andthetoptenpestcompaniescontrol84percentoftheirmarket.
Holt-Giménez(2007)identifiesasimilarpatternofincreasingconcentrationofpowerin
thebiofuelindustry,documentingan800percentincreaseinventurecapitalinthissectorfrom
2004-2007,mostlybyMNCs.Inrelatedagriculturalandenergyindustries,henotesthatCargill
andArcherDanielsMidland(ADM)control65percentoftheglobalgraintrade,whileMonsanto
andSyngentacontrolone-quarterofthegenetechindustry.Holt-Giménez(2007)arguesthat
MNCsareconsolidatingcontrolwithinthevaluechainofproductionandthatalready
‘capitalizationandconcentrationofpowerwithinthebiofuelindustryisextreme’.Hefurther
maintainsthattheseactivitiesareforcingsmalllandholdersoutofmarketsandoffland,and
thatalthoughwecouldimaginethatlandholdersmightbeabletoconsolidateactivitiesrather
thanexitthemarket,theincreasingconcentrationofcorporatepowerrunscountertothe
maintenanceofsmall-scaleproduction.
Ascorporatecontrolincreasesandstateregulatorycapacitydecreasesinmany
industries,corporationshaverespondedtocivilsocietypressureforequitableandsustainable
practicesbydevelopingcorporatesocialresponsibilityinitiatives.Structuresareinplace,for
example,formulti-stakeholderprogramsforsustainabilityinsoyandpalmoil,includingthe
RoundtableonSustainablePalmOil(RSPO2009)andtheRoundTableonResponsibleSoy
(RTRS2009).14Theseinitiativesfocusontheenvironmentalandsocialimpactsoftheindustries.
However,accordingtoanalysescompiledbyUttingandClapp(2008),ingeneral,
private-sectorvoluntaryprogramshavenotprovenparticularlyeffectiveinregulatingactivities
acrosstransnationalcorporations.OversightandimplementationofCSRhavetendedtobe
weak,particularlyintheabsenceofsanctionsfornon-compliance(Ibid,27).Inaddition,onlya
smallpercentageofMNCs,affiliates,andsuppliershaveadoptedCSRprinciples(Ibid,11).
14 The Round Table on Responsible Soy Association involves multiple stakeholders at the international level; specific regional initiatives also exist, such as the efforts of Dutch corporations to promote sustainable soy through the Task Force Sustainable Soy (TFSS 2009).
23
AlthoughsomelegalmechanismshaveemergedtotrytoholdMNCsmoreaccountableinthe
areasofenvironmentalandsocialjustice,thesecorporationshavehighlyskilledlegaladvisors
anddefenseteams(Ibid,119).
GivenUttingandClapp’sanalysis,alongwitharticlesbyothercontributingauthorsin
theireditedbook,theextensionoftheroundtablemodeltobiofuels–with,forexample,the
initiationoftheRoundtableonSustainableBiofuelsin2007–anditscontinuanceinbiofuel
feedstocksectors(soyandoilpalm)wouldseemtoholdonlymodestpotentialtoadvance
moreequitableandecologicallysoundoutcomesforthebiofuelsector.Consumerpressuresfor
sustainablebiofuelsmightalsoinfluenceMNCstobehavemoresustainably.YetstrongMNC
controloftheindustrywithoutstrongstateoversightwouldnotsuggestthisoptimistic
outcomeislikely.Inlightofthealready-concentratedpowerofMNCsintheagrifoodsector,
andthelimitationsofvoluntarisminsustainabilityinitiatives,public-privateandlocal-
multinationalalliancesforbiofuelproductionseemfarmorelikelytofurtherentrench
corporatecontroloftheprocessesofproductionanddistribution,andleadtofurther
environmentaldegradationandsocialinequities.
Atastatelevel,then,emergingeconomieswithestablishedlinkstotheglobalmarket
andsupportiveeconomicinstitutionsmaybenefiteconomicallyfromgrowthinthebiofuel
sector;however,thesebenefitsdonotextendtoalldevelopingcountrieswithfeedstock
productionpotential,particularlythoseenteringthemarketlate,withweakbureaucratic
structures,andwithfewchannelsforsocietalintereststoinfluencegovernancedecisions.
Embeddedautonomy,inEvans’account,focusesonsocietalelites(althoughhenotesthe
broadersocialwelfarebenefitsofstateswithbroadersocialties);forsuccessfuldevelopmental
states,thisraisesthequestionofthedistributionalconsequencesofsuchstate-encouraged
industrialactivity.PetrasandVeltmeyer(2007,372)pointoutthatthe‘capitaliststate...
necessarilyoperatesintheinterestsofcapital’,ratherthantheinterestsofsocietyasawhole.
Inadditiontotherisinginequalitiesamongdevelopingstates,wemustalsoconsiderthe
dynamicswithintheemergingeconomiesthatappeartobewinnersontheglobalbiofuelstage.
Withinthestate–forestpeoples,landtenure,andplantation-basedbiofuelproduction
24
Inadditiontostate-levelvariationandinequalities,intrastatedynamicsarealsoshapingthe
socialandenvironmentalimpactsoftheemergingglobalbiofuelindustry.Discussionsof
sustainabilityforbiofuelstendtofocusontheconsequencesforsmall-scalelandholders,food
security,andnetcarbonemissionsacrossbiofuelfeedstocks.Evenwhenincludingbiodiversity
protectionandlanduseconversion,discussionsdonottendtohighlighttheroleoflandtenure,
non-agriculturalforestcommunities,ortheindirectdeforestationresultingfromdisplacing
communitiesontomarginallands.Asaresult,evenifgovernmentsandlocalcompaniescan
securemeaningfulrolesinallianceswithmultinationalcorporations,andevenifMNCstakeCSR
seriously,thepotentialimpactsofso-calledsustainablebiofuelproductionarestillconcerning.
Inlightofouranalysisofstatesize,timing,bureaucraticstrength,andinternational
marketaccessforagriculturalcommodities,wemightanticipatethatcountrieslikeBrazilwill
achieveatleastsomeoftheproposedbenefitsofbiofueldevelopment.Attheaggregatelevel
thisdoesseemtobeoccurring.Arndtetal.(2009)presentprojectedbenefitsfrombiofuel
investmentinMozambiqueindicatingthecurrenttrajectorywillleadtoanincreaseof0.6%in
annualnationaleconomicgrowthanda6%reductioninpovertyovera12-yearperiod.National
economicgrowthandcorporateprofits,ofcourse,donottranslatedirectlyoreasilyto
equitabledevelopmentwithinacountry,especiallyamongdiversesocialgroups.The
distributionofbenefitsdependsinlargepartonsub-nationalpoliticaldynamics.Inthissection
weassessstate-societalrelations,focusingondifferentiatingsub-nationalcommunities,toshed
furtherlightonwhichgroupsareespeciallyvulnerabletoexpandingbiofuelproduction.
Makingacasefortheneedtoembedanalysiswithinspecifichistoricalcontexts,Taylor
andGarcia-Barrios(1995)arguethat‘globalizedanduniformitarianaggregateanalyses’are
insufficientforassessingthedynamicsofenvironmentalchangeindevelopingcountries.They
considerhowlocalconditionsintersectwithprocessesinthebroaderpoliticaleconomy.In
particular,theyhighlightthestructuresandpoliciesthatinfluencepatternsofdiscrimination
againsttheruralpoor,suchaseducationalopportunitiesandlandtenuresystems.Wefocus
ouranalysisonthelatter.
TaylorandGarcia-Barrios’modelgivesparticularweighttohistoricalpatternsincausal
explanations;specifically,itaimstointegrateregional-specificstudiesintogeneralisedcausal
25
patterns.Tobetterassesstheimpactofthebiofuelindustryonruralpopulations,weusethis
local-globalframeworktoexplorehowpatternsoflandexclusionandconflictinglandrights
claimsintersectwithincreasingpressureonlandfromagriculturalandforestry-basedbiofuel
feedstocks.Weconsequentlyconsider‘theeconomicdimensionsofenvironmental
degradation’(TaylorandGarcia-Barrios1995,24),aswellasthesocialdimensionsofthese
dynamics.Webeginbyassessingtheecologicaltrade-offsofproducingbiofuelfeedstock,then
turntoreflectonlikelysocio-ecologicalimplicationsandoutcomesofincreasingbiofuel
production,inlightofdifferentiatedgroupsofruralagrarianandforestcommunities.
a.Ecologicalimpacts:carbon,biodiversity,andbiofueltrade-offs
Usingbiofuelsasastrategytomitigateclimatechangeandpromotedevelopmentrunsup
againstothereffortstolinkclimatechangemitigationwithdevelopment,suchasprogramslike
reducingemissionsfromdeforestationandforestdegradationplusconservationindeveloping
countries(REDD-plus).REDD-plusinitiatives,spearheadedbycountrieslikePapuaNewGuinea
undertheUNFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC),compensatedeveloping
countriesfinanciallyforsequesteringcarbon.Inrelationtobiofuels,though,Kirschbaum(2003)
stressesthedifficultyofsimultaneouslymanagingaforestforbothcarbonstorageandfuel,
arguingthatstoringcarbonintemporarysinksisunlikelytohavemuchvalueformitigating
climatechange.Hehighlightsthecomplexityofthetrade-offsinvolvedinforestplantations,
notingthelowercapacityofyoungerplantationforeststocontrolerosion,bufferwind,stabilise
slopes,andstorecarbonthanoldernaturalforests(althoughhealsopointsoutthehigherrisk
offorestfiresinolderstands).Healsostressestheimportanceofmanagementforthepotential
ofplantationstostorecarbon.
Similarly,Gibbsetal.(2008)emphasisethelocation-specificimpactsofplantationcrops,
where,forexample,expandingbiofuelfeedstockplantationsintodegradedoralready-
cultivatedareasprovidecarbonsavings,yetdevelopingtheminareasthatonceheldtropical
forestsprovides‘nomeaningfulcarbonbenefits’,andinfactwilllikelyleadtonetcarbon
emissions.Theyraiseconcernsabouttheriskofexpandingagriculturallands,notingthatthe
pasttwodecadeshavealreadyseentropicalforestsclearedforsoyandoilpalmproduction.
26
Reaffirmingtheseconcerns,Danielsenetal.(2009)pointoutthatoilpalmhasalreadyreplaced
over13millionhectaresoftropicalforests(eitherdirectlyorindirectly),largelyinSoutheast
Asia,whileNorrisetal.(2010)concludethatagriculturalexpansionlargelycausedthelossof10
millionhectaresofforestinWestAfricaoverthelastcentury.AnanalysisbyDeFriesetal.
(2010)indicatesalinkbetweenforestlossandtheinternationaldemandforagricultural
productsinthe2000-2005period,whichsuggeststhatinternationalagriculturaltrademay
exacerbatedeforestationpressuresindevelopingcountries,andTrivedietal.(2009)warnthat
theinteractingpressuresofdeforestation,biodiversityandecosystemserviceloss,andclimate
changecouldleadtothelossofhalfoftheAmazonianforestareaby2030.Danielsenetal.
(2009)notetheironythateffortstomeetKyotoProtocolcarbonreductioncommitments
throughbiofuelsmayactuallyspeedupclimatechangethroughcarbonreleasesfromforest
conversion,andmayadditionallyundermineotherenvironmentalcommitments,includingthe
ConventiononBiologicalDiversity.
Turningfromthemoreecologicaltosocialimpacts(althoughweacknowledgethat
theseareinterrelated,particularlygivenboththesocialcausesandtheimpactson
communitiesofenvironmentaldegradation),weobserveequallycomplextrade-offswherethe
benefitsandcostsofbiofuelproductionvaryacrossplaces,biofuelfeedstockcroptypes,and
socialgroups.
b.Socialandeconomicimpacts:historiesofdisplacement
1)State-societyrelations
Biofuelproductionhascontributedtolanduseandlandtenureconflictsinsomeruralareas.15
Onewaytoexaminesuchconflictsoverlanduseistocomparestateversuscommunitycontrol
ofproductionsystems.Inananalysisofcommunityforestryand‘domesticforests’,Michonet
al.(2007)describetheknowledgebylocalfarmersofforestmanagement.Theyadvocatefor
moreequitablerelationsbetweenforestagency‘experts’andfarmersmanagingforest
resourcesontheirownland.Recognizingandrespectingcommunityexpertise,Michonetal.
15 See McMichael (in this volume) for an analysis of the meaning and consequences of this ‘global land grab’ and of the intensification of ‘a long-term process of appropriation of resources by powerful states and firms’.
27
optimisticallyargue,wouldhelppromotesustainablecoexistenceofpeopleandnature(and
helptoavoidatrade-offbetweendevelopmentandconservation).
Theiranalysisisbasedonstatesandsocietyastherelevantdivideinforest
management.Thismaynotreveal,however,thefullpictureofcompetingknowledgesand
practicesinlocalecosystemgovernance.State-societyandrural-urbandichotomiesareoften
insufficientfordescribingtheinterestsofgroupswithinacountry.Mitchell’s(1991)critiqueof
thestate-societydivideishelpfulforstructuringamorecomplexunderstandingofpower
relations,particularlyinthecontextofemergingalliancesoflocalfirms,governments,and
MNCs.Thesealliancesblurthelinebetweenstatesandcertaineconomicgroupswithinthe
state;sustainabilityinitiativesthatinvolvecivilsocietyalsoillustratethedivideswithin‘society’,
associalgroupingsoftendonotrepresentall–orevenmost–peoples’interests.
Theideaofsocietaldisaggregation,andespeciallypeasantdifferentiation,hasarobust
placeintheagrarianpoliticaleconomyliterature,withByres(2009),forexample,tracingthe
historyofthestratificationofpeasantcommunitiesindifferentnationalsettings.Asdefinedby
Wright(2006,144),classexploitationinvolvesnotonlyasymmetricaccesstoproductive
resources(whichhedescribesas‘nonexploitativeeconomicoppression’),butalsothe
appropriationoftheproductsofthelabouroftheexploitedbythosewhocontrolthe
resources.Specifically,thelinkbetweenpropertyrelationsandexploitationisbasedonongoing
interactionsanddependsontheeffortsoftheexploited.Wrightrevealsmultipledimensionsof
classrelations,alongcontinuumsofauthority,skilllevels,ownershipofmeansofproduction,
andtheengagementofpaidlabour.Suchdistinctionsmakeitdifficulttoundertakeasimple
classanalysisbasedon‘proletariat’and‘bourgeoisie’,butreflectimportantsubtledifferences
amonggroupsofsmall-holderandsubsistence-levelruralpeople.Byres(2009,35)identifies
peasantsthroughtheirtiestotheland,coercedrelinquishingofrents,and‘servile’positionin
domesticproductionsystems,wherepeasantshaveasimilarstructuralpositioninthe
economy,butheemphasises‘itiscrucialtonotethatthesepeasantriesaresocially
differentiated’.
DaCorta(2008)similarlynotesthestructuralpositionofpeasants,highlightingtheir
assets-basedvulnerability,inwhichtheyoftenfaceresourcetrade-offs,andthesacrificeof
28
long-termstabilitytosolveshort-termproblems.Theseeconomicdilemmasare,accordingto
daCorta(2008,6),rootedin‘deeplyunequalsocialrelations’,andhaveasomewhatpath-
dependenttrajectory,inwhichthosewithsomematerialandsocialadvantagesbenefitfrom,
andcanmanufactureopportunitiesfor,accumulationduringtimesofeconomicchangesand
crises.Thesedynamicshavebeenseeninthepastwiththeintroductionofnewtechnologies
andpractices;forinstance,Scott(1987)documentstheimpactsofcombinesanddouble-
croppingonthematerialandsocialconditionsofdifferentpeasantgroupsinavillagein
Malaysia.Shiftsinglobalmarketsandopportunities–suchasthesurgeininterestinbiofuels–
thereforeintersectwithlocalsocialrelations,tendingtoyieldthegreatestbenefitstomore
privilegedgroupsandfurtherentrenchingthevulnerabilityofpoorpeople.
Thus,forunderstandingthepotentialconsequencesofbiofuels,dividesamongand
withinsocialgroupsareasrelevantasdividesbetweenthestateandsociety.Mitchell(1991,
77)arguesthattheboundarybetweenthestateandsocietyis‘elusive,porous,andmobile’,
indicatingtheimportanceofassessingthepatternsoforganisationandcontrol–andexclusion
–thatemergeindifferentconfigurationsofpowerrelations.Disaggregatingmorehighly
commercialisedagrarianhouseholdsfrompredominantlysubsistence-levelfarmers,andmore
agrarianfrommoreforest-dependentpeople,16providesusefulinsightsintotheimpactsof
biofuels;italsoillustratesthevariableeconomicbenefitslikelytoaccruetodifferentpeople
evenincountrieswitheffectivegovernments.Developingbiofuels,forexample,maywell
benefitsomeimpoverishedruralgroups,whilefurtherharmingothers.
2)Landtenureconflictsandsocio-ecologicalimpactsofhistoricalpatternsofexclusion
Atthestatelevel,benefitsaccruedfrombiofuelsdepend,tosomeextent,ontheinteraction
amongexistinggovernanceinstitutions,andonrelationshipsamongproducers,industrialists,
andthestate.Theseinstitutionsandnetworksenablesomestatestoadoptnewtechnologies
andenterglobalmarkets.Inthesameway,atthesubnationallevel,theexistingpatternsof
wealth,land,andpowerdistributioninfluencetheabilityofdifferentgroupstoshareinthe
benefitsofnewopportunities.Biofuelshavebeenpresentedasawaytoprovideeconomic16 Noting, as in footnote 3, that these categories are not strictly delineated; for instance, landless households may be more dependent on forest products than land-holding households, as Santra et al. (2008) document.
29
developmenttosmall-scalefarmers.However,historicallegaciesoflandtenureandcontrol
influencethelikelihoodthatruralcommunitiescantakeadvantageoftheseopportunities.The
displacementofcommunitiesforextractiveindustrialactivitiesandforconservationhavebeen
observedinthepast;AdamsandHutton(2007)describethedisplacementofpeopleinEthiopia
andBotswanatoestablishprotectedareas;andMeher(2009)examinesthedisplacementof
tribalpeopleinIndiaforminingprojects.Itisnotastretch,therefore,toconsiderthepotential
displacementofsubsistencefarmers,indigenouscommunities,andothermarginalisedgroups
forbiofueldevelopment.
Landtenureconflictsinvolvenotonlycurrentsocietalrelationships,butemergeoutof
historicalstrugglesforcontrol.Michonetal.(2007)provideadviceforincorporatingcommunity
forestryintostateforestrypractices,requiringstatestonotonlyrecognisetheknowledgeof
localcommunities,butalsotheirrightstothelandandproductsoftheland.However,there
aresubstantialbarrierstoovercomingthesehistories;whileMichonetal.’ssuggestionmaybe
anadvisablestrategytoimproveforestmanagement,itwouldrequiremajorchangesinstate
controloflandresourcesandstaterelationswithmarginalisedsocialgroups.Beyond
accountingforhistoricalstaterelationswithdifferentgroups,Shah’s(2005)workonthe
historicaldisplacementandadaptationoftheindigenousadivasipeopleinIndiaunderscores
theimportanceofconsideringsocietal–andespeciallypeasant–differentiationandrelations.
Shah(2005)analysestheadivasipeoples’geographicandsocialdisruptionbycolonialintrusion,
findingthatmarginalisationisnotonlyaproductofexclusionbythestate,butisalso
perpetuatedandreinforcedbyothersocietalgroups.
Formanyruralhouseholds,landtenureisbynomeanssecure;thuseffortstointegrate
evensmall-scalelandownersintoproductionsystemsstillexcludemanyruralpeople.These
marginalisedpeopletendtohavecomplexrelationshipswiththestateandwiththeecosystems
onwhichtheydepend.Lawloretal.(2009,6-7),forexample,notethatinsomecountries
clearingaforestcanbeawaytoestablishpropertyrightsanddemonstrate‘productivity’.
Althoughthismaybeoneavenueforsecuringlandtenure,inthetropicsitusuallydoesnot
promoteenvironmentalorlong-termeconomicsustainability,becausesuchpropertyrights
30
regimesprovideincentivestodevelopagricultureandplantationsattheexpenseofpreviously
biologically-richforests.
Beyondthelossofforestsfromincentivestoclearlandtosecuretenure,displacingand
resettlingcommunitiesintonewareasalsotendstoincreasepressureonforests.Tropp(2003,
213),forexample,findsthatthedisplacementofindigenouspeopleintheSouthAfricanregion
ofTranskeiancontributedtomoreconflictoverlandandincreasedtheintensityofforest
resourceusebythetransplantedcommunities,astheyconstructednewsettlements.
Moreover,thepatternsofresettlementestablishedduringcolonialtimesinfluencedindigenous
communities’relationswiththestateinthepost-colonialera,providingthebasisforboth
extensivestateinterventionandcompetingnarrativesbyindigenouspeopleonconservation
anddevelopment.
Alongwiththeincreasedsegmentationofruralcommunitiesresultingfromuneven
effectsonforest-basedandagriculturalhouseholds,theremaybeunevenimpactswithin
agrariancommunities.First,theremaybelayeredlevelsofownershipof(andaccessto)land
andforestresourcesthatdonotcorrespondtoofficialpropertyrights,whichcorporate
managementofbiofuelfeedstockproductioncandamage.Forinstance,Rocheleauand
Edmunds(1997,1351)describethegendereddynamicsofpropertyrightsovertrees,
particularlyinAfrica,whichinvolve‘nestedandoverlappingrights’.Theserightsmaybe
negotiablewithinthecommunity,anddifficulttomanagewhenexternalownershipand
productionregimesarefixedratherthanflexible.17Thelackoftenurehasprovendetrimental
forpoorhouseholds’participationinothersustainabledevelopmentinitiatives,too.Boydetal.
(2007),forexample,examineCleanDevelopmentMechanism(CDM)carbonsinkprojectsunder
theUNFCCC,findingthattheprojectstendtoexcludethosewithoutnationallyrecognizedand
sanctionedlandownership–peoplewhotendtobethepoorest.
Second,differentialaccesstolandandcapitalmayinfluencefarmers’abilitiestoinvest
indifferentcrops.Biofuelproductionmayprovideopportunitiesforhigheconomicreturnsfor
somefarmers,as,forexample,McCarthyandZen(2010)reporthappenedwhenthepriceof
17 In the context of biofuels, see Julia and White (in this volume) for an analysis of the impacts of oil palm expansion on a Hibun Dayak community in Indonesia, disaggregated by gender. Additionally, for a more general discussion of gender in agrarian political economy, see Razavi (2009).
31
palmoilwentfrom$570tomorethan$1440permetrictonfrom2007to2008,andas
Richardson(inthisvolume)documentswhentheworldpriceforsugarreacheda30-yearhigh
inAugust2009.However,potentialreturnscanvarywidelyacrossbiofuelfeedstockcrops,and
mayprovepolarisingasland-andcapital-poorcommunitymembersfindthemselvesunableto
capitaliseontheseopportunities.Intermsofvariationacrossfeedstocks,Jatropha,for
example,isestimatedtobetwiceaslandintensiveassugarforbiofuels,butsugaristhree
timesmorecapitalintensive(Arndtetal.2009).Consequently,farmerswithgreaterinitial
accesstocapitalcaninvestinsugarcanecropsthathaveahigherreturnperunitofland,while
thoselackingsuchfundsmaybeexcludedfromtheseopportunities.
Third,theroleofriskinbiofuelproductionisrelevanttothisunevennesswithinagrarian
communities.Despitehighpricesforpalmoilandsugar,McCarthyandZen(2010)and
Richardson(inthisvolume)notethevolatilityofthesecommodityprices.Althoughatvarious
timesreturnsfromsomecropsmaybehigh,farmersmaybefacedwithbearingthecostsof
failedefforts,andthosealreadylivingatthemarginscanfindthemselvesunabletotakesuch
risks.Scott(1976),inTheMoralEconomyofthePeasant,highlightsthetrade-offssubsistence
farmersfacebetweeneconomicreturnsandriskaversion,wherehigherfinancialrewardsare
foregoneinfavouroflessriskyinvestmentsforthosewhohavelittlecapacitytobufferlosses.
Althoughsomeeconometricstudieschallengetheseassumptionsofrisk-aversionbypoor
farmers(see,forinstance,HenrichandMcElreath2002,andRoumasset2008),severalstudies
provideevidencethatlow-incomehouseholdsallocategreaterfinancialandlabourresourcesto
low-risk,low-returncrops(seeVargasHill2009forabriefsurveyandananalysisofUgandan
coffeeproduction).Wegren(2008)demonstratestheimpactofeconomicstatusonrisk-
aversioninRussia,suggestingtheneedforadifferentiatedassessmentofdecisionmaking
basedonrisk-takingtendencies.NelsonandGalvez(2000)assessthesocialimpactsofthe
cocoaindustry,andcautionthat,evenwithfairtradeschemes,agriculturalproductionthat
focusesonasinglecommodityposemanydangers.Asingle-cropfocus,forexample,can
increasetheriskforproducerswhogiveupdiversifiedinvestmentactivities;itcanalso
marginalisethemostvulnerableproducerswithoutliquidassetsandreservefundswhoare
unabletoreducediversityandthereforecannottakeadvantageofmarketopenings.
32
Unlikelypositiveagriculture-industrysynergiesforbiofuels
Manyresearchershavereflectedonpossiblestrategiesformoresustainablebiofuel
production,withsolutionsrangingfromtheuseofalternate(andespeciallynon-food)
feedstocks(e.g.,Regalbuto2009),tofosteringsynergiesbetweenagricultureandindustry(e.g.,
Kay2009),topromotingmoreopenandextensiveNorth-Southtrade(e.g.,Mathews2007).
However,althoughtheseinitiativesaddresssomeofthetrade-offsamongfoodsecurity,energy
security,andbiodiversityprotection–thetrilemma,inTilmanetal.’s(2009)description–for
landlessandnon-agrarianruralpeoplesthesedonotsolve,andmayevenexacerbate,the
problemsthatindustrialandglobalisedbiofuelproductioncauseforlandrightsandland
tenure.
Somepoliciesandactionsforrenewableenergyhavethepotentialtobenefitsmall-
scalefarmers,promotesecond-andthird-generationbiofuels,andencouragetheuseof
marginallandsratherthanfood-producingagriculturalfieldsforbiofuelfeedstocks.Replacing
mixedforestswithoilpalmplantations(replacingforestswithplantations,preventingnet
deforestation)andofmarginalcroplandwithJatrophaandswitchgrasses(turningunproductive
areas,ratherthanagriculturalfields,intofeedstockproductionlands),mayreducetheimpact
onfoodcropsandthedirectcarbonfootprintofresultingbiofuels.Althoughplantationforests
rarely,ifever,replicatetheecologicalandbiologicalvalueofnaturalforests,theycanprovide
someecologicalbenefits,whichvarydependingontheextenttowhichtheyaremonocultures,
introduceexoticandinvasivespecies,andhavevariationintheirunderstories(Rudeletal.
2005).
Regalbuto(2009)considersthepotentialforwoodybiomass-basedbiofuels,which
wouldreduceconcernsaboutfoodbeingusedforfuel.Tilmanetal.’s(2009,271)trilemmaof
food,energy,andenvironmentaddressesthetrade-offsbetweenagriculturallandandfood
production,greenhousegasreductions,andbiodiversity.Inresponsetothesechallenges,they
advisethat‘Threestepsshouldbetaken:meaningfulscience-basedenvironmentalsafeguards
shouldbeadopted,arobustbiofuelindustryshouldbeenabled,andthosewhohaveinvested
infirst-generationbiofuelsshouldhaveaviablepathforward’.
33
However,thefailureofsomefairtradesystemstoprotectthelivelihoodsofthemost
vulnerablepeople,asNelsonandGalvez(2000)document,raisesconcernsabouttheabilityof
sustainabilityinitiativesinthebiofuelsectortoprotectenvironmentalandsocialwell-being.
Eventhoughsomesustainabilitypathwaysforbiofuelsconsiderfoodandfuel,manystillleave
outquestionsoflanduseconversionfromintactordiversestandingforests,aswellas
questionsoflandrightsofresidentcommunitiesthatincreasedproductionmaydisplace.The
indirecteffectsofpromotingbiofuelsmaythereforestillprovetobeecologicallyandsocially
destructive,andunderminetheoptimisticprojectionsofcombiningeconomicdevelopment
withsocialequalityandenvironmentalprotection.Suchsustainabilitymeasures,iftheyignore
contentiouslandtenureclaimsandhistoricalpatternsofexclusion,areunlikelytopreventthe
furtherdisplacementofcommunitiesfrommarginallands.
Steward’s(2007)criticalanalysisof‘sustainablesoy’inBrazil,forinstance,pointstothe
differingwaysactorsandstakeholdersinterpretforestuseandsustainablepractices.
ConservationNGOs,agriculturalfirms,andthestatehavedifferentviews,forexample,on
forestvaluesandappropriateusethandolocalsmall-scalefarmers(or‘colonos’).AsTropp
(2003)discoveredinSouthAfrica,Stewardfindsthatcurrentlandusepracticesandrelations
areaproductofthearea’ssettlementhistory,andthelegacyofcolonialcontroloverland.The
dominantstateandmainstreamNGOdiscoursesondevelopment,sheargues,deniestherole
oflocalfarmersinsustainingandpromotingecologicaldiversityandignoresthematrixof
agriculturallandandsecondaryforeststhattheymaintain.Thesefarmers’consequent
exclusionfromdevelopmentplansfurtherentrenchespovertywithinthesecommunities.
Thesedynamicsofdeforestationandenvironmentalprotectionfurtherillustratethe
complexityofdisplacedandmarginalisedpeoples’relationshipswiththeforests,thestate,and
withinsociety.Lawloretal.(2009)highlightthiscomplexityformitigatingclimatechange.
Analyzingthereductionofemissionsfromdeforestationandlanddegradation,theyfind,in
additiontoinsecurepropertyrightsforforestpeople,manyproblemswiththeproposed
emissionsreductionprogramsandpaymentsforavoideddeforestation,includinglimitedpublic
participationinforestandrevenuemanagement,andcorruption.Thesepotentialproblems
34
bothparallelandaugmenttheonesinthebiofuelsector,underminingeffortstopromote
sociallyandenvironmentallysustainablebiofuels.
Competingdiscoursesaroundbiofueldevelopmentnowcontestthemeaningsof
sustainablebiofuels,althoughgenerallythesedebatesareframedintermsoffoodsecurityand
opportunitiesforsmall-scalelandowners,butnotinthebroadercontextoflandrightsand
indigenouspeoples’displacement.Withahistoryofantagonisticrelationsbetweenmanystates
and‘their’indigenouspeoples,thenewalliancesamongpublicandprivateinvestorsand
producersofbiofuels,especiallybetweenMNCsandgovernmentsandlocalfirmsintheglobal
South,thusseempoisedtoreinforcepatternsofexclusionandmarginalisationratherthan
achieveanylastingenvironmentalandsocialgains.
Conclusions
MNCs,asthetrajectoryoftheemergingglobalbiofuelindustryshows,arepoisedtoincrease
theircontroloverthenextfewyearsovertheproductionanddistributionofbiofuels,
particularlyfrommajorfeedstockslikecorn,sugarcane,soy,andoilpalm.Thehistoriesofthe
globalpoliticaleconomiesofrelatedagriculture,energy,andforestrysectorssuggestthisis
likely,especiallygiventheconsolidationofcontrolovertheproductionandexportofthese
feedstockcropsbyagriculturalMNCslikeADM,Cargill,andothers.Ifthebiofuelindustrydoes
followthepathofthesesectors,stateswithweakbureaucraticcapacitylooksettolosecontrol
ofpartnershipsbetweenlocalfirmsandMNCs,furtherentrenchingthepowerofMNCsinthe
agrifood,forestry,andenergysectors.Intheabsenceofstateoversight,voluntarymeasures
seemunlikelytorealisethepositivepotentialofbiofuels,especiallygivenpastfailuresofCSRto
enhancesustainabilityintheagrifoodandforestrysectors.Moreover,evenwhereeconomic
benefitsextendbeyondMNCs,anybenefitswillaccrueunevenlyinruralcommunities,with
small-scalefarmers,peoplewithinsecurelandrights,and–especially–indigenousforest
peopleslargelyleftoutorevenharmed,particularlybyindustrial-scaleandplantation-based
productionoffeedstockcrops.
Ouranalysisoftheroleofbiofuelalliancesandcoalitionscontributestothetheoretical
debatesinglobalandagrarianpoliticaleconomy.First,atthestatelevel,ourfindingssuggest
35
thataggregateeconomicbenefitsfrombiofuelswillmorelikelyaccruetodevelopingcountries
thatenterbiofuelmarketsearlyandthathaveexistingexport-orientedsectorstochannel
biofuelsmoreeffectivelyintotheglobalmarket.Thiswillbemosteasilyaccomplishedwith
cropsalreadyunderlarge-scaleproductioninthosecountries,likeoilpalmandsugar,andcrops
thatareefficientlyproducedthroughplantationorlargemonocropprocesses.Stateswithlarge
internalmarketstobufferagainsttherisksofcompetinginternationallywillalsobenefitmore
easily.So,too,willstateswithstrongadministrativecapacityinagrifood,forestry,andenergy,
asthesestateswillhavemoreopportunitiesandfewerbarrierstotakingadvantageofglobal
opportunitiestodevelopbiofuels.Theseopportunitiesarethenlikelytoreinforcetheeconomic
andpoliticalpowerofemergingeconomiesoftheSouth.
Second,byhighlightingstate-societyrelations,particularlydrawingonrecentworkin
agrarianstate-societyrelations,ouranalysiscontributestounderstandingtheconsequences
withincountriesofdevelopingbiofuels.Weanalysedtheframingofdebatesonsustainable
biofuelsatthedomesticlevel,drawingattentiontomarginalisedcommunitiesthatstateand
corporatenarrativestendtoexclude.Wethenlinkedthepatternsofexclusioninthese
relationstohistoriesofdisplacementandlandtenureconflictinforestryandagriculture,
particularlythroughthedesignationoflandasmarginaloridle.Althoughfoodsecurityisan
importantdimensionofthesedebates,wehavedemonstratedthatthedevelopmentof
commercialbiofuelsraisesequallycriticalconcernsforlandrights,forestaccess,andnon-
agrarianlivelihoods.
Ourfindingsfurtheraddcautionarynotestothesustainabilityofso-calledsustainable
biofuels,aswellasthevalueofmoreopenmarketsforbiofuelsfromtheSouth.Somefield
studiessuggestthatsomefarmersandcommunitiesmaybenefitfromthedevelopmentofnew
anddiversifiedmarketsforagriculturalcommoditiesandfromlocalenergyproduction.Small-
scaleproductionandcooperativeefforts,inwhichfarmersmaintaincontroloftheircropsand
land,couldwellcontributetoeconomicstabilityandimprovedlivelihoods.However,the
increasingcorporatecontrolofindustrial-scalebiofuelproductionanddistributionprocesses
putsintodoubttheabilityofthesectortoachievewidespreadpositiveresultsforthepoor.The
distributionalconsequencesofbiofuelproductionappearsettoleavebehindthosestates–and
36
especiallygroupswithinstates–thatarealreadyatadisadvantageintheinternationalsystem.
Theproductionandconsumptionpatternsofbiofuelswillbenefit,attheinternationallevel,
stateswithexistingexperiencesofsuccessintheglobaleconomy,and,atthedomesticlevel,
groupsalreadyintegratedintocommercialproductionsystems.Statesandruralandindigenous
peoplealreadystrugglingtocopewithglobalisedmarketsandindustrialisedproductionwillbe
leftevenfurtherbehind,withevenwell-intentionedeffortstomitigateclimatechangeand
supportdevelopmentthroughbiofuelslikelytoacceleratedeforestationandfurther
marginalisevulnerablepeopleandecosystems.
ReferencesAccenture.2008.‘Irrationalexuberance’?Anassessmentofhowtheburgeoningbiofuelsmarketcan
enablehighperformance:Asupplyperspective.AccentureConsulting.Acemoglu,D.andJ.Robinson.2009.Foundationsofsocietalinequality.Science,326(30October),678-
679.Achten,W.M.J.,W.H.Maes,R.Aerts,L.Verchot,A.Trabucco,E.Mathijs,V.P.SinghandB.Muys.2010.
Jatropha:Fromglobalhypetolocalopportunity.JournalofAridEnvironments,74(1),164-165.Adams,W.M.andJ.Hutton.2007.People,parksandpoverty:politicalecologyandbiodiversity
conservation.ConservationandSociety,5(2),147-183.Akram-Lodhi,A.H.2007.Land,marketsandneoliberalenclosure:anagrarianpoliticaleconomy
perspective.ThirdWorldQuarterly,28(8),1437-1456.Amin,A.andR.Palan.2001.Towardsanon-rationalistinternationalpoliticaleconomy.Reviewof
InternationalPoliticalEconomy,8(4),559-577.Antkiewicz,A.andJ.Whalley.2006.BRICSAMandthenon-WTO.ReviewofInternationalOrganizations,
1(3),237-261.Ariza-Montobbio,P.,S.Lélé,J.Martinez-AlierandG.Kallis.2010.ThepoliticalecologyofJatrophacurcas
plantationsforbiodieselinTamilNadu:asocio-ecologicalfailurewithunevenconsequences.JournalofPeasantStudies,37(3).
Arndt,C.,R.Benfica,F.Tarp,J.ThurlowandR.Uaiene.2009.Biofuels,poverty,andgrowth:acomputablegeneralequilibriumanalysisofMozambique.EnvironmentandDevelopmentEconomics,15,81–105.
AssociatedPress(AP).2008.WhiteHousedefendsfood-basedbiofuels:administrationbackingdecisionasfoodcostsriseathomeandabroad[online].MSNBC-Politics,May19.Availablefrom:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24715112/[Accessed30August2009].
Bates,R.2008.Whenthingsfellapart:statefailureinlate-centuryAfrica.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Belcher,B.andK.Schreckenberg.2007.Commercialisationofnon-timberforestproducts:arealitycheck.DevelopmentPolicyReview,25(3),355-377.
Bernstein,H.2009.V.I.LeninandA.V.Chayanov:lookingback,lookingforward.JournalofPeasantStudies,36(1),55-81.
Borras,Jr.,S.M.2009.Agrarianchangeandpeasantstudies:changes,continuitiesandchallenges–anintroduction.TheJournalofPeasantStudies,36(1),5-31.
37
Boyd,E.,M.GutierrezandM.Chang.2007.Small-scaleforestcarbonprojects:AdaptingCDMtolow-incomecommunities.GlobalEnvironmentalChange,17(2),250-259.
Broegaard,R.J.2005.LandtenureinsecurityandinequalityinNicaragua.DevelopmentandChange,36(5),845–864.
Byres,T.J.2009.Thelandlordclass,peasantdifferentiation,classstruggleandthetransitiontocapitalism:England,FranceandPrussiacompared.JournalofPeasantStudies,36(1),33-54.
Campbell,H.2008.ChinainAfrica:challengingUSglobalhegemony.ThirdWorldQuarterly,29(1),89-105.
Chakrabortty,A.2008.Secretreport:biofuelcausedfoodcrisis–InternalWorldBankstudydeliversblowtoplantenergydrive[online].TheGuardian,July4.Availablefrom:http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/jul/03/biofuels.renewableenergy[Accessed10August2008].
Clapp,J.andD.Fuchs,eds.2009.Corporatepoweringlobalagrifoodgovernance.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.
Cooper,A.F.,A.AntkiewiczandT.M.Shaw.2007.Lessonsfrom/forBRICSAMaboutSouth–Northrelationsatthestartofthe21stcentury:economicsizetrumpsallelse?InternationalStudiesReview,9,673-689.
DaCorta,L.2008.Thepoliticaleconomyofagrarianchange:dinosaurorphoenix?QueenElizabethHouseWorkingPaperSeries,QEHWPS174,WorkingPaperNumber174.UniversityofOxford.
Danielsen,F.,etal.2009.Biofuelsplantationsonforestedlands:doublejeopardyforbiodiversityandclimate.ConservationBiology,23(2),348-358.
Dauvergne,P.1997.Shadowsintheforest:JapanandthepoliticsoftimberinSoutheastAsia.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.
Dauvergne,P.1998a.WeakandstrongstatesinAsia-Pacificsocieties.Sydney:AllenandUnwin.Dauvergne,P.1998b.ThepoliticaleconomyofIndonesia’s1997forestfires.AustralianJournalof
InternationalAffairs,52(1),13-17.Dauvergne,P.2001.LoggersanddegradationintheAsia-Pacific:corporationsandenvironmental
management.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Dauvergne,P.andK.J.Neville.2009.ThechangingNorth-SouthandSouth-Southpoliticaleconomyof
biofuels.ThirdWorldQuarterly,30(6):1087-1102.Davis,C.2007.March2007monthlyupdate:globalbiofueltrends[online].WorldResourcesInstitute,
EarthTrendsEnvironmentalInformation.Availablefrom:http://earthtrends.wri.org/updates/node/180[Accessed6January2009].
DeFries,R.S.,T.Rudel,M.UriarteandM.Hansen.2010.Deforestationdrivenbyurbanpopulationgrowthandagriculturaltradeinthetwenty-firstcentury.NatureGeoscience,3,178-181.
Donald,P.F.2004.Biodiversityimpactsofsomeagriculturalcommodityproductionsystems.ConservationBiology,18(1),29.
Evans,P.1995.Embeddedautonomy:statesandindustrialtransformation.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.
Fargione,J.,etal.2008.Landclearingandthebiofuelcarbondebt.Science,319(5867),1235-1238.Forge,F.2007.Biofuels–anenergy,environmentaloragriculturalpolicy?[online].LibraryofParliament,
ParliamentaryInformationandResearchService,ScienceandTechnologyDivision,8February.Availablefrom:http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0637-e.pdf[Accessed7January2009].
Franco,J.,L.Goldfarb,M.Hoenicke,M.L.MendoncaandD.Fig.2010.InterrogatingEuropeanUnionbiofuelspolicy:(drivers,assumptions,visions,andimpacts)withcasestudiesfromGermany,BrazilandMozambique.JournalofPeasantStudies,37(3).
38
GibbsH.K.,etal.2008.Carbonpaybacktimesforcrop-basedbiofuelexpansioninthetropics:theeffectsofchangingyieldandtechnology[online].EnvironmentalResearchLetters,3(3).Availablefrom:http://www.iop.org/EJ/article/1748-9326/3/3/034001/erl8_3_034001.html[Accessed27August2009].
Goldemberg,J.2007.Ethanolforasustainableenergyfuture.Science,315(5813),808-810.Gropas,M.2006.Landscape,revolutionandpropertyregimesinruralHavana.JournalofPeasant
Studies,33(2),248-277.Henrich,J.andR.McElreath.2002.Arepeasantsrisk-aversedecisionmakers?CurrentAnthropology,
43(1),172-181.Holt-Giménez,E.2007.Displacedpeasants,higherfoodprices,andacrutchforthepetrolindustry
[online].GlobalPolicyForum.Availablefrom:www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/212/45389.html[Accessed27August2009].
Holt-Giménez,E.andA.Shattuck.2009.Theagrofuelstransition:Restructuringplacesandspacesintheglobalfoodsystem.BulletinofScienceTechnologySociety,29(3),180-188.
Hunsberger,C.2010.‘Thisplantcanchangelives’:SmallfarmerandotherstakeholderperspectivesonJatrophacurcasinKenya.JournalofPeasantStudies,37(3).
Julia,(Kam)andB.White2010.Expropriationandincorporation:genderedpoliticsofoilpalmexpansioninaDayakHibuncommunityinWestKalimantan.JournalofPeasantStudies,37(3).
Kay,C.2009.Developmentstrategiesandruraldevelopment:exploringsynergies,eradicatingpoverty.JournalofPeasantStudies,36(1),103-137.
Kirschbaum,M.U.F.2003.Tosinkorburn?Adiscussionofthepotentialcontributionsofforeststogreenhousegasbalancesthroughstoringcarbonorprovidingbiofuels.BiomassandBioenergy,24(4-5),297-310.
Krasner,S.D.1976.Statepowerandthestructureoftheinternationaltradingsystem.WorldPolitics,28(3),317-43.
Kurdusiewicz,I.andG.Wandesforde-Smith.2008.Burstingthebiofuelbubble:comparativedynamicsoftransitionstofreedomfromoil.Conferencepaperforthe49thAnnualMeetingoftheInternationalStudiesAssociation,SanFrancisco,California,26-29March2008.
Lawlor,K.,L.P.OlanderandE.Weinthal.2009.Sustaininglivelihoodswhilereducingemissionsfromdeforestation:optionsforpolicymakers.WorkingPaperNIWP09-02.NicholasInstituteforEnvironmentalPolicySolutions,DukeUniversity.
LuladaSilva,L.I.2007.StatementofBrazilatthegeneraldebateofthe62ndSessionoftheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly[online].NewYork,September25.Availablefrom:www.un.org/webcast/ga/62/2007/pdfs/brazil-en.pdf[Accessed31August2009].
LuladaSilva,L.I.2008.StatementattheFAOhigh-levelconferenceonworldfoodsecurity:thechallengesofclimatechangeandbioenergy.Rome,Italy,June3.
Martin,W.G.2008.Africa’sfutures:fromNorth-SouthtoEast-South?ThirdWorldQuarterly,29(2),339-356.
Martins,J.de.S.2002.Representingthepeasantry?Strugglesfor/aboutlandinBrazil.JournalofPeasantStudies,29(3),300-335.
Mathews,J.A.2007.Biofuels:whatabiopactbetweenNorthandSouthcouldachieve.EnergyPolicy,35,3550–3570.
Mathews,J.A.andH.Goldsztein.2009.Capturinglatecomeradvantagesintheadoptionofbiofuels:thecaseofArgentina.EnergyPolicy,37,326-337.
McCarthy,J.2007.ShiftingresourceentitlementsandgovernancereformduringtheagrariantransitioninSumatra,Indonesia.JournalofLegalPluralism,55,95-121.
McCarthy,J.2010.Theoilpalmquestion:biofuels,oilpalmandagrarianchangeinEastSumatra.JournalofPeasantStudies,37(3).
39
McCarthy,J.F.andR.A.Cramb.2009.Policynarratives,landholderengagement,andoilpalmexpansionontheMalaysianandIndonesianfrontiers.TheGeographicalJournal,175(2),112-123.
McCarthy,J.andZ.Zen.2010.Regulatingtheoilpalmboom:assessingtheeffectivenessofenvironmentalgovernanceapproachestoagro-industrialpollutioninIndonesia.Law&Policy,32(1),153-179.
McMichael,P.2009.Afoodregimegenealogy.JournalofPeasantStudies,36(1),139-169.McMichael,P.2010.Thepricelessnatureofagrofuels.JournalofPeasantStudies,37(3).Meher,R.2009.Globalization,displacementandthelivelihoodissuesoftribalandagriculture
dependentpoorpeople:thecaseofmineral-basedindustriesinIndia.JournalofDevelopingSocieties,25(4),457-480.
Michon,G.,H.DeForesta,P.LevangandF.Verdeaux.2007.Domesticforests:anewparadigmforintegratinglocalcommunities’forestryintotropicalforestscience[online].EcologyandSociety,12(2),1.Availablefrom:http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art1/[Accessed27August2009].
Migdal,J.S.1988.Strongsocietiesandweakstates:state-societyrelationsandstatecapabilitiesintheThirdWorld.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.
Mitchell,T.1991.Thelimitsofthestate:beyondstatistapproachesandtheircritics.TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview,85(1),77-96.
Moreira,J.R.,L.A.H.NogueiraandV.Parente.2005.Biofuelsfortransport,development,andclimatechange:LessonsfromBrazil,chapter3inGrowinginthegreenhouse:protectingtheclimatebyputtingdevelopmentfirst[online],K.A.Baumertetal.,WorldResourcesInstitute.Availablefrom:http://pdf.wri.org/gig_chapter3.pdf[Accessed30August2009].
Nelson,V.andM.Galvez.2000.Socialimpactofethicalandconventionalcocoatradingonforest-dependentpeopleinEcuador.NaturalResourcesandEthicalTradeProgramme,NaturalResourcesInstitute,UniversityofGreenwich.
Norris,K.,A.Asase,B.Collen,J.Gockowksi,J.Mason,B.PhalanandA.Wade.2010.Biodiversityinaforest-agriculturemosaic:thechangingfaceofWestAfricanrainforests.BiologicalConservation(inpress).
Novo,A.,K.Jansen,M.SlingerlandandK.Giller.2010.Biofuel,dairyproductionandbeefinBrazil:competingclaimsonlanduseinSaoPaulostate.JournalofPeasantStudies,37(3).
Parayil,G.andF.Tong.1998.Pasture-ledtologging-leddeforestationintheBrazilianAmazon:thedynamicsofsocio-environmentalchange.GlobalEnvironmentalChange,8(1),63-79.
Peluso,N.L.1996.Fruittreesandfamilytreesinananthropogenicforest:ethicsofaccess,propertyzones,andenvironmentalchangeinIndonesia.ComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory,38(3),510-548.
Peluso,N.L.andP.Vandergeest.2001.GenealogiesofthepoliticalforestandcustomaryrightsinIndonesia,Malaysia,andThailand.TheJournalofAsianStudies,60(3),761-812.
Petras,J.andH.Veltmeyer.2007.The'developmentstate'inLatinAmerica:whosedevelopment,whosestate?JournalofPeasantStudies,34(3),371-407.
Pimentel,D.2003.Ethanolfuels:Energybalance,economics,andenvironmentalimpactsarenegative.NaturalResourcesResearch,12(2),127-134.
Pimentel,D.andT.W.Patzek.2005.Ethanolproductionusingcorn,switchgrass,andwood:biodieselproductionusingsoybeanandsunflower.NaturalResourcesResearch,14(1),65-76.
PinKoh,L.andD.S.Wilcove.2007.Cashinginpalmoilforconservation.Nature,448,993–994.Punter,G.,etal.2004.Well-to-wheelevaluationforproductionofethanolfromwheat[online].FWG-P-
04-024,LowCarbonVehiclePartnershipFuelsWorkingGroup,WellToWheelSub-Group.Availablefrom:http://www.lowcvp.org.uk/assets/viewpoints/Biofuels%20WTW%20final%20report.pdf[Accessed31August2009].
40
Putnam,R.D.1993.Makingdemocracywork:civictraditionsinmodernItaly.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.
Pye,O.2010.Thebiofuelconnection–transnationalactivismandthepalmoilboom.JournalofPeasantStudies,37(3).
Roumasset,J.2008.Anewinstitutionalapproachtopro-pooragriculturaldevelopment:lessonsfromAsia.JournalofAsianEconomics,19,378–388.
Razavi,S.2009.Engenderingthepoliticaleconomyofagrarianchange.JournalofPeasantStudies,36(1),197-226.
Regalbuto,J.R.2009.Cellulosicbiofuels–gotgasoline?Science,325,822-824.Richardson,B.2010.TradeandtransformationinSouthernAfrica:aPolanyianreadingofsugarcane
exports.JournalofPeasantStudies,37(3).Righelato,R.andD.V.Spracklen.2007.Carbonmitigationbybiofuelsorbysavingandrestoringforests?
Science,17,902.Ringwald,A.2006.CouldsustainableinvestmentindevelopingcountriesaddressEurope’s‘biodiesel
famine’?YaleSchoolofForestryandEnvironmentalStudies,Master’sThesis.Rocheleau,D.andD.Edmunds.1997.Women,menandtrees:gender,powerandpropertyinforestand
agrarianlandscapes.WorldDevelopment,25(8),1351-1371.RoundTableonResponsibleSoy(RTRS).2009.RoundtableonResponsibleSoyAssociation:whoweare
[online].Availablefrom:http://www.responsiblesoy.org/[Accessed27August2009].RoundtableonSustainablePalmOil(RSPO).2009.Promotingthegrowthanduseofsustainablepalmoil
[online].Availablefrom:http://www.rspo.org/[Accessed27August2009].Rudel,T.K.,etal.2005.Foresttransitions:towardsaglobalunderstandingoflandusechange.Global
EnvironmentalChange,15,23-31.Saikia,A.2008.ForestlandandpeasantstrugglesinAssam,2002-2007.JournalofPeasantStudies,
35(1),39-59.Santra,A.K.,A.K.SamantaandS.Pan.2008.ForestbasedeconomicdependencyoffarmersinSouth
WestBengal.EnvironmentandEcology,26(4),1598-1601.Scharlemann,J.P.W.andW.F.Laurance.2008.Howgreenarebiofuels?Science,319(5859),43-44.Scoones,I.2009.Livelihoodsperspectivesandruraldevelopment.JournalofPeasantStudies,36(1),171-
196.Scott,J.C.1976.Themoraleconomyofthepeasant:rebellionandsubsistenceinSoutheastAsia.New
Haven:YaleUniversityPress.Scott,J.C.1987.Weaponsoftheweak:everydayformsofpeasantresistance.NewHaven:Yale
UniversityPress.Shah,M.2005.Firstyoupushthemin,thenyouthrowthemout.EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,
November19,4895-4899.Smith,J.,K.Obidzinski,SubarudiandI.Suramenggala.2003.Illegallogging,collusivecorruptionand
fragmentedgovernmentsinKalimantan,Indonesia.InternationalForestryReview,5(3),293-302.Steward,C.2007.Fromcolonizationto‘‘environmentalsoy’’:acasestudyofenvironmentalandsocio-
economicvaluationintheAmazonsoyfrontier.AgricultureandHumanValues,24,107–122.Sumner,A.2008.Foreigndirectinvestmentindevelopingcountries:havewereachedapolicy‘tipping
point’?ThirdWorldQuarterly,29(2),239-253.Supachai,P.2008.South-Southtrade[online].PaperbytheSecretary-GeneralofUNCTAD,Istanbul,June
3.Availablefrom:www.developing8.org/2008/06/03/southsouth-trade-paper-by-sg-unctad-secretary[Accessed7January2009].
TaskForceSustainableSoy(TFSS).2009.Thetaskforcesustainablesoy[online].Availablefrom:http://www.taskforcesustainablesoy.org/index.php[Accessed27August2009].
41
Taylor,P.andR.García-Barrios.1995.Thesocialanalysisofecologicalchange:fromsystemstointersectingprocesses.SocialScienceInformation,34(1),5-30.
Tilman,D.,etal.2009.Beneficialbiofuels–thefood,energy,andenvironmenttrilemma.Science,325,270-271.
Trivedi,M.R.,A.W.Mitchell,N.Mardas,C.Parker,J.E.WatsonandA.D.Nobre.2009.REDDandPINC:Anewpolicyframeworktofundtropicalforestsasglobal‘eco-utilities’.IOPConferenceSeries:EarthandEnvironmentalScience,8,availablefrom:http://iopscience.iop.org/1755-1315/8/1/012005/pdf/1755-1315_8_1_012005.pdf.
Tropp,J.2003.Displacedpeople,replacednarratives:forestconflictsandhistoricalperspectivesintheTsolodistrict,Transkei.JournalofSouthernAfricanStudies,29(1),207-233.
USDepartmentofState(USDS).2008.JointstatementbyUnitedStatesandBrazilonenergysecurity[online].OfficeoftheSpokesman.Availablefrom:http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/November/20081120140136eaifas0.879513.html[Accessed30August2009].
Utting,P.andJ.Clapp,eds.2008.Corporateaccountabilityandsustainabledevelopment.Delhi:OxfordUniversityPress.
Vandergeest,P.andN.L.Peluso.2006a.Empiresofforestry:professionalforestryandstatepowerinSoutheastAsia,Part1.EnvironmentandHistory,12,31-64.
Vandergeest,P.andN.L.Peluso.2006b.Empiresofforestry:professionalforestryandstatepowerinSoutheastAsia,Part2.EnvironmentandHistory,12,359–393.
VargasHill,R.2009.Usingstatedpreferencesandbeliefstoidentifytheimpactofriskonpoorhouseholds.JournalofDevelopmentStudies,45(2),151-171.
Vedeld,P.,A.Angelsen,J.Bojö,E.SjaastadandG.K.Berg.2007.Forestenvironmentalincomesandtheruralpoor.ForestPolicyandEconomics,9,869–879.
Vel,J.2010.JatrophainEasternIndonesia:thecommoditizationofanalternativebiofuelcropformarginalareas.JournalofPeasantStudies,37(3).
Wegren,S.K.2008.Typologiesofhouseholdrisk-taking:contemporaryruralRussiaasacasestudy.WorkshoppaperfortheAgrarianStudiesColloquium,YaleUniversity,22February2008.
Wilkinson,J.andS.Herrera.2010.BiofuelsinBrazil:debatesandimpacts.JournalofPeasantStudies,37(3).
Wright,E.O.2006.Classanalysis.In:R.F.Levine,ed.Socialclassandstratification:classicstatementsandtheoreticaldebates,2nded.Lanham,MD:RowmanandLittlefield,pp.143-166.
PeterDauvergneisProfessorofPoliticalScience,CanadaResearchChairinGlobalEnvironmentalPolitics,andDirectoroftheLiuInstituteforGlobalIssuesattheUniversityofBritishColumbia.Hehaspublished7books,2monographs,andover50articles.Hisrecentbook,TheShadowsofConsumption(MITPress),wonthe2009GeraldL.YoungAward,presentedbytheSocietyofHumanEcologyforthebestbookauthoredin2008inthefieldofhumanecology.KateJ.NevilleisaPhDstudentintheDepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofBritishColumbia.SheholdsaBachelorofSciencedegreeinBiologyfromQueen’sUniversityandaMaster’sofEnvironmentalSciencefromYaleUniversity.Herlatestpublication(withPeterDauvergne)is‘TheChangingNorth-SouthandSouth-SouthPoliticalEconomyofBiofuels’,ThirdWorldQuarterly30(6)(2009):1087–1102.Correspondingauthor:PeterDauvergne,LiuInstituteforGlobalIssues,UniversityofBritishColumbia,6476NWMarineDrive,Vancouver,BC,V6T1Z2,Canada.Email:[email protected].